20160217-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council -APPEAL-15-2502-ADDRESS to the COURT-Supplement 2

8/20/2019 20160217-Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to County Court of Victoria-Re Buloke Shire Council -APPEAL-15-2502-ADDRESS t…

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Page 1 AP 2502 ADDRESS TO THE COURT Suppl 2, Hearing date 22-2-2016 (or alternative date if allocated)

p1 17-2-2016 Hearing date 22-2-2016 Ballarat venue Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. Appeal 15-2502Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. 107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria [email protected]

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

ADDRESS TO THE COURT (Written submissions) Supplement 1County Court of VictoriaBallarat venue (and/or alternative venue)

Cc: Elliott Stafford and Associated [email protected] Andrews Premier Victoria [email protected] Mr Martin Pakula, [email protected] & [email protected] Court of Victoria [email protected]

Reference AP 2502 Buloke Shire Council for State of Victoria (s114 of the constitution) v Schorel-Hlavka

Sir/Madam,as I maintained all along an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION I submit no hearing

De Novo can eventuate. Where the Fire Prevention Notice is without legal force then everythingelse so to say falls by the wayside and the court cannot for this invoke jurisdiction. It musthowever be understood that this is one of many legal issues I raise and as such is not theexclusive reason of OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION.

I quote below Section 21A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Victoria) and particularly draw the courtsattention toQUOTE

(4) This section does not apply to conduct engaged in by a person performing officialduties for the purpose of —

END QUOTE

My submission is that the manner in which the Fire Infringement Notices were issued have beena conduct of STALKING. This as they were not within the delegated authority of the CountryF ir e Author ity Act 1958 beyond outside the provisions of the act, and Buloke Shire Council andits legal representatives have aided and abetted in this.It is for the court to ascertain if the Fire Prevention Notices were issued within the delegatedauthority of the Country F ir e Authori ty Act 1958 or not.Unbeknown to me Buloke Shire Council lawyers had already seemingly prepared a Form 11 for

a 18 March 2013 hearing for a previous alleged offence, just never provided me then with theform 11 nor notified me with the Form 11 and neither with a Full Brief.Ity is this “Full Brief ” which then was provide me with the 25 November 2015 dated letter(reproduced below) albeit including claimed photographs dated November 2014. As such, theForm 11 then dated 25 November 2015 was false and misleading, as it was a full brief that was

pulled from the record and some other items added and pretended to be the full brief regardingthe 20 August 2015 and 17 September 2015 hearings before the Magistrates Court of Victoria AtSt Arnaud. In my view this is a very serious matter where lawyers engage in this kind ofdeceptive conduct to pervert the course of justice.

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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The fact that the envelope shows no markings of Australia Post may underline also it was not posted as ordered by His Honour Mullaly J on or before 9 November 2015. In any event the 25 November 2015 date ought to be more than sufficient to accept it never could have been posted

on or before 9 November 2015. (As the correspondence has been reproduced below.)

QUOTE Criminal Procedure Act 2009

(vii)a copy of any other information, document or thing required by the rules of court to beincluded in a full brief; and

(f) if the informant refuses to disclose any information, document or thing that isrequired to be included in the full brief, a written notice that the informantrefuses disclosure under section 45, identifying the ground for refusingdisclosure.

END QUOTE Criminal Procedure Act 2009


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Buloke Shire Council and its legal representatives failed to comply with this part also.As such I view a total/considerable failure by Buloke Shire Council to comply with s41 of theCriminal Procedure Act 2009 . A part of an 18 March 2013 brief with added pages of otherlitigation and yet signed on 25 November 2015 as being a full brief I submit is a seriousdeception. While I immediately discovered this others may not and surely lawyers who are legal

practitioners should be trust worthy in their conduct and that I view clearly proved not to be so,.Then by way of 27 November 2015 correspondence the lawyers (see below reproduced

document) claimed in the Form 11 that the full brief was provided. Whereas the cover letterindicates it is just the Form 11, and claiming an administrative error. Where in fact as I view itthe 18 March 20143 may have been then an actual date but again unknown to me.

Moreover Buloke Shire Council provided me (but didn’t serve me as is legally required) with aForm 11 that referred to an 18 March 2013 hearing in the Magistrates Court of Victoria. I wasunaware of any such hearing as I was never notified about it and do not know what theneventuated, however checking records I now realise that this might have been in regard of a FirePrevention Notice that was issued in 2012. Likewise a Fire Prevention Notice was issued in2011, and 2015. As such over a period of numerous years the same content of the Fire Prevention

Notice was issued regardless of what actually the condition of the property was.It means no proper service of a complete brief ever eventuated, not even out of time, albeit Iwould not have accepted any service out of time as I notified Buloke Shire Council and its legalrepresentatives in writing about this.is.To consider if this constitutes a “criminal offense” one has to look as the STALKING legislative

provisions and the conduct of those involved allegedly STALKING.

While Mr Wayne Wall the Municipal fire protection Officer, Buloke Shire Council and itslawyers and others may claim they were exercising legitimate conduct in line of legislative

provisions as provided for in the Country F ir e Authori ty Act 1958 that would be equally as a police officer claiming that the injuries a person sustained at the hands of the police officer was

due to the person resisting arrest when it turn out the police officer had trespassed upon a property (without warrant) and commenced to bash the person on private property and thenseeks to use excuses to justify his/her unlawful conduct.It ought to be clear (as shown in this part 2 document, that Mr Wayne Wall as Municipal FireProtection Officer is limited to act with the delegated powers provided to him and the moment heexceeds that delegated powers then this causes his conduct to become unlawful. Those who areassisting him nevertheless then are party to the unlawful conduct. And where this unlawfulconduct is repeated year after yearly unlawfully Fire Prevention Notices as a harassment then itfalls in my submission within the provisions of Section 21A of the Criminal Act 1958 ofSTALKING!

http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracy

QUOTE

Conspiracy

CONSPIRACY, noun [Latin See Conspire.]

1. A combination of men for an evil purpose; an agreement between two or more persons, to

commit some crime in concert; particularly, a combination to commit treason, or excite

sedition or insurrection against the government of a state; a plot; as a conspiracy against the

life of a king; a conspiracy against the government.

http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracy


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More than forty had made this conspiracy Acts 23:13.

2. In law, an agreement between two or more persons, falsely and maliciously to indict, or

procure to be indicted, an innocent person of felony.

3. A concurrence; a general tendency of two or more causes to one event.

END QUOTE.QUOTE Sorell v Smith (1925) Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords

In an action against a set person in combination, a conspiracy to injure, followed by actual injury, will givegood cause for action, and motive or instant where the act itself is not illegal is of the essence of theconspiracy.

END QUOTE

.There ought to be no doubt that these proceedings and other conduct by those involved have beenvery harmful to both my 83 year old wife as well as myself.Also the time and cost of preparing documents to try to get those involved to understand thatthey are so to say barking upon the wrong tree has been considerably but to no avail as I view

they simply disregard what I write. That might be their right to ignore it but that cannot then justify their conduct of STALKING and conspiring against me. In fact it make it worse.Some Authorities indicated that stalking ordinary requires more than one incident albeit theAuthorities at times held that one protracted incident can constitute STALKING. However, inthis case it has been going on year after year and as such requires proper legal action against thewrongdoers as to set an example that the courts will not tolerate this kind of conduct, both byordering exemplary damages against the offenders or suspected offenders as well as criminalcharges for them to face the full brunt of the law.Each Fire Prevention Notice contains the same wording and each being in violation to the legal

provisions of the Country F ir e Authori ty Act 1958 .

http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracyhttp://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/Conspiracy


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The Fire Prevention Notice that was not included in the emailed pdf but was included in the enveloperefers to “remove all combustible material from land”, which as I pointed out is contrary to legislative provisions of s41of the Country Fi re Authori ty Act 195 8, (which excludes buildings and its content) fromwhich the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer derives its powers, and hence the notice is invalid, and

cannot form the basis of any litigation.


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As is set out below the Fire Prevention Notice itself was in violation of the provisions of theCountry F ir e Author ity Act 1958 as it demanded me to do something which was specificallyexcluded by the legislation! For example it required to remove “all combustible material” from

property which in itself would be an utter and sheer nonsense as not only are buildings and itscontent excluded by the legislation but no one in his/her right mind can accept that a propertyowner has to remove all buildings, wooden fence poles, trees, etc, for a duration of a declaredfire danger period. And the 100 mm height which the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer alsoinsisted upon growth was effectively to legislate beyond the powers delegated to him. So to say

no one in the world (including any judicial officers!) could reasonably be expected to remove all buildings, trees, wooden fence posts and wooden railings from a property and this neither waswithin the intend of the legislation or indeed within that of the legislators. In law this is a“Notice” that violates the legislative provisions and hence is invalid.

Neither did the Country F ir e Author ity Act 1958 provide delegated by-law legislative powersfor Buloke Shire Council or for that the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer to make rules inviolation of the Countr y Fi re Authori ty Act 1958 . As such the 100mm requirement within theFire prevention Notices are not legally permissible as it implies a delegated powers to narrowwhat the parliament provided for which clearly never was as such provided for.

Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 (28 April 1998)

Dawson J pointed out in Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville when discussing the statutory provision in thatcase: "substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible. Either therewas compliance or there was not."

The reasoning of Fullagar J in Clayton v. Heffron (supra) in relation to the provisions of s 5B of the

Constitu tion Act 1902 (NSW) is materi al in th is context: "A manner and form are prescribed by section 5B, and that manner and form must be observed if a validlaw is to be produced. Any prescription of manner and form may be repealed or amended, but, while itstands, the process prescribed by it must be followed . That was decided Trethowan's case and I thinkthat the whole of what is prescribed by section 5B relates to manner and form. It does not seem to me to be

possible to say that some of the requirements of the section are matters of manner and form while others arenot. The section describes one entire process - a series of steps, one following on another - and only thecompletion of the entire process can produce a valid law." (Supra at 262)

And the same applies to the Infringement Notice that was issued subsequently that relied uponthe invalid Fire Prevention Notice.

Version No. 235

Crimes Act 1958No. 6231 of 1958

Version incorporating amendments as at 10 February 2013QUOTE

21AStalking

(1) A person must not stalk another person.

Penalty: Level 5 imprisonment (10 years maximum).

(2) A person (the offender) stalks another person (the victim) if the offender engagesin a course of conduct which includes any of the following —

(a) following the victim or any other person;

http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca1902188/s5b.htmlhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca1902188/s5b.htmlhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca1902188/s5b.htmlhttp://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca1902188/s5b.html


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(b) contacting the victim or any other person by post, telephone, fax, textmessage, e-mail or other electronic communication or by any other meanswhatsoever;

(ba) publishing on the Internet or by an e-mail or other electronic communicationto any person a statement or other material —

(i) relating to the victim or any other person; or

(ii) purporting to relate to, or to originate from, the victim or any other person;

(bb) causing an unauthorised computer function (within the meaning ofSubdivision (6) of Division 3) in a computer owned or used by the victim orany other person;

(bc) tracing the victim's or any other person's use of the Internet or of e-mail orother electronic communications;

(c) entering or loitering outside or near the victim's or any other person'splace of residence or of business or any other place frequented by the

victim or the other person;

(d) interfering with property in the victim's or any other person's possession

(whether or not the offender has an interest in the property);

(da) making threats to the victim;

(db) using abusive or offensive words to or in the presence of the victim;

(dc) performing abusive or offensive acts in the presence of the victim;

(dd) directing abusive or offensive acts towards the victim;

(e)giving offensive material to the victim or any other person or leaving it whereit will be found by, given to or brought to the attention of, the victim or theother person;

(f) keeping the victim or any other person under surveillance;

(g) acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected —

(i) to cause physical or mental harm to the victim, including self-harm;

or

(ii) to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her ownsafety or that of any other person —

with the intention of causing physical or mental harm to the victim, including self-harm, or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her own safety orthat of any other person.

(3) For the purposes of this section an offender also has the intention to cause physicalor mental harm to the victim, including self-harm, or to arouse apprehension or

fear in the victim for his or her own safety or that of any other person if —


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(a) the offender knows that engaging in a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause such harm or arouse such apprehension or fear; or

(b) the offender in all the particular circumstances ought to have understood thatengaging in a course of conduct of that kind would be likely to cause suchharm or arouse such apprehension or fear and it actually did have that result.

(4)This section does not apply to conduct engaged in by a person performingofficial duties for the purpose of —

(a) the enforcement of the criminal law; or

(b) the administration of any Act; or

(c) the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or

(d) the execution of a warrant; or

(e) the protection of the public revenue —

that, but for this subsection, would constitute an offence against subsection (1).

(4A) In a proceeding for an offence against subsection (1) it is a defence to thecharge for the accused to prove that the course of conduct was engaged in withoutmalice —

(a) in the normal course of a lawful business, trade, profession or enterprise(including that of any body or person whose business, or whose principal

business, is the publication, or arranging for the publication, of news orcurrent affairs material); or

(b) for the purpose of an industrial dispute; or

(c) for the purpose of engaging in political activities or discussion orcommunicating with respect to public affairs.

* * * * *

* * * * *

(6) It is immaterial that some or all of the course of conduct constituting an offence

against subsection (1) occurred outside Victoria, so long as the victim was inVictoria at the time at which that conduct occurred.

(7) It is immaterial that the victim was outside Victoria at the time at which some orall of the course of conduct constituting an offence against subsection (1) occurred,so long as that conduct occurred in Victoria.

(8) In this section —

mental harm includes —

(a) psychological harm; and

(b) suicidal thoughts.


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Note

The Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 provides that the Court within the meaning of thatAct may make a personal safety intervention order in respect of stalking.

END QUOTE

I submit it cannot be excused that a person employed as a Municipal Fire Prevention Officer andclaimed by the lawyers is a Law Officer then somehow cannot manage year after year to checklegislative provisions as to the precise delegated powers.

In particular where legislation at times is amended by the Parliament then those seeking toenforce legislation cannot excuse themselves not to keep abreast with legislative amendmentswhen they seek to purportedly enforce the law. However, if ordinary citizens are deemed toknow the law then those purportedly enforcing it certainly have a legal duty to be aware of anyamendments, if applicable to their delegated powers.Section 41 of the Country Fire Authority Act 1958 have the following side notes as toamendments, which may have considerable impact upon the delegated authority of the MunicipalFire Protection Officer. In any event I submit that it was also the duties and obligations of thelawyers to check legislative provisions and not nilly willy litigate despite of what might beunlawful and leave it up to innocent victims to try to clear their names.

The following issue about signatures also raises the question if Fire prevention Notices are at allissued for the right purposes or just that the provisions of the Country F ir e Authori ty Act 1958

used to fraudulently Buloke Shire Council to enrich itself.

I know of no person who can sign his/her name identically in the same manner year after year being precisely overlapping. I view the signatures are not hand written signatures and may simply be that somestaff member in the office sits there printing out the Fire prevention Notices with the signature stored inthe computer and then sent out the Fire Prevention Notices to whomever and then Mr Wayne Wall finally

after time provided in the fire prevention Notice expired goes around top dish out the Infringement Notices without ever having formed the “opinion” required to justify each Fire Infringement Notice.At about $1,500 each and considering that some Fire prevention Notices have numbers near 2,000 thenthis is a multimillion dollar financial bonanza for Buloke Shire Council and hence I submit why it is sostringently pursuing me as if they are defeated then this means millions of dollars less in its coffers. Andsurely that is not what the purpose of the Country Fi re Authori ty Act 1958 stands for?

Because of the possibility of arguments by Buloke Shire Council and its lawyers as to

seeking to be allowed to continue with what I consider vexatious harassment against me I

am left no alternative but to further address this issue.

http://egiewcms-test-auth.elasticbeanstalk.com/legal/ward-lee-v-linehan-1/

Ward-Lee v Linehan [1993] EGCS21

Nos 5040 s. 42, 5191 s. 30.

S. 41 amended by Nos 6887

s. 2(a)(b), 7318 s. 2, 7476

s. 2(a) – (e), 7606 s. 2(a)(b)(c)(i) (d), 7876

s. 2(3), 7877

ss 9(b), 21(a)(iv), 8257 s. 9(a) – (c),

8933 s. 4, 9389 s. 3, 9488

s. 2(a), 10004 s. 10, 10149

ss 11(a) – (c), 12(a)(i)(ii)(b), 21(1)(d)(i)(ii)(e) (as amended by No. 10173 s. 4), 10235 s. 11(f), 45/1986 s. 6, 12/1989 s. 4(1) (Sch. 2 items 17.11 – 17.13), 50/1989 s. 14,

substituted by No. 2/1995 s. 5.

http://egiewcms-test-auth.elasticbeanstalk.com/legal/ward-lee-v-linehan-1/http://egiewcms-test-auth.elasticbeanstalk.com/legal/ward-lee-v-linehan-1/http://egiewcms-test-auth.elasticbeanstalk.com/legal/ward-lee-v-linehan-1/


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QUOTE

A party such as the tenant seeking an extension of time for service after the validity of the proceedings

had expired and after expiry of any relevant limitation period had to show good reason for the court to

exercise its power to extend and also give a satisfactory explanation for the failure to apply for

extension before the validity of the proceedings expired. END QUOTE

https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htm

ANDREW HYNDMAN v SAMUEL WALLS T/A DERRY ARMS Neutral Citation no. [2001] NIQB 24

QUOTE In Davis v NI Carriers [199] NI 19 Lowry LCJ (as he then was) said at page 20:

“Where a time-limit is imposed by statute it cannot be extended unless that oranother statute contains a dispensing power. Where the time is imposed by rulesof court which embody a dispensing power, such as that found in Order 64, rule7, the court must exercise its discretion in each case, and for that purpose therelevant principles are:

(1) whether the time is sped: a court will, where the reason is agood one, look more favourably on an application made before the timeis up;

(2) when the time-limit has expired, the extent to which the party

applying is in default;

(3) the effect on the opposite party of granting the application and,in particular, whether he can be compensated by costs;

(4) whether a hearing on the merits has taken place or would bedenied by refusing an extension;

(5) whether there is a point of substance (which in effect means alegal point of substance when dealing with cases stated) to be madewhich could not otherwise be put forward; and

(6) whether the point is of general, and not merely particularsignificance.

To these I add the important principle:

(7) that the rules of court are there to be observed.

In this connection I could not hope to improve on what Lord Guest has said in Ratnam v. Cumarasamy [1965] 1 W.L.R. 8, 12:

‘The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed, and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken there must be some materialupon which the court can exercise its discretion. If the lawwere otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified

right to an extension of time which would defeat the purposeof the rules, which is to provide a time table for the conduct oflitigation’. …”

END QUOTE

http://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/1998/april/anson-v-trump Anson v Trump [1998] All ER (D) 136 QUOTE

Practice - Judgment in default of defence - Defence served after expiry of time limit and withoutleave to serve out of time - Whether default judgment may be entered - RSC Ord 19, r 2.

END QUOTE

https://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htmhttps://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htmhttps://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htmhttp://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/1998/april/anson-v-trumphttp://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/1998/april/anson-v-trumphttp://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/1998/april/anson-v-trumphttps://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htmhttps://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-GB/Judicial%20Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2001/2001%20NIQB%2024/j_j_HIGC3453.htm


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http://www.criminalsolicitor.net/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=9892 QUOTE

I think that you need more than just a late application.

Discretion to exclude late application where deliberate manipulation of rules or unfairness

In the case of Hassett [2008] EWCA Crim 1634 the Court of Appeal agreed with the Recorder thatthe delay was �unacceptable�, and that that is not the sole test to apply. It is necessary to go on toconsider the interests of justice and prejudice separately from the finding of unacceptable delay. Muchwill turn on factors such as:

(i) Whether it would be an injustice were the jury not to hear the evidence.

(ii) Whether the defence are prejudiced by the late application: they might be prejudiced if the

prosecution has not taken adequate steps to obtain relevant details which would not only tend to

support the application, but which equally might undermine it�

(iii) The degree of prejudice to the accused. In Urushadze the Recorder noted that the defence hadbeen warned informally that an application would be made and that U must know his own bad

character. That is logically correct, but cannot mean that there is insufficient prejudice from a lateapplication: otherwise r35 would be meaningless in cases of previous convictions if not in otherinstances of allegations of bad character. The degree of prejudice may typically be less than with e.g.a late hearsay application, but it can still impede the defence.

(iv) Whether adjourning the trial in order to give the party that seeks to adduce the evidence moretime to do so would be impracticable or not in the interests of justice.

(v) Whether refusing the late application would amount to no more than disciplining the prosecution

agency (Moran[2007] EWCA Crim 2947).

(vi) Musone[2007] EWCA 1237 confirms that a trial judge has the power to exclude the evidence ifthere has been a failure to comply with r35. Although this is not explicit in r35 (cf r34(5) in relation to

hearsay), the overriding objective of the Crim PR leads to such a conclusion.

Ramirez[2009] EWCA Crim 1721 (24 July 2009) (Discretion to exclude late application wheredeliberate manipulation of rules or unfairness) failure to give notice of the evidence or of theintention to cross-examination about bad character was due not to an oversight but to a deliberate

intention to ambush the co-defendant.

Edited by Ron Barker on 16 July 2013 at 12:15 END QUOTE

There can be no doubt about it that to provide falsification in its Form 11 statements, not once but twice cannot be accepted by any court as to justify the lawyers blatant disregard to legalrequirements.

No legal provisions were connected to the matters currently before the court, either directly orindirectly, and so for lawyers to falsify a form 11 statement in my submission cannot be leftunrewarded with perhaps a stint as a guest of her majesty accommodation facilities.Lawyers who are OFFICERS OF THE COURT must be held legally accountable for makingfalse statements.

http://www.criminalsolicitor.net/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=9892http://www.criminalsolicitor.net/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=9892http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1634.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1634.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1634.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2498.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2498.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2498.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/2947.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/2947.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/2947.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/1237.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/1237.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/1237.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2009/1721.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2009/1721.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2009/1721.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/1237.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/2947.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2498.htmlhttp://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1634.htmlhttp://www.criminalsolicitor.net/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=9892


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One has to question why on earth Buloke Shire Council through its lawyers objected aMelbourne hearing where from onset I objected to the jurisdiction of any court to hear anddetermine the matter of the summons. After all its lawyers are based in Melbourne as I am and soit is nonsensical to have proceedings adjourned to Ballarat, where ordinary proceedings shouldhave been held in either the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Swan Hill venue or Heidelbergvenue and then an appeal would have been in Bendigo for Swan Hill or Melbourne city forHeidelberg.It is my submission that the conduct of the lawyers was to deliberately frustrate my ability to

attend.

I do not like to disclose medical details, and hence didn ’t produce any medical certificate I had infact obtained in regard of the litigation at St Arnaud, as after all lawyers who do not show upand cause an adjournment by this to my knowledge never produced any medical certificate forthis. Why then DOUBLE STANDARDS I may ask? I indicated however to His Honour MullalyJ that I had problems standing, and His Honour Mullaly J to his credit did allow me to stayseated. Having had various operations on my leg, where due to a growth originally from my bonethere is a problem, I appear to be back to the same and have to find out if I have to undergofurther operations. It could very well be that instead of attending court in Ballarat I might be onan operation table as doctors are more concerned as to their patients ability to recover then toworry about what some judge may do who may lack any common decency to understand thatcourt are there to provide justice e and not continue the abuse and misuse of legal powers as theymay deem fit and proper to protract harm already inflicted.

In my submission this e entire case should be impartially investigated because I understand thatso to say I am merely the tip of the ice burg of victims which are likewise denied their legalrights.In my submission no fair minded person could hold that the conduct of Mr Wayne Wall, BulokeShire Council and its lawyers and let’s not forget the Premier and the attorney-General have beenall appropriate. Despite my 9 December 2015 FOI Act request and Supplement dated 11December 2015 regarding relevant matters I am still denied the details/information I requested.I submit that may constitute obstruction of the course of justice!

This submission is not intended neither must be perceived that I relinquish in any way myobjections!

In view that Buloke Shire Council and its lawyers since the 2 September 2015 correspondenceacknowledged to be aware of the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION but at no time made anyattempt to place before the court any details/material; to prove jurisdiction then I submit the courtis bound to take that time to do so is long gone and I am entitled to the benefits of presenting mycase as I did to oppose jurisdiction.

I submit that the court should reserve its orders and reason of judgment so it canappropriately consider the ADDRESS TO THE COURT and the ADDRESS TO THE

COURT supplement 1 and this ADDRESS TO THE COURT supplement 2.

This written submission is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all relevantissues and oral supplement may be made. After all it is unknown to me what, if any, other mattermay arise before the hearing is held.

Appellant G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.