246 Space Neg

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

1/51

Space NegDOW 8BenischeckiShannonFRONTLINE 1-8NOT INEVITABLE EXT 9-10Commerce and Satellite Destruction Ext. 10-13ARMS RACE EXT 13-17SB WEAPS NOT EFFECTiVE 18THREAT EXAGGERATED 19-20SOLVENCY FRNTLlNE 21-23SBSF FAILS 24BIZCON LINK 25POLITICS nasa pop 26POLlTIC(S nasa unpop 27~t}ov,;ihoij F rtJt;tn ll~~ . '2_J/)r;{,? ! / t i .~O'1 1.- ,....lk, ...,,;">.e ~ i ~ cf

IV

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

2/51

Space NegDDW 2008Benischeck

Space Weapons Frontline1.Space Weaponization is not inevitable-vulnerabilities have consistently been overlooked andthere are other more probable scenariosKarl P. Mueller RAND Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable? International Studies Association Annual ConventionNew Orleans, 27 March 2002 http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/muellcr.htmlThe core of this inevitability argument is that even (or especially) if the United States chooses notto build space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in large part because of the great and still growingdegree to which U.S. military operations depend upon what has traditionally been known as "space force enhancement":the use of satellites to provide a vast array of services including communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and missilelaunch warning, without which American military power would be crippled. This parallels the argument that theimportance of satellites to the U.S. economy will make them an irresistible target, except that military satellites are farmore indispensable, and successful attacks against a relatively small number of them could have a considerable militaryimpact, for example by concealing preparations for an invasion or by disrupting U.S. operations at a critical juncture.l [341Rivals of the United States might also find space-to-earth weapons to be a very attractive way to counter U.S. advantagesin military power projection.

TheseareMatrreaS6nablettfgttmerrts;buttoc6tleludefromthemthatspaceweaponi21ationis'inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is no question thatspace systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several) for U.S. military capabilities. An enemy that attacked themmight be able to impair U.S. military operations very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that concern U.S.strategists. Itneed not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest inthe weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many importantvulnerabilities that adversaries have often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts.To cite but one widely-discussed example, during Operation Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt tomount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aircraftoperating from them during take-off or landing, although such an action could have profoundly disrupted the Alliance'sbombing campaign.2[35]Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S.space systems, it would choose to do so in ways-such as investing in ground-basedASAT lasers orcomputer network attack capabilities-that would not involve weaponizing space, and against whichcommercial satellites, "bodyguard" weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts of attacks, while theterrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger networks of smallersatellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps together with supplementing satellite platforms for somemilitary functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),3[36]and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and satellite launch and control facilities.

1
http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/muellcr.htmlhttp://www.isanet.org/noarchive/muellcr.html

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

3/51

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

4/51

Space NegDOW 2008Benischeck

Space Weapons Frontline3. There are many barriers to constructing space weapons

Theresa Hitchens, cm Vice President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18, 2002http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfmIndeed, the technical barriers to development and deployment of space-based weapons

cannot be overestimated, even for the U.S. military. There are serious, fundamental obstacles tothe development of both kinetic kill weapons and lasers both for use against targets in space andterrestrial targets - not to mention the question of the staggering costs associated with launch andmaintaining systems on orbit. Problems with lasers include power generation requirements addingto size, the need for large quantities of chemical fuel and refueling requirements, and the physicsof propagating and stabilizing beams across long distances or through the atmosphere. Space-based kinetic energy weapons have their own issues, including achieving proper orbitaltrajectories and velocities. the need to carry massive amounts of propellant, and concern aboutdamage to own-forces from debris resulting from killing an enemy satellite. Space-based weaponsregeneration. A detailed discussion of technology challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, but acomprehensive primer on the myriad problems with developing space-based weapons is a September1999 paper by Maj. William L. Spacy II, "Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?"written for the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education at Air University, MaxwellAir Force Base, Ala.

4. Space-Based Lasers face many ChallengesNATO, Parliamentary Assembly, 2003, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=367

of destroying missiles during their boost phase. Despite the advantages of operating a laser in thevacuum of space, some of the operational challenges for an SBL are daunting. According to a studyby the US National Defense University (NDU), these include lift-to-orbit and space assembly,stable and reliable operation in space, and maintenance and re-supply of fuels. Moreover, aneffective system should rely on a constellation of at least 12 satellites, considerably elevating costs.Itis perhaps for these reasons that the SBL programme has recently been scaled back. In September2002, the Pentagon closed the office dedicated to developing the SBL and moved all related researchinto a new MDA directorate called Laser Technologies. The first test of the programme, scheduled for2012, and plans to build an SBL test facility have also been cancelled. Despite Congressional cuts to theprogramme, MDA continues to keep the programme alive, allocating US$50 million for it in 2004.

3
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfmhttp://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=367http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=367http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

5/51

Space NegDOW 2008Benlscheck

Space Weapons Frontline5. The construction of space weapons will lead to an arms race

Theresa Hitchens, CD! Vice President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18,2002http://www.cdi.org/missile-defen se/spaceweapons. cfmSpace weapons - even those primarily designed for defense of U.S. satellites - would haveinherent offensive and first-strike capabilities, however, (whether aimed at space-based or earth-based targets) and would demand a military and political response from U.S. competitors."To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China) will notdevelop and deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain that deploying U.S. weapons in space will lead to thedevelopment and deployment of ASATs to counter such weapons," notes a new policy brief by the Cato Institute. 127China and Russia long have been worried about possible U.S. breakout on space-basedweaponry. Officials from both countries have expressed concern that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed notat what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballistic missiles, but rather at launching along-term U.S. effort to dominate space.Both Russia and China also are key proponents of negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand thearms race in outer space," has been stalled due in large part to the objection of the United States. For example, inNovember 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the others were Israel and Micronesia) to refuse to votefor a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of space. 128Itis inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the solenation with space-based weapons. "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a hugeasymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that gap. An arms race tendsto develop an inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article inAirpower Journal. 129Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurringPakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." Itisquite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic weaponsrace proved to be.

4
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defenhttp://www.cdi.org/missile-defen

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

6/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckSpace Weapons Frontline

6.Threatened countries may resort to terrorism or their own space weapons to strike back

Theresa Hitchens, COl Viee President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18,2002http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaeeweapons.cfmMany experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from theneed to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants inthe race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors might wen look to terrorism usingchemical or biological agents as one alternative.Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of Advanced Airpower Studies atMaxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States would not be able to maintain unchallengedhegemony in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threateninternational stability, it would be even more dangerous to U.S. security and relative powerprojection capability, due to other states' significant ability and probably inclination to balancesymmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power." 131. .c c S P u f r i n g o t l l e r " n a t i o n s C t o a c g U i r e " s p a c e : : 1 J a s e a w e a p o n s o f t l l e f r o w n " , e s IW 5 c t a : U 5 t 'W e a p o n s a i m e dat terrestrial targets, would certainly undercut the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on theground on a worldwide basis - negating what today is a unique advantage of being a militarysuperpower.132 U.S. commercial satellites would also become targets, as well as military assets(especially considering the fact that the U.S. military is heavily reliant on commercial providers,particularly in communications). Depending on how widespread such weapons became, it also couldeven put U.S. cities at a greater risk than they face today from ballistic missiles.

5
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaeeweapons.cfmhttp://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaeeweapons.cfm

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

7/51

Space NegD O W 2008Benischeck

Space Weapons Frontline7.Missile Defense might not evenwork- The tests aren't accurateSteven A. Hildreth Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, July19,2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weaponsIRL31111.pdfThe key question remaining, however, centers around levels of effectiveness, particularly in wartime.Under test-range conditions, most military systems perform better than they do in anoperational environment. The Patriot system used in Desert Storm is a notable example. Prior to thewar, Patriot successfully intercepted 17 of 17 very different targets under a variety of test rangeconditions. Patriot encountered a vastly different operational environment when deployed, and itssuccess of failure during the war is still debatable, and, according to experts, probably ultimatelyunknowable. Kinetic kill as a concept for destroying long-range ballistic missiles is even moreproblematic at this stage. There is no unambiguous, empirical evidence to support the contention

thatkinetiek4HforI:eBM 7defensewHt7W6rk,,Missiledef'et"lSe'advocatesargucthatsinccthcmid"'1980s, a string of such tests have occurred with varying degrees of success; some have failed toachieve interception, while others were deemed successful. But in almost every case, post-testdoubts have been raised. Critics have charged that test results over the past two decades havebeen exaggerated by false claims of success and promises of performance that later provedfalse. Many tests were proven to have had their targets significantly enhanced to ensure thelikelihood of success.

6
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weaponsIRL31111.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weaponsIRL31111.pdf

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

8/51

Space NegDDW2008Benischeck

Space Weapons Frontline8. National Missile Defense is Unnecessary, our enemies will not attack

Gary Brown and Dr Gary Klintworth Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 5 December 2000,http://www.aph.gov.aulLibrary/pubsIRP/2000-01/01RP16.htm#againstA significant gap apparent in many of the arguments advanced by the US to support NMD isthe almost complete absence of discussion on the value of traditional military deterrence inprotecting the country from ballistic missile attack. Itis plain fact that the United States is capableof military responses against any of the putative threatening states beginning at minor air raids andmilitary harassment and going all the way up to nuclear obliteration. Any state contemplating anattack on the US must take into consideration the risks involved in provoking the worldtsgreatest military power. In 1990-91 the US committed almost 400000 of its own personnel todefeat the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and secure the west's oil supplies.(88)This was done not toC"piotecftlietrSitserr15uroJie~oritrimportanrex1ernarTiiteiesfs:WnocaIrsay~wliaflheUSwoulddo if Iraq, or any other similar state, were to destroy one of its cities with a nuclear armedmissile? After such an attack the mood in the United States would be very hostile-perhapsreminiscent of that which prevailed after 7 December 1941, when 'remember Pearl Harbor'became an American mantra.It is of course sheer speculation to ask what a nuclear-armed US might have done to Japan in1941, but it is a matter of historical fact that as soon as the US had nuclear weapons it immediatelyused two of them against Japan. Any state attacking the US today risks terrible retaliation.Indeed, the US response might be very swift, based on shock, grief over huge losses and outragedirected at the attacker. (The lightning fast nature of American command, control andcommunications systems makes an immediate, emotionally-driven, response a distinctpossibility.) The threat of heavy retaliation is the essence of military deterrence, and in thissituation it would seem to apply. One is therefore bound to ask: given that the site of an ICBM

i ' S " ' i i 0 ; g ' T a u n cc l i '' 'c a n n o T ' b e ' ' c o n c e a r e ' ( f; 'w n ' I ) " w o u l ( 1 1 0 ( f a r e ' ! !a l f a c K ' m e " m ! n l " t ll is i ! 'w a y ? " ~ t T s e e K s " t o f C l T u ' v i a " " ' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' '' V L ' ' '' '; ; Z ' '' '' '' I'a costly. complex and problematic defensive system what the overwhelming military powerof the United States already does by basic deterrence.

7

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

9/51

Space NegD OW 2 00 8Benischeck

Space Weapons Frontline9. Military space programs will take decades to launch and come onlineDwayne A. Day, Phd. InPoli Sci, Space Journalist and historian, 10/4/07http://www.thespacereview.com/artic1e/970/1What we have learned from fifty years of military space operations is that the pace of developmentis slowing down, and the space component is subject to greater constraints than the groundcomponent. What we have also learned is that revolutionary change now seems less and less likelycompared to the past. Fifty years of military space experience can allow us to draw some generalconclusions about the principles guiding the development of military space systems. We know that themost important aspect of military space programs is that they are developed by humans, and social,economic, political and even emotional factors will have an effect upon the evolution of military spaceover the next five decades that will be just as important as the pace of technology development-itselfcontrolled by the decisions that humans make.

" ' " = " T 1 l 1 t f i f s l ' p f i n c i p l e t l f a : fW e ' c a n n o W d e f i ' v c ' f r o f f i " " a l r o f t l J I 's ' e x p e f i c ' n c e " i s 'm a f l n e a e v e l o p m e n t ' o t "space systems takes a long time, sometimes decades. This was not always so. Early reconnaissancesatellites went from first concept to full operation in three years or less. But today it is common for big,sophisticated military spacecraft to take a decade or more to develop, and the time from first proposal tofirst flight is even longer. An example is the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) missile warningsatellite. The US Air Force first began discussing developing an advanced missile warning satelliteto replace its Defense Support Program satellites in the late 1970s. After numerous false startsproducing an alphabet soup of acronyms, SBIRS was officially approved in 1996, with a plan ofproducing an operational satellite by 2004. But the first full-up satellite will not fly until 2008, andrecent news is that it may not fly until 2009 due to problems with a similar satellite. That's thirteenyears of development time, and nearlv three decades from the first declaration of need to the actualfielding of the svstem.

' ' 7 ? ; = ; = " ' 5 ~ ' ' i s = ' r m ' i c a r , ~ n ( l " t n e F e ' ' ' r e = n u m e r o u s " o f J i e r 'e x a n l ' P l e s " " O i ' s a f e f l i t e s " i n i li l lf ly " c o n c ' e i ' v e ( J " a z ' a e c I T ( J e ' S " " , w m l f H " " ; C S Y 0 S h f ' ' ' ' ' ' ' W Cor even longer before they actually became operational. For instance, GPS was conceived in the late1960s but not declared operational until the 1990s. Milstar was conceived in the early 1980s but did nothave its first launch until the 1990s.In some cases these long development times were the result of technological challenges thatdesigners had to overcome, often because military officers demanded more than contractors coulddeliver and contractors did not admit this. But often there were other, more bureaucratic reasons forthe delays. The Air Force today likes to take credit for GPS. But Air Force officials originally fought theprogram's development for years because they believed that existing navigation systems were sufficient,and because they were wary of a navigation system that could be jammed. It was not technology alonethat slowed down the development time of many spacecraft, it was people, making choices.

8
http://www.thespacereview.com/artic1e/970/1http://www.thespacereview.com/artic1e/970/1

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

10/51


Not Inevitable ExtensionsSpaceWeaponization not inevitable

Michael Krepon is Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center Space Assurance or Space Weapons? 2004http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications/joumallIssues/sf04IFofum%20Krepon.pdfDire predictions to the contrary, the weaponization of' space, or a "space PearlHarbor" is not inevitable.I If'the weaponization of space were inevitable. it would surely haveoccurred during the Cold War. While many countries have used space to support militaryoperations, no weapons are deployed in space, interactive ASAT testing during the Cold Warended two decades ago. and no satellites have been destroyed in warfare. Thus, theweaponization of space is certainly not inevitable, unless this mind set holds sway.

Evidence concerning adversaries development ofspace weapons is very thinTheresa Hitchens, cor Vice President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18, 2002http://www.cdi. org/missi Ie-defense/space weapons .cfm

Furthermore, the evidence of'actual space weapons programs by potential adversaries is thin.There have been Chinese press reports about China's military researching micro satellites(weighing less than 100 kilograms) or nanosatellites (weighing less than 10 kilograms) to attack U.S.satellites in space in a future war, but evidence of actual progress is scant. Russia also has longexplored anti-satellite technology. but there is little reason to believe that Moscow has changedits policy against deploying such weapons (Russia has had a unilateral ban on ASAT testing forsome time), especially given the current cash-starved state of the Russian space program. No othercountries have shown visible signs of'interest (although obviously any space-faring nation, such asIndia or Pakistan, have latent capability).

9
http://www.cdi./http://www.cdi./

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

11/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckNot Inevitable Extensions

The probability of an attack in space is slim to none at best

Michael Krepon is Founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center Space Assurance or Space Weapons? 2004http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/publications(iournallIssues/sf04/Fofum%20Krepon.pdfBy definition, any military or terrorist actions against the United States would constitute asymmetricwarfare, given the overwhelming military superiority the United States now enjoys. Concerns overasymmetric warfare are completely warranted and steps need to be taken to reduce U.S.vulnerabilities on the ground as well as in space. For example, surprise attacks are more likely tocome about by a computer hacker than by a space mine or an ASAT. Attacks to criticalinfrastructure-including ground stations that control satellites-offer relatively low barriers toentry, multiple paths of disruption and greater potential difficulty in assessing responsibility forthe crime. Moreover, if the weaker party were to carry out a surprise attack in space, it wouldnot alter the outcome of a military contest with the United States, but it would, in all likelihood,increase the severity of the U.S. response. Adversaries would be far more likely to carry outstrealrlft tat!itsagn:in:stt tIe'U nitei. :t 'Statest11cit ies;ports;n:n:awnercveflnc.AmericarCflag!i 'rm5wll' '"abroad, than to engage in space warfare.

10

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

12/51


Commerce and Satellite Destruction ExtensionsThe American construction ofSpaceWeapons is what encourages others to destroy our satellites

Jeffrey Lewis Graduate Research Fellow at the Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland CollegePark, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation. 2002http://www .cissm. umd.edulpapers/files/armscontfolalt. pdf

The SPACECOM approach rests on the questionable premise that space dominance can protect U.S.satellites. Although the United States may be able to deny other countries access to space.defending its own satellites against the unrestrained development of anti-satellite weapons isimpossible. Arms control however, could constrain offensive capabilities, giving satellites asporting chance. Although the Pentagon believes that anti-satellite programs among potentialadversaries are inevitable, China-the Pentagon's usual suspect for a peer competitor-, haslinked its anti-satellite efforts to U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses. Policy makers now haveto decide whether satellites are best protected by technology or arms control.Michael Krepon president emeritus and cofounder of the Henry L. Stimson Center. currentlyc C ( [ i r e c i l n g C f h e c c c e n t e r ~ s c c ~ r p a c e c S C e c u r H y C P r o J e c t : S e v e n Q u e s t t o n s : S p a c e cW e a p o n s I l i l y 2 0 0 S 0 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php ?story_id=3119Itis really difficult, if not impossible. to protect a satellite that someone wishes to destroy.Objects traveling in low Earth orbit-even those as small as marble or grains of sand-aretraveling at a speed equivalent to a I-ton safe being dropped from a five-story building. Thatcan easily destroy a satellite. Because itis so easy, countries that value satellites have explicitlydecided not to strike at them. Proposing space weapons throws that deterrence into question.

11
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.phphttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

13/51

Space NegD OW 2 00 8BenischeckSpaceweapons may lead others to destroy American satellites, which are essential to both themilitary and civiliansTheresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April 18,2002 http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm

The competitive and cost challenges the U.S. satellite industry faces could be increased if theUnited States moved to make space a battlefield. Up to now, the threat that commercial satellitescould become direct wartime casualties has been negligible. But an aggressive U.S. pursuit ofASATs would likely encourage others to do the same, thus potentially heightening the threat toU.S. satellites. Space industry executives, whose companies often are working at the margins ofprofitability, are concerned about U.S. commercial satellites and their operations becomingtargets, especially because current commercial satellites have little protection (electronic hardening,for example, has been considered too expensive). There would be cost~ to commercial providersfor increasing protection, and it is highly unclear whether the U.S. government would cover all thosecosts. Continues ... The health of the U.S. commercial space and telecommunications industry iscritically important to the computerized, globalized U.S. economy, but also directly to the U.S.l l i i l i t a r 'y : : :n , r n e p a r t m e f i t ' o f V e f e n s e n o ' W u s e s c o f f im e r c i a T ' s a ( e n i l e s y s f e m s f o cc o v e f a B o m 6 U : percent of its satellite communications needs, and that dependence is growing. 50 Military useof commercial assets is unlikely to significantly decline, in part due to the high costs of building andoperating military-dedicated satellites.

12
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfmhttp://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

14/51

Space NegD DW 2 00 8BenischeckSpaceWeapons will shut down space commerce and discourage satellite useBruce M. Deblois Adjunct Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations The Advent of Space WeaponsCFR Report Atropolitics Vol.l Ver.l Spring 2003http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Bergman_llast03.pdf

In addition to posing insurmountable military opportunity costs and the potential of another costlyarms race, space weapons directly threaten the fiscal health of the space sector itself. Use ofdestructive weapons in space would obviously promote an orbital debris problem that is on thethreshold of becoming a major inhibitor to space commerce. Currently the U.S. SpaceSurveillance Network used ground based radar and opticallinfrared sensors to track roughly 7,500objects across orbital space. That constitutes objects greater than 10cm in diameter in low Earthorbit to objects greater than Irn in diameter in geostationary orbit. Only approximately five percentof those objects are operating satellites; the rest are effectively debris, 40 per cent of which arefragments of disintegrates satellites and upper stages of rockets. Unfortunately there are between30,000 and 100,000 untracked objects between lcm, and l O cm in diameter and an unknown butenormous number of particles smaller than 1cm. While the environment is

some space HH~"HJH"active protection through shielding is already a requirement. Getting this shielding to orbit is anadded expense to an already low profit margin industry. Anv weapon use in space, butparticularly proliferating weapons use in space, could readily make space a no-go area ofdangerous debris, in the process preempting commercial and civil development.Beyond the use of weapons in space the satellite insurance business is extremely volatile. In thelast four years, satellite insurance rates have risen by 129 per cent driven by increasing complexityand anomalies of satellite systems. The mere presence of weapons poses a risk and insurancecompanies structure their rates on risk estimates. The resolution approach for the insurerswill be to strengthen their exclusion clauses for acts of war-and pass the risks to the financierswho will have to decide to go to space without such insurance or not go at all.

expensive hardening and increasing risk (perceived by insurers and/or assumed by financiers) allproducing an inaccessible international space commerce environment.

13
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Bergman_llast03.pdfhttp://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Bergman_llast03.pdf

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

15/51


Arms Race ExtensionsPursuing SpaceWeapons will start an expensive process that we might not winTheresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? April] 8, 2002http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm

Such a strategic-level space race could have negative consequences for U.S. security in the longr!!!! that would outweigh the obvious (and tremendous) short-term advantage of being the first withspace-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbital weapon systemsand keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U.S. space-weapon capabilities - raising theproverbial question of whether we would be starting a game we might not be able to win. (Itshould be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in space warfare, in that spaceassets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, haveinherent vulnerabilities.) Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial-with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercial firms between $300million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, accordingto Ed Cornet, vice president of Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm. 130

1 4
http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfmhttp://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

16/51

Space NegD D W 2 00 8Benischeck

Arms Race ExtensionsForeign powers will rebel against national missile defense

Gary Brown and Dr Gary Klintworth Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 5 December 2000,http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/RP/2000-01l01RP16.htm#against

In today's world the US is the predominant strategic power. The Russian Federation retains asubstantial nuclear arsenal, though there are concerns that its command-and-control and othersupporting infrastructure has been seriously degraded by shortage of resources over the lastdecade.(98) But the relative importance of lesser nuclear powers such as China has undoubtedlyincreased. Neither Russia nor China support NMDand can be relied upon to do what they canto prevent itsdeployment. But they recognise that this may not be possible, and are therefore sayingthat if NMDgoes ahead (which would also spell the end of the ABM Treaty as now understood)theywillhave no option but to upgrade their strategic nuclear forces. For China in particular thisis necessary, because its present nuclear force is both small and, in terms of delivery systems, basic.will be most effective against the least sophisticated delivery systems. But, in view of the well-knowndecline of the military since the fall of the USSR, even Moscow may feel that it needs at least afully modernised front-line ICBM and warhead re-entry system to maintain its strategicposition vis-a.-visthe United States. Thus it is likely that Beijing will move to expand andupgrade the effectiveness of its nuclear delivery systems should the US deploy NMD.Unfortunately it is not only the US that takes careful note of Chinese nuclear and missiledevelopments. India in particular is highly sensitive to such and it is generally agreed that anunderlying motive for India's move to overt nuclear weapons status in 1998 was concern aboutChina. (99)(India has a clear conventional military advantage over China's friend Pakistan, which isnow in a nuclear standoff with India, but the Indians fear Chinese intervention in support ofPakistan). Thus a Chinese nuclear upgrade is likely to draw some response from Delhi, and that inturn will not go unnoticed in Pakistan. NMDdeployment could therefore act as a stimulus for atrigger a latter-day nuclear arms race in a world which would also be without the stabilisingeffects of the ABM Treaty.

15

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

17/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckArms Race Extensions

National Missile Defense stretches our relations with allies

Gary Brown and Dr Gary Klintworth Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Group 5 December 2000,http://www.aph.gov.aulLibrary/pubs/RP/2000-01/01RP16.htm#againstIthas already been noted that the US has had difficulty in enlisting the support of allies for itsNMD effort; the major NATO allies in particular are deeply sceptical. negative report from aUK Parliamentary committee has already been noted, but other US allies are equallyunenthusiastic.i'V" Earlier this year French President Chirac described NMD as of 'a nature toretrigger a proliferation of weapons, notably nuclear missiles. Everything that goes in thedirection of proliferation is a bad direction', while Canada's Foreign Minister said 'there are somany other ways we could be pursuing stability. We have expressed very strong concernsthat any movement of the national missile defense that abrogates the ABM Treaty would bewrong. We don't like anything that would further expand acceleration of missilecapacity' .003)

Anti-missile programs only threaten us moreSteven A. Hildreth Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, July19,2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weaponsIRL31111.pdfCritics, however, take issue with assertions that the threat is increasing, citing evidence that thenumber of nations seeking or possessing nuclear weapons has actually declined over the pasttwenty years. Moreover, they argue that the technology for effective missile defense remainsimmature, that deployment can be provocative to allies, friends, and adversaries, and it is abudget-buster that reduces the availability of funds to modernize and operate U.S. conventionalmilitary forces. They argue especially that some major powers view U.S. missile defense as anattempt at strategic domination and that other, such as China, will expand their missile capabilities

16
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weaponsIRL31111.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weaponsIRL31111.pdf

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

18/51


Arms Race ExtensionsRussia vows to match the USwith building space weapons

Domainb.com, A news website focusing on news in he space and aeronautics field October 3,2007,http://www.domainb.com!aero/OctoberI2007/20071003_retaliate.htmThe chief of Russia's space forces has said that Moscow would follow suit if others deployweapons in space. Col-Gen Vladimir Popovkin did not name any specific country, but he ~clearly referring to US plans for space-based weapons, which the Kremlin had vociferouslyopposed.

Russia and China have strongly pushed for an international agreement banning spaceweapons, but their overtures have been snubbed by the United ~tates. Popovkin warned that thecomplexity of space weapons could even trigger a war. He said that satellites could fail forpurely technical reasons, but their owners could think they were incapacitated by an enemy andretaliate. A country reliant on space defences could legitimately suspect that any satellite failure isthe beginning of an enemy effort to deafen and blind it, Popovkin said.

17
http://www.domainb.com%21aero/OctoberI2007/20071003_retaliate.htmhttp://www.domainb.com%21aero/OctoberI2007/20071003_retaliate.htm

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

19/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckSpace Based Weapons not Effective

SDI will not have the success or strategic usefulness as was originally planned forGary Brown and Dr Gary Klintworth Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 5 December 2000,http://www.aph.gov.aulLibrary/pubsIRP/2000-01/01RPI6.htm#againstPerhaps the most striking thing about the American pursuit of technologies to defeat ballistic missileattack has been its singlemindness. Notwithstanding dramatic political and strategic change sincePresident Reagan first announced his Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, and despite numeroustechnological failures and setbacks, the United States continues to pursue a technology-basedsolution to the problem of ballistic missile attack.

even this radically slashed objective is proving exceptionally difficult to achieve.Ithas been suggested in the section of this paper giving arguments against NMD that the US has (notfor the first time) actually been 'talking up' possible threats in order to justify its ongoing interestin NMD. Certainly there seem to be signs of moderating tendencies in both North Korea and Iran, stateshigh on the US ballistic missile threat list, and both have announced halts to long-range missiledevelopment. Be that as it may, it is certainly true (as even official supporters of the programacknowledge) that the US has allowed its threat perceptions to drive the NMD project into a high-risk configuration. This has involved preparing for early deployment at a time when few of thescheduled tests have been conducted (and not all of those successfully), and when some key componentshave not been tested at all. This is an approach which violates many basic precepts of major militaryproject management and which certainly increases the risk of delay, cost blowouts and even failure.There are questions as to whether or not the United ,tates will be able to deploy an NMD systemwhich can protect it from attack by weapons of mass destruction. There is the issue of the NMDtechnology itself and the fact that NMD does nothing to protect the US from WMD delivered bymeans other than a ballistic missile-in particular, covert means that simply bypass the whole NMDcomplex and, moreover, offer would-be attackers other advantages.

18

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

20/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckThreat Exaggerated

The Threat of ICBMs is exaggerated

Gary Brown and Dr Gary Klintworth Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group 5 December 2000,http://www.aph.gov.aulLibrary/pubsIRP/2000-01/01RP16.htm#againstHowever the NIE has been challenged on several grounds. First, that it arrived at a higher ballisticmissile threat to the US by 'moving the goalposts'-i.e. by making the definition of whatconstitutes a threat easier to meet. Thus it substituted what was possible in the way of futuredevelopments for what was probable, the earlier standard. Again, it made it easier to identify a threatto the US by redefining the US as the whole territory thereof instead of the 48 contiguous states, aspreviously. This made it possible to claim a North Korean threat to the US because some remoteparts of Alaska could just be reached by Taepo Dong 1with a minimal payload, though the mainpart of the US remains unreachable. Finally, the NIE changed the criterion for a threat from whena country could deploy a long-range missile to the much easier to meet requirement of when acountry could first test a missile. (79)Thus it appears that in recent times the US has been redefining threats in such a manner as tomagnify them, thereby creating an apparent justification or requirement for countermeasureswhich, on another assessment, might be unnecessary. This is in fact not unusual conduct for the USdefence and intelligence establishment: in the last years of the Cold War, with Gorbachev in power inMoscow and the Soviet Union in obvious military decline, the Pentagon continued to issue analarmist military assessment, Soviet Military Power, which made the most extraordinary claims aboutthe USSR's military capabilities at a time when the state was in fact on the verge of collapse. (80) Themotive in this casewas similar to that driving those who seek to magnify the NMD threat-to preservea budget and organisation which might otherwise come under close scrutiny. The Pentagon's use ofthis device was unsuccessful in preventing post Cold War defence budget cuts; it remains to be seenwhether exaggeration of the missile threat to the US will have more success.

19

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

21/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckThreat Exaggerated

Our largest threat does not originate from foreign missiles

Bill Richardson, January/February 2008 http://www.foreignaffairs .org1200801 01faessay87111-p30lbill-richardsonla-new-realism.htmlMost urgently, we need to focus on the real security threats from which Iraq has sodangerously diverted our attention. This means doing the hard work to build strong coalitions toinfiltrate and destroy terrorist networks, to stop nuclear proliferation, and to keep nuclear weaponsout of the hands of terrorists. In the twenty-first century, a nuclear threat will come not from amissile but from a suitcase or a cargo hull. In such a world, nuclear security will not beachieved with missile defense or a new generation of nuclear weapons. It will come throughtough, patient, determined diplomacy to secure fissile material worldwide.

20
http://www.foreignaffairs/http://www.foreignaffairs/

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

22/51


Solvency Frontline1. Solar Satellites have an extremely short life

Robert McLeod, Professor of Electrical and Computer Science, September 12.2006,http://entropyproduction.blogspot.com/2006/07 /solar-power-satellite.htmlA further problem is that satellites in geosynchronous orbit are outside the Earth'smagnetosphere, leaving them open to bombardment by charged particles. This willdrastically limit their lifetime compared to ground-based systems. A satellite in geosynchronousorbit will see a flux of 6.1013 (1 MeV electrons) cm' year" (with considerable variation year-to-year depending on solar flare activity). A 1Mega electron volt particle is highly energetic andmore than enough to break bonds and eject K and L-shell electrons from semiconductors. A solarcell in geosynchronous orbit will typically lose 5-6 % of its performance per year. Comparethat to ground based units that are guaranteed to provide 90 % power after 12.5 years, or a loss of0.8 %/year. We can see that even if a space solar panel receives 8x the insolation of a ground~.~~e~l~Il~t.!t.~i!l._!Il..._!~.~!_.J~.~.~~.Il~..~....I.~~~~Il~~g:y~!.er it~._.Ill.Il~..~ .~~.?~_!~~..!~!~.!!Ill~~...'I'~~._."Yi~~pe~iaartiCle-Clarmsallfetimeo(2CYyearsbLlt 'thatis not r e a f l s t l c : - the e c o n o m i c s s u f f e r ' a s a r e s u l t -

21
http://entropyproduction.blogspot.com/2006/07http://entropyproduction.blogspot.com/2006/07

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

23/51


Solvency Frontline2.We don't have the technology to develop Space based power

Dwayne A. Day, Phd. In Poli Sci, Space Journalist and historian, June 9, 2008http://www.thespacereview.comlarticleIl14 7 1 1The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere neardeveloping practical SSP and that it is not a viable solution for even the military's limitedrequirements. Itstates that the technology to implement space solar power does not currentlyexist ... and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology developmentmust occur before it is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the keytechnology requirement is cheap access to space, which no longer seems as achievable as itdid three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the discussion andhope others solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love withthe messenger.

Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study Report to the National Security Space Office October 10, 2007http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htmSeveral major challenges will need to be overcome to make SBSP a reality. including thecreation of low cost space access and a supporting infrastructure system on Earth and inspace. Solving these space access and operations challenges for SBSP will in turn also openspace for a host of other activities that include space tourism, manufacturing, lunar or asteroidresource utilization, and eventually settlement to extend the human race. Because DoD wouldnot want to own SBSP satellites, but rather just purchase the delivered energy as it currently doesvia traditional terrestrial utilities, a repeated review finding is that the commercial sector will needGovernment to accomplish three major tasks to catal ze SBSP develo ment. The first' to retirea e ear v ec ruca rrs s. IS can e accom s e VIa an mcremenresearch and development program that culminates with a space - borneproof - of - concept demonstration in the next decade. A spiral development proposal to fielda 10 MW continuous pilot plant en route to gigawatts - class systems is included in Appendix B.The second challenge is to facilitate the policy. regulatory, legal. and organizationalinstruments that will be necessary to create the partnerships and relationships(commercial - commercial, government - commercial, and government - government) neededfor this concept to succeed. The final Government contribution is to become a direct earlyadopter and to incentivize other early adopters much as is accomplished on a regular basis withother renewable energy systems coming on - line today.

22
http://www.thespacereview.comlarticleil14/http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htmhttp://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/nsso.htmhttp://www.thespacereview.comlarticleil14/

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

24/51

Space NegDDW2008Benischeck4. Before Space Based Solar can be used it must be proved SafeAstra, Magazine Specializing On Space Study and Management, Spring 2008,http://www.nss.org/adastraiAdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdfAssuring that a space solar power satellite can be operated safely- even in the face ofoperator error-is a critical requirement. There are several issues to consider: (1) assuringthat the satellite's power beam is directed toward-and only toward-the desired targetreceiver; (2) delivering the beam energy precisely-without exceeding established radiofrequency (RF) or light intensity limits outside a known receiver area; (3) establishing "fail-safe"methods and systems to minimize any risk (4) guaranteeing that under normal operations thepower beam will not harm plants or animals near the receiver on the ground; and, finally (5)assuring that all other operations (including launch, manufacturing, etc.) are conducted inaccordance with established industrial and government safety standards. Future efforts mustassure that these and related issues are addressed effectively and transparently for energy fromspace to be accepted by the public.

23
http://www.nss.org/adastraiAdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdfhttp://www.nss.org/adastraiAdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

25/51


Space Based Solar Fails ExtensionSupporters of Spaced based power ignore the technical problems

Dwayne A. Day, Phd. In Poli Sci, Space Journalist and historian, June 9, 2008http://www.thespacereview.com/artic1e/ 1147/1But there's also another factor at work: naivete. Space activists tend to have littleunderstanding of military space, coupled with an idealistic impression of its managementcompared to NASA, whom many space activists have come to despise. For instance, they fail torealize that the military s_paceprogram is currently in no better shape, and in many casesworse shape, than NASA. The majority of large military space acquisition programs haveexperienced major problems, in many cases cost growth in excess of 100%. Although NASAhas a bad public record for cost overruns, the DoD's less-public record is far worse, and militaryspace has a bad reputation in Congress, which would never allow such a big, expensive newprogram to be started.this is not to insult the fine work conductedpower an amount any resources.itis nonsensical for members of the space activist community to claim that "the militarysupports space solar power" based solely on a study that had no money, produced by anorganization that has no clout.

24
http://www.thespacereview.com/artic1e/http://www.thespacereview.com/artic1e/

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

26/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckBizcon/lnvestor Confidence link

SpaceWeapons will destroy investor confidence and damage the satellite sector

Hitchens, Theresa. "U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From "War of Words" to Cold War in Space." China Security.(Winter 2007): http://www.spacedebate.org/argumentll162Certainly, it is in the interest of no spacefaring power for near-Earth orbit to become so pollutedas to become unusable - an outcome that cannot be ruled out over the long-term in a weaponizedspace environment. But even in the short-term, an increase in the threat from space debris couldhave negative consequences for space-faring nations and space operators. A report on thepotential market impacts of the Chinese ASAT test by U.S. market consulting firm Teal Groupfound: "About the last thing that the satellite market needs now is the uncertainty that willaccompany any moves to start blowing up objects in space or arming military satellites withprotective countermeasures. The added debris problem is bad enough. An ASAT weapons racewill have the effect of increasing the financial risk of any satellite program, and this willundoubtedly be felt most within the commercial market through decreased investor confidence

> ; i " "

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

27/51

Space NegD DW 2 00 8Benischeck

Politics Links- NASA PopularBoth Parties support NASA FundingAndrew Taylor, Associated Press Writer, October 4,2007, LexisThe Senate decided Thursday to add $1 billion to NASA's budget as both Democrats andRepublicans voted to further break President Bush's budget for domestic programs.The money would replenish NASA accounts tapped to make improvements to the space shuttleprogram in the wake of the crash of the Columbia shuttle. The space agency has tapped non-shuttle accounts such as science and other space exploration programs for about $2.7 billion forsafety upgrades and other costs identified after the 2003 disaster."NASA is being starved," said Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., adding that without the money, thenext-generation Constellation space flight program wouldn't be able to launch astronautsinto orbit until 2015. The last shuttle flight is slated for 2010.The funding was added to a $56 billion measure

yearuntil the Senate returns from a weeklong recess.The voice vote approval of the NASA money reflected widespread support for the agencyamong lawmakers, including Republicans from states such as Florida, Texas and Alabama, hometo large NASA facilities.

26

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

28/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckPolitics links- NASA Funding Unpopular

Increased NASA funding is unpopular

Stewart M. Powell, Houston Chronicle Washington Bureau, Jnne 17, 2008http://www.chron.com!disp/story .mpl/space/5 843539 .htmlWASHINGTON - Key arguments being made by supporters of increased NASA fundingare not resonating with the American public, a new Gallup Poll released Tuesday found.The poll conducted for a business group called the Coalition for Space Exploration found thatvoters strongly approve of the venerable space agency's work but are reluctant to pay moretaxes to finance new initiatives.The Gallup survey - released just a day before the House is scheduled to vote on adding $2.9billion to the NASA budget - undercut a kev argument being used by Texas lawmakers intheir bid to persuade Congress to boost spending: that more money is needed to compete in spaceagainst China and to close a five-year gap in manned U.S. space operations between retirement ofthe shuttle fleet in 2010 and launch of the Constellation in 2015.

27
http://www.chron.com%21disp/storyhttp://www.chron.com%21disp/story

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

29/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckInnovation Frontline

1. The United States has already lost its spot as a leading innovatorMarket Activity and News, a news site focusing on economics and market trends, 9/26/06, http://e-nvestments.blogspot.coml2006/09/us-loses-top-competitiveness-spot.htmlThe US has lost its status as the world's most competitive economy, according to the WorldEconomic Forum. The US now ranks only sixth in the body's league table of global competitiveness,behind Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Singapore. Risks attached to the large US trade andfiscal deficits prompted its fall. The UK has retained its place among the world's 10 most competitiveeconomies but China, Russia and Brazil have all fallen down the rankings.

2.The Plan doesn't Address the root cause ofAmerican decay, a failing educational system

fears-for-U.S.-competitiveness/2100-1008_3-5598936.htm1"We have a lousy education system," Intel Senior Vice President Pat Gelsinger said, speaking on apanel of technology leaders at the here. "We have a weak infrastructure that isdecaying."Gelsinger noted that companies like Intel can adjust by hiring workers in other places but said theconsequences for the United States could be devastating. He has noted in the past that the decline inthe number of doctorates being awarded is particularly troubling."As a global company, this is OK," he said. "As a U.S. citizen, I am fearful. Ijust fear for our long-termcompetitiveness. "Microsoft Chief Technical Officer Craig Mundie echoed those concerns. "The U.S. is increasingly in adeficit situation in its education," Mundie said.Mundie's boss, Gates, last week put a finer point on it, declaring that "America's high schools areobsolete:'

28

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

30/51

Space NegD OW 20 08Benischeck

Innovation Frontline3. The onlyway to increase American Competitiveness is through BasicResearch andEducationional Research and DevelopmentNSF, National Science Foundation, January 2008, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/starLhtmU.S. industry and the Federal Government are the primary pillars of financial support for the U.S.research and development (R&D)lZl enterprise. The National Science Board (Board) observes withconcern the indicators of stagnation, and even decline in some discipline areas, in support for U.S. R&D,and especially basic research, by these two essential patrons and participants. A decline inpublications by industry authors in peer reviewed journals suggests a de-emphasis by U.S.industry on expanding the foundations of basic scientific knowledge. More specifically, researchcontributions by U.S. industry authors in the physical and biomedical sciences throughpublications in peer reviewed journals have decreased substantially over the last decade. In addition,in this century the industry share of support for basic research in universities and colleges, theprimary performers of U.S. basic research, has also been declining. Likewise, Federal Government ~ s u p p o r r f o r a c a ( { e r n i c R . ~ D f g c l c D e g " a n T a m l ig i i i C 2 0 ( } 5 r o r ' U r e l i r s f f i m E t i r i a i j u a r t e r c e n l U f y : 'w 1 1 i T e c , . ,Federal and industry support for their own basic research has stagnated over the last several years. Thesetrends are especially alarming in light of the growing importance of knowledge-based industries in theglobal economy.

29
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/starLhtmhttp://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/starLhtm

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

31/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckInnovation Frontline

4. High Healthcare costs destroy competitiveness and force jobs overseasLee Hudson Teslik, Assistant Editor Toni Johnson. Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations, MarchIS, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publicationIl3325/Employer-funded coverage is the structural mainstay of the U.S. health insurance system. According to2005 data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the most recent official data available, employer-providedhealth benefits cover 175 million Americans, or about 60 percent of the population. Those numbershave fallen since 2001, when 65 percent of the country had some form of employer coverage, based ondata from the Kaiser Family Foundation, a nonprofit focused on healthcare issues. Premiums haveskyrocketed, rising S7 percent since 2000. In 2004, health coverage became the most expensive benefitpaid by U.S. employers, according to a report by the Employment Policy Foundation.

million employees and former employees, footing healthcare costs presents an enormous expense-thecompany says it spent roughly $5.6 billion on healthcare expenses in 2006. GM says healthcare costsalone add $1,500 to the sticker price of every automobile it makes, and estimates that by 200S thatnumber could reach $2,000."In many places, you have small businesses that simply cannot afford to offer coverage." -- Rep. JohnSarbanesItis difficult to quantify the precise effect high healthcare costs have had so far on the U.S. job market.Healthcare is one of several factors-entrenched union contracts are another-that make doing businessin the United States expensive and it's difficult to parse the effects of each factor. Moreover, economistsdisagree on the number of U.S. jobs that have been lost to offshoring-the transfer of business. . ..... .Alan S. Blinder, in a 2006 Foreign Affairs article, says that judging by data compiled from "fragmentarystudies," it is apparent that "under a million service-sector jobs in the United States have been lost tooffshoring to date." Blinder goes on to predict that somewhere between 28million and 42millionU.S. jobs are "susceptible" to offshoring in a future where technology allows the more efficienttransfer of jobs. Many other economists, however, have shied away from making such estimates, andsome have criticized Blinder's approach.Itis clear, however, that health care expenses affect every level of U.S. industry. For largecorporations they mean the massive "legacy costs" associated with insuring retired employees. For smallbusiness owners they can be even more devastating. "In many places, you have small businesses thatsimply cannot afford to offer coverage," Sarbanes says. Often, he says, healthcare expenses make itimpossible for small business owners to hire candidates they would otherwise desire.

30
http://www.cfr.org/publicationIl3325/http://www.cfr.org/publicationIl3325/

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

32/51

Space NegDDW2008BenischeckInnovation -Extensions

Investment in Education is essential to American Success

Chad Holliday Jr.and Graham B. Spanier, Holliday Jr. is chairman of the Council on Competitivenessand Spanier is president of Pennsylvania State University, Apr. 11, 2008http://www.philly.comlinquirer/ opinionl20080411_Science _education_research_need_a_ boost_from_U_S_.htmlHowever, when political push came to budgetary shove, all these words of support turned out to behollow. The $555 billion government spending bill signed into law by the president in Decemberleft science out in the cold.Those of us from the nation's private sector and higher education have long advocated a renewedcommitment to funding scientific research. The Council on Competitiveness and its membership of150 CEOs, university presidents and labor leaders recently issued its Five for the Future competitiveness'/e ,(l~eIlda,.\V~iS.h.e..~et~~l.~...~.~t~e~....~.~!e~~~~.~.~..t~~.~l1?l?'X..~.~e..~/~.~x~te?l1..~.~?I?l1g-terIll ..Y:~~?~?Illi~ ..~ll~.~.~.~~:'tJiis/caHtoaCtioIl c i i e s l e a d e r s h i p aiiiie f r o n t i e r of sCience/anifiechnoIogY i t s a compedHve' /... ..advantage, particularly to those poised to rapidly translate new knowledge and insight into high-valueproducts and services.Americans have prospered for more than two centuries because we are explorers and seekers of newknowledge. Science is the bedrock upon which U.S. economic growth has rested since the nation'sleadership responded to the 1957 launch of Sputnik with a substantial investment in research andeducation. Federally supported basic research was the basis for an extraordinary array oftechnological advances, from the Internet and global positioning systems to MRIs and MP3 players.New investments are likely to produce the next-generation Internet, alternative energy sources, andinventions we can now barely imagine.

31
http://www.philly.comlinquirer/http://www.philly.comlinquirer/

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

33/51


Ban Weapons CounterplanCP TextThe United States Federal Government should ban the destruction of satellites, as well as thedevelopment, testing, and deployment of space weapons and ground based ASATs, and should complywith all international regulations established to maintain, strengthen, and monitor such a ban

1.The United States is essential to a baneNS. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2006,http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/armscontro]/internationaII

Since 2002, there have been two primary space arms control proposals discussed within the CD: !!tE~~!X~~~!li~g~B~.f:.~.."'!~~B()!l?.~rlsI..!~e.g~~

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

34/51


Ban Weapons Counterplon2.A Ban on SpaceWeapons would solve the problems ofspace warfare

Jeffrey Lewis Graduate Research Fellow at the Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland CollegePark, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation. 2002http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/filcs/armscontrolalt.pdf

Ifdefensive deployments in space cannot keep pace with offensive developments on the ground, thesome means of restraining offensive capabilities needs to be found needs to be found to even the playingfield. The most obvious mechanism for restraint is a ban on the destruction of satellites, supportedby bans on the testing and deployment of space based weapons and ground based ASATs. Such anagreement might also include separation requirements or "keep out" zones to prevent thedeployment of space mines, as well as protocols for on orbit inspections and confidence buildingmeasures. During the 1980s, several groups, including the Union of Concerned Scientists, preparedsimilar draft treaties that outlined these basic principles. Currently, the government of the People'sRepublic of China, is circulating a working paper outlining elements of an agreement concerning tn e ' 't p r 'e v e n t l O n 'o f a n ' a r m s r a c e 'i i i ' o u te r ' s p a c t : t T P 'A R O S ) i i f f n t r C o ' n l ' e r e n c e o 11 D l ' s a rm a m e n r a C '" .Geneva. Continues ... Although defensive deployments will have difficulty keeping up with unrestrainedoffensive developments, under the constraints imposed by arms control measures, the United Statescould deploy sufficient defenses to defeat these sorts of "cheap shots". Moreover such an agreementwould enhance U.S. deterrence in space because the United States would retain the most capablebreak-out capability of any country.

33
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/filcs/armscontrolalt.pdfhttp://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/filcs/armscontrolalt.pdf

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

35/51

Space NegD OW 20 08Benischeck

Ban Weapons CP ExtensionsOther nations will be willing to support the banNorman Polmar is an analyst, historian, and author specializing in naval and strategic issues. February15,2008, http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004003.htmlRussia and China -- enemies for most of the Cold War 0 - have joined together to propose a newtreaty to ban space weapons. The proposal comes a little more than one year after Chinademonstrated that it possessed an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability.Russia (at the time the Soviet Union) and the United States had earlier demonstrated the ability todestroy satellites in orbit. In January 2007, the Chinese employed an SC-19 ballistic missile to firedirectly at and destroy an outdated Feng- Yun-I C weather satellite at an altitude of 527 miles above theearth. Two previous ASAT attempts by China may have been intentional "misses" for test purposes.Reportedly, at the time of those earlier missile launches the U.S. intelligence community believed thatsurprise when the ASAT capability was demonstrated, creating a massive field of space debris.Now China has joined Russia in proposing a ban on all weapons in space. The proposal was voicedby Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on 12 February at an international disarmament conferencein Geneva. "Without preventing an arms race in space, international security will be wanting," hetold the conference. "The task of preventing an arms race in space is on the conference's agenda.It's time ... to start serious practical work in this field," he said.

34
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004003.htmlhttp://www.defensetech.org/archives/004003.html

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

36/51


Ban Weapons CPExtensionsRussia and China support banning space weaponsNew Scientist Space and Reuters, February 12,2008, http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn13312-russia-proposes-treaty-to-ban-space-weapons.htmlRussia proposed a treaty on Tuesday to ban the deployment of weapons in outer space, warningthat their development could lead to a new arms race and a repeat of the Cold War.The draft treaty, also backed by China at a UN-sponsored forum, would prohibit the deployment ofweapons in space and the use or threat of force against satellites or other spacecraft, Russia'sForeign Minister Sergei Lavrov said."Weapons deployment in space by one state will inevitably result in a chain reaction," Lavrov saidin a speech at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. "This, in turn, is

Tensions between Russia and the US have deepened in recent years over US plans to revive itsstalled "Star Wars" programme from the 1980s with a new generation of missile defence shields.Moscow has repeatedly denounced US plans to build part of the missile shield infrastructure informer Soviet satellites in Europe.Lavrov said the nuclear arms race had led to the Cold War, "which lasted over four decades and resultedin a gigantic waste of material and other resources at the expense of finding solutions to the problem ofdevelopment" ."Is it worthwhile to repeat the history?" he said.

Cross-ApplicationsA lack of space weapons will not be detrimental to US security-CIA Mueller 02 ev. That Space Weaponization is not inevitable-CIA Hitchins 02 evidence that enemies will attack the US conventionally or through terror attacks-CIA Brown and Klintworth 200 and Richardson 08 ev. That ICBS do not pose a real threat to the US.

35
http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn13312-http://space.newscientist.com/article/dn13312-

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

37/51

C o l o n iz a ti o n F a i lsDDWD8ShannonSpace Colonization is impossible- it would take magic tricks to get us there.

Stross, grad degree in computer science at Bradford University, 6117/7, ["Interstellar Colonization Is Really Difficult"http://gr

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

38/51

CoionizationFaiisDOW 08ShannonSpace colonization is a joke; it would take lifetimes to get to an inhabitable planet and take vastamounts of energy.Stross, grad degree in computer science at Bradford University, 6/17/7, [http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2007/06/the_high_frontier_redux.html]

And] don't want to spend much time talking about the unspoken ideological underpinnings of the urge to space colonization,other than to point out that they're there, that the case for space colonization isn't usually presented as aneconomic enterprise so much as a quasi-religious one. "We can't afford to keep all our eggs in one basket"isn't so much a justification as an appeal to sentimentality, for in the hypothetical case of a planet-trashingcatastrophe, we (who currently inhabit the surface of the Earth) are dead anyway. The future extinct ion of the human speciescannot affect you if you are already dead: strictly speaking, i t should be of no personal concern.Historicallv, crossing oceans and setting up farmsteads on new lands conveniently stripped of indigenousinhabitants by disease has been a cost-effective proposition. But the scale factor involved in space travelis strongly counter-intuitive.Here's a handy metaphor: let's approximate one astronomical unit - the distance between the Earth andthe sun, roughly 150 million kilometres, or 600 times the distance from the Earth to the Moon - to one centimetre.Got that? lAU = lcm. (You may want to get hold of a ruler to follow through with this one.)The solar system is conveniently small. Neptune, the outermost planet in our solar system, orbits the sun at a distance of almostexactly 30AU, or 30 centimetres - one foot (in imperial units). Giant Jupiter is 5.46 AU out from the sun, almost exactly twoWe've sent space probes to Jupiter; they take two and a half years to get there if we send them on a straight Hohmann transferorbit, but we can get there a bit faster using some fancy orbital mechanics. Neptune is still a stretch - only one spacecraft,Voyager 2, has made it out there so far. Its journey time was 12 years, and it wasn't stopping. (It's now on its way out intointerstel lar space, having passed the heliopause some years ago.)The Kuiper belt, domain of icy wandering dwarf planets like Pluto and Eris, extends perhaps another 30AU, before merging intothe mueh more tenuous Hil ls cloud and Oort cloud, domain of loosely coupled long-period comets.Now for the first scale shock: using our handy metaphor the Kuiper belt is perhaps a metre in diameter. The Oort cloud, incontrast, is as much as 50,000 AU in radius - its outer edge lies half a kilometre away.Got that? Our planetary solar system is 30 centimetres, roughly a foot, in radius. But to get to the edge of the Oort cloud, youhave to go half a kilometre, roughly a third of a mile.Next on our tour is Proxima Centauri, our nearest star. (There might be a brown dwarf or two lurking unseen in the icy depthsbeyond the Oort cloud, but if we've spotted one, I'm unaware of it.) Proxima Centauri is 4.22 light years away. A light year is 63.2x 103 AU, or 9.46 x 1012 Km. So Proxima Centauri, at 267,000 AU, isjust under two and a third kilometres, or two miles (in oldmoney) away from us.But Proxima Centauri is a poor choice, if we're looking for habitable real estate. While cxoplanets are apparently common asmuck, terrestrial planets are harder to find; Gliese 581c, the first such to be detected (and it looks like a pretty weird one, at that),. . . .Try to get a handle on this: it takes us 2-5 years to travel two inches, But the proponents of interstellartravel are talking about journeys of ten miles. That's the first point I want to get across: that if the distancesinvolved in interplanetary travel are enormous, and the travel times fit to rival the first Australian settlers.then the distances and times involved in interstellar travel are mind-numbing.This is not to say that interstellar travel is impossible; quite the contrary. But to do so effectively you needeither (a) outrageous amounts of cheap energy, or (b) highly efficient robot probes, or (c) a magic wand. And in the absenceof (c) you're not going to get any news back from the other end in less than decades. Even if (a) is achievable, or by means of (b)we can send self-replicating factories and have them turn distant solar systems into hives of industry, and more speculatively findsome way to transmit human beings there, they are going to have zero net economic impact on our circumstances (except insofaras sending them out costs us money).What do I mean by outrageous amounts of cheap energy?Let's postulate that in the future, it will be possible to wave a magic wand and construct a camping kit that encapsulates all theneecssary technologies and information to rebuild a human civilization capable of eventually sending out interstellar colonizationmissions - a bunch of self-replicating, self-repairing robotic hardware, and a downloadable copy of the sum total of humanknowledge to date . Let 's also be generous and throw in a closed-circuit l ife support system capable of keeping a human occupantalive indefinitely, for many years at a stretch, with zero failures and losses, and capable where necessary of providing medicalintervention. Let's throw in a willing astronaut (the fool!) and stick them inside this assembly. It's going to be pretty boring inthere, but T think we can conceive of our minimal manned interstellar mission as being about the size and mass of a Mercurycapsule. And I'm going to nail a target to the barn door and call it 2000kg in total.

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

39/51

ColonizationFailsDOW 08Shannon(Of course we can cut corners, but I've already invoked self-replicat ing robotic factories and closed-cycle life support systems,and those are close enough to magic wands as it is. I'm going to deliberately ignore more speculative technologies such asstarwisps, mind transfer, or Als sufficiently powerful to operate autonomously - although r used them shamelessly in my novelAccelerando. What I'm trying to do here is come up with a useful metaphor for the energy budget realistically required forinterstellar flight.)Incidentally, a probe massing 1-2 tons with an astronaut on top is a bit implausible, but a 1-2 ton probe could conceivably carryenough robotic instrumentation to do useful research, plus a laser powerful enough to punch a signal home, and maybe even thatshrink-wrapped mili tary/industrial complex in a tin can that would allow it to build something useful at the other end. Anythingmuch smaller, though, isn't going to be able to transmit its findings to us - at least, not without some breakthroughs incommunication technology that haven't shown up so far.Now, let's say we want to deliver our canned monkey to Proxima Centauri within its own lifetime. We'resending them on a one-way trip, so a 42 year flight time isn't unreasonable. (Their job is to supervise the machinery as it unpacksitself and begins to brew up a bunch of new colonists using an artificial uterus. Okay?) This means they need to achieve a meancruise speed of 10% of the speed of light. They then need to decelerate at the other end. At 10% of c relativistic effects are minor- there's going to be time dilation, but it'll be on the order of hours or days over the duration of the 42-year voyage. So we needto accelerate our astronaut to 30,000,000 metres per second, and decelerate them at the other end. Cheating and using Newton'slaws of motion, the kinetic energy acquired by acceleration is 9 x 1017 Joules, so we can call it 2 x 1018 Joules in round numbersfor the entire trip. NB: This assumes that the propulsion system in use is 100% efficient at converting energy into momentum,that there are no losses from friction with the interstellar medium, and that the propulsion source is external - that is, there's noneed to take reaction mass along en route. So this is a lower bound on the energy cost of transporting our Mercury-capsule sizedexpedition to Proxima Centauri in less than a lifetime.

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

40/51

ColonizationFailsDOW OSShannon

It's impossible- we would need to release the energy in an the worlds nuclear bombs to get halfway.Stross, grad degree in computer science at Bradford University, 6/17/7, [http://www.antipope.org/chariie/blog-static/2007 /06/the_high_frontier_redux.htmlJTo put this figure in perspective, the total conversion of one kilogram of mass into energy yields 9 x 1 0 1 6Joules, (Which one of my sources informs me, is about equivalent to 21.6 megatons in thermonuclearexplosive yield), So we require the equivalent energy output to 400 megatons of nuclear armageddon inorder to move a capsule of about the gross weight of a fully loaded Volvo V70 automobile to ProximaCentauri in less than a human lifetime, That's the same as the yield of the entire US Minuteman mrCBM force.For a less explosive reference point, our entire planetary economy runs on roughly 4 terawatts of electricity (4 x 1012 watts). So it would take our total p lanetaryelectricity production for a period of half a million seconds - roughly 5 days - to supply the necessary va-va-voom.But to bring this back to earth wi th a bump, le t me just remind you that this probe is so implausibly eff ic ient that it' s veer ing back into "magic wand" te rrit ory. I 've tap-danced past a 100% effici ent power transmission system capable of operating across inte rste lla r distances wi th pinpoint precis ion and no conversion losses , and thata llows the spacecraf t on the receiving end to conver t power direct ly into momentum. This is not exac tly li ke any power transmis sion system that anyone 's bui lt to thisdate, and I'm not sure I can see where it's coming from.Our one astronaut, 10% of c mission approximates well to an unmanned flight, but what about longer-term expeditions? Generation ships are a stap le of SF; they'reslow (probably under 1% of c) and they car ry a se lf -suff ic ient ci ty-sta te . The crew who se t off won't live to see thei r dest ination (the f li ght time to Proxima Centauri at1% of c is about 420 years), but the hope is that someone will. aside our lack of a proven track record at building social institutions that are stable

space rawand unusual, doing it to an entire city for several centuries probably as a againstAssuming the same super-efficient life support as our solitary explorer, we might postulate that each colonist ten tons of structural mass to move around in.(Abont the same as a large trailer home. For life.) We've cu t the peak velocity by an order of magnitude, but we've increased the payload requirement by an order ofmagnitude per passenger - and we need enough passengers to make a stable society fly. I'd guess a sensible lower number would be on the order of 200 people, thesize of a p rehistoric primate troupe. (Genetic diversity? I'm going to assume we can hand-wave around that by packing some deep-frozen sperm and ova, or frozenembryos. for later reuse.) By the time we work up to a minimal generation ship (and how minimal can we get, eonlining 200 human beings in an object weighing aout2000 tons, for roughly the same period of time that has elapsed since the Plymouth colony landed in what was later to become Massachusetts") we're actuallyrequiring much more energy than our sol itary high-speed explorer.And remember, this is only what it takes to go to Proxima Centauri our nearest neighbour. Gliese 581c is five times as far away. Planets that are already habitableinso far as they orbit inside the habitab le zone of their star, possess free oxygen in their atmosphere, and have a mass, surface gravity and escape velocity that are nottoo forbidding, are likely to be somewhat rarer. (And if there is free oxygen in the atmosphere on a planet, that impliessomething else - the presence of pre-existing photosynthetic life, a carbon cycle, and a bunch of otherstuff that could well unleash a big can of whoop-ass on an unprimed human immune system, The question ofhow we might interact with alien biologies is an order of magnitude bigger and more complex than the question of how we might get there - and the preliminaryoutlook is rather forbidding.)

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

41/51

Colonization FailsDDW08Shannon

Space colonization fails-Copernican logic proves.The New York Times, international news service, 7,17, 7, ["A Survival Imperative for Space Colonization",http://www.nytimes.eoml2007/07!l 7/science/ 17tier.html? .r=I&pagewanted=2&oref=slogi n]It might seem hard to imagine that humans would invent rockets and then never use them to settle otherworlds, but Dr. Gott notes that past civilizations, notably China, abandoned exploration. He also notes thathumans have been going into space for only 46 years - a worrisomely low number when usingCopernican logic to forecast the human spaceflight program's longevity.Since there's a 50 percent chance that we're already in the second half ofthe space program's totallifespan, Dr. Gott figures there is a 50 percent chance it will not last more than another 46 years. Maybethe reason civilizations don't get around to colonizing other planets is that there's a narrow window whenth~Yh

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

42/51

SBSoiar SpendingINDEX- DDW 2008Benischeck/Shannon

Notes;The Solar Disad is really no different than any other spending DA, except I have included adifferent internal link, this one deals with inflation, rather than investor confidence orotherwise. I think it carries a better chance of being unique, because the economy is so shittyright now. The story goes that the US is banking on the fact that rising inflation will make alltheir debts payable in a few years, but they are taking the countries holding our debts for idiots.The fact of the matter is that they aren't, and if we keep spending like we are, they are going towise up and call in our tab. Since we don't have the cash, it is going to fuck out markets in moreways than one.The link cards are pretty damn good, solar is expensive as a motherfucker. Cutting brinkupdates throughout the year wouldn't be a half bad idea, although they are hard to find. Outthere though.I would recommend running this along with some kind of "Space solar leads to weaponization"disad (if it isn't already one of their advantages) with some kind of "China gets pissed" arg,because then can make the that that would increase the likelihood of China

I've also included the four home run impact cards; Khalizad '95, Cook '7, and Mead '98, andMead '92. Pretty good for the most part, and they are interchangeable with a little cardswitching.

Good Luck.

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

43/51

DDW'08ShannonSBSoiar Spending DA

A- Uniqueness; Bush is committed to fiscal discipline, his veto threats have been specific andunyielding.Associated Press, News cooperative, 6/25/ '8, [Democrats press funding increases for veterans, education,http://ap.google.com/article/ ALeq M5injFf08 Mlw J tFFF _n29 IR630N94AD91 GMK882]A Senate panel awarded sizable spending increases for health research, education and community healthcenters on Tuesday, though thev appear dead on arrival so long as President Bush remains in office.So too, it seems, are big increases for homeland security programs approved across Capitol Hill by aHouse panel. The House Appropriations Committee also approved a bill providing an almost 14 percentincrease above last year for veterans programs and military construction accounts.The welter of activity comes as Congress' annual appropriations process gets under way in earnest. TheDemocratic-drafted bills are remarkably generous compared with Bush's much-maligned February budget submission, which wasstacked high with budget cuts previously rejected by both Demoeratic- and Republican-controlled Congresses.For instance, the Senate panel, responsible for labor, health and education programs, approved an almost 5 percent increase in 80-called Title I grants to schools serving a large number of disadvantaged students, a $1 billion increase for health research at theNational Institutes of Health, and a 7 percent increase in funding for community health centers.That bill, along with a raft of others making their way through various legislative steps, face Bush vetothreats. Bush is expected to promise to veto bills exceeding his requests. He's also promised to veto any " l m r ' f n ' \ v n i c n I a w m a K e r s n a v e n ' f c u f t 5 y h a r r m i r n u l l D e r a m r c o s r o T p e { p r o j e c t s m o w n a s e a r m a f l Z s . Jerry Lewis, R-Calif., the House Appropriations Committee's top Republican, said Democrats weresimply "throwing money at problems," and warned taxpayers to "hold onto your wallets."
http://ap.google.com/article/http://ap.google.com/article/

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

44/51

DDW'08ShannonSBSolar Spending DA

B-Link; Space solar costs a trillion bucks- they couldn't give us a better link to our disad.CNN.com, Internationally recognized and respected news agency, 6/1 '8 ["How to harvest solar power? Beam it down fromspace!", http://www.cnn.coml200S/TECH/science/05/30/space.solar/]American scientist Peter Glaser introduced the idea of space solar power in 1968.NASA and the United States Department of Energy studied the concept throughout the 1970s, concludingthat although the technology was feasible, the price of putting it all together and sending it to outer spacewas not."The estimated cost of all of the infrastructure to build them in space was about $1 trillion," said JohnMankins, a former NASA technologist and president of the Space Power Association. "It was anunimaginable amount of money."

8/7/2019 246 Space Neg

45/51

DOW '08ShannonSBSolar Spending DA

c- Internal Link-Spending leads to econ collapse. The US is banking on a weaker dollar to pay it'sdebt, but lenders are likely to wise up if we don't stop the spending.Free Market News Network, western news wire, 5110 6http://www.freemarketnews.com!Analysis/28/ 4835/2006-05 -] 0 .asp ?wid=28&nid=4835]

["The Daily Reckoning",

That is the big difference between a trade deficit and a trade surplus. In the former, you gradually become aslave to your trading partners. The larger the deficits, the more you tend to owe them. In the latter, theygradually become slaves to you. That is what is happening with the Chinese and Japanese. They have now become ourcreditors; they can enjoy income from their U.S. paper while we struggle to keep up with the debt.But who will turn out to be the greater fool, the one who buys what he can't afford, or the one who lends what won't be repaid?

will continue to engineer a gradual devaluation of the dollar so as to ruin their creditors rather than themselves. The dollar losthalf its value during the Greenspan years alone. And now, the Bush administration is adding more debt than all theother administrations in U.S. history combined. Inflation looks l ike a sure bet..a "done deal."Commodities are r ising. Health care, educat ion, housing, energy - everything measured in dolla rs that the Asians can 't produce and Wal -Mart can 't put on i ts shelves.is soar ing. Gold is rocket ing. Gold is outperforming stocks, commoditi es, bonds , the euro, housing - everything. How nice i t would be if the empire 's creditors wouldgo gently into that good night! They must read the papers. They must see the dollar going down and gold going up. Imagine yourself in the same situation; wouldn'tyou be tempted to shuck some of that green paper in favor of the yel low meta l? Wouldn 't you want to protec t yourse lf=But, according to lumpen-Ameri can economictheory, the creditors just stand there , stock-stil l. while the big int1ation bus runs over them. Not only do they not sel l t heir U.S. bonds and dump their U.S. dolla rs, theycont inue adding to thei r inventory, like collectors of Cabbage Patch dol ls long after the fad has moved on.

God bless 'em. But we doubt the lenders are quite as dumb as the borrowers believe. In fact, there couldcome a time - any minute, in fact - when the lenders wise up. The dollar could end its gentle dec1ine...anddrop like a stone. Then, the lending would cease, too. The U.S. economy would come to a halt,

Documents

246 Space Neg