2017 Use of Force Report v12.2 [FINAL] - New York2017 Use of Force Report New York Police Department Police Commissioner’s Message This is the New York City Police Department’s

2017 Use of Force Report New York Police Department

Police Commissioner’s Message

This is the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD’s) second

Annual Use of Force Report (formerly known as the Annual

Firearms Discharge Report).

The NYPD has published a report since 2007, and has tracked

firearms discharges since 1971. In 1983, the Police Department

also began tracking general uses of force in arrest situations. The

first Annual Use of Force Report covered 2016, and was the most

comprehensive reporting on the topic in the history of the NYPD.

The NYPD Annual Use of Force Report is intended to provide a

full accounting of all uses of force per year as defined by

policyincluding firearms discharges, conducted electrical weapon (CEW) discharges, and

general uses of force in which police subdue subjects, use impact weapons, use oleoresin

capsicum (OC) spray, or employ foot or hand strikes. It also catalogues uses of force against police

officers in greater detail than was previously possible.

In 2016, the NYPD instituted a new comprehensive use of force policy for documenting force

used by and against police officers. It also established three levels of forceup to, and including,

deadly physical forceand defined the type of reporting or investigation that must take place

after use of force at each level. The policy does not change what officers are empowered to do

under the law, but it does ensure that individual police officersand the NYPD as a wholetake

responsibility for and justify the actions taken in each case.

Over the past 46 years, the NYPD has made extraordinary progress in reducing the number of

firearms dischargesdown nearly 95% since 1971and 2017 saw the fewest firearms

discharges ever recorded in New York City by members of the NYPD. This extraordinary reduction

was the result of clear firearms policies, recurring firearms training, and thorough oversight and

accountability. In updating our use of force policy in 2016, the goal was to bring the same level

of policy, training, and accountability to all police uses of force. The policy further ensures that

our officers remain prepared and proficient in appropriate tactics, and allows them to do their

difficult jobs as effectively and safely as possible.

At the NYPD, we continue to build on a solid foundation. In 2017, the New York City Civilian

Complaint Review Board (CCRB) recorded the fewest annual police‐force complaints in more than

10 years. While use of force is sometimes necessaryincluding the use of deadly physical

forceit is clear that NYPD police officers rarely use force in making arrests, and exercise

substantial restraint when they do use force.

New York Police Department 2017 Use of Force Report

As a direct result of the hard work and dedication of the men and women of the NYPD, overall

crime continues to decline to levels not seen in New York City in more than 50 years. Our

Neighborhood Policing philosophy is transforming the way we interact with communities,

localizing both police service and crime‐fighting; our recurring, in‐service training focusing on

enforcement encounters is teaching our officers de‐escalation techniques and other alternatives

to force; and our use of force policy is holding us accountable in situations when force is

necessary. With each passing day, and with every policy and operational improvement, we are

building trust and strengthening relationships with all the people we servein every

neighborhood. This is our way forward: public safety as a shared responsibility with everyone

who lives in, works in, and visits our great city.

James P. O’Neill

Police Commissioner

2017 Use of Force Report New York Police Department

“The police should use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to achieve police objectives; and police should use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.” Sir Robert Peel - 1829

New York Police Department 2017 Use of Force Report

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1

NYPD Use of Force Policy ................................................................................................................ 4

Firearm Discharges ....................................................................................................................... 12

Overview ................................................................................................................................... 12

Intentional Discharges – Adversarial Conflicts ......................................................................... 14

Intentional Discharges – Animal Attack .................................................................................... 24

Unintentional Discharges .......................................................................................................... 26

Unauthorized Discharges .......................................................................................................... 28

Conducted Electrical Weapons ..................................................................................................... 29

General Uses of Force ................................................................................................................... 34

Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 40

Appendix A: NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process ........................... 40

Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge ‐ Adversarial Conflict Incidents ..... 41

Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division ....... 45

Appendix D: Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location .............................................. 54

Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges ....................................................... 55

Appendix F: Use of Force and Racial Demographics ................................................................ 57

Appendix G: 2017 Uses of Force Incidents by Members’ Assignment ..................................... 58

Executive Summary 2017 Use of Force Report

Page | 1 New York Police Department

Executive Summary

The second New York City Police Department’s Annual Use of Force Report reflects continued

efforts in 2017 by the Department to change and improve reporting and investigating force. The

NYPD has long been a leader in reporting and investigating deadly force and firearms discharges.

The Department accounts for every shot fired by its members, whether intentionally or

unintentionally, except of course, for shots fired in firearms training. Since 2007, the NYPD has

issued an annual report that fully catalogues all shooting incidents, including the number of

subjects killed and wounded, the number of innocent bystanders killed and wounded, animal

shootings, accidental discharges, unauthorized use of Department firearms, and police officer

suicides with service weapons. The data collected is continually analyzed and assessed to

evaluate and improve NYPD policies and practices.

The data shows an extraordinary and consistent decline in firearms discharges dating back to

when official recording began in 1971. In that year, there were 810 firearms discharge incidents,

314 subjects shot and injured/killed, and 2,113 total shots fired. In contrast, 2017 recorded the

lowest number ever of firearms discharge incidents (52), of subjects shot and injured/killed (19),

and of total shots fired (242).

Following the model of last year’s report, this report continues to provide a fuller picture of use

of force than past Firearms Discharge Reports. In addition to firearms discharge data, this report

contains an accounting of general uses of force and the use of Conducted Electrical Weapons

(CEWs) for calendar year 2017. Tracking how, when, where, and why officers use force is an

invaluable tool for working towards the NYPD’s goal of minimizing force incidents and injuries

while maximizing officer effectiveness in situations where force is unavoidable. While some of

this data has been available in years past, this is only the second time it has all been reported

under one cover.

The NYPD’s use of force policies and incident reporting structure were enhanced in 2016 and

provide for a comprehensive collection of data on the use of force by police officers. The Threat,

Resistance or Injury (TRI) Incident Report is an integral part of that reporting structure and

provides more data on use of force and allows for deeper analysis of aggregate uses of force,

than was previously possible.

In June 2017, after evaluation of the revised use of force policies, substantive modifications were

made. The most notable change is the Level 2 use of force designation for any

allegation/suspicion of excessive force or the commission of a prohibited action (e.g., use of a

chokehold) even if there is no injury to a subject.

2017 Use of Force Report Executive Summary

New York Police Department Page | 2

The 221 Series in the NYPD Patrol Guide groups together all use of force policies and procedures

and organizes uses of force into three categories. Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot

strikes, forcible subduing of subjects, the discharge of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, the

discharge of CEWs in “cartridge mode,” or the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure

subjects. Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton,

other equipment, etc.) police canine bites, or the use of CEWs in “drive stun” mode. Level 3 is

defined as the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical

injury, including the discharge of a firearm.

Thorough oversight and investigation are built into the NYPD Use of Force Policy. All three levels

of force must be reported on TRI reports. All Level 1 uses of force are investigated by the officer’s

immediate supervisor. Level 2 uses of force are investigated by captains or above. The NYPD

Force Investigation Division (FID) investigates Level 3 cases that involve firearms discharges or

cases in which the subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die. The NYPD Internal Affairs

Bureau (IAB) investigates all other Level 3 incidents (i.e., subject’s injuries are not life‐

threatening).

Further modifications to policy and the TRI reports are being undertaken as the NYPD joins a

national effort to standardize submission of use of force data to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI). Accordingly, and in keeping with the NYPD’s commitment to build trust, the

NYPD seeks to improve its policies and reporting practices.

Firearms Discharges

In 2017, there were a total of 52 firearms discharges, a decrease of 20 incidents from the 72

recorded in 2016. Slightly less than half of the discharges (23) in 2017 occurred when officers

intentionally discharged their firearms in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal

subjects.

Nineteen subjects were struck by police gunfire; 10 were killed and nine were injured (intentional

discharges in adversarial conflicts that resulted in death are described in Appendix C). Two

subjects fired shots at officers. While there were no officers injured by gunfire in adversarial

conflicts‐intentional discharges in 2017, three officers were injured by means other than gunfire.

One officer was shot and injured in an incident where a subject fired shots at officers and then

committed suicide (see Appendix C). That incident was not considered an adversarial conflict‐

intentional discharge as officers did not discharge their firearms.

In 2017, one officer was shot and killed. Detective Miosotis Familia was seated inside a mobile

police command center when the subject fired a shot into the passenger side of the command

center, which struck and killed Detective Familia.

Executive Summary 2017 Use of Force Report


Nine intentional firearms discharges occurred during animal attacks in 2017, down from 11 in

2016. There were 12 unintentional discharges in 2017, down from 14 in 2016. There were eight

unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms in 2017, of which five were officer suicides. While the total

of unauthorized use incidents decreased compared to last year (10 in 2016), the number of officer

suicides increased (4 in 2016).

Conducted Electrical Weapons (CEWs)

There were 728 CEW discharge incidents in 2017, an increase from the 501 incidents in 2016. Of

the 728 CEW discharge incidents, 296 occurred in arrest situations, 228 in situations in which

officers were seeking to control an emotionally disturbed person, four in animal attacks, and the

remaining in situations including unintentional discharges, prisoners, violent prisoners, car stops,

and suspicious person stops.

The CEW was deemed effective in 448, or 75.3%, of 595 intentional discharge incidents. The

number of ineffective discharges were attributed to different causes including the probes missing

the subject, the probes falling out or being removed by the subject, or the probe wires breaking.

General Uses of Force

There were 7,369 reportable use of force incidents in 2017. Arrest situations were the most

commonly recorded use of force. The NYPD used force in effecting approximately 1% of arrests

in 2017, as recorded on arrest reports.

Of the 7,369 reported uses of force, 82.4%—6,071 incidents—involved the minimal amount of

reportable force: hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible subduing of subjects. There were also

728 CEW discharges, 324 discharges of OC spray, 105 uses of impact weapons, 82 uses of mesh

blankets to control subjects, 52 firearms discharges, and seven canine bites. In 2017, there were

1,316 uses of force reported among the 176,153 radio runs concerning emotionally disturbed

persons. Eighty‐nine percent of force incidents were classified as Level 1 uses of force, 8% as

Level 2, and 3% as Level 3.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are

generally those that require admission to a hospital. A total of 9,213 subjects, or 96.1% of all

subjects of police force in 2017, sustained no injuries or minor injuries in the course of police uses

of force. Two hundred and fourteen subjects, or 2.2%, were substantially injured and 158, or

1.7%, were seriously injured. A total of 4,004 police officers were injured in use of force incidents

in 2017. Four hundred and six of those, or 10.1%, were substantially or seriously injured.

2017 Use of Force Report NYPD Use of Force Policy


NYPD Use of Force Policy

STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND CASE LAW

Police officers are among a select few who have the authority to use force in the course of their

duties. Under New York State law, police may use force to protect life and property, as well as to

effect arrests or prevent escapes. In New York State, private citizens, except in certain limited

circumstances, may only resort to force in self‐defense or defense of others and must exhaust all

attempts at retreat before using deadly physical force, except in their own dwellings. Police, in

contrast, are not only obligated to stand their ground, but required to pursue fleeing perpetrators

and use force, if necessary, to stop that flight.

The use of force by a police officer is oftentimes the result of a subject resisting arrest. Private

citizens may not resist arrest, and resisting arrest is a crime in New York State.

Although police achieve compliance in the vast majority of police encounters with verbal

commands alone, when verbal commands are insufficient and subjects choose to ignore

instructions or resist, officers may use an array of force options to compel others to submit to

their lawful authority. These options range from physical force, to less‐lethal options (e.g., OC

spray, CEWs, or impact weapons), or when appropriate, to deadly physical force. The officer is

not required to move sequentially from one level of force to the next. The officer may escalate

from verbal commands to pointing a firearm, for instance, or may de‐escalate from a threatened

use of force or a use of force to verbal commands, as a situation evolves.

Two Supreme Court cases, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386 (1989), established the constitutional standards for police uses of force. Graham

established a standard of “objective reasonableness” that restricts an officer’s authority to

compel or constrain another citizen. Garner sets forth the standard governing use of deadly force,

namely that officers may use deadly force when there is probable cause to believe that the

suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm.

In Graham, the Supreme Court wrote that “the ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must

be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20

vision of hindsight.” In People v. Benjamin, 51 NY2d 267 (1980), the New York State Court of

Appeals observed that “it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await

the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.” Graham and Benjamin both explicitly

acknowledge the strain under which officers make life or death use of force decisions.

NYPD Use of Force Policy 2017 Use of Force Report


The New York State Penal Law allows an officer to use physical force only when he or she

“reasonably believes such to be necessary” to effect arrest, prevent escape, or defend a person

or property from harm.

NYPD policy imposes more stringent guidelines than New York State or federal statutes, holding

its personnel to a higher standard of restraint. New York State law, for example, allows the use

of deadly physical force to protect property, but Department policy does not. Department policy

stipulates that deadly force may only be used against a person to “protect members of the service

and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death” (Patrol Guide 221‐01).

NYPD POLICY

With respect to general use of force, NYPD policy stipulates that “force may be used when it is

reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect

life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody”

(Patrol Guide 221‐01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of

force that is judged to be “unreasonable under the circumstances…will be deemed excessive and

in violation of Department policy” (Patrol Guide 221‐01). Use of force, in this context, is broadly

defined to encompass a wide range of force options that may be employed to gain compliance

or ensure the control of a subject.

The NYPD has long had progressive and effective firearms discharge policies, including clear rules

on when firearms can be used and recurring semi‐annual training with the firearm itself. These

policies have had a highly positive impact over the past 46 years. The data shows a record of

increasing firearms restraint dating back to 1971, when there were 810 discharge incidents,

compared with 52 discharge incidents in 2017. In 1971, 314 subjects were shot by police and 93

were killed, compared with 19 shot and ten killed in 2017. In 2017, the NYPD recorded the lowest

number of total discharge incidents in its history. The 52 officer involved discharges in 2017

reflect a 22% decrease from the previous lowest year on record (67 incidents occurred in 2015).

NYPD officers have become increasingly restrained in the use of firearms because they have

clearer rules, more vigorous oversight, and more training.

In June 2016, the NYPD established a unified force reporting structure that reflected national

best practices. This policy overhaul was the product of a collaborative effort among NYPD

leadership, City stakeholders, and external subject matter experts. The goal of this policy

overhaul was to improve oversight, enhance training, generate comprehensive reporting, and

thoroughly investigate all uses of force. The Department concentrated all policies bearing on use

of force in a single section of the NYPD Patrol GuideSeries 221. Series 221 contains definitions

of “excessive force” and “deadly force.” Additionally, Patrol Guide procedures 221‐01 and 221‐



02 define de‐escalation and instruct officers to use de‐escalation techniques whenever

appropriate.

Patrol Guide procedure 221‐03 defines three levels of force, as well

as the reporting and investigation requirements at each level:

Level 1 (Physical Force/Less‐Lethal Device)

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible take‐

downs, the discharge of OC pepper spray, the discharge of CEWs in

“cartridge mode,” or the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure

subjects.

Level 2 (Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less‐Lethal Device)

Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object,

(including a baton, other equipment, etc.), a police canine bite, or

the use of CEWs in “drive stun” mode.

Level 3 (Use of Deadly Physical Force)

Level 3 is defined as the use of physical force that is readily capable

of causing death or serious physical injury, including the discharge

of a firearm.

Ordering a person to lie on the ground, guiding them to the ground

in a controlled manner, and the use of Velcro straps or

polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects are not, by themselves,

reportable uses of force.

The degree of injury to the subject can alter the categorization of

an incident and whether it is treated as a Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 use of force. A substantial

injury to the subject results in a Level 2 classification, and a serious physical injury results in a

Level 3 classification, regardless of the type of force used. Substantial physical injuries are

generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious physical injuries are generally those

that require admission to a hospital.

Suspicion that excessive force was used, or attempted suicide, also elevates an incident to a Level

2 classification. Alleged or suspected excessive force accompanied by serious physical injury, or

attempted suicide that causes a serious injury, elevates an incident to a Level 3 classification.

In June 2016, to better track and investigate the use of force by NYPD officers, the NYPD began

use of force reporting, using two forms: the TRI Report and the Investigating Supervisor’s

89%

Level 1

8%

Level 2

3%

Level 3

2017 Use of Force



Assessment Report (ISAR). The Department’s Finest Online Records Management System

(FORMS) is used to access TRI reports and ISARs.

A TRI report contains one or more TRI worksheets. TRI worksheets are prepared by the members

involved in any reportable force incident. Patrol Guide procedure 221‐03, entitled, “Reporting

and Investigation of Force Incident or Injury to Persons During Police Action,” states that TRI

worksheet(s) will be prepared when force is used or alleged, as well as in incidents in which any

person sustains an injury related to police action or in police custody, and when prisoners

complete or attempt suicide. Additionally, TRI worksheet(s) will also be prepared when force is

used against police officers.

The first half of a TRI worksheet is completed by the member who used force, or was subject to

force, and the latter part is completed by their immediate supervisor who records the nature of

injuries sustained by the subject and information about the use of specific equipment (e.g.,

CEWs), as necessary. Witnessing officers are not required to complete a worksheet. The

supervisor makes a determination about whether the use of force in question was in compliance

with Department procedures and makes recommendations as to whether further investigation

is necessary, depending on the level of force used. Upon completion of the TRI worksheet(s), the

information is entered into the FORMS’ TRI application to generate a completed TRI report. The

FORMS TRI application creates a specific incident number for the report and the number is then

entered on the corresponding worksheet(s).

ISARs are prepared for Level 2 and Level 3 force events. The ISAR provides space to complete a

narrative of the events. All Level 1 uses of force are investigated by the member’s immediate

supervisor, except in cases when a CEW is deployed, in which case, the investigation must be

conducted by a supervisor in the rank of lieutenant, or higher. Level 2 uses of force are

investigated by the commanding officer or the executive officer of the officer’s unit, or by the

duty captain, during hours when the commanding officer and the executive officer are not

available. Level 3 uses of force are investigated by IAB or FID (Appendix A details the

documentation/investigation process).

In June 2017, after a year’s evaluation of the newly implemented force policies, several

substantive modifications were made. The most significant of these changes required a Level 2

classification for any allegation/suspicion of excessive force or the commission of a prohibited

actioneven where there is no injury to a subject (e.g., use of a chokehold). Raising an incident

to Level 2 is an important distinction, because Level 2 mandates the investigating supervisor be

a Department executive (captain or above).

While NYPD use of force policies incorporate national best practices and serve as a benchmark

for law enforcement agencies worldwide, the Department is presently in the process of further



refinement to its use of force protocols. In 2017, numerous focus groups were held in

coordination with an evaluation of the Department’s overhauled force policies. While a strong

framework had been established in both policy and data collection, changes were necessary.

The NYPD voluntarily submits use of force data to the national collection effort supported by the

FBI. Motivated by a proactive commitment to improving its own policies and data collection

processesand by a desire to comport with the FBI’s national data collection standardsthe

NYPD is further modifying its data collection processes. The NYPD is redesigning its mechanisms

for data collectionnamely the TRI report and the FORMS TRI applicationfor several reasons.

Changes to the worksheet and database will improve user interface. Worksheet captions are

being reordered to create a more intuitive data entry process, and a redesigned database is being

developed with field dependencies and conditional captions that will protect against data entry

errors that were identified in the first iteration of the data collection model.

While modifications to the NYPD’s use of force policies and data collection model will make

comparisons of force data difficult between 2016 and 2019, the NYPD is establishing policy

improvements and a sustainable data collection process that will be in alignment with a national

model for many years to come.

FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW

As in most police departments, the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau reports directly to the Police

Commissioner, but many other components in force oversight, investigation, discipline, and

training are direct reports to the First Deputy Commissioner. The First Deputy Commissioner

oversees FID, which investigates all firearms discharges, fatalities related to police action, and

cases when a subject of police action is seriously injured and likely to die, and the Risk

Management Bureau (RMB), which performs a number of roles with respect to use of force,

including monitoring both the preparation of TRI worksheets and the quality of force

investigations. Both the Department Advocate’s Office, which prosecutes discipline cases, and

the Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD’s internal discipline trials, also

directly report to the First Deputy Commissioner.

The First Deputy Commissioner chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews all Level 3

uses of force, determining whether police actions were within policy and making disciplinary

recommendations to the Police Commissioner when they are not.

The various components of the NYPD’s use of force oversight and management are listed below:



Immediate Supervisor

Sergeants and/or patrol supervisors supervise all police field operations within a command,

(precinct, police service area, or transit district). These supervisors are the principal investigators

of Level 1 uses of force.

Duty Captain

The duty captain is the front‐line executive supervisor, overseeing all personnel performing duty

within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not

present. Duty captains investigate Level 2 uses of force in the absence of the commander

officer/executive officer.

Duty Chief

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD when other Department

executives are not present, acting as a representative of the Chief of Department and responding

to all serious incidents within the City, including police‐involved shootings and deaths in police

custody. The duty chief may assist in investigations of use of force incidents during hours when

precinct and borough executives are not present.

Borough/Bureau Investigations Units

Investigations units, assigned to bureau and borough commands, investigate instances of non‐

criminal violations of Department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic

incidents and certain criminal incidents involving police officers. The investigations units may

assist in investigations of Level 2 use of force incidents.

Internal Affairs Bureau

IAB combats police corruption by analyzing corruption allegations and trends and conducts

comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. IAB investigates all

Level 3 use of force incidents that do not involve firearms discharges, subjects who have died,

and subjects that are seriously injured and likely to die, which are investigated by FID.

Force Investigation Division

FID investigates Level 3 incidents that involve firearms discharges, cases in which the subject is

seriously injured and likely to die, and cases in which a subject dies in events related to police

activity.

FID, established in July 2015, has centralized the investigation of firearms discharges in the NYPD.

Before FID’s creation, firearms discharges could be investigated by three different bureaus, (i.e.,



Patrol Bureau’s borough investigations units, IAB, and the Detective Bureau). The assortment of

units responsible for investigating discharges led to quality variances and an investigatory

framework that lacked uniformity. FID now responds immediately to every police firearms

discharge, and the same teams, using consistent investigative standards, investigate these cases.

FID also reviews the tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to

make both general training recommendations and training recommendations for the individual

officers involved in discharge incidents.

Risk Management Bureau

RMB acts as a liaison to the Office of the Inspector General and the court‐appointed Federal

Monitor. RMB is responsible for ensuring the complete and proper implementation of court‐

ordered reforms. RMB also assesses compliance with NYPD policies, develops strategies and

programs designed to minimize risk to the Department, and provides oversight of the NYPD’s

performance monitoring programs. RMB sub‐units include the Quality Assurance Division, the

Risk Mitigation Division, and the Compliance Division. RMB and the First Deputy Commissioner’s

Office lead force review meetings every month with borough and bureau personnel. The purpose

of these meetings is to assess compliance with use of force policy and to ensure accurate

preparation of TRI/ISAR forms.

Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate

The Department Advocate prepares and acts as the prosecutorial entity at Department trials,

providing assistance in command discipline procedures and preparation of charges and

specifications. The Department Advocate makes recommendations to the First Deputy

Commissioner concerning suspension and restoration to duty of members of the service.

Deputy Commissioner, Trials

The Deputy Commissioner, Trials presides at due process hearings of Department disciplinary

cases and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner

consistent with Department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

Use of Force Review Board

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism to maintain the integrity of the

Department’s force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board reviews the most

serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of officers during force

encounters.



Civilian Complaint Review Board

The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) is an independent agency empowered

to receive, investigate, mediate, and hear complaints against New York City police officers

alleging use of excessive force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or the use of offensive language.

CCRB attorneys prosecute force cases in NYPD administrative trials. CCRB investigates force

allegations, issues findings, and forwards recommendations to the Police Commissioner

regarding disciplinary action with respect to these allegations.

TRAINING

An officer’s training serves as the foundation and framework for deciding whether and how to

use force. Revisions to the NYPD’s use of force policy and reporting structure has led to changes

in training. As use of force data is collected and analyzed, Department policy is revised, training

is evaluated, and new instructional scenarios are employed.

Training Bureau

The Training Bureau oversees NYPD training and educational programs, providing recruits,

uniformed officers, and civilians with the most up‐to‐date academic, tactical, and technological

training available. In‐service training for officers include sessions on the latest tactics, de‐

escalation strategies, Crisis Intervention Training, and changes in the law and police procedures,

as well as ways to positively interact and collaborate with community members. Additionally, all

officers complete rigorous firearms training as recruits and must re‐qualify for the use of their

service and off‐duty weapons twice a year for the entirety of their careers. Officers also receive

specialized training when they are assigned to certain units, such as the Emergency Service Unit

or the Strategic Response Group.

NYPD firearms training emphasizes that the principal goal of every police officer is to protect life,

including the lives of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other officers. Yet, it is sometimes

necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force. To make the right decision about whether

and how to use deadly force, an officer relies on judgment, skill, and most importantly, training.

Police officers are trained to use deadly physical force to “stop the threat,” which means ending

the subject’s ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. Sometimes, stopping

a subject results in the subject’s demise, but the purpose of using force is not to kill, but to stop

the threat. To accomplish this purpose in dynamic shooting situations, officers are trained to

shoot at the center mass of the suspect, the largest target available, and the one most likely to

stop the threat. Arms and legs are smaller and less static, and therefore, less certain targets.

Hitting a subject in these extremities is also far less likely to stop an assailant.

2017 Use of Force Report Firearm Discharges


Firearm Discharges

Overview

Over the course of 46 years, the New York City Police Department has experienced a dramatic

decline in the number of firearms discharge incidents, a trend that continues today. Not only did

2017 witness a 28% reduction in total discharge incidents from the previous year, but it also

represents the lowest annual discharge total since official record keeping began in 1971. Since

2007, when the Department introduced its annual Firearms Discharge Report, discharges have

decreased 53%. The data underscores the diligence and restraint displayed by NYPD officers in

their interactions with the public at large, as well as changes and improvements in firearms policy

and training.

The Department analyzes each discharge category to improve understanding of the various types

of incidents and adjusts training and policy, where necessary. The discharge data in this report

has been compiled from Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, detective case files, medical

examiner’s reports, arrest and complaint reports, Firearms Analysis Section reports, Force

Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, and

previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. The relatively small number of discharges in 2017

(52 overall discharge incidents, including 23 adversarial conflict discharges) limits the scope of

conclusions that can be drawn from the dataset, as well as any basis on which to forecast future

trends.

Even when intentional firearms discharges by police are deemed justifiable in a court of law, they

nevertheless are reviewed by the NYPD for tactical errors and violations of procedure, as well as

any other factors that suggest modifications to policy and procedure. Discipline in these cases

does not always result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but may result from a violation

of other Department procedures. All officers who discharge their firearms are sent to a firearms

tactical review course, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.

Historical Snapshot, 2007‐2017

Discharge Category 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Adversarial Conflict 45 49 47 33 36 45 40 35 33 37 23

Animal Attack 39 30 28 30 36 24 19 18 15 11 9

Unintentional Discharge 15 15 23 21 15 21 12 18 15 14 12

Mistaken Identity 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Unauthorized Use of a Firearm 6 3 4 6 2 6 2 4 2 5 3

MOS Suicide/Attempted Suicide 6 8 3 2 3 9 8 4 2 4 5

Intentional Discharge‐No Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

Total 111 105 106 92 92 105 81 79 67 72 52

Firearm Discharges 2017 Use of Force Report


Firearms discharges are divided into six categories:

Intentional Discharge–Adversarial Conflict (ID‐AC): when an officer intentionally discharges a

firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were twenty‐three intentional discharges in

adversarial conflict incidents in 2017.

Intentional Discharge–Animal Attack (ID‐AA): when an officer intentionally discharges a firearm

to defend against an animal attack. There were nine intentional discharge incidents in the course

of animal attacks in 2017.

Unintentional Discharge: when an officer unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were

twelve unintentional discharge incidents in 2017.

Unauthorized Use of a Firearm: when an officer intentionally discharges a firearm outside the

scope of his or her employment, or when another person illegally discharges an officer’s firearm.

There were eight unauthorized discharge incidents involving NYPD firearms in 2017, five of which

were officer suicides.

Mistaken Identity: when an officer intentionally fires on another officer in the mistaken belief

that the other officer is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity cases do not include crossfires, when

an officer accidentally strikes a fellow officer while firing at another target. There were no cases

of mistaken identity and one incident of crossfire in 2017. This incident of crossfire was counted

in the Intentional Discharge–Animal Attacks category as it was incidental to an animal attack.

Intentional Discharge–No Conflict: when an officer discharges a firearm to summon assistance.

Due to the rarity of discharges to summon assistance, this category is usually excluded from the

report. There were no discharges classified as Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2017. Notably,

the NYPD did experience one Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2016, the only one of its kind

in a decade.

4549 47

3336

4540

35 3337

23

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Adversarial Conflict, 2007‐2017

39

30 28 30

36

2419 18

1511 9

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Animal Attack, 2007‐2017



Intentional Discharges – Adversarial Conflicts

There were 36,169 uniformed officers employed by the NYPD in 2017.

Of them, 32 (0.1%) intentionally discharged a firearm at a subject. In

2017, officers responded to more than 5.4 million calls for police service,

of which 64,171 involved weapons.

Of the thousands of weapons arrests that resulted from these

encounters, nearly 3,469 were gun arrests. Officers also had thousands

of additional interactions with the public, including investigative

encounters, car stops, and violation stops, and escorted thousands of

emotionally disturbed persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the

overwhelming majority of incidents in which officers took armed

subjects or emotionally disturbed persons into custody, they did not fire

their weapons.

In 2017, there were 23 intentional firearm discharge‐adversarial conflict

incidents (ID‐AC), involving 32 officers who discharged their firearms.

These conflicts involved 27 known subjects and one unknown and

unapprehended subject. In nine different ID‐AC incidents, at least two

subjects fired directly at officers, killing one officer. Nineteen subjects

were shot in adversarial conflicts, of whom 10 were killed.

The total number of officers injured by gunfire in ID‐AC exchanges has

varied over the years. In 2017, there was only one incident in which an

officer was shot and injured by subject gunfire (this was not classified as

an ID‐AC incident as no officer discharged a firearm); this is fewer than

the four officers shot and injured in 2016, and significantly fewer than

the 13 officers shot in 2012. Detective Miosotis Familia was shot and

killed in the line of duty in July 2017. She was ambushed by a subject

while seated inside of a police mobile command center, and did not fire

her weapon (see Officer Deaths and Injuries on page 16).

Subject Death and Injuries

In 2017, ten subjects were killed by police gunfire in ID‐AC incidents. The total number of subjects

killed during adversarial exchanges has remained fairly level over the last ten years, with an

average of 10 subjects shot and killed by police officers from 2007 to 2017.

Of the 10 subjects killed by police gunfire, each possessed some form of weapon or dangerous

instrument that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Four of the

5.4 Million Calls for Service

286,227 Arrests

176,153 Calls for Emotionally

Disturbed People

64,171 Weapons Calls

36,169 Officers

3,469 Gun Arrests

2 Subjects Fired at Officers

_________________________________________

1 Officer Shot and Killed

52 Firearms Discharge

Incidents

23 Adversarial Conflicts

22 Subjects Fired Upon by

Police

19 Subjects Shot

10 Subjects Shot and Killed

32 Officers Involved in

Adversarial Conflicts

2017 Adversarial Conflicts in Context



subjects possessed and menaced officers with knives; three

subjects possessed firearms capable of firing live ammunition;

two subjects were in possession of imitation firearms; and the

remaining subject menaced officers with a screwdriver. A total

of 11 weapons were recovered in 10 separate incidents where

subjects were killed. In one incident, officers conducted a

routine wellness check in an apartment on behalf of a

concerned landlord. Upon entry, they discovered the tenant in

distress and in possession of a cutting instrument. In addition,

the tenant was also simulating the possession of a firearm,

which was concealed from view. Following unsuccessful

attempts to deescalate the situation and an ineffective CEW

deployment, the officers shot and killed the subject after he

aimed his imitation firearm at the officers. One knife and one

imitation firearm were recovered in regard to this incident (the

10 ID‐AC incidents in which subjects were killed are described

in Appendix B).

Nine subjects were shot and injured by police gunfire in 2017,

fourteen fewer than the previous year and the lowest number

of subject injuries by police gunfire since 1971. Of the nine

subjects shot and injured, two were armed with firearms, two

with imitation firearms, three with cutting instruments, and two

used their vehicles as deadly weapons. In one of the vehicle

incidents, detectives assigned to the Manhattan Violent Felony

Squad and another member from the Allentown Police

Department were attempting to apprehend a violent felon

seated inside of a vehicle. Officers observed the individual making furtive gestures indicative of

a person reaching for a weapon. Two officers present fired their service weapons after the

suspect made repeated attempts to strike officers with the vehicle. The subject sustained a

nonfatal gunshot wound to his left thigh.

Bystander Deaths and Injuries

Unfortunately, bystanders may be injured as a direct result of the adversarial actions of

perpetrators or injured incidental to police action. In 2017, four bystanders were injured in three

separate ID‐AC incidents. In two of these incidents, three bystanders were stabbed/slashed by

assailants armed with cutting instruments. Officers intervened on both occasions and discharged

their service weapons, successfully stopping the perpetrators’ attacks.



In the one remaining incident, officers were responding to the shooting of an on‐duty officer

when they observed the armed suspect fleeing from the scene. As the officers confronted the

suspect, he raised his firearm and pointed it at the officers. The pursuing officers discharged their

firearms at the armed perpetrator, striking him multiple times. During this exchange, a civilian

bystander in close proximity to the ensuing gunfire sustained a non‐fatal gunshot wound to his

abdomen. The laboratory analysis of the bullet removed from the bystander’s abdomen was

inconclusive in identifying the weapon that fired the projectile.

Officer Deaths and Injuries

One officer was killed during an ID‐AC incident in 2017. Detective Miosotis Familia and another

officer were seated inside a mobile command center, in the Bronx. A male suspect surreptitiously

approached the passenger side of the vehicle and fired once, fatally injuring Detective Familia.

Officers in the area intercepted the suspect during his flight from the scene; he was shot and

killed by pursuing officers shortly after the incident (refer to Appendix C for more details

regarding this incident).

Three officers were injured in ID‐AC incidents. All three sustained abrasions and/or contusions

ranging from minor to severe. One officer was seriously wounded while investigating a “shots

fired” call. The officer was speaking with the occupants of an illegally parked vehicle when the

driver drove off, dragging the officer two blocks before the officer was thrown from the moving

vehicle. In another incident, officers responded to a dispute inside of a parking garage involving

multiple individuals. One officer was struck by a vehicle exiting the location, causing him to

sustain contusions to his knees and hand. In the remaining incident, officers were attempting to

restrain an emotionally disturbed person wielding a knife. One officer suffered a concussion from

striking his head on the ground as a result of wrestling with the perpetrator.

In 2017, eleven subjects in adversarial

conflicts possessed either real or imitation

firearms: three semi‐automatic pistols,

three revolvers, and five imitation semi‐

automatic pistols. Seven subjects were

armed with knives or other cutting

instruments; three used their vehicles as

weapons against officers; and one wielded

a blunt instrument (i.e., screwdriver). On

one occasion, officers perceived the

presence of a firearm. Aggravating factors

accompanied this incident involving the

perceived weapons possession. Officers responded to a commercial burglary and were informed

Cutting Instrument

(7)31%

Firearm (11)48%

Other(1)4%

Perceived Firearm

(1)4%

Vehicle(3)13%

Threat Type ‐ ID‐AC Incidents



by a witness that the two perpetrators were armed, one with a flare gun and one with a revolver.

Officers confronted the two suspects fleeing from the location minutes later. After ignoring

multiple commands to remain motionless, one suspect retrieved a black object and pointed it in

the direction of one of the officers. The officer discharged one round from his service weapon,

which did not strike either of the two perpetrators. At the time of the discharge, the perpetrator

was in possession of a black tactical flashlight. Two flare guns were recovered from the scene.

Officers discharged a total of 170 rounds during ID‐AC incidents in 2017, a 44.1% decrease from

2016, when 304 rounds were fired, and 64.4% fewer rounds than the 478 rounds discharged in

2007 (the highest number of rounds fired in the past decade). Twelve officers fired more than

five rounds, the majority of whom fired between six and ten rounds. Twenty of the 32 officers

involved in ID‐AC incidents, accounting for 65% of ID‐AC incidents, fired five rounds or fewer. In

39% of ID‐AC incidents, officers discharged their weapon only one time. In two ID‐AC incidents,

officers fired 20 rounds or more. The number of rounds fired by an officer in adversarial

encounters is not dispositive of whether the officer was justified in discharging a firearm.

1 Round(11)34%

2‐5 Rounds(9)28%

6‐10 Rounds(7)22%

11‐20 Rounds(4)13%

20 Rounds or More

(1)3%

Rounds Fired per ID‐AC Officer

1 Round(9)39%

2‐5 Rounds(6)26%

6‐10 Rounds(2)9%

11‐20 Rounds(4)17%

20 Rounds or More

(2)9%

Rounds Fired per ID‐AC Incident



Of the 23 ID‐AC incidents in 2017, 14 occurred outdoors, primarily on streets and sidewalks, and

nine occurred in semi‐private and/or indoor locations, including residential and commercial

buildings. Twenty‐two of the 23 incidents occurred within New York City.

In 2017, all of the officers involved in adversarial conflicts were on‐duty. Approximately one‐third

of officers (34%) involved in adversarial incidents were in plainclothes. In previous years, the

number of discharging personnel in plainclothes assignments has been higher. Twenty‐nine of

the 32 officers involved in ID‐AC incidents (91%) were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau.

Although officers assigned to specialty units (e.g., anti‐crime) represent a small proportion of

officers assigned to patrol, they comprised 28% of the officers who discharged their firearms in

ID‐AC incidents. This group’s higher representation as participants in shooting incidents in 2017

is likely attributable to the role of specialty units in proactively pursuing armed and violent

criminals.

1

2

29

Special Operations Division

Detective Bureau

Patrol Services Bureau

Officer Assignment, ID‐AC Incidents

2

9

12

Open Lot/Yard

Residential Building

Sidewalk/Street

ID‐AC Incidents by Location Type



Twenty‐eight subjects were involved in ID‐

AC incidents in 2017, all but two of whom

were male. Twenty‐seven of the 28 subjects

were apprehended. Known subject ages

ranged from 15 to 69, with a median age of

27.5. Almost two‐thirds (63%) of known

subjects were 30 years of age or younger.

The race of the subjects was determined by

eyewitness reports, the subjects’ self‐

identification, existing government‐issued

documentation, racial/ethnic physical

characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other sources. Of the 27 known subjects involved

in ID‐AC incidents, 63% were Black, 25.9% were Hispanic, 11.1% were White, and none were

Asian.

The race of subjects involved in the

23 ID‐AC incidents correlates to the

races of both suspects and victims

in the 789 criminal shootings in

New York City in 2017. Among the

498 known criminal shooting

suspects in New York City in 2017,

approximately 75% were Black,

22% Hispanic, 2% White, and 1%

Asian. Among the 936 criminal

shooting victims in 2017,

approximately 73% were Black,

22% Hispanic, 2% White, and 3%

Asian.

63%

25.9%

11.1%

Black Hispanic White Asian/Other

Race of Known Subjects in ID ‐ AC Incidents

73.3%

21.9%

2.2% 2.6%

75.1%

21.9%

2.0% 1.0%


Race of Known Criminal Shooting Victims vs. Criminal Shooting Suspects

Criminal Shooting Victims (936) Known Criminal Shooting Suspects (498)

0%20%40%60%80%

100%

NYCPopulation(8.5 Million)

Gun Arrests(3,469)

KnownCriminalShooting

Suspects (498)

CriminalShooting

Victims (936)

Subjects whoFired at Police

(2)

KnownSubjects Firedon by Police

(22)

SubjectsStruck by

Police Gunfire(19)

Gunfire in New York City 2017




Of the 32 officers who intentionally discharged their firearms during ID‐AC incidents in 2017, two

were female (6%) and thirty were male (94%). At the time of this report, 17.9% of the

Department’s uniformed personnel are female and 82.1% male. Considering both current data

and data from prior years, no discernible pattern emerges with regard to the likelihood that an

officer of any particular race will

become involved in an ID‐AC

incident. The races of officers

involved in adversarial conflicts

closely track the representation

of those races in the NYPD. Of

the 32 officers, 46.9% were

White, 31.3% were Hispanic,

15.6% were Black, and 6.3%

were Asian. The Department’s

officers are 49.8% White, 27.5%

Hispanic, 15.3% Black, and 7.5%

Asian.

Historically, police officers with fewer years of service are significantly more likely to be involved

in ID‐AC incidents compared with officers of longer tenure and officers of higher rank. These

officers are more likely to be serving in patrol capacities and to encounter situations that may

lead to adversarial conflicts. Approximately three‐fourths of ID‐AC officers in 2017 had ten years

of service or fewer at the time of the discharge.

Officers in the rank of police officer comprised 71.9% of ID‐AC officers in 2017, which is consistent

with their two‐thirds representation among the Department’s total uniformed staff and with

historical trends. Over the last decade, officers in the rank of police officers represented

approximately 65% of total uniformed staff and comprised between 56% and 88% of ID‐AC

officers. In years where police

officers made up a higher

percentage of ID‐AC officers,

the percentage of ID‐AC officers

in the rank of detective was

lower. Similarly, in years where

the percentage of ID‐AC officers

in the rank of police officer was

lower, the percentage of

detectives increased. In 2015,

56% of ID‐AC officers were in

46.9%

31.3%

15.6%6.3%

49.8%

27.5%

15.3%7.5%

White Hispanic Black Asian/Other

Race of Officers in ID ‐ AC Incidents

Officer Involved ID‐AC UMOS Staffing

71.9%

6.3%

21.9%

0.0% 0.0%

65.7%

14.5% 13.0% 4.7% 2.1%

PoliceOfficer

Detective Sergeant Lieutenant Captain andAbove

Rank of Officers in ID‐AC vs. Dept Staffing

Officer Involved ID‐AC UMOS Staffing



the rank of police officer and 29% were in the rank of detective. In 2014, 88% were police officers

and 3% were detectives. From 2007 to 2016, sergeants represented approximately 13% of total

uniformed staff and comprised between 7% and 17% of ID‐AC officers. In 2017, there was a slight

deviation from this historical trend, and personnel in the rank of sergeant comprised 21.9% of

ID‐AC officers, which is nearly twice their representation among the Department’s uniformed

staff. Twenty‐eight percent of the ID‐AC sergeants were working as patrol supervisors at the time

of their ID‐AC incidents, 57% were conducting enforcement action in plainclothes as anti‐crime

team supervisors (and one Gang Squad supervisor), and the remaining sergeant was assigned to

the Independence Day Detail at the time of incident.

Most NYPD adversarial firearms

discharges occur within the five

counties of New York City. In 2017, 22

of the 23 ID‐AC incidents occurred

within City limits, with the remaining

incident occurring in Pennsylvania. Of

the 22 incidents within the City, 18

occurred in Brooklyn, Queens, and

the Bronx. Each geographic borough,

except Staten Island, accounted for at

least three ID‐AC incidents. Brooklyn,

with 10 incidents, accounted for over

40% of the 2017 total.

ID‐AC incidents occurred in the confines of seventeen separate precincts throughout the City,

and four of those precincts had more than one incident. The 67 Precinct had three ID‐AC incidents

in 2017 and the 75, 77, and 100 Precincts had two each (see Appendix D).

ID‐AC incidents largely correspond with geographic crime patterns, as demonstrated by

comparing the locations of the 22 ID‐AC incidents that occurred within the City to the locations

of the 789 criminal shootings in 2017. As the map of Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. Police

Adversarial Discharges (page 22) shows, police firearms discharges occur in areas of New York

City where there are higher levels of criminal gun violence. Since the 2007 Annual Firearms

Discharge Report first mapped police and criminal shootings, the geographical correlation

between police shootings and criminal gun violence has been generally consistent. The frequency

and locations of police‐involved shootings are directly and proportionally related to criminal gun

activity and criminal shootings in New York City.

Out of City(1)4.3%

Brooklyn(10)43.5%

Bronx(4)

17.4%

Manhattan(3)

13.0%

Queens(4)

17.4%

Staten Island(1)4.3%

ID ‐ AC Incidents by Location





The number of ID‐AC incidents within the City

is comparatively small against the backdrop

of citywide criminal shootings, with police

shootings accounting for about 2.9% of total

shootings in the City in 2017. More than 43%

of ID‐AC incidents in 2017 occurred during

the first shift (between 2331 hours and 0730

hours). The first or third shift typically

accounts for most ID‐AC incidents.

Objective Completion Rate

The NYPD uses what it calls “the objective completion rate per incident” to determine the

effectiveness of police firearms discharges because it is considered both more accurate and more

informative. When an officer properly and lawfully perceives a threat severe enough to require

the use of a firearm and fires at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether

the officer ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined

irrespective of the number of shots the officer fired at the subject. The objective completion rate

is used for statistical purposes and is not a factor in investigations of individual incidents. The

Department does not

calculate hit percentage

when describing ID‐AC

incidents, in part because

the percentages are

sometimes unknown (for

example, in cases when a

subject flees) and also

because of the widely

differing circumstances in

individual incidents.

In 2017, officers hit at least one subject in 19 of the 23 ID‐AC incidents, for an objective

completion rate of 83%, down 3% from 2016 (86%). However, because a subject in one incident

was not apprehended, but may have been struck by officers’ bullets, the objective completion

rate for 2017 may be higher than reported. Additionally, in the two ID‐AC incidents where the

officers were directly fired upon by the subjects, the officers had an objective completion rate of

100% in those gunfire exchange situations.

0731‐1530(5)

21.7%

1531‐2330(8)

34.8%

2331‐0730(10)43.5%

ID ‐ AC Incident by Tour

0731‐1530 1531‐2330 2331‐0730

62%57%

66%70%

78%

64% 63% 63%70%

86% 83%

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

OBJECTIVE COMPLETION RATE, 2007 ‐ 2017



Shooting Technique

Using a two‐handed grip, standing, and

carefully aligning a firearm’s sights with the

target are not always practical during

adversarial conflict. There are also

occasions when follow‐up investigations

are unable to determine the grip that was

used by involved officers. Of the 32 officers

involved in adversarial conflicts in 2017, 15

officers reported how they held their

firearms. Of those, 73% utilized a two‐

handed, supported position, while 27%

reported a one‐handed, un‐supported position. Post‐shooting investigations determined the

shooting stance of 19 of the 32 ID‐AC officers: 95% were in a standing position and 5% were in a

kneeling position. The investigations also determined the distance all discharging officers were

from their targets during ID‐AC incidents. Although officers are trained to fire on a target from as

far away as 75 feet, approximately two‐thirds of ID‐AC officers were at a distance of 15 feet or

less from the target subject at the time of the shooting. These close‐contact situations require

split‐second, life‐and‐death decisions by officers in adversarial conflicts.

Intentional Discharges – Animal Attack

Department policy authorizes officers to discharge their firearms intentionally during animal

attacks only to defend themselves or others from the threat of physical injury and only as a last

resort to stop an animal attack. Officers are equipped with non‐lethal tools that can counter

animal attacks, including batons and

OC spray, but these options are not

always feasible or effective. There

were nine instances of intentional

firearms discharges during animal

attacks (ID‐AA) in 2017, representing

an 18% decrease from 2016. Eight of

the nine were on‐duty incidents, and

the remaining incident involved an

off‐duty member discharging a

firearm at a dog in Suffolk County.

0‐5(6)19%

6‐10(8)25%

11‐15(7)22% 15+

(11)34%

ID ‐ AC Officer Distance to Target Subject (in feet)

1 Round(3)

33.3%

2‐5 Rounds(4)

44.4%

6‐10 Rounds(1) 11.1%

11‐20 Rounds(1) 11.1%

Rounds Fired per ID ‐ AA Incident



In one of the incidents, two officers

discharged their firearms at one animal.

Another incident involved two dogs and one

officer. Ten officers discharged their firearms

during ID‐AA incidents in 2017. A total of 42

rounds were fired by officers, 17 more than in

2016. Three of the 10 officers fired only once,

and one officer fired 16 times at two dogs. All

of the animals involved were dogs. Eight dogs

were killed; two were uninjured. Two officers

were bitten, and one federal marshal was

bitten and injured by crossfire during these

exchanges.

These numbers do not encompass all animal attacks on officers or civilians. Only incidents

involving intentional firearms discharges by police officers are included here. In 2017, police

officers responded to thousands of calls for service involving dogs and other animals, and they

encountered many more while on patrol, executing search warrants, or investigating complaints

that were not processed through 911 or 311.

Four of the nine ID‐AA incidents occurred during the third shift, between 1531 and 2330 hours.

The first shift, between 2331 and 0730 hours, also recorded four incidents. One incident occurred

on the second shift, between 0731 and 1530 hours.

Each geographic borough, except Staten Island, recorded at least one ID‐AA incident in 2017.

Brooklyn recorded four incidents, followed by one incident each in the other boroughs that had

ID‐AA incidents. The remaining two incidents occurred in Suffolk County and Jersey City, New

0731 ‐1530(1)

11.1%

1531‐2330(4)

44.4%

2331‐0730(4)

44.4%

ID ‐ AA Incidents by Tour

0731 ‐1530 1531‐2330 2331‐0730

Out of City(2)

22.2%

Brooklyn(4)

44.4%

Bronx(1)

11.1%

Manhattan(1)

11.1%

Queens(1) 11.1%

ID ‐ AA Incidents by Location

1 Round(3) 30%

2‐5 Rounds(5) 50%

6‐10 Rounds(1) 10%

11‐20 Rounds(1) 10%

Rounds Fired per Officer in ID ‐ AAs



Jersey. In Suffolk County, an off‐duty officer’s pit bull was fighting with another dog when the

other dog rushed towards the officer’s daughter aggressively. The officer discharged one round

at the pit bull and scared the dog away from her daughter. No injuries or property damage

resulted from this discharge. In Jersey City, officers from the Manhattan Warrant Squad and the

multiagency NY/NJ Regional Fugitive Task Force were executing a warrant. Officers were securing

the side entrance to the suspect’s location when a pit bull charged and bit a federal marshal on

the foot. An officer from the Warrant Squad discharged five rounds at the pit bull and killed it.

The federal agent was struck by a round in his foot and required hospitalization.

Unintentional Discharges

There were 12 unintentional firearms discharge incidents in 2017, a 14% decrease from 2016.

Each of the 12 incidents involved a single officer, and each resulted in a single discharge. Four

separate incidents resulted in injuries to four separate officers; however, only one officer

sustained a gunshot wound.

Of the 12 unintentional firearms

discharges, half occurred while

officers were on‐duty. Two incidents

occurred during car stops, three

inside of Department facilities, and

one incident inside a Department

vehicle. Three of the six off‐duty

incidents occurred while the officers

were attempting to unload their

weapons, one occurred when the

officer attempted to re‐holster his weapon, and one occurred while the officer was using his

weapon to practice his tactics. The remaining off‐duty unintentional discharge occurred when

the officer was robbed and assaulted. The officer unintentionally discharged a round while he

was struggling with assailants who were able to take his firearm. The perpetrators made off with

1

5

2

1

Park/Playground

Residential Building

Sidewalk/Street

Open Lot/Yard

ID ‐ AA Incidents by Location Type

4

1

5

Detective Bureau

Other ‐ Administrative

Patrol Services Bureau

ID ‐ AA Incidents by Officer Assignment

33.3%

16.7%

33.3%

8.3% 8.3%

31.6%

18.1%24.3%

14.2% 11.8%

0‐5 6‐10 11‐15 16‐20 21+

Years of Service, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing

Officer Unintentional (12) UMOS Staffing (36,169)



the officer’s firearm but were subsequently arrested. The officer’s firearm was recovered, and

the officer required stitches to his head and face.

Two of the unintentional discharges occurred when officers mishandled their firearms while

taking police action. In one incident, the officer was struck by a vehicle when the discharge

occurred; the officer suffered no injuries as a result of the discharge. The other officer sustained

a self‐inflicted gunshot wound to the thigh. A total of 11 unintentional discharges occurred when

officers were loading or unloading, holstering or unholstering, cleaning, or otherwise handling a

firearm.

Loading/Unloading

There were four unintentional discharges in 2017 as officers were attempting to load or unload

their service weapons. One officer was on‐duty at the time of the incident and three were off‐

duty. The on‐duty officer accidently depressed the trigger while attempting to unload a firearm

that was to be invoiced for safekeeping. None of the unintentional discharges that occurred

during loading/unloading resulted in injuries to officers or other persons. The other officers, all

off‐duty, accidentally discharged rounds while loading/unloading their service weapons. Two

incidents occurred inside residences and one in a hotel room.

Handling

Eight unintentional discharges in 2017 resulted from the handling of a firearm unrelated to

loading/unloading. One of these unintentional discharge incidents occurred when an officer was

handling a handgun recovered from a perpetrator during arrest processing. Another incident

occurred when a firearms instructor mistook his duty weapon for an inoperable training weapon

and fired a round. No one was injured in either discharge incident. The only incident to involve a

rifle (NYPD Emergency Service Unit’s Colt Commando M4) occurred inside a Department vehicle

when the rifle’s trigger was depressed as it came into contact with a portion of the gun rack in

the vehicle. The officer suffered a ruptured ear drum as a result of the unintentional discharge.

58.3%

33.3%

8.3%0.0% 0.0%

65.7%

14.5% 13.0% 4.7% 2.1%

Police Officer Detective Sergeant Lieutenant Captain andAbove

Rank, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing

Officer Unintentional (12) UMOS Staffing (36,169)



Unauthorized Discharges

There were eight firearms discharges in 2017 that were classified as unauthorized use of firearms,

an 11% decrease compared to 2016. Five of the eight incidents were officer suicides. The

remaining three incidents in 2017 occurred in varied circumstances, but in each incident, the

discharging officers violated Department protocol. In two of those instances, discharging officers

were also unfit for duty at the time of discharge. All eight officers who were involved in

unauthorized firearms discharges in 2017 were male. The officers’ years of service ranged from

one to twenty‐three years. Unauthorized firearms discharges are a relatively infrequent

occurrence and yield no discernible or generalizable trend over time. Since the sample captured

in 2017 is small—representing a fraction of the Department’s total uniformed staffing—these

statistics are insufficient to determine the likelihood that an officer will be responsible for an

unauthorized discharge.

The suicide‐related discharges involved four police officers and one sergeant. All of the officers

involved in the three other unauthorized discharges had 10 years of service or less at the time of

the discharges. Five officers completed suicide by firearm in 2017. This is an increase from the

three officer

suicides and one

attempted suicide

in 2016. All five

officers that

completed suicide

in 2017 were off‐

duty and at home

at the time of the

incidents.

Suicide Prevention

The NYPD and several external organizations provide mental health resources specifically

designed for officers who may be at risk of suicide. Department resources include the Employee

Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain’s Unit, the NYPD Helpline, and the

Psychological Evaluation Unit. External resources include Police Officers Providing Peer

Assistance (POPPA) and the Police Self Support Group. The department actively promotes both

internal and external resources with all uniformed police members of the service through its “Are

You OK?” campaign. The “Are You OK?” campaign is designed to increase awareness of the

available options to address contemplated suicide and encourages fellow officers to play a role

in reaching out to any member of the service who appears to be depressed or possibly suicidal.

6

8

32

3

8

6

4

23

5

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2007‐2017

Conducted Electrical Weapons 2017 Use of Force Report


Conducted Electrical Weapons

CEWs (often referred to as Tasers), provide a less‐lethal use of force option for law enforcement

personnel. CEWs may be used to gain control of non‐compliant subjects who physically resist

restraint or exhibit active physical aggression, or to prevent subjects from physically injuring

themselves or other persons. The NYPD’s policy governing CEWs is in accordance with the

recommendations published in reports by nationally recognized independent bodies, including

the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the National Institute of Justice.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges containing compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that

are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short

controlled pulses of electricity in five‐second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the

human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the

peripheral nervous system to cause temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated

muscular action, without affecting vital organs. Once the five‐second cycle is complete, an

immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post‐incident

investigations.

PERF, an organization focused on policing issues, conducted a study comparing agencies

deploying CEWs with a sample of similar agencies that did not deploy these devices. Statistical

results indicate that CEW discharges are a safer alternative to other less‐lethal options for

subduing a subject. The PERF study suggests that the likelihood of injuries to both suspects and

officers are reduced among agencies that use CEWs. Since 2015, the NYPD has expanded the

number of officers trained and authorized to use CEWs. In 2017, a total of 16,442 uniformed

service members of all ranks had been CEW‐trained and 2,372 CEWs were assigned to precincts,

police service areas, and transit districts. This represents an increase of 51.8% compared to the

10,832 total officers trained in 2016 and a 38.7% increase in the number of CEWs assigned

compared to the 1,710 CEWs assigned to commands in 2016. The NYPD is continuing its efforts

to train officers of all ranks assigned to Patrol Services Bureau, Transit Bureau, and Housing

Bureau in CEW use by 2019.

The use of CEWs in cartridge mode is a use of force option that allows the police to engage

noncompliant and/or aggressive subjects from a distance, providing officers more time to react

and develop solutions in what are typically fast paced and violent situations. Additionally, CEWs

often help officers gain rapid control and compliance, thereby minimizing the likelihood of injury

or fatal medical consequences. Of course, when subjects are presenting officers or others with

an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death, the use of CEWs may not be the

appropriate or reasonable option.

2017 Use of Force Report Conducted Electrical Weapons


There were 728 CEW discharge incidents in 2017 (there were 794 individual discharges; multiple

CEW discharges may occur in a single discharge incident). This represents a 45.3% increase

compared to the 501 CEW discharge incidents in 2016. This increase in CEW discharge incidents

is consistent with the addition of approximately 6,000 officers trained and equipped with CEWs.

Also of note, and coinciding with the increase of CEW discharge incidents from 2016 to 2017, is

the decrease in use of force incidents involving impact weapons. From June to December 2016,

there were 95 impact weapon use incidents compared to the 105 impact weapon use incidents

in the entire year of 2017. (The NYPD did not begin to track the use of impact weapons until the

new use of force policy was instituted in June of 2016. Thus the information for that year is limited

to the last seven months.)

Over two‐thirds, 72%, of all CEW discharge incidents were arrest situations or situations where

officers were attempting to assume custody and control of an emotionally disturbed person

(EDP). Two hundred and ninety‐six CEW discharge incidents were arrest situations, while 228

incidents were of officers subduing EDPs. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in

situations including unintentional discharges, prisoners, animal attacks, vehicle stops, and

suspicious person stops.

EDPs, as defined by the NYPD Patrol Guide, are persons who appear to be mentally ill or

temporarily deranged and are conducting themselves in a manner which a police officer

reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to themselves or others. EDP encounters

are usually not arrest‐related. However, consistent with the New York State Mental Hygiene Law,

Department policy directs officers to take an EDP into protective custody for the subject’s safety

and the safety of the public and to ensure that proper medical and psychiatric evaluation can

take place at a safe location.

Arrest Situation

EDP

Other

Prisoner

Car Stop

Suspicious Person/Condition Stop

Animal Attack

Search Warrant Execution

Order of Protection Service

Crowd Control

Investigation

296

228

167

18

6

5

4

1

1

1

1

CEW Discharges, Incident Type



Officers usually do not know the emotional and/or psychological status of the subject upon first

contact, but they are trained to recognize situational and behavioral cues and to bring the subject

into custody using only the reasonable amount of force necessary. When the verbal directions of

officers fail in these instances, a CEW discharge is one of the safest options for taking an EDP into

custody. The 228 CEW discharges during EDP incidents in 2017 constitute 0.13% of the 176,153

calls for service classified as 10‐54 “EDP” calls. In the vast majority of these assignments, officers

managed the incident without resorting to a CEW.

Deployment Mode

The CEW can be deployed in two separate

modes: “cartridge” mode and “drive‐stun”

mode. Cartridge mode is the preferred

method of discharge under NYPD policy. Of

the 728 CEW discharges in 2017, 635 (87%)

were deployed in cartridge mode. In this

mode, metal prongs are propelled by the

device’s cartridge toward the subject across

an intervening space, providing adequate

separation from the intended target. Used in

this mode, the device will have a greater

chance of affecting the subject’s motor

function. There were 46 deployments of

CEWs in drive‐stun mode in 2017. In drive‐

stun mode, the CEW unit is brought into

direct contact with the subject’s body or clothing without a cartridge, or after a cartridge has

been discharged. A drive‐stun discharge does not achieve the immobilizing effects of cartridge

deployment because it affects a subject’s sensory rather than central nervous system.

Effectiveness

The goal of CEW discharges is to gain control of the subject without having to resort to other

force options. Whether deployed in cartridge mode or drive‐stun mode, a CEW discharge is

classified as “effective” if officers are able to rapidly gain custody and control of the subject

immediately following its use.

Thorough review of TRI Incident Worksheets indicates that 448 of the 728 CEW discharge

incidents in 2017 were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the target subject. Of

the 728 discharge incidents, 133 were unintentional discharges and the remaining 147 were

deemed “ineffective” against the intended target.

Cartridge(635)87.2%

Drive Stun(46)6.3%

Both(31)4.3%

Unknown(16)2.2%

CEW Deployment Mode

2017 Use of Force Report Conducted Electrical Weapons


Ineffective discharge incidents were attributable to situations such as the probes failing to make

adequate contact with the subject’s skin or clothing, the probes missing the subject entirely, a

subject fighting through the pain, or the probe wires breaking. Forty‐four of the ineffective CEW

discharge incidents resulted from the subjects removing the probes. An ineffective discharge

incident may have multiple, simultaneous causes.

As previously mentioned, the NYPD defines an effective CEW deployment as one that terminates

active physical resistance, resulting in the immediate apprehension of the intended target. In

2017, CEWs resulted in the immediate subdual of the intended subject in 448 out of 595

intentional CEW discharge incidents, constituting an effectiveness rate of 75.3%.

Discharging Personnel

Personnel in the rank of police officer and sergeant were responsible for 90.4% of CEW discharges

incidents in 2017 (658 of 728 discharge incidents). Unlike officers serving in an investigative

capacity and higher ranking executives, these officers are much more likely to be involved in

contentious police‐citizen interactions which might lead to a CEW discharge. A large percentage

(76%) of discharging officers in 2017 were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau.

Until 2015, only supervisors (e.g., sergeants and lieutenants) and Emergency Service Unit officers

were authorized to carry and deploy CEWs. Since then, distribution of CEWs has spread widely

to include personnel in the rank of police officer. In 2016, sergeants were responsible for 252

CEW discharge incidents compared with 189 discharge incidents by police officers. In 2017,

sergeants were responsible for 174 CEW discharge incidents compared with 484 discharge

incidents by police officers. Because patrol officers are usually first on‐scene with violent and

combative subjects, and as more and more police officers have been equipped with CEW devices,

24

89

47

22

44

49

75

58

448

Probe wires broke

Subject fought through the pain

Ineffective unknown reason

Probes were too far from surface area

Probes removed by subject

Probes had poor probe spread

Probes fell out of subject

Probes missed subject

Effective

Effectiveness of CEW Discharges



patrol officers accounted for a larger proportion of the CEW discharges in 2017 and likely will

continue to do so in successive years.

Time and Place of Discharges

CEW discharges were relatively consistent across the three shifts, with a larger percentage (37%)

occurring during the third shift (1531‐2330 hours). More discharges typically occur in geographic

boroughs where there are higher numbers of calls for service. In 2017, Brooklyn and the Bronx

led the City in terms of CEW discharges, each accounting for approximately 27% of discharges.

0731‐1530(238)32.7%

1531‐2330(271)37.2%

2331‐0730(219)30.1%

CEW Discharges, Platoon

0731‐1530 1531‐2330 2331‐0730

Bronx(200)27.5%

Brooklyn (199)27.3%

Manhattan(182)25.0%

Queens(113)15.5%

Staten Island(27)3.7%

Outside NYC(7)1.0%

CEW Discharges, Geographic Borough

21%

29%

25%

20%

5%

BRONX BROOKLYN MANHATTAN QUEENS STATEN ISLAND

5.4 Million Calls for Service

911 Calls for Service by Borough, 2017

2017 Use of Force Report General Uses of Force


General Uses of Force

Police officers are responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Under New York State

law, an officer may use force to effect an arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property.

Any force used must comply with state and federal laws, as well as Department policy. In all cases,

officers must use the reasonable amount of force necessary to gain compliance. NYPD officers

seek to gain voluntary compliance, when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, in

order to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. However, voluntary compliance is not

always achievable and some interactions may result in the use of some type of force. Even then,

force was only used to effect 2,916 of the 286,230 arrests made in 2017, as recorded on arrest

reports.

Historically, the NYPD tracked use of force incidents through documentation such as arrest

reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line of Duty Injury Reports. In

June of 2016, the TRI report was introduced to capture more complete data about the types of

force used, the subjects of force incidents, the officers who used force and/or were subjected to

force, injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force

incidents. The NYPD is continuously fine‐tuning its use of force reporting structure to improve

accuracy and clarity. This effort resulted in changes to the TRI report in 2017, and more revisions

are currently being implemented as the NYPD moves to join the national data collection effort to

standardize use of force data submission to the FBI.

In 2017, there were 8,667 TRI reports completed that documented 7,369 reportable uses of

force. One thousand two hundred ninety‐eight TRI worksheets concerned incidents that were

determined not to involve the use of force by a member, but rather a reportable incident

nonetheless. A prisoner in Department custody, assaulted by another prisoner, for instance,

7

52

82

105

324

728

1,298

6,071

Police Canine

Firearm

Restraining Mesh Blanket

Impact Weapon

OC Spray

Electrical Weapon

No Force

Physical Force

Threat, Resistance or Injury Reports, 2017

General Uses of Force 2017 Use of Force Report


would be documented on a TRI worksheet. Similarly, the suicide of a subject in police custody is

reportable on TRI worksheets, but it is not a use of force incident.

Of the 7,369 reportable incidents of force in 2017, 82.4%6,071 incidentsinvolved the

physical subduing of subjects. There were 728 incidents in which CEWs were discharged (9.9%);

both intentionally at subjects and unintentionally while conducting operability tests in a

Department facility. The utilization of other equipment included: 324 uses of OC spray (4.4%),

105 uses of impact weapons (1.4%), 82 uses of mesh restraining blankets (1.1%), 52 firearms

discharges (0.7 %), and seven canine bites (0.09%). Under the three levels of force defined by the

NYPD’s use of force policy, 89% of uses of force were Level 1, 8% were Level 2, and 3% were Level

3.

In 2017, 64.3% of force incidents (4,741), recorded on TRI reports, occurred in arrest situations.

This contracts with 2,916 uses of force reported on arrest reports for 2017. There are several

reasons for the disparity. Some uses of force in arrest situations resulted in summonses issued in

lieu of arrest. Some arrests involved multiple use of force incidents. An arrestee may have been

involved in a use of force at the scene of arrest and a subsequent use of force at the stationhouse

during arrest processing. TRI reports would indicate this as two use of force incidents, but an

arrest report would only indicate that force was used to effect the arrest.

Situations involving emotionally disturbed persons and prisoners accounted for 17.9% and 4.2%,

respectively, of the total uses of force. Summons enforcement accounted for 1.3% and suspicious

person/conditions stops accounted for 1.1% of uses of force. The race of the officers using force

correlated with the representation of the races in the police department. The racial composition

of the subjects of police force reflects the racial composition of the criminal population in the

12

13

15

36

40

61

67

84

99

313

572

1,316

4,741

Order of Protection

Animal

Home Visit

Search Warrant

Detective Investigation

Crowd Control

VTL Stop

Suspicious Person/Condition Stop

Summons

Prisoner

Other

EDP

Arrest

Type of Interaction in Which Officers Use Force, 2017



city, as measured by arrests, assault suspects, robbery suspects, shooting suspects, and people

who resist arrest.

Approximately 65% of subjects were between the ages of 16 and 35. Four percent of subjects

were younger than 16. Brooklyn accounted for 33% of the citywide police uses of force, while

Manhattan and the Bronx each accounted for 24% of the total. Uses of force occurred most often

(43%) on the overnight shift, from 2331 hours to 0730 hours.

Bronx( 2,083 )24.0%

Brooklyn( 2,853 )32.9%

Manhattan( 2,117 )24.4%

Queens( 1,254 )14.5%

Staten Island( 360 )4.2%

Force Reporting by Geographic Borough, 2017

0731‐1530( 2,440 )28.2%

1531‐2330( 2,524 )29.1%

2331‐0730( 3,703 )42.7%

Force Reporting by Tour, 2017

0731‐1530 1531‐2330 2331‐0730

< 163.9%

16 ‐ 2535.1%

26 ‐ 3530.2%

36 ‐ 5016.2%

51 ‐ 594.4%

60 or older1.4%

Unknown8.8%

Subjects of Force by Age, 2017



CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINTS

Use of force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board declined from 4,352 in

2007 to 1,758 in 2017, a decrease of 59.6%. The number of force complaints substantiated by

CCRB in 2017 was 53.

NYPD service members respond to millions of calls for service each year, bringing officers into

direct contact with victims, witnesses, suspects, and other civilian bystanders. The overwhelming

majority of these calls for service occur each year without police use of force or complaints of

unnecessary force. In 2017, NYPD officers responded to more than 5.4 million calls for service,

and a total of 1,758 force complaints were lodged against officers. The ratio of calls for service to

force complaint cases was approximately 3,072 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated

allegations was 101,887 to 1. The ratio of use of force incidents to substantiated force allegations

in 2017 is 139 to 1.

49 29 40 44 13 22 42 56 113 60 53

4,352

3,725

4,471

3,593

3,048

2,004

3,715

2,679 2,556

1,883 1,758

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Historical CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2007 ‐ 2017

Substantiated Force Allegation Force Complaints



Force Used Against Officers

Policing is an inherently dangerous profession, and every officer understands that any encounter

may turn violent. However, no officer would risk injury to themselves, or to anyone else, any

more than they have to in order to do what they must. NYPD officers strive to gain voluntary

compliance but are not always successful. Some contentious encounters between officers and

the public become violent and lead to injuries to both subjects and officers. In 2017, there were

7,638 incidents where subjects used force against officers. Of the 7,638 incidents where force

was used against officers, 4,004 officers sustained injuries, of which 406 injuries were deemed

substantial or serious. The majority of force inflicted on NYPD officers took place in arrest

situations (62.8%) and most involved simple physical force without weapons (95.9%). Encounters

with emotionally disturbed persons accounted for the second most uses of force against officers

(17.5%).

Eighty‐nine percent (6,562 of 7,369) of the officer use of force incidents indicated that subjects

used force against the officers. The vast majority of force used against officers, 96%, was physical

force, i.e., punching, kicking, and grappling.

Most incidents involving use of force against officers occurred in Brooklyn (32.2%), followed by

the Bronx (24.7%), and Manhattan (24.4%). The overnight shift (2331‐0730 hours) accounted for

43% of incidents of force against officers, the evening shift (1531‐2330 hours) accounted for 30%,

and the day shift (0731‐1531 hours) for 27%. The use of force against officers mirrors the use of

force by officers against subject in terms of geography and time of occurrence.

1 1 11 13 17 38 50 60 84 84 91 133

403 520

1,335 4,797

HostageTowing Vehicle

AnimalOrder of Protection

Home VisitSearch Warrant

Detective InvestigationCrowd Control

Suspicious Person/Condition StopVTL Stop

NoneSummonsPrisoner

OtherEDP

Arrest

Force Used Against Officers by Event Description, 2017



In 2017, of the 9,585 subjects of police force, 9,213 individuals (96.1%) sustained no injury or

minor injury. Two hundred and fourteen subjects (2.2%) were substantially injured and 158

(1.6%) were seriously injured. Of the 15,425 officers involved in use of force incidents in 2017,

97.4% sustained no injury or minor injuries. Two hundred and fifty‐six officers (1.7%) were

substantially injured. One hundred fifty officers (1.0 %) were seriously injured. Substantial

injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally

those that require admission to a hospital.

5,869

3,344

214 158

11,421

3,598

256 150

No Injury Physical Injury Substantial PhysicalInjury

Serious Physical Injury

Injured/Not Injured Comparison (Subject vs. Officer), 2017

Subjects Officers

2,111 1,621 1,600

957

273

Brooklyn Bronx Manhattan Queens StatenIsland

Force Used Against Officers by Geographic Borough, 2017

0731‐1530( 1,782 )27.2%

1531‐2330( 1,946 )29.7%

2331‐0730( 2,834 )43.2%

Force Used Against Officers by Tour, 2017

0731‐1530 1531‐2330 2331‐0730

2017 Use of Force Report Appendices


Appendices

Appendix A: NYPD Use of Force Documentation and Investigation Process

Force Event Member of the service completes Part A of the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Incident Worksheet.

Immediate Supervisor responds to scene and determines level of force used. Immediate Supervisor then determines whether or not force was within department guidelines and/or whether event should be referred to a higher authority. All uses of force are investigated, including those

determined to be within department guidelines.

Level 1 Use of: hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible

takedowns, O.C. (pepper) spray, CEW (cartridge mode),

mesh restraining blanket. Or

Type of Injury: Physical Injury only

Level 2 Use of: impact weapon (baton, other

equipment, etc.) police canine bite, CEW (drive stun mode).

Or Type of Injury: Substantial Physical Injury;

Alleged/Suspected Excessive Force (including incidents with no apparent

injury); Attempted Suicide (excluding Serious Physical injury)

Level 3 Use of: physical force readily capable of causing death or serious injury, including

firearm discharge. Or

Type of Injury: Death; Serious Physical Injury; Alleged/Suspected Excessive Force

(resulting in Serious Physical Injury); Attempted Suicide

(Serious Physical injury)

Immediate Supervisor (in case of CEW discharge, Lieutenant or above)

completes Part B of TRI Worksheet; closes event unless further investigation is

warranted.

Immediate Supervisor completes Part B of TRI Worksheet and refers event to Commanding Officer/Executive

Officer/Duty Captain, who completes Investigating Supervisor's Assessment

Report (ISAR) and conducts investigation.

Patrol Borough Investigations Unit may assist in investigation when appropriate.

If subject’s injuries are not life‐threatening:

Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)

completes ISAR and conducts investigation.

If firearm discharged, subject is likely to die, or death occurs:

Force

Investigation Division (FID)

completes Part B of TRI Worksheet and ISAR, and conducts

investigation.

All reports and follow‐up investigations are reviewed by

Precinct Commanding Officers.

All reports and follow‐up investigations are reviewed by

Precinct Commanding Officers. Use of Force Review Board Reviews all cases for which a member of FID or IAB is the investigating supervisor.

In addition, any violations of force prohibitions at any level may be reviewed

on a case by case basis to determine whether, under the circumstance, the actions were reasonable and justified. *FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may

assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.

Appendices 2017 Use of Force Report


Appendix B: Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge ‐ Adversarial Conflict Incidents

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information provided is based on preliminary findings of

ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the Department’s investigation

progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

Incident 1 – 69 Precinct (Male/Black/63) (01/03/2017)

On January 3, 2017, at approximately 2138 hours, officers assigned to the 69 Precinct in Brooklyn

responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person (EDP) inside of a residence. The male

subject advanced towards responding officers with a knife. Officers instructed the EDP to “drop

the knife” several times. After verbal commands failed, one officer discharged a Taser which was

ineffective. Another officer unholstered his service weapon and discharged three rounds striking

the subject. The subject succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at 2211 hours.

A thirteen‐inch metal knife with a black handle was recovered at the scene. Forensic toxicology

testing indicated the presence of methadone in the deceased’s blood.

Incident 2 – 77 Precinct (Male/Hispanic/18) (01/04/2017)

On January 4, 2017, at approximately 0100 hours a male subject discharged three rounds from a

firearm at the front window of the establishment in the confines of the 77 Precinct. Plainclothes

officers assigned to the 77 Precinct “Anti‐Crime” team were in the vicinity when they heard the

gunshots. The officers confronted the perpetrator, who attempted to flee on foot. While in flight,

the perpetrator continued to brandish his firearm and point it in the direction of the pursuing

officers. Two of the officers discharged their weapons and struck the perpetrator. Officers

immediately rendered aid and requested Emergency Medical Services (EMS). The perpetrator

was removed to Brooklyn Hospital Center and pronounced deceased at 0400 hours. A .38 caliber

Smith & Wesson revolver was recovered near the perpetrator’s body.


On January 14, 2017, at approximately 0238 hours, officers assigned to the 113 Precinct

responded to a 911 call for police assistance at a street intersection in Jamaica. Two uniformed

officers arrived shortly after and proceeded to canvass the location for indications of suspicious

and/or criminal activity. Their investigation led them to a male subject threatening a woman with

a screwdriver in a nearby apartment. The officers issued several commands to drop the

screwdriver. An officer discharged a CEW but the probes missed the subject. The subject fled

with the woman in his grasp back into the apartment, and the officers followed. The male subject

then lunged at the officers with the screwdriver causing the officers to discharge their firearms,

striking the subject. The perpetrator then retreated to a rear bedroom where he collapsed. A

screwdriver was removed from the perpetrator’s hand. Officers rendered aid and requested EMS.



The perpetrator was removed to Jamaica Hospital and pronounced deceased at 0357 hours.

Forensic toxicology testing indicated the presence of alcohol in the perpetrator’s blood and urine.


On February 16, 2017, at approximately 1537 hours, three plainclothes officers assigned to the

75 Precinct “Anti‐Crime” team were conducting a surveillance operation in the vicinity of the

Cypress Hills Housing Development. Officers observed a suspicious male subject, identified

themselves as police, and instructed the subject to walk toward their vehicle. The subject

brandished a firearm and fired at the officers. Two officers returned fire, and the subject fled the

scene. One officer pursued the perpetrator on foot, and the remaining two officers returned to

their vehicle to follow the subject. An unidentified male bystander directed the officers in the

vehicle to a nearby house where the subject had entered. One officer exited the vehicle,

continued his pursuit down a gated driveway, and encountered the subject who attempted to

discharge a firearm at the officer. The officer shot the subject and recovered a revolver. EMS

pronounced the perpetrator deceased at the scene at 1602 hours.


On February 19, 2017, at approximately 0045 hours, three plainclothes officers assigned to the

83 Precinct “Anti‐Crime” team responded to a 911 call of a robbery in progress at a local

delicatessen. Officers conducted an investigation, and witnesses stated that a male suspect had

removed property while brandishing a firearm. Officers were canvassing the area when they

stopped the subject who turned toward the officers and pointed what appeared to be a firearm

in their direction. Officers immediately drew their service weapons and fired, striking the subject.

A pellet gun was recovered on the ground in the immediate vicinity of the perpetrator’s body.

Officers requested an ambulance and the perpetrator was removed to Woodhull Hospital where

he was pronounced deceased at 0125 hours. Forensic toxicology screening revealed the presence

of alcohol in the deceased’s blood.


On July 5, 2017, at approximately 0029 hours, two uniformed officers were assigned to a mobile

command post in the confines of the 46 Precinct to address a recent spate of shooting incidents.

The two officers occupied the front driver side and passenger side seats of the mobile command

post vehicle. A male subject drew a silver firearm and discharged one round into the passenger

side window of the mobile command post vehicle before fleeing. The officer seated in the front

passenger seat was struck in the left side of her forehead. The other officer transmitted “police

officer shot” over the radio and rendered aid to the wounded officer. Two uniformed officers

driving an unmarked police vehicle heard the call for assistance and proceeded toward the

location. While enroute, the officers observed the subject running away from the location on a



public sidewalk. The two responding officers exited their unmarked vehicle and engaged the

subject, who was still brandishing a firearm. The officers discharged their firearms, striking the

subject. A revolver was recovered. A civilian bystander, who believed he was shot by the subject,

sustained a non‐fatal gunshot wound to his abdomen. The wounded officer was transported from

the scene in a marked police vehicle to Saint Barnabas Medical Center; she succumbed to her

injuries at 0337 hours. The injured bystander was removed by ambulance to Lincoln Hospital and

survived his injuries. The subject was pronounced deceased at the scene by an FDNY emergency

medical technician at 0045 hours.


On July 31, 2017, at approximately 1219 hours, four uniformed officers responded to a 911 call

of an EDP inside an apartment in the confines of the 67 Precinct. The responding officers were

confronted by a male subject at the location. The subject advanced towards the officers with a

large kitchen knife and one officer discharged a CEW. Despite the probes piercing the subject in

the right forearm and upper chest, he continued to advance toward the officers. He took an

officer to the floor, and was atop the officer while still holding the knife. Another officer

discharged several rounds, striking the subject. The subject was pronounced deceased at the

scene by an FDNY emergency medical technician at 1256 hours. A 13‐inch silver serrated knife

was recovered. Forensic toxicology screening detected alcohol in the deceased’s blood.


On September 6, 2017, at approximately 1727 hours, two uniformed officers assigned to the 47

Precinct received a 911 call from the owner of a multi‐family residence requesting police to check

on his third floor tenant, whom the landlord had not heard from or seen in several days. The

responding officers found the male subject standing inside his apartment. The subject had a knife

in his left hand and was concealing his right hand, indicating the possession of another weapon.

Officers unholstered their service weapons and ordered the man to drop the knife and to show

his right hand. The officers attempted to deescalate and requested the response of the patrol

supervisor and an officer equipped with a CEW. One supporting officer positioned himself in front

of initial responders and discharged his CEW at the subject, but it was ineffective. At the same

time, the subject pointed an imitation pistol with a laser sight, which he had been concealing, at

the officers. The first responding officers then discharged their service weapons, striking the

perpetrator several times and causing him to fall to the floor. The perpetrator was pronounced

deceased at 1811 hours by an FDNY emergency medical technician. A black folding knife and an

imitation pistol with a fixed laser sight were recovered.




On November 13, 2017, at approximately 1945 hours, two uniformed officers assigned to the 48

Precinct responded to a 911 call of an assault with a knife inside of a residential housing complex.

The male subject had stabbed two security guards and was still in possession of the knife when

officers arrived. The subject advanced toward the responding officers, and the officers

discharged their firearms, striking the subject. Emergency medical technicians removed the

perpetrator to Saint Barnabas Hospital where he was pronounced deceased at 2011 hours. The

two injured security guards were also removed to Saint Barnabas Hospital and were treated and

released for puncture and laceration wounds. Officers recovered the knife wielded by the subject

on the floor of the lobby, and an additional knife which was removed from his jacket pocket. The

forensic toxicology report indicated the presence of marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine in his system

at the time of death.


On December 5, 2017, at approximately 0410 hours, uniformed officers assigned to the

Emergency Service Unit (ESU) executed a search warrant in regard to a firearms and narcotics

investigation in the confines of the 40 Precinct. While the officers were executing the warrant, a

male subject confronted the officers with a machete. The officers issued verbal commands to

drop the weapon. The suspect continued to advance with a machete in his right hand, and an

officer discharged a firearm at the subject, striking him. The subject was removed to Lincoln

Hospital and pronounced deceased at 0453 hours. Officers recovered a 29‐inch silver machete.

Forensic toxicology screening indicated the presence of alcohol in the deceased’s blood.



Appendix C: Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information provided is based on preliminary findings of

ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department’s investigation

progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

Death in Custody

Death in Custody typically occurs after the restraint of a particular subject. The term “in custody,”

refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or

that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. In death in

custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere, (e.g., at a hospital, at a police station, or

in Department of Correction’s custody awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to

intervening circumstances or actors beyond police control. Such intervening incidents include

medical crises like heart attacks and strokes, suicides, drug‐related deaths from drugs taken or

ingested prior to custody, and injuries inflicted prior to custody during accidents or assaults by

people other than police. In 2017, there were ten death in custody incidents.

Medical/No Police Force Used – 5 Precinct (Female/White/28) (01/13/2017)

On January 12, 2017, officers assigned to Manhattan North Narcotics arrested a subject for

criminal possession of controlled substances in the confines of the 34 Precinct. The subject was

transported to Manhattan Central Booking, deemed fit for arraignment by medical staff, and then

turned over to the Department of Correction for pre‐arraignment lodging. The next morning, on

January 13, 2017, police officers regained custody of the subject to escort her to court when they

observed that the subject looked unwell. The subject informed the officers that she was

experiencing symptoms of withdrawal. Soon thereafter, the subject convulsed, collapsed, and

became unresponsive. The officers rendered aid and requested Emergency Medical Services

(EMS). The subject was removed to New York Presbyterian Lower Manhattan Hospital where

hospital staff learned that the subject was approximately 20 weeks pregnant. Treatment failed

to resuscitate the subject, and she was pronounced deceased at 1309 hours; her unborn child

did not survive. The subject’s death certificate indicated that her immediate cause of death was

internal hemorrhaging due to perforation of the left pulmonary vein. A contributing condition

was acute intoxication by the combined effects of heroin and cocaine. The Medical Examiner

deemed the subject’s death to be an accident.



Medical/No Police Force Used – 78 Precinct (Male/Asian/58) (4/5/2017)

On March 30, 2017, officers responded to a radio run of an assault in progress in the confines of

the 70 Precinct. Responding officers found the complainant and the subject at the location where

they had engaged in a physical altercation. The subject had stabbed the complainant in the thigh

with a kitchen knife, and the complainant was able to stop the subject from further attack by

slapping the subject several times to the head with an open hand. The responding officers

conducted an investigation and determined that the subject was the primary physical aggressor

and placed him under arrest. The subject was brought to Kings County Hospital from the scene

because he complained of facial pain. The subject was released from the hospital after being

treated for elevated blood pressure and a contusion on his cheek. Over the next two days, the

subject would be treated and released by Brooklyn Hospital and admitted to Methodist Hospital

for complaints of chest pain. On April 2, 2017, while at Methodist Hospital, the subject began to

vomit and complain of headaches. He was brought to the intensive care unit for observation

where he became unresponsive. On April 3, 2017, the subject was deemed brain dead by medical

staff. The subject died on April 5, 2017, and his death certificate indicated that his immediate

cause of death was complications arising from a subdural hematoma due to blunt force injuries

to his head.

Medical/No Police Force Used – 102 Precinct (Female/Black/57) (4/5/2017)

On April 4, 2017, the subject, who was wanted in an ongoing stalking investigation, was

apprehended by officers in the confines of the 109 Precinct. The subject was brought back to the

109 Precinct and placed under arrest by the precinct detective unit. On two occasions during her

arrest processing, the subject informed officers that she was not feeling well and was seen by

EMS. The subject initially refused to go to the hospital. The second time, she was brought to

Flushing Hospital where she was treated for high blood pressure and released back to the

precinct. The subject was subsequently brought to Queens Central Booking and cleared for

arraignment by medical staff on site. On April 5, 2017, after spending the night awaiting

arraignment in Department of Correction’s custody, the subject fell asleep and could not be

awaken by correction officers when it was time for her arraignment. A police officer was notified

and requested EMS for the subject. The subject was transported to Jamaica Hospital where she

was pronounced deceased. The death certificate listed the immediate cause of death as chronic

alcoholism complicated by hypertensive and arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease and obesity

and determined the manner of death to be natural.

Suicide/Police Force Used – 41 Precinct (Male/Hispanic/33) (5/8/2017)

Officers responded to the location of a radio run of an emotional disturbed person where they

found the subject, who had stabbed himself in the neck. The subject’s mother was applying



pressure to his wound at the time responding officers and EMS arrived on scene. When

emergency personnel approached the subject to render aid, the subject became combative and

had to be restrained. The officers handcuffed the subject, and EMS provided him with medical

attention and transported him to Lincoln Hospital. Medical staff at the hospital were unable to

control the subject’s bleeding, and he was pronounced deceased at 2020 hours. The subject had

been previously hospitalized for violent and aggressive behavior. The subject’s death certificate

indicated that the immediate cause of death was a stab wound to the neck that severed the left

and right jugular veins and classified the death as a suicide.

Medical/No Police Force Used – 63 Precinct (Male/White/34) (5/15/2017)

On May 7, 2017, officers responded to a radio run of an aided male in the confines of the 63

Precinct. Responding officers arrived at the location and found the subject unresponsive and

receiving treatment by EMS. EMS removed the subject to Mount Sinai Brooklyn Hospital after

performing CPR and the officers marked the job and resumed patrol. The responding officers

went to the stationhouse to prepare an aided report for the subject when it was discovered that

the subject was wanted on an active I‐Card. The detective assigned was notified and placed the

subject under arrest while the subject was at the hospital. At the time, the subject was in critical

but stable condition, and officers were assigned to guard him as he was then under arrest. On

May 10, 2017, officers were informed that the subject tested positive for opioids and cocaine and

his prognosis was downgraded to likely to die. The subject died on May 15, 2017 and his death

certificate indicated that the immediate cause of death was acute and chronic abuse of cocaine,

opiates, and benzodiazepines. The toxicology report indicated the presence of

amitriptyline/nortriptyline in the subject’s system at the time of death.

Suicide/Police Force Used– 45 Precinct (Female/Black/64) (5/22/2017)

Officers responded to a call of an emotionally disturbed person and discovered the subject lying

in a bathtub with a knife in her abdomen. EMS attempted to render aid but could not properly

provide medical attention as the subject was attempting to push and twist the knife deeper into

her body. Officers handcuffed and subdued the subject at EMS’s request, and she was

transported to Jacobi Medical Center with the knife still in her abdomen. Medical staff at the

hospital were unable to control the subject’s bleeding, and she was pronounced deceased at

1150 hours. The subject was bipolar and was discharged two days before her death after being

admitted to the psychiatric ward at North Central Bronx Hospital for two weeks. The subject’s

immediate cause of death, as recorded on her death certificate, was a stab wound to the

abdomen which injured her liver and spleen, and the death was ruled a suicide by the Medical

Examiner. The toxicology report indicated the subject had hydrocodone, fentanyl, and

midazolam in her system at the time of death.



Medical/Police Force Used – 120 Precinct (Male/White/45) (8/1/2017)

Officers were responding to a call of an emotionally disturbed person when they found the

subject at the location, bleeding from the head and eating out of a garbage can. The officers

approached the subject to render aid, and he began to scream and act irrationally. The officers

restrained the subject and requested EMS to the scene. Emergency personnel placed the subject

on a gurney and transported him to Richmond University Medical Center. Several hours later,

hospital staff notified police that the subject was in critical condition; he was pronounced

deceased soon thereafter. A subsequent investigation revealed that immediately before police

arrival, the subject had fallen to the ground from the second‐floor window, and hit his head on a

metal railing along the way. The subject had a documented history of acting erratically while on

controlled substances and had previously attempted to jump off a two story building. The

subject’s death certificate indicated that his immediate cause of death was blunt impact injuries

to his torso consistent with a fall from an elevated height. The toxicology report indicated the

presence of cocaine in the subject’s system at the time of death.

Suicide/No Police Force Used – 44 Precinct (Male/Black/31) (8/22/2017)

Officers responded to a domestic assault and placed the subject under arrest after they

interviewed the subject and his wife. The subject was calm and compliant, and was removed to

the 44 Precinct for arrest processing without incident. Shortly after the subject was lodged in the

precinct’s prisoner holding pen, the subject removed the cloth drawstrings from the bottom

seams of his cargo shorts and fashioned a makeshift noose. The subject went to the corner of the

holding pen that was outside of the desk officer’s viewable area and tied one end of the cloth

drawstring to the upper portion of the pen, placed the noose around his neck, and dropped his

body weight. As soon as officers became aware of the subject’s condition, they immediately

performed CPR and used the precinct automated external defibrillator (AED), to no avail. EMS

removed the subject to Bronx Lebanon Hospital where he was pronounced deceased. The

certificate of death indicated that the subject’s cause of death was hanging, and the death was

ruled a suicide by the Medical Examiner. The toxicology report indicated that the subject had

alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana in his system at the time of death.

Medical/Police Force Used – 44 Precinct (Male/Black/34) (9/5/2017)

On August 29, 2017, officers responded to an emotionally disturbed person call of a naked man

walking on the street and hitting people with his hand. The responding officers found the subject

who was restrained by a group of males at the location. The subject, naked, acting erratically,

mumbling incoherently, and foaming at the mouth, freed himself from the group, pushed and

spat at the officers and refused to comply with verbal commands to desist. An officer deployed

his CEW against the subject and successfully subdued him. EMS were then able to take the



subject to Bronx Lebanon Hospital for treatment. The subject was diagnosed with acute drug‐

induced psychosis after a toxicology screening revealed the presence of benzodiazepines and

marijuana in his system. The subject was kept at the hospital for treatment and under police

custody because there was an open complaint against him and because he was a suspect in a

homicide investigation. Over the next few days the subject experienced kidney and muscle

failure. On September 5, 2017, the subject was transferred to the Intensive Care Unit at Bronx

Lebanon Hospital because of blood clots in his lungs. While at the ICU, the subject complained of

chest pains, summoned a nurse, and went into cardiac arrest. He was pronounced deceased soon

thereafter. The death certificate indicated that the immediate cause of death was pulmonary

thromboemboli due to deep vein thrombosis of the extremities following sedation and restraint

for acute psychosis while in custody. The Medical Examiner further determined that contributing

factors to the subject’s death were sickle cell trait and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. The

toxicology screening detected chlorpromazine and marijuana in the subject’s system at the time

of death.

Medical/No Police Force Used – 67 Precinct (Male/Black/36) (10/30/2017)

On October 26, 2017, EMS were responding to a call of an unconscious male. In the course of

rendering aid to the subject, they discovered two firearms. EMS requested police to the location,

and responding officers arrived to secure the scene while EMS transported the subject to SUNY

Downstate Medical Center. A warrant was obtained and executed resulting in the recovery of

two pistols, ammunition, a high capacity magazine, and three air pistols. The subject, who had

not regained consciousness, was placed under arrest at the hospital for the found contraband.

On October 27, 2017, officers were informed by medical staff that the subject was brain dead

due to an anoxic brain injury. The subject died on October 30, 2017 of natural causes and his

death certificate indicated that his immediate cause of death was anoxic‐ischemic

encephalopathy with brain herniation following cardiac arrest due to atherosclerotic

cardiovascular disease with complications due to obesity.

Death Preceding Custody

Deaths preceding custody typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a

particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or

that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not,

in fact, established control of the person. Eleven cases investigated by FID in 2017 are categorized

as deaths preceding custody. In five cases, the subject was fleeing the police when the death

occurred.



Suicide – 105 Precinct (Male/Black/46) (1/19/2017)

On January 18, 2017, officers responded to a call of an assault in progress, involving a “male with

a knife.” The subject had stabbed his wife and stepson and then pointed a silver firearm at them

before the subject’s wife was able to lock herself and her two children in a second floor

bathroom, away from the subject. The responding officers spoke with the victims from outside

the house when they arrived on scene and called for backup. ESU officers safely extracted the

victims through the bathroom window while other officers established communication with the

subject who had barricaded himself in the house. The subject told the officers that he did not

have anything to live for and that he was going to lie down. The officers heard a gunshot from

the second floor of the house. ESU gained entry and discovered the subject on the floor with a

firearm by his hand. The subject was removed to Jamaica Hospital and pronounced deceased at

0425 hours on January 19, 2017. The subject’s cause of death, as noted on his death certificate,

was a gunshot wound to the head. The Medical Examiner ruled the subject’s death a suicide.

Fleeing Subject – 46 Precinct (Male/Black/29) (2/28/2017)

Officers assigned to Manhattan North Warrant Squad attempted to apprehend the subject for

an active I‐card and an open bench warrant in the confines of the 46 Precinct. Two officers

knocked on the subject’s door but were unable to gain entry. An officer positioned outside the

building observed the subject climb out his window, onto the fire escape, and up onto the

building’s roof. Before the officers gained access to the roof, the subject attempted to flee to an

adjoining rooftop and he fell to the ground. The subject was removed by ambulance to St.

Barnabas Hospital where he was pronounced deceased. The subject’s death certificate indicated

that his immediate cause of death was blunt impact injuries to the head and body. Toxicology

report revealed the presence of oxycodone and marijuana in the subject’s system at the time of

death.


Officers were searching for the subject who was wanted for robbery. They had reason to believe

that the subject was in his cousin’s apartment when they responded to the location. While the

officers were outside of the apartment, the subject fled through the rear bedroom window in an

unsuccessful attempt to evade apprehension. The subject attempted to descend from the

eleventh story with the assistance of bed sheets, which were tied together and thrown from the

apartment window. The subject successfully descended about one floor before the knots became

unfastened causing him to fall approximately ten stories to the ground. The subject was removed

by ambulance to Brooklyn Hospital where he was pronounced deceased. The Medical Examiner

ruled the death accidental, and records indicated that the cause of death was blunt impact

injuries to the torso and extremities.




Officers assigned to the Critical Response Command were on post in the confines of the 17

Precinct when they were informed that the two males, who had run past them, were the

perpetrators that had just robbed a nearby newsstand. The officers conducted a canvass for the

perpetrators and continued their search into the 59th Street train station. During their search, the

officers located and followed the subject to the train platform where he appeared to be hiding

behind a column. The subject moved towards the edge of the platform and, as the officers

instructed the subject to back away from the edge, he jumped off the platform and onto the train

tracks. The subject lost his footing and made contact with the third rail. EMS pronounced the

subject deceased at the scene. The subject’s death certificate indicated that his death was an

accident and that his immediate cause of death was electrocution.


On May 3, 2017, officers responded to a call of a male shot and they found a complainant on the

street with several gunshot wounds. Several officers rendered aid to the complainant while

others proceeded to the apartment building where the shooting had occurred. Upon arrival at

the location, the officers heard a door slam and two gunshots on the fourth floor. NYPD ESU

responded and gained entry to the apartment where they discovered the subject with a gunshot

wound to his head. The subject was transported to Kings County Hospital by EMS where he died

on May 5, 2017. The subject’s death certificate classified his death as a suicide and indicated that

his immediate cause of death was a self‐inflicted gunshot wound to the head.

Suicide – 84 Precinct (Male/Asian/28) (6/29/2017)

Officers assigned to the Brooklyn Bridge detail were informed by a witness that the subject was

standing on the ledge of the bridge and smoking a cigarette. The subject told the witness that he

was fine and was just enjoying the view. The witness was concerned because of the subject’s

demeanor and slurred speech. The officers responded to the subject’s location and requested

backup. ESU officers arrived and engaged the subject in conversation in an attempt to convince

the subject to come down from the metal stanchion on which he was standing. The subject threw

his cellphone, driver’s license, and money to an officer, turned around to the face the water, and

jumped off the bridge. According to his death certificate, the subject’s death was deemed a

suicide, and the immediate causes of death were drowning and blunt force injuries to his torso

and head. The toxicology report indicated that the subject had alcohol, alprazolam,

amphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana in his system at the time of death.




Officers responded to a radio run of an emotionally disturbed man threatening to jump from the

Washington Bridge above the Harlem River. The officers arrived on the scene and observed the

subject sitting on the ledge of the bridge, beyond a chain link fence that serves as a safety barrier

between the ledge and the pedestrian walkway. The officers, on the walkway side of the chain

link fence, engaged the subject in conversation and he told responding officers that “I don’t want

to live.” ESU officers arrived and attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject.

Approximately fifteen minutes after officers arrived at the location, without warning, the subject

appeared to intentionally slide off the ledge and into the Harlem River. The subject’s death

certificate indicated that his death was a suicide, and the immediate causes of death were blunt

impact injuries and drowning. The toxicology report showed the presence of alcohol, alprazolam,

and oxycodone in his system at his time of death.

Suicide – 75 Precinct (Male/Asian/29) (8/10/2017)

Officers responded to a call of a nonviolent suicidal male. Upon arrival at the location, the officers

were met by the subject’s mother who told them that the subject would probably exit from the

rear of the house after realizing that the police were there. After waiting for EMS to arrive, the

officers entered the house to locate the subject, and one of the officers entered the rear

bedroom. Upon entering the dark, unlit bedroom, the officer was shot five times. The officers

secured the location and requested backup. The initial responding officers were removed to

Jamaica Hospital for treatment and additional officers took up positions around the house.

Multiple gunshots were heard over the course of the next hour and a half, and ESU subsequently

made entry to the bedroom where they discovered the subject lying on the floor with a self‐

inflicted gunshot wound to the head. EMS pronounced the subject deceased on the scene.

Medical Examiner reports indicated that the subject’s death was ruled a suicide and his cause of

death was a self‐inflicted gunshot wound to the head. The subject had alprazolam, clonazepam,

and etizolam in his system at his time of death. Two firearms were recovered, and two suicide

notes from the subject were also found during the investigation.

Suicide – Midtown North Precinct (Female/White/69) (8/22/2017)

Officers responded to a radio run of an emotionally disturbed person sitting on the ledge of hotel

roof. The officers found the subject sitting on the roof’s ledge and attempted to engage her in

conversation. Another officer arrived and attempted the same, but the subject was not receptive.

Shortly before ESU officers arrived on the scene, the subject climbed down from the ledge where

she had been sitting to the window ledge below, facing the officers, while holding onto the roof’s

ledge. Approximately 10 minutes after the first officers arrived on the roof, the subject let go of

the ledge and fell to the ground. EMS pronounced the subject deceased on scene. The subject’s



certificate of death indicated that the cause of death was blunt impact injuries to the head, torso,

and extremities due to falling from a height. The Medical Examiner deemed the subject’s death

a suicide.

Fleeing Subject – 121st Precinct (Male/White/28) (9/24/2017)

An officer assigned to Highway Patrol Five was on routine patrol on the Staten Island Expressway

when he observed a motorcycle in front of him moving at a high rate of speed. The officer

attempted to keep pace with, and catch up to, the motorcycle, but, did not activate his turret

lights or sirens. After traveling approximately two and a half miles from the Staten Island

Expressway to the West Shore Expressway, the officer lost sight of the motorcycle and continued

southbound on the West Shore Expressway. A short time later, multiple 911 calls were received

regarding a motorcycle accident on the exit ramp of the West Shore Expressway at Victory

Boulevard. Officers assigned to the 121st Precinct responded along with EMS. After stabilizing

the motorcyclist, EMS transported the aided to Staten Island University Hospital South where he

succumbed to his injuries. Based upon an independent investigation conducted by Highway

Collision Investigation Squad, it was determined that, as the motorcycle exited the highway and

traveled on the off ramp, it struck the rear of a tractor trailer. During the investigation it was

revealed that the motorcycle operator’s NYS driver’s license was suspended. The subject’s death

certificate indicated that his death was an accident.

Fleeing Subject – 109 Precinct (Female/Asian/38) (11/26/2017)

On November 25, 2017, officers assigned to Queens North Vice were conducting an enforcement

operation targeting a subject who had previously agreed to have sexual intercourse for a fee with

an undercover officer. In the course of the operation, officers approached the subject’s location,

but were unable to gain entry into the subject’s fourth‐floor apartment. One officer was outside

the building when he heard a loud impact and turned to see that the subject had fallen to the

sidewalk from an elevated height. The subject was transported to New York Presbyterian Queens

Hospital where she was pronounced deceased on November 26, 2017, after unsuccessful efforts

to save her. The death certificate indicated the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the

head, neck, and extremities caused by a fall from elevated heights. Toxicology report revealed

the presence of fentanyl, ketamine, and lidocaine in the subject’s system at the time of death.



Appendix D: Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location

Precinct/Location Adversarial Conflict

Animal Attack

Unauthorized Unintentional Total

1 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

13 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

30 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

32 PRECINCT 0 1 0 0 1

40 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

41 PRECINCT 0 1 0 1 2

45 PRECINCT 0 0 0 1 1

46 PRECINCT 1 0 0 1 2

47 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

48 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

50 PRECINCT 0 0 1 0 1

52 PRECINCT 0 0 0 1 1

61 PRECINCT 0 0 1 0 1

63 PRECINCT 1 0 0 0 1

67 PRECINCT 3 0 0 0 3

69 PRECINCT 1 0 0 1 2

75 PRECINCT 2 0 0 1 3

77 PRECINCT 2 1 0 0 3

81 PRECINCT 0 1 0 0 1

83 PRECINCT 1 2 0 0 3

100 PRECINCT 2 0 0 0 2

101 PRECINCT 0 1 0 0 1

102 PRECINCT 0 0 0 1 1

103 PRECINCT 1 0 0 1 2

113 PRECINCT 1 0 1 1 3

122 PRECINCT 0 0 1 0 1

123 PRECINCT 1 0 1 0 2

Nassau County 0 0 1 0 1

Suffolk County 0 1 1 0 2

Westchester County 0 0 0 1 1

Putnam County 0 0 0 1 1

Cayuga County 0 0 1 0 1

New Jersey 0 1 0 0 1

Pennsylvania 1 0 0 0 1

Maryland 0 0 0 1 1

TOTAL 23 9 8 12 52



Appendix E: Historical Data on Police Firearm Discharges

994

520

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total NYPD Involved Firearms Discharge Incidents, 1971 to 2017

2,510

242

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Total Shots Fired, 1971 to 2017



4740

50

17 1611

1611

1710

13

26

13

24

10

26

1521

3124

28 29

19

1115 15

23

10 118 10

7 74

74

73

0 2 3

13

3 2 3 40

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Officers Shot and Injured by Subjects, 1971 to 2017

12

67

4

6

1

45 5

10

43

1

4

0

32

65

0

2 2 2 2

0

54

3

0 0 0 0

2 2 2

0

3

0 0 01

0 0

2 21 1

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Officers Shot and Killed by Subjects, 1971‐2017

221

145118

80 87 79 88 78 8010191 87

6348 47 38 36 46

61 72 8163 58 61 58 48 39 43 32

20 19 24 22 23 26 24 19 18 20 16 19 13 17 14 15 239

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Subjects Shot and Injured by Officers, 1971 to 2017

93

6658

4144

253037

282533332926

111814

2430

39272422

2926302019

111411131411 9 13101312 8 916

8 8 8 9 10

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Subjects Shot and Killed by Officers, 1971‐2017



Appendix F: Use of Force and Racial Demographics

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

NYCPopulation

Arrests AssaultSuspects

RobberySuspects

ShootingSuspects

Arrests forResistingArrest

ArrestsWhere Force

Used

Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2017

BLACK HISPANIC WHITE ASIAN/PAC.ISL

50%

29%

14%7%

49%

28%

15%8%

White Hispanic Black Asian

Officers Using Force, 2017

Officers Using Force UMOS Staffing

Black56%

Hispanic29%

White9% Oth/Unk

4%

Asian2%

Amer Indian0%

Force Reporting by Subject Race, 2017

Asian5%

Black48%

Hispanic34%

White13%

Total Arrests by Race, 2017

Asian2%

Black60%

Hispanic30%

White8%

Force Used During Arrests, 2017



Appendix G: 2017 Uses of Force Incidents by Members’ Assignment

Precinct/Command Electrical Weapon

Impact Weapon

Police Canine

OC Spray


Physical Force

Total

001 PRECINCT 4 0 0 4 0 40 48

005 PRECINCT 2 0 0 4 0 21 27

006 PRECINCT 16 3 0 5 0 60 84

007 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

007 PRECINCT 5 1 1 3 0 26 36

009 PRECINCT 5 2 0 9 0 60 76

010 PRECINCT 13 0 0 0 1 24 38

013 PRECINCT 9 0 0 1 0 36 46

013 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

014 PCT‐MIDTOWN SO. PCT 1 0 0 3 0 34 38

017 PRECINCT 4 0 0 2 0 12 18

018 PCT‐MIDTOWN NO. PCT 9 0 0 5 0 36 50

019 PRECINCT 2 1 0 2 0 43 48

020 PRECINCT 4 1 0 0 0 33 38


023 PRECINCT 8 0 0 1 0 48 57

024 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

024 PRECINCT 4 0 0 2 0 68 74

025 PRECINCT 4 0 0 0 0 54 58


026 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

026 PRECINCT 8 0 0 0 0 22 30

028 PRECINCT 5 0 0 3 0 58 66

030 PRECINCT 11 0 0 1 0 38 50

032 PRECINCT 9 1 0 0 0 77 87


033 PRECINCT 5 0 1 2 0 59 67

034 PRECINCT 13 2 0 18 0 62 95


040 PRECINCT 21 0 0 1 0 109 131


041 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

041 PRECINCT 8 3 0 4 0 47 62


042 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

042 PRECINCT 9 1 0 2 0 85 97


043 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

043 PRECINCT 6 2 0 2 1 62 73


044 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

044 PRECINCT 35 3 0 9 1 151 199


045 PRECINCT 4 0 0 3 0 42 49

046 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

046 PRECINCT 9 2 0 4 0 119 134





Impact Weapon

Police Canine

OC Spray


Physical Force

Total

047 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

047 PRECINCT 19 2 0 1 0 95 117


048 PRECINCT 26 6 0 7 0 90 129


049 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

049 PRECINCT 9 1 0 4 0 48 62


050 PRECINCT 8 1 0 2 0 35 46


052 PRECINCT 11 3 0 1 1 124 140


060 PRECINCT 1 0 0 2 1 58 62

061 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

061 PRECINCT 0 1 0 2 0 45 48


062 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

062 PRECINCT 2 1 0 2 0 36 41

063 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

063 PRECINCT 5 1 0 1 0 48 55

066 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

066 PRECINCT 3 0 0 1 0 10 14

067 PRECINCT 11 1 0 8 0 96 116

068 PRECINCT 2 1 0 0 0 36 39

069 PRECINCT 5 1 0 5 0 38 49


070 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

070 PRECINCT 11 3 0 7 0 84 105

071 PRECINCT 14 4 0 4 0 109 131


072 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

072 PRECINCT 3 0 0 4 1 81 89


073 PRECINCT 7 2 0 3 0 90 102


075 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 6 6

075 PRECINCT 19 5 0 5 1 145 175


076 PRECINCT 4 0 0 1 0 32 37

077 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 1 0 2 3

077 PRECINCT 21 1 0 2 0 111 135

078 PRECINCT 2 2 0 6 0 25 35

079 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

079 PRECINCT 9 1 0 3 0 100 113


081 PRECINCT 7 2 1 1 0 73 84

083 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

083 PRECINCT 6 2 0 2 0 74 84

084 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2




Impact Weapon

Police Canine

OC Spray


Physical Force

Total

084 PRECINCT 2 1 0 2 0 26 31

088 PRECINCT 1 0 0 2 0 38 41

090 PRECINCT 12 0 0 1 0 62 75


094 PRECINCT 1 1 0 1 0 28 31

100 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

100 PRECINCT 3 0 0 1 0 41 45

101 PRECINCT 12 1 0 1 0 56 70

102 PRECINCT 1 0 0 3 0 39 43


103 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

103 PRECINCT 8 0 0 4 0 62 74

104 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

104 PRECINCT 4 2 0 0 0 36 42

105 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

105 PRECINCT 14 1 0 3 0 64 82

106 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

106 PRECINCT 11 1 0 1 0 31 44

107 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

107 PRECINCT 5 0 0 1 0 24 30


108 PRECINCT 1 0 1 0 1 25 28

109 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

109 PRECINCT 5 0 0 4 0 35 44


110 PRECINCT 2 1 0 0 0 31 34

111 PRECINCT 2 0 0 2 0 12 16

112 PRECINCT 0 0 0 0 1 15 16

113 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

113 PRECINCT 13 0 0 4 0 84 101


114 PRECINCT 10 1 0 3 0 58 72

115 DET SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

115 PRECINCT 9 1 0 0 0 56 66

120 PRECINCT 16 1 0 1 0 97 115


121 PRECINCT 2 0 0 0 0 44 46

122 PRECINCT 5 1 0 0 2 32 40

123 PRECINCT 1 0 0 2 0 9 12


AUTO CRIME 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

BRONX COURT SECT 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

BROOKLYN COURT SECTION 0 0 0 1 0 19 20

CAREER DEVELOPMENT DIVISION 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

CENTRAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV 0 0 0 1 0 1 2

CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT 2 0 0 2 0 5 9

COLD CASE SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE DIVISION 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC 0 0 0 0 0 1 1




Impact Weapon

Police Canine

OC Spray


Physical Force

Total

CRIMINAL JUSTICE BUREAU 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

CRISIS OUTREACH & SUPPORT UNIT 1 0 0 0 0 3 4

CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND 0 0 0 0 0 11 11

DB GRAND LARCENY SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 8 8

DEPUTY COMM OF TRAINING 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

DET BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

DET BORO QUEENS SOUTH 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

DET BUR MAN SPEC VIC SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

DISORDER CONTROL UNIT 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

EMER SERV SQ 01 3 0 0 0 4 5 12

EMER SERV SQ 02 4 0 0 0 1 2 7

EMER SERV SQ 03 3 0 0 0 2 1 6

EMER SERV SQ 04 0 0 0 0 14 1 15

EMER SERV SQ 05 0 0 0 0 2 1 3

EMER SERV SQ 06 1 0 0 0 4 2 7

EMER SERV SQ 07 4 0 0 0 19 4 27

EMER SERV SQ 08 3 0 0 0 15 9 27

EMER SERV SQ 09 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

EMER SERV SQ 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

EMER SERV UNIT 1 0 0 0 2 3 6

FINANCIAL CRIMES TASK FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

FIREARMS SUPPRESSION SECTION 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

GANG SQUAD BRONX 0 0 0 0 0 6 6

GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN NORTH 1 0 0 0 0 5 6

GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN SOUTH 0 0 0 0 0 15 15

GANG SQUAD MAN NORTH 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN SOUTH 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

GANG SQUAD QUEENS NORTH 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

GANG SQUAD QUEENS SOUTH 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

GANG SQUAD STATEN ISLAND 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z1 (BK,Q,SI) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z2 (MAN,BX) 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

GUN VIOLENCE SUPPRESSION DIV 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

HARBOR UNIT 0 0 0 1 0 2 3

HB BROOKLYN RESPONSE TEAM 0 0 0 2 0 12 14

HB BX/QNS IMPACT RESPONSE TEAM 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

HB MANH. IMPACT RESPONSE TEAM 0 0 0 0 0 9 9

HEADQUARTERS SECURITY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

HIGHWAY DISTRICT 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

HIGHWAY UNIT NO 1 0 0 0 2 0 4 6



HIGHWAY UNIT NO.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

HOUSING BOROUGH MANHATTAN 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

HOUSING PSA 1 7 1 0 3 1 61 73

HOUSING PSA 2 13 0 0 4 1 61 79

HOUSING PSA 3 6 1 0 3 0 73 83




Impact Weapon

Police Canine

OC Spray


Physical Force

Total

HOUSING PSA 4 10 1 0 0 0 31 42

HOUSING PSA 5 6 2 0 3 0 51 62

HOUSING PSA 6 5 1 0 3 0 29 38

HOUSING PSA 7 11 2 0 1 1 94 109

HOUSING PSA 8 3 0 0 5 0 65 73

HOUSING PSA 9 9 0 0 1 0 35 45

INTEL‐CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION 0 1 0 0 0 4 5

INTEL‐PUBLIC SECURITY SECTION 0 1 0 0 0 0 1

INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU 0 0 0 0 0 6 6

JUVENILE CRIME SECTION 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

MAN COURT SECTION 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

MTN SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

MTS SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

NARC BORO BRONX 2 1 1 0 0 46 50

NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH 2 0 0 1 0 40 43

NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH 0 1 0 1 0 14 16

NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH 0 0 0 2 0 38 40

NARC BORO MANHATTAN SOUTH 0 1 0 2 0 43 46

NARC BORO QNS NORTH 0 1 0 0 0 13 14

NARC BORO QNS SOUTH 0 1 0 0 0 22 23

NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND 0 0 0 0 0 16 16

NYPD EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CTR 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

OTHER 0 1 0 1 0 39 41

PATROL BORO BKLYN NORTH 1 0 0 0 0 1 2

PATROL BORO BKLYN SOUTH 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

PATROL BORO BRONX 1 0 0 1 0 7 9

PATROL BORO MAN NORTH 0 0 0 0 0 8 8

PATROL BORO MAN SOUTH 0 0 0 1 0 39 40

PATROL BORO QUEENS NORTH 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND 0 0 0 2 0 2 4

PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS 1 0 0 0 0 2 3

PBBS SCHOOL SAFETY 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

PBBX SCHOOL SAFETY 0 0 0 0 0 21 21

PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS 0 0 1 0 0 4 5

PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

PBQN SPECIALIZED UNITS 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

PBSI SPECIALIZED UNITS 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

POLICE ACADEMY TRAINING UNIT 2 0 0 0 0 1 3

QNS COURT SECTION 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

SCHOOL SAFETY DIVISION 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

SPECIAL FRAUDS SQUAD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV 0 0 0 0 0 2 2

SSD MAN/BRONX ZONE 0 1 0 0 0 0 1




Impact Weapon

Police Canine

OC Spray


Physical Force

Total

SSD QNS/BKLYN/SI ZONE 0 0 0 1 0 5 6

STATEN ISLAND COURT SECTION 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN 1 2 0 0 0 13 16

STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX 0 0 0 2 0 12 14

STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN 0 0 0 0 0 8 8

STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS 0 0 0 2 0 4 6

STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 SI 1 0 0 2 0 10 13

STRATEGIC RESPONSE GROUP 0 0 0 0 0 22 22

STRIKE FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT 1 0 0 8 0 32 41

TB SPECIAL OPERATIONS DISTRICT 0 0 0 2 0 10 12

TRAFF CONTROL BK SUMMONS ENF. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

TRAFF CONTROL MAN INTERSECTION 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

TRAFF CONTROL MAN SUMMONS ENF. 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

TRAFF CONTROL QNS SUMMONS ENF. 0 1 0 0 0 2 3

TRANSIT BORO BKLN TASK FORCE 1 0 0 4 0 15 20

TRANSIT BORO BRONX 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

TRANSIT BORO BX/QNS TASK FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE 0 0 0 3 0 24 27

TRANSIT BUREAU 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1 2 1 0 8 0 29 40












TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC T/F 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

UNIFORMED PROMOTIONS TRN UNIT 3 0 0 0 0 1 4

VED MAJOR CASE SECTION 0 0 0 0 0 3 3

VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 4

WARRANT SECTION 10 2 0 2 0 37 51

TOTAL 728 105 7 324 82 6,071 7,317

Documents

2017 Use of Force Report v12.2 [FINAL] - New York2017 Use of Force Report New York Police Department Police Commissioner’s Message This is the New York City Police Department’s