14thCLMPS2011_A2_Bacigalupo

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A2. Philosophical Logic

Meinong and Husserl on Existence

Dr. Giuliano Bacigalupo

[email protected]

Seattle University, U.S.A.; Universit de Lille 3, France

Short Abstract

This paper will analyze and compare the treatment of existential judgments and

therefore of the notion of existence in Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl. Both

philosophers inherited the problem of how to interpret existence from their common

teacher Franz Brentano and tried as will be argued to provide a more refined accountby deviating from Brentanos semantic model. Their work brings to bear on the

contemporary debate over whether existence is a predicate and the related question of

how to make sense of references to objects that dont exist.

Long Abstract

Since the groundbreaking work of R. Chisholm, R. Routley and T. Parsons, the interestin the semantic ideas developed by A. Meinong has not only revived but also steadily

increased. On the other hand, the debate started by D. Fllesdal on the notion of noema

and phenomenologically inspired approaches in metaphysics and logic (W. Smith, A.

Thomasson, M. Fontaine, S. Rahman) have shown the relevance of E. Husserl, even for

those not following his phenomenological method or transcendental turn. This paper will

compare the insights of the two philosophers on a crucial subject that lies at the heart of

their influence on the contemporary debate: What does it mean to say that something

exists or that it does not exist.

Both Husserl and Meinong were well acquainted with F. Brentanos introduction of

intentional objects: every thought, such as representing, judging, longing or avoiding, has

an intentional object, i.e. an object that should be distinguished from the potentially

existent transcendent thus, non psychological object. Otherwise, it would be

impossible to long for or be afraid of something that does not exist, which obviously is

not the case. Moreover, if the intentional object were identical with the existent object, we

would fall prey to the infamous paradox of existence: every existential judgment would

become either a tautology (when existence is affirmed) or a contradiction (when existence

is denied). Hence, Brentano thought himself justified in postulating an intentional object

different from the potentially existent one.

Whereas Meinong and Husserl both recognized the necessity of a semantic distinctionbetween intentional and existent objects, they did not follow Brentanos interpretation of

intentional objects as psychological entities. Such objects would in fact have the


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advantage of allowing intentional predicates such as longing for or being afraid of to

be interpreted as regular binary relations between existent objects. (In I admire Sherlock

Holmes, both I and Holmes would refer to existent objects.) However, intentional

objects as psychological entities would fail to give a satisfactory solution to the paradox

of existence, as Meinongs and Husserls analysis shows.

The first part of the paper will dwell on Meinongs handling of the riddle of non

existence in ber Annahmen (1901-10). Here two complementary moves will be

distinguished: first, Meinongs definition of truth as reference to something that is

subsistent or factual and, second, the attribution of an extra-ontological status to the

reference of the subject of existential judgments. Thus, a judgment like Holmes does not

exist has be interpreted not as referring to an existent object Holmes, which would

lead to the paradox of existence, but to a subsisting or factual proposition-like entity that

can be spelled out as the fact that Holmes does not exist.

The second part of the paper will address Meinongs two semantic moves in order to

assess the efficacy of his solution to the riddle of existence. First, the well-known

criticism raised by B. Russell against the introduction of objects beyond being and non-

being will be taken into account, namely that such object would infringe the law of non

contradiction and allow an ontological proof of the existence of everything. Secondly,

Brentanos criticism of Meinongs definition of truth as implying an infinite regress of

entities will be addressed.

Husserl approach in Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischen

Philosophie (1913) which will be discussed in the third part of the paper tackles the

notion of existence from a different angle than Meinong: whereas the latter asked himself

how it is possible to predicate existence of something without implying a tautology or acontradiction, the former asked himself what was left after the bracketing of an objects

existence. Still, the paradox of existence is looming in Husserls approach too, even if in

a reverse and less common form: if, after the bracketing of existence, we are left with an

object that still has some kind of existence, an infinite regress will inevitably take place.

Thus, Husserl, like Meinong, is forced to postulate an extra-ontological semantic

category. However, it will be shown that Husserl achieves this not by postulating a

reference to extra-ontological objects, but by distinguishing between sense and reference.

The fourth part will dwell upon Husserls distinction between sense and reference. First,

it will be shown how a Fregean interpretation of such a distinction would be inconsistent

with Husserls own wording of it. Second, with the help of references to the so-called

East Coast reading of the notion of noema (R. Sokolowski, J. Drummond), the

problematic character of the distinction advanced by Husserl will be addressed.

Finally, it will be pointed out how the deviation from Brentanos semantics can be best

interpreted as a Kantian inspired move: even while using different semantic tools, it

seems that the common goal of both philosophers was to give us a framework for making

sense of I. Kants dictum that existence does not add anything to the determination of an

object. From this point of view, recent attempts to treat existence as an (almost) perfect

ordinary predicate should not claim Meinong as a forerunner. On the other hand, the

difficulties Meinong and Husserl have run into could hint to the fact that we shouldfinally waive goodbye to Kant.


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Bibliography

Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Leipzig: Duncker &Humblot.

Chisholm, R. M. (1972). Beyond Being and Nonbeing. In R. Haller., ed., Jenseits vonSein und Nichtsein, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt: 245-255.

Chisholm, R. M. (1973). Homeless objects. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27:207-223.

Drummond, J. (1990). Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism.Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Fontaine, M., Rahman S. (2010). Fiction, Creation and Fictionality : An Overview.Methodos, 10: http://methodos.revues.org/2343.

Fllesdal, D. (1969). Husserls Notion of Noema. The Journal of Philosophy, 66: 680-97.

Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischenPhilosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfhrung in die reine Phnomenologie. Jahrbuch

fr Philosophie und phnomenologische Forschung. Halle: Max Niemeyer. Republished

in Karl Schuhmann, ed. (1977), Husserliana 3/1, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.Meinong, A. (1910). ber Annahmen. Leipzig: Barth. Republished in R. Kindingerand R. Haller, eds. (1969), Gesamtausgabe IV. ber Annahmen. Graz: AkademischeDruck- u. Verlagsanstalt: 1-384.

Parsons, T. (1980). Nonexistent Objects. New Haven and London: Yale UniversityPress.

Routley, R. (1980). Exploring Meinong's Jungle and beyond. An Investigation ofNoneism and the Theory of Items. Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences,Australian National University.

Russell, B. (1905). On Denoting. Mind, 14, 4: 479-493.Smith, D. W. and McIntyre, R. (1982). Husserl and Intentionality: a Study of Mind,

Meaning, and Language. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Smith. D. W. (2007). Husserl. New York: Routledge.Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Thomasson, A. L. (1999). Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

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