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Bringing Emotions into Social Exchange Theory

Author(s): Edward J. Lawler and Shane R. ThyeSource: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25 (1999), pp. 217-244Published by: Annual ReviewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223504 .

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Annu.Rev. Sociol. 1999. 25:217-44Copyright? 1999 byAnnual Reviews. All rightsreserved

BRINGINGEMOTIONSINTOSOCIALEXCHANGETHEORYEdwardJ. LawlerSchool of IndustrialandLaborRelations,andDepartmentof Sociology, CorellUniversity,Ithaca,New York 14853;e-mail:ejl3@comell.eduShane R. ThyeDepartmentof Sociology, Universityof SouthCarolina,Columbia,South Carolina29208; e-mail:srthye00@gamet.cla.sc.eduKEYWORDS: ocialexchange,motion,ocial ormation,argaining,egotiationower

ABSTRACTWe analyzeandreview how researchon emotion and emotionalphenomenacan elaborate and improve contemporarysocial exchange theory. Afteridentifying six approachesfrom the psychology and sociology of emotion,we illustratehow these ideas bearonthecontext,process,and outcome of ex-change in networks and groups. The paperreviews the currentstate of thefield, developstestablehypothesesforempiricalstudy,andprovidesspecificsuggestionsfordevelopinglinks betweentheoriesof emotion andtheoriesofexchange.INTRODUCTIONSocial exchange theory assumes self-interested actors who transact with otherself-interested actors to accomplish individual goals that they cannot achievealone. Self-interest and interdependence are central properties of social ex-change. Whether it is two lovers who share a warm and mutual affection, ortwo corporations who pool resources to generate a new product, the basic formof interaction remains the same. Two or more actors, each of whom has some-thing of value to the other, decide whether to exchange and in what amounts.

2170360-0572/99/0815-021 7$08.00

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218 LAWLER& THYESuch actors are normallyviewed as unemotionalbeings who have informa-tion, cognitively process it, andmake decisions concerning hepatternand na-ture of exchangewith others.In this paperwe explore how emotions can bebrought nto social exchange theory.Withinthe exchangetradition,emotions are a relativelyvacuous"catchall"category for phenomenathat cannotbe subsumedby behavioral or rationalchoice principles.The classic works on exchange contain references to emo-tion of various sorts (Thibaut& Kelley 1959, Homans 1961, Blau 1964) andeven sustained concern with some emotionally tinged phenomena, such as"sentiment"n Homans(1961). In the related literatureonjustice andequity,emotionalreactionsare assumed to be moreimportant,but even there,they arenottheorized o any greatextent(Molm& Cook 1995,Hegtvedt&Markovsky1995). This is trueof mostsociological theoriesandtraditions;nfact,it is onlyin the last 10to 15yearsthat emotionsbecameaprominent esearcharea n thediscipline (Kemper1990a,b,Gordon1981, Scheff 1983, Thoits 1989).A close examination of many common exchange relations suggests thatemotions both enter andpervadesocial exchangeprocesses. Friendshiprela-tions are often propelled by strong affection or feelings of joy; corporatemergers may resultfromfear or anger;economic partnershipsmay thrive be-cause they producepositive feelings such as confidence orpleasure.The con-text of exchange may have a discernible emotional tone, invoke particularemotionrules,andgeneratecorrectivemeasureswhen emotionssurfaceor areexpressed(Hochschild 1979). Theprocessesof exchange may cause individu-als to feel good, satisfied, relieved, excited, and so forth (Lawler & Yoon1996). The outcomeof social exchange may generateprideor shame directedat one's self (Scheff 1990a) or anger or gratitudedirected towardthe other(Weiner 1986). We believe thatemotionaldynamicshave a more centralrolein social exchange thantypically assumed. This is the motivationfor writingthis paper.

Emotion is neglected primarilybecause of metatheoreticalconceptions atthe core of exchange heory, nparticular,ehavioral ndrational hoiceassump-tions aboutactors.From a behavioral(reinforcement)perspective, emotionsare essentially epiphenomenal,that is, inseparablefrom reinforcementsandpunishments Homans1961, Emerson1972a,b).As rational-choiceprincipleswere introducedntoexchangetheorizing, t becameincreasinglyclear thatac-tors who engage in "cognitive work"may not strictly conformto either ra-tional choice orreinforcementprinciples.Onereason sjudgmentalbiases (seeMolm 1994, Plous 1993). Exchangetheoristshave been willing to incorporatethe idea of an information-processing, ognizing actor but slow to introducethe idea of an emoting actor. Thereare, however, exceptions. Severalrecentpapersexamine the role of emotionin exchange(see Lovaglia 1995, Molm &Cook 1995, Willer et al 1997), and interestamongrationalchoice theoristsis

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE 219revealed by a 1993 special issue of Rationalityand Society on emotion andchoice.

To fill thevoid, we offer a selective reviewandanalysisof thejuxtapositionbetween emotion theories and exchange theories. The purpose is to identifyavenues by which emotions and emotional processes can enrichor improveexchange theorizingandresearch.We pose questions that warrantattention,provideanswersusing work fromboth emotion and exchangetraditions,andapply select theories of emotion to social exchange phenomena.In generaltermswe are concerned with restrictedexchange,broadlydefined as a directexchange involving contingencies between actors' behaviors (Ekeh 1974).Emerson(1981) identified two kinds of restrictedexchange-reciprocal andnegotiated. Reciprocal exchange entails sequential giving with unspecifiedterms and obligations;negotiated exchange entails an agreementwith speci-fied terms and obligations. In each case, exchange is a joint task and actorshave an incentiveto accomplishor consummate t in some fashion.The organizationof this paperis based on three main points of entry foremotionphenomenainto social exchange-exchange context, exchange pro-cess, andexchangeoutcomes. Emotions arepartof andcanalterthe context ofexchange as well as be caused andproducedby the exchangeprocess and/orthe resultsof negotiated exchanges. Before turning o ourprimary ask,how-ever, it is important o review recent efforts in sociology andpsychology todevelop the concept andmeasurementof emotion.CONCEPTUALIZINGEMOTIONSBroadly,we define anemotion as a relativelyshort-livedpositive or negativeevaluative state that has neurological and cognitive elements (Schachter&Singer 1962, Izard 1991). Emotionsare internal states that are not under thecompletecontrol of actors. We agreethatthe questionis, whatpeople do withthem? Therearemanyunansweredquestionsaboutthenatureand definitionofemotions. How manyemotions are there(Kemper 1987)?Are some emotionsmorefundamentalandothersmorederivative(Watson&Tellegen 1985, Izard1991, Kemper 1987, Scheff 1990b)?Are emotions culturallyspecific or uni-versal (Lutz 1988, Izard1971, Scherer1984, 1988)?Ourpurposeis not to ad-dress all or even manyof these issues directly,but to help social-exchangere-searcherscut a path throughsuch sticky conceptualissues.Over the last ten or so years,psychologists have attempted o develop con-cepts andmeasuresof emotion based on thewordspeopleuse to describetheirown feelings andthose of others.This approach,which mightbe termedpsy-chometric, has addressed two conceptual issues: first, whether there are asmall number of dimensions(two or three)thatcan concisely capturefunda-mentalemotions beneaththe apparentdiversityof feeling-wordsused by peo-

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220 LAWLER&THYEpie themselves; second, whether some emotions are categorically differentthan others.1

These questionshave inspiredtwo competingmodels. One indicates thatemotionslie on continua, hat s, they varyas amatterof degreeover a few fun-damentaldimensions(Guttman1954,Russell 1980,Watson & Tellegen 1985,Russell et al 1989, Mano 1991). Perhaps hebest-known solution here is Rus-sell's (1980) circumplexmodel of affect, whichmapstheuniverseof emotionas points on a circle in two-dimensionalbipolar space. One dimension of thecircumplex capturesemotional valence (pleasure-displeasure);he other di-mension is orientedperpendicularo the first and reflects the level of arousal(high-low). Althoughsome debatehas arisen over how the dimensionsshouldbe named (Larsen & Diener 1992), and how many dimensions are optimal(Osgood 1966, Russell & Mehrabian1977), there is considerable evidencethatmany people do organizetheiremotionsin this way (Russell 1980, 1983,1991,Watson & Tellegen 1985,Watson et al 1984,Russell &Ridgeway 1983,Haslam 1995).The second model stipulatesthatthe experienceof emotion is not as con-tinuous or seamless as the circumplexmight suggest (Cloreet al 1987, Oatley& Johnson-Laird1987, Ekman 1980, 1992, Izard 1977, Batra & Holbrook1990, Osgood 1966, Storm& Storm1987, Wierzbicka1992). These research-ersarguethat emotionsarediscreteevents, and thatthe circumplexmodel canbe decomposedinto a small numberof distinctregions thatrepresentfunda-mentalemotions, each qualitativelydifferentfromthe others.The usual sus-pects for a list of fundamentalor basic emotions include anger, fear,joy orpleasure, frustration,and sadness; such emotions ostensibly differ along animportantdimension that the circumplex does not capture. For example,Larsen& Diener(1992) pointout thatangerand feararevery close to one an-other on the circumplex(i.e., both emotions are negative andactive) andyetthese emotionstend to resultin very differentbehaviors. Whereasanger maylead apersonto fight,fearmightcause apersonto retreat.Frijdaand associates(Frijda1986, Frijdaet al 1989) provideevidence that differentemotions do infact activate different levels of actionreadiness.The above suggeststhat all emotionsvary alonga few abstractdimensions,but also that each emotion may have a few concretepropertiesthat make itunique from others. We see an inherenttradeoff between continuousmodelsthatfocus on the abstractorgeneralpropertiesof emotion,and discretemodels

1There are many debates in this literature,most of which are beyond the scope of ourdiscussion. For example, emotions have been construed as (a) continuously graded or sharpcategories Russell 1980, Cloreet al 1987), (b) infusedwithcognitionorseparate ystems(Lazarus1982, 1984, 1995, Zajonc 1980, 1984), (c) culturallyspecific or mostly pancultural Lutz 1988,Izard 1971, Shaver et al 1992), (d) accompaniedby diffuse or specific physiological arousal(Schachter& Singer 1962, Levensonet al 1992), and the list goes on.

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE221thatemphasizethe more concrete or specific aspects.Neither model is neces-sarilybetter than the other;the questionbecomes, what is the theoreticalpay-off for a generalversusspecific conceptof emotion?In the social exchangelit-erature,which is still relatively young, we suggest that the circumplexmodelprovides researcherswith a good abstractaccount of the emotionaluniverseoverall,andit also hasthe advantageof pointingto dimensionsthatintuitivelyseem important o social exchange (e.g. pleasureandarousal).The processesand outcomes of exchange can and do generatevariabledegrees of pleasureandarousal n the form of excitement(Lawler& Yoon 1996).APPROACHESTO EMOTIONAND SOCIALEXCHANGEWhat emotion theories or frameworkshave implicationsfor exchange con-texts,processes, or outcomes?Thereare innumerable rameworks orclassify-ing or groupingthe types of emotion or emotionalprocesses; in fact, there hasbeen anoutpouringof such efforts in the last 10 to 15 years. Kemperhas con-tributeda number of importantworks, includinghis contrastof fundamentalemotions that areneurologicallywired versus other emotions thataresociallyconstructed(Kemper1978, 1987). Averill (1992:2) developed a comprehen-sive, multilevel, 15-categoryclassification of variables that cause emotionalbehaviors. Izard (1991) revised his differentiated-emotions heory, whichbears some resemblance o Kemper'snotion of fundamental motions.Ortonyand associates (1988) developed a framework hatarguesfor threeclasses ofemotionbased on thecognitiveobjectinvolved:events,actions,orobjects.So-ciological researcherssuch as Hochschild(1979, 1983), Clark(1990), Heise(1979), and Collins(1981, 1989)developed conceptualdistinctionsdirectedata particular heoreticalproblemor domain.Based on our analysis of these frameworkswe identify six approaches othestudyof emotion,two for each facet of exchange:context,process,and out-come. In the case of exchangecontext,a cultural-normativepproach Hochs-child 1990)treatsemotions aspartof the normativecontext,while a structural-relationalapproach(Collins 1975, Kemper 1978) treatsactors' social posi-tions as fundamental auses of emotions andfeelings. Inthe case of exchangeprocess, a social-cognitive perspective (Isen 1987, Bower 1991) views emo-tions as shapingactors'perceptionsandinterpretations f the other andsitua-tion, andsensory-informationalheories(Heise 1979, Frank1988) view emo-tions as important ignals (or bits of information) hataredisplayedto actorsand others. Finally, for exchange outcomes, a social-attributionapproach(Weiner1985, 1986)analyzestheemotionsproducedby actors' attributions fcredit/blame orgood/badoutcomes,and thesocial-formationsapproach Col-lins 1981, Lawler & Yoon 1996) indicates how emotional reactions to ex-changeoutcomesimpactrelationsover time.Eachapproachposes auniqueset

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222 LAWLER&THYEof theoreticalquestions.We briefly introducethese below and explore themmore deeply in the sections thatfollow.

To analyze the exchange context, the cultural-normative pproachstartsfrom thepremisethatany social context invokes expectationsaboutwhat sortof emotions are appropriate o experience and, in particular, o express in avisible orpublicmanner Hochschild 1990, Clark1990, Thoits 1990). Forex-ample,the normsfor displayingemotions at a funeral,wedding, orjob inter-view are socially defined and circumscribed.Behavior that is consistentwiththe prevailing emotional norms both affirms and reestablishes those normswhile fostering an emotional tone, i.e., a prevailingemotional environment,that is salient to new entrants.Thus,exchangecontexts should have norms fordisplayingemotionsin additionto an emotional tone tied to theparticular x-changecontext.Taking a differentslice of the exchange context, structural/relationalp-proaches begin from the premise that social positions impact the emotionspeople arelikely to feel. The core idea is capturedby Collins' (1975) theoryofsocial stratification,which essentially claims thatgiving ordersmakespeoplefeel goodwhile takingordersmakespeople feel bad. Thismaybe dueto differ-ent capabilitiesto generaterewardsand avoid costs, the degreeof respectandsocial esteemtheyreceive fromothers,and/or he overall sense of controltheyhave in the particularsocial context. Such explanationshave stimulatedex-change theorists to addressa variety of questions linking power, status, andemotion(Kemper1978, 1987, Kemper& Collins 1990, Ridgeway& Johnson1990, Lovaglia & Houser 1996).To analyzetheprocess of exchange, sensory-informational pproachesbe-gin with the notionthatemotionsaresignalsto self (Heise 1966, 1987) and/orto others(Frank1988, 1993). Forexample, feeling bad as a resultof violatingan emotionnorm s aninternalsignalthat will likely producerestitutiveactionsuch as an apology. Issues for exchangetheoriesinclude the role of emotionsin signalinginformation o the actor anddeterminingwhen suchemotions aredisplayedto others.From a social cognitive approach,emotions modify or adjust cognitionscentralto the exchange processes. A general question is how do emotionalstates influence actors'perceptionsof each other,theirpredictionsfor futureencounters,and the way they deal with uncertainty?For example, given thatexchange contexts inherently involve uncertainty, emotions that promotemoreoptimisticrather han morepessimistic informationprocessingcan haveimportant onsequencesfor the exchange process andoutcomes.To analyze exchange outcomes, a social-attributionapproachstartsfromthe notionthat attributions f creditor blameto self, the other,orthe situationare likely to have emotional effects on actors. Specific emotions (gratitude,pity, shame,anger,pride, etc) shouldvarywith the natureof theconsequences

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE223(positive-negative)andattribution arget(self, other,situation).Forexample,creditto self yields pridewhile blame to otheryields anger(Weiner1985). It isalso possible thatattributionsare directedat social relationshipsor largerso-cial units as a specific component of the situation (Hewstone 1989). Thismeans that as a joint task, social exchange may generatesocial attributions,which have effects on the order, cohesion, and solidarity of relations andgroups.The social-formationsapproach reatsemotions as integralto the processthroughwhichrelationshipsandgroupsform andremainsalient(Collins 1975,Lawler & Yoon 1993, 1996). This idea can be traced to Durkheim's classicnotion, abstractedas follows: Whenpeople engage injoint activity with oth-ers, they tend to experiencean uplift (elation) which heightenstheirsense ofcollective orgroupmembership.Jointactivityreaffirmsandstrengthens ocialsolidaritybecause of the shared emotions andfeelings it produces.Fromthisperspectiveit is important o understandhow and when social exchange pro-duces sharedpositive feelings and whetherthose feelings result in strongeraffective attachments o anexchangerelationor network.These six approachescapturekey elements of the exchange context, ex-change process, and exchange outcomes. These elements hang togetherin asystematicway as shownin Figure1. Withinthe exchangecontext, structural-relational conditions are fundamentalcauses of emotions actually felt andemotion norms shape their expression or display. Withinthe exchange pro-cess, emotionshave signalingfunctionsfor self and for others,andthey maybias how membersperceive one another n presentand future nteraction.Ex-change outcomes-such as the frequencyand nature of exchange-generateanother ayerof emotionsthat can increase/decrease ocial cohesionwhen theemotions are attributed o exchange relations, networks, or groups. Each ofthese six theoreticalthemes is elaborated n the next three sections.

Exchange Exchange ExchangeContext Process OutcomesEmotionNorms Emotion Social(Expectations) Signals AttributionsPower/Status Cognitive SocialConditions Adjustments Cohesion

Figure 1 Where emotions enterthe exchange process.

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224 LAWLER& THYEEXCHANGE CONTEXT AND EMOTIONSCultural/Normative ApproachesFromthisperspective,emotions aresocially constructed,displayed,andman-agedinthe context of the varioussocialroles,memberships, dentities,or cate-gories that individualsoccupy (Clark 1990, Gordon 1990). This idea can betracedto the symbolic interactionismof Goffman(1959), who theorized thatsocial situationsentail scriptsfor acceptablebehavior.A scriptis a recipe ornorm for appropriate ehavior in a given situation.Emotionalreactions oftenfollow scripts, but more importantly,emotion norms can be construed asscripts.Forexample,it is bothacceptableandexpectedto experienceand dis-play emotion when a musicalpiece is concluded at an orchestraconcert. Thesameexpressionanddisplayinthe middle of the firstmovement,however,is aster violation in this context. A good deal of the theoreticaland empiricalworkin this traditionhas focused on situationsthat elicit a particular motionbutprohibitit frombeing displayed.In this sense, the cultural/normative p-proachmaintains a focus on the interplaybetween social context (e.g., rolesand identities)and outcomes (e.g., emotionaldisplays). When there is a dis-crepancybetween theemotions we experienceandthose we mayappropriatelydisplay, individualsexperience what Thoits (1985, 1990) calls "emotionaldeviance" and may attemptto regulate their expression throughwhat Ho-chschild (1983) terms "emotionmanagement."Hochschild (1975, 1979, 1983) observed that emotions and their rules fordisplayoccurin the context of norms that areimplicitlyor explicitly attachedto a givenjob. Inherbook, TheManagedHeart,Hochschild(1983) documentsthatflight attendants a) often experiencestrongemotions as a result of rudetravelers,and(b) aretrained o inhibit heirtruefeelings. The result s that ndi-viduals want to expressemotions butcannot,and thusthey managetheir emo-tions to alleviate the tension. She proposestwo basic strategies hroughwhichthis occurs.Surface acting involves changingone's outwardbehaviorwiththehope of altering nnerfeelings. Forexample,flightattendantswho force them-selves to smile afterbeing insultedreport feeling better.Deep acting occurswhen individualsattemptto regulatetheir physiological activity (e.g., "justcalm down and breatheslowly") or shift their focus of attention (e.g., "justignore it andyou will feel better").Social exchangecontextsmay also have emotionnormsthatvarywith thenatureof therelationship.Businessrelationships-such as explicitcontractingbetweenrepresentativesof differentcorporations-will likely have a normofemotionalneutrality; n fact,being "professional"n such contexts is being incontrol of one's emotions.Bargainers uppress heurgeto displaytheirexcite-ment in ordernot to "tiptheir hand" o the opposing partyand raisesuspicion.

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EMOTIONN EXCHANGE 225By the same token, anger or contempt for the other party is held in check.Thereis much surfaceacting in these exchanges.

The opposite also may occur. At times actors intentionallyreveal a falseemotion for strategicpurposes.Professionalgamblers feign nervousness, oy,orconfidence to createimpressionsthatgive them anadvantage."Bluffing" sa strategic act and inherent feature of many economic exchange contexts.Ironically, in contexts where bluffing is normatively expected-such as thepokertableor used-carlot- it may actuallylose effectiveness. In contrast, nvery close relations,it is partiallythe emotionaldisplays thatare themselvesthe objects of exchange. The trueexpressionof emotionbecomes a valuablecommodityabove andbeyond any materialgoods.The cultural-normative erspectiveimplies that the generalizabilityof so-cial exchange principles is limited or conditionedby the emotionalenviron-ment,e.g., emotionnorms,emotionmanagement,etc. Most contemporary x-changetheories assume(andmost empirical ests explicitlycreate)arelativelysterile and dispassionateenvironmentwith a neutralemotional tone. This in-hibits the developmentand expression of emotion, enhances surface acting,and fosters an overallemotional contextthat makesthe formationandmainte-nance of strongrelationsproblematic.One can imagine that the typical ex-change context is similarin some respects to thatdescribedby Hochschild's

flight attendants.In any case, the managementand regulation of emotionnorms across various exchange contexts are importantavenues for futurere-search.Structural/RelationalApproachesThe orientingidea of the structural-relationalpproach s thatpositional dif-ferences create differencesin felt emotion,and these have important ffects onexchange relations and networks. Structural-relationalheoriespredictemo-tion from specific relationalattributes,such as one's position in a power orstatushierarchy.By way of comparison,culturalnormativetheories focus onsymbolic or emergentsocial definitions and norms in groups with commonidentities(gangs, flight attendants,etc). In general,structural-relationalheo-ries tend to have a more deterministicflavor, making causal predictionsforwhich emotionsemerge given a set of structural onditions;whereas cultural-normativeapproachesaremoreconceptualandinterpretive.Kemper's(1978, 1987, 1990c) theoryof emotion falls squarely n thestruc-turaltradition,given its focus on two relational attributes:power and status.His basic assumption s that an increasein power or statuswill result in posi-tive emotions, while a decrease in power or statuswill lead to negative emo-tions. More specifically, Kemper(1978, 1990c) predicts that an increase inrelativepowerresultsin feelings of security,while a decrease n relativepowerleads to fearoranxiety.The term "relative" n theprecedingsentence is impor-

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226 LAWLER&THYEtant. Thetheorypredictsan individualfeels secure when her or his own poweris directlyincreasedover another,or when theirpower is indirectly ncreaseddue to a reduction n the power of the opposing party.The theoryfocuses onemotionscausedby poweror statusdynamicsthatactually ranspire,butit alsosuggests thatanticipatory motions occur when one expectsa changeinpoweror status whether or not it actuallyoccurs.Turningto status, changes again stimulateemotionalresponses (Kemper1990c). An increasein statusproducessatisfaction or happiness,while a de-crease in statusproducesshame,anger,ordepression.Thecase of status oss ismorecomplexthanthat forstatusgain.Consideranx-y relationship nwhichpersonx suffers a loss inrelativestatus.Ifx attributes hestatus oss to personyandbelieves it is notjustifiedorlegitimate,then thetheorypredictsx should beangry.But when x assumesresponsibilityfor the statusloss, then the emotionis likely to be shame.Finally,if anuncontrollableexternalagentis responsiblefor statusloss, thendepressionis the predictedresult.Kemperoffers arigorous heorythatconnectspowerand statusdynamicstoemotionalphenomena.He distinguishestheemotionalconsequencesof powerand statusconditions,and recentresearchaffirmsthatpowerand statusdimen-sions produce somewhat different emotions or emotional processes. Let usconsider some of this researchby exchangetheorists.EMOTIONS PRODUCEDBY POWER In exchange theory, power is defined as astructuralpotentialbased in the patternandqualityof exchangeopportunities(Emerson 1972b, 1981, Willer & Anderson 1981). The classical example ofstructuralpower is a three-actordating network, A-B-C, where the cen-trallylocated B has the optionof datingtwo people each of whom has no dat-ing alternatives.Assumingthatinteractionsbetween one dyad precludeinter-actionsin theother,then A orC mustalwaysbe excludedon anygiven nightofdating.By the sametoken,positionB will alwaysbe guaranteedo have apart-ner, and so we say thatB occupies a high power position.There is considerable evidence that actors who bargainfrom high powerpositions, like actorB in the three line shown above, tend to experience posi-tive emotions. Willer and associates (1997) tested this propositiondirectly.Theymeasured heemotions of all three actors after a series of bilateralnego-tiationsin the three-actor ine. The results show thatB tended to reportstrongpositive emotionsfollowing exchanges,while A andCreportednegativeemo-tional reactions.The findingthatpower differencesyield corresponding mo-tional reactions has also been reportedby Lawler& Yoon (1993, 1996).Molm (1991) providesfurtherevidence on the relationshipbetweenpowerand emotion. Shereportsan interestingasymmetrybetweenthe base of power(rewardversuspunishment)andsatisfactionwith the exchangerelation.Datafrom a series of experiments indicate that a single unit of punishmentde-

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EMOTIONN EXCHANGE227creases satisfactionmore than a single unit of rewardincreases satisfaction.That is, punishmentpower has a strongereffect than rewardpower on emo-tional reactions.The findingthat individualsrespondmore stronglyto nega-tive outcomes is consistentwith research on collective action (Hardin1991)andexchangenetworks(Skvoretz&Zhang1997, Thyeet al 1997). Insum,theevidence reviewed above indicates that actorswho occupy low power posi-tions of various types experience negative emotions, while actors in highpower positions experiencepositive emotions.EMOTIONSRODUCEDY STATUS Those who study status processes in face-to-face discussion groups have arrivedat similar conclusions. Bales (1950,1953) arguedthatpositive emotionalbehaviors,such as actingfriendlyor ex-pressing agreement,are functionalto the groupbecause such behaviorspro-mote positive task outcomes. Bales reasoned that in collective and task-orientedgroups,negative emotions emerge when individualgroupmembersdisagree, and these have deleterious effects by divertingattentionand timefrom the task. Positive socioemotional behaviors help members maintainatask focus anddeal with disputesalongtheway (Bales & Slater1955, Bales &Hare 1965). Shelly (1993) suggests further hatpositive sentimentscan shapeinteractionandinfluence, as does statusin expectationstatestheory.

Ridgeway& Johnson(1990) develop an expectationstatestheoryof statusand socioemotionalbehavior,explainingwhy high-andlow-statuspersonsex-perience different emotions. They argue that group memberswith positivestatus characteristicsaretargetsof higher performanceexpectations,and as aresult, they receive positive feedback from groupinteractionsand encountervery few disagreements romlower statusgroupmembers.In the event a highstatus member is challenged by a statussubordinate, he formerwill typicallyattributethe disagreementexternally (e.g., "You clearly do not know whatyou're talking about!").In comparison,lower performanceexpectationsareassociated with memberswho possess the low states of statuscharacteristics;theyreceive more criticism forexpressingtheir deasand tend to attribute riti-cisms internally e.g., "You'reright,that s asilly idea.").The combinedresultof differentialperformanceexpectations,selective feedback,and attributionalbiases is thathighstatusmembersexperiencepositiveemotionandaremore freeto displaythese feelings. By the sametoken,low statusgroupmembersexperi-ence negative emotions and aremoreaptto conceal them fromthe group.Lovaglia & Houser (1996) proposethe notion of "statuscompatibleemo-tions" to explain how emotions combine with status to produceinfluence ingroups. They suggest that positive emotion is compatible with high status,while negativeemotion is compatiblewith low status.Theyconducteda seriesof experiments, and the results indicated that for both high- and low-statussubjects, positive emotionalreactions tended to decreaseresistance to social

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228 LAWLER& THYEinfluence,while negativeemotiontendedto increaseresistance o influence at-tempts. These findings suggest that high status group members experiencepositive emotions and, as a consequence, become more open to the tasksuggestionsmadeby lowerstatusothers.At the same timelow statusmembersexperience negative emotions and consequently become more steadfast intheir conviction. This researchdetails how emotional reactionscombine withstatuscharacteristics o determinepatternsof social influence in groups.EXCHANGEPROCESSAND EMOTIONSSensory/Informational pproachesThesetheoriesemphasize hatemotionsconvey informationwithin or betweenindividuals. This can happen in multiple ways. First, individuals can sensetheir own emotional reactions and use this informationto make inferencesaboutthemselves and the environment.A personwho overreacts o a friend'smild criticismmay, ex post facto, infer theirfriendship s drifting apart.Sec-ond,thedisplayorvisibilityof an emotionto othersmayinform hoseothersofone's own internal reactions or disposition. In this example, the friendwhowas the targetof the emotional outburstmay make the same inference. Thissection discusses theories that detail how emotions signal information o theself and others. We use Heise's (1979) affect control theory2 to illustratesignaling to self and Frank's(1988) theory of moral sentiments to illustratesignalingto the other.In affect control theory, emotions signal the self. Briefly, the theory as-sumes that individuals carry with them a set of"fundamental" meaningsregardingthemselves, other persons, objects or behaviors (Smith-Lovin &Heise 1988). Fundamentalmeaningsrefer to the evaluationof aperson, objector action out of context. Forexample,most individualsprobablybelieve thatdoctors,birthdaycakes, and volunteer work aresomewhatpositive. Meaningis thought to vary along three primarydimensions: good-bad (evaluation),powerful-powerless (potency), and lively-quiet (activity). The evidence sug-gests thatpeople fromvaryingculturesand social strataorganizefundamentalmeanings along these dimensions (Heise 1966). Transientmeanings occurwhen objects, behaviors,and situations arestrung togetherin more complexscenarios(e.g., the doctorabusedherchild). As a single unit of analysis,tran-sientmeaningscan also be measured.Affect controltheoryassumesthat indi-viduals seek consistencybetween fundamentalmeanings(i.e., thatwhichtheybelieve to be true),and transientmeanings(i.e., thatwhichthey experienceatagiven moment).Emotionalreactionsreflect whetheror not this consistency ismaintained.

2The affectcontroltheoryhomepage is athttp://www.indiana.edu/-socpsy/ACT/Index.html.

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE229In affect controltheory,emotion is the result of a cognitive appraisal.Thetheory asserts that individualsoccupy identities that provide baselines from

which transient mpressions(or events) areinterpreted.An emotional reactionoccurswhen one experiencesanevent and then assesses how well it fits her orhis fundamentalunderstanding f the people, identities,andactions involved.When the fit between one's fundamentalunderstandingandtransient mpres-sions is good, emotions felt are consistentwith the identity.An example is aperson with a positive self identity (e.g., communityvolunteer)who experi-ences a positive, confirmingevent (e.g., an awardrecognizingservice). Herethe fundamentalmeaning associated with the identity is consistent with thepositive transientmeaning,and the theorypredictsthatpositive emotionswillensue. When a person holds a negative identity (e.g., criminal)and experi-ences a consistentconfirmingevent (e.g., an indictment), hennegative emo-tionswill be the result. Theoverarchingassumption s consistency;events thatconfirmidentities resultin emotionswith the same valence.

Applied to exchange theory, affect control theory suggests that the emo-tions experienced in exchange are contingent on the actors' identities. Asnotedearlier,certain dentities-such as corporate epresentative,professionalarbitrator,or merchandise buyer-involve contextual norms that demandcontrol of one's emotionaldisplays.Other dentities such as colleague, friend,or husband are more forgiving in this respect, in thatthey normativelyallowor generatericher emotional experiences. One implicationis that as the ex-change context changes frompurely instrumental o partially expressive, thesalience of certain identitieswill shift, resultingin a wider rangeandgreaterdepthof emotions.It's worthnotingthat emotions in affect controltheoryare both social andrelational.Heise (1987) suggests thatwhen anotherpersonis a salientpartofthe environment,our transientexperiences can move in the directionof thatperson's identity.Forexample,whentalkingwith apowerfulsenator,apersonmayhave transient mpressionssuch as awe orgratitude.When these emotionsaredisplayedfor others to see, we essentiallybroadcastourprivate appraisalsoutward.Thus,while emotionssignalthe self in affect controltheory,theyalsomay be communicated o others.Such communicationof emotion is the focus of Frank's(1988, 1993) theoryof moral sentiments. Frankbegins with a rational-choicemodel of human ac-tion thatassumes behavior is drivenby immediate self-interest.He notes thatthe unbridledpursuitof self-interest, however, results in an interestingpara-dox: Actors who are always attemptingto maximize their local self-interestblindly stumble into social dilemmas. The dilemma is that such actors canneverreapthe benefitsof collaboration,even when itpromises greaterrewardsin the long run.A purely self-interestedactor would always steal if she or hecould safely do so without cost or detection;in a populationof egoists, mar-

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230 LAWLER&THYEriagescould neversurvive external emptations,businesspartnerswouldcheatone another,etc. Theseareinstances of what Frankcalls "theproblemof com-mitment."Frank 1988, 1993) arguesthat emotionshelp individualsresolve theprob-lem of commitmentby fostering prosocial tendencies that are reciprocatedovertime. He claims thatemotionalreactionssuch as love, sorrow,andsympa-thyarepowerful ncentives that curbself-interest.A spousewho is consideringanaffair,forexample, mayrefrainout of love orrespectfor herpartner.Work-erswho receive cashpayments may neverthelessreportall income to the IRSout of fear,guilt,or a sense of national dentity.Inthisway emotional/affectiveprocessesshort-circuit ndregulate he desire for immediateself gratification.

Notice thatalthoughemotionshelp promote ong-termbehavioralcommit-ment for any given person,the unilateralexperienceof emotion is not enoughto fully solve the commitmentproblem. Long-termcommittedrelationshipscanonly emergewhen eachparty(a) experiences commitment-inducing mo-tions and(b) can detect(andbe detectedby) otherswith the samecapacity.Thefirst traitgives one the ability to controlpassing temptations; he second en-suresthat individualswith high "moral iber" are likely to locate similar oth-ers. Frank suggests that individuals communicate their emotional makeupthroughsubtlebehavioralgesturesand cues thathave evolvedthroughbiologi-cal mechanisms.To summarize, he theoryof moral sentimentspostulatesthat emotions al-low commitmentto emerge, but long-termcommittedrelationshipsprosperonly when emotionalreactions arecoordinatedat the dyadiclevel. Frankpro-vides a convincing argument or the importanceof emotionalexpressionstothedevelopmentof trustand commitment.The broad mplication orexchangetheory is that communicatedemotions are an inherentpartof social interac-tion, and these are particularly mportant o the developmentof cohesive orsolidaryrelations.CognitiveApproachesA rather arge body of psychological research examineshow emotions influ-ence cognition.Mood, affect, andfeelings all have been shown to impacthowpeople process informationandthe degreeto which they reveal a concernforothers.It is now well establishedthatindividuals n a positive moodperceive,encode, interpret,and rememberevents in a morepositive light thando indi-vidualsin a negativemood (Bower 1981, 1991, Isen 1987). Forexample,Isenandcolleagues(1978) have shownthatsubjects napositivemoodtendto havebetterrecallforpositive traitadjectivessuch as "kind"or"friendly"earnedatan earlierpointin time. Others indatendencyfor individuals n a given moodstate to havegreaterrecall for material earnedwhile in that same mood state,aphenomenonknownas state-dependentearning Bartlettet al 1982, Bower et

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EMOTIONN EXCHANGE231al 1981). Overallthere is little doubtthat emotions(bothpositive andnegative)affect how information s encoded and retrievedfrommemory.

Emotional states also have been shown to bias social judgments (Bower1991). Wright& Bower (1992) foundthat,comparedto subjectsin a neutralmood, those in a good mood tended to overestimate heprobabilityof positiveevents and underestimate he probabilityof negative events. Subjectsin a badmood did just the opposite-they overestimatedthe probabilityof negativeeventsand sawpositive events as less likely. Johnson& Tversky(1983) reportcomparablebiases withrespectto subjective frequencies.In a series of experi-ments, they found that subjects in a bad mood tended to overestimate thefrequencyof other bad events. Others found thatpositive emotions correlatewiththetendencyto makeriskydecisions,butonly when thepotentialfor lossis small or inconsequential(Isen & Patrick1983, Isen & Geva 1987). All ofthis research ndicates that moods do in fact shapesocialjudgments.What s not so well understood s exactly whymoods altersocialjudgments.We identified four distinct models of judgmentin thepsychological literature.Accordingto the primingmodel advancedby Bower (1981, 1991), the com-mon thread hat weds these researchfindings togetheris thatpositive ornega-tive emotional statesactivate and make salientcognitive structures f the samevalence. A distinct, but related,model suggests that mood-congruentsocialjudgmentsresult from efforts to maintainone's currentmood state(Isen 1987,Wegeneret al 1995). These ideas areparticularlyrelevant to exchangetheo-ries, as they suggest thatpleasant/unpleasant ocial exchanges trigger cogni-tions of the same tone that build on one anotherover time andultimatelybiasinformationprocessing. This is one basis for "boundedrationality."A thirdmodel assumes that individualsmakedecisions, in part,by sensingtheir current motionalreactionsandusingthis dataas input(Schwarz& Clore1983, Schwarz1990, Clore & Parrott1994). From thisperspective,emotionalreactionsoperateas stimuli that sometimes canbe confused with moreobjec-tive information.We have all made decisions thatjust don't feel right, andwhen thishappens, t is tempting o cast aside morereasoned houghtand udg-ment. This raises an interestingpossibility for exchange theory. If emotionalstates function as information, hen it is at least possible thatemotions origi-natingfromearlierexchangeswith otherpeople mightcarry-over nto the cur-rent exchange context. The emotional consequence of a morning speedingticketmightstill be felt inthatafteroon's businessmeeting.Researchon sym-pathetic activation and excitation transferprovide conceptualand empiricalsupport or this possibility (Zillman 1983).

Perhaps he most provocativeideas for exchange theorycome from the re-ducedcapacitymodel,whichholds that emotionsdisruptattentionor diminishcognitive capacity (Eysenck 1977, Isen 1987, Mackie & Worth1989, 1991).Considerableresearchdocumentsthatemotionalexperiencestendto resultin

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232 LAWLER&THYEsuperficial informationprocessing. For example, Mackie & Worth (1989,1991) report hatsubjects n apositive mood are less attentive o messages andhavepoorerrecall of their contentcompared o subjects n a neutralmood.Pre-sumably,emotional reactions consume cognitive resources thatmight be di-rected elsewhere. Mackie & Worthprovidefurtherevidence in supportof thisidea, reporting hatsubjectswho feel positive simply take longerto readandinterpreta message, which again suggests loweredcognitive ability.Turningto negative emotion, studies show thathigh-fear subjectstend torely more on group stereotypesandprocess messages less carefully(Wilder&Shapiro 1989, Baron, Inman,Kao & Logan 1992). For example, Wessel &Merckelbach(1997) found thatspiderphobics exposed to a large live spider(i.e., thehigh-fear group)had less recall forminor details than did non-spiderphobics (i.e., the low-fear group). However, at least one recent experimentquestions these ideas. Baron and colleagues (1994) reportthathigh fear pa-tients about to receive a dentalfilling actuallyprocess cavity-related nforma-tion morecarefullythanpatientsin a low fear condition.They arguethatlazyinformationprocessingmay actuallyresultfrom attentionalshifts towardthestressor,rather han an overall diminutionof cognitive ability.Appliedto exchangetheory, lazy informationprocessingmay enhancethecohesion andsolidarityof exchangerelationsandgroupsbypromotingrelaxedaccounting.Individualswho adopta relaxed or "loose"accounting system donot keep precise recordsof the benefits or costs to actors,whereas restrictiveaccounting systems are characterizedby continuous and precise tallying ofsuch information.Kollock (1993) used computersimulationto demonstratethat relaxedaccounting systems producemore mutualcooperation n prison-er's dilemma games. The immediateimplicationis that if positive emotionspromote lazy informationprocessing and relaxed accounting systems, thismay in turnpromotemutualcooperation,commitment, rust,andsolidarity nthose relations.Overall,there aregood reasonsto believe emotionsbias howindividualsperceiveandinterpretheirexchangeswith others.In thefollowingsection we illustrateone suchbias with an application o elementary heory.AN APPLICATION There is an interesting theoretical link between socialcognitionresearchand theelementary heoryof powerin social relations(Wil-ler 1981, Willer & Markovsky1993). Willer andassociatesput fortha resis-tance theorythat suggests power is partiallydeterminedby what actorshope(or aspire)to receive in exchangewith others.Fromcognitive theories we hy-pothesize that if individuals in exchange relations experience positive andnegativeemotions,these systematicallybias whatthey hope to receive as theynegotiate exchange. Resistance theory asserts that actors possess a certainlevel of "resistance" o exchange depending on their best expected payoff(Pmax)and thepayoff at confrontationwhen no exchangeoccurs(Pcon). Ac-

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EMOTIONIN EXCHANGE 233cordingto the theory,A's resistance(RA)to a given offer (PA)is given by thefollowing equation,

PAmax- PPA-PAcon

This suggests that actors resist exchangewhen they expect to receive morethanthey are offered (Pmax- PA is large) or when the profitthey are offeredbarely outweighsthe profit from no exchangeat all (PA- Pcon is small). ThetheoryassertsthatexchangesbetweenA andB occurwhen the resistanceof Ais equalto the resistance of B such thatPAmax-P, PB max-PBRA A =RBPA PAcon PB-PBcon B

To briefly illustrate,assume actorsA andB mustagreeon how to divide 20units of profitor each will earnnothing.Assuming each unit of profit is indi-visible, each actor canreasonablyhopeto take no more than 19 of thepossible20 units. If either actorrequestsall 20 units then the incentive to exchangedissipates. Thus we have PAmax= PBmax= 19. If A and B fail to reachagreementhen heyeachearnnothingmakingPAcon= PBcon= 0. Itfollowsthat19-P 19-PRA _ _ RB_o - 0B-0A PB

Sinceany agreementbetween A andB must sum to 20 units,we setPB = (20- PA) and solve to find PA = 10 and therefore PB = 10. In dyadic exchangewhere eachpartyhas no alternative, he resistancemodelpredictsan equaldi-vision of the profitpool.The relevantpointfor ourpurposes s thatresistanceto exchangeentails theweighing of best hopes (Pmax) gainstworst fears(Pcon).Recall from our ear-lier discussion that actors n apositive mood tend to overestimate heprobabil-ity of positive outcomes,while actorsin a negative mood state tend to be lessoptimisticand view negative events as more likely (Wright& Bower 1992).When incorporated nto resistancetheory, this finding implies that emotionsbias Pmaxn the direction of one's emotional stateduringthe negotiations.Consider he following example. Again let actorsA and B negotiatehow todivide a 20-point profit pool under he conditionsspecifiedabove.Further,as-sume thatA is in apositive mood while B is in a somewhatnegativemood.Forease of calculation,let's assume the emotions of A andB arereliablymeas-ured,thenstandardized n a scale(E*) rangingfrom0 to 1such that argerval-ues reflect more positive emotion. Let EA*= 1.0 and EB* = .70. Use this bias tocalculate PAmax = (1.0)19 = 19 and PBmax = .70(19) = 13.3. Plugging thesenew values into theresistanceequationandsolving forPAyields a slight profit

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234 LAWLER&THYEadvantage for A such that PA = 11.76 and PB = 8.23. This example demon-strates how emotional reactions, because they act on the judgments ofexchange-related nformation,mightaffect social exchangeoutcomes.Thus, actorsin a positive mood shouldperceive Pmaxo be approximatelyits full value,or at leasthigherthanthePmaxorthose inanegativemood state.Similarly,actorsin arelatively negative mood should have reducedprofitas-pirationsand perceive their Pmax o be lower. The combined effect of theseemotions is a slight profit advantage for actors with positive feelings andhigher profit aspirations.This is, of course, a testableprediction.EXCHANGEOUTCOMESAND EMOTIONSAttributionalApproachesWeiner(1985, 1986)putsforthan attributionheoryof emotion that addresseshow actorsinterprethe oftenvague andglobal feelings they experiencein in-teractionor exchangewith others. He arguesthat when an actorexperiencesasuccessful or blocked goal opportunity, he result is a generalizedemotionalreaction that is global and diffuse. Weiner terms these "primitive" motions.They aredependenton the outcome of the interactionbut not associatedwithanything nparticular. mportantly, uchemotionsgeneratean attribution ro-cess throughwhich actors attemptto understandand interpretthe sources(causes) of the interactionoutcomes. Thus, the global (i.e., primitive) emo-tions are "outcomedependent"and"attributionndependent."InWeiner's(1985) theory,positive emotions(pleasure,happiness)follow apositive event and negative emotions (sadness) follow a negative event, anidea quite compatiblewith exchangetheorizing.He holds that the attributionprocessreshapes hese emotionalreactions,furtherdifferentiating hegeneral-ized emotionsinto morespecific affective reactions.The sense of sadness fol-lowing a spoiled job interviewmaybe transformed nto shame(if attributed oself) or anger(if attributedo the other).These specific emotions are "attribu-tion dependent"becausethey resultdirectlyfrom the causal attributionsasso-ciatedwith the event.Through his attribution rocess,morespecific emotionsevolve and become attached o particularobjects (i.e., self, other,situation).The object targetedby the attributionprocess actuallydeterminesthe spe-cific emotionthatemerges.As noted,guilt or shame result fromnegative out-comes attributed o one's self, and angerresults fromnegative events attrib-uted to arbitrary rillegitimateactsof others.Prideresultsfrom attributions fpositive events to self, andgratitude esults fromattributions f positive eventsto the other. Weiner's theory posits a series of feedbackloops throughwhichattribution-specific motions are formed andguide an individual'sfuturebe-havior.As with other attributionheories, however,the emphasisis on attribu-tions to individualsbased on theirbehavior.In social exchangesuchindividu-

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE 235alized attributionsare more difficult because exchange outcomes are jointproductsof two or more actors' behaviors.

Weiner'sapproachneverthelessrepresentsanimportant ontribution o thestudy of emotion. He recognizes that some emotions result from events thatrequirevery littlecognitive processing,while othersemergeaftermorecarefulthoughtor reflection.Inthis sense, he finds a viablemiddleground n the clas-sic debate regardingthe primacy of affect versus cognition (Lazarus 1984,Zajonc 1984). By differentiatingglobal from specific emotions andelucidat-ing the specific types of attributions hat lead from one to another,his theorysuggestsadynamicpictureof theway emotions unfoldinexchangerelations.To develop an explicit link to exchange theory, two shifts are needed inWeiner'sframework.First,theprimitive,globalemotionsshouldbe viewed asinternalreinforcements/punishmentshatpeople consciously feel andattemptto explainor understand. nvoluntary,global emotionalreactionsthen are mo-tivating states in exchange relationsbecause, once they arepartof consciousawareness,actors strive to reproducepositive feelings and avoidnegativefeel-ings. This theoretical shift narrowsthe emotions of concern to those that areglobal and detected(perceived) by the actors themselves. For exchangetheo-rizing, it seems quitereasonableto supposethatpeople involved in exchangerelations sometimesfeel good or bad as a result of the exchange;theyare moti-vatedto reproduce hepositive and eliminatethenegativeemotions;and there-fore they tryto understandandinterpret heir own emotional reactions.The second shift needed is that the objects of attributions hould include"social units"in addition to self, other, and situation. This is implied by thejointness and "social embeddedness"of exchange.If social units-such as ex-change relations, networks, groups, or larger organizationsand communi-ties-become targets or perceived causes of global feelings, then emotionattributions have important implications for solidarity-relatedphenomenasuch as compliance (Hechter 1987), solidarity (Markovsky& Lawler 1994),affective attachments(Kanter 1968, Lawler 1992), and relational cohesion(Lawlerand Yoon 1996). Social unitsperceivedas the cause of positive feel-ings in exchange should generate stronger individual-to-collective attach-ments than those perceived as a source of negative feelings from exchange.The social-formations erspectiveexaminednextelaborates heseimplications.Social-FormationApproachesTwo basic ideas are the foundation of the social-formations approach.Thefirst is directlyfromsocial exchangetheory:that mutualdependenciesare theunderlying structuralconditions for cohesion and solidarity in social units(Emerson1972a,b,Hechter1987, Molm& Cook 1995, Lawler & Yoon 1996).Mutualdependence s thedegreeto which two or moreactors n arelation,net-work, or group are dependent on each other for valued rewards. Emerson

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236 LAWLER&THYE(1972b) explicitlyindicated hatcohesion was a functionof thesum oraverageof each actor'sdependenceon the other.3

The second idea originatesin Durkheim(1915) and has been developedmorerecently by Collins (1975, 1981, 1989, 1993). This is that oint activitiesgenerate uplift, elation, confidence, or other emotions that affirm and makesalient social ties andgroup memberships.This is the centerpieceof Collins'(1981, 1989) theoryof interactionritualchains.Theoriesin the social-forma-tions traditionexplain how the emotions and feelings that social exchangegenerates,in turn,foster cohesion or solidarity.How can we theorize the degreeandconsequenceofjointness in social ex-change contexts? Kelley & Thibaut(1978) distinguishedthree types of de-pendencies:reflexive control,fatecontrol,and behavioralcontrol. These referrespectivelyto the degree that actors' outcomes are determinedby their ownbehavior(independence), he behavior of the other(dependence),or a combi-nation of their own and others'behavior(interdependence).Mutual fate con-trol establishes the foundation for tradingresources or behaviors that do notproducenew value to be divided but still involve contingencies.In contrast,mutual behavioral controlpromotesthe negotiationof coordinatedbehaviorsthat have multiplicativeeffects on resources or exchange outcomes (Molm1994). These forms of dependence are interwoven, and it is reasonable tohypothesize that the greaterthe degree of mutual behavioral control (inter-dependence) and the lower the degree of mutual reflexive control (inde-pendence), the more actorstake account of each other and the morethey seethe results of theirexchange-positive ornegative-as produced ointly.In discussing Weiner's (1985, 1986) theory,we alreadyproposedthat in-terdependencemakes the relevant social units (dyads, groups,organizations,etc) causal objects in actors' attributions.How and when might such attribu-tions occur? Lawler & Yoon (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998)addressed his questionin theirtheoryof relationalcohesion. They argued hat structural onditionsofdependence-relative and total (mutual)dependencies-make exchangesbe-tween some pairsof actors morelikely than others.Specifically,when mutualdependenceis high, then actors should find one anothermore attractiverela-tive to otherpotentialexchange partners.Whenrelativedependence s equalasopposedto unequal,thenthey should findit easier to reachagreementbecauseneitherhas an a priori bargainingadvantagethat raises fairness issues. Thetheoryindicates thatexchange frequenciesacrosspairsof actorsin a networkor groupwill vary dependingon these conditions of dependence(Lawler&Yoon 1996).

3The same point is also built into Molm's (1987) idea of "averagepower"and Bacharach&Lawler's(1981) notionof"total power."

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE 237The theory of relational cohesion goes on to argue that structuralde-pendence relationsdo not have a direct impacton the formationof cohesive

exchange relations; the effects are indirect and mediated by exchange fre-quencies and the emotions produced. Successful exchange generates globalfeelings of pleasure/satisfactionand interest/excitement,emotions that are"primitive" n Weiner's terms. Actors are motivated to interpretand under-standthe causes of these feelings, andin the process, theirexchangerelationsbecome more salient.In this way, globalizedpositive emotions lead actors toview the exchange relation or group as a cohesive object, and they then arewilling to takerisks or make sacrifices on its behalf. Severalstudiesby Lawler& Yoon (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998) demonstratethat the endogenous pro-cess-from exchange frequency, to positive emotions, to perceived cohe-sion-produces commitment o exchangerelations.Through his process, theexchangerelation becomes an expressive object of attachment or actors.The emotional aspects of social formationprocesses can be elaboratedbyCollins' theory of interactionritual chains. Interactionritual is infused withemotionandexpressiveness. Collins arguesthat interactionsrequireandpro-duce emotionalenergy,a global, undirectedreserveof positive feelings (e.g.,confidence, uplift). Emotional energy is a "common denominator"acrosssituations and relations, and it is fundamentallywhat binds groupmemberstogether.Emotions aresynchronized,microlevel events thatspreadacross in-teractionsand have macrolevel effects on the groupstructureandstability.To Collins (1981, 1989, 1993), an interactionritual entails(a) at least twopeople,who (b) have a mutualfocus on someobjectoraction.A churchprayer,faculty meeting, or long-distance telephone conversation are potential con-texts for interactionritual. The conditions for enhanced social solidarityin-clude notonly a mutualfocus butalso (c) theexperienceof a common mood oremotion and, by implication,the sharingof that emotion, as well as (d) thestrengtheningof feelings over time. All of these conditions,with the possibleexception of the last, seem to fit the conditions usually found in social ex-change-a mutual focus and common mood. Whenthese conditions are satis-fied, Collins (1989:18) assertsthat a social boundarybegins to emergewithinwhich "participantseel like membersof a littlegroup,with moralobligationsto one another."In this way, socially based emotions set the stage for or re-affirm symbolic group membership and social solidarity. Collins' theoryspecifies an emotional foundation for groupformation n contrastto the pre-dominantly cognitive one found in social identity theorizing (Kramer &Brewer1984,Kramer1991). Therearestrongaffinities betweenCollins' workand recenttheoryand researchon emotion in social exchange.To conclude,thecore ideas of the social-formationsapproach o emotioninexchange can be stated as follows: Mutualdependencies (or interdependen-cies) producejoint activities which, in turn,generatepositive/negative emo-

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238 LAWLER& THYEtionsorfeelings; to the extent that these emotionsare attributed o the relevantsocial unit,theyproduce stronger/weaker ndividual-collective ies, and thosegroups memberships ommandmore/lesscooperationandcompliance.Whenemotions produce stronger individual-collective ties, relational or groupmembershipsappearmore distinctive thanbefore and standout more vis-a-visalternativememberships.Feedback effects also occur such that mutual de-pendencies are enhancedby the consequencesthey produce.The growthanddecline of exchange-basedrelations andgroups mightbe understood n theseterms.CONCLUSIONThe sociology of emotions andthe sociology of exchangearehighly distinct,incommensurable raditionswith very differentassumptionsabout actorsandhumanbehavior(e.g., Emerson 1972a, Kemper 1990a, Collins 1981, Scheff1990b, Hochschild 1983, Molm & Cook 1995). The actors of exchangetheories are individualistic, instrumental,and emotionallyvacuous, whereasthose of emotion theories are socially oriented,expressive, and emotionallydeep andcomplex. The formerare drivenby reason,the latterby passion.Yetresearchfrom a variety of domains shows thatpassion and reason are inter-twined, andthis poses an importantquestion:What role do emotionsplay insocial exchange?We illustratethe potentialfruitfulnessof buildingemotionand emotionalprocesses into exchange theorizing by surveyinga rangeof sociological andpsychological work on emotions. Emotion theories raise many questions ofrelevanceto social exchange(e.g., Hochschild1983,Heise 1987,Frank1988);they suggest new testablepropositionsthat refine existing exchange predic-tions (e.g., Bower 1991), expandtherangeof phenomena reatedby exchangetheorizing(e.g., Lovaglia& Houser1996, Lawler & Yoon 1996) andpointto-warda richerexchange-theoryexplanationfor social cohesion and solidaritythan is possible with extantcognitive or rational-choiceprinciples(see Hech-ter 1987). Ourcoveragehas been necessarilyselective, yet we have identifiedsix traditions n the emotions literature hat containimplicitor explicit claimsabout emotional aspects of social exchange-its context, process, or out-comes.

Together,the six approachesreveal a multitude of theoretical uncturesatwhich emotionalphenomenacan complement,deepen, or broadenexchangetheorizingand research.A cultural-normativeperspective (e.g., Hochschild1979, 1983) sensitizes us to the fact thatexchangecontextsnecessarilyentailemotion normsthat imitthepublic expressionof emotions,andresult n actorsmanagingtheir emotions to fit their roles or positions. Structural-relationalapproachesposit different emotions for actorswith high power-statusversus

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EMOTIONNEXCHANGE 239actorswith low power-status, and analyze when these emotions maintainorundermine nterpersonal elations(e.g., Ridgeway & Johnson 1990, Lovaglia& Houser 1996). Sensory-informationapproachescast emotions as signalswithin the exchange process, revealing the intentionsand trustworthinessofexchange partners (e.g., Frank 1988), or indicating whether an actor's feltemotions are consistent with his or her identity in that context (e.g., Heise1987). Cognitivetheoryand research ndicatethatpositive (ornegative) emo-tions enhance, correspondingly,an actor's perceived probabilityof positive(ornegative)behaviorsby anexchange partner.Attribution heoryhelpsus un-derstandwhy and how actorsexplain and interpretglobal feelings generatedby exchange outcomes (e.g., Weiner 1986). The social-formationsapproachelucidates the conditions under which these global feelings strengthenorweaken the cohesion of exchange relations or person-to-group ties (e.g.,Collins 1981, Lawler & Yoon 1996).The six approachesalso imply distinctemotionalunderpinnings or differ-ent forms of social exchange(see Emerson1972b,Ekeh 1974, Molm & Cook1995 for a classification of formsof exchange). Of particular elevance is thecontrastbetweennegotiatedandreciprocalexchange-respectively, a contextwhere actorsrepeatedlynegotiatethe terms of a tradeversus a context involv-ing the sequentialprovisionof unilateralbenefits (e.g., favors,gifts, etc) withunspecified timingandobligations(Blau 1964, Emerson1981, Molm & Cook1995). Negotiated-exchangecontextsusuallypromoteand rewarddispassion-ate,unemotional magesorpresentationsof self inthe actualprocessof negoti-ating, i.e., a "professionaldemeanor" or "affective neutrality" n Parsons'(1951) terms.Reciprocal exchangeallows a wider arrayof emotionalexpres-sions anda greatervarietyof emotion norms to emerge.We hypothesize that the cohesion and solidarityof relations based on re-ciprocal exchange should be quite sensitive to emotional expressions in theexchange process. Forexample, experiencingandexpressinggratitude, n re-sponseto a favor,helpassurethegiverthattherecipientwill likely reciprocatesometime in the future;expressing anger n responseto a denial of a favor is animplied threat not to provide benefits in the future;expressing sadness mayinvoke shame or guilt in the other and engenderbacktrackingor restitutivebehavior. In reciprocal exchange, emotions expressed are also behaviorsexchanged, and these affective exchanges should have importanteffects ontrustandcommitment; hese are criticalbecause the sequentialcharacterof re-ciprocal exchange entails more or different types of risk than the bindingagreementsof negotiatedexchange (Molm 1994). Thus, emotionexpressionsareintegralpartsof the exchange process in reciprocal(nonnegotiated)socialexchange.In negotiated exchange, emotion expressions that reveal intentions maygive the partner nformation to use as leverage, so the risk is revealing too

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240 LAWLER&THYEmuch, not too little. The emotional consequences of thejoint outcomes (i.e.frequencyof andprofitfromagreementsmade)shouldbe moreimportanthanemotionalexpressionsin the exchange process.First, ointness is more salientand the sense of commonactivitythereforestronger.Second,actorsin negoti-ated exchange are more likely to perceive a sharedresponsibilityfor the out-comes and targetthe relation, network,or group.The upshot is that (ceterusparibus) he cohesion effects of successful exchange(i.e. outcomes)should bestronger ornegotiated exchangethanreciprocalexchange,whereas the cohe-sion effects for emotionalexpressions in the exchange process (i.e. displays)shouldbe stronger or reciprocalexchangethan for negotiated exchange.In conclusion,we propose,based on ouranalysishere,thatexchangerela-tions, groups,and networks are more likely to endure f emotions (a) felt andexpressed correspondwith contextual norms and actors' identities, (b) areopenly shared so as to promotemutualtrust,and(c) are attributed o the rele-vant social units. Relations and groups that regularly satisfy these criteriashould yield greater compliance, obligation, sacrifice, and collective actionthan can be explained by extant social exchange theorizing (e.g. Ekeh 1974,Hechter 1987). In this sense, bringingemotion into exchange theoryhas thepotential o generalizeanddeepensocial exchange explanationsof social orderandsolidarity.We believe general questionsabout social exchangeand socialorderare importantavenues for futuretheorizing and research because ex-change serves as a bridging phenomenon forging ties across differentiatedparts of social systems (Ekeh 1974). Emotions and emotional processeswarranta centralrole in suchtheorizing.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSWe thank KarenHegtvedt, MurrayWebster,and JeongkooYoon for helpfulcomments on an earlierversion of this chapter.

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