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8/16/2019 2. Egoism Article
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E
Ethical Egoism
goism is a position where the prime consideration is the effects of one’s actions on oneself.
This sort of analysis can be seen to stem from the traditional philosophical dichotomy
between one’s self (the subject) and the rest of the world (the object). It is argued that, since
one is inevitably bound up with one’s own interests, happiness, desires, hopes, etc., then howone ought to behave will, also inevitably, be centred on the effects that make a difference to us
directly.
The ethical egoist’s approach, broadly speaking, says that the good action is the one which is
best for me as an individual. Thus, if I am hungry but have no food and take your chips to eat,
this is good for me and hence good to do.
This approach, perhaps surprisingly at first glance, has some respectable philosophical
roots. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) observed that human nature is fundamentally self-interested, that it is natural that I as an individual am most concerned with what is best for
me. From this observation he argued that we cannot expect an individual to do things which
promote the interests of others above the interest of that individual since this goes against
human nature. So, it should be no surprise that I help myself to your chips when I’m hungry.
Of course, Hobbes thought this through and realized that if everyone freely helped themselves
to what is not theirs we would all end up worse off which wouldn’t be good for anyone. His
conclusion was that we all agree to rules (such as property rights) where our immediate self-
interest (my taking your chips) is replaced by a longer-term self-interest (by observing the rule
about property rights I can rest assured that someone won’t steal my jacket, say). The theorythat develops out of this analysis is that obeying the rules is what is good because this is what
is best for all the individuals’ self-interests.
This seems persuasive but if we don’t like the conclusion about simply being obedient, we have
to start picking it apart. One place to start is what precisely Hobbes’ observation about human
nature really amounts to.
Imagine you see that I am hungry and you offer me your chips to eat (even though you are
quite hungry yourself). Is it that we cannot help ourselves acting out of self-interest? Is whatyou do as inevitable as growing a fingernail or digesting your food? If your answer to this is
‘yes’ (i.e. in a strongly deterministic way) then the consequence is that no-one
is responsible for what they do since they have no choice in the matter, just as we cannot
decide against growing a fingernail or digesting a meal. And from this we cannot praise or
blame people for what they do, just as we don’t praise people for their ability to grow their
nails or blame them for being unable to digest fibre. This interpretation of human behaviour is
consistent with that set out in the biologist Richard Dawkins’ book The Selfish Gene: social
animals share food because they are genetically programmed to do so since this optimizes the
http://www.sevenoaksphilosophy.org/ethics/hobbes.htmlhttp://www.sevenoaksphilosophy.org/ethics/hobbes.html
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chances of survival of each individual in the group. What reinforces the ‘right’ thing to do is a
feeling of satisfaction that comes with the optimal survival-strategy action. Thus, you give me
chips now in the expectation that I will behave like you at some future time when I have the
chips and you don’t. This interpretation seems unpromising to say the least since ethics
disappears altogether leaving behind a mere psychological theory about human nature.
Further, even if it is initially proposed as a psychological theory, it threatens to be unscientific in
that it is untestable and hence merely a dogma:
“You offered me your chips because it gives you a feeling of satisfaction.”
“No, it’s because I thought it was the right thing to do.”
“It was the thought that ‘it was the right thing to do’ that gave you the satisfaction then.”
“But I didn’t think that!”
“No, but your subconscious made you do something that would give you a feeling of
satisfaction.”
“But Freddie was here at the same time and also has chips. Why didn’t he offer you any of
his?” “His subconscious made him do something that gave him a feeling of satisfaction by
keeping his chips for himself”
“So whatever someone does is caused by their subconscious desire for a feeling of
satisfaction?”
“You’ve got it.”
“So if I offer you chips the explanation for that action is the same as if I don’toffer you
chips?!”
“Er... yes.”
“But that’s preposterous!” “Live with it – that’s the way it is.”
“All that is is an assertion. You have no evidence – and no way of getting evidence – to
prove it. I prefer to be more thoughtful and look for reasonable explanations for things.
And you won’t get any more of my chips.”
‘People only do what makes them satisfied’ argument
The exchange above is an example of a very common way of arguing about our behaviour,ethical or otherwise. I hope that it illustrates that ‘doing the satisfying thing’ isn’t really an
argument at all – it only looks as if an explanation is being offered. In reality, all we are being
offered is an assertion about how we are – perhaps on a par with ‘we behave this way as a
result of an internal feud between a devilish entity and an angelic one. Oh, and by the way,
these angels and devils are entirely undetectable except by the results which show up in a
person’s behaviour.’ The latter ‘argument’ means that we can refer any behaviour to
undetectable entities (e.g. ‘He behaved badly because the devil gained the upper hand’). The
former argument about ‘doing what satisfies you’ is equally inadequate. What if a person gave
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up all the pleasant trappings of life to live in great hardship, pain and ill-health to work among
the poor who, in return, abused and despised them? Such a person could justifiably claim to be
dissatisfied. But by this ‘argument’ we would have to say that they are doing it because they
are satisfied – by being dissatisfied! This absurdity really points up the weakness of the
‘explanation’.
A philosopher, committed to reasoned explanations for things, will want to consider alternatives
to this thoughtless approach. Perhaps we are not just ‘lumbering robots’ behaving in a strictly
programmed fashion, perhaps it is more complicated (and more interesting) than that.
A candidate a step forward would be to claim that what is good is what is good for me as an
individual. This is usually referred to as individual ethical egoism. However, it is not much of
a step forward once you consider the implications. Let’s take Tony Stuart as an example. Since
the Holocaust had no discernible effect on him then the moral rightness or wrongness of the
killing of millions of Jews is morally irrelevant. Similarly, morality only came into being when he
was born and will disappear when he dies. Apart from this idea appearing to be just plain
wrong (and rather silly), it is also of no help to anyone other than Tony Stuart in a guide tomoral behaviour. And what’s so special about him, we might ask.
A more promising advance is universal ethical egoism which is the idea that
whateveryone ought to do is what is best for them as individuals – even if this harms other
people. The reason why this is more promising is that seems to call on individuals to weigh up
options about their behaviour so as to optimize what is best for them. Weighing in the balance
might be things like cooperation with others to achieve this; considerations of long-term as well
as short-term interests; toleration; charity; compassion... Suddenly we find ourselves in the
thick of heavyweight ethical notions. The first one to address, however, is whether it is feasibleto rest these weighty notions on the fulcrum of self-interest.
The point worth emphasizing here is that, in ethical egoism, the individual need make no effort
to give any considerations to what might be best for others, or what might be best for society.
The idea is that, simply by doing what is in their own interest will lead directly to what is best
for all. (There is a parallel theory in Economics: having a free market which allows all
individuals to act out their selfish interests will necessarily lead to the best outcome including,
through greater competition, cheaper goods and better products.)
However, there are several criticisms leveled at ethical egoism. Some of these appeal
to intuitions about the consequences that would follow rather than pointing out flaws in the
theory itself. So, for example, there is the ‘posterity argument’. To an egoist, it would make no
difference if, as a result of their actions, all life on Earth were ended in 100 years time. This
appeals to an intuition – that we should find this position appalling: we ought to care about the
future even though we won’t be in it and won’t benefit from it. But if the egoist shrugs and
says that, in fact, they do not find this appalling, then other grounds are needed to argue them
out of their position. Another is the ‘helpful neighbour argument’. If someone helped you (the
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egoist) out, then you would have to say that what they did was morally wrong. This is another
intuitive appeal: we ought not to feel this way about charitable people. The egoist might give
another shrug and point out that they (the egoist) are not a neighbour to rely on for help and
they are never going to rely on neighbours being there to help out anyway.
A more philosophical tack to try is the ‘friendship argument’ which aims to expose an absurdity
at the heart of egoism. Obviously (the argument goes) a deep friendship brings great
satisfaction so an egoist should make friends since this will be better for them. But wait, a deep
friendship is only possible if both parties in it suspend or sacrifice their self-interest from time
to time. But this is impossible for the thorough-going egoist – they cannot give up egoism to
achieve egoism! Again, the egoist can reply to this that, on the contrary, deep friendship is not
more desirable than satisfying self-interest; that time spent developing friendships is wasted
time; that friendships are possible where one of the parties (the egoist) never sacrifices self-
interest so long as the other party does. These are all empirical replies and so are open to
testing to see if they are true or not. Surveys of how people respond to the egoist position
nearly always undermine it.
To sum up, ethical egoism has some appeal in that it appears to be consistent with a very
plausible interpretation of human nature and that there are few, if any, powerful arguments
that point to flaws in it as a theory. On the other hand, it also appears not to be a wholly
satisfactory account of the full complexity of human behaviour which would include the notions
of compassion, charity, love and friendship – all of which require us to consider the interests of
other people as well as our own. Such things seem to cry out for a more comprehensive account
of how humans ought to behave than egoism offers.