1997 Some Experimental Assessments of Indecisives

7/27/2019 1997 Some Experimental Assessments of Indecisives

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Some E xperimental Assessments of Indecisives:Support for a Non-cognitive Failures Hypothesis

Joseph R. FerrariDepartttient of Psychology, 2219 North Kentnore Avenue

DePaul University, Chicago, IL 60614-3504John F. Dovidio

Departtnent of Psychology, C olgate Un iversityHam ilton, NY 13346Chronic indecisioti {i.e., decisionalprocrastination) involves a delay inma king decisions that may be a function of a cogn itive inab ility torespond quickly. In two experiments, the response speeds and errorrates of indecisives were compared to decisives (Experiment I: cardsorting by color and by suit; Experiment 2: key pressing on reaction timeboxes under simple and complex conditiotts). Although speeds in-creased across trials in both experiments, there were no significantdifferences between decisives and indecisives in either stttdy, even whencognitive efforts to process information were increased. Results dem on-strated that chronic indecision is not a cognitive inability impacting ondecision-making speed. Further research shouldfoctis on motivationalprocesses that impact on the decision making strategies of indecisives.

A growing body of literature has explored an individual differencevariable indecision-making, called decisional procrastination (see Ferrari,Johnson, & McC own, 1995), which is based on Janis and M an n's (1977)model of decision m aking under stress. The Janis and Mann (197 6,1977)model posited that stress interferes with rational decision making byproducing hyper-vigilance. This engenders a hasty, disorganized, andincomplete evaluation of information leading to faulty decisions andpost-decisional regret (Janis, 1982; Janis, Defares, & Grossman, 1982).A person also may attempt to escape the conflict by avoiding the


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procrastinating (i.e., putting off) the decision until a later period (Burnett,1991; Burnett, Mann, & Beswick, 1989).

Decisional procrastination has been related to motivational forces(such as self-defeating orientation s; Fe rrari, 1994), social forces (e.g., therejection of good-spirited others; Harriott, Ferrari, & Dovidio, 1996),perceptions ofthe self (e.g., negative global self-identity; Harriott et al.,1996), and parental influences and styles (e.g., stern inflexibility, lowwarmth and overcontrolling; Ferrari & Olivette, 1993). Decisional pro-crastination also has been related to a number of personality variables,including: a diffuse-oriented identify, low self-esteem, non-com petitive-ness, forgetfulness, interpersonal dependency, low self-control, and re-venge seeking (Berzonsky & Ferrari, 1996; Effert & Ferrari, 1989;Ferrari, 1994; Ferrari & Emmons, 1994). Taken together, these correla-tional studies suggest that chronic indecision (or, decisional procrastina-tion) represents a stable individual difference variable characterized bydelays in making decisions, particularly under stressful circumstances(Ferrari et al., 1995).

The present research explored the possibility that decisional procras-tination may reflect differences in cognitive abilities and orientationswith a set of tasks involving time pressure . Decisional procras tination, forexample, has been related to cognitive biases, such as distractibility andthe failure to process positive information about oneself (Harriott et al.,1996). Unlike previous correlational studies, in the present researchindecisives were compared to decisives under various conditions onresponse speed tasks to assess experimentally whether decisional pro-crastination was a function of a person's cognitive inability. Frost andShows (1993) recently found that indecisives compared to decisives hadlonger latencies on an experimental decision-making task. However, theincreased latency was for a task that indecisives perceived as unpleasant,suggesting that participants were motivated to delay decisions. Responsetimes, then, were not necessarily reflective of cognitive ability, indepen-dent of motivation.

In the present experiment, chronic indecisives and decisives were


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Ferrari & Dovidio RESPON SE TIMES BY INDEC ISIVES 529

(e.g., when the cognitive effort for task com pletion was great and a timeconstraint [speed] was a component of the task). To the extent thatdecisional procrastination was a function of cognitive inability, it wasexpected that chronic indecisives compared to decisives would havehigher response speeds and error rates on reaction time tasks. On the otherhand, if decisional procrastination was a motivational strategy preferredby some individuals, then indecisives compared to decisives were ex-pected not to differ significantly in speeds/errors under the presentexperimental conditions.

METHODParticipant Selection and Categorization

Tw o samples of college students (M age = 19.7 years old, 80% firstyear students) participated across two experimental studies outlinedbelow . All participants attended a sm all, private , northeastern college andwere enrolled in introductory psychology courses. Extra course creditwas earned for involvement in each study. There were 58 students (40wom en, 18 men) in Sample 1, and 108 students (88 wom en, 20 m en) inSample 2.

Participants w ere categorized into "indec isives" or "decisives" basedon self-reported scores on Mann's (1982) Decisional Procrastination(DP) 5-item, 5-point Likert scale. This brief inventory had acceptableinternal consistency (in the present study: Sample I a = .70, Sample 2a - .72) and temporal stability (retest r = .69: Effert & Ferrari, 1989).High scores on this scale reflect a tendency to put off decisions by doingother tasks. Sam ple items include "I delay making decisions until it is toolate" or "I put off making decisions." Chronic indecision as measured onthe decisional procrastination scale is a moderate predictor of everyday,behavioral procrastination, low self-control, high levels of suppressedanger, perfectionism, self-handicapping tendencies, and lack of energy(Beswick etal., 1988;Buniett, 1991; Burnett eta l., 1989; Effert & Ferrari,1989; Ferrari, 1991, 1992,199 4). M an n's (1982) scale for indecisivenesswas chosen instead of Frost and Show's newly developed (1993) inven-


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Ferrari CSL Dovidio RESPON SE TIMES BY INDEC ISIVES 531

flip each card over as quickly as possible w ith their preferred hand. A s acard was turned over it was to be sorted into red or black piles (Task 1).Participants also were told that the three quickest men and women eachwould receive a cash reward for their performance. No perfonnancefeedback (i.e., response speed, error rate) was provided after each trial orthe set of trials.A female research associate (blind to the participant's decisionalprocrastination scale score) recorded both the response time (in sec/msecusing a Tandy LC D digital Quartz Stopw atch, Model # 63-5010 ) and the

number of errors per trial. Trial time was recorded from the moment thefirst card in the shuffled deck w as touched until the last card from the deckwas placed in a sorted pile. Errors per trial were defined as any cardtouching a card of the opposite color after it was flipped from the shuffleddeck.In addition, a random half of the participants (n = 28) w ere instructedto correctly recall an 8-digit random number after each trial. Participantswere shown a num ber for 10 seconds before each card sorting trial. Afterthe last card had been sorted, the participant w as to state aloud the num berin order of presentation. The associate recorded whether the participantwas correct or incorrect at recalling at least six of the dig its.On the second task, the same participants were again instructed tosort a deck of shuffled playing cards. How ever, for this task (Task 2) theywere asked to sort the cards by suits (diamonds, spades, hearts, clubs) asquickly as possible for 12 additional trials. Response times and error rates

per trial again were recorded by the female research associate; errors weredefined as a card touching an inappropriate suit. Fu rtherm ore, the randomnumber condition participants were asked again to correctly recall an 8-digit random number after each trial.Tasks 3 and 4. Sample 2 participants were involved in two tasks toassess their response speed and error rates. Both tasks involved keypressing at the onset of a white light from a single key, dual light (red/white) reaction time box (Lafayette Instruments 63O2C Visual Choice,

Model #6302AS), with response time recorded in msec on an electric


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532 JOURNA L OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY

light. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible whenthe white light appeared. Besides earning extra course credit, participan tswere informed that the quickest response times for the top three men andthree women would receive a cash award. The associate recorded theresponse time (msec) for each trial, and whether the response was anerror, defined as key pressing at the onset of a red light.

After the completion of the "simple" Task 3, Sample 2 participantswere asked to com plete another 30 experim ental trials involving responsespeed to a white light stimulus (Task 4 ). Here, participants w ere asked topress the key with their preferred index finger whenever the majority oflights were white, instead of red, out of the last three trials. That is,participants were to press the key as quickly as possible only if the lasttwo and the present trial totaled mostly wh ite (i.e., 2 out of 3 were whitelights), and to state "no" if the majority was red. Participants werereminded that cash awards would be issued to the quickest speeds for menand w om en. The sequence of white to red lights were random , with halfthe trials presen ting white lights. The female experimenter again reco rdedeach partic ipant's response speed (in msec ) and errors across trials in this"complex-memory" Task 4.

RESULTSIn Sam ples 1 and 2, there were no significant gender differences

across trials, tasks, or decisional procrastination types; consequently, nofurther gender comparisons were computed.Sample 1

Tasks 1 and 2. Trials were grouped by sets of four for both tasks.Then, response speeds and error rates were assessed under a 2 (decisionalprocrastination [DP] type: indecisive vs. decisive) x 2 (cognitive effort:digit recall v s. no digit recall) x 3 (trials: 1-4 vs 5-8 vs. 9-12 ) AN OV A,with repeated measures on the last factor. Tahle 1 presen ts the m edianresponse speed (in sec/msec) across trials on the simple and complexcard-sorting tasks (Tasks 1 and 2, respectively).


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TA B L E I M edian Respon se T im e (sec) Ac ross Tr ia l s fo rIndecis ives and Decis ives on Tasks I (s imple) and2 (complex) Card-sor t ings

TASK 1: Simple (color)Indecisives''DecisivesAll Participants'^TASK 2: Complex (suit)Indecisives"DecisivesAll Participants'"

Card-sor t ing

Card-sort ing

Trials1-4

60.758.859.3

93.692.392.9

Trials5-8

49.049.949.3

87.987.087.3

Trials9-12

47.347.847.6

81.382.081.8

n = 30: "n = 2S;'n = 58.

F ( l, 54) = 3.50, p < .06, with pa rticipants in the digit condition mak ingmore errors (M = 51.6) than participants in the non-digit condition (M =42.7).On Task 2 there again were no significant m ain or interaction effectswith decisional procrastination and cogn itive effort. T here was a signifi-cant decrease, however, across trials in response speed, F(2 ,10 4) = 19.38,p < .001, indicating that participants became faster in sorting cards bysuits. In the digit condition, participants made significantly more errors(M - 56.50, SD = 6.23) than in the non-digit condition (M - 43.70, SD =4.89) on Task 2, F( l, 54) = 5.40, p < .02.

Digit recall. Participants in the digit condition recalled the randomdisplay correctly (i.e., recalled at least six of the eight digits in order), onaverage, 3.30 (SD - 1.50) times in the sim ple, color sorting task (Task 1),


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TA BLE 2 Median Response Time (Msec) Across Trials forIndecisives atid Decisives on Task 3 (Simple) KeyPressing

Indecisives(n = 35)Decisives(n = 35)All Participants( n = 1 0 8 )Note: Value in parenthesis is standard deviation.

Trials1-10

350.1(55.1)333.4(67.3)324.5(61.5)

Trials11-20343.7(52.4)324.6(75.8)332.0(63.5)

Trials21-30332.6(67.8)326.0(66.6)326.7(67.8)

Table 2 presents the median response speed (msec) across trials forindecisives and decisives in Task 3. There w ere no significant main effectfor decisional procrastination type, nor interaction effect between typeand trials on this simple reaction time task. However, participants diddecrease significantly in response speed across trials, F(2, 206) = 3.98,p < .02. Also, there were no significant main or interaction effects on theerror rates of this task.Table 3 shows for chronic indecisives and decisives on the com plex,memory task (Task 4) the mean num ber of correct responses ("hits") andthe mean number of false responses ("false alarms") and response times

TA BLE 3 Mean Response Rate for Hits and False Alarms andMedian Response Time (msec) by Indecisives and


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Ferrari & Dovidio RESPONSE TIMES BY INDE CISIVE S

(msec) out of" 15 trials each. There was no significant difference betweendecisional procrastination types in the mean number of hits or falsealarms. However, on Task 4 participants were more likely to presscorrectly the key when the majority of lights were white than when themajority were red. As for response speeds, tbere was no significantdifference between indecisives and decisives on their response speed forhits and false alarms; both types of participants were faster on hit trialsthan on false alarm trials.

Intelligence test scores. For all 108 participants in Sample 2 whocom pleted the Shipley (1940) intelligence test, decisional procrastinationscores were not significantly related to abstraction (r = -.04) or verbal (r =-.11) indices of mental abilities. In fact, tbere was no significant differ-ence on abstract intelligence between chronic indecisives (M = 12.47,SD = 3.14) and decisives (M = 12.74, SD - 3.32). There also was nosignificant difference on verbal intelligence between chronic indecisives(M = 25.56 , SD = 4.32) and decisives (M = 26.29, SD = 3.25).

DISCUSSIONThe present research considered tbe possibility tbat differences incognitive capacities might mediate indecisiveness between people highor low on decisional procrastination. Despite tbe implications of cogni-tive-related differences, such as distractibility (Harriott et al., 1995), thepresent series of experimental studies found no significant differences incognitive performances (in terms of speed and errors) on simple card-

sorting tasks (Tasks 1 and 2), with or without a concurrent task ofremembering digits.The significant, general improvement in the perform ances of partici-pants over time and the poorer performance of participants in the digit-recall condition than in the no-digit condition suggest that absence ofeffects for decisional procrastination could not readily be accounted forby the insensitivity ofth e task or lack of statistical pow er. Perfonnance onthe task was related in the expected ways by practice and cognitive

demand. The effects and interactions associated with decisional procras-


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attention. Taken together witb tbe first two tasks, it seemed (hat decisionalprocrastination was not a function of a cognilive inability to respondefficiently yet rapidly.It appears that indecisives may be able to respond in a timely fashionon well-structured tasks, even with high levels of cognitive demand andcomplexity. This claim was supported furtber by the finding tbat in a

more direct test of general cognitive ability, decisional procrastinationwas uncorrelated witb both abstract (r = -.04) and verbal (r = -. 11) scoreson Shipley's (1940) intelligence test. Recent work (e.g., Greve et al.,1996) supports the validity of this frequently used intelligence test,showing that it relates to low cognitive abilities (Beatty et al., 1995).

As G reenwald (1975) has argued, support for the null hypothesis canbe theoretically informative, particularly when the tasks are dem onstratedto be sensitive to experimental factors and the statistical tests reflectadequate power. These conditions were satisfied in tbe present research.This demonstration of comparable performance by decisives andindecisives on highly structured tasks implied that strategic or motiva-tional factors may indeed be the critical factors mediating decisionalprocrastination. These differences may be manifested, therefore, prima-rily in situations that permit strategic variability and motivational influ-ences (Janis & Mann, 1977).Fina lly, the absence of significant differences between decisives andindecisives suggests that to fully understand tbe relationship betweenaptitude and accomplishment research needs to account for strategic andmotivational infiuences in performance. Performance on highly struc-tured tests of intelligence (e.g., Shipley's 1940 test), and on alternativecognitive tasks that are demanding and stressful are not likely to bediagnostic ofth e performance of indecisives, who may exhibit dysfunc-tional procrastination strategies wben confronted with a broader range ofdecisional choices. These findings reinforce the practical importance ofconsidering the person x situation and understanding how the social andtask context moderates the impact of potentially dysfunctional individualdifferences.


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R E F E R E N C E SBeatty, W.W., Hames, K. A.. Blanco, C .R..& Paul, R.H. (1995). Verbal ab.stracliondeficit in multiple sclerosis. Neitropsychology, 9, 198-205.Berzon sky,M .D.,& Ferrari, J.R. (1996). Identity orientation and decision-makingstyles. Personality and Individual D ifferences, 20, 597-606.Be.swick, C , Rothblum, E.D., & Mann , L. (1988). Psychological an tecedents tostudent procrastination. Australian Psychologist, 23, 207-217.Burnett, P.C. (1991). Decision-making style and self-concept. Australian Psy-

chologist, 26, 55-58.Burnett, P.C, Mann, L., & Beswick, G. (1989). Validation of the FlindersDecision-making Questionnaire on course decision making by students.Australian Psychologist, 24, 285-292.Effert, B., & Ferrari, J.R. (1989 ). Decisional p rocrastination: Exam ining p erson-ality correlates. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 4, 151-156.Ferrari, J.R. (1991). Com pulsive procrastination: Som e self-reported characteris-tics. Psychological Reports, 68, 455458.Ferrari, J.R. (1992). Procrastination and perfect behavior: An exploratory factoranalysis of self-presentation, self-awareness, and self-handicapping com po-nents. Journal of Research in Personality, 26, 75-84.Ferrari, J.R. (1994). Dysfunctional procrastination and its relationship with self-esteem, interpersonal dependency, and self-defeating personality. Personal-ity and Individual Differences, 17,Ferrari, J.R., & Emmons, R.A. (1994). Procrastination and revenge: Do peoplereport using delays as a strategy for vengeance? Personality and IndividualDifferences, 17, 539-544.Ferrari, J.R., Johnson, J.L., & McCown, W. (1995). Procrastination and taskavoidance: Theory, research, and treatment. New York: Plenum Publica-tions.Ferrari, J.R., & Olivette, M.J. (1993). Perceptions of parental control and thedevelopment of indecision am ong late adolescent females. Adolescence, 28,963-970.Frost, R.O., & Shows, D.L. (1993). The nature and measurement of compulsiveindecisiveness. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 31, 683-692.Greenwaid, A. (1975). Consequence of prejudice against the null hypothesis.Psychological Bulletin, 82, 1-20.Greve, K.W., Farrell, J.F., Besson, P.S., Crouch, J.A. (1996). A psychometricanalysis of the California Card Sorting Test. Archives of Clinical Neuropsy-chology, 10, 265-278.Ha rriott,J.,Fen-a ri,J.R.,& D ovidio ,J.F. (1996). Distractibility, daydreaming, and


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Janis. I.L., & Mann. L. (1977). Deci.sion-niakin^: A psychological analysi.s' ofconflict, choice, cind commitment. New York: Free Pres.s.Mann, L. (1982). Decision-making Questioniuiire. Flinder'.s University of SouthAustralia [available in J.R. Ferrari, J.L. Johnson, & W. McCown (1995)Procrastination and task avoidance. New York: Plenum Press].Paulson, M .J., & Lin, T. (1970). Predicting W A IS-IQ from Shipley-Hartfordscores. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 26, 453-461 .Shipley, W.C. (1940). A self-administering scale for measuring intellectualimpairment and deterioration. Journal of Psychology, 9, 371-377.Sine s, L.K., & Sim mo ns, H. (1959). The Shipley-H artford Scale and the DoppeltShort Form as estima tors of WA IS-IQ in a state hospital popu lation. Journalof Clinical Psychology, 14, 4 5 2 ^ 5 3 .


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1997 Some Experimental Assessments of Indecisives