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STEVEN T. WAXFederal Public Defender
STEPHEN R. SADY
Chief Deputy Defender
Steven Jacobson
Bryan E. Lessley
Christopher J. Schatz
Ellen C. Pitcher
Craig Weinerman
Mark Bennett Weintraub
Gerald M. Needham
Thomas J. Hester
Ruben L. Iiguez
Anthony D. Bornstein
Lisa Hay
Tonia L. Moro +
Susan Russell
Patrick Ehlers
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDERDISTRICT OF OREGON
101 SW Main Street, Suite 1700
Portland OR 97204
503-326-2123 / Fax 503-326-5524
Branch Offices:
859 Willamette Street 15 Newtown StreetSuite 200 Medford, OR
97501
Eugene, OR 97401 541-776-3630
541-465-6937 Fax 541-776-3624
Fax 541-465-6975
Francesca Freccero
C. Rene Manes
Amy Baggio
Nell Brown
Kristina Hellman
Harold DuCloux III
Alison M. Clark
Brian Butler+
Thomas E. Price
Lynn Deffebach
Michelle Sweet
In memoriam
Nancy Bergeson
1951 - 2009
Eugene Office
+ Medford Office
Research/Writing Attorney
December 7, 2010
Molly Dwyer, ClerkUnited States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco, CA 94119-3939
Re: Lee v. Lampert
No. 09-35276
Dear Ms. Dwyer:
This letter is to supplement the petition for rehearing en banc
in the above entitled
case with the attached opinion inLopez v. Trani, No. 10-1088
(10th Cir. December 6, 2010).
The panel in the present case held that the miscarriage of
justice exception to procedural
default articulated in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), did
not apply to the federal habeas
corpus one-year statute of limitations. The supplemental
authority supports rehearing
because the Tenth Circuit applied Schlup to a case filed outside
the one-year limitations
period.
After reviewing the procedural history, the Tenth Circuit cited
Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), as articulating disjunctive exceptions
to procedural default: cause-and-prejudice or fundamental
miscarriage of justice. Opinion at 4. The Court held that the
Schlup actual innocence gateway applied to procedural barriers
regardless of cause:
We now expressly hold that, in the equitable tolling context as
in the contexts
discussed by the Supreme Court in Coleman and Schlup, a
sufficiently
supported claim of actual innocence creates an exception to
procedural barriers
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December 7, 2010
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for bringing constitutional claims, regardless of whether the
petitioner
demonstrated cause for the failure to bring these claims forward
earlier.
Opinion at 5. In treating the fundamental miscarriage of justice
exception as applicable tothe statute of limitations, the Tenth
Circuit, as did the petitioner in this case, emphasized the
narrow scope of the exception:
We stress that this actual innocence exception is rare and will
only be applied
in the extraordinary case. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321 (internal
quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, where such an extraordinary case exists,
the lack of
a showing of due diligence in pursuing claims should not prevent
the equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations for a prisoner who has
presented a
substantial claim of innocence.
Opinion at 6. After holding that the petitioner passed through
the Schlup gateway, the court
denied a certificate of appealability on the merits. Opinion at
7-8.
TheLopezopinion supports grant of rehearing en banc because it
demonstrates that
the panel opinion is inconsistent with other Circuit authority
and with Supreme Court
authority.
Yours truly,
/s/ Stephen R. Sady
Stephen R. Sady
Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender
SRS/jcd
cc: Assistant Attorney General Erin C. Lagesen
Assistant Attorney General Carolyn Alexander
Assistant Attorney General Janet A. Klapstein
