1994 Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited Separating Fact From Fiction

7/30/2019 1994 Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited Separating Fact From Fiction

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Psychological Bulletin1994. Vol.116, No . 1.21-27Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0033-2909/94/S3.00

Positive Illusions and Weil-Being Revisited:Separating Fact From FictionShelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown

In 1988, we published an article that challenged the notion that accurate perceptions of self andthe world are essential for mental health (Taylor & Brown, 1988). We argued instead that people'sperceptions in these domains are positively biased and that these positive illusions promote psycho-logical well-being. In the current article, we review our theoretical model, correct certain miscon-ceptions in its empirical application, and address the criticisms made by Colvin and Block.

Taylor and Brown's (1988) model of mental health maintainsthat certain positive illusions are highly prevalent in normalthought and predictive of criteria traditionally associated withmental health. The work initially derived from research withcancer patients (Taylor, 1983) but was integrated in the 1988essay with literature on social cognition, suggesting that thefor-mulation could also make sense of previously anomalous andsomewhat unrelated errors and biases in human thought. As isthe case with any theoretical model, the goal of the article wasto generate research. On this ground, the model appears to havebeen quite successful. According to Colvin and Block's estima-tion, approximately 250 studies have made use of the formula-tion. Given its popularity and influence, a critical examinationof the Taylorand Brown argument is appropriate.In this article, we (a) review some of the central points ofour theoretical model; (b) examine Colvin and Block's articlein view of these issues; (c) present research germane to our the-sis but not discussed by Colvin and Block; and (d) raise someimportant issues that have yet to be resolved. As before, our aimis to contribute to an informed dialogue regarding the nature ofpsychological well-being.

Accuracy as Essential for Weil-BeingThe point of departure for our 1988 article was the widely

accepted belief that accurate perceptions of oneself and theworld are essential elements of mental health (Jahoda, 1953;Maslow, 1950). Against this backdrop, we reviewed evidence in-dicating that most people exhibit positive illusions in three im-portant domains: (a) They view themselves in unrealisticallypositive terms; (b) they believe they have greater control over

Shelley E. Taylor, Department of Psychology, Universityof California,Los Angeles; Jonathon D. Brown, Department of Psychology, Univer-sity of Washington.

Preparation of this article was supported by National Institute ofMental Health Grants 42152 and 42918 to Shelley E. Taylor. JonathonD. Brown was supported by National Science Foundation PresidentialYoung Investigator Award BNS 89-58211.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Shel-ley E. Taylor, Department of Psychology, 1283 Franz, University of Cal-ifornia, Lo s Angeles, Lo s Angeles,California 90024-1563.

environmental events than is actually the case; and (c) they holdviews of the future that are more rosy than base-rate data canjustify. Establishing the prevalence of positive illusions in non-pathological populations was one important contribution of ourarticle. Asjust noted, accuracy has been regarded as essentialto psychological well-being. Yet our review showed that mostpeople do not hold entirely accurate and unbiased perceptionsof themselves and the world in which they function. It follows,then, that accuracy is not essential formental health;otherwise,most people would have to be classified as unhealthy.After documenting the prevalence of positive illusions in nor-mal populations, we examined whether positive illusions pro-mote psychological well-being. Our strategy had two parts.First, we identified established criteria of mental health fromthe relevant clinical literature: contentment, positive attitudestoward the self, the ability to care for and about others, opennessto new ideas and people, creativity, the ability to perform cre-ative and productive work, and the ability to grow, develop, andself-actualize, especially in response to stressful events (Taylor,1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988). We then reviewed evidence sug-gesting that positive illusions contribute to each of these behav-iors and perceptions. For example, we discussed research indi-cating that the ability to engage in productive, creative work,which is considered by many to be a defining feature of mentalhealth (e.g., Jourard & Landsman, 1980), is facilitated by theperception that one is capable and efficacious, even if these be-liefs are somewhat illusory.In summary, our 1988 article made two major points: (a) Itchallenged a major tenet of psychological thought by document-ing that most people hold overly positive views of themselves,their ability to effect change in the environment, and their fu-ture; and (b) it considered how positive illusions of this typecontribute to a broad range of criteria consensually regarded asindicative of psychological well-being.

Colvin and Block CritiqueWith this discussion as background, we turn to Colvin and

Block's critique. To begin, we note that Colvin and Block focusheavily on only a small portion of Taylor and Brown's (1988)essay (three pages). Moreover, the section that is given such at-tention does not make the claims attributed to it by Colvin andBlock. Colvin and Block state that "the heart of the evidence

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22 SHELLEY E. TAYLOR AND JONATHON D. BROWNthat Taylor an d Brown bring to bear in support of their argu-ment that positive illusions underlie me ntal he alth is to be foundin the section of our paper titled "Positive Illusions an d SocialCognition" (pp. 194-197). This is a misstatement of fact. Th ematerial referred to in these pages docume nts the prevalence ofillusions in normal populations (and their relative absence indysphoric populations). It does not examine whether positiveillusions promote psychological well-being. This issue is dis-cussed in the next section of our article (pp. 197-200), in whichwe focus on the criteria traditionally associated with mentalhealth an d then evaluate th e relation of positive illusions tothose criteria. The so-called Step C th at Colvin and B lock attri-bute to us and criticize is their ow n invention, not a faithfulrepresentation of our line of argument.More generally, th e bu lk of Colvin an d Block's critique is con-cerned with research that goes under th e name of depressiverealism. As reviewed in our 1988 article, there is suggestive evi-dence that depressed people exhibit accurate perceptions of thetype traditionally thought to characterize the psychologicallywell-adjusted individua l. Colvin an d Block correctly note thatthis provocative thesis must still be regarded as preliminary:Some studies find that depressed individuals are balanced andaccurate in their perceptions; others find they are negatively bi-ased in their perceptions (for reviews, see Ackerman & De-Rubeis, 1991; Alloy & Abramson, 1988; Dobson & Franche,1989).Resolution of this issue is not, however, critical to Taylor an dBrown's (1988) thesis. Our concern is with mental health, notdepression. The crucial issue is not whether depressed peopleare accurate or negative ly biased; it is whether norm al, healthyadults are accurate or positively biased. The evidence on thispoint is clear: Most healthy adults are positively biased in theirself-perceptions. This fundamental fact is not altered by evi-dence that depressed people often bias inform ation in a negativedirection. Evidence that the perceptions of depressed people arej us t as distorted as those of healthy adults can hardly be takenas supporting the traditional view that mental health demandsaccuracy.In addition to q uestioning the existence of depressive realism,Colvin an d Block make several other points deserving of atten-tion. In the following sections, we consider these issues. Specifi-cally, we address the following: (a) Do the perceptions and be-liefs we have called "positive illusions" deserve to be so charac-terized, and (b) do these perceptions and beliefs actuallypromote psychological adjustm ent?

What Constitutes an Illusion?As just noted, C olvin and Block question whether Taylor andBrown (1988) were warranted in concluding that most peoplehold positive illusions about themselves and the w orld. We con-cu r that this issuewhat constitutes an illusionis an impor-tant one. In our 1988 article, we were careful to point out thatit is often hard to distinguish reality from illusion. This is espe-cially difficult when one is dealing with people's interpre tationsor subjective perceptions of stimuli an d events that do not havea sure, physical basis (Brow n, 1991). If a person thinks she hasa wonderful sense of hum or, who is to say that she is wrong?The tack we have taken in addressing this issue, which has

been adopted by other researchers, is to identify multiple cri-teria that might be said to reflect illusion and look at overallpatterns of evidence. Although any one operational definitionof illusion may have problems associated with it, when studiesusing different criteria with nonoverlapping problem s show thesame effect, ou r confidence in the phenomenon is increased. Wemaintain that this situation exists in the literature on positiveillusions.Self-Aggrandizing Self-Perceptions

Consider our claim that people hold unrealistically positiveviews of themse lves. This assertion is not based on evidence thatpeople's self-conceptions are more positive than negative, asColvin and B lock contend (p p. 4-5). It is based largely (althoughnot ex clusively) on evidence that people consistently regardthemselves more positively an d less negatively than they regardothers. In sofar as it is logically impossible for most people to bebetter than others, we label this tendency an illusion.Colvin and Block argue that this tendency is not illusory.They contend that students at elite universities are warranted inbelieving they are better than most other people. Although wedo not find their argument compelling (in what sense are uni-versity students warranted in believing they are kinder, warmer,an d more sincere than the average person?), we note that the"better-than-most" effect does not depend on whether peopleare comparing themselves with a generalized other (Brown,1986, 1993; Brow n & Gallagher, 1992) or with those who aremore similar to themselves, such as fellow students at their ownuniversity (Campbell, 1986; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holz-berg, 1989; Schlenker & Miller, 1977). Nor is this form of self-aggrandizement foun d only among college students. At leastthree studies have shown that individuals facing acute orchronic health threats show the same self-aggrandizing biaswhen evaluating them selves relative to other patients with thesame disease (B uu nk , Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof,1990; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, & As-pinwall, 1991). In short, there is no support for the contentionthat these judgments ar e simply th e normatively appropriateperce ptions of privileged college students.Colvin and Block raise a second objection to our depiction ofthese self-aggrandizing beliefs as illusory. They argue that it isentirely fitting for people to believe they are better than othersbecause people often (a) choose dimensions of comparison onwhich they are advantaged, (b ) define attributes in idiosyncraticways that emphasize their perceived strengths, or (c) selectworse-off comparison groups that guarantee a favorable self-other comparison. We certainly agree that people are highly re-sourceful when it comes to promoting positive views of them-selves. However, these are dem onstrations of the w ays in whichpeople develop an d main tain illusions rather than counterex-planations or exceptions to the effect (Brown, 1991; Taylor &Brown, 1988; Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983). In summary,we stand by our original 1988 assertion that people's positiveviews of themselves deserve to be classified as illusory.Moreover, evidence continues to accumulate indicating thatthese self-aggrandizing views are linked to psychological well-being. For example, in the achievement domain, people withhigh self-perceptions of ability are more apt to attain success


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POSITIVE ILLUSIONS AND WELL-BEING REVISITED 23than are those whose perceptions are more modest (Steinberg& Kolligan, 1990). Most important, this is true even if theseperceptions are somewhat inflated. As one leading researchernoted:

It is widely believed that misjudgment produces dysfunction. Cer-tainly, gross miscalculation can create problems.However, optimis-tic self-appraisals of capability that are not unduly disparate fromwhat is possible can be advantageous, whereas veridical judgmentscan be self-limiting. When people err in their self-appraisals, theytend to overestimate their capabilities. This is a benefit rather thana cognitive failing to be eradicated. If self-efficacy beliefs alwaysreflected only what people could do routinely, they would rarelyfail bu t they would no t mount th e extra effort needed to surpasstheir ordinary performances. (Bandura, 1989, p. 1177)

Other researchers suggested that overly optimistic assess-ments of one's ability are particularly beneficial during earlychildhood, facilitating the acquisition of language and the de-velopment of problem-solving and motor skills (Bjorklund &Green, 1992; Phillips & Zimmerman, 1990; Stipek, 1984).Viewing oneself in more positive terms than one views othersalso appears to mollify the effects of stressful events such ashealth threats. The belief that one is healthier or coping betterthan other patients similar to oneself is not only highly preva-lent in such samples (e.g., Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Reed, 1989;Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985), it is also associated with re-duced distress (e.g., Helgeson &Taylor, 1993; Reed, 1989).To summarize, we asked two questions of the literature onpeople's self-aggrandizingbeliefs about themselves: Are thesebeliefs illusory, and are they linkedto the criteria and tasks nor-mally associated with mental health? On these points, we be-lieve our 1988 assertions are buttressed, not challenged, by sub-sequent evidence from the experimental literature and fromreal-world samples.

Illusion of ControlParallel to the questions posed by the self-aggrandizement lit-

erature, Taylor and Brown (1988) posed two questions concern-ing the evidence for an illusion ofcontrol: Doessuch an illusionexist? Is it associated with the tasks and criteria traditionallyassociated with mental health? In examining our original articleand some of the studies that have been generated sincethat time,Colvin and Block suggest that depressed people are not morerealistic than healthy adults in terms of the illusion of control.As indicated earlier, research on depressive realism is of interestin its own right, but it does not change the fact that normal,healthy adults often show an illusion of control.

Moreover, evidence continues to mount that this illusion ofcontrol is associated with good adjustment, especially understressful circumstances. A substantial experimental literaturelargely generated in the 1970s indicates that an illusion of con-trol helps people adjust to forthcoming laboratory stressors, andthese conclusions remain unchallenged by subsequent experi-mental work (Spacapan & Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 1981;Thompson & Spacapan, 1991). Similarly, experiments con-ducted in medical settings clearly demonstrate that people whobelieve theyhave control during stressful procedures cope betterthan those undergoing the same procedures but not exposed tocontrol-enhancing interventions, as indicated by a broad array

of physiological, health-related, and affective measures; theseeffects occur even when that "control" is largely perceivedrather than actual (Spacapan & Thompson, 1991; Thompson &Spacapan, 1991; see Taylor, 1991, for a review).

Complementing these findings, a growing literature over thepast five years has addressed whether self-generatedfeelings ofcontrol relate to adjustment in the context of chronic disease.The general finding of this literature is that, just as in the labo-ratory and in controlled medical experiments, perceived controlis associated with better adjustment (see Spacapan & Thomp-son, 1991; Thompson & Spacapan, 1991, for reviews).Why, then, do Colvin and Block review a subset of the litera-ture on self-generated perceptions of control and conclude thatthe evidence is mixed? First, their argument, again, dependsheavily on the depressive realism phenomenon, which, as wehave noted, is not directly germane to the Taylor and Brown(1988) thesis.Thesecond reason stems from the fact that Colvinand Block evaluate the illusion of control with respect to a falsestandard. The important issue is not whether people believethey can control things they cannot control (and the relation ofthose beliefs to adjustment) but rather whether people believethey can control things more than is actually the case (and howthese beliefs relate to adjustment). A discussion of the formerleads to absurd predictions. One would have to predict, for ex-ample, that people who believe that they make the sun rise inthe morning and set at night are examplesof mentally healthyindividuals. Although some laboratory research examined theillusion of control in circumstances in which no control exists(e.g., Langer, 1975), Taylor and Brown (1988) were concernedwith the second issue, that is, whether people believe they cancontrol things more than is actually the case.

Thus, in evaluating evidence concerning self-generated per-ceptions of control, one must ask: control over what? Clearly,from the standpoint of Taylor and Brown (1988), not all feelingsof personal control would be expected to predict adjustment. Ifa small group of individuals persist in believing that they cancure themselves of indisputably advancing, chronic, or life-threatening diseases, we might find that these individuals aremaladjusted, as is sometimes the case. Typically, however, theseare not the domains over which chronically ill patients believethey can exert control. People switch their control-related be-liefs from survival and cure to control of symptoms and of lifetasks, and, in these domains, control continues to be associatedwith good adjustment despite clearly declining absolute levelsof control (e.g., Buunk et al., 1990; Reed, Taylor,& Kemeny,1993; Thompson, Nanni, & Levine, 1993; Thompson, Sobo-lew-Shubin, Galbraith, Schwankovsky, & Cruzen, 1993).

The third reason why Colvin and Block conclude falsely thatevidence for the adaptiveness of illusion of control isequivocalis that they examine studies designed to address issues morecomplex than this simple main effect and attempt to construemain effect conclusions from them. Many of the studies theycite areaddressing issues orthogonal to the general adaptivenessof control. For example, the studies by Affleck, Tennen, Pfeiffer,and Fifield (1987) and Taylor, Helgeson, Reed, and Skokan(1991) were concerned with direct control versus vicarious con-trol and how control-related beliefs and their relation to adjust-ment shifts with disease course. The Burish et al. (1984) inves-tigation concerned health locus of control. The study by Schi-


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24 SHELLEY E. TAYLOR A N D JONATHON D . BROWNaffino an d Revenson (1992), cited by Colvin an d Block as aqualification of the illusion of control, draws that conclusiononly about which variables moderate or mediate the relationof perceived control to adjustment. The relation itself is not indispute: Perceived co ntrol was associated wi th less pain, less dis-ability, and reduced depression (see also Taylor, Kemeny et al.,1991).Although a number of published articles speculated thought-fully about th e potential limitations of the illusion of control(e.g., Re id, 1984; Thom pson, Cheek, & Graham, 1988), mostof these concerns address reservations about the adaptiveness offeelings of control wh en control does not exist. It is imp ortan t toreiterate that the illusion of control typically represents a milddistortion in domains over which people actually have somecontrol. Like the other illusions, the illusion of control is nottypically held about things that are completely uncontrollable(although this condition has sometimes been created in certainlaboratory studies). In the case of self-generated feelings of con-trol, research has moved beyond the simple question of whethercontrol predicts adjustme nt, a relation firmly established by theexperimental literature and by the literature that asks patientswhat areas of their lives they think they can control. In sum-mary, we stand by our original conclusion that the illusion ofcontrol often exists in normal samples an d that, when it does, itis typically associated with good psychological adjustment.

Unrealistic OptimismParallel to our questions concerning self-aggrandizement an dthe illusion of control, we asked tw o questions of the literatureon unrealistic optimism: Does it exist in normal samples?When it does, is it associated with the tasks and criteria nor-mally regarded as indicative of men tal health? Evidence for un-realistic optimism in normal samples is voluminous and con-t inues to grow. According to Weinstein (1993), there are at least121 articles on perceived invul ne rab ility and optim istic biasesabout risk an d future life events alone, a listing that does notinclude a number of relevant references on optimism as a traitconcept (e.g., Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Scheier &Carver, 1985; Scheier et al., 1989). Although C olvin and Blockcorrectly note that some of the studies found that depressedpeople are unduly pessimistic rather than accurate , these stud-ies uniformly find that normal adults are optimistic. The evi-dence clearly indicates that most people anticipate that theirfuture will be brighter than can reasonably be justified on sta-tistical grounds.In large part, this volum inou s literature also continues to up -

hold the conclusions reached in the 1988 review: Unrealisticoptimism makes people feel better, it appears to be associatedwith positive social relationships, it predicts high motivation toengage in productive wo rk, and, as a dispositional construc t, it isassociated wit h the ab ility to cope m ore successfully and recoverfaster from certain health-related stressors (e.g., Scheier &Carver, 1985; Scheier etal., 1989; Scheier, We intraub , & Carver,1986).As an illustrative exam ple, consider the a rticle by Taylor et al.(1992), which examined the relation of acquired immunodefi-ciency syndrome (AIDS)-specific optimism an d dispositionaloptimism to a broad array of indicators of psychological adjust-

me nt. This study revealed that m en wh o had tested seropositivefor hum an immunodeficiency virus (H IV ) were significantlymore optimistic about not acquiring AIDS than men who knewthey were seronegative fo r HIV ; this surprising finding was con-strued as suggestive evidence that AIDS-specific optimismamong seropositive men is illusory. Moreover, this AIDS-spe-cific optimism was associated with reduced fatalistic vulnera-bility regarding AIDS, with the use of positive attitudes as acoping techn ique, with the use of personal growth/helping oth-ers as a coping technique, with less use of avoidant coping strat-egies, and with greater practice of health-promoting behaviors.In addition, A IDS-specific optimism was related to a lower per-ceived risk of AIDS an d greater feelings of control. A similarpattern of effects wa s identified for the dispositional measure ofoptimism . Thus, the breadth of support for the conclusion thatAIDS-specific optimism is associated wit h psychological adjust-men t is mu ch greater than C olvin and Block imply.In short, a substantial literature on unre alistic optimism con-t inues to demonstrate that unrealistically optimistic beliefsabout the future are held by no rma l individuals with respect toa wide variety of events. There is, in our judgment, no clearevidence that such beliefs compromise mental health andmo untin g evidence that they contribute to it.Furthe r Clarifications Regarding the Taylor and BrownPositive Illusions Formulation

We have already addressed on e misconception regarding Tay-lor an d Brown's (1988) position: namely, ou r model predictsthat depressed people are more accurate in their self-percep-tions than are nondepressed people. A num ber of other miscon-ceptions regarding our model have made their way into the lit-erature and into Colvin and Block's critique and are now dis-cussed.More Illusion Is Better

We restricted our claims regarding the benefits of positive il-lusion to a specific set of moderate tendencies to view oneself,one's ability to control th e environment, an d one's future insomewhat more positive terms than can realistically be justified.Typically, these illusions remain mild because the social envi-ronment tolerates an d fosters modest illusion but not substan-tial degrees of illusion (Taylor, 1989). At extreme levels, as wenoted (Taylor, 1989), illusion may well be maladaptive(Baumeister, 1988). Three of the articles cited by Colvin an dBlock as refutations of Taylor and Brown (Donovan & Leavitt,1989; Donovan, Leavitt, & Walsh, 1990; Haaga & Stewart,1992) also conclude that a djustm ent is greater, given moderatelevels of illusion, but that the illusion-adjustmen t relationbreaks down at high levels of illusion (cf. Diener, Colvin, Pavot,& Allman, 1991). These patterns are consistent with, no t con-tradictory to, our framework.

Positive Illusions Are Simply Defense Mechanisms inAnother G uise, and, by Implication, DefensivenessShould Be Associated With Mental Health.Taylor (1989, Chapter 4) clearly discriminated positive illu-sions from defense mechanisms both conceptually and opera-


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POSITIVE ILLUSIONS A N D WELL-BEING REVISITED 25tionally. Chief among these argum ents is the finding that posi-tive illusions are directly responsive to threatening circum-stances, whereas defenses are conceptualized as inverselyresponsive to threate ning inform ation. Thus, for example, ad-vancing cancer patients typically do not deny or repress infor-mation about their deteriorating condition. They are aware thattheir circumstances have worsened, but within the context ofthis acknowledgment, they may put a more optimistic spin ontheir circumstances than conditions w arrant. This line of argu-ment questions the appropriateness of Compton (1992) as a testof the positive illusions fram ewo rk.

All Illusions Are Go odWe have confined our arguments regarding the benefits ofpositive illusions to specific ones that relate to self-perceptions,perceptions of control, and unrealistic optimism. Althoughthere may be other positive illusions that facilitate psychologicalwell-being, this is an empirical case to be made rather than anextension to be drawn from ou r arguments.Thus, our analysis also does not imply that illusory self-per-ceptions are never destructive or that some types of psychopa-thology are not characterized by illusory perceptions of theirown. It is absolutely clear that certain illusions or distortions(e.g., delusions of grandeur, h allucinations, gross mispercep-tions of physical reality) are associated with mental illness(Brown, 1991; Taylor, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This im-portant point is sometimes m issed by those wh o have criticizedou r approach.

Illusion Is Necessary for Mental HealthAn argument that illusions promote mental health does notimply that they are a necessary condition for mental health.

That is a point that has yet to be proven or refute d. Two pointsof refuting evidence offered by Colvin and Block are based onthis misinterpretation (Com pton, 1992; Langer & Brown,1975).Illusions Cure People of Physical Illnesses

One of the articles cited by Colvin and Block (Doan & Gray,1992) is strongly critical of Taylor and Brown (1988), arguingthat the re is no evidence that positive illusions can cu re cancer.We concur. We certainly did not make that claim in the 1988essay, and Taylor (1989) explicitly argued against this kin d ofovergeneralization.The Absence of Depression Is Mental Health

Colvin an d Block consistently imply th at we used the absenceof depression as a primary criterion of mental health. This isnot correct. Depression is not the obverse of mental health; it isonly on e form of me ntal illness.On the basis of prior theoreticalformulations, we identified multiple indicators of mentalhealth: the ability to be happy or conten ted, the ability to feelgood about oneself, the ability to care for and about others, thecapacity fo r creative an d productive work, and the ability togrow and deve lop, especially in response to stressful events (Tay-lor, 1989; Taylor & Brow n, 1988). Considering the convergence

in the literature on these criteria, we are puzzled as to why Col-vin and Block believe we "did not use conceptually acceptableand empirically substantial operationalizationsof the constructof mental health" (p. 16).We also disagree that these criteria are synonymous with pos-itive illusions. Although there is certainly overlap with respectto positive mood and positive views of the self, the remainingcriteria we considered (e.g., productive work) are clearly dis-criminably different from the illusions we have identified.Experimental Studies With College Students Are

Sufficient to Yield a Model of Mental HealthContrary to C olvin and Block's assertion, we never suggestedthat experimental studies with college students are a sufficientbasis for building a model of mental health. As concerns oursubject populations and procedures, we agree with Colvin andBlock that the experimental literature with college student sub-jects is intrinsically limited. College students do differ frommem bers of the general population in important ways, and the

way research participants experience experimental situations isnot always the way these situations are inte rpreted by investiga-tors.For these reasons, our research efforts also included the stu dyof illusions in the "real world." For example, the work of Tayloran d her associates indicates that positive illusions are linked towidely accepted indicators of me ntal health among individualsfacing traumatic stressful events in their lives, such as AIDS, cancer, and heart disease. These findings supplement and sup-port the experimental evidence relating illusions to well-being.Colvin and B lock dismiss this evidence as"long-term fixes," butgiven the broad range of mental health indicators that positiveillusions predict, an d considering the decades or mo re that peo-ple live with these health-related stressors (HIV-seropositivemen; cancer patients in remission; heart patients), these "fixes"appear to fix things quite well and are "long term" indeed!These findings make us wonder why Colvin and Block end theiressay by questioning whethe r illusions influence mental healthin the "real world."The Human Mind Is Untuned to Reality Detection

Con trary to C olvin and Block's characterization of our posi-tion, we do not adopt a "pervasive, dismal, view of the humanmind as being untun ed to realitydetection."We agree that thereare ways in w hich people ex hibit self-corrective tendencies overtime (see, e.g., p. 203 of Taylor & Brown, 1988). In Taylor(1989), considerable space is devoted to reconciling mild posi-tive illusions with the need to monitor reality effectively. Subse-quent research on cognitive illusions has carried these argu-ments further. Am ong the most intrigu ing findings are those byGollwitzer and Kinney (1989) and Taylor (1993). When indi-viduals are in a deliberative mindset, attempting to m ake a de-cision, their positive illusions are qu ite m odest; bu t when theyare in an implemental mindset, attempting to put a decisioninto effect, illusions increase dramatically. Interestingly, the be-havior of control subjects (i.e., those in neither m indset) is morelike the illusion-prone behavior of those in an implementalmindset, a finding that is also consistent with Taylor and


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26 SHELLEY E. TAYLOR AND JONA THON D. BROWNBrown's (1988) point of view. This research im plies that theremay be windows of realism d urin g which people suspend theirillusions, at least somewhat, in favor of a more realistic vantagepoint.

Concluding RemarksIn conclusion, we reaffirm the basic principle s of the Tayloran d Brown (1988) position. We maintain that self-aggrandizingself-perceptions, an illusion of control, and unrealistic opti-mism are widespread in normal human thought. We furthermaintain that these "illusions" foster the criteria norm ally as-sociated with m ental health. We concur with Colvin an d Blockthat the evidence for depressive realism is equivocal bu t reiter-ate tha t whe ther depressives are accurate or negatively biased isnot directly relevant to ou r formulation.We also agree with Co lvin and Block that laboratory studieswith college student samples provide only partial support forour theoretical position. H owever, we note that a substantialbody of longitudinal evidence no w exists that examines how

people cope with intensely stressful events in their daily lives.On the independent variable side, this research provides clearevidence of illusion, and on the outcome variable side, it makesuse of clearly agreed-on, well-established indicators of mentalhealth. Thu s, five years and at least 250 refe rence s later, we seelittle evidence to challenge our original position. Instead, theaccumu lating findings from adult populations facing traumatic,potentially me ntal health-compromising events have broadenedthe base of our original assertions.How, then, do we account for Colvin and Block's bottom line:that the illusions-mental health link has ye t to be convincinglydemonstrated? We suggest, first, that their main quarrel is withthe depressive-realism literature, no t with the Taylor an d Brownformulation. In this vein, we also believe that their literaturereview wa s limited. Colvin an d Block consider o nly a portion ofthe references cited in our original article an d only 45 articlespublished since ou r article appeared; of these 45, only 19 aredirectly relevant to the positive illusionsframework, another 12examine only depressive realism , and 14 are cited to addressother issues raised by Colvin an d Block. If one reviews only amodest amount of the literature, one is apt to find the amountof supportive literature to be modest.In closing, we suggest that work on illusions and mentalhealth has gone beyond the simple questions of "Do illusionsexist and are they associated with mental health?" The ques-tions we should be asking no w are, "When are positive illusionsmost in evidence?", "Do they ever compromise mental health,an d if so , when?", "Are there conditions when they dam p downor disappear altogether?", and "D o such conditions address theparadox of how people can hold positive illusions about them -selves, their world, an d their future while still coping success-f u l l y with an environ me nt that would seem to demand accurateappreciation of its feedback?" On these questions, recent re-search suggests that progress is being made.

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Received September 4, 1993Revision received November 15, 1993

Accepted November 15, 1993

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1994 Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited Separating Fact From Fiction