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    Philosophy and DemocracyAuthor(s): Michael WalzerSource: Political Theory, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Aug., 1981), pp. 379-399Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191096 .

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    PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACYMICHAEL WALZERInstituteor Advanced Studies,Princeton

    I.The prestige fpoliticalphilosophysveryhigh hesedays. t com-mands the attention f economists nd lawyers, he two groupsof

    academicsmostclosely onnected o theshaping fpublicpolicy, s ithas not done in a longtime.And it claimstheattention fpoliticalleaders, ureaucrats,nd udges,most speciallyudges,with new ndradicalforcefulness.he command nd the claim follownotso muchfrom hefact hatphilosophersredoingcreativework,but from hefactthatthey redoingcreativeworkof a specialsort-whichraisesagain, after long hiatus, hepossibility ffinding bjective ruths,"truemeaning," right nswers,"thephilosopher'stone," nd so on. Iwant o accept hispossibilitywithout aying erymuch bout t)andthen sk what tmeansfordemocratic olitics.What s the tandingfthephilosopherna democraticociety? his s an oldquestion; hereare old tensions t workhere:between ruth ndopinion, eason ndwill,valueandpreference,heoneandthemany.Theseantipodalpairsdiffer romone another, nd none of themquitematches he pair"philosophynddemocracy." utthey ohang ogether;hey oint oacentral roblem. hilosopherslaim certain ortofauthorityor heirconclusions; he people claima differentort of authority ortheirdecisions.What s the relation etween hetwo?I shallbeginwith quotation romWittgensteinhatmighteemtoresolvethe problem mmediately.The philosopher,"Wittgensteinwrote, is not a citizen fany communityf deas. That swhatmakeshim nto philosopher."' his s more han n assertion f detachmentin tsusual sense, or itizensre surely apable, ometimes,fdetachedjudgments ven of theirown ideologies,practices, nd institutions.Wittgensteinsasserting moreradicaldetachment. he philosophersandmustbeanoutsider; tanding part,notoccasionally in udgment)butsystematicallyin thought). do notknowwhetherhephilosopherPOLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 9 No. 3, August 1981 379-399? 1981Sage Publications,nc.

    379

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    380 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1981has to be a politicaloutsider.Wittgensteinoes say anycommunity,and the tate polis,republic,ommonwealth, ingdom,rwhatever)scertainly community f ideas. The communities f which thephilosophersmost mportantlyot a citizenmay, fcourse,be largeror smaller hanthe state. That willdependon whathephilosophizesabout. But fhe s a political hilosopher-notwhatWittgensteinad nmind-thenthe state s the most ikely ommunityromwhichhewillhave to detachhimself, ot physically, ut intellectuallynd, on acertain iewofmorality,morally oo.Thisradicaldetachment as twoforms,nd I shallbe concerned ithonlyone of them.The first orm s contemplativend analytic; hosewhoparticipaten it take no interestnchanginghe ommunityhoseideas they tudy. Philosophyeaveseverythings it S."2 The secondform s heroic. I do not want to denythe heroic possibilities fcontemplationnd analysis.One can alwaystakepride nwrenchingonself oosefromhebondsofcommunity;t s not asy odo,andmanyimportant hilosophical chievementsandall thevarietiesfphiloso-phicalarrogance) avetheir riginsndetachment. ut want o focuson a certain raditionfheroic ction, live, tseems,nourowntime,where hephilosopheretaches imself rom he ommunityf deas norder o found tagain-intellectuallyndthenmateriallyoo,fordeashave consequences, nd every ommunityf ideas is also a concretecommunity. e withdraws nd returns.He is like the legislators fancient egend,whoseworkprecludes rdinary itizenship.3in the onghistoryfpolitical hought,here san alternativeo thedetachmentfphilosophers,nd that s theengagementfsophists,critics, ublicists,ndintellectuals. o besure, he ophistswhomPlatoattackswere itilessmen, tineranteachers, ut heywerebynomeansstrangersntheGreek ommunityf deas. Their eaching rewupon,wasradically ependent pon, heresources f commonmembership.In this ense,Socrateswas a sophist, houghtwasprobably rucial ohisownunderstandingfhismission,s critic ndgadfly,hathealso bea citizen: heAthenianswouldhavefoundhim ess rritatingad he notbeen one of theirfellows.But thenthecitizenskilledSocrates,thusdemonstrating,t ssometimesaid,that ngagementndfellowshiprenotpossiblefor nyone ommittedo the earch or ruth. hilosopherscannot be sophists.For practical s well as intellectualeasons, hedistance hat hey utbetweenhemselvesndtheir ellow itizensmustbewidened nto breach ffellowship. ndthen, orpractical easonsonly, tmustbenarrowedgainby deception nd secrecy. o that hephilosophermerges,ikeDescartes nhisDiscourse, s a separatistnthought, conformistnpractice.

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    Walzer/ PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 381He is a conformist,t least,untilhe findshimselfn a position otransformracticento omenearer pproximationothe ruthsfhisthought.He cannotbea participantntherough ndtumble olitics f

    thecity,buthe can be a founder r a legislator, king, nocturnalcouncillor, r a judge-or, morerealistically,e can be an advisor osuchfigures, hisperingnthe ar ofpower. hapedbythevery atureofthephilosophical roject, ehas ittle aste or argainingnd mutualaccommodation.Because the truthhe knows or claims to know issingularncharacter, e s ikely o think hatpoliticsmust e the ame:a coherentonception,nuncompromisingxecution. nphilosophysinarchitecture,nd so inpolitics,wroteDescartes:Whathas beenputtogether itbybit,bydifferent asters,s essperfecthan hework fsinglehand.Thus,"thoseold placeswhich, eginnings villages, avedeveloped n the course of time ntogreat owns, regenerally . . ill-proportionedncomparisonwith hose nengineerandesign twill nan orderly ashion."4 escartes himself isclaims ny interestn thepolitical ersion f uch project-perhapsbecausehebelieves hat heonlyplacewhere e s ikelyoreignupremes hisownmind.But hereis always the possibility f a partnership etweenphilosophicalauthority nd politicalpower. Reflecting n that possibility, hephilosophermay, ikeThomasHobbes,"recover omehopethatonetime rother, hiswritingfminemay all nto hehandsof sovereign,who will .. by he xercise f ntireovereignty.. converthis ruthfspeculation ntotheutility f practice."5 he crucialwords n thesequotations romDescartes nd Hobbes are"design twill" nd"entiresovereignty."hilosophical oundings an authoritarianusiness.

    II.A quick comparisonmaybe helpfulhere.Poets have theirowntradition fwithdrawalndengagement,utradicalwithdrawalsnotcommon mong hem.Onemight lausiblyet longsideWittgenstein'ssentences hefollowingines fC. P. Cavafy,writtenocomfortyoung

    poetwhohasmanaged fter reat ffortofinishnlyonepoem. That,Cavafy ays, s a firsttep, nd no smallaccomplishment:To setyourfootuponthis tepyoumustrightfullye a citizenofthecity f deas.6

    Wittgenstein rites s iftherewere as there re) many ommunities,whileCavafy eems osuggest hatpoets nhabit single, niversal ity.This content downloaded from 200.10.244.100 on Fri, 7 Jun 2013 17:12:27 PM

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    382 POLITICAL THEORY /IAUGUST 1981But 1 suspectthat the Greekpoetmeans n factto describe moreparticularplace: the cityof Hellenic culture.The poet mustprovehimself citizenhere;hephilosophermust rove hathe s not citizenanywhere. he poetneeds fellow itizens, therpoetsand readers fpoetry, ho sharewithhim backgroundfhistoryndsentiment,howillnotdemand hat verythinge writes eexplained.Without eoplelikethat,his allusionswill be lostandhis mageswillechoonly nhisown mind.But hephilosopher earsfellowship,orthetiesofhistoryandsentimentorrupt is hinking. e needs o ook at theworld romdistance, reshly,ike a totalstranger. is detachments speculative,willful, lways ncomplete. do notdoubtthata clever ociologist rhistorian illdetectnhiswork, sreadilys inanypoem, he igns f tstime ndplace. Still, hephilosopher'smbitioninthe raditionhatam describing)s extreme. he poet, bycontrast,s moremodest-asAuden haswritten:

    A poet'shope:to be likesomevalley heeselocal, butprized lsewhere.7The poetmaybe a visionary r a seer;hemayseekoutexileandtrouble;but he cannot,shortof madness, ut himself fffrom hecommunityf deas. Andperhaps or hat eason,healsocannot spireto anything uite ikesovereigntyverthecommunity.fhehopes tobecome a "legislator ormankind,"t is rather ymovinghisfellowcitizens han by governing hem.And eventhemoving s indirect.

    "Poetrymakesnothing appen."8 utthat s notquite he ame hing ssaying hat t eaveseverythings it s. Poetry eaves ntheminds f tsreaders omeintimation f thepoet'struth.Nothing o coherents aphilosophical tatement, othing o explicit s a legal injunction:poem snevermore han partial ndunsystematicruth,urprisingsby ts xcess, easing sby ts llipsis, everrguing case."I haveneveryetbeen ble toperceive," roteKeats, how nythingan be known ortruthbyconsecutive easoning."9 he knowledge fthe poet is of adifferentort, ndit eads to truthshat an,perhaps, ecommunicatedbut neverdirectlymplemented.

    111.Butthe ruths iscovered rworked utbypolitical hilosophersanbeimplemented.hey end hemselveseadilyo egal mbodiment. re

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 383these the laws of nature?Enact them. Is this a just schemeofdistribution?stablish t. Is this basic humanright? nforcet.Whyelse would one wantto knowabout suchthings?An ideal city s, Isuppose, n entirelyroper bjectofcontemplation,nd itmaybethecase that whethert exists nywherer everwill exist s nomatter"-that s, does not affect hetruth f thevision.Butsurelytwould bebetterfthevisionwererealized.Plato's claim hat he dealcitys "theonlycommonwealthnwhosepolitics thephilosopher] an ever akepart" sbeliedbyhis ownattempto ntervenenthepolitics fSyracusewhen nopportunityrose, rsohethought,or hilosophical eforma-tion.0 Plato neverntended,f course, obecome citizen f he ity ehopedto reform.-The claim of thephilosophern sucha case is thathe knows thepatternetup in theheavens."He knowswhatought o be done. Hecannot ust do ithimself, owever,nd so hemust ookfor politicalinstrument. pliableprince s,for bviouspractical easons, he bestpossible instrument. ut in principle ny instrument ill do-anaristocracy, vanguard, civil ervice, ven hepeoplewilldo,so longas its members re committedo philosophical ruthndpossessed fsovereign ower.Butclearly,hepeopleraise hegreatest ifficulties.fthey re not a many-headedmonster,hey re at leastmany-headed,difficultoeducate nd ikelyodisagreemong hemselves. orcan thephilosophical nstrumente amajoritymong hepeople, ormajoritiesin any genuinedemocracyretemporary,hifting,nstable.Truth sone,butthepeoplehavemany pinions; ruthseternal, utthepeoplecontinuallyhange heirminds.Here n ts implestorms the ensionbetween hilosophy nd democracy.Thepeople'sclaim oruledoes notrest pontheir nowledgef ruth(though tmay, s inutilitarianhought, estupontheir nowledge fmany maller ruths:heaccountthatonlythey angiveoftheir wnpains andpleasures).The claim smostpersuasivelyut, t eems o me,not nterms fwhat hepeopleknowbut nterms fwhothey re.Theyarethe ubjects fthe aw,andif he aw s tobind hemsfreemen ndwomen, heymust lso be itsmakers. his sRousseau's rgument.donot propose to defend it here but only to considersome of itsconsequences.Theargument as the ffect fmakingaw a function fpopularwillandnot ofreason s ithad hithertoeenunderstood, hereasonofwisemen, ages, nd udges.Thepeople are the uccessors fgods and absolutist ings, utnot ofphilosophers. heymaynotknowtheright hing odo, but hey laim rightodowhat heyhinksright(literally, hatpleasesthem). IRousseauhimselfulledback fromhis laim, ndmost ontempor-arydemocratswould want to do so too. I can imagine hreeways of

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    384 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1981pulling ackandconstrainingemocratic ecisions,which will utlinebriefly, rawingon Rousseau, but without ttemptingny explicitanalysis fhisarguments. irst, nemight mpose formal onstrainton popularwilling: hepeoplemustwillgenerally.'2heycannot in-gle out (except n elections orpublicoffice) particularndividual rset of ndividuals rom mongthemselvesor pecialtreatment.his sno barto publicassistance rograms esigned, ay,for hesickor theold,forwe canallget ick nd weallhopetogrow ld. Itspurpose storuleout discriminationgainst ndividualsndgroupswhohave, o tospeak, propernames.Second,onemightnsist n the nalienabilityfthepopularwilland then n the ndestructabilityfthose nstitutionsand practices hatguarantee he democratic haracter f thepopularwill: ssembly, ebate, lections,nd so on. Thepeople annot enouncenow theirfuture ight o will or, no suchrenunciationan ever belegitimate r morally ffective).'3 or can theydenyto somegroupamongthemselves, ith r without propername, herightopartici-patein futurewilling.Clearly, hesefirst wo constraintspenthewayfor omekindofreview fpopulardecision-making,omekindofenforcement,gainstthepeople ifnecessary,fnondiscriminationnd democratic ights.Whoeverundertakeshis review nd enforcement illhave to makejudgments bout thediscriminatoryharacter fparticular iecesoflegislationndaboutthemeaning ordemocratic olitics fparticularrestrictionsn free peech, ssembly,nd so on. Buttheseudgments,though do not want o underestimateither heirmportance r theirdifficulty,illbe relativelyimitedntheir ffectsompared o the ortofthing equired y he hird onstraint. nd t sonthe hird onstraintthat want ofocus, or do notbelieve hatphilosophersntheheroictradition an possiblybe satisfiedwith hefirstwo.Third, hen, hepeoplemustwill what s right.Rousseausays, mustwillthecommongood,and goeson toargue hat hepeoplewillwill he ommon ood fthey re a truepeople,a community,nd not a mere collection fegoistic ndividuals nd corporate roups.' Herethe dea seems o bethat here xists single et-thoughnotnecessarilyn exhaustive et-of correct r ust laws thattheassembledpeople, thevoters r theirrepresentatives,aynotgetright. ften nough, hey et twrong, ndthen hey equire heguidance fa legislator r therestraintf a judge.Rousseau's legislator s simply hephilosophern heroic dress, ndthoughRousseau denieshim herightocoerce hepeople,he nsistsnhisrightodeceive hepeople.The egislatorpeaks nthenameofGod,not ofphilosophy. One mightook fora paralleldeception mong

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    Walzer/PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 385contemporaryudges. nanycase,this hird onstrainturely aises hemost seriousquestions bout Rousseau's fundamentalrgument,hatpoliticalegitimacyests n will consent) nd noton reason rightness).

    IV.The fundamentalrgumentanbeput n anappropriatelyaradoxi-cal form:t sa featurefdemocratic overnmenthat hepeoplehaveright o actwrongly-inmuch he ameway hat hey ave righto act

    stupidly. should ay, heyhavea rightoactwrongly ithinomearea(and only, ollowinghefirstwo onstraints,f he ction sgeneral verthe area and does not precludefuture emocratic ctionwithin hearea). Sovereigntys always overeigntyomewherendwith egard osomethings, oteverywherend with egard oeverything.hepeoplecanrightfully,etussay, nact redistributivencome ax,but hey anonly redistributeheirown income,not thoseof some neighboringnation.What s crucial,however,sthat heredistributiveatternheychoose is not subjectto authoritativeorrectionn accordancewithphilosophical tandards.t issubject ocriticism,fcourse, ut nsofaras the critic s a democrathe will have to agreethat,pending heconversion f thepeopleto hisposition, hepatternheyhavechosenought o be implemented.Richard Wollheimhas argued n a well-knownrticle hatdemo-cratic heory onceivednthisway s notmerely aradoxical nsomeloose sense; t s a strict aradox. 6He constructsheparadox nthreesteps.(1) As a citizen f a democratic ommunity,review hechoices vailableto thecommunitynd conclude hatA isthepolicy hatought obe implemented.(2) The people,in theirwisdomor theirwillfulness,hoosepolicy B, the veryoppositeofA.(3) 1still hink hatpolicyA ought o be implemented,utnow, s a committeddemocrat, also think hatpolicyB ought o be implemented.ence, think

    that bothpoliciesought o be implemented.ut this s incoherent.The paradox probablydependstoo muchupon itsverbalform.Wemightmagine moremodest irst erson--so hat hefirsttepwouldgo likethis:

    (1) 1conclude hatA is thepolicy hat hepeopleought ochoose formplemen-tation.

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    386 POLITICALTHEORY /AUGUST 1981Thentherewould be nothingncoherentbout saying:

    (3) Since he eople idn't hooseA,but hoseB instead,now oncludehatought obe mplemented.This s notvery nteresting,ut t sconsistent,ndI thinktmakes enseof thedemocratic osition.What underliesWollheim's ersion f thefirst tep s a philosophical,ndprobablynantidemocratic,rgumentthathas thisform:

    (I) I concludehatA is the ight olicy,nd hat toughto be mplementede-cause t sright.But t snotatall obvious hat policy's ightnessstherighteason orimplementingt. t mayonlybe therighteason orhoping hat twillbeimplementedndso fordefendingt nthe ssembly. uppose that hereexisted push-buttonmplementationystem,nd that he wobuttons,markedA and B,wereonmydesk. Which neshould push, ndforwhat reasons?Surely cannotpushA simply ecause I havedecidedthatA is right.Who am I? As a citizen fa democraticommunity,mustwaitfor thepeople'sdecision,who havea right o decide. Andthen, fthepeoplechooseB, it s notthecase that facean existentialchoice,wheremy philosophical rguments ointtoward A and mydemocraticommitmentsoint owardB,and theres nowaytodecidebetween hem.There s a wayto decide.

    The distinctionhat amtryingodrawhere, etween aving righttodecide ndknowingheright ecision,might edescribedntermsfprocedural nd substantiveustice.Democrats, tmight e said, arecommittedoproceduralustice, nd canonlyhopethat he utcomes fjust procedureswill also be substantivelyust.But am reluctant oaccept that formulation ecause the line betweenprocedure andsubstance eemsto me less clear than tsuggests.What s at stake ndiscussions boutproceduralustice s thedistributionfpower, ndthat s surely substantivematter. o proceduralrrangementan bedefended xceptbysomesubstantivergument,nd every ubstantiveargument in politicalphilosophy) ssues also in some proceduralarrangement. emocracyrests, s I have alreadysuggested, n anargumentbout freedomndpolitical bligation.Hence it s notonlythe asethat hepeoplehave procedural ightomake he aws.Onthedemocratic iew, t sright hat heymakethe aws-even if heymakethemwrongly.

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY ANDDEMOCRACY 387Againstthisview,theheroicphilosophermight rguethat t cannever e rightodowrong not, t east, nce weknow rcanknowwhat

    is right).This is also, at least incipiently,n argument bout thedistributionfpoliticalpower, nd it has two mplications. irst, hatthepower fthepeople ought o be imited y herightnessfwhat heydo; and second,thatsomeone else ought o be empoweredo reviewwhat thepeopledo and step n when heyrnove eyond hose imits.Who else? n principle, suppose, nyonewho knows hetruthboutrightness.ut npractice,nanyongoing olitical rder, omegroup fpeoplewill haveto be foundwho can be presumedoknow hetruthbetter r moreconsistentlyhanthepeopleas a wholedo. Thisgroupwill then be awardeda procedural ight o intervene, rounded n asubstantive rgumentboutknowledgend moraltruth.Popular legislationmightbe revieweddemocratically:n ancientAthens,forexample,citizensconcerned bout the legitimacy f aparticularecision fthe ssemblyouldappealfromhe ssemblys awhole oa smaller roup fcitizens,elected y otandempanelledsajury.The ury iterally ut he awontrial,with ndividual itizens ctingas prosecutorsnd defense ttorneys,nd its verdict ookprecedenceover he egislativect tself.7In this ase,obviously, ospecialwisdomwas claimed; hesameargument r thesamesortofargument ouldjustifyoth he ctand theverdict.Moreoften, owever, roups f hissort reconstitutednaristocraticatherhandemocratic rounds. heappeal is frompopular consciousness, articularnterests,elfish rshortsightedoliciesto thesuperior nderstandingfthefew:Hegel'scorpsofcivil ervants, enin'svanguard arty,nd so on. Ideally, hegroup o which he ppeal s mademust e nvolvednthe ommunityfideas, oriented o actionwithin t,but attuned t thesame timetophilosophers utside. n butnotwholly n, o as toprovide match orthephilosopher'swithdrawal nd return.

    V.In theUnited tatestoday, t s apparent hat henine udgesoftheSupremeCourthavebeenassigned omethingike his ole.Theassign-ments most learly rgued nthework fa group f ontemporaryawprofessors, ll of whom are philosophers oo or, at least, muchinfluenced y political philosophy.'8 ndeed, therevivalof politicalphilosophy as had itsmostdramaticmpactn choolsof aw-and for

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    388 POLITICALTHEORY /AUGUST1981a reason hat snotdifficultomakeout. na settled emocracy, ith orevolution n prospect,udges are the most likely nstrumentsfphilosophical eformation.fcourse, he onventionaloleofSupremeCourt udges extendsno furtherhantheenforcementf a writtenconstitutionhat tself estson democratic onsent nd is subjecttodemocraticmendment. nd evenwhen he udgesact inways hatgobeyond upholdingthe textual integrity f the constitution,heygenerallylaimnospecialunderstandingf ruthndrightnessutreferthemselves nstead to historicalprecedents,ong-establishedegalprinciples,rcommon alues.Nevertheless,heplacethey oldandthepowertheywieldmake it possibleforthemto imposephilosophicalconstraintsn democratichoice.Andthey rereadilyvailable as thepeopleare not)forphilosophicalnstructions to thenature fthoseconstraints. am concerned erewithudgesonly nsofar s they re nfact nstructed-andwith hilosopherseforeudgesbecause numberofphilosopherseem so ready o provide he nstruction.hetensionbetweenudicial review nd democracy irectly arallelsthe tensionbetweenphilosophy nd democracy.But the second is the deepertension, orudgesarelikely oexpandupontheir onstitutionalightsor to sustain program fexpansion nlywhen hey re nthegrip fphilosophical octrine.Now, udgesandphilosophersre mostly) ifferentorts fpeople.One can imagine philosopher-judge,ut theunion is uncommon.Judges reinan importantensemembers fthepolitical ommunity.Most ofthemhave hadcareers s officeholders,ras political ctivists,or as advocates of thisorthatpublicpolicy.Theyhaveworked nthearena;theyhaveparticipatedndebates.When hey requestioned ttheir onfirmation earings, hey re presumed o have opinionsofroughly hesame sortas their uestioners-commonplace pinions,much ofthetime, lse theywould neverhavebeennominated. nceconfirmed, o be sure, theyset themselves t some distancefromeveryday olitics;their pecial standing n a democracyrequirescertain etachmentndthoughtfulnes.heydontherobesofwisdom,and those robes constitutewhat mightbe called a philosophicaltemptation:olovewisdombetterhan he aw.Butudges re upposedto bewise nthewaysofa particularegaltradition, hich hey harewith heir ld professionalnd political ssociates.The stance of the philosopher s verydifferent.he truthshecommonly eeksareuniversal nd eternal, nd it s unlikelyhat heycanbefound romhe nside fanyreal ndhistoricommunity.ence

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY ANDDEMOCRACY 389thephilosonher's ithdrawal: e mustdenyhimself heassurances fthe ommonplace.He does nothave o beconfirmed.)o what ort fplace, then,does he withdraw?Most often, oday,he constructs orhimself since he cannot, ike Plato, discover forhimself) n idealcommonwealth,nhabited ybeingswho havenone of theparticularcharacteristicsnd none of theopinions r commitmentsfhisformerfellow-citizens.e imagines perfectmeetingn an"original osition"or"idealspeech ituation"where hemen ndwomen nattendancereliberated rom heir wn deologies rsubjected ouniversalizingulesofdiscourse.And then,he asks whatprinciples,ules, onstitutionalarrangementshesepeoplewould choose ifthey et out to create nactualpolitical rder. 9They re,as itwere, hephilosophical epresen-tatives ftherest fus,andthey egislatenourbehalf. hephilosopherhimself, owever,s theonlyactual inhabitant fthe deal common-wealth,the only actual participantn the perfectmeeting. o theprinciples, ules, onstitutions, ithwhichhe emerges re infact heproducts fhisownthinking,designed t will nan orderlyashion,"subject nly o whateveronstraints eimposesuponhimself. or areanyother articipantsequired,venwhen hedecision roceduref heideal commonwealths conceivedn terms fconsensus runanimity.For if herewere nother erson resent, ewouldeither e dentical othephilosopher, ubject o the same constraintsnd so led to saythesamethings nd movetoward hesameconclusions, r hewould be aparticular ersonwithhistoricallyerived haracteristicsndopinionsand then his presencewould undermine he universality f theargument.The philosopher eturns romhisretreatwith onclusions hat redifferentrom he onclusions f ny ctualdemocratic ebate.At east,they ave,orheclaims or hem, differenttatus. hey mbodywhat sright,which s to sayforourpresent urposes, heyhave beenagreeduponbya setof dealrepresentatives,hereas heconclusions eachedthrough emocratic ebate aremerely greeduponbythepeople or bytheir ctualrepresentatives.he peopleor their epresentativesightthen be invited o revisetheir own conclusions n the lightof thephilosopher'swork. I suppose that this is an invitation mplicitlyextended very ime philosopher ublishes book. Atthemoment fpublication,t least,he is a properdemocrat:hisbook is a gift o thepeople. But thegift s rarely ppreciated. n thepolitical rena, thephilosopher's ruths re likelyto be turnled nto one more set ofopinions, ried ut, rgued bout, dopted npart, epudiatednpart, r

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    390 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1981ignored. udges,n the ther and,maywellbepersuadedogive hephilosopher differentort. f hearing. heir pecialrolein thedemocraticommunitysconnected,s I have lreadyaid,totheirthoughtfulness,ndthoughtfulnesssa philosophicalosture:udicialstatus anonly eehancedy little eal hilosophy.oreover,udgesareadmirablylaced o mediate etweenheopinionstemporarily)establishedn thedemocraticrena ndthe ruths orked ut ntheidealcommonwealth.hroughhe rtof nterpretation,heyan dowhatRousseau'segislatoroesthroughhe rtofdivination.20

    VI.Considerhe aseof rights."ur deal epresentativesnphilosophi-cal seclusionome pwith list frightshat ttachoeach ndividualhuman eing. etus assume hat he ist s,as itcommonlysamongcontemporaryhilosophers,eeplymeditatednd erious. he numer-atedrightsorm coherenthole,uggestinghat tmightmean orecognizen anothermanorwoman he pecial ualities fmoralagency nd personality.hephilosophicalistdiffersromhe istcurrentlystablishednthe aw,but talsooverlaps ithhe aw ndwithwhatwe can think fas the uburbs f the aw,the lusterfopinions,alues,ndtraditionso which e scape,fwe an,wheneverwefind he nnerity fthe awconstraining.ow he hilosopher-Imean till heheroic hilosopher,hephilosophersfounder-invites

    theudges oattemptmore rganizedscape, romhe aw, hroughthe uburbs,othedeal ommonwealtheyond.he nvitations llthemoreurgentn thatrightsre at stake.Forrights ave his pecialcharacteristic:heir iolationequiresmmediateeliefrreparation.Andudges re notmerelyhe vailable, heyre lsothe ppropriateinstrumentsfreliefndreparation.2'Ineffect,hephilosopherroposes decision rocedureorudgesmodeled nthat f hedeal ommonwealth.his s npart lattery,utitalso hasa factual ationale.orthediscussionsf udges mongthemselveseally o resemblehe rgumentshat o on in the dealcommonwealthin hemind f he hilosopher) uchmoreloselyhandemocraticebate anever o.And t eems lausibleo say hat ightsaremoreikelyo bedefinedorrectlyy he eflectionf he ewhanbythevotesof themany.22o thephilosophersks the udges orecapitulatentheirhambershe rgumentehas lready orkedut

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY ANDDEMOCRACY 391insolitary etreat,ndthen ogive hat rgurnenttheutilityfpractice"first y ocatingt nthe aw or nthe raditionsnd values hat urroundthe aw and thenbydeciding ases in its terms.Whennecessary,hejudgesmust reemptroverruleegislative ecisions.This sthe rucialpoint, or t shere hat he ension etween hilosophynddemocracytakeson material orm.Thelegislatures, fnot hereality,hen t east he ffectiveepresen-tationof thepeopleassembled o rule hemselves.tsmembers ave arighto act within n area.Judiciallynforcedightsan beunderstoodintwodifferentutcomplementaryayswith egard o this rea.First,they re boundariesircumscribingt.From his iew, simple quationfollows:themore extensive he list ofrights,hewider herangeofjudicial enforcement,he less room there s for legislative hoice.The morerightshe udgesaward tothepeopleas individuals,he essfree hepeopleare as a decision-makingody.Or,second,rightsreprincipleshat tructurectivities ithin hearea,shaping olicies ndinstitutions. hen judges do not merely perateat the boundaries,howeverwideornarrow heboundariesre. Theirudgments epresentdeep penetrationaids nto thearea oflegislative ecision.23 ow,allthree fthe onstraintsnpopularwillinghat describedarlier anbeconceivedneither f theseways, s defense ras penetration.ut t sclear, I think, hatthe thirdconstraint imultaneouslyarrows heboundariesndpermitseeper aids.Assoonasthephilosophicalist frightsextendsbeyondthe twin bans on legal discriminationndpolitical epression,t nvitesudicialactivityhat s radicallyntrusiveon whatmight e calleddemocratic pace.Butthis, t can be objected, s to consider ightsnly ntheformalsense, gnoringheir ontent. ndtheir ontentmaywell nhance atherthancircumscribeopularchoice. magine, or xample, philosophi-callyand thenudicially ecognized ight owelfare.24hepurpose fsuch a right s plainenough. t wouldguarantee o each citizen heopportunityo exercisehiscitizenship,nd that s an opportunityecouldhardly e said tohave,or tohave nanymeaningfulashion,fhewere tarvingodeathordesperatelyeekinghelterorhimselfndhisfamily.A defensible ight, urely, nd yiet he argument have ustsketched tillholds.Fortheudicial nforcementfwelfareights ouldradically reducethe reach of democraticdecision.Henceforth,hejudgeswoulddecide, nd as cases accumulated,heywoulddecide nincreasing etail,what thescope and character fthewelfare ystemshould be andwhatsortsofredistributiontrequired. uchdecisions

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    392 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1981wouldclearlynvolve ignificantudicialcontrol f he tatebudgetnd,indirectlyt east, f he evel f axation-theveryssues verwhich hedemocratic evolutionwas originally ought.This sort of thingwould be easier forcommitted emocratsf theexpanded ist frights erencorporatednto he onstitutionhroughpopularly ontrolledmending rocess.Thentherewould exist omedemocratic asis for henew undemocratic)ower fphilosophersndjudges. The peoplewould,I think, e ill-advised o agreeto suchanincorporation nd to surrendero large a partof theirday-to-dayauthority.n themodern tate,however,hat uthoritys exercised oindirectly-its so far, nfact, rom eingday-to-dayuthority-thattheymight eel he urrendero bea minormatter. herightshey ainas individuals in this case, to welfare ervicesfroma benevolentbureaucracy)mightn theirview faroutweigh herightshey ose asmembers.And so it is not implausible o imagine heconstitutionalestablishmentf omethingike, ay,Rawls'stwoprinciplesfustice.25Then theentire rea ofdistributiveusticewouldeffectivelyehandedovertothecourts.What range fdecisions heywouldhavetomake!Imagine a class action suit testing he meaningof the differenceprinciple. he udgeswouldhave odecidewhetherhe lassrepresentedin thesuit was really hemost disadvantaged lass in thesociety orwhetherll orenough f tsmembersellwithinhat lass).And f twas(or if they did), the udges would then have to decide what rightsfollowedfrom he differencerinciple nderthematerial onditionscurrentlyrevailing. o doubt, heywouldbe driven oconsult xpertsand officialsnmaking hesedecisions. twouldmake ittle ense forthem oconsult he egislature,owever,or othese uestions,frightsarereally tissue, heremust e a rightnswer-and this nswers morelikely o be knownby philosophers,udges,experts,nd officials hanbyordinary itizens r theirpoliticalrepresentatives.26Still, fthepeoplecametofeel ppressed ythenew uthoritieshattheyhadestablished, hey ould alwaysdisestablishhem. heamend-ing processwouldstillbeavailable, hough tmight e the asethat hegradualerosionof legislative nergywould makeit less available inpractice han t was inprinciple.27artly or his eason, ndpartly orreasonsto which will now turn, wantto arguethat philosophersshould not be too quick to seek out the judicial (or any other)instrument,nd that udges, thoughthey mustto some extentbephilosophersfthe aw,shouldnot be tooquicktoturn hemselvesntopolitical philosophers. t is a mistake to attemptany extensive

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY ANDDEMOCRACY 393incorporationof philosophicalprinciples nto the law eitherbyinterpretationramendment.orthat s, neitherase,totake hem utofthepolitical rena where hey roperly elong.The interventionsfphilosophershouldbe limitedothegiftshey ring. lsethey re ikeGreeksbringingifts,fwhom hepeopleshouldbeware, orwhat heyhaveinmind s thecapture fthecity.

    VII."Thephilosophersnot a citizen fanycommunityf deas.That swhatmakeshim nto a philosopher." have takenthese entences omean that the politicalphilosophermustseparatehimself rom hepolitical ommunity,uthimselfoose from ffectiveiesandconven-tional deas. Onlythencan he ask and struggleo answer hedeepestquestions bout themeaning nd purposeofpolitical ssociation ndtheappropriatetructuref thecommunityofevery ommunity)nd

    itsgovernment.his kind ofknowledge ne can haveonlyfrom heoutside. nside, notherkind ofknowledges available,more imited,more particular n character. shall call it political ratherthanphilosophical nowledge.tanswers he uestions:What s themeaningandpurpose fthis ssociation?What s the ppropriatetructurefourcommunitynd government?ven ifwe assumethatthere re rightanswers o these ast questions and it s doubtful hattheparticularquestionshave right nswerseven ifthegeneral uestionsdo), it isneverthelesshe ase that herewillbe asmany ightnswerssthere recommunities. utside hecommunities,owever,heresonly nerightanswer.As there remany avesbutonly nesun, o politicalknowingis particular ndpluralistncharacter, hilephilosophical nowingsuniversalist nd singular.The political uccessofphilosophers,hen,would have theeffect fenforcingsingular ver pluralist ruth,hatis, of reiteratinghe structure f the ideal commonwealthn everypreviouslyparticularistommunity.magine not one but a dozenphilosopherkings:theirrealmswould be identicallyashioned ndidentically overned, xcept forthose adjustments equiredby anineradicablyarticularisteography.If God were philosopher ing,He would haveallocatedto eachcommunitynidentical requivalentset of geographic onditions.)The case would be the same withadozencommunitiesounded ntheoriginal osition: here sonlyoneoriginalposition. And it would be the same again witha dozen

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    394 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1981communitieshapedbyundistortedommunicationmong n dealizedset of members: or t is a feature f undistortedommunication,sdistinct rom rdinaryalk,thatonlya very ew hings an be said.28Now,wemayormaynot be ready o assignvalue to particularismand pluralism. t is not easyto know how to decide. For pluralismimplies rangeof nstances-a range fopinions, tructures,egimes,policies-withregard o each of whichwe arelikely o feeldifferently.Wemight aluetherange r the dea of a range ndyetbeappalledbylargenumber f theinstances, nd then earchfor omeprinciple fexclusion. Most pluralists re in factconstrained luralists,nd theconstraintshey efend erive rom niversal rinciples. an it stillbesaidthat hey aluepluralism?heymerelyikevariety,erhaps, rtheyare notreadyyet o makeup theirminds boutevery ase,orthey retolerant, r indifferent.r theyhave an instrumentalistiew:manysocialexperiments ill ead oneday butthatday sfaroff) oa singletruth.All these are philosophical erspectivesn thesensethattheyrequire standpoint utsidetherange.And from hatstandpoint,suspect, luralismwillalwaysbe an uncertain alueat best.Butmostpeoplestanddifferently.heyare inside heir wncommunities,ndthey aluetheir wnopinions ndconventions. hey ometopluralismonly through n act ofempathynd identification,ecognizinghatotherpeoplehave feelingsiketheir wn. Similarly,hephilosophermightcome to pluralismby imagininghimself citizenof everycommunityather han fnone.But henhemightosethat irmense fhimselfndhissolitude hatmakeshim philosopher,nd thegifts ebringsmight e ofless valuethanthey re.I do notmean ounderestimatehosegifts. ut t s mportantow osuggest hat hevalueofuniversalruthsas uncertain hen eenfrominside a particular ommunitys is the value ofpluralismwhen eenfrom utside very articularommunity.ncertain, mean osay,notunrealor negligible: or do notdoubt thatparticular ommunitiesimprovethemselves y aspiringto realizeuniversal ruths nd byincorporatingparticular) eatures fphilosophical octrine ntotheirownwaysoflife.And his hecitizens lso understand. ut from heirstandpoint,twillnot lwaysbeobvious hat herights,ay,of bstractmen ndwomen,he nhabitantsf ome dealcommonwealth,ught obeenforced ere ndnow.They re ikely ohave woworriesboutanysuch enforcement. irst of all, it will involveoverriding heirowntraditions,onventions,nd expectations. hese are,ofcourse, eadilyaccessible o philosophical riticism;heywerenot"designed twill n

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 395an orderlyashion" y founder ra sage; heyrethe esult fhistoricalnegotiation, ntrigue,nd struggle.But that is just the point.Theproducts f a shared xperience,hey re valuedbythepeopleover hephilosopher's ifts ecause theybelongto thepeople and thegifts onot- muchas I might aluesomefamiliarnd much-used ossessionand feeluneasywith new,moreperfectmnodel.Thesecondworrys more losely onnected o democraticrinciple.It is notonlythe familiar roducts f their xperiencehat hepeoplevalue, buttheexperiencetself,heprocess hrough hich heproductswereproduced.Andtheywillhavesomedifficultynderstanding hythehypotheticalxperience f abstractmenand women houldtakeprecedenceover their own history. ndeed,the claim of theheroicphilosophermustbe thatthe first ort of experience otonlytakesprecedenceverbuteffectivelyeplaces he econd.Whereverniversaltruth as beenestablished,here s no room fornegotiation,ntrigue,and struggle. ence, t ooks as if hepolitical ife fthecommunitystobe permanentlynterrupted. ithinomesignificantart fthe reaoverwhich itizens adonce moved reely,heyreno onger o move tall. Why houldthey cceptthat?Theymightwellchoosepolitics vertruth, ndthat hoice, ftheymake t,willmake nturn orpluralism.Anyhistoricalommunity hosemembershapetheir wn nstitutionsandlaws willnecessarily roduce particularndnot universal ayoflife.That articularityan be overcome nlyfrom heoutside nd onlyby repressingnternal oliticalprocesses.But thissecondworry,which s the more mportantfthe two, sprobably xaggerated. or philosophical octrine,ike the aw itself,requires nterpretationefore tcan be enforced.nterpretations ustbe particular n character, nd they invitereal and not merelyhypotheticalrgument. nless hephilosopher ins entire overeignty"forhimself,hen,hisvictory illnot nfact nterruptrcutoff oliticalactivity.f hisvictory ere otake he orm hat havebeen magining,twouldmerely hift he focus ofpolitical ctivity rom egislatures ocourts, romaw-makingolitigation. ntheother and, nsofar s it sa victoryt all, it has to have omeuniversalizingendencies;t east, thas to impose omeconstraintsn the pluralizing endencies f a free-wheeling olitics.The more the udgesare "strict onstructionists"fphilosophicaldoctrine, he more the differentommunities heyrulewill ookalike andthemore hecollective hoices fthecitizenswillbeconfined. o the exaggerationmakes a point: the citizenshave, towhatever egree, ost control ver heir wn ives.And then heyhaveno reason,nodemocratic eason, orobeying hedecrees fthe udges.

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    396 POLITICALTHEORY /AUGUST1981ViII.

    All thismight eavoided,ofcourse,f heudgesadopted policy f"judicialrestraint,"reemptingroverrulingegislative ecisions nlyin rare ndextreme ases. But would uggesthatudicialrestraint,likejudicial intervention,raws ts forcefrom omedeeperphilosophicalview. Historically, estraint as been connectedwithskepticism rrelativism.29t is ofcourse true hatphilosophical iewschange, ndjudgesmustbe leery ffallingnwith omepassingfashion.But aminclined o think hat udicialrestraints consistent ith hestrongestclaims hatphilosophersmakefor he ruthshey iscover rconstruct.For there s a certain ttitude hatproperlyccompanies uchclaims,andhas tsoriginnthe dealcommonwealthrtheperfectmeetingromwhich he laimsderive. hisattitudesphilosophical estraint,nd t ssimply herespecthat utsiders we to thedecisions hat itizensmakeamongthemselvesndfor hemselves.hephilosopher aswithdrawnfrom hecommunity.t spreciselyecause heknowledge eseeks anonlybefound utside hisparticular lacethat tyieldsnorightsnside.

    At the same time, t has to be said thatsince the philosopher'swithdrawals speculative nly,he loses none of therights e has asan ordinary itizen. His opinionsare worth s muchas any othercitizen's; e s entitledike nyone lseto work or heirmplementation,toargue,ntrigue,truggle,ndsoon.Butwhenheacts ntheseways,heis an engaged philosopher, hat is, a sophist,critic,publicist, rintellectual,nd hemust cceptthe risks f those ocialroles. do notmean thathe must ccepttherisk fdeath; hatwilldependupontheconditions f engagementn his community,nd philosophers,ikeother itizens, illhopefor omethingetterhan ivilwar ndpoliticalpersecution. have nmind wo differentorts frisks.Thefirsts theriskofdefeat, or hough heengagedphilosopheran still laimtoberight, e cannotclaimanyof theprivilegesr rightness. e must ivewith heordinary ddsofdemocracticolitics. hesecond s therisk fparticularism, hichs,perhaps,nother ind fdefeat or hilosophy.Engagementlways nvolves loss-not total butserious nough-ofdistance, ritical erspective,bjectivity,nd so on. Thesophist, ritic,publicist,r ntellectual ust ddress he oncernsfhisfellow itizens,try o answertheir uestions,weave hisargumentsnto thefabric ftheirhistory.He must, ndeed,make himself fellowcitizen n thecommunityf ideas,and thenhewillbe unable to avoid entirelyhemoral and even theemotional ntanglementsfcitizenship. e mayhold fast othephilosophical ruthsfnaturalaw,distributiveustice,orhumanrights,uthispolitical rgumentsremost ikely olook ike

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 397somemakeshiftersion f those ruths,dapted o the needs faparticulareople: romhe tandpointf he riginalosition,rovincial;from he tandpointfthe deal peech ituation,deological.Perhaps e houlday hat,nce ngaged,aturalizedgainnto hecommunityf deas, hephilosophers ike political oet, helley'slegislator,ot Rousseau's. houghhestillhopes hathis rgumentsreach eyond isown ommunity,e sfirstfall "local."And ohemust e readyo forsakeheprerogativesfdistance,oherentesign,andentireovereignty,nd seek nsteadwith thoughtshatbreatheandwords hat urn,"o reach ndmove is wn eople.Andhemustgiveup anymore irectmeans o establishhe deal ommonwealth.That urrendersphilosophicalestraint.Judicial estraintollowsand so does vanguard estraintndbureaucraticestraint).he udgesmust old hemselvess closely sthey antothedecisionsf hedemocraticssembly,nforcingirstfallthebasicpolitical ightshat erveosustain he haracterfthatassemblyndprotectingtsmembersrom iscriminatoryegislation.They renot oenforceightseyond hese,nlessheyre uthorizedto do so by democraticecision. ndtdoesnotmattero hejudgessjudges hat more xtensiveist frightsanbe,orthat t has been,validated lsewhere.lsewhereoesnot ount.Onceagain, do not want o deny hatrightsan be validatedelsewhere.ndeed,hemost eneralruthsfpoliticsndmoralityanonly evalidatedn he hilosophicalealm,nd hat ealm as ts laceoutside,beyond, eparate rom veryparticular ommunity.utphilosophicalalidationndpolitical uthorizationre two entirelydifferenthings. hey elongo two ntirelyistinctpheresfhumanactivity.uthorizations thework f citizensoverninghemselvesamonghemselves.alidations thework f he hilosophereasoningalone na world e nhabitslone rfillswithheproductsfhis wnspeculations.emocracyasnoclaimsnthe hilosophicalealm,ndphilosophersavenospecial ightsn thepolitical ommunity.n theworldfopinion,ruths ndeednotherpinion,nd he hilosophersonly another opinion-maker.

    NOTES1. Zettel, d. G.E.M. Anscombe nd G. H. von WrightBerkeley:UniversityfCaliforniaPress,1970),no. 455.2. L. Wittgensteintrans.G.E.M. Anscombe),Philosophical nvestigations,NewYork:Macmillan,1958),para. 124.

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    398 POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 19813. For an account of thisspecialform f philosophicalheroism, ee SheldonS.Wolin,Hobbes ndtheEpic TraditionfPolitical heoryLos Angeles:Univ. fCaliforniaPress,1970).4. Rene Descartes,Discourseon Method, rans.ArthurWollaston Hammonds-worth:Penguin,1960),pp. 44-45.5. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan, artII, ch. 31 (end).6. C. P. Cavafy, The FirstStep," n TheCompletePoemsof Cavafy, rans.RaeDalven (New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich, 976),p. 6.7. W.H. Auden, Shorts I," Collected oems. d. EdwardMendelsohn.NewYork:RandomHouse, 1976).8. "InMemory f W. B. Yeats," n TheEnglishAuden:Poems,Essays nd DramaticWritings,927-1939,d. Edward MendelshonNewYork: RandomHouse, 1977).9. TheLettersfJohnKeats, d. M. B. FormanLondon:OxfordUniv.Press, 952),p. 67.10. TheRepublicof Plato,trans.F. M. CornfordNewYork:OxfordUniv.Press,1945),591A-592B.11. Thus an Athenian rator o the ssembly: It is inyourpower, ightly,odisposeofwhatbelongs oyou-well, or, fyou wish,ll."Quoted nK. J.Dover,Greek opularMoralityn theTimeof Platoand AristotleBerkeley: niv.ofCalifornia ress,1974),pp. 290-291.12. TheSocial Contract, ook 11, hs.ivand vi.

    13. Thisfollows, think,romhe rgumenthat hegeneralwill s nalienable, houghRousseau wants to make even more of inalienabilityhanthis-as in his attack onrepresentation,ook 111, h. xv.14. Social Contract, ook II, ch. iiiandpassim.15. Social Contract, ook II, ch.vii.16. RichardWollheim,A Paradox in theTheory f Democracy,"n Philosophy,Politics nd SocietYSecondSeries), d. Peter aslett nd W.G. RuncimanOxford: asilBlackwell, 962), p.71-87. should tress hat he rgumentere sabout mplementation,notobedience.What s at issue s how or forwhat easons olicies houldbechosen or hecommunitys a whole.Whetherndividual itizenshoulduphold his r that olicy nceithas beenchosen,or assist ncarryingtout, s another uestion.17. A.H.M. Jones,Athenian emocracyOxford:BasilBlackwell, 960), p. 122-123.18. See, for xample,Ronald Dworkin,TakingRights eriously,Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniv.Press,1977); FrankMichelman, In Pursuit f ConstitutionalWelfareRights,"Universityf Pennsylvania au4'Review (1973) 121:962-1019; wenFiss, "TheFormsofJustice," arvardLaw Review1979) 93: 1-58;BruceAckerman,ocial Justicein the LiberalState New Haven: Yale Univ.Press,1980).19. In thismodeofargument, ohn Rawls is obviously hegreatpioneer.But thespecific seofthenewphilosophy ithwhich amconcerneds not dvocatedbyhim nATheory fJustice r inany subsequent rticles.20. LikeRousseau's egislatorgain, heudges haveno direct oercive ower ftheirown: in someultimateense,theymust lways ook for upport mong thepeople oramongalternative olitical lites.Hence thephrase"judicialtyranny,"pplied to theenforcementfsomephilosophically ut notdemocraticallyalidated osition,s alwaysa pieceofhyperbole. n the otherhand, there re forms fauthority,hort ftyranny,thatraiseproblems ordemocratic overnment.

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    Walzer PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY 39921. The pecial nvitationnd he ense furgencyremost lear nDworkin,akingRights eriously.utDworkineems o believe hat he deal ommonwealthctuallyexists,o tospeak,nthe uburbs.he et fphilosophicallyalidatedightsan lsobevalidated,e rgues,n ermsf he onstitutionalistorynd he tandingegal rinciplesof heUnitedtates,ndwhenudgesnforcehese ightsheyredoingwhathey ughtto be doing, iven hesort fgovernmente have.For a differenteadingf ourconstitutionalistory,ee Richard ly,Democracyand DistrustCambridge, A:Harvard niv. ress, 980). ly rgues or omethingerymuchike he wo onstraintsthat havedefended.orhim,oo, he deal ommonwealthies omewhereeyondheU.S. Constitution.t s theproperoalofpartiesndmovements,ot fcourts.22. For carefulndratherentativergumentothisffect,eeT.M.Scanlon,DueProcess"nNomosXXII, d. R. PennockndJ.ChapmnanNewYork:NewYorkUniv.

    Press, 977), p. 120-121.23. Fissprovidesome lear xamplesn"FormsfJustice."24. Cf.MichelmanWelfareights,"nd lso"OnProtectinghe oorThroughheFourteenthmendment,"arvardawReview1969) 3.25. For a proposalo this ffect,eeAmyGutmann,iberal qualityCambridge,England:ambridgeniv. ress, 980), . 199.26. Dworkin, aking ightseriously,speciallyhapters and13.27. Judicialnterventionsn behalf f ndividualightsroadlynderstoodaylsoleadto anerosionfpopularnergies-ateast n theeft. or briefrgumentothiseffect,eemy rticleTheLeftndtheCourts," issentSpring, 981).28. Even fwe were o connecthilosophicalonclusionso some etofhistoricalcircumstances,s Habermasoeswhen e maginesdiscursiveill-formation"ccurring"ata giventagenthedevelopmentfproductiveorces,"ras Rawls oeswhen esuggestshathe rinciplesorkedut n he riginalositionpply nly o democraticsocietiesndermodernonditions,"tremainsrue hat he onclusionsreobjectivelytrue rrightor range fparticularommunities,ithoutegardothe ctual oliticsfthose ommunities.ee Habermas,egitimationrisisBoston: eacon, 975), . 113;Rawls, Kantian onstructivismn MoralTheory," heJournalf Philosophv,7(September,980), . 518.29. See,for xample, ly, emocracy ndDistrust,p.57-59.

    Michael Walzer s a Professorn theSchoolofSocial Sciences t the nstituteforAdvancedStud)' in Princeton,New Jerse'v.His mostrecentbook is RadicalPrinciples: eflectionsf n Unreconstructedemocrat New York:BasicBooks,1980).