1991 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations_Security Community or Defence Community

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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence Community"?Author(s): Amitav AcharyaReviewed work(s):Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), pp. 159-178Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British ColumbiaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2759957 .

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The Associationof SoutheastAsian

Nations: "Security Community"or "Defence Community"?Amitav Acharya

JN May 1989, the formerforeignministerofMalaysia, Abu HassanlOmar, called on the countriesof the Associationof Southeast AsianNations ASEAN) to form "DefenceCommunity"whichwouldtake hemto "new heightsofpolitical and militarycooperation."I Though notclearly efined, heconceptmerits erious ttentionrom nyone nterestedin ASEAN's past and future. ince its nception, hechief oliticalgoal ofASEAN has been toprevent,manage and resolveconflictsntheregion.In this espect,ASEAN's concept fregional rderhas centered n thecre-ationof SoutheastAsian "security ommunity," efinedntheDeutschian

sense as a groupof tateswhose members hare"dependable expectationsofpeacefulchange" intheirmutual relations nd ruleouttheuse offorceas a means ofproblem solving.2n contrast,ASEAN stateshave consis-tently ejected military act.WhiletheMalaysian minister's onceptdidnotcall for ucha pact, tnonetheless epresented striking eparture romthelong-standingpositionofthe ASEAN countries n favour of strictlybilateral rrangementsnthesphereofmilitary ooperation.As such, thevery dea of n ASEAN "defence ommunity, implying heneed for ome

form ftrilateralrmultilateralmilitary rrangement ithin hegrouping,constitutesmarkedly ifferentoalthan he dea of" security ommunity"

I The concept was presented n a speech by theminister t a conferenceheld in Singapore. Uponbeing asked at the conference y thiswriter o provide some specifics s towhat theconcept of "defence

community" meant, or how it would be operationalized, the minister merely noted that it wouldgo beyond existingbilateral cooperation and mightpossiblyinvolve cooperation on arms manufac-turing. See also StraitsTimes,5 May 1989; SundayTimes Singapore), 14 May 1989.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance and advice of two people who helped me considera-bly in researching the manuscript. These two scholars are: Dr. Soedjati Djiwandono of the CentreforStrageticand International Studies, Jakarta, and Mr. Sukhumbhand Paribatra ofthe Instituteof Security and International Studies, Bangkok.

2 The concept of "Security Community" as employed here is borrowed fromKarl Deutsch etal., PoliticalCommunityntheNorth tlantic rea Princeton, NewJersey: PrincetonUniversity Press,1957), pp. 5-6.

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which s focused n cooperation oresolvedisputes nd conflicts ithin heregionalgrouping.3

What makes theconceptof a "defencecommunity"all themoresig-nificants thefact hatbilateralmilitaryrrangementsmongtheASEANmembershavereached stagewhich an no longerbe ignoredwhenevalu-atingthepurposeand role ofASEAN as a regionalgrouping. ndeed, thedistinctiventerlockingattern fbilateralinkshas beentermed ythe hiefof the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno,as an ASEAN"defence spiderweb. 4 Whether n ASEAN "defencespiderweb" couldbe the ogicalfoundation or nASEAN "defencecommunity" snot usta rhetorical uestionfor t raises a numberof mportantssues relating otherelevanceand role of ASEAN as itenters n era of uncertaintyndchange.

Is there conflict etweenthe conceptof "defencecommunity"andASEAN's professed im ofcreating SoutheastAsian "security ommu-nity"?The callfor defence ommunityssumes that ntra-ASEAN con-flicts ave been so mutedthat t snow possibleto envisage"new heights"of ecurityooperation,ncludingmilitaryrrangements. ut sthis credi-ble assumption?Answers o thesequestionsrequire n appraisalof everal

issues, ncluding hefactors ehindASEAN's rejection p tillnow of mili-taryrole,the forms f ntra-ASEAN bilateralmilitaryinksand whethera defence ommunitysa necessary,easible rdesirable ption.Theseissuesconstitute he central nalytic oncernof thispaper.

"SECURITY COMMUNITY" VERSUS ALLIANCE A BACKGROUND

The ideathatASEAN shoulddevelop omeform fmilitaryole snoth-ingnew. In 1970,thethen ndonesianarmedforces ommander,General

Maraden Pangabbean, suggested hat ndonesia wouldbe ready oprovidemilitaryid to tsASEAN partners acing securityhreat.n 1976, ndone-siareportedlyushedfor planto create "jointdefence ouncil" amongtheASEAN states. n the aftermathf the VietnameseinvasionofCam-bodia, thethenprimeminister fThailand, KriangsakChomanan, calledforASEAN militaryxercises,while PresidentMarcos of thePhilippines

I A usefulway to highlight hedistinctionbetween "security community" and "defence com-

munity" in a regional/subregional ontextwould be to applyLynn Miller's definition f the"peace"

and "security" rolesof regionalorganizations.The "peace" role,central o a "securitycommunity,"

refers o the "potential of a regional organization, through tspeace-keeping machineryand diplo-matic techniques, for ontrolling heforceful ettlement f conflicts mong its own members." The

"security" role,whichmightbe considered ntegral oa "defencecommunity, denotes"the potential

of theorganizationtopresenta common military ront gainst an outside actor oractors. " See Lynn

Miller, "The Prospectof Order Through Regional Security, inRichard A. Falk and Saul H. Mend-

lovitz, eds., RegionalPolitics nd WorldOrder San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1973), p. 51.

It needs to be stressedhere again that lthough he Malaysian foreignminister rovidedfew pecif-

ics as towhat an ASEAN defencecommunitywould look like, Miller's definitionprovides a mini-

mum criterionfor udging any regional grouping which aspires to a defence and securityrole.4 StraitsTimes Weekly Overseas Edition), 9 December 1989.

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ASEAN. "Security ommunity"r "DefenceCommunity"?

urgedconsideration fsome mode of ASEAN] cooperation . . to stemthetide of nsurgency" ntheregion. n 1982, Singapore Prime MinisterLee Kuan Yew calledfor rilateral SEAN military xercises nresponseto thethreat osed bythe Soviet-Vietnamese lliance. The former rimeminister fMalaysia, TunkuAbdulRahman, called for nASEAN "jointcommand" to facilitate commonresponseto a possiblespillover f theIndochina conflict.5

None oftheseproposals,however,foundbroadsupport rom ecisionmakers ntheASEAN states.Atbest, n ASEAN militaryrrangement asdeemed unnecessaryor unimportant; t worst, t was seen as counter-productive. he goal of reating "security ommunity" otonly ssumed

priority ver a military act, but the atterwas considered ubversive f heformer.

Although he mergence fASEAN was theresult fmanyfactors, ewwere more mportanthanthedesireof tsmember tates o create forumfor the discussion and resolution of regional disputes. The task ofintraregional onflict eductionhad assumed importance n view of thefailure fprevious ttempts tregionalunity, s inthecase oftheAssocia-tion of Southeast Asia and Maphilindo (Malaysia, thePhilippinesandIndonesia). Singapore'stension-ridden ieswith tsMalay neighbours ol-lowing ts eparationfromMalaysia in1965 added tothechallengesfacingtheviability ftheASEAN experiment.Againstthisbackdrop,ASEAN'sfirst rgent askwasnotto forge militarylliance,but todefuse he ourcesoftension mongthem.Promoting he ong-term abit ofcooperation omove thegrouping owards regional ecurityommunity ormed hecoreofASEAN's politicalrole in itsearlyyears.

Giventhat ourcesof nterstate onflictnSoutheastAsia werecloselylinkedto the domesticpolitical tabilityf theregionalactors, nyration-

ale for military act whichmight reate regional security ommunity")had to be conceivedbyASEAN leaders nthe context f tsutilityn serv-ing nternalegitimacynd stability. lliancesareusually response o thethreat fmilitaryttackbyan external ourceand arenormallynvoked tthe ime f uchan attack. n the aseofASEAN, however,he ecurity er-ceptions fthemember tates onverged n a "common internal nemy.The latterwas represented y thechallengeofCommunist insurgency,whichconfronted ll theASEAN states, s well as ethnic eparatistmove-ments, specially nThailand, thePhilippines nd Indonesia. All ASEANcountrieswere committed oprevent he kind of radical internal hangewhichwas engulfingheir ndochineseneighbours.To the xtent hat heirlegitimacy depended on their ability to promote rapid economic

I Dick Wilson, TheNeutralizationf outheast sia (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 155; Frank Frost,"The Origins and Evolution ofASEAN," World eview,vol. 19, no. 3 (August 1980), p. 10; StraitsTimes, March 1980; BangkokWorld,June 1979; Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Extends ts MilitaryTies," Pacific efence eporterNovember 1982), pp. 55-85; "ASEAN Exercises?" Asiaweek, 4 Sep-tember 1982, p. 13; StraitsTimes,5 November 1979.

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development,conomic ooperationnan atmospherefpolitical ranquilitywas deemed to be theprimary askofASEAN regionalism.A military act

would be largely rrelevant o such tasks. This iswell encapsulated n theconceptofnational and regional "resilience" promotedby the Suhartoregime n Indonesia. "National resilience s an inward-looking oncept,based on theproposition hatnationalsecurityiesnot nmilitary lliancesor under themilitary mbrellaofa greatpower,but nself-reliance eriv-ing from omestic actors uch s economic nd socialdevelopment, oliticalstability nd a sense ofnationalism. 6 As theobjectiveofnational securitypolicy nindividualASEAN states s well as their egionalunity,nationalresilience overridesany rationale for an ASEAN military act. This is

because of heunderlying remise hat ifeach membernation ofASEAN]can accomplish an overall national development nd overcome nternalthreats, egional esilience an resultmuch nthe amewayas a chainderivesitsoverall trengthrom he strength f tsconstituentarts. 7 The sincer-ity fASEAN countries n adhering o thesenotions s not the ssue here.What is evident is thatan alliance was not seen as an effective ay ofaddressing heir ssentiallynward-lookingiew of ecurity, ocussed n thethreats f nsurgency, ubversion, thnic eparatism nd politicaldissent.

The ASEAN states lso perceivedthe need for wo additional criteriain creating heconditionsfor security ommunity: a) the maintenanceof nonprovocativeosture owards he ndochinese tates, nd b) theregu-lationofGreat Powerrivalryn theregion.The firstssumed importancein view ofVietnamese propaganda that portrayedASEAN as the newSoutheastAsianTreatyOrganization.Because oftheir ro-Westernean-ings, any militaryrrangements indingtheASEAN regimeswas boundto be perceived s an extension ftheWestern ecurity ramework. his inturnwas likely o invitecountermeasures rom he otherGreat Powers,

China and the SovietUnion, thereby ntensifyingreat Powerrivalryntheregion nd aggravatinghe enseof nsecurityelt ytheASEAN states.

Moreover, heusefulness fa military actseemed dubious. The mili-taryweaknessofthe ndividualASEAN states,whichmade themdepen-denton Western ecurity uarantees, lsoundermined hedeterrentalueofany ntra-ASEAN securityommitmentssuchas Indonesia's pledgeofsupport o itsneighbours).This realization, nd the mminent epartureofBritain nd theU.S. from heregion,had alreadypushedASEAN states

towardsa more self-reliantecurity osture.Self-reliance,twas hoped,could be made into a viable framework ornational security olicynotthrough pactthatwouldgenerategreater ostilityrom dversaries,but

6 David Irvine, "Making Haste Slowly: ASEAN From 1975," in Alison Broinowski, ed.,UnderstandingSEAN (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 40.

7 Jusuf Wanandi, "Security Issues in the ASEAN Region," in Karl Jackson and M. HadiSoesatro, eds., ASEAN Securitynd Economic evelopmentBerkeley: UniversityofCalifornia, Insti-tute of East Asian Studies, 1984), p. 305.

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ASEAN. "Security ommunity"r "DefenceCommunity"?

by mposingpoliticalbarriers oallforeignntervention. ence, in 1971 nKuala Lumpur ASEAN calledfor Zone ofPeace, Freedom ndNeutrality(ZOPFAN) in SoutheastAsia, which ought o reinforce ormsofmutualnoninterventiono be secured from xtraregional owers. The ZOPFANdeclarationwas seenbytheASEAN states s havinga greater otential oenhance their ecurity han a military act.

The ASEAN states' rejectionof the idea of a military act did not,however, ecessarilymply hat heir iewof ecurity as completelynwardlooking and did not include a shared perceptionof the externaldangeremanatingfrom heCommunistmovementsnIndochina.Nor did itsug-gest hat herelationshipsetween hevariousASEAN states' xternal ecu-

rity inkages, n theonehand,and intra-ASEAN security ies, n theother,were viewed as mutually xclusive. What itsignifiedwas that heASEANleaders considered he potential ostsof a pact, interms f tsprovocativeeffect n Vietnam, to be greater han tsexpected benefits, nd thatwiththeavailability f external ecurity uarantees, he need for securityr-rangement mong theASEAN countrieswas accorded lowpriority ythememberstates.

The call for defence ommunity as notthefirst ime he ssue ofmili-

tary ooperationhad confronted SEAN leaders.They debated the ssueon theeve ofthefirst SEAN summitheld n Bali in 1976but rejected healliance option. Instead, theDeclaration of ASEAN Concord endorsedexisting ilateralmilitary iesby callingfor he"continuationofcoopera-tionon a non-ASEAN basis betweenmember tates nsecuritymattersnaccordance with heirmutual needs and interests. Bilateral inks, uch astheThai-Malaysia andMalaysia-Indonesiaborder ecurity rrangements,were seen as being more flexible nd advantageous than an alliance.Explaining heposition eachedbytheASEAN statesnBali,the henprime

minister fMalaysia, HusseinOnn, observed:"It isobvious thatASEANmember statesdo not wish tochangethe character fASEAN as a socio-economicorganisationnto securityllianceas thiswouldonly reatemis-understandingn theregionand undermine hepositive chievements fASEAN in promotingpeace and stability hrough ocio-economic andrelatedfields. . . [The Bali summit]reiterated henature ofASEAN asa non-ideological,non-military nd non-antagonistic rouping. 8

The position dopted nBali has endured. t survived heVietnameseinvasionofCambodia in ate1978and thethreat oThai security osed bythepresenceof Vietnamesetroopson the Thai-Cambodia border.Whilethe atter roduced public pledgesby Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia,toprovide ssistance oBangkok nthe vent f Vietnamese ttack, eitherBangkoknoritsASEAN partners onceived of such help being providedwithin n ASEAN military ramework. urthermore, he nature of aid

8 New StraitsTimes, 11 January 1978.

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whichwas envisagedwas notto be in theform f roopdeployments o fightalongside the Thais, but the provisionof ammunition nd logistics up-

port.9U.S. assistancewas seen as indispensable gainst any major threattoThailand,and it s ogical o assume that ny major nterventiony forcesfrom therASEAN states n support fThailand would have been possibleonly n conjunctionwitha directAmerican nterventionn the conflict.

EVOLVING BILATERAL MILITARY TIES AMONG ASEAN STATES

While the ASEAN states' rejectionof military lliance remains, thenature nd scope of ntra-ASEAN militaryinkages evelopedon a bilateral

basis have evolved rapidly.Early forms fbilateral ieswere made to dealwithregional border nsurgencies.But withthe virtualcollapse of Com-munist nsurgenciesntheregion,military ooperation as taken he hapeof ntelligenceharing,ointexercises ndtraining, hichhave greater tilityagainst conventionalmilitary hreats.

The shifts especially vident n thecase of heborder ecurity rrange-mentsmentioned bove. The principal imofThai-Malaysia cooperationwas tostampout theremnants ftheCommunistPartyofMalaya (CPM)whichhad retreatedntoThai territoryollowinghe uccessful ritish oun-

terinsurgencyampaign nMalaya. Measures undertaken or hispurposeincluded ntelligence haring,oint counterinsurgencyperations such astheDayoiMusna nd Cahaya enaoperationsn1977,and ointnaval and airexercisestheSea Ex- Thamal eries fnaval exercises eginningn1979,andtheAirThamal eriesof nnual airexercisesfrom 982). Bilateralcoopera-tion, however,was farfrom mooth,withMalaysia accusingThailand oftoleratingPM presencenside ts erritoryndThailandaccusingMalaysiaofsupportingMuslim rebels n its southern rovinces.But in any case, a

tripartitegreementbetween

Malaysia,Thailand and CPM leader Chin

Peng which ed to thedisbandmentof theCPM in December 1989 hasmovedThai-Malaysian military ooperation o a newstagewithboth idesthinking fcooperation n more conventionaldefence areas such as airdefence xercises.

Border ecurityooperation etweenndonesia ndMalaysiadatesfromtheBangkokAgreement etween hetwocountriesnMay 1966,whichfor-mallyended their onfrontation. he twosidessigneda BorderSecurityAgreement in 1972 to curb insurgent activityon the East Malaysia-

9 In Indonesia, Coordinating Minister forPolitico-SecurityAffairsGeneral Pangabbean statedthatmilitary id toThailand would include "ammunition, " althoughhe did not ruleout othertypesof weapon and logistic id (DavidJenkins, "Pangabbean's False Alarm," Far Eastern conomic eview,

8June 1979, p. 24). In the case of Malaysia, Home MinisterGhazalie Shafie indicated that ts "con-tributionwill be in theformof . . sending goods they theThais] are shortof" (New Straits imes,21 November 1979). Among otherfactors, ack of air transportation apability and lack of trainingpracticewithThai forceswould have made anymove to deploytroopsto Thailand extremely ifficult,except perhaps for air operations.

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ASEAN: "Security ommunityor "DefenceCommunity?

Kalimantanborder.They conductedcombinedcounterinsurgencyffen-sives such as theSeriAman n1974,whichreportedlyed to the surrender

offivehundredmembers ftheNorthKalimantan CommunistParty, ndOperation emudin early1982,which was believed to have reduced thestrength fthe NKCP to ninety-six ctive guerrillas).'0These arrange-mentswereexpanded n1984,whenthe copeofcooperationwas extendedto nclude hemaritime order n theStrait fMalacca while he"commonenemy" was redefinedndbroadened o nclude mugglers, rug raffickersand counterfeiters."

The Communist nsurgencynthe ndonesia-Malaysiaborderhas col-lapsed. In 1986, Malaysia claimedthat he trengthf heCommunistshad

been "so reduced that hey re no longer seriousthreat,'12 and Indone-sia proclaimed ts borderareas tobe "clean," with hecaptureofthe astremnants of the insurgents.'3 Accordingly, the focus of Malaysia-Indonesia border ooperation ad shiftedoother roblems, ncluding os-sible threats rom he South China Sea. This shiftwas clearly ndicated n1984 when the two sidesdiscussedmeasures to stepup air and naval exer-cises, oint purchaseofdefence quipment nd supplies, nd the haring fservicingnd support acilitiesor heirnavies and air forces.'4 he follow-

ing year the oint bordercommittee etweenthetwocountries eportedlydiscussed"contingency lansthat ouldbe put ntoeffect hould conflictsintheregion scalateto pose a threat o the security fthetwocountries.This understanding ed togreater ooperation n monitoring ea trafficntheStraits fMalacca, and finalized n agreement ermitting alaysia touse Indonesia's Natuna Island formilitary urposes, ncludingointexer-cises with ndonesia.'5

The decline ofCommunist nsurgencyn the ASEAN stateshas notaffected notherkey area of security ooperation. Intelligence-sharing

among theASEAN stateshas over theyearsbecome moreextensive. nseveralcases, contactsbetween ntelligence gencieswere thecrucialfirststeptowardsmorecomprehensive orms fdefence nd securityoopera-tionamongtheASEAN states.Security iesbetweenMalaysia and Singa-pore, whichsurvived the strainscaused by the latter'sseparationfromMalaysia, providea case inpoint. In December 1981,theprimeministerofMalaysia, Mahathir Mohammed, acknowledgedthatMalaysia andSingaporehad maintained ooperationbetween the security pparatusesofourtwosocieties . . against nysubversive nd criminal lements hatcould affect urstabilityven henoliticaleadersof he wo ountries]erepenly

10New StraitsTimes, 14 November 1983.11New StraitsTimes, 29 November 1985.12 Indonesia Times,1 October 1986.13 StraitsTimes, 29 November 1986.14 Business Times Kuala Lumpur),4.December 1984.15 New StraitsTimes, 29 November 1985; Star, 29 November 1985.

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squabbling"emphasisadded). Indonesia and Singapore had begunregu-lar intelligence xchangessoon after he end ofconfrontation. he Com-

munistvictories n Indochina strengthenedntra-ASEAN intelligenceexchanges.Thailand and thePhilippines igned n accord n December1976"to continue ocooperate ncombattingnternal nsurgency nd subver-sion through consultations nd exchanges of intelligence nd views."Singapore and the Philippines also reached agreement on intelligenceexchanges and consultations n problems ofinsurgency. n 1978, ThaiPrimeMinisterKriangsakconfirmed xchanges f' militarynformation"betweenBangkok and Jakarta.'6More recently,Brunei has developedintelligence inkswith ts ASEAN partners, ncludingMalaysia.17

Bilateralntelligencegreements avebeencomplemented yASEAN-wide exchanges,whichmay have predated the1976 Bali summit.18 orexample, in December 1976,PresidentMarcos confirmed n "an agree-mentfor n exchangeof nformation, fviewsand intelligence mongthecountriesn SoutheastAsiafor he astfouryears"emphasis added). 19 hiswas probably referenceothepractice f ecret nnualmeetings f ntel-ligenceagenciesofall the ASEAN countries.The practicehas continuedtodate,withASEAN countriesaking urnsnhostinghesemeetings. uchmultilateralmeetings rovide

rareprecedentor

ther orms fASEAN-widemilitary ooperation, uch as defenceministers'meetings,which heASEAN stateshave hitherto esisted.

The number ndvariety fbilateralmilitaryxercises etweenASEANstates an be seen from heappendix.As the table makesclear,naval andair exerciseshave been muchmore common than and exercises,reflect-ingthefact hat heformer re somewhatesssensitive han and exercises.Nonetheless, nrecentyears,the numberof and exerciseshas increased,with hebeginning ftheSemangatersaturmy xercise etween ingapore

and Malaysia (now suspended) and the Safkarndopura ommand Postexercises etween ndonesia and Singapore.Secondly, ndonesiahasbeena key atalyst or ntra-ASEAN bilateral xercises.According oajapanesesource,ofthe45 bilateralASEAN exercises trecordedbetweenMay 1972and the nd of1970, ndonesia ookpart38times, ollowedy Malaysia 26),Thailand (9), Singapore 7) and thePhilippines 6).20 ndonesia's bilater-al exercise rogrammewithMalaysiahasbeenthemost omprehensiveneinASEAN. Apartfrom eparate ir,naval andground xercises,ndonesia

16 The StraitsTimes, 23 September 1978.17 New StraitsTimes, 8 December 1981; Richardson, "ASEAN Extends Its Military Ties," p.

55; StraitsTimes,23 December 1976; New Nation, 16 February 1977; K.U. Menon, "A Six PowerDefence Arrangement n Southeast Asia, " ContemporaryoutheastAsia,ol. 10, no. 3 (December 1988),p. 314.

18Noordin Sopiee, "The Challenge of theBali Summit," New Straits imes,20 February 1976.19StraitsTimes, 23 December 1976.20 Asian Security981 (Tokyo: Research Institute forPeace and Security, 1980), p. 121.

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ASEAN: "Security ommunity"r "DefenceCommunity?

and Malaysia conductedthefirstxercises n ASEAN involving ll threebranches of the armed forces n 1982 (exercise Darsasa Malindo). Donald

Weatherbee as contended hat he strong ore" of ntra-ASEAN bilateralexercises s to be found"in thede factoMalaysian-Indonesian securityalliance. 21 This observation ccords well with n officialMalaysian esti-mate, according o whichMalaysia and Indonesia had conducted32 ointexercisesbetween 1972 and May 1984, including12 ElangMalindo ir ex-ercises, 12 Malindo Jaya naval exercises and 8 Kekar Malindo armyexercises.22

The proliferationf uch exercises s partly xplained by their alue inconfidence-building.earsthat ointexerciseswouldprovideforeign roops

an opportunity orterritorial amiliarizationwith the hostcountryhavegradually ivenway to recognition hat hey an help "build linkswithneighbours,overcomesuspicionsand promotecooperation.23 Bilateralexercises lso help developcommonoperating rocedures nd tactics, tan-dardize modes of command and control, nd enhance inter-operabilitybetweenthe armed forces ftheASEAN states, hereby reating hebasisformutual help againsta common security hreat.This consideration sespeciallynoteworthyn thecase oftheMalaysia-Indonesia agreement o

use the atter'sNatuna Island as a base for ointexercises.The accord hasbeen officiallyxplainedas a measure tomeet maritime hreats rom heSouthChina Sea, especially hathypotheticallyosed by the scalating avalcompetition etweenVietnam and China.24

Singapore sthemain beneficiaryf ntra-ASEANcooperation oncern-ing training acilities.Apartfromtstwo armycamps in Thailand, and itsdetachment ffighterircraft tClark Air Base inthe Philippines,Singa-pore has developedtraining acilitiesn Bruneithathave been described yLee Kuan Yew as the "most valuable single facility forthe Singapore

ArmedForces]whichwillbe difficulto duplicate elsewhere." A majorbreakthroughn Singapore's search fortrainingfacilitieswas its ointdevelopmentwith ndonesia of 10,850-hectareirweapons testing angein Siabu in Sumatra.This facility as beenmade available toMalaysia aswell. The openingof thisfacilityn March 1989was accompanied byanIndonesian offer omake available military raining acilities o Singapore"almostanywhere"within ts erritory. ccording o pressreports, forty-

21 Donald Weatherbee, "ASEAN Security Cooperation and theSouth China Sea" (table paperfor he Pacific Forum Symposium "National Threat Perceptions in East Asia/Pacific," Waikoloa,Hawaii, 6-8 February 1982), p. 6.

22 New StraitsTimes, 9 May 1984.23 Lt. -General Winston Choo, Commander of Singapore's Armed Forces, interviewed n the

Asian Defence ournal,no. 3 (1989), p. 46.24 Malaysia's motives forseeking access to Natuna could also be linked to its claim over the

Spratly slands, disputed between itself,China, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines. By deploy-ing forcesout of Natuna, Malaysia might not only be seeking to enhance its claim over the islands,but also to secure de facto Indonesian endorsement of its claim.

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thousand-hectare ite at Batu Raja, southof Sumatra,has already beenidentified s a training roundfor roopsfrom ingapore. Other ASEAN

countrieshave also developedmilitary iesthrough rovisionof trainingfacilities. he Thai Air Forceuses theCrowValley range nthePhilippinesfor ir weapontesting urposes,whileBangkokhas offeredmilitary rain-ing facilities o Brunei.25

Participationn each other's fficerducation nd training rogrammeshas become increasingly ommonplaceamongtheASEAN armed forces.The most mportant orums or uch nteractionre themilitaryommandand staff ollegesfor rainingmiddle-and senior-level fficers.ndonesia,for xample,makes llthree f ts ommand taffolleges vailableto officers

from therASEAN countries. ingapore'shighest-levelormalmilitarydu-cationprogramme,heArmedForces'six-month-longommand andStaffcourse, regularly ncludes participantsfrom other ASEAN countries.Thailand, thePhilippines ndMalaysia have developed imilarlyloseandregularexchangeswithotherASEAN states, ncludingprovisionof edu-cation and training acilities t their ommand and staff olleges. In 1983(duringMahathir's visit oBrunei),Malaysia offered runeithe"fullestcooperation nproviding rainingnadministration,military, olice,edu-

cation" and in other reas.26Brunei's security ies withSingapore cover"exchanges ofvisits n matters elating odefence echnology, ersonneland logisticsmanagement. 27

ANASEAN "DEFENCE COMMUNITY": PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Despitetheir ncreasingnteractionhrough ilateral xercises nd train-ing,the rmedforces f heASEAN states ack nter-operabilitynd integra-tion.Differencesn doctrine nd language as well as variancein training

proceduresnd logistics ystemsimit hebenefitshat ouldbederived romjointexercises, nd undermine hepossibilityfmutualsupportn contin-gencies. Againstthisbackdrop, deas concerning heneed for n allianceframework orASEAN have assumed specialsignificance. heoretically,anASEAN military actcouldoffer number fbenefits ot vailablefrombilateralinkages. t could foster reatertandardizationfdoctrine ndlan-guage,commonalityn command andcontrol rocedures, nd enhancetheprospect of ASEAN states providing assistance to each other incontingencies.

ButASEAN leaderscontinue oresist he dea ofan alliance. As FidelRamos, thedefence ecretaryfthePhilippines as argued,suchan option

25 Bangkok ost, 17July1983; New Straits imes, 8 July 1983; Straits imes,22 August 1986; Denis

Warner, "Point, Counterpoint in South China Sea, " PacificDefence eporterAugust 1984), p. 54;

"Promoting Bilateral Cooperation Between Singapore and Indonesia," Pioneer, o. 138 April 1989),

pp. 2-3; StraitsTimes, 24' March 1989; Star,30 August 1984.26 StraitsTimes,30 March 1983.27 "10 Years ofTraining in Brunei, " Pointer, o. 124 (February 1988).

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ASEAN: "Security ommunityor "DefenceCommunity?

could "intensifydeology-based olarization nd conflicts ithin outheastAsia, encourage hebig powers o nitiate reemptive ounteractionnd pre-

ventASEAN from ursuingwithundilutedvigour and freedom factionitsvision ffull egional tabilitynd economic elf-sufficiency.'"ingapore'sGeneral WinstonChoo has denied any "intention among theASEANstates]to move towardsa defencepact," while Indonesia's General TrySutrisnohas contended hat without military act .. [theASEAN sta-tes] can cooperate more flexibly.28

Despite the seemingconsensus against a pact, some regional nalystsand policymakerscontinue oraisethepossibility fmultilateralecurityarrangements. ingapore,for xample,has expressed hehopethat firm

and strong ilateral ieswillprovide hefoundation ormultilateralooper-ation. '29 Indeed, recent tatements y policymakers nd eliteopinion nASEAN countries oint o twobroad, thoughnotmutually xclusive, on-ceptions f ntra-ASEAN securitynd defence ooperationwhich, freal-ized,wouldgivesubstance o thehypotheticalotion f nASEAN defencecommunity.

The first ocusses n thegoal ofregional elf-sufficencyn armsmanufac-turingndweapon standardization, hichwouldbe a minimalistpproach

to an ASEAN defence ommunity. s Singapore'sStraits imes oints ut,"multilateral ASEAN military] ooperation an begin by exploring uchnon-controversial venues as bulk-buying f basic training tems uch asuniforms,mmunition nd rifles.30From time otime,various eaders nASEAN have expressed nterestn suchcooperation. n 1978,GeneralPan-gabbean of ndonesia suggested he creation fan ASEAN arms factory.3In 1982, Thailand's supreme commander, General Saiyud Kerdphol,advocated standardizationfweapons amongASEAN states hroughointprocurement nd production s well as the creation of a regional "war

reserve ontingency ool. 32 Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippineshavevoiced upport orjointrmsprocurementnd manufacturing.nJuly 990,Thailand's supremecommander nnounced thatASEAN countrieshaveagreed nprinciple oestablish n armsassemblyplantwith ach memberstateproducing pecificweapons parts.33

Butthis oad to an ASEAN "defencecommunity"doesnotholdmuchpromise. Although hedefence ndustries fSingapore and Indonesia areincreasinglyble toproducea widerangeofadvanced systemshatwouldmeet he merging eedsofASEAN countriesndeveloping conventional"

28 SundayTimes Singapore), 26 November 1989; "Is ASEAN Turning Into a MilitaryPact?"Asian Defence ournal,no. 5 (1989), p. 113.

29 General Winston Choo cited in StraitsTimes, 23 March 1989.30 StraitsTimes,Weekly Overseas Edition, 16 December 1989.31 New StraitsTimes, 6 July 1978.32 StraitsTimes,6 November 1982.33 StraitsTimes,20 July 1990.

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warfare apabilities e.g., Singapore's Fast AttackCrafts, ircraftmain-tenance nd repairfacilities nd groundforce quipment, nd Indonesia's

helicopters,ransportircraftnd plannedfrigate roduction), o date therehas been littlemove towards oint production rrangements.A notableexception s an agreement etweenThailand and Singaporeto co-producea rangeof mall rmswhich ould alsobe available for xport o third oun-tries.34 ut Singapore has not been equally responsive to similar co-production proposals with Malaysia.35 Neither has the idea of weaponstandardizationmade muchprogress. n the ate 1970sand early 1980s,severalof theASEAN states cquired similar quipment, ncluding om-bat aircraftF-5s byall exceptBrunei,A-4s by Singapore, Indonesia and

Malaysia, and F-16sby Singapore,Thailand and Indonesia) and groundforces quipment Scorpionight anksby Brunei,thePhilippines,Thailandand Malaysia, and V-150 Commandoersonnelcarriersby Indonesia,Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore). But such standardization s largelycoincidental, ather han theresult fconsciousplanning. n fact, hecur-rent evel of standardization f equipmentamong the armed forces f theASEAN states ouldbepartly ttributedo what ome analysts ave charac-terized s a historical attern f "interactiveweapon acquisitions"or arms

race in the region.36 espite increased rust egarding ach other'smilitaryintentions nd capabilities, certaindegreeofmilitary ompetitionwithinASEAN has persisted asedonprestige onsiderationsnd differing utualthreatperceptions.

In fact, ingapore, hemost dvanced regional rmsproducer, s skep-ticalofthepossibility f an ASEAN arms ndustry. s statedbyitsTradeand Industryminister,heviability fan ASEAN arms ndustrys under-minedbythefact hat heprioritiesf ndividualcountries re differentnkey areas ofmilitaryengineeringand weapon systems.37ndonesia's

Benny Murdani has pointedto twoobstaclesto standardization nd ointprocurementf quipmentnASEAN: (a) differentevelsofdefence pend-ing amongASEAN countries,nd (b) divergent trategic rioritiesf heirarmed forces ased on differencesngeographic ocation,territorialepthandmilitaryoctrine. ontrast, or xample, Singapore's emphasis n for-ward defencewith ndonesia'semphasis n "defence-in-depth,"hailand'spreoccupationat eastuntil ecently) ith and-based hreats rom henorthwithMalaysia's focuson maritime ecuritynd thesafety f thesea lines

ofcommunicationetween tspeninsular nd islandhalves, hePhilippines'

34 Bangkok ost, 27 January 1988.35 J.N. Mak, Directionsfor reater efence ooperationKuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategicand

International Studies, 1986), p. 22.36 Ron Huisken, Limitation fArmamentsn South-EastAsia: A Proposal,Canberra Papers in Stra-

tegy nd Defence, no. 16 Canberra: Australian National University,Strategicand Defence StudiesCentre, 1977).

37 StraitsTimes,5 May 1988.

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ASEAN: "Security ommunity"r "DefenceCommunity"?

turn owards ounter-insurgency ith herest fASEAN's growing rien-tationtowardsconventionalwarfare.

The second, and evidentlymaximalist,conception of an ASEAN"defencecommunity"flows rom worelateddimensions fthechangingprofile fextraregional owers n Southeast Asia. One dimension s theuncertaintybout Americanmilitary ases inthePhilippines ndthe ikelyreduction fU. S. strategic nterest nthe region s a result fsuperpowerdetente. The otherdimension s theprospective ole ofcountrieswith amedium-rangepowerprojection otential ntheSoutheastAsian securityenvironment, uchas China, Japan and India. In theperception fmanyASEAN leaders,especially n Singapore,the twodimensions re closely

linked. Singaporehas contended hat ny significantut nthe U.S. mili-taryforcesntheregionwould lead to a "potentiallydestabilising hangeintheregionalbalances ofpower,one whichmay ead to other ignificantpowersplayinga more active role in theregion.'38 While the ASEANstateshave decidedagainst formal ndorsement fAmericanbases inthePhilippines,39Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur privately worry about theadversegeostrategicmplicationsfU.S. withdrawal. he head of ndone-sia's National Defence Institutehas warned that Southeast Asia could

become the scene of "prolonged, low-intensity onflicts" as well as"unavoidable" maritime onflictsnviewoftheemergence f' Australia,India and Japan . . . as world maritime powers.""" Malaysia similarlysupports ontinuedU.S. presencentheregion.Although ingapore'sofferofmilitary acilities o the U.S. has caused a public outcry n Malaysia,PrimeMinisterMahathirhascontended hat n Americanwithdrawal romitsbases inthePhilippines would be premature .. despite heapparentreductionnregional ensions rought n by heightenedrospects f Cam-bodia settlementnd newpeace overtures rom he Soviet Union. 41The

governments fthePhilippinesand Thailand have also viewedtheU.S.presence nthe regionas a vital factornregionalpowerbalance and sta-bility.Thailand's supportfor heU.S. presencewas made clear when ithailed Singapore's offer f facilities o the U.S. as "somethingthatcouldpreserveregionalsecurityn termsofgreater alance ofpower. i42

Such "balance-of-power"worries,nturn, avebeen inked o theneedfor n ASEAN military rrangement.As the former oreignminister fIndonesia,MochtarKusumaatmadja, stated, n ASEAN military gree-

ment could be a necessaryresponseto"fill hesecurity acuum after heU.S. leaves the region."43Singapore continues to stressthe need for

38 StraitsTimes Weekly Overseas Edition), 24 February 1990.39 "No Basis forConsensus, " Far Eastern conomicReview, 25 November 1987.40 StraitsTimes, 24 August 1989.41 Cited in the StraitsTimes,Weekly Overseas Edition, 24 February 1990.42 StraitsTimes,6 August 1989.43 Cited in StraitsTimes, 22 August 1989.

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trilateral ndmultilateralmilitary xercises mong theASEAN states s a"response to thechanging trategic quation among the majorpowers.44

But the emergenceof a major external hreat erious enough topresstheASEAN states ntoa defence ommunity f orts s extremelynlikely.Even though ndividualASEAN states re worried bout whatrolesChina,India andJapan mightplay n the region,theirperceptions re not ikelytoconverge, s indicated ntheir isagreements ver theCambodia issue.In the 1980s, the differingiews on China's role in the regionwerehigh-lightedover the Sino-Thai strategic elationship.Chinese arms sales toThailand were a matter f concern nMalaysia and Indonesia. Consider-ationswhich ed Thailand toaccept securityinkswithChina also pointto

another actor mpeding heprospect fanASEAN defence rrangement.No ASEAN country eesan indigenousASEAN security rrangement sa substitute or ts ecurityinkageswithfriendlyxternal owers.Despitedoubts over the credibility f the Westernsecurity ommitmentsn theregion, ll ASEAN countries xcept ndonesia remain ied o suchcommit-ments. n fact, he consolidation f the Sino-Thai security elationshipnresponse o theuncertaintyver the U. S. role n theregionhas itsparallelinrecent ffortsy Singaporeand Malaysia toreinvigorate heFivePower

Defence Arrangements. he British onnectionremains thecornerstoneofBrunei's security olicy.Brunei's recent fferfmilitary acilities o theU. S. further nderscores ts continuing emphasis on outside securityguarantees.

Indeed, even themostneutral-mindedASEAN states re skeptical ftheusefulness f ntra-ASEAN securityommitments. s thechief f taffofMalaysianDefenceForcesput t: "In terms fdeterrence alue, t sverydoubtfulf n ASEAN alliance would reallydeter nywould be agressor.... To achievedeterrenceASEAN willhave to form n alliance withone

of thesuperpowers thereby] . . violating heZOPFAN concept.45

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN "SECURITY COMMUNITY" ANDTHE

CHALLENGE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The barriers othedevelopment f n ASEAN "defencecommunity"bringback the ssue of tscurrent tatus s a viable"security ommunity.To be sure,thecurrent tateofrelations etweenASEAN states squalita-tively ifferentrom hat t thetimeofthegrouping'sformation.ASEAN

has indeed becomea securityommunitynthe sense that tsmembersdonot foreseethe prospectforresorting o armed confrontationmong

44 Speech by Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng before the Singapore Press Club, 15 Novem-ber 1988, p. 8. Transcript supplied by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

45 Address by General Hashim Mohammed Ali at the seminar organized by the Integrated AirDefence System, "Regional Defence From the MilitaryPerspective," Singapore, 29 November 1989,published in ISIS Focus, no. 58 January 1990), p. 41.

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ASEAN. "Security ommunity" r "DefenceCommunity"?

themselves o resolve xisting ilateral isputes.Thanksto the mpact ftheIndochina onflictnd the habit" of ooperation eveloped hroughegular

political,diplomatic, ultural ndmilitaryxchanges,ASEAN stateshavemoved to a pointat which ntra-ASEAN conflicts ave "either becomeirrelevant r been mutedconsiderably, as theforeignminister fSinga-pore claimed in 1982.46But the factthat a number of disputes havepersisted nd defiedpolitical nd diplomatic olutions astsa shadowoverASEAN's image as a security ommunity.

ASEAN's future s a regional security ommunity aces twomajorchallenges: irstly,vercomingeveral ingeringntra-ASEANdisputes hatarepotentially isruptive fregionalpeace, and secondly, eaching con-

sensuson how toapproachthe askofeventual econciliation ithVietnamand therebymove thesubregional ASEAN) "securitycommunity"toaregional Southeast Asian) entity.

Of themajor intra-ASEAN disputesthatremain, the one betweenMalaysia and thePhilippines ver Sabah provides good exampleofboththepossibilities nd limits f ntra-ASEAN conflictmanagement.The fi-nal resolution fthe disputehas proven to be elusive, despiteattempts ytheAquino governmentosecure henecessaryegalbasisfor ropping he

claim. PhilippineNational SecurityAdvisor Rafael Ileto has warned thatfailure o resolvethe Sabah issue could lead torenewedMalaysian aid tothe MNLF separatistguerrillas n the Mindanao regionof the Philip-pines.47 hostofother ntra-ASEAN disputeshave emerged,withmanyofthese nthemaritime phere.According o theMalaysianMaritimeEn-forcement oordinatingCentre,ofthefifteenmaritime oundaries ntheSouthChina Sea (excludingtheGulf ofThailand), twelve re indispute,two have been settledone partially) nd one resolved hrough joint ex-ploitationgreement. f particularnterests thefact hat ixof hese ound-

arydisputes rebetweenASEAN countries,withMalaysia havingdisputeswithevery other ASEAN country.48 n April 1988, the arrest by theMalaysian Navyofforty-ninehilippinofishermen hoallegedly ntrud-ed intoMalaysianwaters aused considerable ension nbilateral elations,leadingtodeployment ythePhilippines fadditionalships nd troops nthe area borderingMalaysia.49 n addition,bothMalaysia and thePhilip-pineshave stationed roopson theSpratly tollstosupport heir laims tothese slands,whichhavealso been claimedbyVietnam,Taiwanand China.

Such territorial isputesand mutual suspicionsbased on ethnic ndhistorical actors re a major impediment o thedevelopment fbilateral

46 StraitsTimes,15 September 1988.47 StraitsTimes,18 May 1989.48 Commodore Ahmad Ramli Nor, "ASEAN Maritime Cooperation" (paper presented to the

Defence Asia '89 Conference "Towards Greater ASEAN Militaryand SecurityCooperation: Issuesand Prospects," Singapore, 22-25 March 1989), pp. 2-6.

49 StraitsTimes, 15 September 1988.

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PacificAffairs

security ooperationwithinASEAN. Apartfrom hefact hatMalaysia andthePhilippines avefailed o develop ny securityies, he ase ofSingapore-

Malaysia relations llustrates hevulnerabilityfsuch ties tomutual sus-picions. In 1988-89, following he revelationof a secretmeetingof thedefence hiefs fSingapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, therewas some talkin the regionofthe possible emergenceof "a triangular efence oopera-tive relationship . . of island Southeast Asia.' "50 Yet subsequentde-velopmentshave demonstrated hefragilityfsecurity ies within he so-called sub-ASEAN "strategic riangle. In theheat of heMalaysianpublicoutcryover Singapore's offer fmilitary acilities o the U.S., AhmadBadawi, a formerMalaysian defenceminister, emindedMalaysians that

Singaporecontinued operceiveMalaysia "as a threat o[its]existence,and in thiscontext, the [Singapore] offer . . [mightbe] directed s adeterrencedirectedagainst us."'' Such statements re reminiscentofMalaysia's reaction to the visitby Israeli PresidentChaim Herzog toSingapore n1986,whenthe cting oreignministerlaterdefenceminister)ofMalaysia, Tengku Rithauddeen, ikenedSingapore's position nASE-AN to that of "a wolf in sheep's clothing. 52 A more directblow toMalaysian-Singapore efence ieswas Kuala Lumpur'sdecision osuspend

itsbilateral xercises rogramwith he SingaporeArmed Forces n protestagainst heuncovering f Singapore pyring peratingnMalaysia in ate1989. The uneasiness felt y Malaysia over the growing ilateralmilitarylinks etween ingapore nd Indonesia has been acknowledged y ndone-sia,53nd the ndonesian ambassadortoMalaysia has conceded thatSin-gapore's interestndevelopingclosesecurity ieswith ndonesia couldbedue partly o itsstrategy fusingthe atter s a counterweightoMalay-sianpressure54Even theclosesecurity iesbetweenMalaysia and Indone-sia remain vulnerable. In early 1990, a public outcry n Indonesia over

Malaysia's execution f n Indonesiannational onvicted fdrug raffickingprompted ndonesia's defenceminister o warn that he "special relation-ship" between the two countries can not be taken forgranted. 55

The prospect or "security ommunity" nSoutheastAsia iscontin-genton the resolutionnotonlyof ntra-ASEAN conflicts, ut also of thewider egionalssueofASEAN-Indochina relations. hisassumesparticularsignificance s ASEAN's political unityover the Cambodia issue hasunravelled.The implications fformer hai PrimeMinisterChatichai's

Cambodia policy, specially is nvitationnJanuary 989to PrimeMinisterHun Sen of the Cambodia regime,merit ttention ere. In Singapore,a

50 Zara Dian, "ASEAN Military Cooperation, " Asian Defence ournal,no. 5 (May 1989), p. 5.51 StraitsTimes Weekly Overseas Edition), 2 September 1989.52 StraitsTimes, 27 November 1986.53 StraitsTimes Weekly Overseas Edition), 17 February 1990.54 "Blood and Money," Far Eastern conomicReview,1 March 1990, p. 9.55 StraitsTimes Weekly Overseas Edition), 27 January 1990.

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ASEAN. "Security ommunityor "DefenceCommunity?

founding ather fASEAN, S. Rajaratnam, warnedthatthe Thai initia-tive ould seriously amage ASEAN's credibilitys oneof hefew uccessful

examples of regionalpoliticalcooperation n the thirdworld.56 lthoughthe ndonesian government idnotpublicly riticize heThai move, sec-tions fthemilitary ereunhappy.As a publication fthepowerful lumniAssociation of the Indonesian National Defence Institute charged,Thailand's newCambodia policywouldbe "regardedby the ther iveASE-AN countries s violating heASEAN consensus,wherein ota singleASE-AN countrys ustified o make a commitment hich s directed o helpViet-nam before comprehensive ettlement.'

Intra-ASEAN politicaldifferencesre likely o be compounded n the

so-calledpost-Cambodia era. A SoutheastAsian " security ommunity,developedunder theauspicesofASEAN, must lmostbydefinition ven-tuallyaccept into tsfoldthe ndochinesestatesand Burma. Vietnam isinterested n thisprospect,whichwould help ittonormalize ties with heWest and attractmuch-neededforeign apital.But theASEAN membersappearto be divided overthe ssue.Kuala LumpurandJakartahavepub-licly tated hatHanoi's Communist deologywouldnotbe a barrier o tseventual econciliation ithASEAN inpost-Cambodia outheastAsia. Sin-

gapore, however,has expressedconcern that Vietnamese inclusioninASEAN "could change hecharacter f heorganizationnd eopardize fur-therASEAN cooperation. 58 Accordingto Lee Kuan Yew, the member-shipofthe ndochinese ountriesnASEAN would have to await thetrans-formation ftheir conomicand political ystems o"mesh" with hoseofthe presentASEAN members.59As the conflict n Cambodia and theposition f heASEAN states owardsVietnamcontinue oevolve, t squitelikely hatmoreASEAN states, ncluding ingapore, would accept Viet-nam as a partnernpeace, pavingthewayfor heeventual reconciliation

betweenASEAN and Indochina. But thisprospective econciliation ar-ries mportant isks s well as opportunitiesorASEAN. Given thecement-ing roleofanti-communism, nd the nformal atureofmuch ofASEANpolitical ooperation,Vietnamesemembershipwouldundoubtedly iluteASEAN's politicalunity.Differencesnthe evel ofdevelopment etweenthepresentASEAN members nd the ndochinese tatesmight nderminetheprospect or egional conomiccooperation.Yet it s also arguablethat

56 S. Rajaratnam, "Riding the Vietnamese Tiger," Contemporaryoutheast sia, vol. 10, no. 4(March 1989).

57 Cited in StraitsTimes, 2 June 1989.58 Speech by Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng before Defence Asia '89 conference

"Towards GreaterASEAN MilitaryCooperation: Issues and Prospects," Singapore, 24 March 1989.Lee Kuan Yew stated that ASEAN would not reap "any benefit by expanding too rapidly," andinstead should "deepen the [existing] areas of cooperation." Interview with TheAustralian s ex-cerpted in the StraitsTimes, 16 September 1988.

59 Cited in Michael Richardson, "Asia-Pacific Nations Search forSecurity Strategy, Interna-tionalHerald Tribune, 0 November 1990.

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Vietnamese membership ould improvethe climateforASEAN's secur-ity.ASEAN could be thevehiclefor romoting egionalreconciliation nd

thehabit of cooperation, imilar o its roleinbuildingconfidence mongits members fter he confrontation. s General Sutrisnopointedout, byaccepting Vietnamese membership,ASEAN could "rid the region ofantagonism nd be a force or ooperation, venwith. . [Vietnam's]com-munist deology. 60

In conclusion,ASEAN can claim qualified, thoughtenuous, successas a "security community." The ASEAN "securitycommunity," as itstandsnow,needs to be notonly strengthenednd securedagainsta hostofpotential ntermember onflicts, ut also broadened bybringingnto ts

fold he ndochinese tates nddeveloping modusivendior egional econ-ciliation between the Communist and non-Communist segments ofSoutheastAsia. Meetingthis hallenge, n turn, ssumes greater riorityforASEAN thanpursuing he bjectives f "defence onmmunity" hich,underthepresent ircumstances, ppear impractical.

A numberof otherpoliticalgoals also demandurgent ttention romASEAN leaders.These include he ong-standingbjective fZOPFAN anditsmore recentoffshoot,heproposalfor SoutheastAsia Nuclear Free

Zone. Intra-ASEAN differencesnthetiming nd approachto thesegoalscomplicate the prospectfor an enduring securitycommunity amongASEAN states.Furthermore, SEAN's emphasison subregional ecurityfaces newchallenge nproposalsmadebycountries uch asAustralia ndCanada to create forum or hewiderAsia-Pacific egionmodelledontheConferencenSecurityndCooperation nEurope.ASEAN countries aveexpressed eepreservationsbout the dea,whichwouldundoubtedly tealthe imelightrom SEAN's ownbrandofregionalism,ince uchproposalsarelikely odetract romASEAN's credibilitynd exposethe nadequacy

of tssecurity olein a rapidlychangingregional strategic nvironment.Togetherwith heproblem f ntraregionalonflict,hese hallengesdd

to the senseofuncertaintyoiced overthegrouping'sfuture urposeandrole. AsWongKan Seng,theforeignministerfSingapore,warned,"Thecontinued elevanceoftheorganisation, ost-Cambodia, cannotbe takenforgranted. ASEAN, headded,would need "new rallying ointsorriskdriftingpartto the detriment fregional cooperation nd bilateralrela-tionships. 61 Since theserallying oints renot ikely oincludea concen-

sus on the nature of a new-foundexternalthreat,regionalcooperationamong theASEAN states mightbe better servedby being devoted topreservingntra-ASEANpolitical ohesion,promotingndmanagingthereturn f he ndochinese ountries o theregional nd internationalystem,

60 StraitsTimes,14January 1989.61 Straits imes,24 March 1989; speech by Singapore Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng before

Defence Asia '89 conference, "Towards Greater ASEAN Military Cooperation: Issues andProspects," Singapore, 24 March 1989.

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ASEAN. "Security ommunityor "Defence ommunity?

and resolving hecontradictions hat urround he professed bjectivesofZOPFAN andSEANFZ. These tasks, ll ntegral o the hallenge fbuildinga credibleregional"security ommunity" arenot onlymorepressing orASEAN, buttheir ealization s also a necessary oundationwithoutwhichany prospective attern f military inksthatmight ustify he abel of anASEAN "defencecommunity" would be impractical nd meaningless.

NationalUniversityf ingapore, arch 991

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APPENDIX 1

BILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES IN ASE1972-1989

Countriesnvolved Name f xerciseIndonesia/Malaysia (Army) "Kekar Malindo"/"Tatar Malindo"/"Kripura Malindo"Indonesia/Malaysia (Air) "Elang Malindo"Indonesia/Malaysia (Navy) "MalindoJaya"Indonesia/Malaysia (All Services) "Darsasa Malindo"Indonesia/Singapore (Army) "Safakar Indopura"Indonesia/Singapore (Air) "Elang Indopura"Indonesia/Singapore (Navy) "Englek"Indonesia/Thailand (Air) "Elang ThainesiaIndonesia/Thailand (Navy) "Sea Garuda"

4? Indonesia/Philippines Navy) "Philindo"/"Corpatphilindo"

Malaysia/Singapore (Army) "Semangat Bersatu"i Malaysia/Singapore (Navy) "Malapura"

Malaysia/Thailand (Air) "Air Tharnal"Malaysia/Thailand (Navy) "Thalay"Malaysia/Brunei (Navy) "Hornbill" (and others)Singapore/Thailand (Air) "Sing-Siam"Singapore/Thailand (Navy) "Thai-Sing"Singapore/Brunei Navy) "Pelican"Singapore/Brunei Army) "Termite/FlamingArrow"

Sources: NewStraits imes,17 November 1983; Star,17August 1988; NewStraits imes, 1 February 1981; Donald Weath

paper presented othePacificForumSymposium "National Threat Perceptions nEast/AsiaPacific, Waikoloa, Hawaii,1983; personal interview n Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 16August 1989; AsianDefenceJournal,o. 5 (1976), p. 26; New St1986; IndonesiaObserver,0August 1989; TheStraits imes,16December 1989; Pzoneer,o. 82 (August 1984); Pioneer, o. 128January 1975; ChinaNews, 4 November 1975; TheStraits imes,13June 1973; personal nterviewwiththedefence attSunday imesSingapore), 21May 1989; Pioneer, o. 141 July1989); Pioneer,o. 84 (October1984); B.A. Hamzah, "ASEANno. 22 (Fall 1983), pp. 42-43; Strazts imes,3 August 1989; New Straits imes,21August 1980; K.U. Menon, "A Six PowAsia, vol. 10, no. 3 (December 1988), p. 314; Pioneer, o. 74 (May 1984); Pioneer,o 129 July1988); TheStraits imes,18A1987); AsianDefence ournalJanuary1988), p. 18; TheStraits imes,6July1990.

Documents

1991 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations_Security Community or Defence Community