21ST CENTURY

DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE DATA DOSSIER

information mutate into weapons of mass distraction and disorientation. Legitimate online discourse is subverted by cyber threats and manipulation. In short, liberal democracy is in danger of losing its pow-er to generate the consensus and compro-mises so vitally needed for the cohesion of our pluralistic societies.

At the same time, however, there is hope for democracy. Citizens actively make their voices heard. People want to have their say in politics, participate and interact with the political system also between general elections. Social move-ments are on the rise and strengthen civil society. Requests for deliberative democ-racy increase, and participatory practice supports de-politicisation and consen-sus-building, as two Irish referenda on highly contested topics have exemplified. Debunking becomes a central corrective instrument within the public debate, and post-factual argumentation is increasing-ly uncovered and denounced as such. Cit-izens feel more attached to the EU than ever before. European and global youth have mobilised to protect and shape their own future, and to demand their say in safeguarding the global commons.

This EUI SOU 2019 Data Dossier il-lustrates key trends in democratic tran-sitions, political parties and elections, inclusive and sustainable democracies, trust and the Single Market, as well as EU external action and global governance through facts and figures. It has been cre-ated by the GlobalStat team to inform the discussion about the state of democracy within the EU. It seeks to inspire reflec-tion on past democratic trends and on trajectories for possible futures for de-mocracy in the 21st century.

GABY UMBACH GlobalStat Director

INTRODUCTION

Things taken for granted become pre-cious when we are about to lose them.

This is the case of democracy in Europe and around the world today. Hence, we need to critically reflect on the future of the type of democracy we want in the 21st century. The European University Insti-tute’s The State of the Union Conference 2019 (SOU) provides a much-needed op-portunity to do so at European level.

After the end of World War II and the fall of the Iron Curtain, liberal democra-cy became the foundation of European societies and the European Union (EU). By the dawn of the 21st century, most EU Member States (MS) had a long-standing democratic tradition. Where this was not the case, citizens fought hard for liberal societies and democratic transition.

Liberal democracies protect individu-al freedoms, participatory rights, and the rule of law within societies. They guar-antee representation, procedural equity, lawful decision-making, legitimate polit-ical action, accountable actors, impartial bureaucracies, and independent judiciar-ies and media.

Thus far the ideal. Two decades into the 21st century, we witness a decline in key democratic features in an increasing number of countries within Europe and around the world. Rules-based organ-isations and core institutions of liberal democracy are under siege. Populism is on the rise and identity politics divides societies into ‘us and them’; politicisa-tion accompanies this division, rendering politics confrontational and hard-line; patterns of authoritarian leadership ap-pear and ‘strong men’ are back in politics. Truth and facts become strategic tools; ideology, ‘post-factual evidence’, and mis-

Source: V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy data, (2019)

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00 high // V-DEM liberal democracy score

low1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2017

Austria, Denmark, Belgium,France, (Western) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg

and the Netherlands all followed asimilar trajectory, picking up quickly,then steadily after the Second World War

Austria, Denmark, Belgium,France, (Western) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg

and the Netherlands all followed asimilar trajectory, picking up quickly,then steadily after the Second World War

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania democratise after the end of the Cold War

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania democratise after the end of the Cold War

Greece democratises briefly, while Cyprus

picks up steadily

Greece democratises briefly, while Cyprus

picks up steadily

Greece, Portugal and Spainemerge from dictatorshipsGreece, Portugal and Spainemerge from dictatorships

Finland, Ireland and Swedenwere virtually unphasedby the Second World War

Finland, Ireland and Swedenwere virtually unphasedby the Second World War

Fledgling democracies after the First World War

Fledgling democracies after the First World War

50% of 178 sampled countries scored below thisdot in 2017

50% of 178 sampled countries scored below thisdot in 2017

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Germany

Denmark

Spain

EstoniaFinland

FranceUnited Kingdom

Greece

Croatia

Hungary

IrelandItaly

Lithuania

LuxembourgLatvia

Netherlands

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Sweden

United Kingdom

Spain Sweden

Slovakia Slovenia

Portugal Romania

Netherlands Poland

Lithuania Luxembourg

Italy Latvia

Hungary Ireland

Germany Greece

Finland France

Denmark Estonia

Cyprus Czech Republic

Bulgaria Croatia

Austria Belgium

1900 2017

1900 2017

Source: V−Dem, (2019)

11

00

Among representative democracies, liberal democracies stand out for

their participatory patterns, the protec-tion of individual freedoms – including those of most vulnerable groups – and the rule of law. This type of democracy prevails among EU MS and is especially strong in Scandinavian countries, while some MS in Central and Eastern Europe are currently facing challenges to their liberal democratic practice.

As a result, and regardless of the overall good track record and their long-stand-ing tradition, democratic politics within the EU are currently being challenged by bottom-up, grassroots protest movements and new political parties. Consequently, liberal democracy is increasingly contest-ed, and various authoritarian patterns of leadership are appearing within the EU and beyond.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN EUROPE

TO WHAT EXTENT IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ACHIEVED?

V-DEM SCORE, 1900-2017

THE SHAPE OF RISE AND DECLINE

V-DEM SCORE, 1900-2017

17parliamentary democracies

among the 28 Member States of the EU. 4 (semi-)presidential systems, 7 constitutional monarchies

KPO

ALO

VGO

VGO

KPO

Martin

LIF

Fritz

TS

FDFRW

Ecolo

AGL−Gr

RvA−UpD

FNBNRP

SDS-ts

ROSSEM KzB|DL

V

LD|LDD

Pp

PAME

DISYAKEL

EnKe

KOPED

NO

KSC SPR-RSC

HNS

HSP-1861

ELAM

SYM

SF

LC

KrFFrP

FK

Gron

NLA

A

TPSL

KD

POP

VIHR

NSP

EKoEVP

Rt

SP|P

MR

VLO

droite

FN

PRG

PRG

GE

V

V

LO

MNR

eco

LCR CPNT

MNR

MF

REM

DLR|DLF

DFU

NPD

B90/Gru

Rep

B90/Gru

Li/PDS

DVU

AfD

KP

LAOS

OP

TelEKEK

TP

TP

ANELLS−CA

LS−CA

ANELLS−CA

DISY

DX

DXD−FS

AASA

NPD

SFWP

SFFKgPMMP

PD

Green

NP

SP

PBPA

DS RI

DPR

FdLV

LNRete

LKP TSKPLKP LKDP

FI−PdLAD

NPSI

DEIdV

M5S SC

FiD

PSI

Greng

NB

GAP

DLGLA

KPL

PID

AD

AD

Bp

D66

GPV

MP

RPF

GPV

PZPRSD

ZSL

CD

SP

LNLPF

PVV

50+

FvD

PDC

CDS-PPMESUDP

FSP

POUSPSR

PRD

PSoDR PNL KDHSZS NSI

SSS

BE

PCTP/MRPP

PAN

PDR

CDS

AP-PPCE|IU

PTE−UC

BNG CC

ERC

UPyD

C−PCP

KD

MP

NyD

SD

SNP

UUP

UUP

UKIP

GP

BNP

Source: Emanuele, V. (2016), Dataset of New Parties and Party System Innovation in Western Europe since 1945, Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali (CISE), (2019)

AustriaBelgium

BulgariaCroatia

CyprusCzech

RepublicDenmark Estonia

FinlandFrance

GermanyGreece

HungaryIreland

ItalyLatvia

LithuaniaLuxembourg

MaltaNetherlands

PolandPortugal

RomaniaSlovakia

SloveniaSpain

SwedenUnitedKingdom

spread and arithmeticcentre of party system

political centre weighted by parties’ votes

farright

farleft

party newly elected to parliament

party re-elected to parliament

KEY

1945

2018

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

Open democratic societies rely on legitimate and accountable political institutions and on democratic elections that allow

citizens to express their preferences with regard to politics. In view of the 2019 European Elections – as with democratic elections and participatory processes in general – ensuring free and fair demo-cratic voting and practice is hence imperative. This even more so against the backdrop of a growing electoral volatility over the past two decades, in which the stability of the West European party sys-tems eroded due to new political parties and political protagonists emerging at the fringes of party systems.

POLITICAL CENTRES AND NEW PARTIES

ELECTIONS SINCE 1945

As regards citizens’ preferences for EU politics, their attachment to the Union has increased over the past eight years from 62% in 2010 to 70% in 2018: more Europeans than ever before perceive themselves as EU citizens. Moreover, 52% of EU citizens have trust in the EU, show-ing that they identify the EU as a beacon of freedom that guarantees the possibility of travelling, studying and working free-ly within its territory. Yet, this positive perception has so far not translated into European Elections turnout: from the highest participation rate of 61.99% in the European elections of 1979, turn out constantly decreased, leading to the low-est rate ever registered, with 42.61% in the last elections of 2014.

almost

80%of those below

30 yearsin Austria, Italy and Malta

voted at any level of government in the past three years, as

opposed to 35 to 40% of Belgians, Irish and Luxembourgers

Source: Eurobarometer, (2018)

13 national

parliamentsin EU Member States moved

towards the right in their last elections, as opposed to 11 parliaments

moving further left

Source: EuropeanEnvironment Agency, (2019)

20% target

EU-28

EU-28

32

49

18

8

2

40

17

6

33

235

296

24

24

15

148

46

4

1

65

94

22

31

16

7

117

47

182

−16−16−13−13

−13−13

−12−12

−9−9

−8−8

−5−5

66

1010

1313

2222

2323

5656

33

3311

33

22

99

1919

1212

−57 −56−53

−49

−43

−41

−38

−34

−31

−30

−26

−25−23

−25

−22

−29

−24

−20−20

−12−12−9−9

−18−18

00

−10−10

−8−8

−2−2

−15−15

−8−8

−6−6

−8−8

−10−10

−18−18

−14−14

−10−10−18−18

on target

short of target

Primary energyconsumption,Mtoe (2016)

Gap between GHG projections and 2020 target in Effort Sharing sectors% of 2005 base year emissions

GHG emissionsreductionsChange 1990

vs 2017

Lithuania

Latvia

Romania

Estonia

Slovakia

Bulgaria

UnitedKingdom

CzechRepublic

Hungary

Denmark

Germany

Sweden

Croatia

BelgiumFinland

Italy

France

Poland

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Greece

Slovenia

Austria

Malta

Ireland

Spain

Portugal

Cyprus

Source: GlobalCit,Electoral Law Indicators, (2019)

Austria

Bulgaria

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

France

Germany

Greece

Italy

Latvia

Malta

Poland

Romania

Spain

United Kingdom

Portugal

Hungary

Slovakia

Slovenia

Belgium

Estonia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Ireland

Denmark

Finland

Sweden

Austria

Bulgaria

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

France

Germany

Greece

Italy

Latvia

Malta

Poland

Romania

Spain

United Kingdom

Portugal

Hungary

Slovakia

Slovenia

Belgium

Estonia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Ireland

Denmark

Finland

Swedenexclusive inclusive

third country nationalsin local elections

non-resident citizens in national elections

EU-2

8 av

erag

eEU

-28

aver

age

EU-2

8 av

erag

eEU

-28

aver

age

2000 2018

United Kingdom

Sweden

Spain

Slovenia

Slovakia

Romania

Portugal

Poland

Netherlands

Malta

Luxembourg

Lithuania

Latvia

Italy

Ireland

Hungary

Greece

Germany

France

Finland

Estonia

Denmark

Czech Republic

Cyprus

Croatia

Bulgaria

Belgium

Austria0060%60%

0.7

2.4

8.5

10.7

0.4

2.3

1.5

1.4

0.6

2.2

8.4

2.6

2.6

0.4

0.6

3.6

5.2

0.8

0.1

1.4

1.5

1

1.6

1.9

Source: Europe 2020 indicators –employment, Eurostat (2019).

gapfemale male

Young Europeans are growing up in difficult times. The financial, eco-

nomic and migration crises, coupled with climate change, are deepening the inter-generational gap in opportunities and re-sponsibilities. Any sustainable democracy depends on the material and immaterial resources that are passed from the present to the next generation. To preserve plan-etary resources and to combat climate change, the EU aims at a climate-neutral circular economy by 2050. Reduction of resource input, reusage of material and recycling of waste are key elements of Eu-ropean climate neutrality.

INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY

VOTING RIGHTS

ELECTORAL LAWS PER EU MEMBER STATE

The future of the EU strongly depends on its youth and on migration. Both have important effects on the intergenerational equity and political participation with-in the EU. One of the most direct ways of promoting political participation of migrant populations is granting them the right to vote. Yet, so far, no Europe-an Member State grants national voting rights to all foreign residents. EU citizens can vote in local elections in other EU MS. Only 12 MS grant local voting rights to all foreign residents.

FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS AND TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Regardless of economic and labour mar-ket recovery, the EU still faces strong dif-ferences between MS in terms of youth unemployment and economically inactive young people. Mitigation options could include allocating shares of MS European Social Fund resources to especially target structural reforms for young people.

9 percentage points (pp)

Within the EU-28 youth unemployment decreased

by almost 9 pp from a peak of 23.7% in 2013 to 15.2% in July 2018

Source: Eurostat, (2019)

6.2% national youth unemployment

ratein Germany is the lowest in the EU in 2018, followed by the Czech Republic (6.7%) and the Netherlands (7.2%). It has risen to critical 39.9% in Greece, 34.3% in Spain and 32.2% Italy

Source: Eurostat, (2019)

6.2% national youth unemployment

ratein Germany is the lowest in the EU in 2018, followed by the Czech Republic (6.7%) and the Netherlands (7.2%). It has risen to critical 39.9% in Greece, 34.3% in Spain and 32.2% Italy

Source: Eurostat, (2019)

26%GHG emissions reductionsbelow 1990 levels by 2020 and 32% by 2030, thus falling short of the self-set goal of 40 % reduction by 2030

Austria | €46.4 bn

Belgium | €43.8 bn

Bulgaria | €6.1 bn

Cyprus | €3 bn

Czech Republic | €18.8 bn

Germany | €318.3 bn

Denmark | €41.1 bn

Estonia | €3.1 bn

Greece | €26.6 bn

Spain | €120 bn

Finland | €28.4 bn

France | €309.3 bn

Croatia | €8.6 bn

Hungary | €19.4 bn

Ireland | €21.8 bn

Italy | €221.3 bn

Lithuania | €4.4 bn

Luxembourg | €5.9 bn

Latvia | €3.1 bn

Malta | €1.3 bn

Netherlands | €78.3 bn

Poland | €59.5 bn

Portugal | €27 bn

Romania | €17 bn

Sweden | €99.4 bn

Slovenia | €5.6 bn

Slovakia | €8.5 bn

United Kingdom | €287.4 bn

Royal Dutch Shell | €12.9 bn

Volkswagen Group | €11.1 bn

HSBC Holdings | €9.1 bn

BNP Paribas | €7.2 bn

Allianz | €6.5 bn

Total | €7.1 bn

Daimler | €10 bn

Banco Santander | €6.8 bn

AXA Group | €5.7 bn

BP | €3.6 bn

BMW Group | €8.6 bn

Anheuser−Busch InBev | €6.7 bn

Siemens | €6 bn

ING Group | €4.7 bn

Intesa Sanpaolo | €7 bn

Enel | €3.9 bn

Deutsche Telekom | €3.3 bn

BASF | €6 bn

British American Tobacco | €40.9 bn

Lloyds Banking Group | €3.4 bn

Bayer | €7.1 bn

AIRBUS | €2.5 bn

Unilever | €5.8 bn

Rio Tinto | €7.4 bn

UniCredit Group | €5.2 bn

Telefónica | €2.9 bn

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles | €3.8 bn

Renault | €4.9 bn

Generali Group | €2 bn

Credit Agricole | €3 bn

Christian Dior | €2.1 bn

ArcelorMittal | €3.9 bn

Société Générale | €2.2 bn

Royal Bank of Scotland | €2.1 bn

Aviva | €1.6 bn

SAP | €4.1 bn

Orange | €1.5 bn

Nordea Bank | €3 bn

Continental | €3 bn

Deutsche Post | €2.6 bn

L'Oréal Group | €3.6 bn

Danske Bank | €2.5 bn

E.ON | €4.1 bn

Volvo Group | €2.2 bn

Danone | €2.4 bn

Peugeot | €1.9 bn

Aegon | €2.2 bn

Royal Ahold Delhaize N.V. | €1.9 bn

Safran | €3.8 bn

LyondellBasell Industries | €4.5 bn

Henkel | €2.5 bn

Merck | €2.5 bn

Rolls−Royce Holdings | €4.6 bn

Telecom Italia | €1.1 bn

Philips | €1.5 bn

Novo Nordisk | €5.2 bn

Erste Group Bank | €1.3 bn

Swedbank | €1.9 bn

Pernod Ricard | €1.5 bn

Svenska Handelsbanken | €1.6 bn

Barclays | €−1.9 bn

Deutsche Bank | €−1.2 bn

EU Member State

Multinational Enterprise

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

50050

100150

thousandsthousands

Czech Republic

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Italy

Netherlands

Spain

Sweden

United Kingdom

1900 2016

negative public wealth

private wealth

public wealth

The creation of the Single Market is one of the EU’s major achievements

and best assets within economic globali-sation. The concentration of econom-ic and financial power is still a threat to global economic equity that favours mul-tinationals in only some countries.

The global financial and economic cri-ses also revealed weaknesses in the eco-nomic governance of the EU and in the Euro. They triggered a retrenchment of cross-border banking and financial activi-ties, and led to an intensified debate about risk-sharing and risk-reduction initiatives within the Economic and Monetary Un-ion (EMU). While related reforms have built-up a common regulatory and super-visory framework, banking and financial activities are still regulated nationally, even within the Euro area. As stabilising factor for the EMU and the Euro, national tax revenue accounts for the main share of public resources.

TRUST AND THE SINGLE MARKET

COUNTRIES’ TAX REVENUE AND SOME EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS IN FORBES’ TOP 500

2017 TAXES ON PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS LESS SUBSIDIES AND 2018 PROFITS, € BN

Sources: Eurostat, (2019); Forbes, (2019)

NET PRIVATE AND PUBLIC WEALTH

INDIVIDUAL AVERAGE, PPP, 1900-2016, CONSTANT 2017 €

This level of economic inequalities is confirmed when comparing net private wealth and net national income. Data show a general rise in net private wealth since 1970, from 200% to 350% of na-tional income in most rich countries, to 400% to 700% today. This trend was large-ly unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis or by the asset price bubbles in countries like Japan and Spain. Transition countries such as China and Russia have also wit-nessed large increases in private wealth with private wealth-income ratios ap-proaching levels observed in France, the UK, and the United States.

Source: World Inequality Dataset, (2019)

40.2percentof EU-28 GDP equaled taxes applied to capital, labour and consumption, as well as compulsory social contributions taxes in 2017

Peaceand

Security

Directorate-Generalfor External Policiesof the Union

Directorate-Generalfor InternalPolicies of the Union

Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group

EP delegations

EP committees

Crisis Management (with EEAS)

Overall policy direction

Crisis Management(with Council)

Crisis Response

Security Policyand Conflict Prevention

Field Coordination

EP SecretariatEP Secretariat

European ParliamentEuropean Parliament

Political bodiesPolitical bodies

European Council/Council of the EUEuropean Council/Council of the EU

EuropeanExternal Action

Service

EuropeanExternal Action

Service

European CommissionEuropean CommissionForeign PolicyInstruments (FPI)

EU Humanitarian Assistanceand Civil Protection (ECHO)

EU Development Programmingand Implementation (DEVCO)

EUPOL COPPSPalestinianTerritories

EUTM Mali

EUTM RCAEUTM Somalia

EULEX Kosovo

EUMM Georgia

EUNAVFOR MED(Operation Sophia)

EUNAVFOR Somalia(Operation Atalanta)

EUCAP Sahel Mali

EUCAP Sahel Niger

EUCAP Somalia

EUFOR ALTHEA

EUAM Iraq

EUAM Ukraine

EUBAM LibyaEUBAM Rafah

civilian

military

542

516

172

377

905

765

261

318

92 23

16

95

139

142

27

173

Common Foreignand Security Policy

Decentralised Agencies

DevelopmentCooperation Instrument

European Instrument forDemocracy and Human Rights

European NeighbourhoodInstrument

EU Aid VolunteersInitiative

Guarantee Fund forExternal Actions

Humanitarian Aid

Instrument contributingto Stability and Peace

Instrument for NuclearSafety Cooperation

Instrument forPre−accession assistance

Macro−FinancialAssistance

Other

Partnership Instrument

Union Civil ProtectionMechanism

2014 2017 2018 20202014-2020

(based on 2014 projections)

ADOPTEDBUDGETS

PROJECTEDCOMMITMENTS TOTAL

2,339

154

19,662

1,333

15,433

148

1,193

6,622

2,339

225

11,699

565

1,167

955

145

327

20

3,168

189

2,440

22

241

945

273

62

2,115

46

159

134

21

354

23

3,275

202

2,447

27

85

981

354

33

1,771

84

167

163

21

Ever since the Lisbon treaty, EU exter-nal action has gained in importance.

In light of the global challenges lying ahead, democratising the policy field fea-tures high within the political debate.

Current EU decision-making in ex-ternal action displays multi-layered, in-ter-institutional dynamics that reflect its connected, complex foreign policy issues. The EU seeks to improve the effectiveness of its external action and its consistency with EU values, as prerequisite for a sus-tainable contribution to peace and securi-ty around the world.

EU EXTERNAL ACTION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

WHO DOES WHAT IN THE EU INSTITUTIONS?

Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (2019), Peace and Security in 2018 - Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AS OF DECEMBER 2017Source: EU Institute for Security Studies, (2018)

MFF HEADING 4 OVERVIEW

2014-2020, € MILLION

Funding for ‘Global Europe’ activities supports joint efforts of EU MS and EU institutions, each of which relates to the peace and security agenda and has a spe-cific geographic or thematic focus in or-der to maximise impact and visibility of EU external action.

Source: EU Institute for Security Studies, (2018)

6%Within the 2014-2020 Multiannual

Financial Framework, 6% of the EU budget support ‘Global Europe’ activities

GlobalStat is a public information tool for users around the world that o� ers a large amount of statistical data free of charge from international sources for all 193 UN member states, from 1960 to present day. It focuses on the economic, environmental, political, social, and cultural performance of nations and its ultimate aim is to provide information about the way human beings live, the freedoms they enjoy and the limitations they face.

ABOUT Today’s increasing relevance of statistics translates only slowly into a transparent visibility of data within the public domain. In order to close the gap between data proliferation and their actual use, new tools are needed to improve the clarity and speed with which statistical data can be accessed as important independent sources of information. GlobalStat takes up this challenge.

It is structured in 12 thematic and three horizontal areas. � ematic areas are divided into sub-themes that include statistical data series. Horizontal areas o� er insight into data on cross-cutting aspects of sustainable livelihood, national wealth, human well-being and quality of life. GlobalStat currently contains over 600 indicators and is designed to grow over time.

May 2019 | GLOBALSTAT - factsheet Robert Schuman Centrewww.globalstat.eu

By presenting data as diverse as income distribution, water resources, migration, land use, food production, nutrition, or life expectancy, GlobalStat contributes to a better understanding of the potential interrelations between human development and globalisation trends. All data and metadata are accessible free of charge for personal information purposes and research.

PROJECT PARTNERS

PROJECT TEAM:

TIMELINE

Partnership between the European University Institute’s Global Governance Programme (GGP) and the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation

Gaby Umbach is the Founding Director of GlobalStat

O� cial launch of the GlobalStat website

GlobalStat starts a collaboration with the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)

Launch of joint publication series with EPRS

GlobalStat is embedded in the EPRS website

GlobalStat starts a collaboration with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

GlobalStat becomes o� cial supporting partner of the EUI’s State of the Union Conference

Launch of upgraded GlobalStat

September 2011

May 2015

2011

June 2016

May 2016

October 2015

June 2016

March 2018

January 2019

Since October 2015, a partnership between GlobalStat and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) o� ers an ever-increasing portfolio of data-based services and publications to GlobalStat users and Members of the European Parliament (EP). Since September 2016, GlobalStat is also integrated as the new ‘Statistics Warehouse’ resource into the EPRS’s intranet in order to provide direct access to GlobalStat for EPRS clients.A cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) started in mid-2016 and is ongoing with the creation of new GlobalStat website with SDMX updates and data visualisation tools.

Project Director: Gaby Umbach Research Associates and Fellows: Caterina Francesca Guidi (Project Coordinator); former team members: Laura Bartolini, Luca Mancini, Laura Puccio, Martiño Rubal Maseda, Marta Russo, Trajche Panov Database development GlobalStat 1.0: Copyright © European University Institute and Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos

CONTACTS:European University InstituteRobert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Villa Schifanoia - Via Boccaccio 121 - I-50133 Florence globalstat@eui.eu www.eui.eu @GlobalStat_eu

Text developed by Caterina Francesca Guidi and Gaby Umbach

Data visualisation created by Christian Dietrich

With the financial support of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies