16-120-1-PB

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

1/9

E-Journal of Drilling Engineering Petroleum Journals OnlinePetroleum Journals OnlinePetroleum Journals OnlinePetroleum Journals Online

Page 1 of 9(page number not for citation purposes)

Research

Sand Control Completion Failures: Can We Talk the Same Language?Sand Control Completion Failures: Can We Talk the Same Language?Sand Control Completion Failures: Can We Talk the Same Language?Sand Control Completion Failures: Can We Talk the Same Language?

Abraham Faga1*, Brian T. Wagg *, and Howard L. McKinzie *

Address: C-FER Technologies, 200 Karl Clark Road, Edmonton, T6N 1H2, Alberta, Canada

Email addresses: Abraham Faga - [email protected]: Brian T. Wagg - [email protected]: Howard L. McKinzie - [email protected]

*These authors contributed equally to this workCorresponding author

Published: 12 July 2006 Received: 01 May 2006

E-Journal of Drilling Engineering 2006, ISSN: 1718-7486. Accepted: 23 May 2006

This article is available from: http://www.petroleumjournalsonline.com/

2006 Faga et al; li censee Petroleum Journals Online.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/), whichpermits unrestricted use for non-commercial purposes, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract

Several operators have recently launched a new industry-wide initiative on sand control reliability. The aim ofthe initiative is to gain a better understanding of Sand Control Completion (SCC) systems and equipmentperformance and reliability in a variety of applications. It focuses on assisting the industry to improve SCCperformance and service life through sharing of failure information, operational practices, and other pertinentdata. One of the key challenges in this effort is how to achieve consistency in the data collected by severaloperators.

This paper presents an approach to establish consistent practices for collecting, tracking and sharing SCCreliability and failure information. The approach is based on two key elements: (1) a general and common dataset; and (2) a standard nomenclature for coding SCC failure information. The general data set contains basicinformation on operating conditions, SCC systems and equipment, and the observed failures. While this dataset is not overly detailed, in that the information is typically already collected by most operators and relativelyeasy to obtain, it is comprehensive enough so that meaningful analyses can be performed. The nomenclaturestandard builds on the International Standard IS0 14224 that stipulates broad definitions and failure attributesrelated to collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment used in the petroleumindustry.

The paper also provides a review of past industry efforts to track SCC system reliability in terms of the typesof data collected, and the main types of analyses performed with the data. Comments are included on difficultissues such as how to define failure of a sand control completion.

It is hoped that the paper will encourage discussion on the topic, and help the industry share SCC reliabilityand failure data in a more consistent manner. The ultimate goals of this work are to assist the industry in

improving SCC service life; improving the basis for selecting sand control systems and equipment; and betterrealizing the full potential of SCC technologies.

1 Now with Schlumberger, Algeria

IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroductionOperators face a major challenge when trying todetermine which sand control completion method tochoose to provide the best economics over the life of a

field. This is especially true because of the increasingcost and complexity of well designs required for hotterand deeper wells. There are now several new optionsfor sand control available with which the industry has

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

2/9

e-journal of drilling engineering http://petroleumjournalsonline.com


very little experience on which to base these decisions.Operators would like to: have a better understanding ofthe factors affecting SCC performance in a wide rangeof applications; be less reliant on a few highlyexperienced staff for effective SCC decision making; andbe able to very quickly climb the learning curveassociated with new SCC methods, in both new andexisting applications. Unfortunately, while there aremany competing forms of sand control performanceinformation, both from service providers and operators,a direct, relatively unbiased comparison between thereliability of sand control types, under a broad range ofoperating conditions, has been hard to find.

As a result, many operators have identified that having afailure tracking system in place is key to reducing failurerates of SCC systems. Problems with system design,equipment specification, manufacturing, installation, andday-to-day operation could be identified and corrected,contributing to increased service lives, lower operatingcosts and increased profits. Accordingly, someoperators and vendors have set up database systems totrack SCC performance, service life and failureinformation.

Through discussions and communications withnumerous operators it is apparent that these effortshave been rewarded with limited success. A review ofseveral tracking systems revealed that they seldomintegrate both failure information and a comprehensiveset of influential factors, (e.g., operating conditions, anddetailed equipment specifications). This limits the abilityto understand the influence of several factors on SCCreliability. Other tracking systems also tend to lacksufficient variety in applications to assess SCC servicelife under different conditions.

These drawbacks impair ones ability to develop generalrelationships or correlations between types andfrequency of failures, field/well conditions and systemcomponent or equipment specifications. Without suchcorrelations, service life predictions that are fed into afeasibility study are little more than educated guesses,adding significant uncertainty to a projects economicresult. Furthermore, investigating the impact that achange in current practices might make on service life

(i.e., conducting what if analyses) is also very difficult.For example, how would the service life be affected ifwe change installation methods, completion fluids orour equipment specification (e.g., by selecting differentscreens)? Generally, the information required for thesetypes of assessments can not be readily obtained fromexisting tracking systems. As such, there is often littlebasis for making such critical decisions. Often, the only

option is a trial-and-error approach, again withuncertain economic results.

Several operators have recently recognized that inorder to get a better understanding of the factorsaffecting SCC service life, and reduce the uncertainty inpredicting service life for new applications, one needsaccess to reliability information derived from as largeand consistent a data set as possible. They have alsorecognized that such a large data set of SCC reliabilitydata can only be achieved by pooling and sharing theirindividual data sets through a joint industry initiative.

Early on, the companies involved acknowledged thatthere were many challenges in such an effort, one ofthem being how to achieve consistency in the datacollected by several operators scattered around theglobe. This paper describes a common set of guidelinesdeveloped through the first phase of an industryinitiative to achieve such consistency. It includes twokey elements: a general data set of quantitative andqualitative parameters, and a standard nomenclature forcoding SCC failure information.

Brief Review of ExistingBrief Review of ExistingBrief Review of ExistingBrief Review of Existing Tracking SystemsTracking SystemsTracking SystemsTracking SystemsDespite the recent increase in discussions about sandcontrol reliability, most of the information that can befound in existing literature relates to sand controlperformance rather than reliability. The few reportedsand control reliability studies often have widelydifferent objectives.

In the early 80s a number of oil companies operating inthe North and the Adriatic Seas started a collaborativeproject to survey the reliability of important wellequipment under 'real life' operational conditions. Thisstudy [1] led to the development of a database ofcompletion equipment and reliability information(Wellmaster). The database covers a wide range ofcompletion tubing accessories and other completionequipment including gravel pack screens. Hother andHebert [2] presented a Failure Modes Effects andCriticalities Analysis (FMECA) of sand controlcompletion technology aimed at identifying and rankingcritical issues and potential improvements. George King[3] presented a paper discussing an inter- and intra-company cooperation that led to the development of anExcel database of sand control reliability/failureinformation on over 2000 wells. The database containsinformation regarding general reliability and hasproduction and reservoir data from many wellsincluding: cumulative production; maximum rates;drawdown; skins; pay deviation; screen length; payinterval sorting; fines content; depth; and length. Several

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

3/9



operators have also implemented in-house reliabilitytracking systems.

Most of the literature addresses well or field specificperformance issues (discussed in relation to skin,productivity index, flow efficiency, etc.) often with somecomparisons of performance among a few sand controlmethods. From the literature, and through discussionsand communications with numerous operators, it hasbecome apparent that most of the existing databasesand tracking systems do not include much of the data(such as drilling data, reservoir characteristics,operational/installation data, and production data) thatwould provide a better understanding of the factorsaffecting SCC reliability in a comprehensive trackingsystem.

Data QualityData QualityData QualityData QualityConfidence in the data collected for reliability studies,and hence any analysis, is strongly dependent on thequality of the data collected [4]. However, ensuring thatgood quality data is collected is also one of the mainchallenges in sharing failure data through a common,industry-wide tracking system [5]. This was of particularconcern in this case because of the potentially large datasets that would be required to account for influentialfactors from: well and completion design; reservoircharacteristics; equipment and fluids selection; drillingand completion operations; production and servicinghistory, etc.

In this initiative, data consistency is promoted bydefining both the parameters (quantitative andqualitative) that this common data set should consist of,as well as how the SCC failures would be described.

A common data set is essential for establishingmeaningful relationships among the types of failuresobserved; the equipment used; the produced fluids; theoperating practices; and other factors. Its primary roleis to enable operators to collect a common set ofparameters. To forestall the potential difficulty ofcollecting and handling an excessively large data set, thiscommon data set is limited to parameters that: (1) willhave immediate or potential use in the analysis; and (2)are readily available from the existing tracking systems,databases and field records of most operators. At thesame time, the data set must be comprehensive enoughso that meaningful analyses can be performed. Hence,defining the list of parameters is challenging because itmust satisfy these two, often-opposing, objectives.

A common terminology and format for classifying thefailures is also necessary; it ensures that all users havesimilar interpretations of a failure event, and that data

collection and analyses are performed in a consistentmanner. Establishing a common set of terminologies isa challenge however, because failures are generallydescribed in qualitative terms, strongly influenced by theexperience and background of the observer.Interpretation of the failure tracking guidelines hasaccounted for the largest proportion of data qualityproblems in other similar failure data collection efforts[6].

Common Data SetCommon Data SetCommon Data SetCommon Data SetThe Common Data Set for the SCC failure trackingsystem currently contains a total of 400 parameters inthe following categories:

Field/Well/Fluid/Reservoir data Operational drilling/installation data

o Such as drill-in/ completion/ workoverfluids, wellbore cleanup Preparation(i.e., mud displacement), installation

techniques etc. Service life informationo Install, Start, Stop, final suspension

dates, etc. Production and Operating Information

o Producing rates, gas oil ratio,Wellhead Pressure and Temperature,etc.

Equipment datao Model, dimensions, materials, etc.o Manufacturer Catalogue information

Failure informationo Mode, Item(s), Descriptor(s), Cause,

Effects, and associated commentsA minimum data set, which is a subset of theCommon Data Set, defines a smaller minimum list ofparameters that serves as a measure of the level ofcompleteness of a record. The Common Data Set is amore comprehensive data set that indicates theinformation a record should have to enable investigationof more potential influential factors and generation ofadditional results and conclusions. Minimum Data Setsdiffer depending on the SCC system type (e.g. Frac Packsystem, Sand Consolidation system, etc.). Some of themain differences between the data sets are in theequipment/system component data andoperational/installation practices. The Minimum DataSets are limited to parameters that are readily availableto most operators and yet are sufficiently detailed toallow a reasonable level of analysis. The Minimum DataSets currently contain between 149 and 190 parametersdepending on the SCC system type.

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

4/9



SCCSCCSCCSCC Failure Nomenclature StandardFailure Nomenclature StandardFailure Nomenclature StandardFailure Nomenclature StandardSCC failure information is currently classified andrecorded in a number of very different formats andcodes. While operators and vendors have standard setsof codes used in their internal tracking systems, thesestandards are not common and widely accepted

across the industry.The SCC Failure Nomenclature Standard attempts toestablish a consistent terminology and structure forclassifying, recording and storing the various attributesof an SCC failure. It is primarily based on one keyindustry guideline, the ISO 14224 [4], Petroleum andNatural Gas Industries Collection and Exchange ofReliability and Maintenance Data for Equipment.Unfortunately, there is currently no common andwidely accepted standard across the industry for thenomenclature for components, parts of sand controlsystems and equipment. It is partly in response to thisthat the International Standards Organization (ISO) hasformed a task group to develop a standardnomenclature for sand exclusion systems (ISO 17824)[7].

Failure DefiniFailure DefiniFailure DefiniFailure Definitions.tions.tions.tions. In line with ISO 14224, the followingfailure definitions are used:

Failure: the termination of the ability of an itemto perform a required function;

Failure Mode: the observed manner of failure; Failed Item: any part, component, device,

subsystem, functional unit, equipment orsystem that can be individually considered;

Failure Descriptor: the apparent, observedcause of failure (of a Failed Item);

Failure Cause: the circumstances during design,manufacture or use which led to a failure; and

Failure Effects: the consequences of a failuremode on the operation, function, or status of anitem.

Failure.Failure.Failure.Failure. Failure occurs when an item has lost its abilityto perform a Required Function. (Note that reliability isdefined as the probability of an item to perform arequired function, under given conditions, for a giventime interval). Implicit in this definition is therecognition that the Required Functions have beenclearly established, which involves identifying both thefunctions necessary for providing a given service and thedesired level of performance for each function. Thedesired level of performance defines the boundarybetween satisfactory and unsatisfactory operatingconditions; it will generally be different betweenoperations, applications and even within the sameapplication as conditions change with time.

The Boundary and Functional Block Diagrams for anInternal Gravel Pack (IGP) system indicating their maincomponents and corresponding Required Functions areshown in Figs. 1Figs. 1Figs. 1Figs. 1 and 2222, respectively. Similar functionalblock diagrams have been developed for other SCCSystem configurations.

In general, the primary Required Function of an SCCSystem is to minimize production of load bearingreservoir sand while allowing hydrocarbon productionat/or above a target rate. However, prevention of sandmovement is generally incompatible with unrestrictedflow of fluids; consequently, some degree ofcompromise between this objective and sand control isoften required. Practical limits for tolerable sandproduction are set by the well operator based oneconomic, technical, operational, safety andenvironmental considerations.

Other functions such as permitting mechanical/hydraulicthrough-bore access may also be considered requireddepending on the SCC configuration and application.

It is important that all of the Required Functions (anddesired levels of performance) be clearly defined andunderstood to allow operational personnel to identifyFailures.

It is recognized that an SCC System failure may or maynot be a complete failure (i.e. the failure might not havecaused the complete lack of a required function). Forinstance, an SCC System that has been choked back dueto excessive sand production may not be considered acomplete failure if the well is able to produce at anacceptable rate until the failed component is repaired. Inaddition, an SCC System may degrade with respect toits Required Functions in a gradual manner or it may failsuddenly (partially or completely). The nomenclaturestandard allows for these scenarios to be accounted for.

Failure Mode.Failure Mode.Failure Mode.Failure Mode. The Failure Mode is the main evidence ofthe downhole equipment failure. It is usually a result ofan abnormal operating condition identified by theoperator through surface instruments, amonitoring/control system, or a well test. A FailureMode can be established once the operator has

determined that the downhole equipment has Failed.Usually, at this point, the interval completed with theSCC System may be suspended to inspect and repairthe faulty SCC component(s). Table 1 lists severalpossible Failure Modes for an SCC installation. SinceSCC systems may be suspended for reasons other thanan SCC equipment or component failure, there may bereasons for suspension other than the Failure Modesindicated in Table 1.

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

5/9



6

13

7

8

9

11

Note: Components in italics areoutside the system boundary for IGPs

IGP System

15

16

Centralizer10

Perforations13

Damaged formation14

Casing18

Cement17

Sump16

Completion Tubing andAccessories

15

Crushed zone12

Gravel Pack11

Seal Assembly9

Sump Packer8

Lower Tell-tale7

Screen Assembly6

Upper tell-tale5

Blank Liner4

Shear out safety sub3

GP Extension withsliding sleeve

2

GP Packer1

DescriptionItem

Centralizer10

Perforations13

Damaged formation14

Casing18

Cement17

Sump16

Completion Tubing andAccessories

15

Crushed zone12

Gravel Pack11

Seal Assembly9

Sump Packer8

Lower Tell-tale7

Screen Assembly6

Upper tell-tale5

Blank Liner4

Shear out safety sub3

GP Extension withsliding sleeve

2

GP Packer1

DescriptionItem

4

1

23

1718

5

14

10

12

Fig. 1 Internal Gravel Pack System BoundaryFig. 1 Internal Gravel Pack System BoundaryFig. 1 Internal Gravel Pack System BoundaryFig. 1 Internal Gravel Pack System Boundary

Permit fluid and sandflow

PerforationTunnel

Permit fluid flowBridge sandKeep tunnel open

Gravel

Bridge sandPermit fluid flowKeep tunnel gravel inplace Gravel

Pack

Permit through-bore accessKeep gravel in placeFluid flowPermit uniform gravelplacement

GPAssembly

Perforations

S a n

d a n

d

F i n e s

F l o w

F l u i d F l o w

F l u i d F l o w

Prevent formation collapseKeep gravel in place

Cement/ Casing

DebrisSump

FormationStability

PrepackAssembly

EvaluationStimulation &

Remedial Work

GP ServiceTool

PerforationGuns

F i n e s

Formation

Fig. 2 Internal Gravel Pack System Functional Block DiagramFig. 2 Internal Gravel Pack System Functional Block DiagramFig. 2 Internal Gravel Pack System Functional Block DiagramFig. 2 Internal Gravel Pack System Functional Block Diagram

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

6/9



Table 1 Failure Modes

General Failure ModeGeneral Failure ModeGeneral Failure ModeGeneral Failure Mode Specific Failure ModeSpecific Failure ModeSpecific Failure ModeSpecific Failure Mode CommentsCommentsCommentsComments

Sand Production High sand production Observed at surface

Observed via sand monitoring devices

Productivity Low productivity Production lower than target rate

As per well test

Access Impaired access As per indications during planned interventions

Other Other

Unknown Unknown

Table 2 Failed Items

IGP ComponentsIGP ComponentsIGP ComponentsIGP Components

Failed ItemFailed ItemFailed ItemFailed Item PerforationsPerforationsPerforationsPerforations GP AssemblyGP AssemblyGP AssemblyGP Assembly Gravel Pack Gravel Pack Gravel Pack Gravel Pack Casing/ CementCasing/ CementCasing/ CementCasing/ Cement

A s s o c i a t e

d P a r t s

/ S u

b

A s s o c i a t e

d P a r t s

/ S u

b

A s s o c i a t e

d P a r t s

/ S u

b

A s s o c i a t e

d P a r t s

/ S u

b - -- - C

o m p o n e n t s

C o m p o n e n t s

C o m p o n e n t s

C o m p o n e n t s

Perforation

Tunnel

Gravel

Crushed Zone

GP Packer

GP Extension sliding sleeve

Shear out safety sub

Blank Liner

Upper tell-tale

Screen Assembly

Lower Tell-tale

Sump Packer

Seal Assembly

Centralizers

Gravel Pack Cement

Casing

Failed Items.Failed Items.Failed Items.Failed Items. As per the definition of Failure above, aFailed Item (i.e., either a main component, such as a

gravel pack assembly, or part of a component, such as ascreen or packer) has lost its ability to perform acertain function. In some cases, the item has beentested or inspected in situ and has failed to meet therequired specifications. Table 2 lists the main downholecomponents and many associated parts for an IGPsystem, as an example, that may be identified as FailedItems.

Failure Descri Failure Descri Failure Descri Failure Descriptors. ptors. ptors. ptors. A Failure Descriptor is an apparentor observed cause of failure of Failed Items. These

observations are usually made during the SCCdownhole equipment inspection. They are the mainsymptoms, or perceptible signs of damage to the SCCcomponents or their parts, that may have resulted inthe system failure. Table 3 lists possible FailureDescriptors for the main SCC components andassociated parts. Note that some Failure Descriptorsmay not be applicable to some parts (e.g. a packer maynot be burned). Where possible, Primary andSecondary Failure Descriptor are assigned to each failed

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

7/9



item to describe the most prominent and secondaryfeatures, respectively.

Failure Cause.Failure Cause.Failure Cause.Failure Cause. The Failure Cause is associated with thecircumstances during design, manufacture or use, whichhave led to a failure. As noted in the ISO 14224,identification of the Failure Cause normally requiressome in-depth investigation, to uncover the underlyinghuman or organizational factors that were influential inthe failure of the system, component or part, and thetechnical explanation and sequence of events leading upto the observed mode, item and descriptors of the

failure. Table 4 lists several possible Failure Causes foran SCC system. It is recognized that it can be verydifficult to uncover root causes for SCC systemsbecause SCC equipment and components are seldompulled to surface for investigation and in situinvestigations are seldom performed. Therefore, theSCC failure tracking system is configured to capture keyword searchable failure related comments (such asinstallation failure, operation failure etc.) to provideperspective regarding each failure record.Notwithstanding, Failure Causes can be specifiedwhenever it is feasible.

Table 3 Failure Descriptors

Failure Descriptors Failure Descriptors Failure Descriptors Failure Descriptors CommentsCommentsCommentsComments

Bent Broken/Fractured Buckled Collapsed Cracked Damaged Dented Disconnected Failed Pressure Test Failed Vibration Test Faulty Clearance or Alignment Leaking

Loose/Spinning Low efficiency Low head Punctured Burst/Ruptured Scratched Squashed/Flattened Stuck Torn Twisted Vibration marks/Rub marks Unbalanced/Vibration

Usually the result of force, pressure, or

torque

Brittle

Burned Corroded Discolored Eroded / Pressure Washed

Hardened

Melted Overheated Swollen Worn

Usually related to the physicalcharacteristics of the material such as

colour, hardness, finish, etc.

Contaminated Plugged Coated - External Coated - Internal

Stuck closed Stuck open

Failures caused by external events or

substances, e.g. paraffin, asphaltene, scale,

sand, iron sulfide

Missing Maintenance Discard

Other

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

8/9



Table 4 Failure Causes

General Failure CauseGeneral Failure CauseGeneral Failure CauseGeneral Failure Cause Specific Failure CauseSpecific Failure CauseSpecific Failure CauseSpecific Failure Cause CommentsCommentsCommentsComments

Fabrication Related Manufacturing problem Damage during manufacture

Design Related Equipment selection size selection Equipment selection fluid design Defective design Operating procedure

Inadequate size (Gravel size is too large , Blank liner is too

short, Screen OD is too large, screen slots tool large/small) Poor placement fluid design Excessive pump rate during packing Damage during handling or storage Packer / seal unit not set (or sealing) Corroded screens

Installation Related Installation field service Damage during installation Improper installation

Operation Related Production strategy Increased volume of fines due to pore pressure decline

Reservoir or fluids

related

Reservoir conditions Unexpected reservoir conditions (grain-size, permeability,

high volume of fines, etc) leading to (1) selection of larger

gravel size than optimum (2) early screen out due to highinjectivity (3) screen erosion by fines

Failure Eff Failure Eff Failure Eff Failure Effects.ects.ects.ects. Failure Effects are the consequences of aFailure Mode on the operation, function, or status of anitem. One of the following Failure Effects (assessed atthe SCC system level) would be reported when a failureis deemed to have occurred:

Curtailed production production rate isreduced for that specific completioninterval.

Minor intervention typically through-tubing workover operations, e.g., usingcoiled tubing, snubbing or slicklineequipment, conducted to completetreatments or well service activities thatavoid a full workover where the tubing isremoved. The operation should save timeand expense compared to a full workoverwithin the operators field experience.

Major intervention a full workover, e.g.,any well treatment or work that requiresthe production tubing to be pulled(including through tubing recompletions),

typically requiring the services of aworkover rig.Plug and abandon the specific completion interval isabandoned.

Applying the Nomenclature StandardApplying the Nomenclature StandardApplying the Nomenclature StandardApplying the Nomenclature Standard. Most of the time,in the existing industry systems, the variouscomponents of a failure record or event (i.e., mode,item, descriptors and cause) are erroneously lumpedinto one or two failure classes; for instance reason for

suspension: low productivity due to plugging of the SASscreens with fines. In line with the proposed Standard,this failure record would be described as the following:Failed Item: screens; Failure Mode: low productivity;Failure Descriptors: plugged; and Failure Cause:reservoir or fluids (assuming the failure investigationreveals these as the root causes).

Conclusions and RecommendationsConclusions and RecommendationsConclusions and RecommendationsConclusions and Recommendations1. Although there are many competing forms of sandcontrol performance information, both fromservice providers and operators, a direct, unbiasedcomparison between the reliability of sand controltypes, under a broad range of operating conditionshas been hard to find;

2. Several operators have now implemented in-housereliability tracking systems but are yet to report anymajor successes. Only a few industry-ledimplementations of SCC reliability databases andother sand control reliability studies have beenreported in literature. These systems vary widelyin scope and content; seldom integrate both failureinformation and a comprehensive set of influentialfactors; tend to be field and/or operation specific;and typically lack sufficient breadth to assess SCCservice life under different conditions. As a result,it is often difficult to develop predictions of SCCfailure rates based on field/well conditions andequipment specifications, thus adding significantuncertainty to a projects economic result;

7/24/2019 16-120-1-PB

9/9



3. To reduce the uncertainty in predicting service life,reliability information should be derived from aslarge and consistent a data population as possible.One of the main challenges facing this efforthowever, is how to achieve consistency in the widerange of data currently being tracked by operatorsand vendors. Two key guidelines were presentedto assist in this task: a common data set ofquantitative and qualitative parameters; and astandard nomenclature for coding SCC failureinformation;

4. The common data set must be limited toparameters that will have immediate or potentialuse in the reliability analysis, while beingcomprehensive enough to enable meaningfulanalyses;

5. An SCC system failure can be described by a failuremode, failed item(s), failure descriptor(s), failurecause and failure effects, consistent with the SCCFailure Nomenclature Standard and ISO 14224.

NomenclatureNomenclatureNomenclatureNomenclatureISO =International Organization for StandardizationIGP = Internal Gravel PackFMECA = Failure Modes Effects and CriticalitiesAnalysisSCC = Sand Control CompletionSAS = Stand Alone Screens

AcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsAcknowledgmentsThe authors thank the Participants in C-FERs SCC-

RIFTS project (Shell, ConocoPhillips, BHP and Chevron)for permission to publish this paper and the followingC-FER staff for their contribution to this work:Francisco Alhanati, Todd Zahacy, Darren Worth, CamMatthews, Keith Hartman, and Marcia Jeremiah.

ReferencesReferencesReferencesReferences1. SINTEF: Reliability of Well Completion Equipment

Phase II. Main Report . February 22, 1996.2. Hother, J., Hebert, B.: Risk Minimization By the Use ofRisk Minimization By the Use ofRisk Minimization By the Use ofRisk Minimization By the Use of

Failure Mode Analysis in the Qualification of NewFailure Mode Analysis in the Qualification of NewFailure Mode Analysis in the Qualification of NewFailure Mode Analysis in the Qualification of NewTechnologyTechnologyTechnologyTechnology Recent Project ExpeRecent Project ExpeRecent Project ExpeRecent Project Experience in Completionsrience in Completionsrience in Completionsrience in Completions

and Sand Controland Sand Controland Sand Controland Sand Control SPE 96335, 2005 SPE Annual TechnicalConference and Exhibition, Dallas, TX, Oct. 9-12, 2005.

3. King, G.: Sand Control Completion Reliability and FailureSand Control Completion Reliability and FailureSand Control Completion Reliability and FailureSand Control Completion Reliability and FailureRate Comparison With a MultiRate Comparison With a MultiRate Comparison With a MultiRate Comparison With a Multi- ---Thousand Well DatabaseThousand Well DatabaseThousand Well DatabaseThousand Well DatabaseSPE 84262. SPE Annual Technical Conference andExhibition held in Denver, Colorado, U.S.A., 5 - 8October 2003.

4.

International Organization for Standardization: Petroleumand Natural Gas Industrious Collection and Exchangeof Reliability and Maintenance Data for Equipment, ISO14424 , First Edition. July 15, 1999.

5. Meeker, W.Q, Escobar, L.A.: Statistical methods forreliability data. Wiley series in probability and statistics.Applied probability and statistics section. New York:Wiley, 1998.

6. Alhanati, F.J.S., Solanki, S.C., Zahacy, T.A.: ESP Failures:ESP Failures:ESP Failures:ESP Failures:Can We Talk the Same Language?Can We Talk the Same Language?Can We Talk the Same Language?Can We Talk the Same Language? SPE ESP Workshop,Houston, USA, April 25-27, 2001

7. Gillespie, G.: Update on ISUpdate on ISUpdate on ISUpdate on ISO Sand Control ScreensO Sand Control ScreensO Sand Control ScreensO Sand Control ScreensStandardStandardStandardStandard Sand Control & Management US 2005 IQPC,Houston, TX, July 26 27, 2005

Publish with Petroleum Journals OnlinePetroleum Journals OnlinePetroleum Journals OnlinePetroleum Journals Online and every petroleumengineer can read your work free of charge

Your papers will be available free of charge to the entire petroleum

engineering community peer reviewed and published immediately upon

acceptance indexed by numerous abstracting/Indexing services

including Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS),Ulrich, DOAJ, PKP, EEVL, and CISTI

yours you keep the copyright

Register here to submit your manuscript:http://petroleumjournalsonline.com/journals

Documents

16-120-1-PB