3 Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt in Nusantara The Past and Present

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Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara:The Past And Present

Umar Faruk Assegaf1

1Faculty of Asian Studies Australian National University,Australia. Email: [email protected]

AbstractThe existence of Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt in the archipelago could

be traced back to the first time Islam entering Indonesia.

Evidently, a number of religious symbols and practices in the

country seem to have a close association with the basic tenet of

the Shi’i school of thought. Even until today, these practices are

still vivid among Muslim community in Indonesia. As an Islamic

school of thought, this madhhab was not as popularly acceptable

as Sunnism for unknown reason, hence, the developments of this

madhhab in Indonesia came into its lowest ebb until it gained the

moment when Khomeini led-Islamic revolution toppled Shah

Pahlevi of Iran in 1979. However, beside the Iranian revolution,

there were other factors impacting the developments of Shi’ism

in Indonesia, They are including dynamic domestic socio-

economic and political situation in Indonesia. Some dominating

aspects in relation with Islamic movement as general in Indonesia

which gained its moment within the period of 1980s and 1990s

are should be part of the consideration.

Keywords : Ahl Bayt, Nusantara, Iran, revolution, Khomeini.

Introduction

The presence of Shi’ism1, the so-called Madhhab Ahl Al-Bait, in Indonesia in the past has always been a contentious issueamong historians and scholars of Islam. The main reason is that,

1In this paper, the term of Shi’ism indicates denomination in contrast with

Sunnism while Shi‘I refers to a follower or devotee in singular form and its pluralone is Shi’is. The term Shi‘i is used both as adjective and noun.

Assegaf, UF. Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt In Nusantara

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this subject is pertaining to the ongoing hot debate about theIslamisation process in the first period in the region. The processwas in fact very complex because it was mainly related to thedifferent historical perspectives of how, when and by whom Islamwas first introduced into the archipelago.

The Islamisation process might presumably be carriedout by ulamas (Islamic scholars) with different Islamic school ofthoughts, including Sunnism and Shi’ism. Some researchers likeBaroroh Baried, M Yunus Jamil, A Hasyim (Hasymi 1983),asserted that Shi’ism had played a major role within early periodof the introduction of Islam into Indonesia (Azra 2000). Forinstance, they found that Shi’ism had ever emerged as strongpolitical power in the archipelago and Shi’ism and Sunnism hadengaged in an acute power competition within the correspondingperiod (Hasymi 1983) . By contrast, researchers like Hamka andAzyumadi Azra and Saifuddin Zuhri, rejected those views sayingthey were baseless due to the absence of convincing evidencesand any reliable references. He asserted that the influence ofShi’ism in the process of Islamisation in Indonesia and theSoutheast Asia region was even more controversial.

Nevertheless, Azra maintained that, as religious politicalideology Shi’ism never existed in Indonesia during the firstintroduction of Islam in the country but admitted that a “Persianinfluence” in cultural and religious matters was undeniable.

The Persian influence in the Nusantara Archipelago couldearly been identified in Ayuthia, Thailand during “the Age ofCommerce” from 15 to 17th century (Reid 1988) . Persian MuslimShi’is frequented to trade offices in Thailand. The interactionbetween the Muslim traders and local people, not only broughtabout positive impacts on local financial sector, but also on thesocio-religious discourses into the region. During that period, theShi’i Muslims had great influence on the local kingdom, whichwas reigned by Prasat Thong. Ibnu Muhammad in his book “TheShip of Sulaiman” even more said that the Shi’i Muslims helpedout King of Siam Prasat Thong’s son, Narai, organize the annualHasan-Hussein feast during the Islamic month of Muharram, themonth which is considered holy in Shi’ism (Mu*hammad Rab*i*ibn Mu*hammad 1972).

The view of Persian influence was also supported byArnold T Walker. Having observed the robust growth of Islam in

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the coastal areas of Java and Sumatra at the end of 14 century,he strongly believes that the introduction of Islam into Indonesiawas under the influence of Persian and Indian culture with thebanner of Shi’ism (Arnold 1913: 368, 83). Undoubtedly, this viewis easily dismissed and clearly left a big question behind: is thePersian influence meaning the dissemination of Shi’ism asreligious ideology or not?

The Sufi Theory

With regard to the Shi’ism presence in Indonesia in thepast, there was a popular assumption, if not sufficient to call it atheory, among historians and researchers is that Shi’ism came toIndonesia through Sufism. This assumption was closely alliedwith a theory proposed by AH Johns. He writes that the spreadof Islam in Indonesia was mainly carried out by Sufi (Johns 1961).Of course, this is very controversial issue throughout the historyand obviously needs further elaboration to answer a series ofquestions which subsequently arise in this respect. What is therelationship between Shi’ism and Sufism? What the elements ofShi’ism influence Sufism?. What sort or branch of Sufism whichbrought Shi’ism along when entering Indonesia?

In a bid to answer to the above questions, it is importantfirstly to elaborate “the Sufi theory”. Johns believes in contrast tothe theory emphasizing on trade activities carried out by localpeople and visiting Muslim merchants, the coming of Islam to thearchipelago was successfully carried out by Sufis. His theory wasalso supported by other scholars like Fatimi and Azra. He furthersaid:

It (Sufism) was directly involved in the spread of Islam toIndonesia, it played a significant part of this socialorganization of the Indonesian port towns and it was thespecific nature of Sufism which facilitated the absorption ofnon-muslim communities into fold of Islam.(Johns 1961)

Although the Muslim traders had regularly visited Indonesia as of8th century, the wide spread of Islam in the region only gained itsmomentum during 13th century. This was because of the fact thatthe Sufism did not appears to be a significant influencing factor inthe Muslim world until the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in1258. Citing Gibbs, Johns underscores that, after the fall of the


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Caliphate, the Sufis played an increasingly role in preserving theunity of the Islamic world, counteracting the tendency of theterritories of the Caliphate to divide into Arabic, Persian andTurkish linguistic regions (Johns 1961). In addition, Escaping fromMongols onslaught, the Sufi missionaries were forced to leaveBaghdad off to the east where they could develop theirorientation (Koentjaraningrat 1984). In addition, Johns describes:

“they were peripatetic preachers ranging over the wholeknown world, voluntarily espousing poverty; they werefrequently associated with trade or craft guilds, accordingto the order (tariqa) to which they belonged; they taught acomplex syncretic theosophy largely familiar to theIndonesians, but which was subordinate to, although anenlargement on the fundamental dogmas of Islam; theywere proficient in magic and possessed powers of healing;and not least, consciously or unconsciously, they wereprepared to preserve continuity with the past, and to usethe terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamiccontext (Johns 1961) .The spectacular spread of Islam in 13th century in the

region was inseparable to particular approaches applied by Sufiwhich were typically flexible and in what Johns said: “acharacteristic of the Sufi Apostolate was a readiness to build on thepast and to enroll elements of local belief and custom into theservice of Islam”. (Johns 1961).

As Sufism is assumed to be a driving force of theIslamisation process in the Malay-archipelago, some scholarsspeculate that Shi’ism came into Indonesia through Sufismmainstream where the influence of both Sunni and Shi’i areconverging (Azra 2000). In this regard, Christoph Marcinkowskiasserted that Shi’i Islam has a long-standing historical footing inwhat is now Indonesia. "Philosophical Sufism" and WujudiyyahTarekat2, as well as certain aspects of classical Malay literature,such as the hikayat genre, according to him, had strong Shi’iundercurrents as well (Marcinkowski 2008).

For instance, Hamzah Fansuri (1593), a North Sumatranmystic and poet, gained enlightenment through the Wujudiyyah

2Wujudiyyah or Wahdatul Wujud (the "Unity of Being") is a Sufi philosophy

stressing that ‘there is no true existence except the Ultimate Truth (God).

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Tarekat in Ayuthia where Shi’i rulers ever reigned ((Drewes andBrakel 1986). He eventually embraced a particular formulation ofSufi theosophy, based on Ibn Arabi’s tradition which may beincluded Shi’i elements.

Actually, this controversial pantheism was initiallyestablished by Al Hallaj (244/858-309/921), which was later onadopted by Ibn Arabi, Muhyyidin Abu Abdallah MuhammadHatemi At Tha’i (560/165-638/240). Louis Massignon in his 4volume books about Al Hallaj, writes that Al Hallaj was stronglyinfluenced by Shi’ism. Under the Caliphate Abbassyiah AlMuktadirbillah, he was allegedly accused of triggering publicunrest by promoting the doctrine of “Da’wa Rububiya”, meaningthe supreme power of God would only be invested through theprophets and Imams to establish government states. Such as thetheory, according to Massignon, is no doubt about its Shi’i origin(Massignon 1982). In conformity, Hamka also attributed thedoctrine of Al Hallaj to Ismailite of Shi’ism, commonly calledBathiniyah which upholds the belief that the universe wascontrolled by “Imamul Ghaib” (the Hidden Imam) (Hamka 1962).However, Hamka later revised his view by adding that Sufism atthe time it spread in Indonesia was in accordance with Sunnism(Hamka 1976).

The doctrine of the Hidden Imam, what the so-called asImam Mahdi by Sunnism and Imam Zaman by Shi’ism, and hiseventual return to the world constitutes a basic belief in Shi’ism.The Sufi doctrine of Imam Mahdi was propagated by Ibn Arabi inchapter 366 of his Al-futuhat Al Makkiyah. (Gibb TheEncyclopaedia of Islam)).

Some years following the Ibn Arabi era, this view wasfurther developed within the Sufi circle which are mostly of Shi’ischools of taught. In contrast, Sunni theologians have never beenattracted so much on this belief. They accept the concept ofImam Mahdi with caution and suspicion (Eliade and Adams TheEncyclopedia of religion). Al Ghazali, for instance, did not writemuch about this belief. Distinctively, such a messianic belief is infact still common in the Muslim community in Indonesia. Moreinterestingly, rather similar messianic belief was also well-knownwithin Hinduism which was prevalent in Indonesia during pre-Islamic era.


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Therefore, the root of messianic belief in the Indonesiansociety might indirectly also give the pathway for the successfulprocess of Islamisation in Indonesia. In short, we can speculatethat the Sufi propagators at that time might inclusively adopt thelocal Hindu-based tradition of messianism or even more possiblyapply the concept of Ibn Al Arabi of Shi’ism. Of course, thesepossibilities confined with the basic characteristics of Sufi whichis the flexible and opened-minded as being described by Johns,Shihab, Azra and Fatimi (Shihab 2001).

Having said that Shi’i cultural and religious traditions wasalready famous among local people since 15 century, it is safe tosay that Shi’ism as an Islamic school of thought or a religiousdoctrine was not as popularly acceptable as Sunnism inIndonesia3. This could be seen that the development of Shi’ism inthe country underwent “a stage of quietism” until the Islamicrevolution of Iran in 1979 when the global Islamic revivalism hasbeen commencing to flourish.

In modern Indonesia, some Shi’I cultural and religiousaspects has so far been underway a process of syncretism withlocal culture. This process is easily observable in a number ofreligious symbols and practices in Indonesia. Even untilnowadays, these practices are still vivid in Muslim community inIndonesia. Some are regarded as traditional and cultural events,commonly performed by Indonesian people such as Acara Tabotin Bengkulu and Bulan Suro in Java, or the same kind of ritualsare also found in Ternate, Maluku.

Tabot is a communal ceremony (ritual) to honor ImamHussein, the second imam in Shi’ism, Hussein was cruelly killed inKarbala. The word of Tabot is derived from an Arabic word“tabut” which literally means “woden box” or “case”. Theprocession of ritual is taking place about 10 days in Month of

3Ironically, many propagators of Islam in Indonesia in the past who have Shiite

inspired doctrine, like Hamzah Fansuri and his students, Siti Syekh Jenar, one of

nine Wali Songo, were accused to promote deviant Islamic teachings. Even

more, some of them were prosecuted and bunt alive. In this regard, I am of the

opinion that this pressure and accusation have in turn brought negative impacts

on the developments of Shi’ism in the following era. Therefore, I assumed that

followers of such a teaching would probably feel traumatic and frightened to

publicly exercise their beliefs.

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Muharram (the Islamic lunar calendar). Especially in Bengkulu,Tabot has completely blended to be a local tradition. This ritual isalso found in Pariaman dan Padang, West Sumatera and also inTernate, Maluku (Kuncaraningrat 1990). As no strong writtenevidences when Tabot ritual began to be known in Bengkulu andWest Sumatera, it was said that Tabot was introduced by Britishsoldiers called Sipahi, or Sepoy4. They are Muslim soldiers ofIndian origin, hired by Sir Stanford Raffles to fortify British rule inthe region (Sumbar 1982). The procession of this ceremony wascalled Ashura.

Ashura is significant distinctiveness of Shi’ism. Thiscentral beliefs of Shi’i community is Karbala tragedy where,Hussein, the third Imam of Shi’ism and the grandson of theProphet, killed brutally by Yazid of Umayyads. This happenedprecisely on October 10, 680 (Muharram 10, 61 AH). At the time,Yazid was in power, seeking the Bay'ah (allegiance) fromHussein.

The drama actually began when Hussein and his group,including companions and family members of no more than 100men, was intercepted on their way to Kufa, Iraq, by a large armyof about 100.000 strong-men of Yazid. At this stage, Husayn wasforced to give his Bay’ah for Yazid but refused it. Consequently,in an unbalanced fighting, Hussein and all of his men were killedand their bodies, including that of Hussein, were mutilated. Thisday was commemorated by Shi’i followers as a sad event, whichis commonly called Ashura.

Ashura is of particular significance to Shi’i Muslim all overthe world. A quite few of them would make pilgrimages to theMashhad al-Hussein, the shrine in Karbala, Iraq that is Hussein'stomb. On this day, all Shi’i followers are wearing mourning attire,mostly black in color. They refrain themselves from musicbecause it is a time for sorrow, respect of the demise and selfreflection. They express mourning by crying as well as listening topoems about the tragedy. All of these activities are intended toconnect them with Hussein's suffering and his sacrifices inkeeping Islam alive. Hussein's martyrdom is basically interpreted

4Sepoy is (from the Persian word سپاھی Sipahi meaning "soldier’ ) is native of

India. Muslim soldier allied to British power.


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by Shi’ism as a symbol of the struggle against injustice andoppression.

Indeed, religious ritual and gatherings are among keypractices in Shi’ism. As Allamah Sayyid Muhammad HusseinTaba’taba’i his book “Shia” that there are certain religiouspractices besides the basic rites which are specifically Shi’ism.Despite stressing the importance of those rites he revealed thatsome of those rites might be also familiar to Sunnism(Taba’taba’i 1981).

In contrast, Vali Nasr maintained that what is settingapart Shi’i followers from their fellow Sunni friends is “the greatfeast of mourning, remembrance and atonement that is Ashoura(the tenth of Muharram) (Nasr 2006). He believed that thoserites are uniquely Shi’ia. Even more Graham describes that “areference of textual and rituals ….religious observances many ofwhich are peripheral to the doctrines, has been woven into thefabric of Shi’i collective consciousness, endowing it with a richand distinctive iconography ” (Graham E. Fuller and Rend RahimFrancke 1999).

Azra and Hamka however insisted that some Shi’isminspired-festivals and traditions, like Tabot in Bengkulu, Tabuik inPadang, or in any other parts of Indonesia, like Ternate andSouth Sulawesi, nowadays have lost its religious meanings. Bothscholars suggested that, unlike those of Iran, Tabot festivals inIndonesia for instance, no longer reflect religious manifestationand spirituality, they are merely popular celebrations. In responseto that view, I argued that, either Tabot in Indonesia or Ta’ziyehin Iran, however, still originally root into the Shi’i religioustradition and culture and uniquely could be found in Shi’ism. It isonly among Shi’i believers that the Tabot or “ta’zeyah”ceremonies were performed. If we have an opportunity to take aclose a look and compare Tabot ceremonies which are usuallyperformed in Indonesia with those in other countries, likePakistan, Lebanon and Iran, we might easily come to the veryconclusion that both ceremonies have the same root of culture. Itis true, I have to underscore here that the Tabot festival inIndonesia has been undergoing a socio-cultural transformationwhich might cause it loose its religious meaning but as a culturalfestival, it is still popular performed by local people.

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In addition to Tabot, some ritual East Java, like “secretritual” (sedekah sirr) and some religious recitation (dzikir) whichare usually performed and read between Isya (evening) prayer upto midnight, are thought to be parts of the Shi’i aspects. Therecitation (dzikir) Five of the Cloak5 especially, means that theyhave five people who can help them out of the hellfire in the dayof Judgement, namely, Al Mustafa (the Prophet), Al Murtada (Aliibn Abi Talib), the two siblings (Hasan dan Hussien) and thedaughter (Fatima). The dzikir is read loudly by a group of Muslimswhich definitely claim themselves as Sunni (Karim 2007). Indeed,accurately Marcinkowski describes this situation with thestatement as “Shi’i-inspired festivals are still encountered in theArchipelago, even if many of their mostly Sunnite participantsmight not be aware of their origins or connotations” (Marcinkowski2008).

The participation of Sunni followers in some Shi’i inspiredactivities was also admitted by Azra. In an interview with aresearcher which was conducted Jakarta in 1998, Azra admittedthat some groups of the Tareqat Mu’tabaroh of Sunnism (Sunnimajor branch of Sufism) has an intimate relationship with that ofShi’ism, especially regarding the admiration to Hasan andHusayn (grandsons of the Prophet) (Basyar 1999).

Considering the above explanation, it is not anexaggeration to say that cultural aspects of Shi’ism have beenpresent in parts of Indonesia long before the Islamic Revolutionof Iran in 979. Nevertheless, it is true that it would be difficult toascertain the presence of Shi’i religiosity in Indonesia just onlylooking at the Shi’i-inspired festive. This implies that there ishardly evidence to support that Shi’ism has ever been a strongreligious political orientation in Indonesia in the past. However, itis also improper to deny that Shi’ism has culturally been existingin the archipelago for as long as 15th century.

5This dzikir is based on the most widespread tradition of the Prophet (hadist),

accepted by both Sunni as well Shia, in relation to the interpretation of AlQur’an (33:33) which is the so-called Hadist Al Kisa’, futher explanation aboutthis see, Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an, volume four, pp50.


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Contemporary Indonesia

During 1970s, a series of successes has been taking placein the Muslim world during 1970s such as the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War, the Arab oil embargo as well as the 1979 IslamicIranian Revolution. “These successes of the seventies resonatedwith an idealized perception of early Islam…” (Esposito 1992). Inaddition, a number of social and political events have also beenunderway, including the imposition of Islamic law in Pakistan andLibya, the Islamic opposition movements in Egypt and Turkey aswell as Muslim movement against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.Other similar events related to this encouraging developmenthave been also in progress in Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Moroccoand Malaysia.

Certainly, these events created a great expectationamong Muslims that an Islamic reawakening era was emerging.These events have boosted the spirit of Islamic revivalismsweeping all over the Muslim world, including Indonesia.

The late twentieth century revivalist spirit prevalentsimultaneously in most Muslim countries was similar in a numberof ways. In spite of a long and an endless argument on definitionof the Islamic revivalism among social scientists, to myunderstanding, it was basically inspired by a single conceptionthat was “Islam is a complete system of life theologically andpolitically”. However, admittedly, in many cases, this spiritsuccessfully restored credibility to Islam as a code of life superiorto other ideologies, at once weakened the influence of the Westup on young Muslims and helped to limit the influence ofWestern ideas and culture. Indeed, as Esposito described, thatthis revival spirit led to a higher profile of Islam in Muslim politicsand society.

The indices of Islamic reawakening in personal life aremany: increased attention to religious observances (mosqueattendance, prayer, fasting), proliferation of religiousprogramming and publication, more emphasis upon Islamic dressand values and the revitalization of Sufism (Von Der Mehden1990).

Inescapably, the Islamic movements in Indonesia during1970s also followed the global trends. The spirit of global Islamicrevivalism not only gave great impetus to the Islamic movements

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in Indonesia but also brought positive impact on social religiousactivities as well as personal life of each Muslims in the country.Meanwhile, in contrary to the global trends, the Islamic activismin Indonesia during the corresponding period was marked with afeeling of disappointment. Muslim community in Indonesia wasfrustrated with a series of political failures since the defeat ofMasyumi Party 6 up to the general elections 1971 and 1977. Thedismay of Islamic activists reached its peak when the New Orderregime introduced Pancasila as the only one basis for mass-organizations. As the effect, many Islamic political elite changedstrategically their struggle and social role from political intocultural interest. They tended to choose education or socialfoundation, for instance, instead of political parties in a bid toarticulate their existing aspirations. Majority of the IndonesianIslamic community no longer regarded political participation asthe only one pathway to contribute for the benefit of the nationand the religion.

During that period, there was a phenomenon of theemergence and development of various Islamic movements inthe country such as Hizbut Tahrir, Tarbiyah Islamiyah, JamaahTabligh and Darul Arqam. These movements, not attached toformal Islamic organizations, were mostly pioneered by youngintellectual Muslims and some of them were even calledunderground movements. (Rosyad 1995).

Like other Islamic movements in Indonesia, such asMuhammadiyah and PERSIS which were deeply influenced byinternational developments, Shi’ism has been early growing inIndonesia. It has gone along with other Islamic strands inIndonesia as the effects of the dynamic spirit of Islamic revivalismduring the beginning of the 15th century of Islamic calendar(hijriah), which was expected to be ‘the Century of IslamicResurgence’ (Abad Kebangkitan Islam).

6Masyumi Party (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) (Council of Indonesian

Muslim Associations) was a major Islamic political party during 1950s. Itincluded the Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama andMuhammadiyah. Masyumi came second in the 1995 election. It won 7,903,886votes, representing 20.9% of the popular vote, resulting in 57 seats inparliament. In 1958, some Masyumi members joined a rebellion against theincumbent President Sukarno. As a result, in 1960 Masyumi was banned.


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Undeniably, as one the striking experiences in the Muslimworld, the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 has furtherinfluenced not only Islamic activists in Indonesia but, indeed, alsothroughout the globe (Von Der Mehden 1990). Particularly,Khomeini, a prominent Islamic scholar of Iran who led therevolution had been successful in creating a state based onIslamic ideology. Not surprisingly, this revolution greatlyattracted the attention of Indonesian Muslim scholars.

Having observed the Khomeini’s success in Iran,Indonesian Muslims intellectuals and politicians were amazedand motivated to imitate him in search for a new political posturein the country. Seemingly, Indonesian activists found analternative, if not a cure for their political disappointment, in theIslamic Revolution in Iran.

The impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran on the earlydevelopment of Islamic youth resurgence movement areclear despite the fact that the revolution in Iran was arevolution of the Shiite (Shi'ah) Muslims. It is a quiteinteresting fact that regardless of differences, IndonesianSunni Muslims accepted revolutionary ideas from the Shi'ite Muslims in Iran. (Rosyad 1995)Of course, as normally and traditionally happening in the

first stage of its development, any Islamic movement spread itsinfluence through academic discussions in campuses. Academicsand learned-people sphere become nursery and fertile ground forthe early development of Islamic movement (Fox 2004). Somereligious discussions were held in secular campuses. In short,despite censorship imposed by the New Order regime, secularcampuses, like ITB (Institute of Technology Bandung) andUniversity of Indonesia (UI), served as good breeding grounds foralmost all of the Islamic movements during the correspondingperiod. For instance, ITB’s mosque Salman, was regularlybecome the venue for Muslim students to gather and discusssocio-religious issues.

Thus, the spread of Shi’ism in Indonesia at that timeoccurred on university campuses, and one of the most importantfactors behind this phenomenon was the spread of Islamicliterature. (Azra et al. 2006). Over the last decades of thetwentieth century, a boom in religious publication enterprisesbecame visible through the appearance of translations of

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numerous works of Islamic thinkers from outside Indonesia,including like Muhammad Iqbal, Maududi, and Fazlur Rahman.Over the 1980s there was also a strong growth in the number ofIndonesian translations of the works of Ali Shari’ati, SayyidTabataba’i and Ayatollah Mutahhari, Khomeini and other Shi’ithinkers. Through such translations, the influence of Shi’i thoughtwas to surface in a wide variety of intellectual currents of theIndonesian Islamic discourse (Van Bruinessen 2002).

“The ideas that made perhaps the strongest intellectualimpact, however, were those of the Iranian thinkers Ali Shari`atiand, a few years later, Murtaza Mutahhari. These two authorsappealed especially strongly to students and young intellectuals.Their attraction was in part due, no doubt, to their associationwith the Iranian revolution, which fascinated many youngIndonesians,” Martin van Bruinessen said. He asserted thatstudents and the gradually emerging Muslim middle classshowed a great eagerness for Islamic reading, numerousdiscussion circles were formed where books were criticallydiscussed.

Works by, and studies on, the great Sufis and Muslimphilosophers were translated, and a growing number ofIndonesian Muslim intellectuals published collections of theirlectures, speeches and sermons — oral communication remainsthe primary form — as books, which found an avid readership.

One of the most significant manifestations of this erawas the flourishing of Islamic intellectual discourses and theemergence of young Muslim intellectuals, especially on universitycampuses. In his book, Muslim Legal Thought in ModernIndonesia, Michael Feener has pointed out that despite theSuharto government’s political pressure concerning the effects ofIran’s Islamic revolution in Indonesia, the influence of IranianMuslim thought was clearly visible among young students in theyears following the 1979 Iranian revolution (Feener 2007). Indeed,a number of Indonesian students were clearly and increasinglyinclined towards Shi’ism at that time. Most of them graduatedfrom Western-style educational institutions, and as a result ofcoming from such a background they became successful inintroducing Shi’ism to the educated Indonesian middle class. Inaddition to seminars and discussions, they also encouraged the


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translation and publication of Shi’i thinkers’ books as a part oftheir contributions to the dissemination of Shi’ism.

This group capitalized on deep transformations inMuslims’ attitudes and understandings of ‘Islamic activism’occurring in the 1980s–1990s. If previously, political involvementwas seen as the only way to contribute to the benefit of thenation and of religion, at this point in time, cultural interests,intellectual debates and philosophy gained a new position, asimportant loci of Islamic revival (Djamaluddin Malik 1998). Inaddition, a hallmark of this new mode of Islamic revival, was theemphasis placed upon putting aside religious fanaticism andmyopic views on various religious matters to develop, instead, anattitude of openness, and the spread of a popular motto of non-sectarianism (Feener 2007).

An exemplary figure of this phenomenon is JalaluddinRakhmat, a lecturer at Universitas Pajajaran (PajajaranUniversity, UNPAD) in Bandung, West Java. In 1988, togetherwith his colleagues, Haidar Bagir, Ahmad Tafsir, Agus Effendi andAhmad Muhajir, he established the Muthahhari Foundation inBandung, which was an institution that focused on da’wa andpublishing. Since 1992 the foundation has expanded its scope toinclude the establishment of high schools across Java 7. Since the1980s, Jalaluddin Rakhmat has been widely recognised as themost active intellectual in spreading Shi’ismon campuses andmore broadly to the educated middle class of IndonesianMuslims. In the post-Suharto era Rakhmat also took leadership ofthe Shi’a community by establishing the Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul BaitIndonesia (IJABI). Other campus figures incline toward Shi’isminclude Dimitri Mahayana (a lecturer at Institute of TechnologyBandung (ITB) and former chairman of IJABI), Hadi Swastio (alecturer at the Communication College and former generalsecretary of IJABI) and Yusuf Bakhtiar (formerly, a deputy chief ofMuthahhari Senior High School, and currently, a political activistin Amien Rais’ National Mandate Party), as well as Sayuti

7These high schools are well known as senior highs schools plus. The attribute,

‘plus’, is used because its programmes combine a number of subjects from thenational curriculum with Islamic teachings and a focus on fostering moralconduct. See SMA Plus Muthahhari, available online at: http://www.smuth.net/(last accessed 26 May 10).

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Asshatri in University of Indonesia (UI), Agus Abu Bakar (UI)8,Zulvan Lindan (University of Jayabaya) and Haidar Bagir (ITB).

Hawza

Another major stream in the development of Shi’ism inmodern Indonesia has flowed through the more traditionalinstitutions of Islamic education, including that of the Shi’ihawza. Since the 1960s, there has been an increasingly activeexchange of visits between Iranian-style pesantern, the so-calledhawzas, and various Indonesian pesantren. For example, in 1962 aleading Shi’i scholar from Iraq, Muhammad Reza Ja’fari, came toIndonesia to visit the al-Khairiyya school in Bondowoso, and tomeet local Muslim leaders such as Hussein al-Habsyi (1921–1994). The discussion lasted for four days, and following thatevent, some teachers converted to Shi’ism (Zulkifli 2009). Thisrelationship between hawza and Indonesian pesantren intensifiedafter the Revolution in 1979. Despite the mounting politicalpressure of the Suharto regime, this sort of exchanges continuedduring the 1980s in connection with the Iranian ulamas’ missionof exporting the principles of the Islamic revolution. Theseconnections contributed greatly to the dissemination of Shi’ismin Indonesia, as the increasing familiarity of local ulama with theirShi’i counterparts overseas made it possible to dispatchIndonesian students to hawzas in Iran. In this regard, twoHadrami Arabs of the most important figures were Ahmad al-Habsyi (d. 1994), leader of Pesantren ar-Riyadh in Palembang(South Sumatra), and Hussein al-Habsyi, who established theYayasan Pesantren Islam at Bangil (East Java) in 1976.

Ahmad al-Habsyi, in Palembang, had established earlycontacts with hawzas in Iran, and had sent his students UmarShahab and Hussein Shahab to study in Qum in 1974 and 1979,

8Agus Abubakar Arsal Al-Habsyi was born in Makassar, South Sulawesi, on 6

August 1960, to a Hadrami migrant family. He was a Shi’i student well-known in

the early 1980s, and was active at the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque of the UI. He

was a student at the Physics Department. His intensive learning of Shii

teachings took place at the university. He was also familiar with Shi’ism, as it

was known before the Iranian revolution, due to the existence of some Shi’is in a

village in South Sulawesi, who also acted as factors in his conversion. See

Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia (Leiden: 2009).


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respectively (Ali 2002). The activities of Hussein al-Habsyi’spesantren in Bangil greatly contributed to the spread of Shi’ism inIndonesia, and any analysis of Shi’i genealogy in the archipelagowould not be complete without the mention of him9. Born inSurabaya on April 21 1921, Hussain al-Habsyi started his primaryeducation at the Madrasah Al Khairiyah -- the oldest Islamiceducational institution in Surabaya, and the same school wherehe later came to teach. In 1970, he set up a boarding school inBondowoso, and another boarding school for boys in Kenep-Beji,Bangil. According to his acquaintances, this occurred after theIranian revolution, but it is possible that he had already becomeinterested in this manifestation of Islam before 1979. In fact, itappears that when teaching at the al-Khairiyya, he, with theother teachers and students of the school, often encounteredMiddle Eastern figures with whom he could discuss Islamicteachings, including Shi’i doctrines (Zulkifli 2009). In the post-revolution years, Ahmad al-Habsyi and Hussein al-Habsy fosteredthe rapid growth of Shi’ism in Indonesia through theiracquaintances with Iranian scholars. In 1982, a delegation fromIran, consisting of Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqiand Hujjat al-Islam Mahmudi, visited the YAPI. As a result of thismeeting with Hussein al-Habsyi, the hawza ‘ilmiyya in Qumagreed to accept ten Indonesian students from his school inBangil each year. The following year, Muhsin Labib, Ibrahim alHabsyi, Rusdi Alaydrus, Thoyyib Nafis, Mukhtar al Jufri, UmarAlatas, Ahmad Baragbah, Hasan Tono, Muhammad and Musamwere sent to Qum (Ali 2002). On their return, after several yearsof study, these students became the leading preachers of Shi’ismin Indonesia. Since then, the number of Indonesian students inQum has increased, so that after a decade, Qum graduates inIndonesia numbered more than a hundred (Ali 2002).

A number of these YAPI alumni returned from their timein Qom to establish and run their own pesantren, and to takeactive roles in several Indonesian Islamic organizations. Amongthem, the most prominent were Zahir Yahya (leader of the Al-

9Ustadz Husein Bin Abu Bakar Alhabsyi Yang Pejuang‘ published on 3 Ocotber

2008 by Republika daily newspaper , last accessed on 29 Ocotber 2009,

available online at:

http://www.republika.co.id/berita/6668/ustadz_husein_bin_abu_bakar_alhabsji

_ustadz_yang_pejuang,(last accessed on October 2009).

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Kautsar Foundation in Malang, East Java, and former head ofYAPI, Miqdad (head of Pesantren Darut Taqrib in Jepara, CentralJava), Fathoni Hadi (founder of the Al-Hujjah Foundation inJember, East Java, and, currently member of staff at the IslamicCollege for Advanced Studies, the London branch of Islamichigher education in Jakarta), Muhammad Amin Sufyan (head ofthe Samudera Foundation in Surabaya), Abdurrahman Bima(elected in 2009 as member of Parliament from the DemocraticParty), Husein Alkaff (adviser at the Al-Jawad Foundation inBandung), Herman al-Munthahhar (head of the Amirul MukmininFoundation in Pontianak, West Kalimantan), Muhammad al-Jufri,and Abdul Aziz al-Hinduan. The arrival of Qum alumni in the late1970s and early 1980s helped consolidate the growing Shi’imovement in Indonesia, as they also directly engaged otherMuslims in informal religious gatherings (pengajian), which wereheld in specific locations and attended by a limited circle. Onthese occasions, Qum Alumni also performed Shi’i rituals (majlis),like Kumayl supplication, Ashura commemorations, and so on (Ali2002).

Post Soeharto Era

The student led reformation in 1998 had delivered ademocratic system in Indonesia and created favorable nationalsocio-political climate for minority group to survive. Suchdynamic political and social changes happening in Indonesia havewidely opened more windows for Shi’ite followers. Thus, thesituation unleashed the acceleration of Shi’ism in the country.Consequently, the Shi’ite movement has turned to be moreopened. Its followers have been confidently promoting theirbeliefs to others and holding religious ceremonies in the publicphere.

As the result of current democratic system, the Shi’itepractitioners had no longer to conceal their beliefs; they couldpublicly hold their religious congregation at will wherever theywant. They obviously showed their identity. No political pressure,or despite still social constraints but very minimum, they freelyexercised their beliefs. They seemed to have exercised freedomin expressing their religious beliefs and therefore they began toshow their real identity.


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The development of Shi’i community in Indonesia hasindicated a tremendous progress after the reformation erafollowing the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Although it is stronglybelieved the Islamic Revolution of Iran (IRI) which delivered therise of Khomeini’s regime in Iran, affecting the spread of Shiismin Indonesia, the favourable domestic socio-economic andpolitical situation has indeed contributed greatly to the rapidgrowth of Shi’ism in the Archipelago.

The phenomena in mushrooming of Shi’i community areconspicuously visible in middle-to-upper sphere of society in thearchipelago country, including scholars and academics. Thenumber of Shi’a affiliated-institutions comprising of socialfoundations or schools, including higher education, has beenclearly observable nowadays all over the region from Aceh in thewestern part of Indonesia to the remote area of Papua in themost eastern of the country.

However, as minority in the mainstream Sunnism inIndonesia, Shi’ite community are really aware that the toppriority of their social agenda is to consolidate their ownorganizations in a bid to gain a wider social recognition.

More importantly, although they have obtained a tick ofapproval from the government, they are still facing challengesbecause of a lack of clarification from the Council of IndonesianUlama (MUI) about the status of Shi’ism, whether it is regardedas deviant group or not. The last decree of MUI was issued in1984, warning Indonesia Muslims to be mindful about Shi’ism. Sofar, there has no more decree yet from this council.

Undoubtedly, this unclear status has actually generatedmixed reactions from the majority Sunnite followers in Indonesiawhich at least could be classified into three attitudes. Firstly,those who adopt soft (lenient) attitude believe that there is nofundamental difference between Shi’ism and Sunnism.Therefore, the differences could be easily put aside for the shakesof united community. Obviously, this group include some leadingscholars (ulama) for instance Quraish Shihab who writes“Sunnah-Syiah bergandengan tangan! Mungkinkah? : Kajian atasKonsep ajaran dan Pemikiran,”. Abdurrahman Wahid and someNU leaders seem to belong to this group. In addition to their softattitude, they also often appear to come and attend Shi’ite

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congregations and share some of the views with their Shi’itecounterparts.

The major part in the society in Indonesia showed amoderate stance towards Shi’ism. This part includes elites ofsome major mass-organization, like NU and Muhammadiyah.Despite of awareness about the differences between Shi’ism andSunnism, they try to avoid a horizontal conflict or public debatewith Shi’ism. Basically, they believed that Shi’ism still within thecorridor of Islam. 10

The last social group is those who consider Shi’ism as un-Islamic. The most active cluster of anti-Shi’ism is Al Bayyinat ofSurabaya which chaired by a Hadhramawt origin, Thohir Alkaf.Ironically, he is one of alumni from the famous Shi’ite pesanternof YAPI in Bangil. So, he is a former student of the noted Shi’itescholar, Hussein Al-Habsyi. Thohir Alkaf believes that not onlyShi’ite followers are infidels but also their blood is eligible to bespilt.

Considering the mixed reactions of Muslims in Indonesia,Shi’ite community in some extent is still facing public resistancelike the ones in Madura, Bondowoso and Bangil, East Java. Forinstance, on December 24, 2006, 500 angry villagers in Jambesarivillage, Bondowoso Regency, East Java attacked 150 IJABImembers conducting routine prayers, destroying three houses, asmall mosque and a car belonging to the local IJABI’s chairman.Local Sunni residents objected to the presence of the Shi’ism intheir community and accused them of deviant Islamic beliefs andheresy.

Another related incidents, on April 8, 2007, in Jember,East Java, an angry crowd surrounded a house belonging toSuwarno, the local chairman of IJABI. They demanded IJABI notspread Shi'ite teachings.

In a rally in front of the local office of public prosecutor inMay 2007, some 500 people in Kecamatan Bangil Pasuruan, EastJava, urged the government to act swiftly against “the deviantelements” in the society. They carried a big poster “Syiah Go toHell”.

10During the recent interview, Chairman of NU Hasyim Muzadi and Chairman of

Muhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin revealed and shared this view.


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Government’s standpoint

On November 2007, Majelis Ulama Indonesia has issuedfatwa regarding nine criteria of deviant groups (aliran sesat) inIslam. But the fatwa itself raised multi interpretations. AlthoughMUI has so far not mentioned Shi’ism, the prescribed guidelinesset by the MUI to define "deviant" teachings and sects arecontentious. For instance, the criteria for deviance includealternative interpretations of Al Qur’an. Under this fatwa, Shi’ismmight be included as a deviant element because some parts ofShi’ite teachings are derived from the alternative interpretationsof Al Qur’an, which are not in line with the mainstream Sunnism.

For this reason, “Syiar” a Shi’ite affiliated magazine,made an interview in December 2007 with one of the MUIchairman Umar Shihab who reinstated that the MUI fatwa didnot mean to include any particular Islamic school of law in itsfatwa. According to Umar, the difference in religious point ofviews was mainly due to the different of school of law. MUI willnot involve in judging any madzhab in Islam. “If the Islamic worldhas already accepted Shi’ism, why should MUI refuse it?” he said.This statement is important for Shi’ism in as a shield againstpossible violent attacks from opponent groups.

However, the repercussion of Umar’s statement isactually very weak as it is only the form of interview, not clearfatwa. For this reason, fearing that the fatwa will bemisinterpreted and misused as a main pretext to attack them asit happened with Jamaah Ahmadiyah, the Shi’ite denominationcurrently continue striving to grab the heart of ummah as thepathway to gain social legitimacy.

During the recent interview, Chairman of Komisi FatwaMUI, Dr. Anwar Ibrahim said that Shi’ism which proliferated inIndonesia is still within the corridor of Islam. However, headmitted there was an element of Shi’ism might possibly beconsidered as a deviant (ghulat). That is the reason, he added,that MUI issued fatwa (religious guidance) in 1984 to remind theIslamic community (umat Islam) be aware of this element. “Sofar, there has been no public concern or complaints about Shi’iteteaching in Indonesia. It is only an extreme group would certainlycreate conflict in the society.” he said.

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Anwar’s statement was precisely describing the positionof MUI about the proliferation of Shi’ism in Indonesia. As far asShi’ism in Indonesia does not create public concern, MUI wouldregard it as no matter.

In line with MUI, the ministry of religious affairs alsoregarded Shi’ite community as the same as other religiousgroups. The department has developed all means ofcommunication with all Islamic mass-organizations in Indonesia,including those of Shi’ite community. “We do not discriminateone another. They (Shi’i community) will be always welcome ifthey want to establish good relationship with us,” said Secretaryof Directorate General of Islam’s Social Guidance Mudzakir.

He stressed that the case of Shi’ism in Indonesia is fardifferent with that of Ahmadiyah which has been punished byMUI as a deviant group. The government would always look atthe aspiration of Islamic community in general. “There is noproblem with Sh’ism at all,” he said.

In addition, Head of the Research and Development Bodyof the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Balitbang, Depag), ProfessorAtho Mudzar said, as religious group, the proliferation of Shi’ismin Indonesia has no problem as long as it does not disseminate apolitical doctrine against the state ideology, Pancasila. “If theydo not uphold any political belief which is against the stateideology, we have no problem with them,” he said.

According to Atho, one of his department’sresponsibilities is to secure the harmony of religious life(kerukunan beragama) in the country. Within this framework, thegovernment in one side would never limit the right of anyreligious groups to live but in other side the government has tomaintain the social stability and security. “If there is violent actagainst minority in the country, it is not government’s initiativesbut criminal’s,” he stressed.

Conclusion

Despite the long-standing debate on various theories ofthe Islamisation process in Indonesia, the existence of MadhhabAhl Al-Bait in the past in the archipelago is undeniable. Itspresence could be traced back to the first time Islam enteringIndonesia. Evidently, a number of religious symbols and practices


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in the country seem to have a close association with the basictenet of the Shi’i school of thought. Even until today, thesepractices are still vivid among Muslim community in Indonesia.

However, Madhhab Ahl Al-Bait subsequentlymarginalized. As an Islamic school of thought, this madhhab wasnot as popularly acceptable as Sunnism for unknown reason,Thence, the developments of this madhhab in Indonesia cameinto its lowest ebb until it gained the moment when Khomeiniled-Islamic revolution toppled Shah Pahlevi of Iran in 1979.

In this regard, one should not jump to the conclusion thatthe current rapid development of Madhhab Ahl Al-Bait inIndonesia was a logical bias of the wind of changes blown by thesuccess of Islamic Revolution in Iran (IRI). In fact, beside theIranian revolution, there were other factors impacting thedevelopments of Shi’ism in Indonesia, They are includingdynamic domestic socio-economic and political situation inIndonesia. In addition, it would be noteworthy to consider somedominating aspects in relation with Islamic movement as generalin Indonesia which gained its moment within the period of 1980sand 1990s. These also directly or indirectly participated inaccelerating the developments of Shi’ism among Muslimcommunity in Indonesia.

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Documents

3 Madhhab Ahl Al-Bayt in Nusantara The Past and Present