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    Five Years Later,a Hidden Crisis

    RepoRt of the IRC CommIssIonon IRaqI Refugees

    maRCh 2008

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    2008 International Rescue Committee122 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10168 theIRC.org

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    taBLe of Contents

    i Executive Summar

    1 Reugees and Their ConditionsWhat Do The Need

    6 Diplomatic Engagement with Host Countr Governments

    6 Assistance Programs

    9 Resettlement o Irai Reugees

    12 Recommendations

    16 Conclusion

    17 Appendices

    18 I. Irai Reugees: Worlds Third Largest Reugee Population

    19 II. Steps to Increase U.S. Resettlement o Irai Reugees

    20 III. U.S. Reugee Resettlement Sstem

    21 IV. Summar o Kenned Legislation

    24 V. Stories the Reugees Told Us

    29 VI. Meetings Held b the IRC Commission on Irai Reugees

    31 VII. Members o Commission and VII. Acknowledgements

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    exeCutIve summaRy

    The war that was launched in Ira ve years ago has produced one o the largest humanitarian crises oour time. Yet this crisis is largely hidden rom the public and ignored by the international community. Morethan our million Irais o dierent religions, ethnicities and backgrounds are estimated to be uprootedby horric violence and death and are in dire need o help. About hal have fed to Syria, Jordan, Egypt,Lebanon and elsewhere in the region.

    Because they are not huddled together in a camp or traveling as a group across a windswept plain, thesereugees are not receiving the attention and help they deserve rom the international community. Much othe reporting about them has been wrong, perpetuating myths that they are wealthy or that the crisis isover and that many are returning to their homes in Ira. The solutions put orward by major donors have

    been wholly inadeuate. Meanwhile, many o the reugees have been severely traumatied and now leaddesperate lives in oreign cities such as Damascus, Amman, Cairo and Beirut.

    This report is based on the visit o the International Rescue Committees Commission on Irai Reugees toJordan and Syria in February 2008. During our visit, we met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad andother senior ocials rom the governments o Syria, Jordan, Ira and the United States. We also met withdoens o reugees in Jordan and Syria and with U.N. representatives.There is a remarkably wide range o estimates, rom 1 million to 2 million, o the number o Irai reugeesin Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and other host countries. Whatever the exact number o reugees, it issubstantial and their experience has been grim. Beore leaving Ira, many suered torture, kidnappingsand the deaths o loved ones. Many are in danger because they have worked or Americansthe U.S.

    military, media, contractors and aid agencies. Single women with children and the elderly are particularlyvulnerable. Others, especially adult men who are unable to work and provide or their amilies, suer romdepression, anxiety and chronic disease. Many grow increasingly destitute with each passing day. Theyneed health care, housing, jobs and schooling, and sae places or children to play. Instead, they remainisolated, unwanted and insecure, overwhelmed by eelings o hopelessness, paralyed without prospectsor a better uture.

    The world is unaware o the massive scale o this disaster and the deplorable conditions in which thesereugees nd themselves. The international response has been completely inadeuate. Help is urgentlyneeded.

    Displaced reugees need substantial aid delivered eectively and eciently. The United Statesshould provide $1.5 billion to $2 billion per year toward a global total o $3 billion to $4 billion.This may seem like a large amount, but is minuscule in relation to the hundreds o billions odollars already spent on the war eort. The United States should cover hal o the anticipated $800million in appeals rom international organiationsabout $400 millionin order to help displacedIrais inside and outside Ira in 2008. Host countries also need much more help, beginning

    with at least $900 million in bilateral assistance rom the United States to Jordan, Lebanon andEgypt in scal year 2008. Ira can provide more reliable deliveries o oil at reduced prices to helpneighboring countries that are helping the reugees. The governments o the United States andIra have the principal responsibility to assist, but this burden should not be borne solely by

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    them. European countries and the oil-producing Gul States can and should contribute. Aid can bedelivered directly by nongovernmental organiations.

    The best solution or most o the reugees is to return to their homes in Ira, but sae repatriationcannot be undertaken now or in the oreseeable uture. The international community must work toachieve conditions in Ira that will allow or the eventual sae, voluntary and sustainable return o

    many reugees and displaced people to their homes. In the meantime, the international communitymust recognie that the reugees may have to remain where they are or the medium or long termand reuire help where they have sought reuge.

    A siable population o Irais cannot return saely under any circumstances and do not plan torepatriate. The international community must work to resettle these individuals in third countries.

    Again, the United States must take the lead in providing saety to tens o thousands o vulnerableIrais. For the current scal year, the U.S. goal is to admit 12,000 Irai reugees. Through reugeeresettlement and special immigrant visas, the IRC Commission on Irai Reugees recommends thatthe president commit to a major eort to increase Irai admissions to at least 30,000 per year orthe next our years. Other countries, especially in Europe, should also do more.

    A high-level conerence o regional countries and interested donors, chaired by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, is needed to examine the humanitarian crisis and develop a comprehensiveplan or addressing it in the region. This conerence should include government ministers who cangrapple with the diplomatic and political aspects o the crisis. The international community needs abetter assessment o true needs.

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    Five Years Later,a Hidden Crisis:

    RepoRt of the IRC CommIssIonon IRaqI Refugees

    This report is based on the visit o the International Rescue Committees Commission on Irai Reugees toJordan and Syria in February 2008. During our visit, we met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad andother senior ocials rom the governments o Syria, Jordan, Ira and the United States. We also met withdoens o reugees in Jordan and Syria and with U.N. representatives.

    The inormation we learned on our visit has also been supplemented by reports by experts; these areindicated in ootnotes.

    We conclude that the Irai reugee crisis is one o the largest humanitarian crises o our time, and muchmore must be done to respond to it. While it is not the subject o this report, the commissioners alsorecognie the magnitude and severity o the displacement crisis inside Ira, which also demands anappropriate response.

    Our report comprises ve parts. First, we discuss the dire situation o the reugees and their needs. Second,we discuss the need or diplomatic engagement in order to address the precarious existence many o themace and to plan or the uture. Third, we outline the assistance reugees and the countries hosting themreuire. Fourth, we examine the pressing need to resettle some o the Irais in other countries. Fith, we setorth our chie recommendations. Additional inormation is provided in a set o appendices.

    I. Refugees and theIR CondItIonsWhat do they need?

    As a result o war, sectarian violence and a complete breakdown o the rule o law, millions o Iraishave fed their homes and now live precariously as reugees in neighboring countries or as internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) inside Ira. Many Irais were targeted or persecution because o their politicalopinions, ethnicities, religious aliations, liestyles or proessions. Some have been attacked or threatenedbecause they worked closely with or helped Americans such as the U.S. military, contractors, humanitarianorganiations and the media.

    The total number o displaced Irais is estimated at more than our million people, although the number isdicult to calculate with any precision. This report concerns itsel with the estimated one million to twomillion Irai reugees who are now living in neighboring countries, especially Syria and Jordan. Many othem fed beore the all o Saddam Hussein; an even larger number have fed since the bombing o the al-

    Askari Mosue in Samarra in February 2006.

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    Over 1.5 MiLLiOn iraQi reFUGees

    Ctry EstiatedIraqi Ppati TtaRegistered Cases AverageCase Size

    Syri 1-1.5 millin 165,000 39,096 3.5

    Jrdn 450,000-500,000 51,559 24,232 2

    Lebnn 50,000 9,950 5,418 1.9

    Egypt 20,000-40,000 10,633 4,129 2.5

    Turkey 5,000-10,000 5,128 2,531 2

    ToTaL 1.5-2.1 millin 242,270 75,406 2

    Source: U.N. High Commission or Reugees, February 2008: http://oreignaairs.house.gov/110/joh022608a.pd

    The table above shows UNHCRs estimates or the number o displaced Irais in the region. Cases isa term used by the U.N. High Commission or Reugees (UNHCR) and can reer to an individual or to aamily o reugees. 1As an intergovernmental agency, UNHCR works with the estimates supplied byhost governments. The ocial estimates place the reugees as a siable proportion o the two majorhost countrieseual to 6 percent o Syrias population and 8 percent o Jordans.2 Other estimates aresignicantly lower. For this report, we will use a range rom the most conservative (1 million) to largest(about 2 million) gures. Whatever the exact gures, this still ualies as a major humanitarian crisis.The number o reugees who are actually being assisted is ar lower than even the most conservativeestimates, and the strain on the host societies can be seen in extremely overcrowded classroomsand medical acilities and heavy demands on basic inrastructure. Most reugees live in impoverishedneighborhoods in the major cities o the host countries.

    A case can be a single reugee or a reugee amily. Some reugee amilies have several cases, as adult sons and1daughters have their own unless they are somehow dependent on their parents.Population o Syria is 19.315 million and Jordan is 6.053 million.2

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    Some o the pressing problems the reugees ace include:

    TraumaThe UNHCR reported that the prevalence o depression and anxiety was high among Irai reugees in Syriaand worse than reported or some other reugee groups.3 A large UNHCR survey o Irai reugees ound

    that:

    77 percent reported being aected by air bombardments and shelling or rocket attacks, and 80percent reported being witnesses to a shooting; 68 percent reported interrogation or harassment (withthreats to lie) by militias or other groups, while 22 percent said they had been beaten by militias orother groups. Results also showed that many reported being kidnapped, 72 percent reported being

    witnesses to a car bombing and 75 percent reported that someone close to them had been killed ormurdered.4

    In Jordan, UNHCR and the reugees themselves reported similarly high rates o violence and trauma byIrais now living in that country.

    HealTH careAlthough state-sponsored clinics in Jordan and Syria are nominally open to them, there is not enoughcapacity to provide basic medical care and medicines to many Irai reugees. Little health problems cangrow big when let untreated. Some o the reugees have chronic medical problems such as diabetes,cancer and cardiovascular disease and have no or limited access to secondary or tertiary health care.Substandard housing, with leaky ceilings and heating problems, has contributed to health problems.

    educaTionAccess to education has improved in both Syria and Jordan. But many Irai amilies still keep their childrenaway rom schools, earing that sending them to school will reuire them to register, which might leadto their discovery and subseuent return to Ira. Some reugees told us that they had no transportation

    to get their children to school. We also heard stories o Irai children being harassed and made to eelunwelcome. Government ocials in Jordan and Syria stressed to us that the schools were open to Iraichildren, but there may be a need to send the reugees clearer signals that their children are welcome inclassrooms.

    JobsAlthough many Irai reugees are well educated and a number are proessionals, none o the hostcountries except Lebanon permit them to work. The lack o legal employment leaves many nearly destituteand represents a tremendous waste o human capacity. Men who work illegally ear being caught byauthorities and detained or expelled to Ira. Some Irai men who worked despite the risk ound that theiremployers reused to pay them and threatened to report them to government authorities. For this reason,

    women and children are sent into the inormal work orce, where they are at risk o exploitation and sexualabuse.

    moneyThe reugees have minimal nancial resources. Their savings are dwindling and many rely on remittancesrom relatives in other countries, including Ira, and on charity. Poor reugees are unable to aord housing,heat or ood.

    UNHCR convenience sample survey, Oct. 31Nov. 25, 2007. Depression 89% and anxiety 82% (n=384).3Second IPSOS Survey on Irai Reugees (Oct. 31Nov. 25, 2007), Final Results.4

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    crimeAs in many displacement crises, petty crime, prostitution, domestic violence and orced marriages becomemore common and strain amilies that have already been traumatied by violence and torture in Ira.

    lack o legal sTaTusBehind many o these problems lies the uncertain legal status o the reugees. O the our major hostcountriesSyria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanononly Egypt is a party to the 1951 Reugee Convention.

    Although the conventions prohibition on orcibly returning reugees to their country o persecution isconsidered customary international law and thereore binding even on nonparties, there is no ormalrecognition by the host countries o the reugee status o the Irais living in their midst. The UNHCR hascreated identity papers or Irais and issued them to some o the reugees in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.However, these documents oer no guarantee o protection rom arrest and orced return and many Iraishave not registered. In this respect, the very recent decision by Lebanon to oer residency status and workpermits to Irai reugees must be commended.

    THe repaTriaTion myTHThere is little actual base or the widely held notion that the reugees are returning home. We oundno evidence o large-scale return; in act, most reugees nd the idea inconceivable. UNHCR says onlytwo amilies have returned rom Jordan and very ew have ventured home rom Syria and stayed. Inlate November 2007, U.S. and U.K. media reported that buses ull o returning reugees were travelingrom Damascus to Baghdad. The reports came on the heels o an Irai government oer to pay $800 toeach returning amily, along with declarations by Irai authorities that the troop surge was working andcommunities were growing saer. The number o returning reugees turned out to be very small, accordingto the UNHCR in Syria, and no buses have run since.5 For our part, we spoke to reugees in Syria who hadtried to go back to Ira but ound their old homes occupied and their neighborhoods too dangerous. One

    woman said her husband had gone back and has not been heard rom since. Nonetheless, the media andpublic in the West seem to have accepted the idea that the reugees are going back. We believe it is both

    dangerous and irresponsible to lure desperate reugees home with misleading statements about improvedsaety and security. Reugees should be discouraged rom returning home to communities where they willnot be sae.

    Jonathan Steele, Reugees celebrate rst bus back to Ira, The Guardian, Nov. 28, 2007; http:/www.guardian.co.uk/5world/2007/nov/28/ira.syria The governments widely publicied plan to run ree buses rom Damascus, Syria, toBaghdad was suspended ater just two runs in Cara Buckley, Reugees Risk Coming Home to an Unready Ira, New YorkTimes, Dec. 20, 2007;. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/world/middleeast/20reugees.html?_r=1&n=Top/Reerence/Times%20Topics/Subjects/I/Immigration%20and%20Reugees&ore=slogin

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    WHy THE IRAqI REUGEE CRISIS IS DIERENTWhile Irai reugees share some o the characteristics o other reugee groups, including fight rom confictand an uncertain uture, there are dierences between the situation o the Irais and that o other reugeegroups. This table provides a summary o the main dierences.

    Iraqi Refgees Cap-based Refgee Sitati

    Hidden in cities Living in cmps

    Living in prtments tht re sctteredthrughut cities

    Tgether in ne plce

    Mny get n id rm hst cuntries rinterntinl cmmunity

    Bsic services prvided by interntinlcmmunity, id gencies

    Uncertin legl sttus oten given reugee sttus

    Very ew registered; reugees must cmerwrd t be registered with UNHCR

    Registered with uthrities respnsible rreugees s prt n rgnized prcess

    Imprecise estimtes number reugeestht vry gretly

    Surveys reugees cn be cnducted in cmpprducing better dt

    Hst gvernments mbivlent twrd ndwry reugees nd thse interested iniding them

    Hst gvernments welcme help

    Difcult r uthrities t rech ll thereugees t prvide inrmtin (lthughthe reugees hve their wn chnnels cmmunictin, including cell phnes t cll

    bck t Irq nd e-mil ccunts)

    Inrmtin prgrms in cmps t inrm reugeesbut their benefts, rights, resettlement ptins,reptritin, etc.

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    II. dIpLomatIC engagement WIth hostCountRy goveRnmentsI the Irai reugees are to be helped, the United States, the government o Ira, the European Union6, the

    Gul States and other major donors will have to engage proactively with the host countries and leadingmembers o the international community on the ull range o issues related to Irai reugees and theirimpact on host countries.This crisis is not just a humanitarian crisis demanding an international response to reduce suering. Itis also a strategic diplomatic opportunity to constructively engage much o the Middle East around anissue that impacts the region and oers a possibility o dealing with the wider issue o the uture o Ira.Every country in the region has a stake in preventing urther displacement and no one wants a long-termreugee crisis. The world seems to be ignoring the crisis, and those that are paying attention treat it assimply another humanitarian disaster. Instead, a major diplomatic eort is needed to deal with the crisisand its underlying causes.

    III. assIstanCe pRogRams

    a. needs

    Jordan and Syria (among other countries in the region) are unairly shouldering the burden o this reugeecrisis. These overtaxed countries, already experiencing economic diculties, have seen an increaseddemand or health services, education, electricity and water related to the large infux o Irai reugees.This is particularly burdensome in an area where water is scarce and many commodities are imported andexpensive.The government o Syria has stated that the total annual cost o accommodating Irai reugees is $1 billionand the government o Jordan also estimates a $1 billion cost (sometimes higher numbers are mentioned).In early February, Jordanian Minister o Planning and International Cooperation Suhair al-Ali said that thecost to Jordans economy o hosting the Irai reugees was $2.2 billion, primarily related to meeting theeducation and health needs o Irai reugees. Minister o Education Taysir Nueimi said that government-unded schools were accommodating 24,000 Irai students, causing pressure and overcrowding in the

    education system and orcing schools to operate in double shits.7Needs in the region are growing as reugees run out o resources and the cost o living rises. Host countriesalso ear that as reugees become poorer, they will also become even more desperate, turning to illegalactivities or income and presenting more o a security risk.

    Because o its involvement in the Ira War, some in Europe would single out the United Kingdom as country that6should also lead, along with the United States, in responding to the reugee crisis.

    IRIN News, Jordan: Schools creaking under burden o 24,000 Irai students,7 http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=76717

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    In Syria, President Assad said that classrooms and clinics are unable to cope with the infux o Irais,stating disappointment that the Irai and U.S. governments are not doing more to help. He cited the needto construct more schools, classroom space and clinics to accommodate the reugees. He told us that thecrisis has not been caused by Syria. He maintained that the United States should take in much largernumbers o reugees and should send money, not troops. He believes reugees will likely be in Syria or

    a long time (up to 10 years), and this view was echoed in our meeting with the vice president, Farouk al-Sharaa.In Jordan, the government is adamant that all programs providing assistance to Irai reugees should alsobenet poor Jordanians, and that no parallel systems be created. Minister or Social Development HalaLattou described to us how increasing prices and rents were aecting many in the country. She told usshe sees a need or more support or the budget o Jordan and or aid agencies that provide goods andservices. She recognied that many Irais are highly skilled and educated and could potentially contributeto the Jordanian economy. Cash assistance, she acknowledged, could be used to help the most desperate(the Jordanian ministries provide some type o this aid). She pointed out that a weaker Jordan would nothelp achieve a stronger, saer Ira.

    b. response To needs (so ar)

    Last year, UNHCR provided health care to 210,000 cases or amilies in neighboring countries (out o250,000 registered cases) and helped tens o thousands o reugee children to attend school. Under the2008 appeal, UNHCR has set a target o 200,000 children in school by the end o the year. 8 While theUNHCRs eorts are laudable and deserving o much greater support, they are only reaching a raction othe Irai reugees.

    UNHCR is also providing direct aid to vulnerable amilies through an innovative pilot project that providescash cards or limited monthly withdrawals rom automated teller machines (ATMs). UNHCR and theWorld Food Program (WFP) will provide ood aid or up to 360,000 Irai reugees in Syria this year,

    working closely with the Syrian Red Crescent. In both Syria and Jordan, the reugee agency is distributingitems such as blankets, heaters, mattresses and other supplies. Some o us visited the UNHCR center inDamascus that distributes ood, cash cards and other items to the reugees.

    We were very impressed by the operation and the use o technology (computeried records, secure ATMcards and e-mail alerts). We appreciated the concern and technology used to prevent raud, such as thepaper that cannot be photocopied or identication cards. However, cash cards only cover part o thereugees needs: the cards provide recipients with about $100 per month, mostly or widows and womenalone with their children. In Syria, Irai women told us that minimum rent or a modest apartment was

    $110-120 per month and utility costs were an additional $75.There are many nongovernmental organiations working in Jordan, including the IRC. Very ewinternational nongovernmental organiations are operating in Syria, with nongovernmental organiationsawaiting registration rom the Ministry o Social Aairs. (Three were recently registered. The IRC is nowseeking registration to work directly in Syria and in cooperation with the education and health ministries.)

    A number o international as well as smaller, local Christian aid groups are also active.

    UNHCR, February 12, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ira?page=brieng&id=47b1890328

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    Appeals and other unding estimates or displaced Irais rom U.N. organiations will likely total $800million in scal year 2008, and a U.S. contribution o at least $250 million is seen by State Departmentocials as the minimum the United States needs to contribute in order to be a credible donor (nearly $200million has been contributed as o February 2008). The United States traditionally covers25-30 percent o appeals rom international organiations or reugee aid. In this case, more is needed.

    We are also concerned that UNHCR appeals may be based on what UNHCR thinks donors will give, ratherthan on actual needs. UNHCR is understandably reluctant to expand its programs beyond what is likely tobe supported by donors. Discussions with donors should clariy true needs and highlight gaps.

    In 2007, the European Commission via the European Community Humanitarian Aid Oce (ECHO) andthe communitys external relations unding mechanisms provided roughly $60 million or the Irai crisis.Through the external relations unding mechanism, the European Commission provided nearly $40 million:$9 million to Syria or public health programs, $27 million euros to Jordan or education, and $3 million toUNICEF. ECHO has contributed about $18 million: $7.8 million to the International Committee o the RedCross operating in Ira and $10 million to UNHCR and the U.N. Oce or the Coordination o Humanitarian

    Aairs (UNOCHA) or the regions reugee programs. Similar levels o unding are currently planned or

    2008.

    This is a start but more must be doneby the United States and othersi the burden on host countriesis to be lessened. Much more could be done by European countries and oil-producing Gul States. Theireorts to date do not match their capacity to aid the host countries and contribute to UNHCR and otherhumanitarian organiations. The debate must shit rom arguing about the causes and course o the war inIra to helping displaced Irais.

    The government o Ira realies that it, too, must contribute more unding to help the displaced and thereugees. A pledge o $25 million or host countries that was announced in April 2007 was very slow tomaterialie; Jordan reportedly reused to accept its $8 million share and suggested it be given directly toUNHCR, because the sum was perceived as so small relative to the need.

    Finally, international donors should explore whether monies contributed to the reconstruction o Ira thathave not yet been spent could be re-allocated to humanitarian needs.

    We applaud the sentiments expressed to us by Harriet Dodd, director o CARE International in Jordan, apartner o the IRC:

    Families without work are expensive to care or; they represent a waste o resources, could exacerbatesecurity concerns, are more likely to support illegal behavior, and may need long-term rehabilitationater long periods o idleness on their return to Ira or in a situation o resettlement. A win-winsituation is needed that benets both the Jordanian and Syrian economies using the skills andmotivation that is present in these reugees rom Ira. Taking a regional view, i re-skilled Irais areable to use their talents, engage in local economies and ultimately return to rebuild their shatteredhomeland having developed good ties and working relations with the communities in which they nowreside, the benets should accrue to the entire region.

    Given the scale o the crisis, donors should contribute to all o the partners currently working in theregion: UNHCR, World Food Programme and other U.N. agencies, nongovernmental organiations and localgroups. Realistically, needs in the region could total $3 billion to $4 billion dollars annually, with the U.S.contribution totaling $1.5 billion to $2 billion. This is a large amount o money, but it is uite small in termso the other costs related to the war in Ira (roughly $10 billion per month), and the short- and long-termbenets or Irais and the region will be tremendous.

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    Iv. ResettLement of IRaqI Refugees

    u.s. reseTTlemenT and iraqi reugeesa.

    The number o Irais accepted globally or reugee resettlement programs actually ell between 2003 and2006. UNHCR has reerred ar more reugees or resettlement than have been accepted.

    U.S. government ocials have criticied the number o UNHCR reerrals as stagnant and predict that theadmissions program will catch up to UNHCR reerrals by the spring o this year. UNHCR, however, hasslowed down its reerrals process because it does not want to create a large backlog o reugees who havealse hopes or resettlement. The chart below shows how UNHCR reerrals to the United States currentlyoutpace the numbers the United States is resettling.

    1952

    19

    2934

    20

    6044

    21

    7911

    84

    9117

    141

    10089

    670

    11458

    1559

    1304

    1

    2009

    1447

    6

    2371

    1545

    6

    2616

    1645

    4

    2991

    0

    2000

    4000

    6000

    8000

    10000

    12000

    14000

    16000

    18000

    Persons

    Feb/March

    2007

    April May June July August September October November December January

    2008

    Cumulative United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Iraqi Submissions

    versus Arrivals to the United States (including non-HCR)

    UNHCR Submissions to the United States

    Arrivals to the United States (including non-UNHCR)

    The U.S. government ell short o its already modest target o 7,000 Irai reugees in scal year 2007and resettled only 1,608. Many o those resettled had been part o earlier waves o reugeesincludingChristians feeing the Saddam Hussein regime. For scal year 2008 (Oct. 1, 2007Sept. 30, 2008), theUnited States has pledged to admit up to 12,000 reugees, a very low number in view o the need. Once

    again, however, it is o to a slow start, admitting only 1,432 reugees in the rst our months o the scalyear (450 in October-, 362 in November, 245 in December, and 375 in January). Because o the slow start,State Department and Department o Homeland Security ocials conceded in early February that theymay not meet the goal o 12,000 Irai reugees in scal year 2008. They continue to have 12,000 as theirtarget, and hope to make up shortalls with higher numbers in July, August and September, but oer noguarantees o reaching the goal. We recommend that at least twice that number be admitted this year.

    Clearly, something other than the normal procedures should be used to respond to this crisis. A major eoron the order o what Presidents Ford and Carter mounted back in the post-Vietnam War era is needed.Between May and December 1975, 131,000 people were resettled, and the United States took in more

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    than 900,000 Vietnamese reugees overall. Similarly, the United States welcomed more than 600,000Russian Jews and other religious minorities during the Cold War, and accepted more than 150,000 Bosnianreugees during the Bosnian confict.

    b. kennedy legislaTion

    In January 2008, President Bush signed into law the National Deense Authoriation Act or scal year2008. A section o this law is the Reugee Crisis in Ira Act o 2007, oten reerred to as the Kennedy billater its chie sponsor, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy. The law provides or greater opportunitiesor vulnerable Irais to obtain protection in the United States.

    The Kennedy legislation expands the categories o Irais who will have priority or admission to the UnitedStates as reugees. The Kennedy bill does not speciy the number o Irais who should come to the UnitedStates each year as reugees, but the emphasis on expanded categories could result in higher reugeeadmissions and more ocus on vulnerable groups. The legislation also authories a signicant increase in

    the number o Irais who can come to the United States with special immigrant visas (SIVs). Under a priorlaw, a total o 500 Irais and Aghans who worked as translators or the U.S. government can get such

    visas each year and they can bring their amily members. Under the new law, another 5,000 Irais andtheir amily members (expected to total 10,000 to 12,000 persons) will be able to get such visas or thenext ve years, and they will be eligible or the same services and benets as those admitted as reugees.The State Department was already planning to resettle 12,000 Irai reugees in scal year 2008. Theimpact o the SIVs and reugee provisions o this legislation could boost admissions this year to at least25,000 Iraisand potentially many moreor whom no other viable solution exists.9

    c. u.s. reseTTlemenT cHallengesA major challenge is that a number o ederal agencies (including the State Department, Departmento Homeland Security and Department o Health and Human Services) have a role in the U.S. reugeeadmissions program, which is unded through a mix o appropriations to these agencies, visa ees andcontributions rom voluntary agencies (see appendix). The State Department uses a partner agency (in

    Jordan and Syria, it is the International Organiation or Migration) to run an intake oce called theOverseas Processing Entity. The entire program also relies on voluntary agencies (unded largely throughthe State Department and the Oce o Reugee Resettlement at Health and Human Services) to help thereugees resettle in the United States. Scaling up to meet the needs o signicantly greater numbers oIrai reugees in a manner that does not undermine the fow o reugees rom other regions would involvemany senior decision makers and reuire investments within the entire system, and not just to one agency

    Another challenge has been that the U.S. resettlement program ocuses almost entirely on threats oviolence and persecution to reugees in their country o origin, and puts almost no emphasis on threatsto the reugees outside Ira. UNHCR, on the other hand, has several categories or Irais who want to beresettled, including severe trauma (including sexual violence and violence against women) in Ira, medical

    There is an overall target or the number o reugees to enter the U.S. in any single scal year. For 2008, the President9has determined a target o 70,000 reugees. This number has not been reached since beore Sept. 11, 2001 and can berevised to accommodate more Irai reugees, should that become necessary.

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    problems or disabilities or which there is no adeuate treatment in the reugee-hosting country, andstatelessness. Other groups listed by UNHCR are:

    minorities targeted in Ira because o their religious or ethnic background;women at risk in their host country;unaccompanied or separated children and children who are the main applicants or resettlement;

    dependents o the reugees living in potential countries o resettlement;

    elderly people at risk;high-prole reugees and/or their amily members;reugees associated with the multinational orce in Ira, Coalition Provisional Authority, the UnitedNations, oreign countries, and international or oreign institutions or companies and the press;reugees with immediate risk o refoulement.10

    d. reseTTlemenT in europe

    Most European countries are indierent toward the Irai reugee crisis, indicating that those who invadedIra (the United States and the United Kingdom) are largely responsible and thus must address theconseuences. This indierence can be seen in the treatment o Irai asylum seekers. Approval rates orIrai asylum seekers in European Union member states vary between 1 percent and 80 percent. Some callthis a poor lottery system o approval and saety. There is a need or the European Union to adopt commonpolicies and practices toward Irai asylum seekers in order to harmonie protection standards and ensurethat no one is orcibly returned to Ira. Tragically, some EU member states are still sending Irais back toIra.

    In addition, Europe accepts only 5 percent o the worldwide resettlement cases, totaling about 4,400places a year, with only seven European states currently accepting reugees in need o resettlement.Europe has the capacity to oer sanctuary to many more reugees, and greater international burdensharing would also help ease pressures on host countries. Hundreds o thousands o reugees rom the

    Balkans were oered permanent resettlement or temporary protection during the Balkan wars in the1990s. But, with the notable exceptions o Sweden and Denmark, we see no political will to open doors

    wider to Irai reugees today.

    While the Irai reugee crisis will not be solved through resettlement programs alone, these types oprograms are an important piece o a comprehensive response, and a potentially lie-saving option orthe most vulnerable cases. They represent a concrete demonstration o solidarity with reugee-hostingcountries, which can provide credibility and leverage to the United States and the European Union whenengaging diplomatically with those countries, as mentioned above.

    UNHCR, Resettlement o reugees rom Ira, January 9, 200710

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    v. ReCommendatIons

    In light o the preceding, the IRC Commission on Irai Reugees makes our chie recommendations

    as ollows:

    1.Displaced Irais need more aid delivered more eectivel and efcientl. TheUnited States and the government o Ira have the principal responsibilit toassist, but this burden should not be borne solel b them. The United Statesshould provide $1.5 billion to $2 billion per ear toward a global total o $3billion to $4 billion. European countries and the oil-producing Gul States canand should contribute more.

    inTernaTional appealsLeaders at the U.N. and donor governments must ensure a strong response to the humanitarian needs oIrais inside and outside Ira. In addition to the Consolidated Appeals Process issued or aid to Ira, theU.N. should issue a complementary appeal or the region. The United States should cover 50 percent othe appeals rom international organiations instead o the 25-30 percent contribution it usually makes,thus helping to guarantee sucient contributions to the current and uture appeals o U.N., internationaland nongovernmental organiations to assist Irai reugees and their host communities. The United Statesshould contribute $400 million o the expected $800 million in appeals to help displaced Irais inside andoutside Ira in 2008 (and assess whether the appeals are sucient).11

    A greater-than-usual U.S. share will demonstrate to other countries that the U.S. is prepared to play a

    leading role in responding. This may encourage other countries to participate at a greater level than theyhave to date. The need or better estimates on the number o Irai reugees, their needs and their impacton their host communities should not be used as an excuse to postpone helping now.

    bilaTeral aidAid to Syria, Jordan and other host countries is needed to meet the strain on health, education, electricity,water and other basic services related to the large population o Irai reugees. We recommend a U.S.bilateral aid package to key countries in the region to help oset the burden o $900 million ($700 millionor Jordan, $100 million or Lebanon and $100 million or Egypt).

    Greater resources can and should be provided by the European Commission and EU member states. Thecommission and EU countries enjoy stable diplomatic relations with Middle East and can provide more

    technical and nancial aid to Ira and its neighbors as well as direct assistance to the reugees. ECHOshould expand its unding and partnerships with aid agencies working in the region.

    Creative approaches, which may involve a distribution o tasks among the international community, needto be ound in order to provide some orm o bilateral aid to Syria that is proportionate to its share o thecost o humanitarian support.

    Senior Coordinator on Irai Reugee Issues Ambassador James Foley, press brieng, Feb. 4, 2008,11http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/100030.htm

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    HumaniTarian cHannel To syriaThe U.S. government will have to seek a dialogue with Syria to discuss the humanitarian needs o theIrais and to ensure that U.S. government personnel can obtain the visas and access they need in orderto process those Irai reugees who apply to resettle in the United States. We do not underestimate thediculties that now characterie the U.S.-Syrian relationship, but a humanitarian channel between the

    two countries, separate rom political disputes, is needed. (Other countries and international organiationsmay be better placed to engage Syria on humanitarian issues related to Irai reugees. Their involvementshould be sought.)

    Getting the numbers right. The international community needs to determine with more precision thenumber o reugees, their needs and the economic burden they place on their hosts. The U.S. governmentcould take the lead on this set o issues and establish a channel or an open-ended discussion onhumanitarian issues with the government o Syria in order to ensure that the needs o the Irais are met.UNHCR should be authoried and unded to conduct inormation campaigns among the reugee populationto make clear what services are available to them, what the host government policies are that aect them,how resettlement programs work and other relevant inormation.

    THe governmenT o iraqIra should contribute more unding to help its own citiens, both the displaced and the reugees. Part oIras contribution toward reugees could go to UNHCR. The Irai government could also ollow through onpledges to sell reliable supplies o oil at reduced prices to the host countries, thus signicantly easing theeconomic burden and helping Irais and host communities who are struggling with high uel costs. Iramight also allow donors to ree up reconstruction monies and reallocate them to humanitarian needs.

    nongovernmenTal organizaTionsAid can also be delivered directly to reugees by nongovernmental organiations. Host governmentsneed to work with the U.N. and aid agencies to minimie bureaucratic impediments to delivery o aid. Forexample, employees o aid agencies should receive visas promptly, and registration o aid agencies to work

    in host countries should be acilitated and expedited.

    All o these arrangements should also make it possible or the reugees to be more sel-sucient,contribute to the local economy and rely less on assistance.

    2.The best solution or most reugees is to return sael and voluntaril to theirhomes in Ira, but sae repatriation cannot be undertaken now or in theoreseeable uture. The international communit must work to achieve conditions

    in Ira that will allow or the eventual voluntar and sustainable return oreugees and displaced people to their homes. In the meantime, major donorgovernments must recognize that or the medium or long term, the reugees mahave to remain where the have sought reuge.

    non-reoulemenTThe IRC supports a policy o voluntary and sae return or the vast majority o the reugees as the long-term solution adeuate to the scale o the problem. Even so, host countries should subscribe ormally to

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    the international obligation o non-reoulement, or orced return. While orced returns have been limited soar, host countries should give more explicit assurance that reugees will not be expelled or orced to returnto Ira beore it is sae or them to do so. The government o Ira should not encourage reugees to returnhome prematurely, as was reportedly done in late November 2007 when money was oered to reugeesin Syria who were willing to go back to Ira. Speaking rom Damascus on Feb. 14, 2008, Antonio Guterres,the U.N. High Commissioner or Reugees, said that he did not believe it was sae enough or Irai reugees

    to return to their country because the clear criteria or the promotion o returns are not present in Ira. Untisae and voluntary return becomes a viable option, adeuate nancial assistance should be provided tohelp host countries and Irai reugees.

    legal sTaTus or reugeesAs part o the discussions with host countries, the United States, the United Nations and the internationalcommunity should raise the issue o reugee status that satises the concerns o, and is ormallyrecognied by, host governments, and that provides reugees a measure o protection. Irais must eelsae rom detention, orced return and harassment. Perhaps a better arrangement regarding legal statusand protection o reugees can be addressed in the context o increased aid to host countries. The bestoutcome, o course, would be or host countries to become parties to the 1951 Reugee Convention.

    3.A sizable population o Irais cannot return sael under an circumstances anddo not plan to repatriate. This calls or the international communit to resettlemore individuals in third countries. Again, the United States must lead. or thecurrent fscal ear, the U.S. goal is to admit 12,000 Irai reugees. Throughreugee resettlement and special immigrant visas, the IRC Commission on IraiReugees recommends that the president commit to a major eort to increaseIrai admissions to at least 30,000 per ear or the next our ears. Othercountries, especiall in Europe, should also do more.

    Many Irais eel vulnerable in their current country o reuge. Others will never be able to return to Irain saety. Citiens o the United States, United Kingdom and other countries engaged in operations in Iraowe it to Irais who have worked or the multinational orces and have received death threats to helpthem nd sae places to live. We also recommend resettlement or the most vulnerable reugees. Theseinclude women at risk, children and adolescents, survivors o violence and torture, the orphaned elderly,members o persecuted religious minorities, reugees with close amily already in the United States, andreugees with urgent medical needs.

    presidenTial commiTmenTThe U.S. Government should increase signicantly the number o Irai reugees to be resettled to theUnited States, and should do so without cutting the fow o admissions rom the rest o the world. PresidenBush needs to announce that this is an administration priority and then ollow through to ensure thatresources are sought rom Congress and made available to handle the large increase in admissions. Forthe current scal year, the U.S. goal is to admit 12,000 Irai reugees. Through reugee resettlement andspecial immigrant visas, the IRC Commission on Irai Reugees recommends that the president commit to amajor eort to increase Irai admissions to at least 30,000 per year or the next our years.

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    und and implemenT THe kennedy legislaTionTimely and eective implementation o the Kennedy bill is critical. As the State Department, Department oHomeland Security and Department o Health and Human Services seek to implement the law, consultation

    with aid agencies and oversight by Congress must continue. In addition, these ederal agencies will reuireadditional resources in scal year 2008 to allow ull implementation o the bill. IRC and other organiationsare recommending that such unding be provided in the scal year 2008 supplemental appropriations bill

    or the Global War on Terror, which will be considered by Congress in spring 2008.

    reseTTlemenT in europeExisting resettlement countries within the European Union should expand their uotas, i they are notalready doing so. Other EU member states are urged to undertake resettlement programs. All memberstates, as a matter o urgency, should improve the procedures and access or reugee resettlement andasylum applications. They should halt all orced returns to Ira. They should ensure that Irai reugees andasylum seekers receive appropriate support and assistance in their country o reuge. They should halt allorced returns to Ira.

    unHcr reerrals

    UNHCR currently has the capacity to reer around 25,000 o the most vulnerable Irais in 2008 and couldreer more with better resources. As countries move to resettle more Irais, donor countries should ensurethat UNHCR has an adeuate budget so that it is not handed an ununded mandate.

    4.A high-level conerence o regional countries and interested donors, chaired bU.N. Secretar-General Ban Ki-moon, is needed to develop a coordinated plan torespond to what is likel to be a long-term, large-scale Irai reugee situation.

    HigH-level conerence

    We propose a high-level conerence chaired by the U.N. Secretary-General to examine the plight o Iraireugees and the impact on their hosts and the pledge to help both. Conerees could examine the crisisacing Irai reugees and the internally displaced, seek assistance or them and consider action that wouldacilitate the sae, voluntary return o many.

    compreHensive plan or THe regionA conerence and planning eort should include government ministers who can grapple with thediplomatic and political aspects o the crisis, and should build on the April 2007 conerence in Genevahosted by UNHCR and subseuent meetings.

    pinpoinTing needs

    The international community should determine with more precision the number o reugees, their needsand the economic burden they place on their hosts. Getting precise numbers has been very dicult,because these reugees are scattered throughout cities and are not concentrated in camps. Many reugeeshave been reluctant to register with UNHCR because they ear being arrested and even orced to returnto Ira. Aid should not be delayed while the crisis is assessed and answers or legitimate uestions aboutthe number o reugees are sought; there is consensus that there are large numbers o vulnerable people

    whose basic needs are not being met and increased aid is urgently needed. To help with the assessmentand speed the delivery o more aid, we encourage host countries to acilitate the registration o aidagencies.

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    ConCLusIonIn 1978, the IRCs board chairman, Leo Cherne, created the independent Citiens Commission onIndochinese Reugees and began a 10-year eort to call attention to and gain unding or the plight oreugees throughout Southeast Asia. At a time when the United States was struggling to move beyond the

    divisive war in Vietnam, the Citiens Commission on Indochinese Reugees successully infuenced publicthinking about reugees, which enabled the ormulation o humane policies toward reugees in the U.S.and in other resettlement countries. This eort resulted in the Reugees Act o 1980, which authoried theadmission o 50,000 Indochinese reugees to the United States per year.

    Thirty years later, with a dierent set o circumstances in a dierent region o the world, reugees remainneglected and in need. While we do not put our recent endeavors on par with that earlier eort, we wereinspired by their example to travel to the Middle East in order to investigate an urgent humanitarian crisis.

    As Americans, we eel our government and our citienry bear a special responsibility to Irais. As peoplewho are aliated with the International Rescue Committee, we are mindul that we must continue a75-year tradition o helping the persecuted, displaced and vulnerable. Now, having witnessed rsthandthe suering o the Irai reugees, we resolve ourselves to bring attention to their plight, make others

    aware, and do our utmost to help them.

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    appendICesIrai Reugees: Worlds Third Largest Reugee PopulationI.

    Steps to Increase U.S. Resettlement o Irai ReugeesII.

    U.S. Reugee Resettlement SstemIII.

    Summar o Kenned LegislationIV.

    Stories the Reugees Told UsV.

    Meetings Held b the IRC Commission on Irai ReugeesVI.

    Members o Commission and AcknowledgementsVII.

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    Appendix IIraqi Refugees: Worlds Third Largest Refugee Population

    Iraqi Refugees:

    World's 3rd Largest Refugee Population

    413,300453,300648,000693,300

    2,000,000

    3,036,400

    3,260,300

    Afghan Palestinian Iraqi (estimates) Burmese Sudanese Colombian Congolese

    Nationality of Refugees

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    Appendix IISteps to Increase U.S. Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees

    The U.S. government should increase signicantly the number o reugees to be resettled to the United

    States, by taking the ollowing steps:

    Adopt much more ambitious goals or the number o Irai reugees to be resettled in the United1.States. Through reugee resettlement and special immigrant visas, the president should commit to amajor eort to increase Irai admissions to at least 30,000 per year or the next our years.

    Ensure that the Department o Homeland Security has more nancial and personnel resources.2.Locate sta in Jordan and Syria instead o sending them or temporary duty, called circuit rides.DHS sta should maintain an ongoing, ull schedule o interviews in Syria and Jordan.

    Look to nongovernmental organiations and U.S. embassies or reerrals o Irai reugees, in3.addition to UNHCR.

    Fully and uickly implement the Irai reugee provisions in the Reugee Crisis in Ira Act o 2007,4.

    included in the National Deense Authoriation Act or scal year 2008. Expand admittance osome Irais by using the priority two, or P-2, category o reugees (reugees in a special group oconcern) and increase the number o special immigrant visas.12

    Resettle the ull range o categories o vulnerable Irais that UNHCR has identied, not just people5.who are associated with the United States.

    According the U.S. Department o State, new categories o Irais in Jordan and Egypt are eligible or resettlement consider-12ation under the United States Reugee Admissions Program. This program is separate rom the special immigrant visa (SIV)program. Irais in Jordan and Egypt who meet one o the criteria below may contact the U.S. Overseas Processing Entity(OPE) in Amman, Jordan or Cairo, Egypt operated by the International Organiation or Migration (IOM) and seek direct ac-cess to the USRAP without a reerral rom the United Nations High Commissioner or Reugees (UNHCR) or a U.S. embassy.The ollowing individuals (and their spouse and unmarried children under 21 years o age) may seek access through thisdirect program:

    Irais who work/worked on a ull-time basis as interpreters/translators or the U.S. government or multinational orces1(MNF-I) in Ira;

    Irais who were engaged as locally employed sta by the U.S. government in Ira;2

    Irais who are/were direct hire employees o an organiation or entity closely associated with the U.S. mission in Ira3that has received U.S. government unding through an ocial and documented contract, award, grant or cooperativeagreement;

    Irais who are/were employed in Ira by a U.S.-based media organiation or nongovernmental organiation;4

    Spouses, sons, daughters, parents and siblings o individuals described in the our categories above, or o an individu-5al eligible or a special immigrant visa as a result o his/her employment by or on behal o the U.S. government in Ira,(even i the individual is no longer alive), provided that the relationship is veried;

    Irais who are the spouses, sons, daughters, parents, brothers or sisters o a citien o the United States, or who are6the spouses or unmarried sons or daughters o a permanent resident alien o the United States, as established bytheir being or becoming beneciaries o approved amily-based I-130 Immigrant Visa Petitions.

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    Appendix IIIU.S. Refugee Resettlement System

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    Appendix IVSummary of Kennedy Legislation

    Summary of Key Provisions of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007

    (nil d arizi ac r ficl yr 2008)si J. 28, 2008

    SECTION 1241: REFUGEE CRISIS IN IRAq ACT OF 2007SECTION 1242: PROCESSING MECHANISMS

    Department o State (DOS) and Department o Homeland Security (DHS) shall establish or useexisting reugee processing mechanisms in Ira and countries in the region.

    In-country processing may be suspended or up to 90 days and may be extended i necessary.

    90 days ater enactment o the Act, a report must be issued describing processing mechanisms, useo video conerencing or in-country processing, and diplomatic eorts to improve mechanisms orissuance o exit permits or reugees and SIVs.

    SECTION 1243: U.S. REFUGEE PROGRAM PROCESSING PRIORITIESGeneral: Reugees o special humanitarian concern eligible or Priority 2 processing:

    Irais who were or are employed by the U.S. government in Ira.o

    Irais who were or are employed in Ira byo

    A media or nongovernmental organiation (NGO) headuartered in the U.S.

    An organiation or entity closely associated with the U.S. mission in Ira thatreceived ocial and documented unding.

    Spouses, children and parents whether accompanying or ollowing to join, and sons,odaughters and siblings o all o the above, and o persons described in Section 1244.

    Persecuted religious or minority communities (as designated by DOS) with close amily ino

    the U.S.

    DOS authoried to identiy other persecuted groups, including vulnerable populations.

    Ineligible organiations: organiations and entities listed in the Treasurys list o Specially

    Designated Nationals or any entity excluded by DHS ater consultation with the Secretary o Stateand the intelligence community.

    Persons who ualiy or P2 processing must satisy the reuirements o INA Section 207.

    Numerical limits will be determined by the President in consultation with heads o NGOs.

    Person who ualies as an immediate relative or is eligible or any other immigrant classicationmay apply or admission as a reugee.

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    SECTION 1244: SPECIAL IMMIGRANT STATUS FOR CERTAIN IRAqISGeneral: DOS in consultation with DHS may grant special immigrant status to persons who:

    Submit a special immigrant visa (SIV) petition.o

    Are otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa.o

    Are otherwise admissible to the U.S. or permanent residence.o

    Have cleared DHS background checks and appropriate screening.o

    qualied individuals must meet all o the ollowing criteria:

    A citien or national o Ira.o

    Was or is employed by the U.S. government in Ira on or ater March 20, 2003, or not lesso

    than one year.

    Provided aithul and valuable service which is documented in a positive recommendationoor evaluation by a supervisor accompanied by approval rom Chie o Mission or designee,

    who shall conduct a risk assessment and review o records.

    Has experienced or is experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a conseuence oo

    employment by the U.S. government.Includes spouse and/or children i accompanying or ollowing to join.

    Includes treatment o surviving spouse or childi a petition was approved or an accompanyingspouse or child and, due to death o the principal applicant, the petition was revoked or terminatedand such petition would have been approved i the principal applicant had survived.

    Numerical limits5,000 per year or the ve scal years beginning ater date o enactment o thisAct (FY2009-FY2013), remaining carry orward or FY2014.

    DOS shall make reasonable eorts to ensure those who are issued special immigrant visas areprovided with the appropriate series Irai passport necessary to enter the U.S.

    DOS shall consult with heads o other Federal agencies to provide individuals applying or special

    immigrant visas with protection or the immediate removal rom Ira i DOS determines they are inimminent danger.

    An individual who ualies as an immediate relative or is eligible or any other immigrantclassication may apply or admission as a special immigrant.

    Eligible or resettlement assistance, entitlement programs and other benets available to reugeesadmitted under INA Section 207.

    SECTION 1245: SENIOR COORDINATOR FOR IRAqI REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONSDOS shall designate in U.S. Embassy/Ira a Senior Coordinator or Irai Reugees and InternallyDisplaced Persons.

    Responsible or the oversight o processing or the resettlement o reugees o special humanitarianconcern, the special immigrant visa program and the development and implementation o otherpolicies and programs concerning Irai reugees and IDPs. May also reer persons to the U.S.reugee resettlement program.

    Additional Senior Coordinators in U.S. embassies in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

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    SECTION 1246: COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT POPULATIONS OF IRAqI REFUGEESWith respect to Ira, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon, DOS shall:

    Consult with government ocials o such countries and other countries and UNHCRoregarding resettlement o the most vulnerable members o the reugee population.Develop mechanisms in and provide assistance to countries with a signicant population oo

    Irai reugees to ensure the well-being and saety o such populations.

    SECTION 1247: MOTION TO REOPEN DENIAL OR TERMINATION OF ASYLUMAn Irai citien or national who applied or asylum and withholding o removal, and whose claimwas denied on or ater March 1, 2003, by an asylum ocer or an immigration judge solely or inpart on the basis o changed country conditions, may le a Motion to Reopen such claim not laterthan six months ater the date o the enactment o this act i s/he has remained in the U.S. sincethe date o such denial.

    SECTION 1248: REPORTSNot later than 120 days ater enactment, DHS shall submit a report to the Committee on the

    Judiciary (House), Committee on Foreign Aairs (House), Committee on the Judiciary (Senate), andCommittee on Foreign Relations (Senate) containing plans to expedite processing o Irai reugees.

    Not later than 120 days ater enactment, the President shall submit an unclassied report toCongress.

    Not later than 120 days ater enactment, DHS in conjunction with DOD, DOS and USAID shall reporton Irai citiens and nationals employed by the U.S. government or ederal contractors.

    SECTION 1249: AUTHORIzATION OF FUNDS

    Such sums as may be necessary.

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    Appendix VStories the Refugees Told Us

    reugees in amman, Jordan

    Seated around a table in UNHCRs oce in Amman, Jordan, Irai reugees told compelling stories. Mr. E.listened as other reugees talked, but when asked to share his story, he did. (No reugee wanted his or hername used out o ear o deportation, a ear palpable in virtually every meeting we had with reugees.)

    About 30, Mr. E. was fuent in English. Hed been well-educated in a not particularly religious amily. Heworked in Baghdad as a logistician or a nongovernmental organiation. Ater the bombing in Samarrao the Shiite mosue, the NGO was attacked. Three staers were killed and the rest threatened, so theorganiation closed its doors, leaving E. to work his way to Amman, where an uncle has a house hes beenstaying in.When asked why he doesnt return, he said, Why? Ill just be kidnapped and killed. I get death threatson my phone. He shares that he has a wie in Britain, but the Brits wont even let in their translators. Itdoesnt help that Im here in Jordan illegally. In this he has lots o companyprobably over 80 percent othe hal million Irais living in Jordan never had a visa or else hold one that has expired. The taxes andpenalties that are accruing or visa violations can be waived, but only i the reugees return home.

    Mr. E. has a sister in North America, but he cant get an interview with the Department o HomelandSecurity ocials who are screening ormer employees o the military and contractors. Hes not certain thatthe NGO will ualiy him, even though he has letters o recommendation rom his ormer boss (who let Irashortly ater things closed down). She sends him some money now and then, but the trauma o his riendsbeing killed at work, the ear o being targeted by the militias, the rustration o not being able to work,

    and his long-term uncertain uture weigh heavily on him. This bright, strong young man ended up in tears

    Mr. A. met us on a rainy steep-sloped street. We had been driven to see him by staers with CARE, animplementing partner with UNHCR in the eort to register Irai amilies so they can be considered orresettlement. Reugees oten hesitate to register, ear that it will lead to their deportation; it would emergethat Mr. A. had been convinced to start the process or the simple reason that his amily was running out omoney.

    Mr. A. led us down 40 or so steps to several cinderblock houses and fats clinging to the steep hill. Thiswas the old, poor part o town. As we entered his tiny fat, there emerged a young son, aged 19, ourdaughters ranging rom late teens to mid-twenties, a young grandson o three, and his wie, who wasdraped in black rom head to toe. The son was dressed in shorts that covered his knees and a short-

    sleeved shirt and baseball-style cap. He was bareoot on a cold, dreary day.

    There was much ado about who should sit on the three plastic chairs that surrounded a table. The son wasdispatched to borrow some other chairs as we sat down or the interview. The place was dreary and tiny.

    A broken cabinet was bursting with clothes and bags. Bulging suitcases were stacked in a six-oot-highpile in a corner, covered with splotches o threadbare cloth. A small gas heater, the only heat source inthe entire home, took the edge o the chilly day ater the door was closed. Tea appeared rom the kitchen,

    where the women had all repaired ater our arrival. Mr. A. lit the rst o many cigarettes and began torecount their story.

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    He had been a singer, he told us. He sang everywhere in the Middle East. He had sung even or KingHussein o Jordan, and he had traveled throughout Europe and North America. He was amous inBaghdad.

    Mr. A. revealed that he had three other sons, one o whom was working as a policeman in Baghdad in

    2004. He told us that his son had been accused o collaborating with the Americans (as many police were).At this point, his wie came into the room carrying a picture o their son in uniorm, as well as one o hisuniorm shirts with the epaulets in place. Tearully, they told the translator that their son had been brutallykilled by the militias. Even worse, i possible, was that they had not heard rom their other two sons,missing since 2005.

    Following the murder o their son, the amily packed up uickly and departed, leaving behind a beautiulhome which was soon taken over by a militia group, making it unlikely they will ever get it back or receivecompensation. They arrived in Amman with about $21,000. Like all asylum seekers, Mr. A is not permittedto work in the ormal economy. Anyway, he couldnt bring himsel to sing in bars and no one could payhim i he could. Now, our years ater he and his amily fed Ira, his money is running out (as it is or

    many, many Irais). The psychological straits o this amily were transparent, and they talked about itrankly. The wie cries all the time, and Mr. A takes medication to manage his depression and PTSD. Hisson has not been able to attend school since he was 15. (This is changing now, but there is still a greatdeal o ear associated with schools and dicult social dynamics with poor Jordanians who see Irais astaking their places).

    The last, terribly sad thing about this experience was learning just how isolated this amily elt. Theyare earul o their Jordanian neighbors (though reports o neighbors suealing on reugees are almostnonexistent, the ear is high). In addition, they are uncomortable with their Irai compatriots, not trustingthat they share the same aliations and/or experiences. Let in urban isolation, these amilies areshattered and roen out o opportunities to come to grips with their grie.

    Mrs. T. is a widow with a large amily. Her husband, a pathologist, was kidnapped, tortured and murdered.One o her daughters was tortured and sexually assaulted. The amily fed Baghdad or Amman withew possessions. Two years later, Mrs. T., her two daughters, their husbands and several grandchildrenare crowded into a small, rigid apartment in Amman. They survive on handouts rom aid agencies. Thechildren are in school, but Mrs. T. has not been able to access proper medical care and has gone blind romuntreated high blood pressure. No one in the amily is legally allowed to work.

    reugee amilies in damascus

    We visited the B. amily living in the Al Yarmouk neighborhood o Baghdada Palestinian reugee camp(really built up to be part o the city) still heavily populated by Palestinians. Many o the services, such asschools and clinics, are run by UNRWA. The Bs are a young couple with ve children ranging in age romabout 12 to 4. The eldest is a girl; all the rest, boys. They are living in a bare two-room apartment withtwo beat-up divans, thin mats on the foor, and a small television.

    The amily was targeted in Baghdad because they are Sunni and the ather worked or the Saddamregime, or the military. They lived in a mixed neighborhood, and their house was bombed by the nationalguard (we think he meant the Mahdi army). The second youngest son was wounded in the blastheproudly lited his shirt to show us a scar rom his abdomen to his breast-bone. The amily tried to stay

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    in Baghdad or a while, moving rom house to house, but eventually let or Syria in 2006. Some o theirneighbors were kidnapped and killed. A riends brother was kidnapped and tortured, and his disguredbody dumped back in the neighborhood. How can we go back and live there, ater what we have seen?he asked.

    All o the children except the youngest have health problems. The girl and one boy have congenital

    heart problems and the second youngest son still suers rom the trauma o his wound. Another son hasdiabetes and his medication is very expensive. (The ather tested the boys blood-sugar level while we

    were there; it was high despite the medication he had taken that morning.) The Syrian Arab Red CrescentSociety subsidies the cost o the medicine by 50 percent, but the amily still has trouble aording it.

    The ather works selling gum and cigarettes 11 to 12 hours a day (we visited on a Friday, which is theday o or most residents o Damascus) and earns an average o about $4.00. He had a regular job or two

    weeks, but the boss didnt pay him, so he uit.

    He said that they are pursued here by Irai agents, who are attempting to develop weapons-smugglingcharges against him. He was detained or 82 days and they attempted to get him deported to Ira. He

    appealed to stop the deportation.

    The children dont play out o doors. They have been beaten up by the neighborhood kids. In general, theather said, Palestinians and Syrians harass and insult Irais. Its too much, he said. We are honorablepeople, we have our dignity.

    The amily is registered with UNHCR, although many reugees dont trust the interviewers and translatorsat UNHCR, suspecting they are Irai agents. So they dont tell them everything. The amily hopes toresettle abroad so that they can get medical care or the children.

    Mrs. M. is a widow whose husband was a Sunni imam. He was kidnapped and tortured horribly, thenkilled and dumped on their doorstep. She has cancer which has metastasied, and she is not getting

    treatment. Her married daughter has come rom Baghdad to be with her.

    She has two sons, 15 and 18. They all live in two tiny, dilapidated rooms. The younger son has problemswith his eyes. The older one is disturbed, angry all the time, reuses to cooperate, and cant hold a job.Occasionally, he breaks things in the house in a rage. Nonetheless, his presence disualies the widowor the UNHCR-administered ATM-card income support. Any amily with an adult male is ineligible. (Askedabout this, UNHCR says it does make exceptions, but word had not reached this lady.) They survive onloans rom riends and neighbors (including the UNHCR outreach worker). Neighbors have given the amilyurniture or their two rooms.

    We next visited Sheik H, a religious leader, and his wie, daughter and three sons. The children werebetween eight and 14 years old. The eldest, a boy, had lost a leg below the knee during a gun battle at hisschool in 2004. He was using crutches and had no prosthesis.

    The sheik was a convert rom Shiism to Sunnism, and was thereore a target o violent attacks. Hismosue, where the amily also lived, was attacked 10 times. Finally it was bombed by the government(Shia orces). Six bombs were placed in the mosue (he had pictures o them). The minaret ell when theyexploded, but the amily had let or Syria by then.

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    The amily is living on savings now, but soon the money will run out. The sheik said, We will have to goback to Ira. What else can we do? They use the UNRWA clinic in the neighborhood, which gives them a30 percent discount.

    Our nal visit was to a 37-year-old woman with a two-year-old daughter. She had arrived in Damascusin November 2005 with her husband, who owned a publishing and distribution company in Baghdad. In

    November 2007, he went back to liuidate some assets to supplement their exhausted savings. She hasnot heard rom him since, or anything about him.

    She is oten insulted by young men in the neighborhood, and receives threatening messages under herdoor or on her mobile. The sheik and other Irai neighbors try to keep an eye on her, and help her. Sheis living in one room with a oyer and small kitchen. The rent is $160 a month, including electricity and

    water.

    Both her parents are dead. She has one brother still living in Baghdad, but he is mentally handicapped.She registered with UNHCR ater her husband disappeared, but she cannot prove she is a widow. This wasthree months ago, but she still hasnt received any assistance. We are lost here, she said

    WHy did THey leave?

    A young woman: My sister was killed last year by the militia. Then my uncle was killed because mymother worked at a munitions plant during the Saddam era.

    A young man: My brother was kidnapped, and then killed, because we couldnt raise enough ransom.Then I got a letter with a bullet saying I would be next. Finally, our bad guys orced their way into ourhome and beat everyone up. I let the next day.

    A ormer proessor and mother o a young child: My husband was a Baathist and then worked or

    the Americans in 2003. The Mahdi army targeted us basically because we were seen saying hi to anAmerican. My husband went to Baghdad to sell our property and was caught by the Mahdi army. That wasour years ago. I have never heard rom him since. The Canadians accepted me or resettlement, but theyreuire proo that my husband was in the Saddam army. I cant go back to Baghdad to get the papers romthe government, so Im stuck.

    A proessional soccer player: We played a game here in Jordan and I stayed behind. Id been targetedbecause our team had both Sunni and Shia players. The militia killed one o our teammates, so we werereally scared and became reugees. I was alsely accused o my teammates death. The other militantsgrabbed my brother and killed him in revenge. Now my amily blames me or my brothers death. I cant goanywhere. Single young men are being ignored.

    A middle aged woman: My husband was a journalist. The militants killed my son, and our house wasburned down.

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    Appendix VIMeetings Held by the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees

    J. 30, 2008Wht, d.c. / nw y, n.y.

    Andrew Harper, Geneva-based Senior Ira Operations Manager or UNHCR

    . 1, 2008nw y, n.y.

    Meeting o Commissioners at IRC headuarters to briefy review the major issues, go over trip logistics andollow-up, and meet with and listen to Fuad Kadim Jawad, Maysoon Jaber Khaaji and Reem Fuad Jawad, arecently resettled Irai amily now living in New Jersey.

    . 8, 2008Wht, d.c. bf

    Bureau o Population, Reugees and Migration (PRM): Sam Witten, Acting Assistant Secretary; AmbassadorJames Foley, Senior Coordinator on Irai Reugee Issues; Theresa Rusch, Director o Admissions; LawrenceBartlett, Deputy Director, Asia and Near East Assistance Oce; and Hilary Ingraham, Program Ocer, Asiaand Near East

    Bureau o Near East Aairs, State Department: Allison Mon, Syria Desk Ocer and Stephen Newhouse,Acting Director or Egypt and Levant Aairs

    Bureau o Near East Aairs, Department o Homeland Security: Barbara Strack, Chie, Reugee AairsDivision, U.S. Citienship & Immigration Services

    . 15, 2008nw y, n.y. / Wht, d.c.

    Sharon Waxman, Oce o Senator Edward Kennedy, and Perry Cammack, Oce o Senator Joseph Biden

    . 18-20, 2008a, J

    Meeting with U.N. Deputy Special Representative to Ira David Shearer

    Meeting with UNHCR Representative Imran Ria

    Visit to UNHCR Registration Center

    Meeting with Iras Ambassador to Jordan Saed Jasim Al Hayiani

    Home Visits with Irai reugees

    Note: A small group also visited the Overseas Processing Entity run by the International Organiation or Migration

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    Group Discussions with Irai reugees at CARE center

    Meeting with head o UNHCR Ira Marco Roggia

    Brieng with U.S. Ambassador David Hale and U.S. Embassy team

    Meeting with Minister o Social Development Hala Lattou

    . 21, 2008d, s

    Meeting with U.S. Charge dAaires Michael Corbin

    Meeting with President Bashar al-Assad

    Meeting with Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim

    Meeting with Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa

    Meeting with UNCHR Outreach Workers (all Irai reugee women)

    Meeting with UNHCR Representative Laurens Jolles

    Note: A small group also met with Syrian ocials rom the Ministries o Health, Education and Social Aairs.

    Note: A small group remained in Damascus or three additional days to meet with more Irai reugees in Syria, visit the UNHCRood distribution and registration centers, and meet with colleagues rom other organiations

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    Appendix VIIMembers of the Commission and Acknowledgments*

    mt awt, IRC Board Member, The Century Foundation; ormer Assistant Secretary o State and

    Ambassador to Turkey and Thailand

    s dt, IRC Board Member; Health Correspondent, The Newshour (PBS)

    kth nw, IRC Board Member; Co-Founder and Director, Migration Policy Institute

    d p, Founder and President, The Tides Foundation

    g r, pt, IRC; ormer President, Columbia University

    J k sth, IRC Board Member; ormer Ambassador to Ireland

    m Wht, Co-Chair o the IRC Overseers; ormer U.S. Representative to UNICEF

    Jh Whth, IRC Chair Emeritus; ormer Deputy Secretary o State

    J Wh, IRC Overseer; ormer President o the World Bank

    IRC SENIOR STA

    g b, Senior Vice President

    rt c,Vice President, Resettlement and Chairman, Reugee Council USA

    a rh,Vice President, Government Relations & Advocacy

    mh kh,Vice President (Acting), International Programs

    ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

    The commissioners would like to thank the ollowing IRC sta members who helped organie thetrip and provided expert advice and materials:Herve de Baillenx, Makenie Brookes, Amanya Michael Ebye, Chelsea Kinsman, Jana Mason, ShannonMeehan, Elissa Mittman, Nathaniel Hurd, Rama Shahin, Hasan Bahjat and Melissa Winkler.

    *Aliations given are not exhaustive. Listed are those most relevant to work o the International RescueCommittee and the IRC Commission on Irai Reugees.

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