23
Open Source Sensing: Can we have both privacy and safety? Christine Peterson Foresight Institute www.foresight.org

2010 opensciencepeterson

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

 

Citation preview

Page 1: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Open Source Sensing:

Can we have both privacy and safety?

Christine PetersonForesight Institutewww.foresight.org

Page 2: 2010 opensciencepeterson

"The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon of a democracy should be the weapon of openness."

—Niels Bohr

Page 3: 2010 opensciencepeterson

No Secret Software for Public Voting

Data! The E-voting mess —The Open Science

community could have nipped it in the bud.

Page 4: 2010 opensciencepeterson

One molecule

Nanotech can do it now too

the sensors are coming

Page 5: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Nanotech-based sensors

“The detector generates a continuous 'spectrum' of information about any chemical agents in its presence...”

“easily programmable”

Page 6: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Sewer monitoring has begun

“The test doesn’t screen people directly but instead seeks out evidence of illicit drug abuse in drug residues and metabolites excreted in urine and flushed toward municipal sewage treatment plants.”

Page 7: 2010 opensciencepeterson

“We found a drug molecule — Everybody out for a breath check!”

Page 8: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Things worth detecting: weapons of mass destruction

• Explosives, chemicals, nukes — today

• Bioweapons – in early stages — nasty, but delicate and hard to control)

• Nanoweapons — later — like bioweapons, but tougher and more controllable)

Page 9: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Time

GDP per capita goes up

Cost of WMD comes down

$

Technological Advance

Page 10: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Fear + poor WMD data =

Sudan pharmaceutical plant, August 1998

Page 11: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Result: more surveillanceElectronic, video, biological, chemicalBeing integrated into national system

Page 12: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Transparency vs privacy

DC doesn’t notice our debates — they just move forward

Page 13: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Top-down approach to bottom-up problem

• Centralized

• Mandatory

• Monolithic

• Limited in participation

• Secretive

• Leads toward Surveillance State

Page 14: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Open Science-stylephysical security

• Decentralized

• Minimal

• Voluntary/privatized

• Experimental

• Collaborative

• Open

• Transparent

“Track the problem, not the people”

Page 15: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Who can figure out whether & how to collect

public sensing data?• Need a community that understands the

relationships between:

• Security

• Privacy

• Functionality

• Freedom

Page 16: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Graphic: Gina Miller

Page 17: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Open Sensing-based Security: What would it be like?

• Open source style development

• Citizen controlled

• Privacy oriented

• Verifiably limited

• Detects materials of concern

• Does not track individuals or nonweapons (e.g. drugs)

Page 18: 2010 opensciencepeterson

What might we regard as worth detecting?

• Real problems

• Anthrax (NYC, DC, FL 2001)

• Sarin (Tokyo, 1995)

• Ricin (London 2002, Las Vegas 2008)

• Later: syn bio accidents or abuse

Page 19: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Who gets the data?

• Communities negotiate

• Mutual data exchange, e.g. anthrax within 100 km

• Agreements on how to treat the data

• “Communities” size can vary from household to nation, depending on what is detected (e.g., TNT vs nukes)

Page 20: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Do we not have a “freedom to sense”?

Proposed law in New York City that will require people to get a license before they can buy

chemical, biological, or radiological

attack detectors

Page 21: 2010 opensciencepeterson

NO SECRET SOFTWARE FOR PUBLIC SENSING

DATA!

Open Source Sensing

Page 22: 2010 opensciencepeterson

orthe Open Science waythe fed way

Page 23: 2010 opensciencepeterson

Open sensing • OpenSourceSensing.org

• Email me: [email protected]

No Secret Software for

Public Sensing Data!