Iraq NI Report 2008 Final En

Iraq

Learning Lessons from Northern Ireland

Paper for the

United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

Bronagh Hinds, Queen’s University Belfast

Quintin Oliver, Stratagem

July 2008

Iraq Learning Lessons from Northern Ireland July 2008

Queen’s University Belfast & Stratagem 1

Foreword

In March 2008 a delegation of Iraqi Parliamentarians, from Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee and Council of Representatives, travelled to Northern Ireland to study the peace process. The study tour, funded by the European Union through the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund (UNDG ITF), was supported by the Office of Constitutional Support of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (OCS -‐ UNAMI) and United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS); and arranged locally by Stratagem.

The Study Visit enabled the Iraqi delegation to engage in dialogue with political, civic and community leaders in Northern Ireland. Their focus was on: negotiating peace, implementing the peace agreements and their legislative requirements, establishing institutions to deliver power-‐sharing and underpin conflict resolution, and lead and facilitate reconciliation and peace-‐building processes generally. The delegation was able to explore the difficulties and well as successes and discuss the challenges that remain in a peace process that is still a ‘work in progress’.

This document has been prepared to consolidate and extend the learning from the Study Visit. It draws on notes of discussions during the study visit, short follow-‐up papers written by contributors to the programme, subsequent interviews with additional key figures, and materials gathered from organisations who have assisted and studied the Northern Ireland conflict and the peace process.

The authors are grateful to: Sir George Quigley (senior business leader), Sir Nigel Hamilton (Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service), Mr Chris Maccabe (senior Northern Ireland Office official), Dr Duncan Morrow (CEO of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council), Professor Adrian Guelke (Queen’s University), Professor Tony Gallagher (Queen’s University), Professor Tom Hadden (Queen’s University), Dr Peter Shirlow (Queen’s University), Professor Paul Arthur (University of Ulster), Dr Michael Hamilton (University of Ulster), Dr Cathy Gormley-‐Heenan (University of Ulster), Dr Neil Jarman and Dr Katy Radford (Institute for Conflict Research), Dr David Stevens (Corrymeela Community / Irish Council of Churches), Dr Debbie Donnelly and Ms Amanda Stewart (Northern Ireland Policing Board), Professor Monica McWilliams and Ms Ann Hope (Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission), Mr Aidan Fitzpatrick and Mr Ciaran Bradley (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland), Ms Frances McCandless and Mr Seamus McAleavey (Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action), Mr John O’Farrell (Irish Congress of Trade Unions), Mr Daire McGill (Study Visit Rapporteur). We also drew on the work of the Eames / Bradley Consultative Group on the Past.

Bronagh Hinds

Quintin Oliver



Contents

1. Northern Ireland Conflict

Introduction Context Key factors in the peace process Remaining challenges

2. Security and Public Order

Segregation Parades Policing principles Community policing

3. Equality, Human Rights and Reconciliation

Fair employment Flags and emblems Statutory equality duty Equality lessons Human rights Legacy of the past Educating the next generation

4. The Role of Civil Society

Civil society The business sector Trade unions NGOs Churches and faith-‐based organisations

5. Making and Implementing Agreements

Political leadership Political party perspectives Negotiating the Agreement Implementing aspects of the Agreement Differences and common ground between political parties Political compromises

6. Facilitating and Administering the Political Process

Track 2 diplomacy Securing a negotiating process Administrative leadership post-‐Agreement Supporting a departmental Minister Enabling the power-‐sharing Executive



1 Northern Ireland Conflict

1.1 Introduction An important prerequisite to ‘lesson-‐learning’ is to avoid deriving prescriptions of what to do from other societies facing very different problems and challenges. Imitation in peace processes can lead to borrowing mechanisms that are not necessarily appropriate in another setting and to the attitude that the formulas used in one society are panaceas for others, with inevitable problems and setbacks.

However, there is much to be learned from comparison – comparison played an important role in the Northern Ireland peace process – and the notion of ‘lessons to be learned’ permits the possibility of negative as well as positive lessons. There is mutual benefit in lesson sharing. If ideas on how to overcome conflict are exported to and imitated in other societies, it is easier to persuade people in Northern Ireland that they should look positively on what has been achieved. The same motive lay behind South Africa’s encouragement to Northern Ireland in the 1990s. It is for Iraq to recreate a society and devise the institutions that reflect its own ideals and values. Its great river valleys cradled the world’s first civilisation over 5,000 years ago and the initiation of writing, and Iraq gave the world its oldest story, the Epic of Gilgamesh. In the succeeding millennia it has been constantly sucked into the vortex of world politics.

There is deep understanding of the human tragedy and the challenges in building peace, stability and prosperity between those who have suffered conflict. Northern Ireland’s experiences of emerging from 800 years of conflict and uniting all people around a vision of a shared future is still a ‘work in progress’; but there is an agreed framework within which the future can be crafted by persuasive argument not by force of arms. Many in Northern Ireland are willing to be part of the network of friendship supporting Iraq to shape its own destiny.

Experience suggests that creating a non-‐violent context and establishing the framework for inclusive dialogue together provide a route out of conflict; specifically:

• Leadership for compromise and peace-‐building, aiming for an agenda for national reconciliation, is vital;

• Power-‐sharing can be a positive way forward, building partnerships to bind groups together rather than perpetuating divisions;

• Dialogue, built on patience, persistence and hope, is critical however long it takes;

• Understand the need to build trust and engage in confidence-‐building measures;

• Principles of equality, rights and justice are central;

• Inclusion and participation of all players, political and other groups (even those who disagree), must be won;

• Recognise and bind in civil society;

• Full sovereignty requires finding the right role for external stakeholders;



• Prosperity is built on ensuring control and fair distribution of resources;

• National unity means working for an agreed solution that reflects differing identities and aspirations;

• ‘Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ ties parties into dialogue and agreement.

1.2 Context At the heart of the Northern Ireland conflict was the persistence of a pattern of political, social, economic and personal relationships with their origins in the colonial politics and economics of the 1600s and 1700s. Ireland was eventually divided into a Northern part with a Protestant and Unionist majority and a southern part with a Catholic and Nationalist majority which became independent from Britain. Within Northern Ireland partition was violently contested from the outset and division between Protestant and Catholic, unionist and nationalist defined politics. Access to employment, housing and government was substantially less for Catholics than for Protestants.

Agitation for civil rights and counter protests in the 1960-‐70s descended into inter-‐communal violence followed by the arrival of British troops, internment, killing of civilians, abolition of the Northern Ireland government, emergency powers and the growth of paramilitaries on both sides. With mass flight of communities into ‘safe’ areas an established pattern of separated living was reinforced. Violence did not result in the total collapse of the system; and after the mid-‐1970s, 95% of deaths and injuries were among the urban poor, distinct rural areas and the security forces. The impact of the conflict led to: an increase in segregation between the two main communities, especially in social housing communities; the death of around 3,600 persons and physical injury to between 30-‐50,000 people (population 1.6m); a growth in post traumatic stress disorder in between a tenth and a fifth of the population; an economy overtly linked to the public sector; interface walls, and other boundaries such as roads and industrial zones, between the two main populations in cities and many principal towns; and an environment conditioned by violence and ethno-‐sectarian atavism. Throughout, most political parties in Northern Ireland appealed to one or other of the ethno-‐nationalist blocs for their votes, often on the basis of the ‘zero-‐sum game’ i.e. if their side wins, our side loses.

The underlying political challenge was the absence of a sufficient base for legitimate government. Both sides could claim that violence was a necessary evil, required to correct a prior injustice: action against an unjust state on one side and action in support of the elected government on the other. The result was a spiral where the state, whose claim to the monopoly of the use of legitimate force was challenged, resorted to emergency security laws which in turn undermined the state’s legitimacy and narrowed the distinction between force and violence on which the unique legitimacy of the state and the rule of law depends.

1.3 Key factors in the peace process Reaching political accommodation led to: endorsement and practice of power-‐sharing; political adversaries symbolically working together in a generally agreeable manner; a significant decline in state and paramilitary violence; demilitarisation and



decommissioning of IRA weaponry;1 embedding of robust anti-‐discrimination legislation; industrial development and growth of a service economy. This was the result of a ‘long peace process’ that emerged in the 1980s, with small steps and regular setbacks, flowing in a predominant direction around a series of critical landmarks: Anglo-‐Irish Agreement (1985); talks between the leaders of nationalism (Hume-‐Adams 1988-‐93); re-‐engagement of Unionists in political dialogue (Brook-‐Mayhew Talks 1991-‐92); Downing Street Declaration (1993); paramilitary ceasefires (1994); Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (1994-‐1996); Mitchell Principles (1996); Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998);2 election to an Assembly and intermittent devolution (1998-‐2007); Patten Report on policing reform (2000); St Andrews Agreement (2006); and re-‐establishment of devolution (2007).

Observers point to some key elements in the roadmap to peace in Northern Ireland:

Alternatives to violence: Purely security solutions to violent conflict cannot establish a basis for sustainable peace in a society where communities must ultimately live together and share the outcomes (as British policy came to recognise). The alternative was to remove inequalities, establish an open economy, promote intercommunity relations and insist on power-‐sharing.

International sponsorship: Where nationalism and claims to absolute sovereignty are the axis of the political dispute, international sponsorship can prove vital in stabilising peace. In this case, generation of a British-‐Irish alliance and the support of the EU and the USA created a political mass to isolate those unwilling to seek a shared outcome and provide confidence on fundamental issues of security and rights.

Inclusion: Full inclusion in democratic politics on the basis of commitment to pursing goals by exclusively peaceful means and an end to paramilitary and terrorist activity offers opportunity and incentive. The peace process was not advanced on the basis of defeating any party and previous combatants were not excluded.3

Stability: To have a real chance of being stable, a settlement must include all the key players to make sure that as many as possible have a stake in the new future. Efforts had to be made to re-‐integrate those who could not accept the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and inclusion of former combatants. The settlement that led to the formation of the administration in 2007 finally includes all.

Power-‐sharing: Specific mechanisms were needed to ensure access to government from across society, rather than protecting the principle of majority rule that entrenched permanent rule of one ‘distinct’ group over another.

Rule of Law: Examination of the instruments of law enforcement and a radical overhaul of policing were important. While not initially agreed by either unionists or republicans the Patten report established international consensus on policing reform which now commands widespread legitimacy.

1 The Irish Republican Army was the largest paramilitary group 2 In general nationalists/republicans refer to it as the Good Friday Agreement while unionists refer to it as the Belfast Agreement. The 2006 St Andrews Agreement supplemented it. 3 ‘Political’ prisoners were given early release (but not amnesty) from 1998-2000.



Consent, Human Rights and Equality: Principles that transcend nationalisms were required as the basis for political legitimacy. These were: no constitutional change without consent of all (in Northern Ireland) and Irish unity only by consent of all (North and South of Ireland). This is underpinned by overt commitment to human rights and equality of opportunity for all. Agreement over sovereignty was unlikely in the absence of any of these.

These are supplemented by a number of lessons about negotiation processes:

Dialogue: There is no alternative to resolving disputes. Northern Ireland’s process proved more protracted than it need have been because not all major political parties were prepared to sit together in the same room and talk directly to each other.

Improving understanding and relationships: The process of negotiations among representatives of different communities brings about greater comprehension of the positions and perspectives of others. While this does not mean necessarily any convergence in viewpoints, it helps to avoid conflicts over misperceptions of the other’s views. It also tends, however slowly, to lessen the influence of ‘bad faith’ interpretations of the intentions of adversaries, which is necessary if tensions are to be reduced to a level at which parties can have a business-‐like relationship.

External environment: The external environment, including help in the mediation process itself, matters. Peace processes involve taking risks. If politicians are to be persuaded to do so, they have to feel that the external environment is either helpful to the process or else that it leaves them with no other alternative. If the external environment offers one or other of the parties the opportunity to avoid the compromises that any peace process is likely to entail they are likely to take it.

Facilitation: External facilitation and mediation can be crucial. When dialogue ran into difficulties US Senator George Mitchell and the British and Irish Governments injected fresh ideas and momentum to help break the logjam.

Compromise: Parties must be prepared to compromise and accept that there is never a perfect outcome for any party. Northern Ireland was a conflict where parties’ objectives seemed mutually incompatible and none was going to capitulate to the other. Each has to be prepared to concede something to gain anything, otherwise the prospect is indefinite stalemate.

Sufficient Consensus: The principle of “sufficient consensus”, borrowed from South Africa, was adopted for negotiations in Northern Ireland; it meant making every effort to reach as wide a consensus as possible on the various elements of the settlement. The underlying notion of what was constituted “sufficient consensus” was that agreement on any substantive point required the support of a majority of unionist and a majority of nationalist representatives.4

4 Professor Adrian Guelke notes that this had practical political implications for the process since considerable effort had to be made to keep small Loyalist parties linked to violent organisations in the negotiations to satisfy the principle as some unionists (the DUP and UKUP) chose not to continue their participation after Sinn Féin entered the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement talks.



Mutual benefit: A settlement is not possible unless and until parties can see, or be persuaded, that their interests ultimately converge and there is a prize which all can share to mutual benefit.

Durability: A settlement requires a normative foundation or rationale to endure. It cannot simply be based on the existing balance of forces; always subject to change, any dispensation relying on balance of forces can rapidly destabilise. International norms and how other societies emerging from conflict have managed divisions and reached agreement are important. So Northern Ireland looked to the South African transition during its peace process as others are now looking to Northern Ireland.

Agreement takes time: Arriving at the point of implementing agreement can take a considerable period of time; for example, twelve and a half years from the IRA ceasefire in 1994 to direct agreement on power-‐sharing between the key protagonists (DUP and Sinn Fein). On the other hand, this reinforces that difficulties can be overcome in the end and there is light at the end of the tunnel.

Civil Society Engagement: Creating a new future is not just the responsibility of the politicians but of civil society as well. If the political process fails, it is civil society that pays the price in terms of quality of life and lost opportunity. Civil society has a crucial role in reminding the political process constantly to persist with dialogue, of the need for compromise and the prize of a better life which success will deliver.

1.4 Remaining challenges Reaching political agreement is a stage in a peace process. It is not the end, nor does it constitute the whole peace process; nevertheless, political leadership is important. In Northern Ireland several aspects of the settlement have not been implemented; there has been disagreement on what constitutes implementation; and other matters that are crucial to long-‐term peace and stability have not been sufficiently considered.

Leading a shared future: Sharing is easier to promote from outside where it can be conceived of as an intellectual exercise in diplomacy, than from within a polarised society which has gone through decades of violence. Politics of suspicion remain if both sides continue to promote the settlement as the ‘least worst’ option; this kind of leadership has consequences.

Gridlock potential: Absence of a shared vision among government parties can mean emphasis on process rather than outcomes as parties seek to promote their own interests and priorities. This increases the potential for mutual veto and gridlock with the political system’s requirement for balance continuing to outweigh trust and efficiency. Furthermore, with no available mechanism for the alternation of government great attention is needed to prevent clientelism and corruption.

Politics: The Northern Ireland political system devised to resolve inter-‐community antagonism and competition of nationalisms makes it difficult to develop a politics in which people change views on the basis of persuasion rather than on the basis of national identities. The unanswered question is whether the system of government in the peace agreement institutionalises division on a national/communal basis in



the longer term, or by establishing stability it creates the conditions to reduce division through pragmatic coalitions between people who were previously enemies.

Political parties: Historical focus on the constitutional issue has driven creative political talent in social and economic matters away from elected politics into civil society organisations, many of which have little link to representative politics.

Policing & Criminal Justice: Disagreement on effective policing and devolution of policing and criminal justice underlines the continuity of suspicion around the use and control of force and violence.

Paramilitarism: There has been no significant decommissioning of loyalist paramilitary weaponry. Paramilitary bodies often command a degree of community legitimacy and exercise community control. They are intertwined with community structures and activity, and changing this is a long and complex process.

Legacy of the past: Lack of agreement on the causes of the conflict and on how to handle the dilemmas of the legacy of the past creates uncertainty. It fuels allegations that democratic politics is unjust or immoral, seen by some as preferring integration of ‘the perpetrators’ in government over justice for victims. There is a sense in deprived communities, experiencing the most conflict, that the peace dividend has been limited.

Limited peace dividend: There is enduring poverty and social exclusion within communities that bore the brunt of conflict and a sense that while the conflict has been resolved at the elite level it remains difficult at ground level where the peace dividend has been limited. There is a growth in new forms of anti-‐social behaviour.

Uncertain peace: The concern within sections of the majority Protestant community that the peace process has favoured the Catholic community may heighten over future constitutional instability. Demographic shifts suggest the potential of a Catholic majority pursing unification with Ireland within 35 years.

Polarisation, segregation and inter-‐community relations: Northern Ireland remains divided by culture, education and residence, with no serious institutional reform outside politics and policing. Most people live in segregated communities and many are intolerant of the ‘other’ community. While political stability depends on support from across society, sectarian politics remain as parties depend on divided constituencies for their power. The absence of a dynamic to solve issues of ‘them and us’ continues to represent a serious threat.



2 Security and Public Order

2.1 Segregation

Despite the decline in violence, many people living in segregated communities still fear, or are intolerant of the ‘other’ community. Segregation has grown, evidenced by the building of new and strengthening of established interface walls. Non-‐violent conflict remains a dominant feature in Belfast and elsewhere because of the existence of ‘the territorial trap’; i.e. the way the principal communities are divided from each other by walls and other features. The disparate ideological boundaries are maintained by a determined lack of interaction across the interfaces. The majority of inhabitants within each segregated space aim to maximise their group’s status relative to those they are opposed to. Their identities are constructed within the boundaries of this space, drawing on introspection and historical memory. As the political process advances it is obvious that the most enduring problem is that of physical separation between the two principle communities.



2.2 Parades Processions, demonstrations, commemorations, feast days, and even funerals often provided the context for public disorder in Northern Ireland. Many towns and villages are viewed as either predominantly Protestant or predominantly Catholic, and particular sites such as war memorials or churches often take on special significance as ethnic markers. The symbolism associated with many parades is perceived by some as deeply offensive, and residents in several areas through which parades pass have organised opposition to specific parades that they consider to be threatening and intimidating.

The most intractable parade disputes are a microcosm of the broader conflict, representing contestation over territoriality and the expression of religious, political and ethnic identities. A number of parade disputes escalated in the mid-‐1990s. At that time, the power to impose restrictions on parades was vested in the police. Furthermore, the statutory criteria gave primacy to the potential for disorder, which meant that the police were often seen to yield to the greatest threat; the law was widely criticised for providing an incentive for those who threatened disorder.

Following a review of the law governing public assembly, new legislation5 introduced three major changes:

• The establishment of a Parades Commission, an independent seven member civic body broadly representative of all affected constituencies, to whom the legal powers to impose conditions on parades were transferred from the police.6

• The extension of the statutory criteria to shift the focus away from potential disorder to concentrate to a greater degree on the impact a parade might have on community relationships and the human rights of others.

• A statutory duty on the Parades Commission to facilitate mediation, to emphasize the importance of local dialogue in avoiding legal adjudication by bringing about early and mutually satisfactory resolution of disputes.

Many lessons can be drawn:

Negotiated management: The policing of public protest is a significant determinant of police-‐community relations. In Northern Ireland’s transition, the policing of parades shifted from an ‘escalated force’ model to one of ‘negotiated management’.

Trained civic actors: Civic actors can play an important role in stewarding, monitoring and mediating contentious disputes. The development of such roles, however, requires investment in the provision of appropriate training programmes.

Local agreement: Local agreement, possibly reached with the assistance of a neutral third party mediator, is the best way of ensuring a sustainable resolution, and avoiding an imposed legal decision (which should always be regarded as a last resort).

5 Public Processions (NI) Act 1998 6 See further http://www.paradescommission.org/



Independent body: The transfer of adjudicatory powers on parades from the police to a representative civic body helped new policing structures take root by shielding the new police service from these charged political decisions. Importantly, developments in the management of parade disputes were inextricably linked with the broader police reform process that resulted from the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.7

Interpreting human rights standards: International and regional human rights standards lay down objective parameters for the adjudicator, which all parties can support. However, within these parameters, there is much room for negotiation about how the various interests at stake might best be mutually respected. It is important to try to develop background consensus about how international human rights standards should be interpreted in light of local circumstances. In this regard, the recent Strategic Review of Parading in Northern Ireland made further recommendations.8

2.3 Policing principles An effective and broadly accepted police organisation is an important element of any modern society and a crucial ingredient in any successful political transition. The police are often the most visible aspect of a repressive state, and are one state agency that citizens engage with, confront, suffer from and see operating on a daily basis. In societies in conflict the police are often identified as an instrument of state policy, and of supporting and sustaining an unpopular government, rather than protecting the rule of law and the rights of the people. In a process of social and political change, or in establishing a new political regime, reform of the police can be a key indicator of that change; and the new ethos of policing can be an indicator of the aspirations of the new government in its relations with wider society.

Police reform has been vital to peace-‐building and political transition in recent processes of conflict transformation, for example in South Africa, Bosnia, Kosovo and Northern Ireland, highlighting:

Legitimacy: Reform of the police is in part about establishing the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of wider society; it also serves as an indicator of intent to the international community. It needs to be done publicly and visibly, and be based on principles of transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness. The reform process will benefit from international support, guidance and advice; the process should include the participation of representatives of international policing organisations.

Internal Support: Police reform needs to secure the active support of senior figures within the existing policing structures who are often well placed to identify areas in most need of change and potential blockages to change, and have ideas on how to change and restructure their organisation effectively. International policing organisations can help by working with existing police structures to implement

7 Specifically, recommendations of the Independent Commission on Policing: Policing in Northern Ireland – A New Beginning. (The Patten Report) http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf 8 See the Interim Consultative Report of the Strategic Review of Parading http://www.srpb.org.uk



reform. Securing police support should not obscure the need to address past issues of corruption, human rights abuse or police impunity.

Representativeness: The new policing body should aspire to be broadly representative of ethnic, racial and religious diversity within the state and should also aim to increase the gender balance within the organisation.

Human Rights: Any policing organisation should be based on international human rights principles and standards that should underpin all elements of policing practice. All aspects of training should be human rights proofed.

Accountability: The new policing organisation should be open, transparent and accountable to the political structures and also to wider civil society. There should be an independent body responsible for overseeing strategy and policy, which should include a range of political and independent figures. There should be an independent Ombudsman responsible for investigating complaints against police officers.

Service Orientation: The new police organisation should be orientated to providing a service to the people, rather than being an agent of force for the state. It should be operationally independent of the state, while remaining accountable to wider society.

Partnership Working: It is recognised that providing safety and security extends beyond the capacity of the state police body, which therefore needs to be willing and able to work in partnership with a range of other bodies including: the wider criminal justice sector, other bodies and organisations responsible for safety and security, human rights groups, NGOs and the business community. (See DPPs below).

Demilitarisation: The police should not be a military-‐like body (although it may need to bear arms). This should be reflected in appearance (uniform, clothing, emblems), equipment, vehicles, command structures and training; and the need for individual officers to be able to operate with discretion and a degree of independence.

Use of Force: In theory the state exercises control over the legitimate use of force in the area under its jurisdiction and the police are the principal body authorised to use force in society. This responsibility should be exercised with extreme discretion, be subject to the principles set down in international human rights standards, and be accountable to independent oversight and review. Abuse of the right to use force will serve to undermine the legitimacy of any police organisation.

2.4 Community policing Background: The Independent Commission on Policing (Patten Commission 2000), following the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, recommended that policing should be decentralised and there should be local dialogue between the police and community. In response, District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) were established in 2003. There are 26 DPPs, one for each council district; Belfast has four subgroups. A DPP is a partnership between the local council and the community comprising



councillors nominated by the council and independent members drawn from the local community and appointed by the Northern Ireland Policing Board.9

Roles and Responsibilities: To meet their statutory duties DPPs: (i) consult with the public to find out their concerns on policing and crime in the district; (ii) identify local policing priorities from the consultation and recommend these to the District Commander for inclusion in the Local Policing Plan; (iii) monitor police performance against the objectives in the Local Policing Plan and the Northern Ireland Policing Plan as it relates to the district; (iv) engage with the community to gain their co-‐operation with the police in preventing crime; and (v) act as a general forum for discussion and consultation on policing the district.

Community consultation & engagement: Patten set in place policing accountability structures that were unique at that time, particularly in the establishment of DPPs with connection to the local community. Most important are local communities meetings at which DPP members listen, offer reassurance and agree to take action on concerns about policing. Since 2003, DPPs have held over 700 public meetings giving local people the opportunity to ask questions of the police service across Northern Ireland’s villages, towns and cities.10 Through consulting a wide range of interest groups, particularly those disaffected from policing, to hear at first hand their specific concerns, DPPs have created a better understanding of what the community wants from its local police service. DPPs commissioned four Public Consultation Surveys, the largest ever undertaken on policing in Northern Ireland. Local communities are at the heart of local policing and have a voice in shaping policing priorities.

Influence & impact: DPP success is evidenced through influence on policing priorities at local and Northern Ireland level. By identifying local policing priorities and formulating local solutions to local problems, the plans have helped make Northern Ireland one of the safest places to live in the United Kingdom. DPPs have contributed to increased confidence in policing; and by working on crime prevention in partnership with the police they helped to reduce crime over the last five years .11

Shaping good practice: DPPs are viewed, nationally and internationally, as a model of good practice on community involvement and oversight of policing. They have been showcased, hosting visitors from across the world. The model is helping shape the development of similar partnerships in England and Wales and Ireland.

9 The number of local councils will be reduced to 11 by 2011, so there may be fewer DPPs in the future. The Police (NI) Act 2000, as amended by the Police (NI) Act 2003, sets out the general functions of DPPs. The DPP Order 2005 made changes to the legal framework, primarily to temporarily extend the lifespan of existing DPPs beyond the local government elections and enable DPP independent members to assume the role of Vice Chair. The St Andrews Agreement Act 2006 provides authority for reconstitution of DPPs outside the trigger of the local government election. 10 During 2007/08, 4,476 members of the public attended DPP public meetings. 11 In the April 2008 Omnibus survey 83% reported confidence in policing compared with 75% in April 2003, representing an increase of eight points since DPPs were established in 2003. There has been a 15% reduction in recorded crime in the last five years.



3 Equality, Human Rights and Reconciliation

3.1 Fair employment Discrimination in employment and allocation of housing were major sources of community division; thus, equality and human rights are central to the resolution of the conflict. Despite a UK anti-‐discrimination context,12 legislation introduced by the British Government in 1976 making discrimination in employment unlawful and setting up a Fair Employment Agency in Northern Ireland nevertheless met with resistance. The initial legislation was criticised for a number of reasons: an Agency acting as judge and jury; the Agency’s lack of authority to approach firms for information; appeal of Agency decisions to County Court judges who were not specialists in equality law; and weak enforcement powers.

Following report by the Northern Ireland Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights strengthened legislation was introduced in 1989. The changes led to: a system of complaints to equality law specialists in special industrial courts called Industrial Tribunals; workplace monitoring to ensure proactive attention to addressing under-‐representation; a newly constituted Fair Employment Commission (to replace the Agency) to ‘police’ monitoring; and, importantly, this Commission could apply affirmative action measures. Strategies included:

Workplace Leaders: Between 1976 and 1989 high profile employers were identified and challenged to lead change in perceptions: Shorts aircraft factory, Harland and Wolff shipyard, Queen’s University, banks, insurance companies, car sales companies and other large industrial employers.

Employers: From 1989 a proactive ‘carrot and stick’ approach was used to ensure employers applied the legislation. The soft approach provided encouragement and assistance. The tough approach pursued cases through Industrial Tribunals.

Industrial Tribunals: The Commission’s approach was reinforced in early decisions by Industrial Tribunals making significant awards to employees against employers found to be discriminating.13

Formal Investigations: Formal investigations were carried out into employment practices in different sectors of industry and commerce.

Direction: Employers could be required to take positive action measures. The Powers of Direction were used just twice; simply having them provided sufficient influence.

Monitoring: Monitoring and measuring progress is essential. Unless the problem is logged and recorded than people chose not to acknowledge it. Employers had to make annual monitoring returns on workforce composition.

Publicity: Employee complainants were protected through confidentiality but the Commission published findings of investigations, regular reports on monitoring results and successes in Industrial Tribunals. Adverse adjudication and publicity were

12 The UK Government also introduced Sex Discrimination legislation around the same time 13 Awards of £25k-‐£25k were large awards in the early 1990s



regarded as so damaging by employers that they worked with the Commission and gradually their outlook and approach changed to a more positive view of equality.

3.2 Flags and emblems Flags and emblems are used to mark out territory in the community, and they used to be used in various workplaces at certain times of the year. They signalled that some did not want ‘the other side’ in their place of work; and ‘the other side’ did not want to go into such a workplace. The concept of a ‘chill factor’ emerged to describe their impact on equal access to employment. Even if there was no direct intention to discriminate, the workplace was not friendly to the ‘other’ community.

And so the Fair Employment legislation began to tackle the matter of unionist/British flags, emblems and parades in and around the workplace as a function of employment and a case of indirect discrimination; high profile employers were pursued to eradicate the practice as part of their equal opportunity employment obligations.

The matter of flags and emblems in wider society has not been properly addressed. As divisions grew nationalist/Irish flags and emblems joined unionist/British expressions. The flying of the (British) Union Flag on local government and other public buildings is a contentious issue. A Flags Order regulates public displays on government buildings now with no significant contention over flying the British flag for 17 days a year only. Local councils are still looking for specific direction and this may be included in forthcoming regulations on local government reform. Local councils and community associations have an important role to play in the removal of offensive murals that mark out territory and are ‘owned’ by one side or the other. Effective policing of flags and emblems is necessary and public agencies must enforce the law rigorously.

3.3 Statutory equality duty The Fair Employment Commission was integrated into a single equality authority called the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland in 1999 along with a number of other equality bodies (on gender, race and disability). In total, the single Equality Commission was given responsibility for nine equality areas and additional powers to monitor and oversee implementation of a statutory equality duty placed on public authorities.

All public authorities in Northern Ireland (and some in Britain with functions in Northern Ireland) must mainstream equality into their policies. They do this through equality planning and equality proofing; each has to design a five-‐year equality scheme, assess existing and new policies and report annually on progress.

From the earlier fair employment experience it was anticipated that placing responsibility for the equality mechanism on the public authorities themselves would create its own momentum. Consultation with NGOs at the core of the duty is important but engagement capacity must be built with targeted NGOs.

There is evidence of small changes in public policy and there have been a number of Equality Commission investigations and judicial reviews. Strategic impact, enforcement and sanctions remain matters of concern.



3.4 Equality lessons Agreed mechanisms: Clearly agreed mechanisms through employers and through public agencies representing the State are required. On contentious issues employers prefer specific direction on what they can and cannot do rather than issuing a general direction (e.g. to provide a harmonious working environment) and leaving it up to them to decide how to achieve it.

Transparency and clarity: Effective work on equality is long-‐term, painstaking and disputed. It is important to gather facts and have the evidence publicised.

Engagement and leadership: Passing the change dynamic to the employer or public agency is effective. Having to log and engages employers and their staff in having to examine their position and focus on the issues and consequences. Workplaces in Northern Ireland are generally free of tensions now.

Transferability: Successful powers pioneered in one area can be applied to others e.g. from fair employment to statutory equality duties or flags and emblems.

Formalise new approaches: A structured, and effective, approach to recruitment and promotion became the norm based on good policies supported by job descriptions, personal specifications, criteria, short-‐listing and interview notes. Restricting access to employment through family following family into particular workplaces has gone.

Long-‐term gains: Employers’ initial resistance to regulation of hiring practices has been replaced by support for equality: (i) the rigorous employment process enables them to hire the best person for the job; (ii) they have legislative protection to remove flags and emblems that were a source of disruption to trade. Employers being able to say ‘it is not us; it is the law’ has been helpful. There is recognition of the need for equality laws, even in matters affecting freedom of action and expression.

Equality implementation units: The public sector model of implementing and mainstreaming equality through core units: (i) an Equality Unit was established within government’s personnel function from the 1970s to implement fair employment in the civil service; (ii) the Local Government Staff Commission was set up to support compliance in local government; (iii) a Staff Commission on education also worked closely with equality authorities.

Contextual changes: Models of company ownership changed, some became part of internationally owned companies with international investment, which made progress easier. The move to a common education curriculum enabled Catholics as well as Protestants to get into technical jobs and engineering.

Integrated Equality: Pioneering a new equality approach covering nine equality grounds has been challenging, especially where there are different laws for different grounds. A Single Equality Bill (being prepared) would harmonise legislation and bring positive action, mainstreaming and anti-‐discrimination approaches together. This elevates the concept of ‘fairness’, promotes a positive approach in advance of, as opposed to regulation and litigation after, a problem emerging.



3.5 Human rights In time of war and violent conflict the concept of citizenship often becomes problematic and human rights are most likely to be abused. In a civil conflict the notion of a common citizenship may be refused and rights denied to the ‘other’ side. But, recognition of the rights and dignity of some obliges them to consider the viewpoints and aspirations of others. A major aspect of conflict resolution, bringing all sides together, implies rebuilding a common citizenship built on common rights.

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was created by the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and established by the UK Parliament in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the main legislation implementing the Agreement. The Commission’s professional staff of 22 serves one full-‐time and nine part-‐time Commissioners, appointed after a competitive selection process intended to secure pluralist representation of Northern Ireland society. Funded through the UK Government’s Northern Ireland Office, the Commission, while subject to the normal accountability and financial controls of any public body, is independent in terms of its policy.

The Commission is recognized by the UN and the Council of Europe as a member of the international ‘family’ of around 70 national human rights institutions (NHRIs), although with special status on account of its sub-‐national jurisdiction. Its design and operation comply with the Paris Principles, the UN standards for independent NHRIs. It engages with international human rights systems, in particular the United Nations and the Council of Europe systems, and contributes to the periodic reporting systems for particular treaties. The Commission’s work, based on internationally accepted human rights standards and drawing on the body of international human rights treaty law and ‘soft law’ standards, seeks to improve the protection, promotion and fulfilment of all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

The Commission has powers of investigation and litigation. Its main activities are: (i) reviewing compliance of law and practice with the UK Human Rights Act 1998; (ii) monitoring compliance within Northern Ireland of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international human rights instruments and engaging with and reporting to treaty bodies; (iii) receiving complaints (around 1,000 a year) from individuals, providing legal advice, mediating and assisting or bringing matters to court; (iv) investigating and making recommendation on systemic problems in such areas as prisons and health; (v) monitoring, advising on and providing human rights education and training in the school curriculum and with others such as the police; (vi) advising regional and national government and public bodies on the compatibility of rights with legislation and policy; (vii) developing proposals for a constitutional-‐level Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland; (viii) liaising with its sister body in the Republic of Ireland, the Irish Human Rights Commission, with which it is developing a non-‐binding Charter of Rights for the Island of Ireland; (ix) co-‐operating with other human rights and equality agencies at regional and national level, and with national institutions in other countries.

Bill of Rights: Of the international standards, the only one enforceable in Northern Ireland courts is the European Convention on Human Rights. The Commission has the legal duty to advise the UK government on the scope for a constitutional-‐level Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, to include rights not protected by the European



Convention taking into account the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland. The Commission will submit its advice to government in December 2008. It will take account of a number of consultations and deliberations including that of a Bill of Rights Forum, established by government in December 2006 and comprising representatives from local political parties and civil society, which reported in 2008.

The Commission intends that the Bill will look forward, building on advances already made in equality, policing and political administration; and also be guided by the past, understanding that tailoring the Bill to Northern Ireland’s needs means establishing which rights were abused, neglected or restricted and need protection in the future.

Dealing with the past: The Commission has undertaken work on the investigation of deaths, in the context of over 3,500 conflict-‐related deaths. It believes that any ‘truth process’ must be based on widespread consultation in order to command the greatest possible public confidence. It has concerns around the adequacy and independence of the inquiry system set up to investigate cases where state collusion in killings has been alleged. The Commission meets with victims and representative groups and has a victims’ working group; produced a victims’ report; and facilitated discussions on disclosure with the police, public records office and information commissioner.

Counter terrorism: The Commission is convinced of the need to protect human rights in the context of combating terrorism. It wants to see rapid normalisation of security and policing arrangements in Northern Ireland, including proper oversight of intelligence operations. It opposes ‘extraordinary rendition’.

Conflict intervention: As a body created by the peace process, the Commission encourages dialogue and a human rights-‐based approach as the way forward in resolving community tensions. In partnership with the Community Relations Council and the Institute for Conflict Research it undertakes to provide training in human rights standards within the framework for conflict resolution.

3.6 Legacy of the past

In their Interim Statement in May 2008 the Consultative Group on the Past14 outlined their views and matters that will receive further attention in their final report; while some comments seem obvious they are nevertheless controversial. They keep in mind the goal of building a shared future, and they suggest that ‘a space should be created for those who wish to tell their story’.

Victims and survivors: Victims and survivors come from all parts of the community, their hurt caused by Republicans, Loyalists and the State yet their grief was the same. Health and welfare needs are not being met and become more acute with age.

Definition and hierarchy of victims: ‘The politicisation of victims appears to be perpetuating the pain rather than healing it’; furthermore, in some cases victims and

14 Co-‐chaired by Sir Robin Eames and Mr Denis Bradley. The views expressed come from the Interim Statement in May 2008 of The Consultative Group on the Past.



survivors themselves are using their pain to continue division, and people need to be helped to deal with their trauma in a way that can create a better future.

Appreciation of the ‘other’: The Group wonders if Republicans appreciate the depth of hurt that exists in the Unionist community and suggests that more needs to be done to convince people that they will never again take up arms. They acknowledge that ‘the re-‐emergence of the IRA did not just happen, the conditions had to be there for this to take place’ along with the ‘primal sectarian violence by Loyalist paramilitaries who mostly targeted Catholics simply because of their religion’. They ask loyalists to fulfil their statement of abject and true remorse by decommissioning their weapons.

State’s role: Society cannot ignore that the State sometimes acted illegally with elements acting outside the law on occasions; and it could be said innocent people were allowed to die through handling of intelligence. Unionists find it hard to come to terms with the fact that the State played a combative role and sometimes went beyond their own rules of engagement. ‘The State itself needs to acknowledge its full and complex role in the last 40 years’.

Informers: ‘The use of informers … corroded the fabric of our communities and the constant pressure now for extended information about informers to be revealed only serves to further undermine the well-‐being of communities to a degree that could be poisonous.’

Truth and Justice: ‘Truth and justice’ are among major challenges and while they are not mutually exclusive they are not always attainable. Many people want prosecutions even if those prosecuted serve just two years under the early release scheme. Securing justice is less likely with each passing day and there must be honesty about what any court or inquiry can deliver. The public needs to understand the limitations in securing convictions and, if this is reality, people must be told this to prevent false hopes. The Group’s approach to ‘truth’ will focus on a solution to the problem noting that there are ‘ways of seeking truth that do not include long drawn out judicial processes.’ The British and Irish Governments can share information that will allow victims in the South of Ireland to get as much truth as possible. The Irish Government will be encouraged to acknowledge the hurt and suspicion that remain within some Unionist communities. ‘Truth’ will form an important part of the report and recommendations.

Political Leadership: Dealing with the past was the biggest omission from political agreements and Members of the Assembly must give a lead and be held to account. Political will to banish sectarianism as the most poisonous legacy of the past is required. ‘Our local politicians have a choice – they continue to act in this antagonistic way and use the past for selfish political aims and allow themselves to be guided only by the hurt on either side. Or they can become statesmanlike round this most difficult issue.’

Civic Society: The Group is critical of the lack of engagement in their work by significant sectors of civic society; many appear indifferent and some declined to submit ideas. This runs counter to the contribution civic society made to bringing about the conditions for peace and ensuring that the essential fabric of society was kept going during the darkest days. Civic society faces the ongoing legacy of the past



at a policy level and in the daily practical outworking of their responsibilities as prolonged violence and political stalemate point to a deeper malaise for which every institution and sector in society must share responsibility. Church leadership is vital on sectarianism. The Group’s report will address the wider societal context.

Reconciliation: The Group stresses the need to nurture generosity in relationships and to address the legacy of the past so as to promote the goal of reconciliation which remains an illusive and contested concept: ‘we must recover a positive and dynamic understanding of what reconciliation means, and will look like’; ‘for some of us this will mean being reconciled to the fact that our future is together, that we do share the land and its resources and a common sense of belonging to this place. For all of us it will mean bringing a new measure of common purpose reflected in greater cohesion, sharing and integration in our communities. We have no choice – there is no better future that is not a shared future and there is no shared future without reconciliation.’ ‘Acknowledgement of wrong doing – saying sorry – and the giving and receiving of forgiveness are not signs of weakness but of great strength and courage. The deepest and most profound legacy of our past is our antagonism and division.’ The report will set a benchmark to judge effectiveness in reaching a measure of reconciliation in this generation to ensure the legacy is not passed to ‘the victims who are not yet born’.

3.7 Educating the next generation For historical reasons schools in Northern Ireland are divided on the basis of religion. A sector of schooling is owned by the Catholic Church, with most staff and pupils Catholic. The ‘state’ system of schools is run by local education boards with most of the staff and pupils Protestant. Since 1981 a third sector of religiously integrated schools has developed to cater for pupils from all denominational backgrounds, with currently about 6 per cent of pupils attending. Few schools operate a religious test for pupil admissions, so most religious separation is voluntary. There is a small sector of schools in which all instruction is provided through the Irish language. All of these schools are funded from the public purse, with most receiving 100% support for running and capital costs. There are, in addition, a small number of Independent Christian schools which do not seek public funds in order to maintain a curriculum which is distinctively influenced by the Bible.

This diverse pattern of ownership of schools, and its link to the wider religious, political and national differences in our society, is illustrative of a dilemma for education in any society with socially significant ethnic divisions. Traditionally the role of education has been to promote social cohesion and a sense of unity. In practice, however, this often leads to assimilation pressures in which the identities of minority communities are relegated (sometimes by default, sometimes as a matter of state policy). A contrasting view, sometimes labelled as multiculturalism, recognizes the right of minority communities to run their own schools in order to preserve identity and culture.

The problem with this is that it may encourage the development of a ‘silo’ society and discourage any discourse of a common good. Achieving the balance between the commonality and cohesion, and equality and recognition of minorities on the other hand, remains the dilemma for education in divided societies.



When political violence broke out in the 1960s many commentators felt that separate schools must have had some influence on community division. In the ensuing discussion three distinctive positions emerged. Some argued that pupils in separate schools were introduced to culturally distinctive worlds due to the use of different textbooks and curriculums that helped to reinforce a sense of difference between the two main communities. In this view the problem could be corrected by the development of new curriculum programmes and common textbooks.

A second view was that the ‘hidden curriculum’ of schools also played an important role in reinforcing a sense of difference between pupils. This could be manifested through the symbols and rituals that were privileged within difference schools, or the implicit value attached to different practices. In this view, change at the level of the curriculum was insufficient and something more was needed to break down the institutional barriers between pupils.

A third view suggested that the problem in Northern Ireland was linked to a relationship of domination/oppression between the majority (Protestant) community and minority (Catholic) community. In this view the problem was less to do with ignorance or misunderstanding, and more to do with inequality and injustice, further implying that the issue of separate schools was largely irrelevant to understanding or tackling community division; in fact, separate Catholic schools were important to the Catholic community as they provided the main public space in which identity could be expressed and an important source of jobs (as teachers).

Evidence was available to support all three claims and there was no consensus on which offered the most ‘accurate’ diagnosis of the situation. In the absence of consensus educationalists engaged in a range of interventions.

The earliest form of intervention was at the level of the curriculum. Initially this focused on the development of new history programmes and textbooks, followed by a programme for religious education and a community relations initiative termed Education for Mutual Understanding. The programmes for the teaching of religious education were innovative to the extent that they were developed as a joint activity by the four main Christian Churches. However, the provision of multiple options in the programme limited the extent to which it provided a genuine basis for cross-‐community understanding. In addition, the programme has been criticized for an over-‐emphasis on Christianity and a lack of material on other faith traditions.

There have been a number of iterations of the history curriculum over the years; the most recent version offers an approach to the history of the conflict in Northern Ireland which seeks to help pupils understand such themes as:

• The way that historical narratives unfold over time.

• That actions or events have consequences.

• Many aspects of the past are unproblematic and indicative of a shared or agreed understanding.

• There are aspects of the past which are contested, either in terms of their significance for the historical narrative or the interpretation of their impact. For these the approach taken is to encourage young people to look for evidence that helps them to understand why such divergent interpretations



might exist. More generally the history curriculum encourages the search for evidence when issues are unclear or contested. This approach is different from many other contexts where parallel narratives are offered – the view here is that there is much history held in common and this should be acknowledged.

The other significant curriculum development in recent years has been a programme of citizenship education. This is interesting in a context like Northern Ireland where there is no consensus on the basis for citizenship: is one British, Irish, European or what? In most jurisdictions citizenship education focuses on the institutions and processes that are held as common to a national community, but Northern Ireland is characterized by conflict over these. For this reason the citizenship programme focuses less on the substance and more on the processes of citizenship. The goal is to provide young people with the language and concepts which will allow them to contribute, as active citizens, to the construction of a new society.

For this reason the citizenship curriculum is organized around four themes:

• Democracy and participation

• Equality

• Rights and responsibilities

• Diversity

In addition, teachers are encouraged to develop examples and content to illustrate these themes at three levels: for Northern Ireland, for Britain and Ireland, and for Europe and beyond.

The second main area of intervention involved contact programmes which brought young Protestants and Catholics together in shared activities. Initially this involved shared holiday programmes, but later developed into school-‐based initiatives. However, despite international evidence on the efficacy of contact work, the programmes in Northern Ireland provided to be very limited, non-‐development, and marginal to the core business of schools.

All available evidence suggests that, apart from a few exceptional examples, most of the contact work had little impact. Partly in response to this, the most recent initiative in this area seeks to develop collaborative networks of Protestant, Catholic and Integrated schools which focus on shared classes in high status curriculum areas and then builds work focused on reconciliation on top of this. This work is still at an early stage of development.15

The third main area of intervention is the development of new Integrated schools for pupils from all denominational backgrounds. The first opened in 1981 due to action by committed and pioneering parents and over the next decade another dozen schools opened. The government formally committed to support the sector in 1989

15 See www.schoolsworkingtogether.co.uk



from when the rate of growth increased. There are about 65 Integrated schools with about 6 per cent of pupil enrolment.16

However, the continuing rate of growth is insufficient to impact the overall system. Thus, partly for this reason, the new initiative on promoting cross-‐sectoral school collaboration described above was advanced with the aim of creating a more integrated system.

16 This represents an impressive demonstration of parent power – an almost unique example of an entirely new sector of schools developed through parental commitment.



4 The Role of Civil Society

4.1 Civil society Many from business, trade unions, NGOs and Churches believed they had to play an active role in finding solutions to the conflict and issues that could undermine the peace process. Sometimes a dual approach was taken with behind the scenes discussion accompanied by mobilisation of public campaigns. Civil society leaders exerted pressure for peace, an end to violence and political stability for economic and social progress; e.g. a public campaign under the banner ‘Time’s Running Out’ encouraged political parties to implement the Agreement. They understood that the marginalised and alienated underclass must be enrolled as stakeholders.

In the new post-‐agreement era it is still important for all elements of civil society to continue to work in close partnership together and with politicians. Politics is then assisted and supported to take its proper place, not as an end in itself or as a means of expressing the identity of particular groups, but as a means to the achievement of a society, all of whose citizens are able to develop their full potential.

Politics is the necessary medium within which questions of power must be worked out. However, a healthy society is one where politics invigorates but does not monopolise life. The more vibrant civil society is, the more likely it is that such a healthy situation will be achieved. For example, civil society leaders established The One Small Step Campaign to encourage individuals to take personal responsibility one step at a time.

4.2 The business sector Opposing aspirations of Protestants/Unionists and Catholics/Nationalists had created not only deep division within Northern Ireland but also gave rise to bad relations between the two parts of the island. Business felt that, whatever the significance of the Border in political terms, it should be irrelevant in economic terms in the era of globalisation and European Union. Business felt that everyone could benefit by improving relations and exploiting the potential for economic and business co-‐operation between the two parts of the island. Business organisations throughout the island gave a determined lead and made more progress than anyone thought possible 20 years ago. Trade has doubled and a single energy market has been developed for the whole island in order to capture economies of scale and improve competitiveness.

Business pioneered the process of creating friendlier relationships between both parts of the island which in turn contributed to the improvement of relationships within Northern Ireland. Business encouraged political parties to persist with the discussions which ultimately led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998 and to deal constructively with the difficulties which emerged after the Agreement.

In order to focus efforts as sharply as possible, the leading business and trade union bodies acted together as the Group of Eight. The Group formed in the mid 1990s, at a time when street violence and disorder erupted again over parades, with loss of life, millions of pounds worth of damage to property, and severe disruption of everyday life all over Northern Ireland. Alarmed at the apparent drift back to the



community breakdown of the worst days of the 1970s, the Group became engaged in trying to persuade those involved in the most difficult parades dispute to settle their differences peacefully. The vacuum caused by the failure of the political parties to create viable political institutions had to be filled.

Efforts were devoted during the next five years to urge society to stop looking back, to disengage from the past and to focus on grasping the prize of a better future. A series of public statements from the Group in the press and on TV and radio argued that, in a highly competitive world, Northern Ireland could never succeed unless priority was given to the development of the economy to improve the standard of living and quality of life for the entire community. The community was urged to support the political parties as they struggled to reconcile their differences.

The Group met the political parties frequently both publicly and privately but did not lecture or criticise them for not moving on more quickly, knowing how difficult their task was. When the political process stalled, business encouraged the parties to keep going and gave strong public support when there were signs of progress. Business remained scrupulously impartial; its sole commitment was to a process which had to produce a political settlement for peace and stability. Everything that could be done to throw weight behind the process was done; individual businesses supplemented the collective Group of Eight with distinctive contributions.

In the period immediately preceding the setting up of the Northern Ireland Executive in May 2007 the new Business Alliance encouraged political parties to focus on a better future and agree the formation of a local administration that could get the economy on to a new trajectory and enhance opportunities for everyone. Parties responded well and spent months sitting round the same table debating the economy, taking evidence from a wide range of interests, and producing a series of reports to the British Government on what needed to be done. All this was going on, on an inter-‐party basis, before political agreement was reached. Their recognition of the importance of economic priorities had grown enormously over the previous 12 years.

A peace process needs to be fully inclusive; leaving people on the outside is a recipe for disaffection and future disaster. Means have to be found to integrate those who have been actively involved in the conflict into normal day to day life and enable them to make their contribution to building the future. About 30,000 people were found guilty by the courts of conflict-‐related offences (including murder) and served prison sentences. When that number is added to immediate and extended families, quite a high proportion of the population of 1.7 million people is more or less directly affected by the kind of future these ex-‐prisoners are to have.

Sir George Quigley chaired a group of representatives of ex-‐prisoners from both sides of the conflict, identifying the obstacles to their integration into normal society – into employment, for example; and negotiated with the Government for the establishment of a Task Force (on which the ex-‐prisoners were well represented) to devise solutions.

The main paramilitary organisation on the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican side got rid of its weapons under the supervision of the International Decommissioning body set up for the purpose. Paramilitary organisations on the Protestant/Unionist/



Loyalist side have not yet done so. Some of their members are engaged in criminal activity like drug dealing and extortion and are responsible for incidents of nasty low-‐level violence. There are housing estates where paramilitaries take upon themselves the responsibility for policing. This unsatisfactory situation is one indicator that peace-‐building and the achievement of a normal society in Northern Ireland is still a “work in progress”. Other paramilitaries are working to end this situation assisted by an Advisory Group, comprising business and professional people and religious and community leaders, led by Sir George Quigley.

Because of the focus on the prize which peace and stable political institutions can bring, there is a real sense of purpose and expectation. There is a chance, for the first time in 40 years, to: concentrate efforts on creating a world-‐class economy and a world-‐class society; attract more investment from overseas; develop a larger private sector base; become a region with an impressive export performance; create higher paid jobs; raise the standard of living and the quality of life; tackle the problems of disadvantage and poverty; streamline the public sector where necessary; and create a sustainable and balanced economy.

4.3 Trade unions The trade union movement in the North and South of Ireland is organised by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU); it has a Northern Ireland Committee.17 It has a history of working for peace, social justice and against violence and sectarianism during conflict in Northern Ireland. Union leaders were prominent figures in the civil rights movement in the late 1960s.

Throughout the civil disturbances, terrorist attacks and sectarian assassinations of the 1970s and 1980s unions played a crucial role as one of the elements that prevented slippage into outright civil war. Workplaces were largely free from sectarian strife even in the worst of these years. Union leaders and activists worked to keep workplaces open during politically-‐motivated work stoppages, to prevent intimidation of workers by paramilitaries and to minimise the effect of polarising flags and emblems. In 1974 when loyalists (unionists) brought the economy to a standstill with the Ulster Workers Strike, union leaders bravely but unsuccessfully led a return-‐to-‐work march to the most symbolic Protestant workplace in Northern Ireland, the Harland and Wolff shipyard.

This was one of a number of trade union-‐led initiatives for peace and social stability that included: the ‘A Better Life for All’ campaign; demonstrations after a massacre of Protestant workers in 1976; a Peace Train from Dublin to Belfast; support for the cross-‐community organisation Women Together; and two projects focused on anti-‐sectarianism in the workplace ‘Counteract’ and ‘Trademark’. In autumn 1993, a leading trade unionist headed a protest march by shipyard workers to defuse a very dangerous situation following an IRA bombing in the heartland of loyalism. The Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions brought together

17 The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) is the umbrella organisation for trade unions on the island of Ireland, striving to achieve economic development, social cohesion and justice by upholding the values of solidarity, fairness and equality. Northern Ireland Committee (NIC) of the ICTU represents 36 trade unions with 250,948 members across Northern Ireland www.ictuni.org



10,000 people in a peace demonstration in the centre of Belfast. ICTU collaborated with the business sector in working to focus politician’s attention on agreeing a peace settlement that would set the basis for stability and economic and social development.

4.4 NGOs18 Northern Ireland’s NGOs are generally referred to as the voluntary and community sector; with community organisations being smaller, locally based groups. There are 5,000 in a population of 1.75 million. Around 600 identify themselves as having a peace building or cross-‐community role as a primary function.19 NICVA, the representative body for NGOs,20 established aims and values to guide the work of the sector in a divided society. These committed to opposing violence and discrimination of any kind; equality, diversity and social justice; independent non-‐partisan action; and an active anti-‐sectarian approach.

The sector is a microcosm of society with diverse views across the full range of unionist, nationalist, republican, loyalist and ‘centre ground’ parties. Many able individuals opted out of mainstream politics and into voluntary and community organisations. The Opsahl Report in 1993 noted “because of the nature of Northern Irish politics and the democratic deficit in which they are played out, some of the brightest talents have chosen to put their energies into the voluntary sector rather than into formal politics. This further underlines the importance of the voluntary sector and its potential contribution to the search for a settlement and the process of reconstruction that would need to follow it.”21

The role of civil society and community-‐based organisations in a divided and conflict-‐ridden society must be more than simply not exacerbating existing tensions. A fundamental difference is the imperative to contribute to building peace and stability. These organisations are the main routes for the ground work that enables many people to put the building blocks for peace in place and emerge from conflict prepared for change, skilled and willing to work with others to rebuild society. Some are the bridges between divided communities, acting to sustain fragile relations and rebuild fractured relationships. Others challenge prejudices within the communities that they serve.

Organisations in Northern Ireland talk about ‘single identity’ work; that is working within one community; and cross-‐community work, that is working with the ‘other’ community. Another way of describing this is ‘Bonding & Bridging’; that is, building bonds within one’s own community and building bridges with the ‘other’ community. The bond-‐building needs to be undertaken in such as way as to enable relations with the ‘other’; for example, working to reduce rather than reinforce

18 Also NGOs, non-‐governmental organisations known as: voluntary and community organisations in Northern Ireland; CSOs, civil society organisations, and CBOs, community based organisations in Iraq. 19 The voluntary and community sector accounts for 4.5% of GDP, employs c 30,000 and its annual income in the year 2000 was £657 million. Most organisations are small with 60% having an income of less than £100,000; over half of the income of the sector is accounted for by 7% of the organisations. 20 NICVA (the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action) is the representative body for voluntary and community groups in Northern Ireland. See www.nicva.org 21 A. Pollak, A Citizen’s Inquiry: The Opsahl Report on Northern Ireland. Lilliput Press Dublin 1993.



prejudices that develop within segregated communities. Single identity work carries the danger of consolidating an identity in isolation from and in competition with surrounding communities and on its own does little to contribute to the understanding of others.22 While crude ‘contact work’ (simply putting people in a room together in the hope that this will encourage them to get along) might do little to increase understanding or to examine the issues that divide, single identity work will not contribute to bridging divisions unless it is part of a process with some sort of cross-‐community work as its eventual goal.

Northern Ireland has a Community Relations Council to build relations across the sectarian divide. It was first established in the 1970s and then abolished when the first power-‐sharing (between opposing communities) government was agreed -‐ the government thought the problem of relations between divided communities was solved because some political parties were working together. Of course this was not the case and the Council was reinstated. It commissions research, develops initiatives and funds local groups and other organisations to build enduring good relations and greater integration between communities. The Peace People, the Corrymeela Community, Protestant and Catholic Encounter, Co-‐operation Ireland, the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation and many other groups promote encounter and work for reconciliation between the two communities.

Those who suffer most from conflict usually live in more disadvantaged areas; this is true on both sides on the conflict. It is important that opposing sides in these areas have equal capacity to represent their communities and engage with each other. Poverty and discrimination had prompted Catholics to develop an infrastructure of community organisations. Similar community leadership skills had to be nurtured within Protestant areas before cross-‐community networking, partnerships and building shared endeavour between opposing communities was possible. Some involved had a background in paramilitary organisations including former life-‐sentence prisoners who influenced on the Protestant/loyalist ceasefires in 1994.23

Cooperation across the divide was cultivated through building common cause and action which in turn built confidence and increased trust. Women found it easier to collaborate than men did; during the height of the conflict Women’s Centres from both sides worked together on advocacy campaigns for funding to sustain services for women. The Ulster People’s College’s brought diverse groups together to work on a shared community leadership programme. Through contact and shared experience people developed and understood the concerns of the ‘other side’, and reached across the divide to offer advice and models of successful practice. Many

22Community Cohesion: a Report of the Independent Review Team Chaired by Ted Cantle, Home Office, London, 2001 notes: “Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges.” 23 Loyalist leader Gusty Spence launched the Community Development in Protestant Areas report; chaired the press conference that announced the UVF, Red Hand Commando and UDA ceasefires; and went on to oversee his political party’s negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement – the PUP (Progressive Unionist Party) associated with the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force).



‘politically active’ people had their horizons widened through discussion of issues of disadvantage and powerlessness common to their communities.

Interfaces are the points at which divided communities meet. They are places of fear with significant inter-‐communal strife and random assassinations. The most widely recognised interfaces are the physical barriers of 'peace-‐walls' along ‘peace-‐lines’, the brick walls and steel fences that divide one community from another; one even runs through a public park and roads also serve as interface ‘markers'.24 Interaction Belfast, formerly Springfield Intercommunity Development Project, runs joint activities to reduce violence along sectarian interfaces or peacelines. It organised a mobile phone network so that responsible community leaders on either side could keep in touch during periods of heightened tension so as to avert violence wherever possible. NGOs have mediated behind the scenes; the Mediation Network assisted in a range of conflicted situations, most notably parades.

It is not always easy for people to meet people from the ‘other’ community in a deeply segregated society. To overcome this problem non-‐partisan organisations provided ‘neutral venues’ or ‘safe spaces’ that were free from physical danger where difficult dialogues could take place. These peace-‐building organisations built their reputations on equal respect, accessibility and provision for all and this allows them to undertake significant work. Some were able to encourage politicians to take part in private dialogues well before it was publicly possible to talk together. The People’s College brought community leaders together in difficult times such as ceasefire breakdowns to share concerns and transfer messages from one side of the community to the other.

Other organisations facilitate dialogue within ‘single identity’ communities and in cross-‐community forums on contentious subjects such as identity, history, culture, tradition and equality. Community Dialogue’s short leaflets provided information about opposing positions on controversial issues in the Agreement inviting people to ask themselves three questions: what do I want? what do need? what can I live with? and then to ask themselves the same questions from the point of view of the ‘other’ community. The leaflets reproduced in the main daily newspapers circulated widely and formed the basis of discussion in local communities.

The Opsahl Commission was an exceptional project. An independent commission set up by a small group of academics and community activists, it fired imaginations about what was possible and encouraged creative thinking. It engaged everyone, not just politicians, in giving ideas for the future of Northern Ireland whether on constitutional or political matters, security, religion, education or any other issue. The Commission sat for a year, receiving written and verbal submissions from political parties, civic and church leaders, community groups, women’s groups, young people and others. Its highly inclusive process held public hearings across the North and South of Ireland and in Britain. It published its own recommendations and all submissions unless confidentiality was requested. It introduced the term ‘parity of esteem’ to signal equal respect for the aspirations of both sides of the community. In the year that followed the Commission, work was undertaken by the founding group

24 Neil Jarman & Chris O'Halloran, Peacelines or Battlefields, Community Development Centre, Belfast 2000 para 13



to animate the Commission’s report and proposals across civil society and with the British and Irish Governments who described the work as being of ‘great and lasting value’.

4.5 Churches and faith-‐based organisations Throughout the conflict religious bodies were often seen as divisive forces that played as much part in polarising communities as providing support and comfort to their own membership. On the other hand, some faith-‐based organisations undertook encounter, outreach, and social action activities. Religion plays a profoundly ambiguous role in conflict situations. On the one hand, it can encourage hatred. Churches can reinforce community division and harden boundaries.

Religion can give divine sanction to nationalisms, political positions and violence. Churches tend to reflect people’s fears, community divisions and community experience of violence and threat – they can also amplify fears – rather than act as agents of change or transformers or conflict. Protestant Churches in Northern Ireland often talk about law and order, reflecting a community under siege, and the Catholic Church often talks about justice, reflecting a community feeling of victimisation.

On the other hand, religion can be a force for restraint – the preaching and living out of non-‐retaliation, forbearance and forgiveness has had real social consequences. Churches in Northern Ireland opposed those who espoused violence. Working together they helped lessen the religious/ political symbiosis.

The developing pattern of church leaders and others meeting together has been a significant public witness. Churches have been encouragers of politicians seeking political compromise. Individuals and groups have worked for peace and reconciliation. Faith groups established contact and dialogue with paramilitary organisations; clergy and others acted as go-‐betweens linking them to the peace process, helping to broker ceasefires and witnessing to decommissioning.

The Irish Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church together ran a peace education programme in schools. In the period up to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, churches encouraged politicians to keep talking and were generally supportive of the agreement without telling people how to vote. Following the agreement Protestant Churches got involved in the Loyalist Commission and the Catholic Church in policing.

A major challenge facing churches is leadership in sharing the future. Issues around shared worship and matters of church unity remain stumbling blocks for many church members. The simple practice of building neighbourliness and friendship is essential in a society that has too few friendships across religious, political and social divides. Peace-‐building means putting good relations and healing a broken society at the heart of ministry.

Churches are present in every community in Northern Ireland and they have a story of moral reflection, social care, forgiveness and reconciliation that should be in a position to contribute significantly to human flourishing. Many church-‐grounded bodies have the resources to connect with the most marginalised, reinvesting their



surpluses through social economy businesses, charities, cooperative and mutual societies, community development initiatives and philanthropic donation.

Faith-‐based initiatives can offer significant bonding, bridging and investment social capital and may be one element of a strategy for community cohesion and development to tackle social exclusion and economic and physical regeneration in neighbourhoods and society-‐wide. A number of facets are required to develop and assess the impact of faith-‐based organisations:

• A clear definition and understanding of the distinction between inter-‐faith and inter-‐cultural practices to map the extent of inter-‐faith work and the financial and resource contribution made by volunteers.

• Open debate about the complexities of religious identity and how this impacts on the use of shared space, urban planning, service delivery, educational curricula, public ceremony, etc.

• A governance infrastructure that respects principles of equality and diversity whether working in a faith-‐dominant or secularised environment.

• A needs assessment of potential partners in inter-‐faith practice.

• Capacity-‐building to build expertise in research, consultation and policy development engagement with communities and government.



5 Making and Implementing Agreements

5.1 Political leadership25 Peace and conflict literature tends to accord opposite labels of leadership to explain behaviours, assumes an onus on leadership to find a way out of conflict and points up the need for actor transformation and/or changes of leadership. ‘Under-‐appreciating the importance of elite decisions and actions hinders conflict management efforts and fails to place blame where blame is due.’26 As elsewhere, there are different leadership propulsions and styles among politicians in Northern Ireland: collective versus individual leadership; the phenomenon of political prisoner as political leader; reluctant leadership; soft-‐skilled leadership; and elastic band leadership.

Critics have commented on the lack of political skills and intellectual capacity, or made pejorative or sanitised assessments of the personalities involved. ‘During peace negotiations the primary function of leaders is to deliver their own people. Assisting their opponents in the process is secondary’. On the other hand it ‘requires leaders to put the long term interests of their nation in achieving a durable settlement before the short term gains that could be achieved by prolonging the conflict’. These contradictions – delivering peace and maintaining party unity – required different role priories with different effects but both are equally important.

Various narratives emphasize leaders’ capacity to influence the process that derives from influence of office, of events and/or of personality. A peace process and its relationships are schizophrenic: public interactions are choreographed; there are contradictions in attitudes and actions of leaders towards initiatives; participation in initiatives is inconsistent; behaviour at home and abroad is contradictory.

Overall, political leadership has suffered from confused roles, undermined capacity and negated effects arising from: moral and ethical dimensions; borrowing lessons from other leaders; over-‐personalisation of the peace process; and the nature of relationship-‐building in an adversarial process. Four contradictions illustrate the nature of leadership limitation:

• Doing the right thing versus securing the best possible deal;

• Needing influential political leaders versus wanting to work with politicians without ‘dirty hands’;

• Focusing on small cohort of leaders versus broadening the range of political elites who could help broker deal;

• Building relationships among players versus the adversarial nature of multi-‐party negotiations.

The multiple contradictions and inconsistencies inherent within peace process leadership is best described as ‘chameleonic leadership’: an inconstant form of political leadership which shifts according to the opinion of others and the climate in

25 Gormley-‐Heenan, C. (2007) Political Leadership and the Northern Ireland Peace Process, Basingstoke: Palgrave-‐Macmillan. 26 Brown 2001 quoted by Cathy Gormley-‐Heenan



which it exists, just as a chameleon changes colour to blend with its background (and light, temperature and mood).

While political leaders anywhere must display skills of deftness, reaction and flexibility, this approach is more acceptable in a ‘normal society’ than in a divided society because of the normative assumptions about how things ‘should’ be as opposed to how they are in ‘reality’. The dichotomies of heroes and villain, positive and negative leaders, ignore the difficulties in assigning villainy in transitional societies. The concept of chameleonic leadership does not.

5.2 Political party perspectives The views expressed below are those of political parties, gathered in discussions individually and in a cross-‐party forum.27 They cover the negotiation process, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and St Andrews Agreement, implementation of aspects of the Agreement, differences and common ground between parties and compromises made. People withdrew from political parties through fear or disillusionment, thus membership of parties is low. Among those who do participate, there is a high level of activity. Turnout at elections has declined slightly recently to 60-‐62% from 68-‐70%.

5.3 Negotiating the Agreement UUP: The UUP was the longest established party of government and is now the second largest unionist party. In European terms it is a party of the centre-‐right. It played a significant role in negotiations, facing a difficult year in 2001 because of the risks it took and suffering splits and electoral setbacks since then. However, these are not as important as having made a contribution to a peaceful and stable future. The UUP is happy to co-‐operate with the Republic of Ireland, but believes it is better to be in the UK as Northern Ireland differs socially and culturally from the rest of Ireland.

Sinn Fein: Sinn Fein is the largest nationalist party. An independent political party; the IRA is not its military wing although it has similar aims. When the British Government realised it could not deal with the situation as a security problem Sinn Fein entered negotiations with its political mandate. The IRA ended its armed struggle in July 2006 to assist the peace process when opponents tried to collapse the peace process and they are unlikely to return to violence. Sinn Fein’s political work to end British interference and bring about Irish unity will continue. Steps towards Irish unity have been taken that include: an all-‐Ireland dimension and institutions; the right to aspire to Irish unity; and acceptance of the economic argument for unification. The North-‐South Ministerial Council will make good

27 The parties were represented in discussions by: UUP: Danny Kennedy MLA, Deputy Leader & Brian Crowe Senior Policy Advisor who joined the UUP in 2000. Sinn Fein: Raymond McCartney MLA, IRA prisoner who took part in the first hunger strike & Martina Anderson MLA former IRA prisoner, member of the Northern Ireland Policing Board. SDLP: Mark Durkin MLA Leader, Minister for Finance in the first Assembly and then Deputy First Minister & Dr Sean Farren former Finance Minister 1999-‐2002 and MLA until 2007. DUP: Simon Hamilton MLA & Cllr. Christopher Stalford joined the DUP in 1998 and youngest councillor in Northern Ireland when elected. Alliance: Gerry Lynch General Secretary and Special Advisor to the Leader. PUP: Dawn Purvis MLA, Leader



decisions for the north and south of Ireland without British representation and people will realise they can have more participation and a better life in a United Ireland when they see UK programmes and policies focusing on England, Scotland and Wales and not Northern Ireland. Unionist business people are beginning to understand that Ireland is best organised as single entity in the EU. The all-‐Ireland Charter of Human Rights has yet to be implemented.

SDLP: The SDLP was the largest and is now the second nationalist party. It was influential in shaping the form and substantial elements of the Agreement, many of which had been SDLP policy throughout the conflict. Negotiations involving more political parties proved to be more productive and successful than those with less but problems arose in implementation. No methods were detailed in the Agreement for dealing with crisis and thus the institutions suffered from continual suspensions. Parties who ratify agreements have different perspectives on what has been agreed and it is wise to be precise on certain matters, particularly crises, to prevent small things ballooning out of control. The Agreement allows for review and an Assembly review is underway. Once an agreement is endorsed efforts should focus on implementing the agreed deal. Parties should not be allowed to lobby separately instead of sharing responsibility for the agreement reached and all succeeding processes should be contained within the agreed institutions. Instead another negotiating process, outside the institutions and involving the British and Irish governments and very few political parties, undermined the institutions and processes for some time.

The process has become more stable now because all major parties accept the principles and outstanding issues are being resolved within the institutions. The British and Irish governments should have pursued implementation of the institutions and decommissioning in 1998/99. Decommissioning was a requirement, not a precondition, for establishment of institutions, which the governments did not make clear to Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionist Party. Their approach was ambiguous and the lesson from their failure at that time is the imperative of demonstrating authority and determination to apply the rules. Moreover, the Agreement is not simply an arrangement between governments; it was legitimated by the people of the North and South, in a process of self-‐determination for the whole island of Ireland. While parts of the Agreement were difficult to accept, the broad package offered political stability and was overwhelming endorsed. Some opposed it at the time, but the Agreement is widely accepted now; some claiming they are able to support it because of changes made by the St Andrews Agreement but this is a small supplement to the main Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

DUP: The DUP has 36 MLAs, is the largest party in the Assembly and holds more ministries than other parties. Committed to union with Great Britain it supports delegation of powers to Northern Ireland from Westminster. It was difficult for the DUP to reach a political accommodation in both the party and the community, mainly because of killings by terrorists linked to Sinn Fein. While the DUP and Sinn Fein are very different from each other they are working together for social and economic gains. The next generation deserves better than the past so the parties must work together for a better country for all. The DUP was able to persuade its voters because: people saw political accommodation as inevitable; they were



concerned that Sinn Fein was going to be biggest party; to counter this development unionists voted for a strong party that would stand up to Sinn Fein; the DUP is pragmatic enough to work as a strong counterforce.

Alliance: The Alliance Party attracts voters from both communities; its General Secretary is Catholic and the Leader is Protestant. The majority in Alliance want to remain in the UK, the minority want a United Ireland. Supporters are mainly well-‐educated, skilled professionals and it has the largest share of the ethnic minority vote. It has faced electoral difficulties since 2000, but began to recover in 2007; with around 5% of the vote and seven MLAs, including the only ethnic minority MLA, its traditional support base is 8-‐10%. It is a liberal party that wants Northern Ireland to be a value-‐based democracy, around human rights and responsibilities, rather than an identity-‐based society. Political identity is often quite blurred with a complex interplay between British, Irish and Northern Irish, so it is not identity but shared values that are important regardless of sovereignty.

Alliance is the only significant party outside government to play an important role. The Assembly committee system was meant to introduce the accountability usually provided by the official opposition; however, parties control their members on those committees to make sure do not criticise the government that is also comprised of their members. Not bound by the collective responsibility of government Alliance is able to hold government to account. The party’s opposition role is obligatory currently. The number and order of Executive ministries is determined by a formula (D’Hondt) and Alliance did not cross the threshold for participation. It expects to cross the threshold in 2011; however, if it is entitled to just one ministry it may choose not to go into government as it may be able to do more in opposition than as small party inside constrained by larger parties. It is about finding the right level and space for the Alliance contribution. Northern Ireland cannot function without consensus, but too much consensus brings political stagnation and ordinary people become disaffected. Alliance seeks to present an alternative vision and policies.

PUP: The PUP was started in 1974 by former political prisoners who believed in sharing responsibility for the future. Linked to the loyalist paramilitary organisation the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), it focuses on deprived areas with child poverty, educational under-‐achievement, health inequalities and higher unemployment. Many party members are community activists, former prisoners and former combatants who helped to build the peace process on the ground. The Agreement was inclusive of all groups and minorities, including those considered to be at the extremes.

The PUP supports a Northern Ireland parliament with North-‐South cooperation, reform of policing and justice systems, and human rights and equality including a Bill of Rights. It advocated talking to republican (nationalist) ‘enemies’ believing that having dehumanised each other to hatred and utter contempt during the conflict the various groups need to re-‐humanise and talk without compromising principles and beliefs; the DUP and UUP did not agree.

The PUP believes grassroots activists were ahead of politicians on conflict transformation – the peace process brought enemies together while the political process brought leaders together. The enforced coalition model brings four parties



together to share responsibility to overcome a history of division, although two-‐party coalition would have been possible had the DUP and Sinn Fein got more votes. With four parties in government there is no effective opposition, but this may emerge in future if parties agree to pursue voluntary coalitions following the review of the Agreement.

5.4 Implementing aspects of the Agreement Policing: The Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB), which has a statutory role to hold the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) to account, is made up of political representatives and civil society independents. The UUP believes that the police service was dominated by unionists in the past because they gave allegiance to the state and there was intimidation of catholic members. It wants increased participation in policing from both sides of the community.

Sinn Fein, who traditionally opposed the police, appointed three members to the NIPB when they felt the legislative tools were in place to hold the PSNI to account, and believes that the Board is challenged by their presence. The current level of Catholic police officers is 20%, including Catholics from abroad (mainly from Poland). Sinn Fein is represented on the Board’s sub-‐committee on human rights and will not encourage people to join the PSNI until they are certain the police will comply with human rights standards.

There is considerable work to be done at local level to ensure the police service delivers fairly for everyone. Steps towards devolution of policing and justice powers were agreed between the DUP and Sinn Fein in mid-‐2008: a single Minister, who will come from neither Sinn Fein nor the DUP, will hold responsibility.

Violence: The SDLP never engaged in or endorsed violence from any source and believes that violence only deepens division and creates unnecessary suffering. The majority in Northern Ireland was opposed to and could not be coerced into a United Ireland and no Irish government supported violence to achieve reunification. The peace process challenged those who engaged in violence and demonstrated that democratic, peaceful alternatives were possible. It persuaded many formerly violent groups and individuals to embrace constitutional politics. The DUP believes participation in government should be earned through votes gained not links to a private army. People are not prepared to accept parties with paramilitary links in government, especially since recent global developments on terrorism.

Paramilitaries: A number of paramilitary groups continue to exist. Sinn Fein is trying to engage dissident republicans unhappy with the Agreement and persuade others who feel that it has not been fully delivered. Banning their organisations is not the solution. The peace process needs to be inclusive but government did not put rehabilitation programmes in place, preferring to criminalise paramilitary groups. The PUP, in partnership with community organisations, offers re-‐skilling, education and training so that former combatants can contribute to society. Most have not used politics as a façade for criminality. However, there are some within paramilitary structures who engage in criminal activities and need to be supported to move away from criminality or face the policing consequences.



Victims: The SDLP stresses that promises made to victims must be kept. Northern Ireland can look forward, but those who suffered must not be left behind. The Russian proverb ‘to dwell on the past is to lose one eye, but to forget the past is to lose both eyes’ is compelling.

Women: The Agreement made promises on political participation and advancement of women in public life. The PUP appreciates that women were active throughout the conflict; they were and are the backbone of communities. No political party has sufficient women politicians, but unionist parties are particularly male-‐dominated with men and women having stereotypical roles. Quotas are not used by political parties in Northern Ireland but should be, as an interim measure to achieve full equality for women.

Media: The SDLP thinks that journalists still work through the prism of the conflict or post-‐conflict rather than focusing on issues of good government and economic and social policies. The media has not established a proper challenge role to government and this does not help to close the gap between people and government.

Striking the right balance: Parties have to keep hardliners on board and be sensitive to causing offence across community lines at the same time. Societies in conflict rarely come to a shared understanding of what they have gone through quickly, and outrage is often provoked by debates and events based on different analyses. Disagreements need to be managed in a way that avoids crises.

5.5 Differences and common ground between political parties It has been said that, in general, political parties in Northern Ireland are more to the centre than to left or right and there is not much difference between them.28 The SDLP describes itself as social democratic and left of centre with the main difference between it and Sinn Fein being that the SDLP has always believed that its aims could not be achieved by violence. The UUP sees political cultures as being the most significant difference in unionism. It believes its tradition of compromise separates it from the DUP.

While nationalists may not agree, it is regarded as moderate within the unionist community. It sees the DUP as being identified with the personality, political approach and religious identity of the Reverend Ian Paisley while the PUP emerged from people and circumstances associated with paramilitary activity. It believes the differences between the UUP and PUP have reduced since 2006.

The PUP does not agree with the UUP’s revision of relationships between the two main unionist parties and paramilitaries when the lines are much more blurred. The PUP sees itself as representing disadvantaged communities, making compromises and offering a new loyalism while the UUP is middle-‐class and the DUP, born during the conflict as the PUP was, has moved away from working-‐class to more conservative policies.

The Alliance Party supports the PUP view, suggesting that individual members and councillors in the UUP have had links with paramilitaries and recalling the DUP

28 Dr Sean Farren SDLP



leadership attempts to form ‘Ulster Resistance’ in the 1980s. Unionist links with paramilitaries are not generally admitted in public.

The DUP and Sinn Fein share some common ground and vision of the future. Traditionally they were the smaller political parties on either side. Initial support for both was in working class areas especially urban areas, but each grew through drawing support from middle class and rural/suburban voters. A four-‐party Programme for Government, unimaginable a year ago, focuses on building the economy, education and public services demonstrates some shared values.

5.6 Political compromises Many compromises were made by political parties to achieve the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, supplemented by the St Andrews Agreement. The principle that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ epitomised the Agreement and set the backdrop for compromise. The SDLP made its compromises long before the 1998 Agreement, having made clear they would accept Northern Ireland as part of the UK unless and until the majority said otherwise. They contributed heavily to the design of the Agreement and therefore did not need to make further major compromises.

The UUP made a number of compromises that led to it dropping from its position as first to third political party. The UUP accepts that this price they paid for peace. The three key compromises the UUP made are:

• The UUP accepted institutional power-‐sharing in the Executive as the basis for governing Northern Ireland. They had always agreed to power-‐sharing in committees, but not in the Executive previously.

• The UUP had agreed to relations with Ireland in the 1970s. They agreed to institutionalise this in a political mechanism.

• Release of paramilitary prisoners. This was the most significant, difficult and emotionally painful compromise at end of a painful 30-‐year conflict. This compromise did the most damage to the UUP afterwards.

The Alliance Party did not compromise on constitutional issues because Alliance had always agreed with a regional power-‐sharing administration, strong links to the South of Ireland and remaining part of the UK as long as this is the majority view. Difficult compromises have to be made in negotiations and these were an acceptable price:

• Prisoner release. This included concerns about paramilitaries generally and corrosion of the principle of the rule of law. Parties linked to paramilitaries came into government and crimes of the past were forgotten. This was and is still difficult but necessary.

• Voting system in the Assembly. Members must define themselves as Nationalist, Unionist or Other. Votes carry less weight if not defined as Nationalist or Unionist. A conflict that began in part because the government would not concede the principle of ‘one person one vote’ was resolved in part by ignoring the same principle. The system fossilises the party divide. A better method could have been adopted e.g. requiring a



super-‐majority of 70% for major issues; this would include minorities without forcing people into boxes.

• Compulsory coalition. Parties in government do not have enough in common to form a good government.

The DUP absented itself from the end of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement negotiations because of the inclusion of Sinn Fein without IRA decommissioning. They held it to be unacceptable to negotiate with people on an unequal basis where unionists have votes while republicans have votes and guns. Progress has been made since then with guns no longer a threat and Sinn Fein forced to take a number of steps including support for the police.

The DUP compromised at the St Andrews negotiations in 2006. They accepted power-‐sharing and compromised slightly on accepting North-‐South bodies across Ireland. The DUP does not accept devolution as a permanent coalition of the four largest parties; they want to see movement to politics based on government and opposition. They also want the voting system changed so that Alliance Party members cannot designate themselves as unionist in order to help the UUP. Sinn Fein was viewed by the SDLP and the PUP as having made the greatest compromises.

US Senator George Mitchell, chair of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement negotiations spoke about ‘shackles of violence’ and ‘shackles of intransigence’, saying that violence took away people’s lives whilst intransigence took away their hopes. All parties deem that people are no longer afraid and life has improved infinitely. Parties that consider they lost electoral support due to the compromises made in reaching agreement believe the sacrifice was worth making.



6 Facilitating and Administering the Political Process

6.1 Track 2 diplomacy Northern Ireland is relatively simple compared to conflicts elsewhere as there are no geopolitical connections. Early in the conflict the Irish Government demanded a Security Council debate; the British Government agreed but pointed out that the conflict in Northern Ireland was purely internal. There was some demand for UN to replace British troops. The United States played an effective role in Northern Ireland and external assistance was instrumental in helping South Africa resolve its problems.

Track 2 focuses on unofficial diplomacy, with academics and others acting as facilitators bringing parties together. Track 2 opportunities are important in building personal knowledge between opponents and ability to talk with, not at, each other. The first Track 2 exercise in Northern Ireland was in 1990 on a European theme. Its purpose was to engender cross-‐party collaboration by tackling under-‐development due to the conflict, weak economy and distance from the centre of the European Union.

The uniting factor was taking advantage of the EU for the benefit of Northern Ireland; this did not threaten the identities at the heart of the conflict and it was something that all parties could win together. For the second exercise, politicians travelled to the United States. Away from the immediate situation they were enabled to work out of the media spotlight and act as individuals rather than representatives of political parties. The environment allowed them time to get to know each other and expand ideas.

Later in 1990 the parties met in France, demonstrating regional co-‐operation and a new axis of development that bypassed state capitals in the new Europe. The US and France meetings were successful with agreement on a common programme. The early exercises were with constitutional parties, the number of parties expanding after 1994 to include those with paramilitary links. The process became more inclusive, and included on occasion Irish and British parties.

In 1994 the four constitutional parties went to South Africa and examined every point in the political spectrum that enabled South Africa to become a successful example of conflict resolution. Politicians learned of the value of technical committees to remove controversial issues from the political arena e.g. policing. They were introduced to the concept of ‘sufficient consensus’ as a means of moving from majoritarianism towards inclusion. The DUP learned that it was better to influence the debate from inside rather than remain impotent outside, even if they disagreed with the issue.

Again the human dimension was important with leisure time as well as meetings leading to growth in personal interaction and realisation of commonality. An example was the changing dynamic at an event in Salzburg where a unionist agreed to participate but not to talk to Sinn Fein. During a discussion on forms of political violence the Sinn Fein member talked about the turmoil and hurt of losing his son, showing that violence knows no boundaries. The unionist responded by talking



about a member of his family who had been killed by the IRA. The two talked for hours, demonstrating the need to move away from rhetoric and posturing.

Many incidental circumstances changed the dynamic for peace. The change in international geopolitics after 1989 with the end of the cold war and apartheid meant that the IRA had to change their rhetoric and engage with new realities. There was a degree of premeditation in planning the dialogues, but much was incidental. The idea was not to get top leaders but younger, intelligent politicians who were ambitious and would have a role to play in future negotiations.

A core cadre of good politicians was involved so it was possible to build some continuity; but the same people could not be guaranteed every time. There was consensus on a number of issues: e.g. a Bill of Rights and economic development. The process focused on some issues that related indirectly to Northern Ireland; e.g. looking at why Intel invested in Costa Rica or using cases in South Africa to examine parades.

Track 2 is not a threatening process; ideas can be explored within communities ahead of inter-‐party debate. Track 2 challenges politicians outside their normal context while enabling them to feel more comfortable and be more expansive. It helps individuals to look afresh at and assess the positions of opponents so that when it comes to formal negotiations a great many things can be taken for granted. The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement would have been unlikely without this initial support.

It is best to ensure that Track 2 projects do not have resource constraints that can result in instability of otherwise worthwhile initiatives. Iraq, internally and internationally, is more complex than Ireland. Track 2 discussions in Iraq might discuss the role of the international community and how it interacts with domestic players. International dynamics change: a re-‐think in US policy after the 2008 Presidential election is probable; when decision-‐makers fail, space opens up for others. No situation is static and it is important to be ready with fresh thinking when opportunities present themselves. There are solutions to even the most intractable problems. This reinforces the importance of on-‐going attention to the human dimension that Track 2 facilitates in preparation for opportunities.

6.2 Securing a negotiating process Some lessons identified by Track 2 facilitators mirror approaches adopted by government. The peace process started in 1972 when Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness were flown to London for discussions with government officials. If contact is not made with key people then government has insufficient information to help it handle the conflict – a message for those with policies that declare there are people who are ‘too bad’ to talk to. The US and its Consuls in Northern Ireland were helpful during the process.

Officials must identify and focus on the goals and talk to everyone, getting as close as possible to the direct drivers. Look at ways of building trust with simple but iconic confidence building measures. Pick off groups among the factions that can be dealt with; distinguish, isolate and negotiate. Personal input from individuals who become known to each other, with authority and ability to deliver, is essential. It is vital to



demonstrate and prove this e.g. small changes to prison rules; symbols of good faith. Officials were supported by a Secretary of State who was willing to ‘take a chance’. Risk-‐taking and risk-‐management are essential. Every step must be tested. The process has to be one of dialogue and diagnostic. In constructing and carrying out dialogues a ‘hard cop’ ‘soft cop’ approach is useful. Entry of external facilitators has to be managed carefully. Sometimes principles have to be conceded.

For example, the Deputy Leader (now Leader) of the DUP said the party would not talk to Sinn Fein; but he also made clear the DUP are democrats and if elected to talk will follow their mandate. It is essential to look for the causes rather than the symptoms of the conflict. Thus the interface between politics and security was addressed in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. Radical advances have been made; the Northern Ireland Police Service is an international model (e.g. assisting in Iraq). Public relations and selling any agreement is crucial. A peace process is not complete with a political agreement. Phases include: cessation of violence – political development – economic prosperity. The ultimate goal is building the future.

6.3 Administrative leadership post-‐Agreement29 It is essential that the senior civil service leads the administration through the changes necessary to support new political arrangements. The civil service role is to advise on the political structure, deliver public services and act with complete neutrality. Civil servants need to be politically aware and astute without political identification and must be conscious of operating within instruments such as freedom of information legislation and judicial review.

Working with a multi-‐party government comprised of antagonistic parties with different political perspectives and priorities is challenging. Mechanisms are needed to pull the interests of different political groups together: e.g. a Programme for Government; facilitating Ministers’ Special Advisors to work together behind the scenes; proposing creative solutions that back up corporate willingness to work. Developing policies in multi-‐party government requires greater reliance on an evidence-‐based approach and reflection of all interests in the decision.

Care must be taken not to become over-‐identified with the larger parties in government and to safeguard minority interests. For example, this may mean not attending inter-‐party negotiations on a policy that involve only the leading parties; and insisting that all papers are circulated to every member of the Executive or Assembly Committee. Rules are needed to govern Special Advisors’ relationship with the civil service. Most traditional civil servants have not been prepared for working at the cutting edge of politics where alertness to potential political difficulty is required. The importance of being aware of what can trigger a problem for a Minister or the Executive is heightened in the context of transition from conflict.

29 Sir Nigel Hamilton retired in July 2008. As head of Northern Ireland’s administration he worked closely with the Northern Ireland Executive as they developed their model of working in ‘enforced’ coalition government. When indigenous Northern Ireland Ministers were appointed for the first time he was Permanent Secretary in the department of which Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness was the Minister for Education.



These political skills must be cascaded down from senior to middle grades in the civil service so that more staff become confident and competent.

The head of the civil service and the Executive’s administration has to: be politically robust; act with impartiality and integrity; manage a distributed network; have policy skills that include policy development and ability to trade off issues against each other; undertake pastoral care; have a good relationship with individual Ministers (all Ministers if possible); broker between them; broker between Ministers and their Permanent Secretaries. Good relationships with Permanent Secretaries, political parties and Ministers are essential.

6.4 Supporting a departmental Minister A Permanent Secretary who leads a government department has to have political antennae and understand symbolism; for example, shaking a Minister’s hand to signal to staff that he is the legitimate Minister and giving public leadership in working with a controversial figure.

Other staff may want to be protected from having to do this. S/he must have the confidence to induct new Ministers into ministerial matters and in having realistic expectations. For example, a controversial Sinn Fein Minister wanted to shake hands with all staff in the first week. He was advised that this was a ‘bridge too far’ and an alternative was found, an opt-‐in Christmas party that had an 80 per cent take up among staff.

The Permanent Secretary must be able to manage significant opposition to his/her Minister. Managing entry into the education community for the Minister was challenging given hostility from many unionists, including through public protest at his public events. It required considerable creativity to engage people who were reluctant to do this publicly. Examples of how this was done include: e.g. dinners with clusters of school principals; inviting audiences to Parliament Buildings for policy announcements rather than visiting individual schools; and tight choreography for external visits.

6.5 Enabling the power-‐sharing Executive The first Assembly and Executive were fraught with difficulty. Due to its large councillor base the Assembly is populist and focused initially on constituencies and projects. Moreover, after the ceasefires of 1994 and 1996 the civil service administration should have focused on public service issues to prepare the ground rather than simply on making politics work.

During periods of Assembly suspension in the early 2000s the administration ought to have been preparing an agenda of things to be done. The model of First and Deputy First Minister laid down in the Agreement operates as a Joint Ministry. Working to Joint Ministers is challenging. It would have been helpful had the Agreement contained a sunset clause to trigger a review. Consideration could then have been given in the future to whether sufficient culture, attitude change and trust existed to replace the Joint Ministry with a single First Minister. Key people in the first Executive did not like one another and it was not possible to remove Ministers who did not agree, but inter-‐relationships gradually improved. While there



is a Ministerial Code that insists on collective action there is no mechanism for assessing compliance; including an oversight role would have been helpful.

The first Executive never reached the stage of making strategic decisions with the consequence that the first Programme for Government was simply a list of departmental programmes; the second Programme for Government (2008-‐11) is more strategic. With the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement six government departments became 11, so that ministries could be shared proportionally between political parties. To counter the expansion of the administrative base the civil service was reformed to share core services between departments.

An Assembly and Executive Review Committee is reviewing the size of the Assembly (currently 108 Members) and number of ministries. It is easy to sink under the convoluted governing structure, and steps are necessary to promote the key messages of political agreement over the day-‐to-‐day detail of administration. Some of the ways this was done include: the Executive hosting the European Union President; lobbying Downing Street for a new corporation tax to underpin the peace process; highlighting meetings between the First Ministers of the North and South of Ireland; being welcomed in the White House; and hosting the US President in Northern Ireland.



Appendix 1: A short history of the Northern Ireland conflict

At the heart of the Northern Ireland conflict ‘was the persistence of a pattern of political, social, economic and personal relationships with their origins in the colonial politics and economics of the 1600s and 1700s. The expansion of the power of the British state during that period was marked by political antagonism to Catholicism, land seizure and distribution and settlement of a garrison community in the north of Ireland. The settlement, while successful, was always profoundly insecure, generating a history of ongoing violent rebellion and repression reinforcing grievances of the native dispossessed while heightening the insecurities of settlers and their descendants and a strong sense of community solidarity. Democracy and industrialisation did not erode difference, but reinforced the evolution of two distinct ‘communities’ in which politics, economics and religion were closely intertwined.’ ‘Confronting a declared revolt by nationalist Ireland in pursuit of an independent republic,’ the British state brought about a devolution package which divided Ireland into a Northern part with a Protestant and Unionist majority and a southern part with a Catholic majority; an eventual treaty consolidated this.

‘Within Northern Ireland partition was violently contested from the outset’ and division between Catholic and Protestant, unionist and nationalist defined politics. No Catholic was a candidate for the government party, the ruling Unionist party, for fifty years. The Northern Ireland government passed and used emergency laws. Unemployment rates among Catholics were double that of Protestants who dominated the civil service and police force. Manipulation in local government maintained Unionist control and preferred housing to Protestants. Agitation for civil rights and counter-‐protests led by Paisley emerged in the 1960s, but ‘few predicted the speed of descent into inter-‐community violence.’ This was followed by the arrival of British troops, internment, killing of unarmed civilians by the army, the abolition of the NI government and the institution of rule from London, and the growth of paramilitaries on both sides.

With the mass flight of communities into ‘safe’ areas an established pattern of separated living was reinforced. Attempts by the British government to promote shared government among ‘moderate’ parties across the divide failed and treatment of IRA prisoners led to the emergence of Sinn Fein as a mass political party.

In 1985 the British government engaged directly with the Irish government signing the Anglo-‐Irish Agreement despite massive unionist objection and protest. This defined the Northern Ireland problem as one of three interlocking relationships – Unionist-‐Nationalist in Northern Ireland, North-‐South within Ireland and East-‐West between Britain and Ireland – and established the basic intellectual framework that guided all subsequent efforts towards a political settlement.

The violence in Northern Ireland did not result in the total collapse of the system; and after the mid-‐1970s 95% of the deaths and injuries were among the urban poor, distinct rural areas and the security forces.



Appendix 2: Useful acronyms

CRC: Community Relations Council for Northern Ireland

DPP: District Policing Partnership

EU: European Union

ICP: Independent Commission on Policing

ICTU: Irish Congress of Trade Unions

IRA: Irish Republican Army

NGO: Non-‐governmental organisation

NHRI: National Human Rights Institutions

NICVA: Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action

NIPB: Northern Ireland Policing Board

PSNI: Police Service of Northern Ireland

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

USA: United States of America

UVF: Ulster Volunteer Force

Political Parties:

DUP: Democratic Unionist Party

PUP: Progressive Unionist Party

SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party

SF: Sinn Féin

UUP: Ulster Unionist Party

Documents

Iraq NI Report 2008 Final En