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The Functional categories of the Verb- Spring Term 2011- Ileana Baciu

Mood, Modality and Modal Verbs

1.Introduction1.1. A distinction should be made between mood and modality. Modality is a semantic/ pragmatic concept while mood is a grammatical category. This distinction is similar to the one between tense and time , gender and sex or aspect and aspectuality.The primary function of „mood ‟ is to express modality and refers to specific linguistic forms or paradigms of forms, typically in verb inflection (Palmer 2001:4; Huddlestone&Pullum 2005:172), asin the contrast between indicative (realis mood ) , subjunctive, imperative, infinitive (irrealis mood ). Modality is defined as a linguistic category that refers to the factual status of a state of

affairs/situation. Modality, hence, does not relate semantically to the verb alone but to the wholesentence. Mood and modality are not always co-extensive. In many languages, not mood but certain modal

systems (e.g. modal verbs in English; cf. Palmer, 2001:4) are the typical means of expressingmodality.

On the other hand, not all functions of mood markers necessarily express modality; we also have theother side of the coin, namely markers of grammatical categories other than mood may help to expressmodal notions, e.g. the past tense form of the verb is used for irrealis marking in English.1.2. As far as English is concerned historical change has more or less eliminated mood markers fromthe inflectional system (the only remnant is 1st/3rd person singular were), the mood system being

rather analytic than inflectional (Huddlestone&Pullum 2005:172).Modal concepts and attitudes can be expressed in English by:

(a) mood/inflectional markers : factual (indicative), non-factual (subjunctive, infinitive form,imperative form)(b) lexical modals:

(i) adjectives: able, bound, certain, compulsory, imperative, likely, necessary, possible, probable,supposed, etc.

(ii) nouns: allegation, assumption, certainty, likelihood, necessity, possibility, probability(iii) verbs: assume, believe, declare, fear, hope, imagine, insist, permit, presume, require, suspect,think, etc.(iv)adverbs: allegedly, certainly, possibly, probably, presumably, undoubtedly,(c) true modal auxiliaries: can, may must, shall, will, could, might, should, would, ought to, need,

dare.(d) semi-modal verbs: have (got) to

Roughly, modality is centrally concerned with the speaker’s/subject’s attitude towards the factuality or actualization of the situation expressed by the non-finite part of the clause (the proposition „ p‟)

(H&P:2002:173).Consider the following sentences:

(i) He wrote it himself(ii) He must have written it

(iii) He must help him(iv) He may help him

(v) He may have written it

A declarative clause like He wrote it himself is an unmodalised assertion : the speaker is committed tothe factuality of the proposition expressed („he write it‟) , i.e. the proposition is taken as a fact in thereal world. Hence, the indicative mood is used.



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On the other hand, a sentence like „ He must have written it ’ is modalised ; the truth of the sentence is

presented as something that is inferred and not as something that is directly known (epistemic modality)A sentence like You must help him expresses a different kind of modality which is concerned with theactualization of a future situation, namely, „you help him‟: I impose on you the obligation to bringthis situation about. (root/deontic modality)

The two modalised examples involve different kinds of modalities (epistemic ,deontic) but theyexpress the same concept, namely the concept of necessity. The concept of necessity and the related concept of possibility are core concepts in modality.Modal possibility is illustrated in the examples under (iv )and ( v) corresponding to the ones in (ii, iii) by replacing must with may.

The sentence He may have written it himself expresses the possibility of his having performed theeventuality described, i.e. it indicates an open attitude of the speaker towards the truth of the proposition (epistemic modality). Similarly, You may help him expresses the possibility of yourhelping him, i.e. the speaker gives permission and thus a potential barrier to the actualization of thesituation is removed (root /deontic modality)

2.Distinctive syntactic and morphological properties of Modal Verbs

2.1. Modal verbs form a special class of auxiliary verbs, given their particular morpho-syntactic properties which distinguish them not only from lexical verbs but also from other auxiliaries such asaspectual be and have. (Avram, 1999).(A) The NICE Constructions - Negation, Inversion, Code and Emphasis - distinguish between modalverbs and lexical verbs, placing modals within the class of aspectual auxiliaries:

(i) Negation can attach to the modal without do-support:(1) It will not work

(ii) Subject-auxiliary inversion is obligatory in questions and in tags, without do-support:(2) Will it rain?

(3) She can walk, can’t she?(iii) Modals can appear in the „code‟ construction without do-support:

(4) Susan can help them and I can too /and so can I.(iv) Emphatic polarity is possible without do-support:

(5) I WILL be there.

Besides the NICE properties, modal auxiliaries share the following properties with the aspectualauxiliaries be and have:(v) Stranding:

(6) He can’t come, but I can.(vi) Precede adverb/quantifier:

(7) They will probably/all come

(vii) Reduced forms:(8) She‟ll come later/ She won’t come later

(viii) Combinatorial and order restrictions; have, be and modals exclude any combination with do (see (iii) above); there are also rigid restrictions on the sequence of auxiliaries; this indicates thatauxiliaries have fixed positions:

(9) She may have arrived/*She have may arrivedShe may be coming soon/*She is may coming soonShe has been reading/*She is having read

B) Properties that distinguish between modal verbs and the aspectual auxiliaries be and have:

(i) Modals show no person-number agreement:(10) *She cans do it

(ii) Modals cannot co-occur:



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(27) *She must can help you vs. She must be able to help you

(iii) Modals lack non-finite forms, consequently are excluded from constructions that require one.From a syntactic point of view modal verbs occur only in finite clauses:

(12) to have – had – had - havingto be -was – been – being

(*to) can – could- *could – *canning

*I regret not canning swim vs. I regret not being able to swim*I have could swim since childhood vs. I have been able to swim since childhood.*I‟d like to can swim vs. I‟d like to be able to swim

(iv) Modals can only select a bare infinitive as complement (except ought ):

(13) They may come/be coming/have come‟

(v) The present /past distinction ; only some modal verbs exhibit a present/past alternation (whichis semantically neutralized in many contexts):can/could; shall/should; will/would; may/might :

(14) She could already swim when she was seven. vs. She could have told me thetruth.

3. Types of Modality

3.1. As already mentioned Modality is realized in standard English mainly by the use of modalverbs.It has long been acknowledged that modal verbs are ambiguous along at least two dimensions: (i) theroot modal meanings and (ii) the epistemic modal meanings.According to Kratzer (1991), „In using an epistemic modal we are interested in what else may (i.e. is

possible) or must (i.e. is necessary) be the case in our world given all the evidence available….Epistemic modality is the modality of curious people like historians, detectives and futurologists…Ahistorian asks what might have been the case, given all the available facts. Using a circumstantial

(=root) modal, we are interested in the necessities implied by or the possibilities opened up by certainsorts of facts… Circumstantial (=root) modality is the modality of rational agents like gardeners,architects and engineers. … An engineer asks what can be done given certain relevant facts‟. Thiskind of information will generally be supplied contextually. The root modal meanings subsume deontic modality and dynamic modality.„Deontic‟ is derived from the Greek for „that which is binding‟, so that it refers to concepts likeobligation, permission. Deontic modality is concerned with the possibility or necessity of acts performed by morally responsible agents. The authority (person, convention, etc) from whomobligation, permission emanates is known as the deontic source.. Prototypically, deontic modalityrefers to the speaker‟s attitude to the actualization of future situations (H&P 2005:178)„Dynamic‟ modalities are concerned with properties and dispositions (such as ability and willingness)of persons referred to in the clause, especially by the subject NP. Prototypically, no person or

institution is identifiable as a deontic source. The boundary between dynamic and deontic modality isoften fuzzy, hence they are grouped together under the heading „root’ modality or agent-oriented modality. Compare:

(15) (i) She can stay as long as she likes. (deontic - permission)(ii) She can easily beat everyone else in the club. (dynamic- ability)(iii) She can speak French. (ambiguous) (H&P 2005:178)

Example (15i) gives permission, (15ii) is concerned with the subject‟s ability, while (15iii) can beinterpreted in either way, deontically, as permitting her to speak French or dynamically as reportingher ability to do so.„Epistemic‟ is derived from the Greek for „knowledge‟ and roughly deals with the the possibility ornecessity of an inference drawn from available evidence as to the truth ( factuality) of past or presentsituations. Epistemic modalities are speaker-oriented .



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It is not the case that „what is known‟ is taken in the strong sense, but it should be understood as what

evidence the speaker has in making an inference or drawing a conclusion. This „personalized‟ kind ofknowledge reduces in fact to the belief-sets of the speaker. Epistemic modality involves the speaker’smental representation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation based on inferential processes. The speaker‟s mental representation of reality is a meta-representation of reality (cf.Papafragou, 2000).

From the speaker‟s point of view, the employment of epistemic modality rests crucially on his abilityto reflect on the content of his own beliefs. The speaker takes into account the reliability of these beliefs and performs deductive operations on them. On this picture, in the epistemic interpretation ofmodal verbs, the speaker uses the embedded proposition (the non-finite part of the sentence) as arepresentation of an abstract hypothesis he makes (i.e. meta-representation) and sees whether this

abstract hypothesis is compatible with, or entailed by his set of beliefs. Note that an epistemically modalised assertion is weaker in strength than its non-modalisedcounterpart (i.e. in the modalised sentence the speaker is less committed to the truth of the sentence)although must conveys epistemic necessity. Compare:

(16) San Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world.(17) San Marino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the world.

Sentence (16) offers a piece of factual information and the speaker trusts it to be true. In (17),the speaker possesses compelling evidence about the country with the highest life expectancy in theworld but the possibility that there are pieces of evidence beyond the speaker‟s beliefs is left open.These extra pieces of evidence may disconfirm the fact that San Marino is the country with thehighest life expectancy in the world. That is why sentence (17) is felt as weaker than (16) in spite ofthe fact that must conveys epistemic necessity.One obvious consequence of the fact that epistemic modality involves the speaker‟s mentalrepresentation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation is based on inferential processes is that epistemic modals, unlike root modals, cannot appear sentence-initially in yes-no

interrogatives:

(18) May the race start?“Is there permission for the race to start?” “*Is it possible that the race starts?”

(19) Should John leave?“Is it required that John leave?” “*Is it predictable that John will leave?”

In general, it is assumed that „the root uses of modal verbs are more basic, with the epistemic usesrising by extension to the domain of reasoning of concepts primarily applicable in the domain ofhuman interaction, such as compelling and permitting‟ (H&P 2005:178).

The sentences below are examples of root and epistemic uses of the modals must and may:

(20) (i) You must do as you are told. (root necessity)=‟you are required/obliged to do as you are told‟

(ii) She must have already left. (epistemic necessity)=‟it is a necessary assumption that she has already left‟

(iii) John must be in class today. (ambiguous)

(21) (i) You may go if you wish. (root possibility)=‟you are allowed to go if you wish‟ He may have left. (epistemic possibility)=‟it is a possible assumption that he has left‟ He may sleep downstairs. (ambiguous) (H&P:178)





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(26) (i)There must be law and order in the country (it is required that…; *it is

certain that…)(ii)The table should be ready for dinner at 7 (it is required that…; *it is certain

that…)

Root readings – permission and obligation- require a responsible agent for carrying out the activity

described by the sentences in (26) and in these cases the agent is identified pragmatically.As far as the alleged meaning shift which root readings undergo in passivization is concerned, it is to be noted that not all root statements undergo such a shift (the examples below are borrowed from Newmeyer,1970); the explanation is the same as the one for the examples above: the predicaterequires the presence of an agent which, in the passive counterparts, is identified pragmatically (27) or

syntactically (the by-phrase in (28)):

(27) (i) Sam must shovel the dirt into the hole.(ii) The dirt must be shoveled into the hole.

(28) (i) Visitors may pick flowers.(ii) Flowers may be picked by visitors.

3.2.2. Properties of the Verbal Complement. It has also been noted that root and epistemic readings ofmodal verbs impose different restrictions on the verbal complement from an aspectual point of view.

Viewpoint aspect: Epistemic interpretations allow the presence of perfect and progressive aspect inthe complement. Root interpretations exclude these forms. The following examples only allow theepistemic reading:

(29) (i) He must have been very tired./She may have left.(ii) John must be joking./She may be sleeping.

A consequence of the aspectual restriction is that epistemic readings have present and pastorientation, i.e. the speaker evaluates propositions about past (29i) or present (29ii) situations.

Lexical aspect: Individual – level states (i.e. inherent properties of individuals: have green eyes, be anative speaker, believe, know, etc) in the complement of the modal force an epistemic reading, not aroot reading of the modal verbs; root readings broadly involve stage-level predicates (activities,events or stage-level states).These predicates refer to situations that can be brought about by anindividual:

(30) He must have green eyes like his mother (it is certain that….*it is requiredthat)

They may be native speakers of Dutch (it is possible that…*it is allowed that)People in this part of the world may believe in strange gods.He must know the answer.

(31) You must behave yourself (it is required that..*it is certain that)You may go now (it is allowed that…*it is possible)

Note, nevertheless, that once the above state predicates are coerced into an achievement oractivity reading (contextually) the root reading becomes available (examples from Papafragou (2000)and Barbiers (1995)); the second condition to obtain a deontic reading with individual level states isthat no co-reference be established between the subject and the bearer of obligation (see example(32iv,v):



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(32) (i) I must be the best chess player there is (i.e. become)

(ii) You must be honest . Do you understand? (i.e. act)(iii) You must believe in God or they‟ll burn you on the stake.(iv) The new professor must be a native speaker of Finnish.(v) My blind date must be tall.

Zagona (1990) remarks that when the complement of an epistemic modal is stative, the eventuality-time of the verbal complement may be understood to be simultaneous with the modal time (i.e. thetime at which the modal evaluation obtains) ; a future-shifted reading is also possible . When thecomplement of the modal is eventive, its eventuality-time is understood to be future-shifted with

respect to the modal evaluation time (actually the interpretation is ambiguous between a root andepistemic reading). Habituals and progressive eventive predicates behave like stative predicates.Compare:

Epistemic reading:

(33) (i) Jeremy must/should be in class today. (simultaneous or future-shifted)(ii) Jeremy must/should leave today. (only future-shifted)(iii) Jeremy must/should be lying on the beach by now. (simultaneous)

Most root modals favour a future-shifted reading of the eventuality-time of the complement relative tothe modal evaluation time regardless of the aspectual class of the complement of the modal, except inthe case of ability readings of can and could :

(33‟) (i) You may go now. (the event of going is future)(ii) She can swim. (generic ability)(iii) She could swim when she was five. (past ability)

3.2.3. Ordering Constraints . When an epistemic and a root modal co-occur, the epistemic readingalways scopes higher than the root, i.e epistemic > root.

In English, the co-occurrence of two modal verbs is syntactically constrained but we may use semi-modals and other modal constructions (examples from Papafragou 2000):

(34) epistemic > rootThey may have to go soonHe ought to be able to do itHe might be allowed to go there

According to Cinque the epistemic > root constraint belongs to Universal Grammar (i.e. it isvalid cross-linguistically). There are no co-occurrence restrictions if the modal expressions are both

root or both epistemic.

(35) root> root

You must be able to prove your innocence

Epistemic > epistemic

Necessarily, the solution to this problem may be false

3.2.4. Interrogatives. Epistemic modals, unlike root modals, cannot appear sentence-initially in yes-no interrogatives:

(36) May the race start?



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“Is there permission for the race to start?”

“*Is it possible that the race starts?” (37) Should John leave?

“Is it required that John leave?” “*Is it predictable that John will leave?”

Papafragou (2000) argues that it is hard to construct a context in which it would be felicitous for thespeaker to ask whether a conclusion is possible or necessary with respect to his own set of beliefs.However, once such a context becomes available, interrogative-initial epistemics become acceptable.Consider:

(38) Might John be a liar?Must John be a liar?

Such sentences involve deliberative questions in which the speaker addresses a question to himself inan attempt to elaborate the evidence he has for a certain conclusion.

Since epistemic readings of modals involve the evaluation of a proposition (state of affairs) withrespect to the current belief-set of the speaker in the here and now of the talk-exchange, they cannotoccur in indirect speech and conditionals. Compare(Papafragou 2000:119):

(38‟) (i) ?If John must have a high IQ, then his teachers should treat him carefully(ii) ?If that blonde may be Jack‟s wife, we should keep quiet about the secretary (iii) If John must leave, then I will go(iv) If money may rule, then there is no justice

3.2.5. Negation. According to Coates (1983) „negation affects the modal predication if the modal hasroot meaning (in this case we speak of external negation), while it affects the main predication (theVP) if the modal has epistemic meaning (in this case we speak of internal negation)

(39) You may [not be given this opportunity again] (epistemic) may [not VP] „It is possible [that you will not be given]‟ - internal negationYou [may not ] enter (root) [not may] VP„You are [not allowed] to enter‟ -external negation

An exception is root must where negation affects the verbal complement and the suppletive formneed is used instead (40):

(40) You mustn‟t eat it all. (root) must [notVP] „It is necessary [that you not eat it all]‟– internal negation

You needn‟t eat it all (root) [not need] VP

„It is not necessary [for you to eat it all]‟– external negation

The above stated claim turns out to be wrong when other modals are taken into consideration.Consider the examples below, where should , ought to (Cormack &Smith 2002) are interpretedoutside negation (assume wide scope over negation, i.e. the negative morpheme negates the predicate(VP)) irrespective of their interpretation:

(41) Alfred shouldn‟t eat nuts. (root) should [not VP]„It is advisable [for Alfred not to eat nuts‟] – internal negation Bob shouldn‟t be late (epistemic) should [not VP]„It is predictable [that Bob will not be late]‟- internal negation

Mary ought not to leave (root) ought [notVP] „It is required [that Mary does not leave]‟- internal negation



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There oughtn‟t to be a problem finding the way. (epistemic) ought[notVP]

„it is predictable [that there will not be a problem]‟ - internal negation

A second group of modals consistently fall under negation,i.e. it is the modal that is negated; in thesecases we have external negation: can, could, need, dare:

(42) (i) George cannot swim (root) [ not can] VP – external negation „George [is not able ] to swim‟

(ii) George can‟t be coming late (epistemic) [not can]VP -external negation „It is [not possible] that George is coming late‟

(iii) Hugh needn‟t leave . (root) [not need] VP - external negation„It is [not required ] that Hugh leave‟

(iv) Unicorns needn‟t exist (epistemic) [not need] VP - external negation„It is [not certain] that unicorns exist‟

(v) You dare not resign (root) [not dare] - external negation

In what follows we shall have a closer look at the way modal readings pattern with respect tonegation adopting the claim put forth by Cormack and Smith (2002) according to whom the scopedivide relative to negation seems to be broadly along the distinction necessity vs possibility.

4. Modals and negation and the logical relation between necessity and possibility

4.1. It has long been noticed that necessity and possibility are logically related.In order to describe the logical relation between necessity and possibility we need to consider theirinteraction with negation (H&P 175). As has been mentioned above, we need to distinguish betweeninternal negation and external negation.Whenever the negative applies semantically to the VP complement of the modal we speak of „internal

negation‟. We say in such cases that the modal has scope over the negation or that the negation fallswithin the scope of the modal.(as in (43i) below; the paraphrase with the lexical modal isilluminating).Whenever the negative applies to the modal itself we speak of „external negation‟ since the modalfalls within the scope of negation.(as in (43ii) below). There are cases when the two types of negationcan combine(as in (43iii)). Consider the examples below:

(43) (i) He may [not have read it] (internal negation)„It is possible [that he didn’t read it]‟

(ii) He [can‟t ] have read it (external negation)„It is [not possible] that he has read it‟

(iii) He can‟t not have read it.

„It is not possible that he didn‟t read it‟

A second set of examples is (44) below:

(44) (i) You mustn‟t eat it all (internal negation)„It is necessary [that you not eat it all]‟

(ii) You needn‟t eat it all (external negation)„It is [not necessary ] for you to eat it all‟

The equivalence between pairs of clauses expressing modal necessity (irrespective of how they areexpressed: must, need, necessarily, necessary etc) and possibility (irrespective of how they areexpressed: can, may, possible, possibly, perhaps, etc) is illustrated in the examples below (H&P 176)where we use „Nec‟ for necessity, „Pos‟ for possibility and P for the propositional content „He be



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guilty‟; „not- Nec‟ and „not-Pos‟ indicate „external negation‟ while „not-P‟ indicates „internal

negation‟:

Necessity PossibilityHe must be guilty He can‟t not be guilty [NecP]=[not-Pos not P]

He must be not guilty. He can‟t be guilty. [Nec not-P]=[not-Pos P]

As can be noticed from all the examples above necessity modals scope over negation i.e. „not „negates the VP complement of the modal; possibility modals scope under „not‟. The paraphrases with

lexical modals are relevant and illuminating as we can see in (43) and (44).According to Cormack and Smith (2002) the two exceptions would be:(i) May, a possibility modal, where the relevant distinction is that between epistemic and root

reading.e.g.You may not leave = You are not allowed to leave; [not may] P

He may not be coming tomorrow=It is possible that he is not coming; may [not P](ii) the necessity modal need which should be considered a negative polarity item so it willalways appear under negation.

The pre-negative modals are labeled as Modal1 while post-negative modals as Modal2 inCormack& Smith‟s analysis (2002). The positions for modals relative to NEG is given below

PRE-NEG necessity: shall, should, must, will, would, ought to, be to, have to„Modal [Not]‟ possibility: epistemic reading only: may, might

POST-NEG possibility: can, could, dare (only root) Not [Modal] root r eading only: may, might

necessity: need

5. The semantics of modal verbs5.1 The most natural question that arises on the root-epistemic shift is: are modals lexicallyambiguous (e.g Palmer 1990, Coates, 1983), polysemous (e.g. Sweetser 1990) or unitary in meaning(monosemous) (e.g. Wertheimer (1972) Perkins, (1983), Haegeman (1983), Kratzer 1977,1981, 1991,Papafragou, 2000) ?

The root/epistemic alternation has been given various explanations:(i) the distinction is determined at the syntactic level (e.g. Picallo, 1990): epistemics are inserted

at sentence (IP) level while root modals are inserted within the VP level;

(ii) the difference is determined in the lexicon (e.g. Ross, 1969,Jackendoff 1971, Huddleston1974): epistemics are lexically one place (intransitive) predicates,corresponding to raisingverbs, while roots are two-place (transitive) predicates corresponding to control verbs. Thiswould mean that root modals and epistemic modals are distinct lexical items.

(iii) the distinction is determined contextually in the semantic/pragmatic component (e.gWertheimer (1972) Perkins, 1983, Haegeman (1983), Kratzer 1991, Papafragou, 2000), i.e.the interpretive differences are determined by the conversational background . This is knownas the monosemous approach.

The solution we adopt is the third one, namely a unitary semantic approach, i.e. a commoncore for the meaning of each modal . The different interpretations modal expressions acquire arecontext-dependent . The theoretical framework is the one suggested by Kratzer (1991) and Papafragou(2000).Let‟s take the following set of examples:



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(45) (i) I must go on a diet.(ii) You ought to be ashamed.(iii) You may go home only if you have finished your work.(iv) You should acknowledge the authorities‟ effort to fight crime.

(46) (i) You must be John‟s wife.(ii) That problem ought to be easy for a genius like you.(iii) You may find that your love for opera is not widely shared here.(iv) Since you are interested in industrial design, this course should be

useful. (Papafragou 2000:520)

Broadly speaking, the utterances in (45) involve a root modal base and convey that a given state ofaffairs is considered possible (permissible) or necessary (obligatory) in view of some physical, moral,legal, social circumstances in the real world; on the other hand, the utterances in (46) involve anepistemic modal base and convey that a given proposition presents itself as a possible or necessary

conclusion in view of the evidence available to the speaker . The „evidence‟ can be explicitly stated orinferred: e.g. in (46ii) in view of the fact that you are a genius it is a necessary assumption that the problem is easy for you.In the logic of modality, modal expressions in general are treated as propositional operators (i.e.quantifiers) which quantify over a set of possible worlds (identified by the non-finite part of theclause/the VP complement, i.e. the proposition) and relate to the proposition under question.Modal operators express different types of commitment to the truth of the proposition, i.e. a modaloperator expresses an attitude towards the proposition it operates on. This attitude is determined bythe contextual and pragmatic information required to understand the utterance.5.2. All conversation presupposes a common conversational background (or modal base). The propositions in the conversational background are taken as premises in the judgements people make

about the truth of the utterance.1 To quote Papafragou „a first approximation to the meaning of modal

verbs is that they express possibility or necessity with respect to different types of modal base‟.Consider the following set of examples that contains the various modal meanings of

the verb MUST (Kratzer (1977). In all the examples below the modal expresses some kind ofnecessity and the paraphrases with the phrase in view of (in 47‟) give the preferred modal

base for the interpretation of the utterances :

(47) a. All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors. b. The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti.c. If you must sneeze, at least use your handkerchief.

d. When Kahukura-mir died, the people of Kahunguru said: Rakaipaka must be our chief.

1 The propositions in the conversational background play an important role in human reasoning, since they are taken as implicit premises in the judgements

speakers make. These implicit premises are sometimes explicitly signalled by using phrases of the type: by virtue of what is known, by virtue of what is

reasonable/lawful, etc. For instance, all speakers/hearers in our real world interpret a sentence such as (1) as true in our solar system:

(1) Nothing can travel faster than light

When we talk to other people we generally suppose that they share with us a common ground, which is the same for all community. members. As a rule, we do

not suppose that a person we address comes from another solar system regulated by other physical laws and where sentence (1) can be false.



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The verb MUST in (47a) has a deontic reading : it refers to a duty. The verb MUST in (47b) is used

epistemically: it refers to a piece of knowledge. The verb MUST in (47c) has been called„dispositional must’ : it refers to dispositions people have. The verb MUST in (47d) is sometimescalled „ preferential must’ : it refers to preferences and wishes.

(47‟) a‟. In view of what their tribal duties are, all Maori children must learn the names of

their ancestors b‟. In view of what is known, the ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahitic‟. If – in view of what your dispositions are - you must sneeze, at least use yourhandkerchiefd‟. In view of what is good for us, Rakaipaka must be our chief

In order to account for the utterances in (47) Kratzer adopts a number of ingredients. Thethree factors that are important and which underlie modal operators are:

the modal relation,

the modal base andthe ordering source

The modal relation is basically the relation of compatibility or logical consequence (or entailment);this relation underlies the notion of possibility or necessity.The modal base and the ordering source are the two parameters along which the conversationalbackground is defined.The modal base is the set of possible worlds/domains where the propositions considered as premisesin the modal inference are true, i.e. worlds compatible with what is known, worlds compatible withwhat is believed , worlds compatible with what is the norm, etc. Such a background may be signalled by phrases such as in view of what is reasonable, in view of what is desirable, or in view of what isknown. The modal bases form the restrictions for the particular modal expressions they are relevant

to. According to Kratzer, the epistemic-root distinction arises from the kinds of facts that areconsidered salient in forming a particular modal base.

Modal bases are generally inferred from the conversational context . As we can notice, modal bases are organized in various domains: the factual domain (i.e. propositions that describe the factualworld), the regulatory domain (i.e., propositions that include legal rulings, social regulations,religious rules, chess rules, etc.), the domain of moral beliefs (i.e., propositions that are descriptions ofstates of affaires in ideal worlds), the domain of desirability (i.e., propositions that are descriptions ofstates of affair s in worlds desirable from someone‟s point of view), the social domain, the biologicaldomain, etc.

A particularly salient ingredient in interpreting modality is that it may have a strongnormative component. Modal judgements of the type exemplified so far imply not only a modal base but also an ordering source, i.e., a set of principles that impose an ordering among the considered

alternatives.The ordering source is some „ideal‟ world with respect to which the worlds (i.e. alternatives) in themodal base are to be considered, The ordering source further delimits the domain over which themodal relation is taken to quantify.In the examples below both „ should ‟ and „must ‟ are necessity modals. The difference between them isgiven by the ordering source :‟must‟ is a strong necessity modal (NecP entails P) ( the modal base iscompatible with different domains, as in (47‟)), while „should‟ is a weaker necessity modal ( in viewof what is the norm ), i.e. the modal base is compatible only with the normative domain:

(48) (i) Jeremy must be at Heathrow by now.(ii) Jeremy should be in class.

As we have seen above (ex.47), one and the same modal verb can be evaluated with respect to variousmodal bases („in view of‟ phrases). In the following examples (taken from Anna Papafragou, 2000)



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the verb CAN is evaluated in the pre-posed modal bases, which are thus made explicit; in these

contexts, CAN conveys different types of possibility (potential) : physical, social , legal , biological :

(49) a. As a former champion, John can lift heavy weights b. As a simple guest , John can dress casuallyc. As a University employee, John can get health benefits

d. As a human being , John can have conscious mental states

To conclude, modal operators express different types of commitment to the truth of the modalised proposition. The modality of the sentence signals the context in which it is evaluated; this context is

determined by the modal operator. What changes is the kind of world or situation where the proposition is evaluated (i.e., what changes is the modal base, that is, situations compatible with whatis known, situations compatible with what someone believes, etc.). More often than not modal basesare inferred from the pragmatic /conversational context.Modal expressions have incomplete or under-specified content; we say that they are system-neutral .

Their contents need pragmatic/contextual support on the basis of which speakers process inferencesthat ensure the recoverability of „modal verbs‟ meanings. This contextual support is assumed to begiven by the modal base, the in view of phrases, which are contextually given or inferred.

Thus, a sentence that contains a modal verb is tripartite; it contains a modal operator (i.e., themodal verb), a modal base/domain (i.e., a contextually specified set of propositions) and the proposition p (i.e. the verbal complement). The introductory phrases in the sentences in (49) aboveactually spell out the modal bases. This tripartite structure can be formalized as follows:

(50) Operator (Restrictor, Matrix)

In the case of modals the operator is the logical relation of entailment or compatibility, thematrix is the proposition p (the complement of the modal) and the restrictor is the modal base/domain

(the restrictor may be either linguistically indicated or pragmatically inferred) .To exemplify, the core meaning of CAN generally covers the notion of factual possibility (potentiality) in the sense that factual circumstances in the modal base/domain do not preclude anevent x from happening (Klinge 1993, Papafragou 2000). A state of affairs is potential when it iscompatible with the state of affairs in the real world and, hence, may itself be actualized at some point in the future. The introductory sentences in (49) spell out the factual circumstances in the modal bases that underlie the interpretation of the modalised sentences.

Operator Restrictor (Modal Base/domain) Matrix (Proposition p)CAN in view of his physical ability John lifts heavy weights

In view of the social requirements John dresses casuallyIn view of university regulations John gets health benefits

The semantic/grammatical information of modal CAN spelled out above may be formallystated as below (where p stands for the proposition while D for the modal domain/restrictor):

CAN p is compatible with Dfactual

There are instances when the speaker - hearer misunderstand each other because they may bemistaken in the recovery of the modal base/domain. Jokes are a good example to illustratemisunderstanding in the identification of the right modal base/domain. (cf. Papafragou, 2000:50).Suppose that a zookeeper says sentence (51) to his new assistant:

(51) The monkey can climb to the top of the tree



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Later on in the day, the monkey is missing and the zookeeper is angry with the assistant because he

warned the assistant that the monkey was able to climb to the top of the tree and so could escape. Theassistant replies that he interpreted the sentence to be about what the monkey was allowed to do, andwas therefore not worried when the monkey behaved in just this way. The misunderstanding is due toa modal domain/ base mismatch: the zookeeper had in mind potentiality in terms of the monkey‟s physical abilities (ability), while the assistant had in mind potentiality in terms of the zoo’s

regulations (permission).A further piece of evidence, which shows that interlocutors are sensitive to subtle aspects of the modal bases, is that speakers and hearers frequently shift and modify modal domains/bases during the sameconversational exchange. Imagine that Alice and her lawyer have been discussing the prospect ofAlice‟s having a divorce. Alice utters sentence (52a) and her lawyer replies as in (52b):

(52) a) I can‟t leave my husband penniless. b) Of course you can – the law allows you to.

The modal domain/base in (52a) includes assumptions about Alice‟s feelings and moral profile

whereas in (52b) it includes assumptions about legal regulations. This example is a cleardemonstration of how the modal base/domain affects the truth-conditional content of a modalisedsentence.In what follows we shall adopt the view that modal verbs have a core meaning on the basis of whichone can derive the vast range of possible interpretations that modals may contextually receive (cf.Perkins, 1983, Kratzer, 1977, 1991, Papafragou, 2000).

To quote Kyle von Fintel (2006) „...in other words modal expressions have in of themselves arather skeletal meaning and it is only in combination with the background context that they take on a particular shade of meaning (such as epistemic or deontic, dynamic)‟. 6. Root and epistemic necessity . (must, need, need to, have(got) to, should, ought to ).6. ROOT MUST6.1. Of all the modals conveying deontic necessity, deontic MUST conveys strong obligation. It is

a typical member of the class of modal auxiliaries with all properties applying unproblematically.According to Papafragou (2000) the grammatical information that must has is the one in (53)

below:

(53) must: P is entailed by Dunspecified

What this formula actually says is that must conveys necessity and (just like possibility may) is semantically more general than other necessity modals ( should or ought for instance) in the sense thatit admits a variety of domains as restrictors and the unspecified domain D has to be narrowed down pragmatically to sub-domains. Recall that should, another necessity modal is restricted to a normative domain.Coates (1983) interprets Root must as being related to a cline extending from strong to weak

obligation (from „it is obligatory/imperative to „it is important/appropriate „).The interpretation of must has also been related to to the presence or absence of the feature: the speaker’s involvement in the utterance. Consider the following examples:

(54) (i) You must be back by ten.(ii) The president must formally approve the new Government before it can undertake its duties.(iii) The accused must remain silent throughout the trial.(iv) In opening a game of chess, the players must move a pawn.

The most commonly conveyed type of necessity with must is purely deontic, the obligation-imposing use. This use arises in case :

the modal restrictor involves a set of regulatory propositions which the speaker is entitled to enforce;the speaker has authority over the hearer



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the hearer is in a position to bring about the situation described.

The example in (54i) is prototypical deontic modality with the speaker as the deontic source: thespeaker is the one who imposes the obligation. Palmer (1986) calls this „discourse orientation‟ whileLyons (1977), Huddlestone and Pullum (2000) as „subjective‟, while Coates (1983) calls it„performative‟.

The interpretation of (54ii,iii,iv) requires regulatory domains of different types, hence thesources of obligation are different: (54ii) expresses necessity with respect to the Constitution, (54iii) anecessity with respect to judicial rules, (54iv) a necessity with respect to the rules of chess. In allthese case, therefore, the deontic source is not assumed to be the speaker but rather rules, regulations,law or even custom. Some grammarians call this „objective‟ necessity.

In order to understand the distribution and interpretation of must vs have (got) to we will assume withPalmer (1986), among others, that in the case of deontic must there are degrees to which the speakermay be involved:

he may be totally involved;

he may be involved as a member of the society or body that instigates the action; orhe may not be involved at all.

Palmer (1979:93) correlates the degrees of speaker involvement as:

discourse-oriented deontic sourceneutral oriented deontic sourceexternal oriented deontic source

In example (54i) must is discourse-oriented ; in (54ii,iii,iv) the deontic source is neutral (rules, regulations; the speaker is part of the system or he states what the rules, regulation or lawdeontically requires).

6.1.2 Generally speaking, in the case of deontic must we speak of obligation which can be defined as socially-oriented deontic necessity. We have argued that with deontic must we can identify differentdeontic sources:

the deontic source is the speaker/hearer who imposes an obligation on the subject to bring about thesituation described (the paraphrase could be „I order/oblige you); with first person subjects thespeaker expresses self-imposed obligation (self-compulsion); Coates (1983) argues that in this casewe speak of weak obligation which simply comes from the speaker‟s sense of the importance of someaction, the paraphrase being „it is important/appropriate‟ :

(55) You must concentrate on one thing at a time.Tell him he must stop this dishonest behavior at once.

You must clean up the mess right awayMust I answer all the questions?If I must go there, why don‟t you say so? I must remember to feed the cat later.I must work hard if I want to be a student.What I have promised I must do.I must do something about that leak.I must lose weight.

Anyway, we must consider seriously the Prom programme.

Generally, the imposition of an obligation by the speaker involves animate subjects, typically human, who are capable of performing the action.



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Contextually, the force of obligation may be weakened to express emphatic advice, invitation,

suggestion, in contexts where the hearer/addressee is the beneficiary of the action described; the stateof affairs described by the proposition is desirable to the hearer and beneficial to him..

(56) I absolutely must walk home with you.You must see this movie.

You must come round and see us.You mustn‟t miss this show.You must keep everything to yourself, be discreet.We must get together for lunch sometime.

And you mustn‟t miss the Shakespeare play that‟s on at the Everyman Theatre in Liverpool when you

are there.

With first person subjects must can be used in a „hedged performative sentence‟ (the speaker is performing what he is in the act of urging himself to do) with a limited number of verbs, allrelated to the act of conversation: admit, say, confess, promise, warn, etc:

(57) I must admit that I was wrongI must order you to leave the building at onceI must beg you to help me out of this mess

the necessity arises from some internal need, the subject‟s dispositions or properties, or by force ofcircumstances; H&P call this use of must „dynamic must‟ while Kratzer calls it „dispositional‟ must .In such cases we do not identify a deontic source. This use of must is sometimes found in theharmonic idiom must needs(H&P:185)

(58) Ed‟s a guy who must always be poking his nose into other people‟s business. (H&P 2000:185) „internal need/disposition‟

Now that she has lost her job she must live extremely frugally. „force of circumstances‟ I must sneeze.

We must remember that the peasantry in those days didn‟t live on wages alone. (Coates 1983)They will eventually split, because either of them must needs have his own way.

This use can be pragmatically exploited in sarcastic questions conveying different speech (i.e. non-literal) acts such as indirect directives. The subject is you and „must ‟ is invariably stressed; must could easily be replaced by „will ‟ in the sense of „insistence‟ Leech 1971):

(59) `Must you make that dreadful noise? („for heaven‟s sake stop it‟) If you 'must smoke (='will smoke), use an ashtray.

If you 'must behave like a savage, at least make sure the neighbours aren‟t watching.

the deontic source is ‘objective’ (rules, regulations, custom, fate; the speaker is part of the system orhe states what the rules, regulation, law, etc deontically require); in this case the obligation use ofmust may be found with inanimate or impersonal subjects (Coates 1983, Papafragou (2000), amongothers) in warnings, rulings and rules of the type exemplified below:

(60) We must make an appointment if we want to see the Dean.Passengers must cross the line by the footbridge.Door must be closed when machine is in operation.„If you commit murder, Charlotte, you must be punished‟

Women must cover their heads in church.Clay pots must have some protection from severe weather .(Coates)Students must pay course fees before attending classes.In England traffic must keep to the left.



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In a pessimistic assessment of the cold war, Eden declared „There must be much closer unity

within the West before there can be effective negotiation with the East‟ But with all due respects and allowances, it must truthfully be said that what they heard was

more syrup than sweet, more mannered than musical.There must be a solution to this problem on my table this morning.

In such cases, must can be replaced by „have to‟ under certain circumstances which will be stated when we discuss the semi-auxiliary have to.

6.2. Scope of negation with deontic must

6.2.1 As already mentioned root must normally takes internal negation (i.e. mustn‟t

= must [not P] or Nec [not-P] ), the negative affects the main predication) and is

interpreted as „obligation not to do something‟.

To negate the modality for necessity there is no appropriate form for must but needn’t may

be used. In English, the negative form mustn’t is generally used only deontically. Hence,

obligation can be externally negated by using need which takes external negation

(needn‟t=not Nec P) and which is interpreted as lack/absence of obligation. Consider the

examples below borrowed from J. Coates (1983:39), Stefanescu (1988:455):

(61) You mustn’t put words into my mouth Mr. Williams

“You are obliged,/ required not to put words‟

The present overdraft must not be increased.

We must take no risk.

Caravans must not be parked here.

Vs

(62) You needn’t answer that question.

„you are not obliged/required to answer „

The politics of the party does not and need not concern them.I don‟t think we need worry about it.

6.2.2 Temporal reference

As already mentioned, as far as temporal reference is concerned a distinction should be made

between the modal time, i.e. the time at which the obligation is issued, and the

situation/eventuality time, i.e. the time of the VP complement of the modal.

Generally, in the case of deontic modality (obligation, permission), the modal time is

present while the time of the situation/eventuality is future: one can impose an obligation/or

grant permission on the animate subject to do something in the future but one can‟t impose

an obligation/grant permission in the past. Moreover, must has no past tense (historically it is

itself a past tense form (Coates 1983:40).Whenever the sentence combines with a future time adverb, the adverb as such qualifies as

reference time for the event described by the VP complement of the modal e.g. This must be

discussed next week.

In the discourse – oriented deontic interpretation must needs no past tense. In the neutral

(objective) – necessity interpretation, have(got) to is used to render past necessity or if

necessity is future or conditional . Consider the following examples, borrowed from different

sources:

(63) (i) I must have all your news: how long have you been there, and how‟s that

fabulous husband of yours.

(ii) You must tell me at once.(iii) This must be discussed next week.



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(iv) …and we must do something about it.

He gave the children their presents in early December but they didn’t have/hadn’t got to open

them until Christmas Day

Well, I’ll have to think about it.

The next time you can take the exam is April. Otherwise, you’ll have to wait till September.Yes we’ll have to go out, if you‟re really going to do it, darling.

How long do they reckon we‟re going to have to wait to find out if the mortgage advance is

forthcoming?

However, must can be used in reported speech where the context is past or with internal

monologue. Consider the following examples borrowed from different sources

(e.g.Jespersen, 1931, part iv:7; Coates 1983:40):

(64) (i) I told him he must either apologize or go away immediately.

(ii) “One thing was certain: the Government must make a distinct move of some kind‟

(iii) „Sapt began to know exactly how far he could lead or drive, and when he mustfollow‟

(iv) Bill had reluctantly decided that Kay must be left in the dark.

Quite exceptionally, deontic modality may combine with present or past situations only with

general requirements, conditions, options, etc as in (65i) (present) or (65ii) (past) (H&P

2000:184); in such cases must takes the perfect infinitive:

(65) (i) We must make an appointment if we want to see the Dean.

(ii) Candidates must have completed at least two years of undergraduate studies.

„It is required that candidates have completed 2 years of study”

6. Epistemic Must : logical necessity, probability

6.1. In the case of epistemic must the modal base is assumed to consist of the speaker‟s

belief-set, i.e. the speaker reasons (domain of the laws of reason) on the basis of evidence

reconstructed from encyclopedic and situation specific information.

According to Coates (1983), „in its most normal usage, Epistemic MUST conveys the

speaker‟s confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a logical process of deduction

from facts known to him (which may or may not be specified)‟. So, in the case of must , a

necessity modal, knowledge-oriented necessity is interpreted as conclusion. According to

Leech (1976:72) „Must is used …of knowledge arrived at by inference or reasoning rather

than by direct experience….In each case…a chain of logical deduction can be postulated.‟

Along the same lines, Palmer(1986:64) states that „it is the notion of deduction or inferencefrom known facts that is the essential feature of MUST. Consider the examples below:

(66) (i) Look at that house! Those people must have a lot of money.

(ii) It must be hot in there without air-conditioning.

(iii) The computer is on so someone must be using it.

(iv) What a sensible Mum she must be.

(v) It must surely be just a relic from the past.

(vi) She is a bridesmaid and she must be all excitement at the moment.

(vii) …In such a war he must have been the captain of the protestant armies.

He must be working late at the office; the lights are on.

His teeth were still chattering but his forehead, when I felt it, was hot and clammy. He said „Imust have a temperature‟ (Coates 1983:41)



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Must represents the strongest epistemic judgement one can make, nevertheless a

factual assertion makes a stronger claim than the strongest of all epistemic judgements.

Compare the following examples borrowed from Papafragou (2000:73):

(67) (i) San Marino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

(ii)San Marino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

(67i) states a fact, while (67ii) conveys that the speaker makes his assertion based on

evidence which may be incomplete.

Leech (1976:72) remarks that the knowledge arrived at indirectly by inference/deduction is

felt to be different from knowledge acquired by direct experience; hence the sense of

„logically inferred‟ can be weakened to „logically assumed‟ or even a guess:

(68) (i) You must be John‟s brother .(ii) You must be tired/thirsty.

(iii) You must be a foot taller than I.

(iv) He must be well over eighty.

Epistemic must can also be used to express pure logical necessity with no element of

speaker-involvement as in the examples in (69 i,ii).

(69) i) If it is a bird, it must have wings.

(ii) He is a bachelor, so he must be unmarried.

6.2.Temporal reference

6.2.1 With epistemic must , as already mentioned, the modal time is always present , while the

main predication usually refers to states or processes/events in the present, as the examples

below indicate; please notice the progressive form of the predicate:

(70) (i) Judging from the noise , the children must be playing upstairs.

(ii) There must be some mistake.

(iii) He must be working late at the office.

Epistemic must very rarely occurs with future time reference, since a future time reference

would be open to a deontic interpretation e.g. He must come tomorrow/The government mustact soon.

According to Huddlestone&Pullum (2001:182) the future+epistemic combination is more

likely in conjunction with harmonic surely (which is not used deontically): It must surely rain

soon.

Palmer (1979:45) shows that be bound to could be used to express epistemic necessity when

the main predication refers to states or events in the future; according to Coates (1983),

Palmer (1979) the interpretation in such cases is „it is inevitable that’ :

(71) (i) It‟s bound to come out though, I think….It‟s received such rave notices that

somebody‟s bound to put it on.



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6.2.2. Must, as already mentioned has no past form, but sentences with epistemic must may

refer to situations that occurred in the past, since we can make judgements, at now, about past

situations. In such cases, the perfect infinitive (have-en) is used. Perfect have, just like

negation, belongs semantically in the complement; in such cases we speak of internal

perfect , i.e. the time reference of the modal is unaffected (i.e. present), while the timereference of the verbal complement is past:

(72) (i) She must have arrived late last night.

„I confidently believe/I am sure that she came last night‟

(ii) She must have been such a pain in the neck to her Mum and vice versa

(Coates (1983)

(iii) He must have been dishing up the same lectures for 30 years at a gradually slower

and slower speed (Coates (1983)

I mean there must have been an awful lot of hit and misses, mustn‟t there?2

6.3. Negation6.3.1 As already mentioned, in terms of negation, must is anomalous :

(a) with root meaning, must takes internal negation, i.e. negation affects the main predication

[Nec not-P], lack of necessity (not-Nec P) being rendered by the suppletive form needn’t

(external negation);(b) epistemic must has no morphologically related negative. For epistemic must , the more „naturalexpression‟ of impossibility in English is can’t . Infrequently, needn’t can also be used (with a

different meaning though). In colloquial English needn’t is replaced by not necessarily.

(e.g. He needn’t be guilty = He isn’t necessarily guilty) Compare:

(73) (i) He must have done it deliberately.

„it is certain that he did it‟ (ii) He can‟t have done it deliberately.

„it is not possible that he did it‟=‟it is necessarily the case that he didn‟t do it‟

(iii) He needn‟t have done it deliberately

„it is not certain/necessary that he did it deliberately‟

6.3.2. Must , like all epistemic modals, does not occur in interrogative sentences. If it does it is

under very restricted circumstances. Papafragou (2000) argues that it is hard to construct a

context in which it would be felicitous for the speaker to ask whether a conclusion is possible

or necessary with respect to his own set of beliefs. More often than not, need may be

considered the interrogative counterpart of epistemic must .

6.4. Harmonic combinations.

The term „modally harmonic‟ was introduced by Lyons (1977) and describes the

combinations that a modal verb may have with expressions („words or phrases‟) which

convey the same degree of modality; the modal expressions are said to be mutually

reinforcing: I’m sure, surely, certain, necessarily, of necessity, inevitably (Coates 1983:46):

(74) (i) It must surely be valid.

(ii) It must necessarily have involved deception.

2

Note: mustn’t never occurs with epistemic meaning except in tag-questions i.e. in what Halliday (1970:333)calls „verbal crossing-out‟) (apud Coates 1983:44)



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Anyone who says that must inevitably and of necessity be wrong.

7. NEED and NEED TO

It is important to make a distinction between the auxiliary verb need and the relatedfull or „lexical‟ verb need to. The modal need exhibits the modal properties described in 2.0

above and expresses both root and epistemic necessity (Leech 1976, Coates 1983, etc).

Need to, on the other hand, forms interrogative and negative forms employing the

auxiliary DO and takes tense morphemes. The main verb to need followed by the to-infinitive

has practically the same meaning as when it is followed by a noun or gerund: e.g. He needs to

practice more=He needs more practice./ My pen needs filling (Leech 1976:96).

7.1. ROOT NEED

7.1.1 As a modal auxiliary, need is a necessity modal and is characterized by all the

properties which define a modal. Need occurs infrequently in affirmative contexts (mainly if

the context is non-assertive), i.e. this verb is chiefly restricted to non-assertive contexts, tosentences containing a negative form or an adverb like only or hardly, or interrogative

sentences. In such contexts need ’ s main function is to provide the negative counterpart of

deontic must .

Deontic needn’t expresses „lack of obligation‟, and generally expresses the authority

of the speaker , being in complementary distribution with need to and have to (where the

deontic source is an external authority or circumstances). The paraphrase in such cases is „it

isn‟t necessary/obligatory‟. Consider the examples below, borrowed from different sources

(e.g. Coates 1983):

(75) (i) „I‟m very grateful to you.‟

„You needn‟t be. I told you. I‟m glad to do it.‟

(ii) I need hardly tell you that it was a most gratifying experience

He need have no fear.

I do not think I need read subsection 2.

You needn‟t take that medicine any more‟

All you need do is go there and pay the money.

I wonder if I need be present.

Need also provides an additional interrogative form for the must paradigm. Root need I/he

etc. is especially used when a negative answer is expected. Must I/he etc. does not have this

implication, i.e. we have an open question. Compare:

(76) (i) Must I wait for her now? (open question)

(ii) Need I wait for her now? (hoping for a negative answer)

7.1.2.Time reference

Needn‟t+short infinitive has only present (or extended present) reference , although

it can occur in indirect speech:

(77) (i) He needn’t come tomorrow.

(ii) Need I say more?

(iii) I told him he needn’t come if he didn‟t want to.





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7.3.NEED TO

As already mentioned need to is a regular verb having none of the properties of modal verbs:

it forms the interrogative and negative with the auxiliary do, it takes the whole range of verb

forms and assigns theta roles.Semantically, need to, alongside need, expresses obligation/necessity, but while needn’t

generally expresses the authority of the speaker, (don’t ) need to parallels (don’t ) have

to /haven’t got to in expressing that it is an external authority or circumstances that

impose/remove the obligation or necessity for action.

The distinctions in meaning between need and need to occur only in the present tense in view

of the fact that the „deficiencies‟ of need are supplied by need to/have to, as already

mentioned.

With need to the deontic source is an external authority or circumstance. Compare:

(81) (i) You needn‟t cut the grass.= „ I allow you not to cut the grass’

(ii) You don‟t need to cut the grass. =„it is not necessary ….‟.

Sentence (81i) involves the authority of the speaker who exempts the subject from cutting the

grass; a possible paraphrase would be „ I allow you not to cut the grass’ ; in (81ii) it is the

circumstance of the grass not having grown to need cutting that exempts the subject from

cutting the grass; a possible paraphrase would be „it is not necessary ….‟.

With past time necessity, as already mentioned, there is a sharp contrast between need and

need to illustrated below:

(82) (i) He needn‟t have gone there. (*so he didn‟t)

(ii) He didn‟t need to go there. (so he didn‟t)

In (82i) the deontic interpretation of need+have-en implicates that he did go there, i.e. it

wasn‟t obligatory for him to go, but he did; (82ii) only conveys that it wasn‟t necessary for

him to go there; so the addition of „so he didn‟t‟ is possible for (82ii) but not for (82i).

Need to just like have to is more suited to express general, habitual actions; must or need (as

well as have got to) are more suited to occur in statements referring to particular occasions:

(83) (i) Do I need to/have to show him my ID card every time?

(ii) Need/Must I show him my pass now?

8. HAVE (GOT) TO

8.0.Have to and have got to are not true modals but no discussion of must or of the modals of

necessity would be complete without reference to them.

Semantically, have (got) to is very similar to must . It can express both root and

epistemic meaning. It is acknowledged that have (got) to is most commonly used for deontic

necessity, and, unlike must , it is never discourse-oriented with respect to the deontic source.

According to Leech (1976) the two meanings of have (got) to (deontic, epistemic) are

scarcely distinguishable in scientific and mathematical writing where the author is

expounding an abstract system of thought. To take an example, borrowed from Leech

(1976:73) „ Every clause has to contain a finite verb‟ can be interpreted either as: „every



24

clause is obliged (by the rul es of language) to have a verb’ or „ It is necessary for every clause

to have a verb’ .

As already mentioned, the meaning of have (got) to is different from that of must in the

present due to the fact that , unlike must , it is not discourse-oriented , but rather external-

oriented with respect to the deontic source, i.e.the subject is bound to do something because itis the only course of action, the obligation being imposed by circumstances/authority which

are independent of the speaker or the addressee. Nevertheless, must and have(got)to may

share the same contexts, whenever the deontic source is neutral (H&P 2001:205; Coates

1981:55):

(84) Now that she has lost her job, she has (got) to live extremely frugally.

There is already a great imbalance between what a student has to pay if he‟s in lodgings and

what he has to pay if he is in a hall of residence.

We‟ve got to bear in mind that there is not one healthy fox.

In the examples above must can be substituted for have (got) to. Must, however, is not veryfrequent in such cases.

8.1. HAVE GOT TO

8.1.1. Have got to is generally substitutable for have to in colloquial English, except that

there are no non-finite forms (*to have got to; *having got to; *will have got to). Thus have

got to cannot occur in the following: We may/will have to leave early; I regret having to

refuse your offer.

Semantically, have got to is similar to must in expressing both root and epistemic

meaning; the latter, though, occurs only rarely in Br.E. In American English, though, have

got to is common in epistemic interpretation. Consider the following examples, borrowed

from different sources:

Root

(85) (i) There is a whole lot of literature you‟ve got to read.

(ii) Oh, well, he’s got to go into hospital, you know.

(iii) This, I think, is something on which universities have got to begin now to

take a stand.

(iv) A really healthy effective Opposition which you‟ve got to have if you‟re going to

shake the government.

(v) I began to beat my hands against the slime-covered walls…”Don‟t Charlotte. You‟ve

got to stick it out for another few minutes‟.

Epistemic

(86) (i) If you‟ve seen all the old Frankensteins you‟ve got to know all the

jokes.

(ii) Something has got to give in this second half, I think.

(iii) You‟ve got to be joking.(AE) vs. You must be joking (Br.E).

(iv) Someone has got to be telling lies.

(v) This has got to be the worst restaurant in town.

(vi) There has to be some reason for his absurd behavior

(vii) Somebody had to lose the game.

8.1.2. Root meaning.



25

It is generally agreed upon that have got to, just like have to, indicate external

compulsion/obligation, i.e. have got to/have to is either neutral or external -oriented with

respect to the deontic source, but never discourse-oriented.

Palmer (1979:93), Coates (1981:53) remark that, in certain contexts there is semantic

overlap between must and have got to; actually, in all the examples in(85) above must can besubstituted freely (Coates 1981:53). The examples above do not indicate a discourse-oriented

statement, rather all the examples suggested are neutral with respect to the deontic source

(see also Coates 1981). Consider, also, the following examples (offered by Palmer (1979:93))

that share similar contexts for have got to and must and which justify the belief that in such

cases the deontic source is neutral :

(87) (i) I must have an immigrant‟s visa. Otherwise they‟re likely to kick me out, you

see.

(ii) I‟ve really got to know when completion date is likely. Otherwise I might find

myself on the streets.

Consider the example below which is a clear case of external compulsion/obligation and

hence rules out must which is never external with respect to the deontic source:

(88) They‟re obliged by the curriculum in force to pass in various ways; they‟ve got

to/*must pass our section of it.

It should be noted that Root have got to, like must , is preferred in statements referring

to particular occasions, i.e. have got to and must are not used in habitual, general statements :

(89) (i) I must /have got to feed the baby now; she‟s been crying for half and hour .

(ii) I have to/*have got to/ *must feed the baby six times a day.

In the present, have got to (and have to), unlike must , implies actuality, i.e. the event

denoted by the verbal complement is under way at now. With must , on the other hand, the

event denoted by the verbal complement could only occur in the future.(Palmer 1979 apud I

Stefanescu 1988:455). This accounts for the use of have got to in the example below, where

must cannot be used:

(90) It‟s slow walk down. H e’s got to fight his way through the crowds.

Palmer (1979) shows that the sentence describes a boxer actually in the process of fightinghis way through.

8.1.3. Temporal reference

Have got to, like must, has no non-finite forms, hence only have to can be used in contexts

requiring this form. Have to is also employed to supply for the whole range of verb forms

that have got to lacks.

Have got to may occur in the context of future time adverbs (alongside have to ) to

indicate that the situation described is already planned and arranged for the future:

(91) We have got to be there at ten tomorrow



26

The past tense form had got to is rarer and is suggested to be acceptable only in (free) indirect

speech contexts in BrE; moreover, had got to lacks the implication of actuality, i.e. the

implication that the event actually took place. Compare the following examples (Palmer

1979:97):

(92) (i) We had to make a special trip down to Epsom to collect the bloody thing.

(ii) We‟d got to make a special trip down to Epsom anyway, so it did not matter very

much.

(iii) She had got to think of some way out.

I told him he‟d got to hurry up.

8.1.4.Negation

Don’t have to /have not got to , like needn’t, take external negation, i.e. the modal predication

is negated; do not have to/have not got to mean „it isn‟t obligatory/necessary for‟.

(93) (i) They haven‟t got to juggle about. They‟ve got the total page copy.

8.1.5.Epistemic meaning

Have got to may occur in epistemic context but only rarely, as in (94) below:

(94) (i) If you‟ve seen all the old Frankensteins you‟ve got to know all the

jokes.

(ii) Something has got to give in this second half, I think.

In American English, however, have got to is common in epistemic interpretation, where

British English is likely to use must :

(95) (i) You‟ve got to be joking.(AE) vs. You must be joking (Br.E).

(ii) Someone has got to be telling lies.

(iii) This has got to be the worst restaurant in town.

In British English there is a difference of meaning between have (got) to and must .

Epistemic must is used of knowledge arrived at indirectly by inference or reasoning , i.e. a

chain of logical deduction.

According to Coates (1983), „in its most normal usage, Epistemic MUST conveys the

speaker‟s confidence in the truth of what he is saying, based on a logical process of deductionfrom facts known to him (which may or may not be specified)‟. Hence, „logical necessity‟

can easily become weakened to „logical assumption‟ or even guess. In the case of epistemic

must we speak of „factual necessity‟ (Leech 1976:73).

Epistemic have (got) to, on the other hand, never appears to be far away from its deontic use;

in this case the necessity is imposed by an idea, circumstances and hence we can speak of

‟theoretical necessity‟; as „theoretical necessity‟ means that the possibility of the opposite

state of affairs cannot even be conceived of, have (got) to has a stronger force than must and

cannot be weakened, like must , to the interpretation of „logical assumption‟.or „guess‟.

(Leech 1976:73).

Compare the following examples:

(96) (i) Someone must be telling lies.



27

(ii) Someone has (got) to be telling lies.

(iii) You must be mad to do that.

(iv) You have (got) to be mad to do that.

While (96i) voices a mere suspicion, (96ii) sounds more like an accusation. What (96iii)conveys is that the speaker‟s conclusion from the evaluation of the subject‟s action is that the

subject is mad; (96iv) states that being mad is a necessary condition for acting in a certain

way. We notice that the difference in the epistemic interpretation of must and have(got)to is

given by the fact that in the case of have(got)to the deontic use is never far away.

According to Leech (1976), Huddlestone and Pullum (2001, Coates (1981), etc.

epistemic have(got) to is much less frequent, in British English at least, than must , because it

is frequently unidiomatic. A roundabout way of expressing „theoretical necessity‟ would be

the following negative alternatives:

(97) These lines can‟t be by anyone but Shakespeare

Nobody but Shakespeare could have written these lines.

8.2. HAVE TO

Have to has none of the properties of modal auxiliaries; it forms negation and inversion with

the auxiliary do and it is fully inflected (similar to need to with which it shares a lot in

common semantically and formally). Given its regular behavior have to acts as a suppletive

form of modal must/have got to, when the latter lack the necessary verb forms.

(98) (i) I‟m having to read this very carefully

(ii) I have had to give up the idea

I told him I had had to give up the idea

We may have to change our plans

It‟s a pity to have to give up the idea

No one likes having to pay taxes

Semantically, have to is similar to must/have got to; is has a deontic (obligation) and an

epistemic interpretation (logical necessity), the latter being infrequent, according to different

scholars. It is acknowledged that have to is most commonly used for deontic necessity, and,

unlike must , it is never discourse-oriented with respect to the deontic source, but rather

external -oriented or neutral -oriented with respect to the deontic source i.e. with have to the

authority comes from no particular source.

(99) (i) You have to file a flight plan before you start,give an estimated time of

arrival,stick to certain heights,routines and landing drills

(ii) Will you say to him that I can‟t come to the meeting next Wednesday because I have

to go to a Cambridge examiner‟s meeting.

As already mentioned, Palmer (1979:93), Coates (1981:53) remark that, in certain contexts

there is semantic overlap between must and have to; actually, in all the examples in (100)

below must can be replaced freely by have to. As already mentioned, there are cases when the

speaker reports what someone else deontically requires or is himself/herself committed; in

such cases we said that the deontic source is neutral :



28

(100) (i) The verdict of a jury must/has to be unanimous:if its members are unable to

reach agreement , the case must/has to be retried before a new jury.

(ii) The University is saying‟these people must/have to be expelled if they disrupt

lectures‟

(iii) A new insistence from President Nixon that Hanoi government must/has to negotiate if there is to be any settlement.

Epistemically, have to just like have got to expresses „theoretical necessity‟ (see 8.1.5)

8.3.Summary of have to/have got to in relation to must

The distinctions in meaning and usage between must and have to/have got to occur only in

the present tense in view of the fact that the „deficiencies‟ of must are supplied by have

to/need to as already mentioned:

Must and have got to lack verb forms; have to supplies for the missing forms (101); thevariant with got is more colloquial (101iv):

(101) (i) We may have to change our plans

It‟s a pity to have to give up the idea

No one likes having to pay taxes

Pensioners have (got) to be careful with their money.

Have to (similar to have got to) is never discourse-oriented with respect to the deontic

source; must is never external-oriented with respect to the deontic source; it is only in the

„neutral necessity’ reading that must can be replaced by have to/have got to (examples in

(100);

(102) They‟re obliged by the curriculum in force to pass in various ways; they‟ve got

to/*must pass our section of it.

Have to/need to may be used to indicate what is habitual, general (103), or may refer to a

particular occasion (104); must/have got to only refer to particular occasions (104):

(103) (i) I have to get up at seven every morning(ii) Do I have to/need to show him my ID card every time I come here?

(iii) I don‟t have to/need to work on Sundays

(104) (i) We have to be there at 7 tomorrow/

We must/we‟ve got to be there at seven tomorrow.

(ii) Do I have to show him my ID now?/

Must I/have I got to show him my card now?

Have to has an implication of actuality (i.e. the event took place) in the present and past;

must does not ; have got to implies actuality only in the present:



29

(105) (i) We had to make a special trip to Epsom to collect the bloody thing.

(ii) Colin the shotgun, the one who had to get married.

(iii) She had to sleep in the kitchen last night.

(iv) It‟s slow walk down. He’s got to fight his way through the crowds.

Don’t have to takes external negation similar to needn’t and haven’t got to; the negative

particle has scope over have [not-Nec P], i.e. the modality is negated and the meaning is „not

necessary/not obligatory‟; must takes internal negation, i.e. the verbal complement is negated

[Nec not-P] i.e.„is necessary/obligatory ..not to‟

(106) (i) You mustn‟t do that

„you are obliged not to do that‟

vs

You don‟t have/haven‟t got to to do that.

„you are not obliged to do that‟

Epistemic must conveys „factual necessity‟; have to/have got to convey „theoretical

necessity‟: epistemic have (got) to never appears to be far away from its deontic use.

Must , need , and have to can be used in sarcastic questions conveying directives:

(107 (i) Must you make that dreadful noise?

(ii) Need you drop ash all over my carpet?

(iii) Do we have to have jam roll and custard every day?

8.4. Should and ought to

8.4.1. Ought to (OE ahte) derives historically from a past tense form of „owe‟. Should (OE

sceolde) is diachronically the past tense of „shall‟ (O.E. sceal). It preserves the original notion

of „obligation‟ that has all but dropped from „shall‟. Synchronically it is not perceived as the

preterite form of shall but has entered the modal system as a separate, individual item, hence

it requires independent description. Neither should nor ought to have a past tense form, since

historically they are past tense forms.

The intuition that many researchers and grammarians have tried to capture is that

ought and should convey a somewhat weaker necessity than must. Some evidence for this

relative „weakness‟ comes from examples like (108) and (109) below where (108) is not a

contradiction while the one in (109) is:

(108) (i)You ought to/should do the dishes, but you don‟t have to.

(ii)He ought to/should come, but he won‟t.

(109) (i)*You must/have to do the dishes but you don‟t have to.

(ii)*He must come, but he won‟t.

These verbs differ from „must‟ in that the speaker admits the possibility that the event may

not take place (Palmer 1986).

According to grammarians, the second point of difference between „must‟ and „should/ought

to‟ is that the latter (i.e. should/ought to) can refer to past events, whereas „must‟ cannot.

More often than not, in the case of ought to have/should have, the presupposition is that the

event did not occur , i.e. they have a stronger negative connotation of „contrary to fact‟ Consider the examples below:



30

(110) You ought to have/should have come (but you didn‟t)

„You had an obligation to come and you would have come if you had fulfilled it‟

According to Palmer (1986:101) „the explanation for the differences is that ought to/should are essentially conditional – referring to what would occur or would have occurred‟

As we shall detail below, the difference in acceptability can be accounted for in terms of the

selection of the restrictor (modal base).In (109) must lacks semantic restrictions so it is open

to an interpretation where an obligation is imposed on the subject by the speaker or general

rules (social or ethical laws); the continuation of the utterance is therefore unacceptable; in

(108) the speaker reports what is entailed by norms/duty concerning the subject‟s behavior,

which has nothing to do with the authority of the speaker so the continuation of the utterance

is acceptable; to put it in plain words, the speaker merely recommends a course of action

which may or may not be followed. (A more detailed account will follow in the next sub-

chapters.). This distinction was expressed formally in (111) below:

(111) must : P is entailed by Dunspecified

Should/: P is entailed by Dnormative

Ought to: P is entailed by Dideal

Because of this difference in the selection of the restrictor between must/have to and

ought/should , the latter are often referred to as „weak necessity modals‟ (as opposed to

„strong necessity‟ modals like must and have to)

8.4.2. Should

Should , as already mentioned, is not viewed as the past tense form form of shall ,; it

has entered the modal system as a separate individual item. This point of view is defended by

a large number of grammarians and linguists. (Ehrman (1966); Coates (1983), Leech (1971);

Palmer 1990, Warner (1993); Papafragou 2001) etc). Should is also known in the literature as

the „subjunctive modal‟ or the „past modal‟ (Laka 2009)

Should may be used in several ways in modern English:

(a) as a modal auxiliary,having a root meaning and an epistemic meaning (112i,ii );

(b) as a subjunctive equivalent (112 iii);

(c) hypothetical marker (112 iv,v).

These uses are exemplified below:

(112) i) You should go to school tomorrow (deontic)

(ii) The next road on the left should be King Street (epistemic)

(iii)…. and it is only fitting that there should be splendor about these funeral rites

(subjunctive equivalent)

(iv) I should be grateful if you could bear my case in mind. (hypothetical maker)

(v) Should you require any further assistance, please feel free (hypothetical

maker)

8.4.2.1.Root should



31

As with must, should conveys obligation (i.e. a deontic modal base) but, as already stressed,

of a weaker type than must.

According to Bybee, Perkins &Pagliuca (1994:186) apud Fintel&Iatridou, 2006:5ff) „…the

major distinctions within obligation have to do with gradations of strength of

obligation: that is an obligation may be either strong or weak. If a weak obligation is notfulfilled, the consequences are not too serious; but the consequences of not fulfilling astrong

obligation are much more severe.‟

Huddlestone and Pullum (2001:186), alongside other well-known grammarians,

assume that deontic should is weaker than must in that it allows for non-actualization.

Consider the following examples:

(113) (i) I should stop now but I‟m not going to

(ii) I must stop now * but I‟m not going to

(114) Chief scout to the younger boys:

(i) You must be back by midnight * though it‟s fine by me if you aren‟t

(ii) You should be back by midnight, though it‟s fine by me if you aren‟t

As already discussed, must admits a variety of propositional domains as restrictors,

i.e. must is entailed by Dunspecified.; the unspecified domain is pragmatically narrowed down

allowing for the different types of necessity conveyed by must (necessity imposed by

different regulatory domains).

Should , on the other hand is acknowledged to convey: „duty or propriety in general‟

(Jespersen 1931:323), which in our framework rewrites as:

(115) should : P is entailed by Dnormative‟,

i.e. should expresses a necessity relative to existing stereotypes or norms, (Papafragou

2000:62).

Papafragou assumes that the comprehension of should in all its uses „relies quite

heavily on the sort of structured knowledge humans typically possess about the normal

course of events‟. (Papafragou 2000:62).

Norms acquire a regulatory status as well, hence should becomes indistinguishable

from certain interpretations of must ; still, since what is expected/normal can be quite different

from what is commanded , should is often perceived as communicating a less urgent necessitythan must , i.e. should is sensitive to less coercive sets of rules and principles than must .

(Papafragou 2000:62).

Let‟s analyse the examples in (114i,ii) above along the suggestions put forth by

Papafragou (2000:63).

In (114i) and (114ii) the differences in acceptability bear on the selection of the

restrictor: on its most accessible reading, in (114i) the speaker imposes an obligation on the

referent of the subject (given contextual assumption concerning authority and social

relations) and expects to be obeyed; the continuation of the utterance becomes therefore

unacceptable; in (114ii) the chief scout reports what is entailed by norms and expectations

concerning a scout‟s behavior and suggests a course of action; the speaker may not be in

agreement with these norms so he will not use his authority to enforce them.



32

Grammarians distinguish between subjective and objective uses: if subjective it

merely offers advice or suggestions/recommendations; if objective it describes correct

procedure; at its strongest should takes on the meaning of moral obligation or duty, similar to

ought to (defined in moral or legal terms (Coates 1983:59):

(116) (i) One should always tell the truth.

(ii) We should buy now while the market is depressed.

(iii) A critic should above all be fair.

(iv) A friend should bear a friend‟s infirmities.

(v) You should tell your mother.

(vi) I just insisted very firmly on calling her Miss Tillman but one should really

call her President.

(vii) By the age of sixteen anybody who is going to be an academic should have

done their general reading.

Should is quite often used to convey criticism or to issue indirect directives:

(117) (i) You should be doing your homework instead of watching television

(ii) The right-hand column should be left blank

8.4.2.2.Temporal reference

As already mentioned, as far as temporal reference is concerned a distinction should be made

between the modal time, i.e. the time at which the obligation is issued, and the

situation/eventuality time, i.e. the time of the VP complement of the modal.

In the case of deontic modality (obligation, permission), the modal time is present

while the time of the situation/eventuality is future: one can impose an obligation/or grant

permission on the animate subject to do something in the future but one can‟t impose an

obligation/grant permission in the past.

Should , just like must, has no past tense form, since historically it is a past form itself.

As already mentioned, the Perfect construction (HAVE-EN) has a strong relationship with

Epistemic modality. However, Root should , similarly to deontic needn‟t, does occur with this

construction and is used to express what was advisable/obligatory in the past . Just like in the

case of needn’t have, should have is nearly always used to convey propositions of opposite

polarity, i.e. they have a stronger connotation of ‘contrary to fact’ ; the context makes it clear

that the subject did not take the course of action recommended by the deontic source. In such

cases we speak of external perfect , that is the perfect has scope over the modal. Consider theexamples below borrowed from different sources:

(118) (i) they should‟ve left it (=Belfast) completely alone and they‟d have got

Southern Ireland perhaps back into the fold. (Coates 1983:62)

„it would have been advisable for them to have left Belfast alone‟

(implies „but they didn‟t)

(ii) He should have told her. (H&P 2000:203)

(iii) I (you, he) should really have been more careful. (Zandvoort1967:70)

(iv) By the age of sixteen anybody who is going to be an academic should have

done their general reading. (Coates 1983:62)



33

Example (118iv) is one of the rare instances where the construction is not used

counterfactually. What the sentence means is : „it would be advisable/required for anyone

who is going to be an academic to have done their general reading by the age of 16. „ This

example is similar to the one below that includes deontic „must‟

(119) Candidates must have completed at least two years of undergraduate studies.

„It is required that candidates have completed 2 years of study”

In both cases the perfect has scope over the VP complement, as the paraphrases

indicate. In this case, as already mentioned, we speak of internal perfect. The explanation is

the one offered by H&P , namely: „ Quite exceptionally, deontic modality may combine with

….. past situations only with general requirements, conditions, options,‟. Coates (1983)

also points out that, in this case, the aspect of the VP complement is habitual rather than

punctual.

Negation

Like all necessity modals, should is generally assumed to take internal negation:

(120) He should not have made such a fuss about nothing (Zandvoort 1967:70)

He shouldn‟t go with them (H&P 2002:204)

We shouldn‟t be imposing on you in vacation time (Coates 1983:63)(…but we

are)

They (beggars) shouldn‟t be allowed to go about like this. (Coates 1983:63)

(…but they do)

Some such examples have a counterfactual reading as can be easily noticed.

Quite frequently, should (whether deontic or epistemic) occurs in open interrogatives ,

normally with „why‟:

(121) Why should we keep on paying premiums to insurance companies?

Why should old age pensioners wait for their promised increase when civil servants

receive increases backdated? (Coates 1983:60)

Why should we let them get away with it? (H&P 2002:167)

According to Coates (1983:60) „such utterances represent an idiomatic usage and

despite the interrogative form they are essentially statements asserting that some state ofaffairs is not necessary. They qualify as rhetorical questions which convey the speakers‟s

impatience with a supposed obligation‟. The implicature is, hence, that there is no reason for

actualization.

Epistemic should (probability, expectation)

In its epistemic use, should expresses a tentative assumption, an assessment of probability

based on facts known to the speaker. Core examples are given below:

(122) (i) The trip should take about 16 days (Coates 1983:64)

„it‟s probable/I expect that the trip will take…‟

(ii) The next road on the left should be King Street.



34

Papafragou (2000: 75) argues that epistemic should is favoured in contexts where the

evidence is based on norms/expectation, unlike in the case of must where we deal with

perceived/direct evidence. The different type of evidence is a consequence of the difference

in the type of restrictor that the two verbs allow.

The different type of restrictor, hence the different type of evidence, accounts forthe verifiability of the utterances involving the two modals (noted by Lakoff 1982): in the

case of „must ‟ (perceived evidence) the embedded proposition is verifiable at present , while

expectation-based evidence, as in the case of should , needs to await support or

disconfirmation from future situations.

This account also explains why should/ought to are used epistemically in inferring

consequences from causes but not the other way round, so that they could substitute for must

in the first case but not in the second .( Huddlestone &Pullum 2002 suggest that the

difference is due to the primacy of the deontic reading):

(123) (i) He‟s better now: he must/should be able to return to work

(ii) He‟s back at work now: he must/*should be better

This account also explains the difference in acceptability between (i) and (ii)

(124) (i) There should be another upturn in sales shortly.

(ii) ??There should be another disaster shortly

Given that should , unlike must , encodes normative concepts it is odd to suggest that the

occurrence of a disaster follows from our expectations about the normal/prescribed course of

events. The same account is valid for the following examples where an epistemic reading is

much less likely with unfavorouble situations than with favourable ones:

(125) (i) They should accept the manuscript. (ambiguous)

(a) „I expect of them to accept it „ (deontic)

(b) „I‟m fairly confident they will‟ (epistemic)

(ii) They should reject the manuscript (only deontic)

OUGHT TO

Ought to has all the properties of modal verbs with one notable exception: it takes a to-infinitive complement. It has a Root and Epistemic meaning both of which are virtually

identical with those of should .(Palmer 1979, Coates 1983, etc.)

As in the case of should, ought to expresses a necessity relative to existing stereotypes or

norms,with a strong tinge of ideal/morally recommended state of affairs (Papafragou

2000:62). Papafragou assumes that the comprehension of should/ought to in all the uses

„relies quite heavily on the sort of structured knowledge humans typically possess about the

normal course of events‟. (Papafragou 2000:62).

The examples below (borrowed from different sources) illustrate the two uses. In all the

examples should can be used as an alternative to ought to in both senses:

(126) (i) You ought to be ashamed of yourself (Zandvoort 1966:70)



35

(ii) Dear Judith, it is sometime since I last wrote to you and though I am awaiting

a letter I think that I ought to write to send you the money I owe you (Coates 1983:71)

(iii) He ought to pay for the broken window (Leech 1971:94)

(iv) Our guests ought to be home by now (Leech 1971:94)

(v) If it‟s a story by J.P. Woodhouse, it ought to be amusing. (Zandvoort 1966:70)(vi) Don‟t you think Eclipse ought to win the Derby? (Zandvoort 1966:70)

Just like in the case of should, there are cases when the interpretation of ought to is

indeterminate between a deontic or epistemic reading (Coates 1983, Leech 1971, H&P 2000):

(127) (i) she‟s (Mrs. Thatcher) not sunk yet, but it ought to be beginning to occur to her

that if you try to walk on water, your feet get wet. (Coates 1983:79)

(a) „it‟s reasonable to assume that it‟s beginning to occur to her….‟

(b)‟she has a duty to begin to realize that….‟

(ii) well sir, don‟t ask me, you ask the people here, they should know. ((Coates

1983:79)

According to Coates (1983) the examples express similar meanings but are clearly

distinguished by prosodic features, particularly stress.

Possibility modals : may and can

It is generally assumed that the basic system of English distinguishes between weak and

strong modality, both epistemic and deontic. (Palmer 1986). Definitely, it is the notions of

necessity and possibility that are involved in this distinction. The first type is represented by

the necessity modal must and its more „tentative‟ forms should and ought to, while the second

by the possibility modals - may and can -.

As in the case of must and should/ought to, may and can differ in the semantically

encoded information assigned to them, i.e. must and may turn out to be semantically more

general than should and can respectively.

Just like in the case of must , the restrictor of the modal (the D-value) of may is

unspecified so they need to be pragmatically saturated . In the case of can , just like in the

case of should, the domain is semantically specified. To put it differently , may and must are

cases of domain selection while can and should are examples of domain restriction:

(128) may: p is compatible with Dunspecifiedcan: p is compatible with Dfactual

must:p is entailed by Dunspecified

should : p is entailed by Dnormative

CAN – General Remarks

Traditionally, the modal verb can has been discussed under the convenient labels

„Permission‟ (deontic), Ability (dynamic) and Root Possibility (potentiality). Papafragou

2000 makes a fine point, supported by various grammarians, arguing that the

ability/potentiality distinction generally collapses. Coates (1983) calls this „the gradient ofinherency”. Coates (1983) also argues that Permission can and Possibility can are related



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through a gradient of restriction, possibility being most simply described as the unmarked

meaning with respect to the two gradients of restriction and inherency. According to Coates,

„where there is no clear indication of either restriction or of inherent properties of the subject,

then Possibility is the meaning that applies‟( Coates 1983:93). Both permission and ability

are associated with agentivity, but there is no necessary association of possibility with anagentive subject function. For instance, inanimate subjects and passive sentences are

naturally predicted to favour a root potentiality interpretation if we assume with Papafragou

that the ability reading of can be subsumed under the „potentiality‟ reading; the ability

reading arises whenever the subdomain of factual assumptions belongs to the „file‟ for an

individual or object. Papafragou argues that proof for the fact that ability is not present in the

semantic content of can is the relation between can and be able to, the latter encoding ability,

relative to their occurrence in conditionals:

(129) (i) John can/??is able to swim, if he likes

(ii) We can/??are able to offer you a discount, if you wish

According to Papafragou, inherent ability cannot be subject to an individual‟s wishes and it is

this incongruity that is the reason for the unacceptability of the utterances containing be able

above.

Huddlestone and Pullum (2000:185) also subsume ability under what they call „dynamic

possibility‟, defining ability as „a matter of internal properties of the subject referent‟.

The subtle distinctions are shown in the following triad taken over from Coates (1983:93):

I can do it = Permission - human authority/rules and regulations allow me

to do it

I can do it =Possibility - external circumstances allow me to do it

I can do it = Ability - inherent properties allow me to do it

Here are some examples borrowed from different sources:

(130) Deontic possibility (Permission;)

(i) You can have the book when I have finished it (deontic source: speaker)

(ii) You can have one more turn (deontic source: speaker)

(iii) Poppy can‟t drive her little car because she hasn‟t got any insurance on it.

(deontic source: rules and regulations)(iv) You can borrow up to six books at a time (deontic source: rules and regulations)

Ability

(v) I can only type very slowly as I am quite a beginner.(inherent properties/potential

of the subject)

(vi) She can make her own dresses.

(vii) She can run the marathon in under three hours.

Root possibility („nihil obstat‟ Ehrman (1966)

(viii) Bad weather can ruin the crops.



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(ix) Solutions can be found which will prove satisfactory.

(x) Thanks to Doctor Fox I can quote some interesting examples of building costs

from the accounts for fourteen twenty seven (Coates 1983:94) („Dr.Fox‟s accounts

allow me to quote some interesting examples).

(xi) Well, I think there is a place where I can get a cheap kettle (Coates 1983:95)(xii) The most we can expect is a slight cut in the sales-tax (H&P 2000:184)

It is generally assumed that can is the only modal verb where we do not find the Root-

Epistemic distinction since, according to Papafragou , the verb restricts the domain to the

factual one. Actually, as Huddlestone and Pullum (2000) , Coates (1983), Papafragou (2000)

argue, in its epistemic sense can, like need , is restricted to non-assertive contexts can+not

qualifying as a suppletive to the must paradigm rather than as providing an alternative to

may+not (Coates 1983:102).

ABILITY CAN (Dynamic)

In its ability sense (coates 1983:89)we identify the following properties: (a) subject is

animate and has agentive function;b)verb is eventive (dynamic) ;c)the possibility of the

action is determined by inherent properties of the subject. Can expresses generic ability

(potentiality) with eventive predicates and has Could as a past time equivalent. The negative

„not‟negates the modal so we have external negation.

(131) a) Elena can type only very slowly as she is a beginner

b) I just can‟t remember a time when I couldn‟t swim

There are examples where although the subject is inanimate, CAN clearly refers to inherent

properties of the subject: „ Britain’s word CAN still be of value in some parts of the world’ ;the

plane has an inbuilt stereo-tape recorder which CAN play for the whole four hours flight’

(Coates 1983:90)

Could like can is found with stative verbs of perception ( see, hear, feel , as well as verbs

like remember,understand etc) in an aspectual sense, substituting for the unacceptable

progressive form *I am seeing/understanding etc. Expression like can’t face/can’t stand are

also included here. Ability CAN is factive i.e. the speaker is committed to the truth of the proposition expressed in the main predication.

132) a) He could/can remember how his father had not been able to help him

b) I can see you

Whenever we want to express the actuality of a situation (i.e actual performance of a single

successful event) the equivqlent BE ABLE TO is used. Couldn’t is acceptable, as seen below,

to express non-fulfilment; the form couldn’t is therefore both with habitual ability (see 131

b) and single events

(133) I ran fast and was able to catch the bus



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I ran fast and couldn‟t catch the bus

*I ran fast and could catch the bus

As a matter of fact BE ABLE TO is preferred to CAN whenever we want to suggest that the

subject accomplishes the task:

In this way we are able to carry out research and not simply to undertake consulting

Could also functions as a hypothetical form (i.e. a subjunctive form)

(i) I don‟t really think I could write ….and this was a sort of 96 page booklet, you

know (I don‟t think I would be capable of writing…).

(ii) (ii) All good salesmen and women possess 4 attributes without which they could

not succeed (without which they would not be capable…)

This use though is not very frequent.

In less usual circumstances, can is used to express a tendency (general characteristics) or a

factual statement on what is often the case. The negative form is not cannot but won't (or a

negation without the modal verb).

(i) She can talk your ears off, if you don't watch out.

(ii) She was in great pain and could get angry over the smallest thing. (past generic)

(iii) He can get so engrossed that he forgets to eat.

(iv) She can be catty/charming at times;

(v) He can tell awful lies.

Future ability is rendered by means of BE ABLE TO:

When you are in your 80‟s you‟ll be able to say “I had to do Anglo Saxon for 3 years.

PERMISSION CAN (Deontic)Examples that display this use of Can are given below:

(134) a) I took the gun from under my arm, the big Luger.‟You can go into the bathroom

and fix your mouth‟ (personal authority –very rare; neutral as to the speaker‟s wishes

butimply that the subject does want to do the action concerned))

b) Poppy can’t drive the car because she hasn‟t got any insurance (rules andregulations)

c)How then can I help other people to impose a ban in which I do not believe?

Ethical/moral laws)

All the above sentences can be paraphrased with allowed or permitted and all have a deontic

source which more often than not is external to the speaker (rules, laws, regulations).The

examples show the following characteristics: (i)animate subject; (ii) agentive verb; iii)

utterances can be paraphrased with the words „be permitted, be allowed, have permission‟.

Permission can is also used in spoken English as a polite form for offering?asking for food

and drink:

135)Can I pour you your tea?



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Can I have the salt?

As in the case of ability can the negative „not‟ negates the modal:

136) Can I go out and play father? No,you can‟t.

You can‟t smoke in here, smoking is forbidden in this area.

It is to be remarked that this use of CAN can be extended from permission to smth like strong

recommendation or sarcastic suggestion in contexts like:

You can forget about your holidays

You can jump in the lake if you feel like it

Could is used to express permission in the past, though this is not very frequent. More often

COULD as a past tense form is used in indirect speech

137. (i) I don‟t think women could take degrees until as late as that. (it was permissible for..)

(ii) they could have anybody they liked as long as they looked after them (had

permission to/were allowed to)

(iii) She said that, if she wanted , she could come/ He said I could leave the day after

tomorrow

It occurs with animate subjects and agentive verbs. Could , just like in the case of „ability

could‟ may be used to express hypothetical permission (could is a subjunctive):

138) and they do not do many things which they could do legally because they know

that this would be death (it would be permissible for them to do many things).

This form is quite often used pragmatically in questions as a polite way of making a request,

(139) Could I go out and play? Yes you can/No,you can‟t ** Yes you could/**No,

you couldn‟t

Could I help you with your luggage?

Could I give your name as a possible referee?

ROOT POSSIBILITY CAN

Both Ability and Permission CAN are associated with agentivity. In the case of ROOT

Possibility there is no obligatory association with agentivity. The subjects can be both

agentive and non-agentive, impersonal Where there is no clear indication of inherent

properties (ability) or a deontic source (rules regulations, human authority) but only enabling

circumstances (natural laws; other external circumstances),we speak of CAN as denoting

possibility. The paraphrase which is most suitable here would be „it is possible‟. The meaning

can be defined as „nihil obstat‟ i.e. there is nothing to prevent us from

140) (i) Salts can easily be separated from the solid residue by dissolving them

(natural laws)(ii) Well, I think there is a place where I can get a cheap kettle



40

(iii) We can make coffee like this upstairs

(iii) Lightening can be dangerous

iv) We believe that solutions can be found which will prove satisfactory

(v) The particle size can be varied by regulating the distribution

vi) first thing in the morning they come you can hear the whistle(vii) A fussy referee can ruin a bout.

We find this interpretation in passive sentences, written texts and bureaucratic and academic

contexts.

Negative examples mean „not nihil obstat‟=it is not the case that nothing prevents. In such

contexts the „disabling‟ circumstances are often specified:

141) (i) You can’t see him because he is having lunch with a publisher

(ii)they were just engaged all the time so he can’t even find out whether it‟s been sent

off to him or not.

(iii) but of course it was a kit as I say and you can’t really go wrong with them

Past time reference is rendered by COULD in indirect speech as well.

142) (i) In those days you could buy buns for a penny (it was possible for you to…*

(ii) Electricity supplies were restored…. so that housewives could prepare their meals

(the restoration of electricity made possible for the wives to prepare the meal)

(iii) The taxi driver said that ……he could deposit them with the porter if there is no

one at the Department of English

The idiomatic expression „how can…. with the implied meaning of „it‟s unreasonable‟

appears as „how could you‟ : „How could we possibly run out on anyone so admirable‟

Hypothetical COULD is found with Root Possibilty CAN as well. According to Coates this is

the most frequently occurring usage of COULD.

143) (i)If he got free he could run me through in an instant (it would be possible for…)

(ii) well, we could have another holiday

Hypothetical could is used to make polite requests and sometimes commands or suggestions:

(144) Could you ask him to give me a ring?

Could you shut the door please?

Could we go on to modern novels, then?You could always ring us up you know.

Hypothetical COULD +HAVE+EN. In this construction COULD expresses „contrary to fact‟

(i.e. it is counter factive+it would have been possible for ……but)

145) (i) I could have got a job in Hatfield College, actually

(ii)I could have gone straight there but I just couldn‟t get there (=it would have been

possible for me to….but I wasn‟t able to)

Epistemic CAN’T/COULD

Focusing on can and could , the former is only used to talk about presentimpossibility, occurring together with not , while the latter can be used to talk about



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possibility, both present and past. In its epistemic sense can, like need , is restricted to

non-assertive contexts can+not qualifying as a suppletive to the must paradigm rather than as

providing an alternative to may+not (Coates 1983:102). The meaning of examples with

Epistemic can’t corresponds to that of Epistemic Must , namely it expresses the speaker‟s

confidence in the truth of the proposition, and that confidence is the result of a process ofinference which is often overt (Coates 102). The patterns of Epistemic can’t in terms of

syntactic features are identical to those of Epistemic Must .

146) They can‟t have left last night; I saw them this morning.

He can‟t be that stupid!

According to Coates (107) Could is occasionally found expressing Epistemic possibility and

synonymous with Epistemic May and Might. Epistemic Could, according to Coates (165)

seems to express only tentative possibility:

147) Carol C. …..began by agreeing that she could have been mistaken about the preciseminute of Dackson‟s visit the previous Wednesday (= it was tentatively possible that …..)

The General Elections could well be with us before the shape of the local government

in Greater London is settled (=it is highly likely that….)

The syntactic patterns of Epistemic Could are the same as thos of Epistemic May/Might . It

seems (Coates) that it is never found with agentive verbs and is most commonly associated

with the verb to be. According to Coates Epistemic Could is not associated with the

Progressive.

MAY May is used to express Permission, Root Possibility and Epistemic Possibility. According to

Coates (131) Permission and Root Possibility occur only in more formal contexts (compared

to CAN). It can also be used as a quasi-subjunctive (also knows as concessive, factual or

speech act may) and to express benediction or malediction.

Permission (Deontic Possibility)

(i) No vehicle may be left in the University grounds during vacations (deontic source:

rules regulations

(ii) May I read your message? (deontic source: hearer/addressee)

Root Possiblity

(i) to save money any scrap may be used and if this is nailed and glued together strongly, it

may be marked and cut to shape, later ( deontic source: external: glueing and nailing)

Epistemic possibility

I may be a few minutes late, but I don‟tknow

Concessive may (Factual May)

Whatever steps he may take, will will have a far reaching significance.He may be a a university professor, but I doubt it because he‟s so dumb.



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Benediction (subjunctive )

And may the city to whom this nation owes so much have in your year of office a vintage

year.

ROOT MAY

The Root meaning includes Permission may and possibility may which can be described as a

fuzzy set. The two are not strictly separable, there is no deviding line between them. May is

understood as Permission where the context identifies some form of human authority or

involves rules, regulations. When the constraining factor is not so identified but with external

circumstances, then may is understood as Root possibility. According to Coates (139), in

other words,like CAN, ROOT May has the meaning „nihil obstat‟ which may be realized as

either „no human authority, law, regulation‟ prevents x‟(Permission) or as „no external

circumstances prevents x‟ (Possibility)

Permission. (Deontic possibility)Giving permission implies the power to withhold permission and hence to impose a barrier to

actualization of the situation.(H&P183) Prototypically Deontic modality can be subjective

(speaker deontic source) or objective (rules,regulations). Reference time of the modal is

present and reference time of VP is future with agentive verbs

(i) You may have another turn (subjective

(ii) You may borrow up to 6 books at a time (objective)

The negative marker „not‟ negates the modal i.e external negation. Very infrequently we may

come across examples of internal negation: You may NOT come to the lectures (I allow you

NOT to come…) Might as a past tense form occurs in indirect speech. Past permission is

rendered by means of “allow, permit, give permission‟.

Root Possibility

Where no deontic source is identifiable; where enabling circumstances are mentioned in

context: „it is possible for‟ „circumstances allow x‟.

(i) I‟m afraid this is the bank‟s final word. I tell you this so that you may make

arrangements elsewhere if you are able to(=so that it will be possible for you….

This use is never found with negation unlike permission may.

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