TRACY V. ATKINS

This paper is intended to evoke thoughtful reflection

of a solicitor's liability.

The title of this paper may be somewhat misleading

as the broad issues of a solicitor's liability have been decided

since Tracy v. Atkins by a decision of the Supreme Court of

Canada in Central and Eastern Trust Company v. Rafuse and Cordon

(1986) 31 D.L.R. (4th) 481.

First let us consider the following:

1. STANDARD OF CARE OWED BY A LAWYER.

2. FOUNDATIONS OF LIABILITY.

3. A LAWYER'S DUTIES TO HIS CLIENT.

4. A LAWYER'S DUTY TO A THIRD PARTY.

STANDARD OF CARE

Lawyers, as professionals, face a higher standard

of care than the layperson. The reasonable person standard

of care yields to an objective standard based on a reasonable

degree of skill and competence for a professional.

The standard of care required of a solicitor was set

out by our Appeal Division in the case of Lockhart v. MacDonald

(1981) 42 N.S.R. (2nd) 39, Chief Justice MacKeigan in spea~ing

for the court said "the solicitor contracts with his client

to be skilful and careful; Haldane, L.C., in Nocton v. Lord

Ashburton, (1914) A.C. 932, at p. 956. The standard of care

and skill which can be demanded from a solicitor is that of

a reasonably competent and diligent solicitor: Charleswoth

on Negligence (5th Ed.), p. 312. I find also helpful the following

summary in Linden's Canadian Negligence Law (1974), pp. 39-41):

A lawyer is obliged to act like a 'prudent solicitor'.

In other words, an attorney is liable if it is shown that his

'error or ignorance was such that the ordinary competent solicitor

would not have made or shown it'. He must bring to the exercise

of his profession a reasonable knowledge, skill and care in

connection with the business of his client'.

The duty owed by a lawyer to his client has been founded

on contract - not on tort, for well over a century. Since 1964,

however, third persons, who may not be clients, may also sue

lawyers, in tort for negligence, in certain circumstances.

A lawyer's duty is not 'absolute, ascending into the realm of

insurance against loss. It involves only careful, unnegligent

advice on matters of law.

There is no liability for a mere 'error in judgment'

because 'a solicitor does not undertake with his client not

to make mistakes, but only not to make negligent mistakes'.

Liability is generally imposed when a solicitor fails

to take some 'routine step' that any lawyer would realize is

necessary. The giving of erroneous legal advice may also engender

responsibility.

No liability will ensue, however, where the lawyer

merely makes an error on a complicated issue of law, for if

it did, every law suit could generate a negligence action against

the losing lawyer.

Linden emphasizes that neither lawyers nor doctors

guarantee success."

A solicitor is not required to know all of the law

applicable to the performance of a particular legal service,

but he must have sufficient knowledge of the area of law in

which he had undertaken to fulfil a service. He must also be

aware of the errors and issues in which he needs further background

or updated research. He is expected to possess the knowledge

and skill of other well informed solicitors and exercise his

undertakings with reasonable care.

The texts say that the lawyer is not an insurer against

loss. The standard of care required is the ordinary care of

an average solicitor in good standing according to Linden, (Canadian

Tort Law) 4th ed. This raises an interesting issue of whether

there is a different standard of care owed by a specialist over

that of the generalist. In Elcano Acceptance Limited v. Richmond

Stambler & Mills (1985) 31 CCLT, 201 (Ont. H.C.), Mr. Justice

Smith stated that the standard of "reasonably competent specialist"

may be appropriate in some cases. The new and inexperienced

lawyer, however, is not given any grace period to attain the

standard of the generalist.

The objective standard of care has a regional perspective.

A lawyer is expected to conform to the standard of conduct for

the legal community in which he practices. In Maple Leaf Enterprises

Limited v. MacKay, White, Stroud, Langley and Sutherland (1980)

42 N.S.R. (2nd) 60, Hallett, J. decided that a lawyer in the

exercise of his duties must bring to those duties a "degree

of expertise and care to his work equivalent to the standard

exercised by reasonably competent solicitors in the province".

Thus, evidence of the practice of other lawyers in the area

can be either very useful or damaging in a negligence action.

To summarize, the standard of care owed by a lawyer

is that he exercise a reasonable amount of knowledge, skill

and care consistent with that of a prudent solicitor in the

community or province, in regard to the performance of a particular

service.

FOUNDATIONS

Until recently there has been both academic and judicial

debate of the foundation of a lawyer's liability. For years

the legal community's duty of care was thought to arise from

contract. The common law duty of care in non-contractual situations

is created by a relationship of proximity, arising apart from

contract. Cases as Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners

Limited [1964] A.C. 645, Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C.

562, and Anns v. Merton London Borough Counsel [1978] A.C. 728,

began to erode the position that tortious liability was precluded

by the existence of contractual relationship.

The liability question has been authoritatively decided

by the Supreme Court of Canada in Central and Eastern Trust

Company v. Rafuse (supra.), Le Dain, J., writing for the Court,

gave a lengthy summary re concurrent liability in either contract

or tort citing such cases as J. Nunes Diamonds Limited v. Dominion

Electric Protection Co. (1972) 26 D.L.R. (3rd) 699, Esso Petroleum

Co. Limited v. Mardon [1976] 1 Q.B. 801, Hedley Byrne & Co.

Limited v. Heller and Partners Limited [1964] A.C. 465, Scuttons

Limited v. Midland Sylicones Limited [1962] A.C. 446, amongst

many others. The Court concluded that there was a common law

duty of care created by a relationship of proximity, and as

such, the issue is the existence of sufficient proximity, not

how it arose. This being so, the Court found that there is

nothing naturally present in the contractual intention to preclude

concurrent liability. The Court went on to express the view

that there was no sound policy or principle why a solicitor

should be in a more favourable position than any other professional

in regard to such liability. The Court further held that where

there was concurrent liability the Plaintiff could assert either

cause of action, depending on the legal consequence that would

be most advantageous, subject only to the exception that they

could not circumvent or escape a contractural exclusion or limitation

of liability.

There is a third foundation of liability involving

breach of a fiduciary relationship. Chief Justice MacKeigan

in Lockhart v. MacDonald (supra.) at page 51 says as follows:

In Nocton v. Lord Ashburton (1914) A.C. 933 (H.L.),

Viscount Haldane, L.C., after referring in the passage from

which I have quoted supra. to a solicitor's duty to be skilful

and careful and to his liability "at law in contract or even

in tort, for negligence in breach of a duty imposed on him"

(p. 956), went on to emphasize the relevancy of equitable doctrines,

quite apart from negligence (pp. 956-957):

When, as in the case before us, a solicitor has had

financial transactions with his client, and has handled his

money to the extent of using it to payoff a mortgage made to

himself, or of getting the client to release from his mortgage

a property over which the solicitor by such release has obtained

further security for a mortgage of his own, a court of equity

has always assumed jurisdiction to scrutinize his action. It

did not matter that the client would have had a remedy in damages

for breach of contract. Courts of equity had jurisdiction to

direct accounts to be taken, and in proper cases to order the

solicitor to replace property improperly acquired from the client,

or to make compensation if he had lost it by acting in breach

of a duty which arose out of his confidential relationship to

the man who had trusted him.

The Lord Chancellor emphasized tht the courts "can

treat what is alleged either as a case of negligence at common

law or as one of breach of fiduciary duty" (p. 957).

A solicitor is in a fiduciary relation with his client.

He thus will be required to make restitution to his client if

he has permitted his duty and his personal interest to conflict

and has unjustly benefited therefrom, especially if he benefited

at his client's expense. This is a principal corollary of the

broader rule described by Professor Gareth Jones in Unjust Enrichment

and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty (1968), 84 L.Q.R. 472, at

pp. 472-473:

It is said to be an 'inflexible ' rule of equity that

no fiduciary may profit from his position as a fiduciary: no

man 'who stands in a position of trust towards another, (can),

in matters affected by that position, advance his own interest

(e.g., by making a profit) at that other's expense l."

In Tracy v. Atkins (supra.), the defendant lawyer

for the purchasers had prepared a mortgage back to the vendors

who happened to be unrepresented. At no time did the defendant

or the vendor plaintiffs say that a first mortgage would have

priority over their second mortgage. The purchasers defaulted

on their first mortgage and the plaintiffs lost their equity.

Ruttan, J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court Trial Division

held that the Defendant lawyer did not only breach a fiduciary

duty to the plaintiffs, but he was also liable due to the proximity

of his relationship with the plaintiffs. Ruttan, J. went on

to decide that a contractual relationship was not essential

to liability where there was a fiduciary relationship or a relationship

of such proximity that reliance should have been anticipated

by the lawyer.

British Columbia Court of Appeal (decision of 16 B.C.L.R.

23) affirmed the lawyer's liability for damages as the court

agreed that he owed a duty of care to the vendors arising from

the fact that he had placed himself in a position of proximity

where he knew or ought to have known that the vendors would

rely on him, especially in the absence of independent legal

advice.

The Tracy v. Atkins decision indicates that there

may be circumstances where a lawyer may be liable for both negligence

and a breach of a fiduciary relationship based on the proximity

of the relationship. This foundation of liability will be more

fully discussed under the heading of Liability to Third Parties.

To summarize, there are three foundations of liability

from which a duty of care may arise: contract, tort, and a

fiduciary relationship.

DUTY TO CLIENTS

A survey of some of the more recent Nova Scotia decisions

may prove useful in establishing some of the circumstances of

breach of duty to clients in our legal community. The following

are cases decided by our courts near or from the time of the

Tracy v. Atkins decision. In Webb Real Estate Limited and Antigonish

Home Furnishings Ltd. v. McInnes, Meehan and Tramble, and Patterson

Smith Matthews and Grant (1978) 25 N.S.R. (2nd) (S.C.C.), the

defendant lawyer was retained by the plaintiffs to process a

claim under a fire insurance policy. After a first unsuccessful

attempt at filing proofs the solicitor hired a counsel for assistance.

The Supreme Court of Canada with Mr. Justice Pigeon desenting,

found the defendant totally liable for not commencing the action

within the limitation period, thus breaching his contractual

duty.

In Caldwell and Caldwell v. Fitzgerald, Kelleher and

Morrison (1977) 26 N.S.R. (2nd) 140, T.D., the defendant solicitors

were found liable for failing to obtain a release or partial

release of a mortage where the purchaser was purchasing one

of five lots covered by the mortgage.

In Federal Savings Credit Union Limited v. Hessian,

Hessian and Boyne, Crocker, Jones and Murant (1979) 36 N.S.R.

(2nd) 166 (T.D.), the defendant lawyer disbursed funds on a

second mortgage without a written undertaking or the execution

of a postponement agreement based on an oral agreement with

a bank manager, and was found negligent.

In Lockhart v. MacDonald (1980) 42 N.S.R. (2nd) 29,

the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Trial Division

finding the defendant solicitor negligent. The Court did however

find the lawyer in breach of his fiduciary duty to his client

in charging interest and a bonus as he was not to profit personally

from their relationship.

In MacCulloch's Estate and MacLennan v. Corvette (1982)

49 N.S.R. (2nd) 663 (C.A.), the lawyer negligently incorporated

a company necessitating a rectification of the share register,

and was in breach of her duty to advise her clients that the

company under Section 81 (3) of the Companies Act was to issued

qualifying shares.

In Dorey and Dorey v. Romney (1982) 51 N.S.R. (2nd)

53, the Defendant lawyer involved in a previous sale of the

land in question, forgot to record the deed. In a later transaction,

when acting for the plaintiffs he searched from the previous

sale forward and as a result missed the unrecorded deed. The

court held that he had failed to exercise reasonable care in

his title search, relying on his memory rather than a complete

search.

In Knox v. Veinote, Veinot and Cook (1982) 54 N.S.R.

(2nd) 666, the defendant solicitor was found negligent when

he did not search the title to the land after the purchasers

requested him to act for them. He was also negligent for improperly

drafting a legal description.

In Federal Business Development Bank v. Royal Bank

of Canada and Power (1985) 67 N.S.R. (2nd) 18, the solicitor

for the plaintiff failed to obtain a postponement agreement

from The Royal Bank in relation to an existing third charge

in the debenture. Although he paid out the existing first and

second mortgages he was found negligent for disbursing the proceeds

without obtaining a postponement.

In Dreisorner v. Romney (1986) 73 N.S.R. (2nd) 123,

the purchaser's lawyer was found negligent for failing to issue

a qualified certificate of title when the size of the lands

was less than that stated to be in the deeds. He was also negligent

in failing to insist on a surveyor emphatically point out the

risks to the purchaser.

In Federal Business Development Bank v. Boudreau (1986)

74 N.S.R. (2nd) 429, the company applying for a loan supplied

a deed and an expired option on two different pieces of land

to the lender. The lender mistakenly assumed that the company

owned both lots and its lawyer placed a mortgage on the lot

not owned by the mortgagor, and was subsequently found negligent.

In A & R Properties Limited v. Stern (1987) 77 N.S.R.

(2nd) 406, the defendant lawyer in the conduct of a title search

had information before him which at least raised a doubt as

to whether the seller owned all the land to be conveyed. The

lawyer was found negligent for failure to advise the purchaser

or to get a surveyor to certify the title subject to survey.

In Clarke v. Milford et al (1987) 78 N.S.R. (2nd)

337, the defendant solicitors failed to secure title to the

property and failed to register the deed. The property had

been left by will to a minor whose mother conveyed the property

to the plaintiff. The solicitors were found negligent for not

registering the deed.

Regardless whether the actions were founded in contract

or in tort, it may be worth notice that a survey of cases indicates

that a majority of the cases of professional negligence against

lawyers arise from real estate transactions and company law.

Predominately solicitor practice as distinguished from barrister

practice. This reality should not leave a barrister with a

false sense of security. Canadian courts have rejected the

British authority of barristers immunity in the conduct of litigation

in Leslie v. Ball (1863) 2 UCQV 512 (C.A.) and more recently

Demarco v. Ungaro et al (1979) 21 O.R. (2nd) 673. In Briseau

v. Martin (1978) 30 N.S.R. (2nd) 671, the B.C. Supreme Court

declared a mistrial due to the lack of competence and preparation

of the plaintiff's counsel.

to pay the cost personally.

As a result, the counsel was forced

The court described the counsel's

incompetence as "obvious travesty of justice".

DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES

Whereas clients can sue their lawyer on any of the

three foundations, third parties must sue based on tort or breach

of a fiduciary relationship. The cases seem to indicate that

liability under either of these heads will be founded when there

is a relationship of such sufficient proximity so as to create

a duty of care.

In Leisure Cedar Homes Construction, Incorporated

v. Metcalf & Holme (1977) 21 N.S.R. (2nd) 703 (C.A.), the solicitor

undertook to pay funds on behalf of the client from mortgage

advances. The solicitor was held liable to the third party

plaintiff for not paying out of the advances in accordance with

the undertaking.

In Domfab Limited v. Ross, Viner, the Black united

Front of Nova Scotia and Mundebah & Mundebah (1976) 22 N.S.R.

(2nd) 185 (T.D.), the solicitor was personally liable on his

undertaking to disburse mortgage funds to seller.

In Clarence Construction Limited v. Lavallee (1980)

III D.L.R. (3rd) 582, the B.C. Supreme Court found the solicitor

for the purchaser liable to the unrepresented vendor when he

had prepared the deed, a second mortgage back to the vendor,

and on closing provided the vendor with a statement of adjustments

as well as the balance of the monies. The Court found his liability

to the vendor in negligence for not advising the vendor the

nature and extent of the second mortgage. The outcome in this

case is not surprising considering the remarkable similarities

to Tracy v. Atkins.

In November 1980 the Ontario High Court of Justice

handed down its decision in Lapierre v. Young 117 D.L.R. (3rd)

643. In this fact situation the lawyer was acting for both

sides in a second mortgage transaction. Among other difficulties,

the lawyer had failed to advise the unsophisticated vendor that

he was acting for both sides; that the property had recently

sold for less than the amount of the first and second mortgage;

the first mortgage was in arrears at the time; and the borrower

would have paid a higher rate of interest on the second mortgage.

Not only was the solicitor found to be negligent in falling

below the standard of care, but he was also liable for breach

of his fiduciary duty to the lender.

In Mason v. Mason (1981) 47 N.S.R. (2nd) 435 N.S.S.C.

ad, the husband had retained a solicitor to draft the separation

agreement and had the wife sign it without her realizing the

fact that it was to be a permanent property settlement. Hart,

J.A. for the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal remarked that it was

mandatory for the husband's lawyer to insist that the wife receive

independent legal advice. The court disregarded the agreement

pursuant to a plea of non est factum by the wife.

The Alberta Queen's Bench in 1983 acknowledged that

an action by a client could sound in either contract or tort.

In Ferris v. Rusnak 9 D.L.R. (4th) 183, the solicitor was aware

that the lender was unsophisticated, and he should have been

aware that the lender would rely on him to protect his interest.

The plaintiff lender loaned money to a limited company without

any assets on the basis of a promissory note and personal guarantees.

The Court held that the lawyer had a duty to obtain financial

statements of the guarantors or in the alternative to advise

that the plaintiff lend money directly to the individuals.

As a result of his breach, the lawyer was found liable to the

lender.

The Court went on to remark that even in situations

where the parties had previously arrived at a deal independently

of legal advice, a solicitor would be acting improperly if he

did not advise the unsophisticated lender to obtain independant

legal advice. The Court went on to say that the solicitor should

further warn the party not to proceed in absence of such advice.

How far are the courts willing to extend liability

for failure to insure that the parties are properly advised?

Has the lawyer gone too far when he begins to unravel a seemingly

reasonable agreement arrived at freely between parties when

all he has been asked to do is to put the terms down on paper?

How far should a lawyer inquire as to the sophistication of

the parties, and should he ever be satisfied that they may know

what is in their own best interest? If a lawyer may owe a duty

of care to a third party, at what point will that duty be in

conflict with his duty to his client.

Recommendations

A lawyer may have a duty of care based on contract,

tort and fiduciary relationship to his client, and based on

tort and fiduciary relationship to non-clients. The courts

have been reluctant to find a solicitor negligent where he or

she has met with a requisite standard of care - reasonable competence

in the exercise of his skill. The following cases are examples

of scenarios where liability was not found due to significant

factors within the fact situations.

In Winston v. MacDonald et al (1981) 119 D.L.R. (3rd)

256, the Ontario Court of Appeal found the mortgagors solicitor

not negligent in respect of an action by the mortgagee. The

defendant had given the mortgagee's lawyer a misleading statement

of adjustments. The court held that the plaintiff mortgagee

was not acting in reliance on the defendant's skill or judgment,

and as such there was no proximity through reliance, and consequently

no duty of care in the absence of a contractural relationship.

In this situation the test of sufficient proximity was defeated

by the existence of independant legal counsel.

In Lockhart v. MacDonald (supra.) our Court of Appeal

held that a lawyer does not guarantee results, only skill, care

and competency. The fact that his reorganizing of his clients

business did not bring any beneficial results, was not negligence

in the circumstances.

In Maillet and Pothier v. Haliburton and Comeau (1983)

55 N.S.R. (2nd) 311 (T.D.), the plaintiff was awarded $75,000.00

by a jury. The award was appealed and the lawyer advised her

to accept an offer of $40,000.00. The plaintiff sued her lawyer

alleging that he should have known that the Appeal Court would

not have reduced the original award. The court found the lawyer

had acted with reasonable prudence, but did state that in light

of the recommendation to the client to settle, financial assistance

to the client was ill-advised, on the basis of an inference

of breach of fiduciary duty.

The B.C. Court of Appeal in Jerlock v. Safety Mart

Foods Limited, Webber, Jeffrey, and Whist, Webber, and Woodruf

(1983) 2 WWR 569 held that the lawyer for the defendant company

was not liable to the plaintiff employer who wished to acquire

shares in the company, and subsequently suffered loss, as the

lawyer had relieved himself of liability by advising the employee

to seek independant legal advice, or in the alternative to seek

accounting advice. The court found that it was a duty of care

owed by the defendant lawyer to the plaintiff to advise him

to obtain independent legal advice, but not to insure that he

did so. Further the lawyer had not drafted or completed any

security documents for the plaintiff and this seemed to be of

relevance to the court. A stronger set of circumstances appeared

in Kwak v. Odishaw (1984) 59 B.C.L.R. 54. Here the defendant

lawyer drafted a promissory note for his client to be signed

by the plaintiff. Prior to reviewing and executing a promissory

note with the plaintiff, the defendant advised the plaintiff

to obtain independent legal advice. The plaintiff refused to

obtain independent legal advice alleging to have signed promissory

notes before and to have had legal training. The plaintiff

defaulted and sued the lawyer claiming that he was not aware

of the legal consequences of signing the note. The B.C. Court

of Appeal confirmed the dismissal of the action, as the defendant

lawyer was required only to advise the plaintiff to obtain legal

counsel. As this was done, the plaintiff could not rely on

the defendant to protect his interest. What marks this case

in distinction to the Gerlock case (supra.) is that the defendant

was responsible for the preparation and execution of the instrument.

In Winifred Gaunt Blown v. William Charles Johnson

and W. Charles Johnson & Co. (1986 unreported) the B.C. Court

of Appeal dismissed an action against the defendant lawyer even

though he had contravened the Law Society handbook rule

requiring lawyers participating in business ventures with clients

to warn and advise in regard to independent legal advice. The

Court seemed to have decided that due to the relatively high

degree of sophistication of the real estate saleswoman and that

of her lawyer, it would not be fair to place her loss upon him.

This case is cited with some hesitation, especially in light

of Central and Eastern Trust Company (supra.), where the Supreme

Court dismissed the claim of contributory negligence based on

the fact that the executive officers and members of the executive

committee of the Board of Directors although having legal training

and experience, were not acting in that capacity and did not

have a duty of care in respect to the legal consequences of

mortgage. It remains to be seen whether implicit in the Supreme

Court's denial of contributory negligence is the recognition

that the level of sophistication of the plaintiff may not be

of significant relevance unless it should alert a solicitor

that another party will be relying upon their skill.

In Getaway Investments Limited v. Salah et al (1986)

73 N.S.R. (2nd) 12, the client purchased a rental property

with rental income of $2,320.00 per month, while the registered

rent set by the Rent Review Commission was $985.00. The client

realized that the actual rent exceeded the registered rent.

The lawyer did not contact the Commission nor was he requested

to do so. The Nova Scotia Supreme Court Trial Division found

the lawyer not negligent, as a reasonably competent and diligent

lawyer in 1983 would not have conducted a search of the Rent

Review Commission. Thus the standard of care was not only qualified

by the particular legal community, but is also qualified by

chronology.

On examining the foregoing survey of case law, a number

of observations become clear. Although many of these

have already been implemented in the day to day practice of

our legal community, the following are some suggestions:

1. Clarify client/non-client relationships - Do not

assume that the two individuals across the desk from you are

to be treated as one party. All too often ostensibly non adversaries

will approach a solicitor with a particular service to be fulfilled.

To these individuals the concept of conflict is non-existent.

Now matters should be clarified and discussed

fully. An acknowledgement should be obtained from the non-client

as to the fact that he should be represented, and to the client

as to the possible consequences of non-representation by the

non-client.

2. Do not permit a client to convince you to take

a short cut, whether it be acting for both sides or in disbursing

funds from a mortgage prior to obtaining all the requisites.

The client will be the first one to complain when the matter

turns sour.

3. Obtain clear instructions from your client from

your first meeting.

a) Make use of detailed instruction sheet, follow-ups,

and be attentive to limitation dates.

b) Maintain proper communication with your client

in up-dating instructions. This in not only beneficial from

a promotional side but also from the prevention perspective.

4. a) Maintain your legal education by constantly

updating yourself on current revisions to the statutes and the

case law, especially in your particular areas of practice.

b) Maintain close contact with your peers whether

through personal or professional relationships, or Bar Society

programs such as the Bar Refresher Course or other courses offered

by the Continuing Legal Education Society of Nova Scotia in

an effort to keep your legal knowledge current.

5. When faced with a problem situation, or an area

outside the realm of your usual practice, use research and guidance

from another member of the Bar more knowledgeable in the particular

area.

6. Attend to each transaction as if it is unique,

and the only file you have to work on to avoid complaisance

and lack of attention to detail.

Conclusion:

As practicing barristers and solicitors, we are all

directly involved in the evolution of the standard of care as

an objective standard based upon our practices. The foregoing

case law demonstrates that the standard requires not so much

disabling introspection, but enabling attention. Cases indicated

not so much incompetence, but carelessness and lack of attention

to the state of the law. While a lawyer is not expected to

be flawless, he is expected not to make mistakes that would

have been avoided through prudence and due care. The message

seems relatively clear: We must be careful not be become complacent

within our practices. By consistently monitoring our practices

and of the Bar as a whole, we will be alerted to the areas of

Ollr practice most in need of revision, and we will achieve a

level of professionalism expected and deserving of the Bar.