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136 G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 April 29, 1966

FRANCISCA VILUAN, petitioner, vs. TH C!URT !F A"" ALS, "ATRICI! HUFANA #$% GR G!RI!HUFANA, respondents.

&o'(ri$) :In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the

driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.

F#'(s :It appears that, as the bus owned by petitioner Viluan and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino neared the gate of the abaldon school building in the municipality of !angar, another passenger bus owned by "atricio Hufanaand driven by regorio Hufana tried to overta#e it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced with the overta#ing bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post,crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.

$he heirs of those who perished sued petitioner Viluan and the latter%s driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, fordamages for breach of contract of carriage. &arolina 'abado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the

driver for damages.In their answer, petitioner Viluan and her driver Aquino blamed respondent regorio Hufana for the accident.(ith leave of court, they filed third party complaints against regorio Hufana and the latter%s employer, "atricioHufana.

After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the twobuses and held both, together with their respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages.

!oth petitioner Viluan and her driver Aquino and the respondents herein appealed to the &ourt of Appeals.(hile affirming the finding that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of both theViluan and the Hufana buses, the &ourt of Appeals differed with the trial court in the assessment of liabilities of

the parties. In its view only petitioner Viluan, as operator of the bus, is liable for breach of contract of carriage.$he driver, Aquino, cannot be made jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter%semployee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage.

Iss*) : 'hould "etitioner Viluan)operator of the bus that caught fire)be held to be the only one liable for thedeath and injuries suffered by passengers of his bus* A$s+)r No.

H)l%: As early as + +-, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez , / "hil. +00 that in case of injury to apassenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. 'omemembers of the &ourt, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi1delict.

&isposi(i ) "or(io$ (herefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that petitioner aswell as respondents "atricio Hufana and regorio Hufana are jointly and severally liable for the damagesawarded by the trial court. $he disallowance of moral damages in the amount of "+,222.22 is correct andshould be affirmed. 3o costs.

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136/ & LFIN LI0 #$% I IL TAHA, pl#i$(i s-#pp)ll#$(s, s. FRANCISC! "!NC & L !N AN&!RLAN&! 0A&& LA, %) )$%#$(s-#pp)ll))s.

.4. 3o. 5166 7 August 6 , + 0

T!"IC

Violation of &ivil and "olitical 4ights&!CTRINa person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damagesfrom the public officer or employee responsible therefor

$o be liable under Article -6 of the 3ew &ivil &ode it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutionalrights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.

FACTS8n April 6 , + /+, 9i#il $aha sold to a certain Alberto $imbangcaya of !roo#e%s "oint, "alawan a motor launchnamed ;5 5< from plaintiff1appellant @elfin 5im and impoundedit.

@elfin 5im pleaded with 8rlando addela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.

9i#il $aha through his counsel made representations with =iscal "once de 5eon to return the seiBed property toplaintiff1appellant @elfin 5im but =iscal "once de 5eon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense.

@elfin 5im and 9i#il $aha, filed with the &ourt of =irst Instance of "alawan a complaint for damages against=iscal =rancisco "once de 5eon and 8rlando addela, alleging that:

on 9uly /, + /6 8rlando addela entered the premises of @elfin 5im without a search warrant and thenand there too# away the hull of the motor launch without his consentC that he effected the seiBure upon order of =iscal "once de 5eon who #new fully well that his office was

not vested with authority to order the seiBure of a private propertyC that said motor launch was purchased by @elfin 5im from 9i#il $aha in consideration of "-,222.22,

"6,222.22 of which has been given to 9i#il $aha as advance paymentC that as a consequence of the unlawful seiBure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialiBeC and that since 9uly /, + /6, the said motor launch had been moored at the !alabac !ay, "alawan and

because of e?posure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.

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=or the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs1appellants prayed that defendants1appellees beordered to pay jointly and severally each of them the sum of " ,0 2.22 representing actual, moral ande?emplary damages and attorney%s fees.

"once @e 5eon and addela denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defensesalleged that:

the motor launch in question which was sold by 9i#il $aha to Alberto $imbangcaya on April 6 , + /+

was sometime in April + /6, forcibly ta#en with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by 9i#il$aha from Alfredo $imbangcaya without the latter%s #nowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filingof a criminal charge of robbery against 9i#il $ahaC

that =iscal "once de 5eon, in his capacity as Acting "rovincial =iscal of "alawan ordered 8rlandoaddela to seiBe and impound the motor launch

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F E $he rights to be secure in one%s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches andseiBures.??? ??? ???$he indemnity shall include moral damages. >?emplary damages may also be adjudicated.

A4$. 66+ . oral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:??? ??? ???

F/E Illegal searchC??? ??? ???F+E Acts and action referred to in Articles 6+, 6/, 60, 6G, 6 , -2, -6, -7 and - .

"ursuant to the foregoing provisions, # p)rso$ +5os) 'o$s(i(*(io$#l ri 5(s 5# ) ))$ iol#()% or i p#ir)%is )$(i(l)% (o #'(*#l #$% or#l %# # )s ro (5) p* li' o i')r or ) plo )) r)spo$si l) (5)r) or.

@efendant1appellee =iscal "once de 5eon wanted to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that

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A )r'# s. V)r .4. 3o. 51/ G// April + , + GG

">4'83' 4>'"83'I!5>. ) Article -6 spea#s of an officer or employee or person

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counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seiBures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

As to who should be made liable for damages, the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. Article -6 spea#s of an officer or employee or person %directly% or

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138 0H" G#r )$(s . CA

=acts:

+E H" arments Inc. had the e?clusive franchise to sell and distribute official !oy 'couts niforms andinsignias.6E H" then received information that Agnes &ruB et al. were selling !oy 'cout items and paraphernalia

without any authority to do so.-E $hey then undertoo# the necessary surveillance and made a report to the "hilippine &onstabulary F"&E7E An H" employee together with "& went to the stores of Agnes &ruB et al. at the ari#ina "ublic

ar#et and seiBed the items without a warrant. $he seiBure caused a commotion to the embarrassmentof &ruB et al. 8ne of the customers even shouted ay na#aw pala.J

E H" instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendors. However the provincialfiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seiBed items of the vendors.

/E $he vendors, &ruB et al., then filed an action for sum of money against H".0E H" contend that they should not be made liable for damages since they did not commit the act of the

seiBure.GE $he trial court ruled in favor of the vendors. $he &A affirmed the ruling of the 4$&. Hence the case ofpetition for certiorari.

Issue: Ffocusing on tortsE

+E (on H" is liable for damages in the unwarranted search even if it did not effect the seiBure of thesubject merchandise.

Held:

Des the '& affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. H" is liable. (hile undoubtedly, the members ofthe "& raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents%constitutional rights, still, the omission will not e?culpate petitioners.

4atio:

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damagesto private respondents. "etitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondentsagainst unreasonable search and seiBure. =irstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the

emorandum Agreement to underta#e the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. ++ Ascorrectly observed by respondent court:

Indeed, the acts committed by the "& soldiers of unlawfully seiBing appellees% Frespondents%Emerchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees FrespondentsE were fothe protection and benefit of appellant FpetitionerE corporation. 'uch being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fairto infer from those acts that it was upon appellant FpetitionerE corporation%s instance that the "& soldiersconducted the raid and effected the illegal seiBure. $hese circumstances should answer the trial court%s query

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) posed in its decision now under consideration ) as to why the "& soldiers immediately turned over theseiBed merchandise to appellant FpetitionerE corporation. +6

$he raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. 5arry de uBman did not lift afinger to stop the seiBure of the boy and girl scouts items. !y standing by and apparently assenting thereto, hewas liable to the same e?tent as the officers themselves. +- 'o with the petitioner corporation which evenreceived for safe#eeping the goods unreasonably seiBed by the "& raiding team and de uBman, and refusedto surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

3otes:

(hile undoubtedly, the members of the "& raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents% constitutional rights, still, the omission will not e?culpate petitioners.

In the case of 5im vs. "once de 5eon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutionalrights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

Art. -6. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall beliable to the latter for damages.

??? ??? ???

F E $he rights to be secure in one%s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches andseiBures.

??? ??? ???

$he indemnity shall include moral damages. >?emplary damages may also be adjudged.

Art. 66+ . oral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

??? ??? ???

F/E Illegal searchC

F+E Acts and actions referred to in Articles 6+, 6/, 60, 6G, 6 , -2, -6, -7, and - .

"ursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired isentitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,e?emplary damages may also be awarded.

??? ??? ???

$he very nature of Article -6 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that thereshould be malice or bad faith. $o ma#e such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article -6 which isthe effective protection of individual rights. "ublic officials in the past have abused their powers on the prete?tof justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. "recisely, the object of the Article is to putan end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the nited 'tates this remedy is in the nature of a tort.Femphasis suppliedE

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In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, +2 the &ourt >n !anc e?plained the liability of persons indirectlyresponsible,viB:

L$Mhe decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article -6. $he law spea#s of an officeror employee or person

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139 0ARCIA s. C!URT !F A"" ALS12; SCRA 193

=A&$':

8n @ecember 6-, + /, in the municipality of 5ubao, "ampanga, a passenger bus owned and operated byprivate respondent Victory 5iner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent =elarde "aje, collidedwith a jeep driven by &lemente arcia, resulting in the latterKs death and in physical injuries to hereinpetitioners, >dgar arcia and 4enato Dap. $hereupon, information for homicide and serious physical injuriesthru rec#less imprudence was filed against =elarde "aje.

8n 9anuary 6-, + 0, an action for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents, alleging thatthe mishap was due to the rec#less imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.

(hile the civil case for damages was in progress, the criminal action proceeded. $he accused =elarde "ajewas convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the &ourt of Appeals, he was acquitted and theconclusion is that N&4I I3A5 3> 5I >3&> is (A3$I3 in this case, and that appellant was 38$ even

I5$D of &IVI5 3> 5I >3&>. Insofar as the appellant is concerned, it was a case of " 4> A&&I@>3$.J As a consequence, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the civil case for damages against theminvo#ing the decision of the &ourt of Appeals in the criminal case F&orpus vs. "ajeE. $he trial court dismissedthe civil case for damages. 8n appeal the &ourt of Appeals, the decision of the trial court dismissing the civilcase was affirmed.

"etitioners averred that the civil action they filed was one of the nature of an Independent &ivil Actionsprovided under 'ection 6, 4ule +++ of the 4ules of &ourt, and therefore, such action should proceedindependently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

I'' >:

Is there a valid independent civil action for damages based on physical injuries in this case*4 5I3 :

N!. 'ection 6 of 4ule +++ merely refers to the institution of independent civil action without waiting for the filingor termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper. However,acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not e?ist, bars the filing of anindependent civil action if it is based on the crime.

As held in the prior criminal case F&orpus vs. "ajeE, rec#less imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article -- of the &ivil &ode. $he injuries suffered by herein petitioners werealleged to be the result of criminal negligenceC they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civi

action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.$he charge against =elarde "aje was not for homicide or physical injuries but for rec#less imprudence resultingto homicide Fdeath of &lemente ariciaE and physical injuries suffered by petitioners. $hey are not one of thethree crimes mentioned in Article -- of the &ivil &odeC therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently ofthe criminal prosecution.

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14; 0#%):

1 In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and

distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. 'uch civil action shall proceedindependently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.1 $he term

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conducive to civic spirit and to individual self1reliance and initiative to habituate the citiBens tdepend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. I( is (r*) (5#( i$

#$ o (5) '#s)s r) )rr)% (o i$ (5) pro isio$ 'i()%, # 'ri i$#l pros)'*(io$ is prop)r, *(i( s5o*l% ) r) ) )r)% (5#( +5il) (5) S(#() is (5) 'o pl#i$#$( i$ (5) 'ri i$#l '#s), (5)i$

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141 Ar# il)s s "5il o*r$#lis(s

G.R. No. 1=;2=6 0#r'5 2=, 2;;4

&!CTRIN

$here is no malicious sensationaliBation of facts in a published article when the sources come from an officialpublic document, such as police blotter, and from the interview made with the victim.

FACTS

O "etitioner &atalino Arafiles see#s a review of the &A decision which dismissed his complaint for damagesagainst respondents publisher "hilippine 9ournalists Inc, anuel Villareal 9r, editor a? !uan 9r and reporter 4omy orales.

O 4espondent orales wrote a report that appeared on "eopleKs 9ournal $onight, which related how >melita@espuig, an employee of the 3ational Institute of Atmospheric 'ciences F3AI'E of "A 1A'A, lodged a

complaint against petitioner, a 3AI' director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction withattempted rape and the supposed details of the rape.

O About a year after the report was published, Arafiles instituted the complaint for damages, alleging that onaccount of the grossly malicious and overly sensationaliBed reporting in the news itemJ, his reputation as adirector of 3AI' was injured, that he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted asa se?1craBed stal#er and serial rapist and that the news deferred his promotion.

O In their Answer, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the &omplaint, they alleging that the news itemhaving been sourced from the "olice !lotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a personalinterview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional provision of freedom o

the press . . . . ,J and by way of &ompulsory &ounterclaim, they prayed for the award of moral and e?emplarydamages plus attorneyKs fees.

O $he PueBon &ity 4$& ruled in favor of petitioner, but was later on reversed by &A, claiming that the petitionewas not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that Fherein respondentsE were motivated by a sinister

intent to cause harm and injury to Fherein petitionerE.J

ISSU

O (hether or not the &A erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice tothus free respondents of liability for damages

H!L&ING > RATI! & CI& N&I 3o. In actions for damages for libel, it is a?iomatic that the published wor# alleged to contain libelous

material must be e?amined and viewed as a whole. In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be considered,

each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication ? ? ? $he headlines of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.

$he presentation of the news item subject of petitionerKs complaint may have been in a sensationalmanner, but it is not per se illegal.

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4espondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline andfirst seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the 3IA' actuallycommitted the crimes complained of by >melita. $he succeeding paragraphs Fin which petitioner andcomplainant >melita were eventually identifiedE sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the

narration of events was only an account of what >melita had reported at the police headquarters.

>very citiBen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider thatthe respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. $he newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them tocourageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and LeditorsM usually have to race with their deadlinesC and consistently withgood faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mista#es or imperfection in the choice of words.

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+76.Amonoy vs utierreB

$opic: Intentional tortCabuse of right

=acts

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:

(;3 the &ourt of Appeals was correct was correct in deciding that the petition LwasM liable to the respondentsfor damages.&I@>3@I

"etitioner invo#es this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondentsK house.He maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the (rit of @emolition ordered by the 4$&.

&learly then, the demolition of respondents% house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the $48, was not onlyan abuse but also an unlawful e?ercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this&ourt%s 8rder and wittingly caused the destruction of respondentsC house.

8bviously, petitioner cannot invo#e damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid e?ercise of aright.+7 Anything less or beyond such e?ercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle

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accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, muchless abated.

@amnum absque injuria may not be invo#ed by a person who claims to e?ercise a right but does so in anabusive manner violative of Article + of the &ivil &ode. Indeed, in the availment of oneKs rights, one must

@amnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.$rue, petitioner commenced the demolition ofrespondentsK house on ay -2, + G/ under the authority of a (rit of @emolition issued by the 4$&. !ut therecords show that a $emporary 4estraining 8rder F$48E, enjoining the demolition of respondentsK house, wasissued by the 'upreme &ourt on 9une 6, + G/. $he &A also found, based on the &ertificate of 'ervice of the'upreme &ourt process server, that a copy of the $48 was served on petitioner himself on 9une 7, + G/.

"etitioner, however, did not heed the $48 of this &ourt. (e agree with the &A that he unlawfully pursued thedemolition of respondentsK house well until the middle of + G0. Although the acts of petitioner may have beenlegally justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the $48 amounted to an insidious abuseof his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing thedemolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the 4$&. Verily, hisacts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid e?ercise of a right that had been suspended whenhe received the $48 from this &ourt on 9une 7, + G/. !y then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with thedemolition.

A commentator on this topic e?plains:

$he e?ercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to theprejudice of others. $he mas# of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to themodern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person e?ercises a right when he unnecessarilyprejudices another ? ? ?. 8ver and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of

justice ? ? ?C and he who violates them violates the law. =or this reason, it is not permissible to abuse ourrights to prejudice others.J

Article + , #nown to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certainstandards which may be observed not only in the e?ercise of oneKs rights but also in the performance of oneKsduties. $hese standards are the following: to act with justiceC to give everyone his dueC and to observehonesty and good faith. $he law, therefore, recogniBes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in theire?ercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article + must be observed. A right, though by itself legalbecause recogniBed or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. (hena right is e?ercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in Article + and results indamage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsibleJ

In the ultimate analysis, petitioner%s liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to ma#e whole thedamage caused to another by reason of one%s act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently andwhether or not punishable by law

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143 AL0ARI! T. SALTA s "HILI""IN NATI!NAL ?AN

FACTS

"etitioner was an employee of the "3! assigned as anager of the alolosK branch. As such, his duty was,

among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to e?ercise care and prudence,and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the ban#.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent ban#, petitioner indiscriminatelygranted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by "3!, in manner characteriBed by negligence, fraudand manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. $his is how therespondent ban# found petitioner to have discharged his duties as branch manager of the ban#, and so it fileda civil action in the &=I of anila F&ivil &ase 3o. 0 G-, !ranch RIVE on April 66, + 02, and another case F&i&ase 3o. GG-7-, !ranch VIIE on 'eptember 6-, + 06, to recover losses the ban# suffered. At the same timethe ban# caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case with the &ircuit &riminal &ourt of the =ifth9udicial @istrict at 'an =ernando, "ampanga, &riminal &ase 3o. &&&1V1//G, for violation of the Anti1 raft and&orrupt "ractices Act.

In the criminal case, the &ourt, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the prosecution has rested,granted the motion providing as follows: accused A5 A4I8 $. 'A5$A A&P I$$>@ of the offense charged inthe Information the prosecution having to prove the essential ingredience and;or elements of the crimecharged, with costs de oficio.$I$I83>4':

Insisted that quasi1delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentionaland voluntary, citing Andamo v. IA&, thus, $orBuela%s act of shooting 3apoleon @ulay constitutes quasi1delict actionable under Article 6+0/ of the 3ew &ivil &ode.

$hat under Article 6+G2 of the 3ew &ivil &ode, private respondents are primarily liable for theinegligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. $his liability is independent of theemployee%s own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability un

Article +2- of the 4evised "enal &ode. $he civil action against the employer may therefore proceedindependently of the criminal action pursuant to 4ule +++ 'ection - of the 4ules of &ourt. "etitionerssubmit that the question of whether $orBuela is an employee of respondent ' ">4 A4@ or 'A=> A4@ would be better resolved after trial.

$hat $orBuela%s act of shooting @ulay is also actionable under Article -- of the 3ew &ivil &ode, to wit:o Art. 33. In cases o+ de+a ation, +raud, and physical injuri s , a civil action +or da a5es,

entirel$ separate and distinct +ro t e cri inal action, a$ be brou5 t b$ t e in%ured part$. Succivil action s all proceed independentl$ o+ t e cri inal prosecution, and s all require onl$ a

preponderance o+ evidence.

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$he term 3$':

'ince the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles6++/ and 6+00 of the 3ew &ivil &ode.

T5) 'i il #'(io$ 'o$() pl#()% i$ Ar(i'l) 2177 is $o( #ppli'# l) (o #'(s 'o i(()% +i(5 %)li )r#()i$()$(, *( o$l #ppli)s (o :*#si-o )$s)s *$%)r Ar(i'l) 36= o (5) R) is)% ")$#l Co%).

$orBuela%s act of shooting Atty. @ulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done withdeliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security guard.

And since Article 6+G2 of the 3ew &ivil &ode covers only: acts done within the scope of the employee%assigned tas#s, the private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.

ISSU (o3 a civil action based on Article -- lies.

H L& S.$he term

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;@; P il. A P il. =9 F;=?? C . I( is $o( (5) 'ri ) o p5 si'#l i$

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CAS N!. 148 G.R. No. L-7817 !'(o )r 31, 19=6

ALFR &! 0. V LA ! , in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent &8 >4&IA5 AI4 5I3>', I3&. F&A5IE, plainti++-appellant , vs 'H>55 &8 "A3D 8= $H> "HI5I""I3> I'5A3@', 5$@., de+endant-appellee , D>U H A$4A@I3 &84"84A$I83, "A 5 'D&I" and A!A'A Q &8., intervenors .

T!"IC : Intentional $orts: Abuse of 4ights

FACTS

&ommercial Airlines Inc. F&A5IE is a domestic corporation engaged in air transportation businesses. 'ince thestart of &A5IKs operation, its fuel needs were all supplied by 'hell &ompany, herein defendant.

"rior to + 7G, &A5I owed "+02# Fabout 0 #E to 'hell &ompany. 'hell had reasons to believe that thefinancial conditions of &A5I was far from being satisfactory. In fact, &A5I offered its &1 7 plane as payment 'hell &ompany Fthe plane was in &aliforniaE but 'hell at that time declined as it thought &A5I had sufficientmoney to pay its debt.

In + 7G however, &A5I was going ban#rupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In thameeting, &A5IKs secretary informed the creditors that &A5I was in a state of insolvency and had to stopoperations.

$he creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a wor#ing committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. $hey also agreed not to file suit against &A5I but &A5I didreserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.

'hell &ompany was represented by r. =itBgerald to the three man wor#ing committee. 5ater, the wor#ingcommittee convened to discuss how &A5IKs asset should be divided amongst the creditors.

!ut while such was pending, =itBgerald sent a telegraph message to 'hell 'A advising the latter that 'hell"hilippines is assigning its credit to 'hell 'A in the amount of 0 #, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of &A5I to 'hell "hilippines. 'hell 'A got wind of the fact that &A5I has a &1 7plane is &alifornia and so 'hell 'A petitioned before a &alifornia court to have the plane be the subject of awrit of attachment which was granted.

eanwhile, the stoc#holders of &A5I were unaware of the assignment of credit made by 'hell "hilippines to'hell 'A and they went on to approve the sale of &A5IKs asset to the "hilippine Airlines. In 'eptember + 7G,the other creditors learned of the assignment made by 'hell.

$his prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against &A5IKs assets. &A5I thenfiled for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the "hilippines from being attached. Alfredo VelayoKsappointment as &A5IKs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding.

In order for Velayo to recover the &1 7 plane in &alifornia, it filed for a writ of injunction against 'he"hilippines in order for the latter to restrain 'hell 'A from proceeding with the attachment and in thealternative that judgment be awarded in favor of &A5I for damages double the amount of the &1 7 plane.

$he &1 7 plane was not recovered. 'hell &ompany argued it is not liable for damages because there isnothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSU (hether or not 'hell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

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H L& Des. $he basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article + , 6+, and 6- of the &ivil &ode whichstates:

H"rt ;=. "n$ person ust, in t e exercise o+ is ri5 ts and in t e per+or ances o+ is duties,act wit %ustice, 5ive ever$one is due and observe onest$ and 5ood +ait .

H"rt. @;. "n$ person w o will+ull$ causes loss or in%ur$ to anot er in a anner t at is contrar$ to

orals, 5ood custo s or public polic$ s all co pensate t e latter +or t e da a5e .

"rt. @

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L+7 M SAU&I ARA?IAN AIRLIN S, p)(i(io$)r, s. C!URT !F A"" ALS, 0ILAGR!S ". 0!RA&A #$%H!N. R!&!LF! A. !RTI , i$ 5is '#p#'i( #s "r)si%i$ *% ) o ?r#$'5 89, R) io$#l Tri#l Co*r( o

*)Do$ Ci( , r)spo$%)$(s..4. 3o. +66+ +. 8ctober G, + G

T!"IC Abuse of 4ights

&!CTRIN An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a testJ or connecting factorJ or point ofcontactJ. &hoice1of1law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship Fsuch as property right, contract claimand a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res , the place of celebration, the place ofperformance, or the place of wrongdoing...&onsidering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factorJ or point ofcontactJ could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.

FACTS

"laintiff orada wor#ed as a =light Attendant for defendant 'audi Arabian Airlines F'A @IAE which isbased in 9eddah, 'audi Arabia. April 60, + 2 1 (hile on a lay1over in 9a#arta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow

crew members $hamer Al1 aBBawi and Allah Al1 aBBawi, both 'audi nationals. !ecause it was almostmorning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have brea#fast together at the room of$hamer. (hen they were in the room, Allah left on some prete?t. 'hortly after he did, $hamerattempted to rape plaintiff. =ortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries forhelp and rescued her. 5ater, the Indonesian police came and arrested $hamer and Allah Al1 aBBawi,the latter as an accomplice.

9anuary +7, + 6 1 9ust when plaintiff thought that the 9a#arta incident was already behind her, hersuperiors requested her to see r. Ali eniewy, &hief 5egal 8fficer of 'A @IA, in 9eddah, 'audi

Arabia. (hen she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police too# her passport andquestioned her about the 9a#arta incident. iniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her toma#e a statement dropping the case against $hamer and Allah. 3ot until she agreed to do so did thepolice return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of 9eddah.

8ne year and a half later or on 9une +/, + -, in 4iyadh, 'audi Arabia, a few minutes before thedeparture of her flight to anila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to ta#ea later flight to 9eddah to see r. iniewy, the &hief 5egal 8fficer of 'A @IA. (hen she did, a certainUhalid of the 'A @IA office brought her to a 'audi court where she was as#ed to sign a documentwritten in Arabic. $hey told her that this was necessary to close the case against $hamer and Allah. Asit turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on 9une 60, + -. "laintiff thenreturned to anila.

'hortly afterwards, defendant 'A @IA summoned plaintiff to report to 9eddah once again and seeiniewy on 9une 60, + - for further investigation. "laintiff did so after receiving assurance from

'A @IA%s anila manager, Aslam 'aleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed nodanger to her.

9une 60, + - 1 In 9eddah, a 'A @IA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same 'audi court. 3othinghappened then but on the following day, 9une 6G, + -, a 'audi judge interrogated plaintiff through aninterpreter about the 9a#arta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,however, just as her plane was about to ta#e off, a 'A @IA officer told her that the airline had forbiddenher to ta#e flight. At the Inflight 'ervice 8ffice where she was told to go, the secretary of r. Dahya'addic# too# away her passport and told her to remain in 9eddah, at the crew quarters, until furtherorders.

9uly -, + - 1 A 'A @IA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to herastonishment and shoc#, rendered a decision, translated to her in >nglish, sentencing her to five

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months imprisonment and to 6G/ lashes. 8nly then did she realiBe that the 'audi court had tried her,together with $hamer and Allah, for what happened in 9a#arta. $he court found plaintiff guilty of F+EadulteryC F6E going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic lawsC and F-EsocialiBing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

=acing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner 'A @IA.nfortunately, she was denied any assistance.

!ecause she was wrongfully convicted, the "rince of a##ah dismissed the case against her andallowed her to leave 'audi Arabia. 'hortly before her return to anila, she was terminated from theservice by 'A @IA, without her being informed of the cause.

8n 3ovember 6-, + -, orada filed a &omplaint for damages against 'A @IA, and Uhaled Al1!alawiF

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$here is li#ewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing overJ or turning overJ of thperson of private respondent to 9eddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its duties asemployer. "etitionerKs purported act contributed to and amplified or even pro?imately caused additionalhumiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. "etitioner thereby allegedly facilitated thearrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise of petitionerKs authority asemployer, ta#ing advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedlyfound by the "rince of a##ah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent waswrongful. !ut these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done,once duly proven.

&onsidering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factorJ or poiof contactJ could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. Andapplying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the "hilippines could be said as a situs of thetort Fthe place where the alleged tortious conduct too# placeE. $his is because it is in the "hilippineswhere petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a =ilipina residing and wor#ing here. Accordingto her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the e?ercise of its rights and in theperformance of its duties, act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and goodfaith.J Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. $hat certain acts or parts of the injuryallegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. =or in our view what is important here is theplace where the over1all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, socialstanding and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below Fherein privaterespondentE. All told, it is not without basis to identify the "hilippines as the situs of the alleged tort.

L$Mo determine the 'tate which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to beta#en into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particularissue: FaE the place where the injury occurredC FbE the place where the conduct causing the injuryoccurredC FcE the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of theparties, and FdE the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over1all injury occurred and lodged in the"hilippines. $here is li#ewise no question that private respondent is a resident =ilipina national,wor#ing with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. $hus, the relationshipJ between the parties was centered here, although it should bestressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. =rom the record, the claim that the"hilippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondentas plaintiff below against defendant Fherein petitionerE, in our view, has been properly established.

"rescinding from this premise that the "hilippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and the placehaving the most interest in the problemJ, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the "hilippine law on

tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arisingout of this case

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1=; GL!? 0AC A s. CA58!> A&UAD &A!5> A3@ 4A@I8 &84"., and H>4!>$ H>3@4D vs.

&8 4$ 8= A"">A5' and 4>'$I$ $8 $8!IA'.4. 3o. G+6/6, August 6 , + G

&!CTRIN S Article + of the &ivil &ode contains the principle of abuse of rights which sets certain standards which must beobserved not only in the e?ercise of oneKs right but also in the performance of oneKs duties.(hile Art. + lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, the remedies for its violations may be found in Arts. 62 and 6+ of the &ivil &ode.

FACTS$obias was employed by lobe ac#ay in a dual capacity as a purchasing and administrative assistant

to the engineering operations manager. In + 06, 58!> A&UAD discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to $obias, it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on 3ovember +2 to his immediate superior =erraren and to Hendry who was then the >V" and of lobe ac#ay. $hefollowing day, Hendry confronted $obias and told him that he was the primary suspect and ordered him to ta#ea + wee# forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open and to leave theoffice #eys.

(hen he returned to wor#, Hendry called him a croo#J and swindlerJ. $obias was ordered to ta#e a liedetector test and submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for e?amination by policeinvestigators.

8n @ecember /, + 06, the police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report and cleared $obiasof participation in the anomalies. nsatisfied with the results, Hendry hired retired &ol. =ernandeB, a privateinvestigator, who found $obias guilty. $his report stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.3evertheless, on @ecember +6, + 06, Hendry issued a memorandum suspending $obias from wor#preparatory to filing of criminal charges against him. 5t. $agle reiterating the results of the first report made asecond laboratory crime report.

3otwithstanding the reports, lobe ac#ay and Hendry filed a complaint for estafa through falsificationof commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. "etitioners also filed five more complaints of estafathrough falsification of commercial documents and a complaint for Art. 6 2 of the 4"& Fdiscovering secretsthrough seiBure of correspondenceE. All of these complaints were dismissed by the fiscalKs office. $he appeal tothe 'ecretary of 9ustice resulted in the same result as that of the fiscalKs office Y complaints dismissed.

In the meantime, $obias received a notice that his employment has been terminated effective@ecember +-, + 06. $obias filed a compliant for illegal dismissal. $he 5abor Arbiter dismissed the complaint

but the 354& reversed the decision of the former. However, the 5abor 'ecretary, upon petitionerKs appeal,reinstated the 5AKs decision. (hile $obias appealed the case to the 8ffice of the "resident, $obias and lobeac#ay entered into a compromise agreement in settlement of the illegal dismissal case.

(hen $obias sought employment with the 4epublic $elephone &ompany F4>$>5&8E, Hendry, withoutbeing as#ed by 4>$>5&8, wrote a letter to the latter stating that $obias was dismissed by lobe ac#ay dueto dishonesty. $obias filed a civil case for damages based on allegd unlawful, malicious, oppressive, andabusive acts of petitioners.

4$& Y petitioners liableC pay G2# Y actualC 622# Y moralC 62# Y e?emplary damagesC -2# Y attorneyKs fees&A Y affirmed 4$& decision in toto.

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ISSU : (83 petitioners are liable for damages to $obias.

H L&: D>'.RATI! :

Art. + . >very person must, in the e?ercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.$his article, #nown to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certainstandards which must be observed not only in the e?ercise of one%s rights but also in the performance of one%sduties. $hese standards are the following: to act with justiceC to give everyone his dueC and to observe honestyand good faith. $he law, therefore, recogniBes a primordial limitation on all rightsC that in their e?ercise, thenorms of human conduct set forth in Article + must be observed. A right, though by itself legal becauserecogniBed or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. (hen a right ise?ercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article + and results in damage toanother, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. !ut while

Article + lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of socialorder, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. enerally, an action for damages under either Article 62 or

Article 6+ would be proper. Article 62, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

"rt. @E. )ver$ person w o contrar$ to law, wil+ull$ or ne5li5entl$ causes da a5e toanot er, s all inde ni+$ t e latter +or t e sa e .

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they weremerely e?ercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. $his does not, however, leave privaterespondent with no relief because Article 6+ of the &ivil &ode provides that:

"rt. @;. "n$ person w o wil+ull$ causes loss or in%ur$ to anot er in a anner t at iscontrar$ to orals, 5ood custo s or public polic$ s all co pensate t e latter +or t eda a5e.

$his article, adopted to remedy the

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=ilipinos as well as Hendry%s earlier statements about $obias being a 5&8 sometime in 8ctober + 07, stating that $obias had been dismissed by 58!> A&UAD due to dishonesty. !ecause of the letter,$obias failed to gain employment with 4>$>5&8 and as a result of which, $obias remained unemployed for alonger period of time. =or this further damage suffered by $obias, petitioners must li#ewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 6+0/ of the &ivil &ode.

=inally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of si? criminal complaints against $obias. $o constitutemalicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to ve? and humiliatea person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant #nowing that the charges were false andgroundless. &oncededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution.$he mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith. Inthe instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminalcomplaints against $obias.

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1=1/ AL? NS!N s. C!URT !F A"" ALSTopi' I$()$(io$#l Tor( A *s) o Ri 5(s&o'(ri$) l) )$(s o A *s) o Ri 5( there is a legal right or dutyC e?ercised in bad faithC for the sole intenof prejudicing or injuring another

FACTS Albenson >nt. delivered mild steel plates to uaranteed Industries Inc. A "acific !an#ing &orporation &hec#was paid and drawn against the account of >5 (oodwor#s. &hec# was later dishonored for the reason

Account &losed.J &ompany traced source of chec# and later discovered that the signature belonged to one>ugenio !altao.

Albenson made an e?trajudical demand upon !altao but latter denied that he issued the chec# or that thesignature was his. He further alleged that uaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not havetransacted business with Albenson.

&ompany filed a complaint against !altao for violation of !" 66. It was later discovered that private respondenthad son: >ugene !altao III, who manages the business establishment, >5 (oodwor#s. 3o effort from thefather to inform Albenson of such information. Instead, the father filed complaint for damages against Albensonbecause of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for allegedly issuing a chec# which bouncedin violation of !atas "ambansa !ilang 66 for a measly amount of "6, 0 .22 with the 4$&.

4$& ruled in favor of !altao, in its decision the lower court observed that & records showed that president to uaranteed was >ugene !altao F>!E !an# said signature belonged to >! >! did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact - >bs, 9r., 'r. and the III.

$here was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that: the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to ve? and humiliate a person and that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant #nowing that his charges were false and

groundless

>lements of abuse of right under Article + :

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+. there is a legal right or duty6. e?ercised in bad faith-. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

>lements under Article 6+: contra bonus mores:+. there is an act which is legal

6. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy-. it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally see# ways to compel the debtor to payhim. It was normal for petitioners to find means to ma#e the issuer of the chec# pay the amount thereof. In theabsence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that theadverse result of an action does not per se ma#e the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

(H>4>=84>, the petition is 4A3$>@ and the decision of the &ourt of Appeals in &.A. .4. &.V. 3o. +7 7Gdated ay +-, + G , is hereby 4>V>4'>@ and '>$ A'I@>. &osts against respondent !altao.

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1=2 S RGI! A0!N! !s. Spo*s)s !S GUTI RR #$% ANG LA F!RNIL&AG.R. No. 14;42;. F) r*#r 1= , 2;;1/ "ANGANI?AN, " . T!"IC Intentional $ort 1 Abuse of 4ights

&!CTRIN nder the principle of Da nu absque in%uria , the legitimate e?ercise of a personKs rights, evenif it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury. $he law does not prescribe aremedy for the loss. $his principle does not, however, apply when there is an abuse of a personKs right, orwhen the e?ercise of this right is suspended or e?tinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availmentof oneKs rights, one must act with justice, give others their due, and observe honesty and good faith.

FACTS A 838D was the counsel of =rancisca &atolos, Agnes &atolos, Asuncion "A'A !A and Alfonso=84 I5@A in 'pecial "roceedings 3o. -+2- of the &=I of "asig, involving the settlement of the estate of 9ulio&antolos, involving / parcels of land in $anay 4iBal. After the "roject of "artition was approved, 6 of the lotswere adjudicated to "A'A !A and =84 I5@A, but they in turn mortgaged these two lots to A A838D tosecure payment of attorneys fees he was charging them, which was in th amount of "60./#

"A'A !A died in =eb + / and =843I5@A followed suit in 9uly + / . Herein respondent A3 >5A, wife of9ose utierreB, was among the heirs of Alfonso =843I5@A.

In 9anuary + 02, A 838D filed at the &=I of "asig, to foreclose on the two lots because he was not paid hisattorneyKs fees. $he heirs opposed, contending that the fees that A 838D charged were unconscionable, asthe agreed sum was only "++,/ . 6. $he &=I however rendered judgment in favor of A 838D in 'ept.+ 06, requiring the heirs to pay within 2 days the "60./#, secured by the mortgage, "++,GG2 as value of theharvests, and " ,/7 .22 as another round of attorneyKs fees. $he heirs failed to pay, so the two lots wereforeclosed and sold at a public auction, wherein A 838D was the highest bidder, at "6-,0/2.22. A 838Dclaimed for deficiency, and to satisfy it, another e?ecution sale was conducted, with him again being the

highest bidder at "+6,+-0. 2. Included in the lots sold was the lot where the house of $I>44>T '"8 '>'FAngela and 9oseE had their house.

A year after the decision was rendered, $I>44>T spouses filed before the &=I for the annulment thereof,but it was dismissed. 'uch dismissal was affirmed by the &A. $he &=I then issued a (rit of "ossession, andpursuant to which, a notice to vacate was made. 8n motion by A 838D, a demolition order was issued on thestructures in the sold lots, including the houses of the $I>44>T '"8 '>'.

"etition was filed at the '&, and a $48 was granted, enjoining the demolition in 9une KG/. In 8ctober KGG, $48was made permanent. However, by the time the '& decision was promulgated, the house had already beendestroyed in accordance with a (rit of @emolition ordered by the lower court. And so, '"8 '>' $I>44>Tfiled a &omplaint for damages in connection with the destruction of their house filed at the 4$& in @ecKG . 4$&dismissed the suit. 8n appeal at the &A, 4$&Ks decision was set aside, and A 838D was ordered to pay'"8 '>' $I>44>T "6 2# as actua damages. A 838D filed 4, but was denied. Hence, this recourseto the '&.

A0!N! C!NT N&S He is not liable for the demolition, because he was merely acting in accordance withthe (rit of @emolition ordered by the 4$&.

ISSU (hether &A was correct in deciding that A 838D was liable to '"8 '>' $I>44>T fordamages.

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H L& D>', because there was abuse of right on the part of A 838D, when he wittingly caused thedemolition of the $I>44>T '"8 '>'K house, despite his receipt of the $48.

RATI!

1. Da nu absque in%uria finds no application to this case. (ell1settled is the ma?im that damageresulting from the legitimate e?ercise of a personKs rights is a loss without injury 11 da nu absquein%uria11 for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, one who merely e?ercises oneKs rightdoes no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages.

2. Tr*), p)(i(io$)r 'o )$')% (5) %) oli(io$ of respondentsK house on ay -2, + G/ *$%)r (5)#*(5ori( o # ri( o &) oli(io$ i ssued by the 4$&. ?*( (5) r)'or%s s5o+ (5#( # T) por#rR)s(r#i$i$ !r%)r JTR!K, enjoining the demolition of respondentsK house, +#s iss*)% (5)S*pr) ) Co*r( on 9une 6, + G/. $he &A also found, based on the &ertificate of 'ervice of the'upreme &ourt process server, (5#( # 'op o (5) TR! +#s s)r )% o$ p)(i(io$)r 5i s)l o$ *$) 4,1986.

3. ")(i(io$)r, 5o+) )r, %i% $o( 5))% (5) TR! o (5is Co*r t. (e agree with the &A that he unlawfullypursued the demolition of respondentsK house well until the middle of + G0. $his is clear from4espondent Angela utierreBKs testimony. $he appellate court quoted the following pertinent portionthereof:

Although the acts of petitioner may have been l) #ll

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be obscured, much less abated.

8. In the ultimate analysis, petitionerKs liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to ma#e whole thedamage caused to another by reason of oneKs act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligentlyand whether or not punishable by law.

H R F!R , the "etition is D)*I)D and the appealed @ecision "44I'&)D. &osts against petitioner.

S! !R& R &.&elo, B! air anC, 0itu5, Gonza5a-'e$es, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, 66., concur.

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1=3 U . #%)r F) r*#r 17, 2;;;

&o'(ri$)

A!'>3&> 8= 88@ =AI$H '$ !> ' ==I&I>3$5D >'$A!5I'H>@ =84 A ' &&>''= 5

"48'>& $I83 !D $H> A 4I>V>@ "A4$D I3 A ' I$ =84 A! '> 8= 4I H$ 3@>4 A4$I&5> + .FACTS

9ader was a law student at the niversity of the >ast. He failed to ta#e the regular e?am for "ractice &ourt I sohe was given an incomplete grade. He too# the removals but he was given a grade of five. 9ader attended thegraduation and prepared for the bar. He later learned of his deficiency. 9ader sued > for damages. >Ksdefense was that 9ader should have verified grade[

ISSU (83 > was liable for damages.

H L& D>'

> had the contractual obligation to inform its students as to whether or not all the requirements for theconferment of a degree have been met. It also showed bad faith in belatedly informing 9ader of the result of hisremovals, particularly when he was already preparing for the bar.

A!'>3&> 8= 88@ =AI$H '$ !> ' ==I&I>3$5D >'$A!5I'H>@ =84 A ' &&>''= 5"48'>& $I83 !D $H> A 4I>V>@ "A4$D I3 A ' I$ =84 A! '> 8= 4I H$ 3@>4 A4$I&5> + .

ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from ta#ing undue advantage of another, even though theforms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.

8n Art. + :1intended to e?pand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moralwrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.

1the ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civiliBed society 1A persshould be protected only when he acts with providence and in =, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse

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1=4 >'$>4IA =. GARCIAN! , petitioner, vs. $H> H83. C!URT !F A"" ALS

.4. 3o. /+6/ August +2, + 6

$opic: Intentional $ortsC Abuse of 4ights

@octrine: 5iability for damages under Articles + , 62 and 6+ of the &ivil &ode arises only from*$l#+ *l, +ill *or $) li )$( #'(s that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

FACTS "etitioner >steria arciano was hired to teach in the Immaculate &oncepcion Institute in the Island of &amotes. In + G6, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was ta#ing her to Austria where her daughter was employed. $he application approved by the"resident of the school%s !oard of @irectors.

A letter was sent to petitioner through her husband, 'otero arciano Ffor she was still abroadE, informing her of

the decision of =r. 9oseph (iertB, the school%s founder, concurred in by the president of the "$A and the schoolfaculty, to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: F+E the absence of any writtencontract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign oneC and F6E the difficulty ofgetting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract.

pon her return from Austria she made inquiries from the school about the matter. $hen the members of the!oard of @irectors of the school, with the e?ception of =r. (iertB, signed a letter notifying her that she wasreinstated.

$he president, vice president, secretary, and - members of the !oard of @irectors, resigned their positionsfrom the !oard for the reason that the I&I =aculty, has reacted acidly to the !oard%s deliberations for the

reinstatement of rs. >steria =. arciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the !oard%s decision."etitioner filed a complaint for damages against =r. (iertB, >merito 5abajo, and some members of the facultyof the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. $he 4$& ruled in favor of arciano but onappeal, the &A reversed the 4$&Ks decision. $he &A dismissed the complaint and ruled that the defendantswere absolved from liability.

ISSU (83 the &A gravely erred in absolving the private respondents from liability by faulting the petitionefor her failure to report bac# to her wor#

H L& 3o. 4espondents are 38$ liable for damages. $hat the school principal and =r. (iertB disagreed withthe !oard%s decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, didnot ma#e them liable to her for damages.

RATI! $he board of directors of the Immaculate &oncepcion Institute, which alone possesses the authority tohire and fire teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the petitioner. It in fact directed her toreport for wor#. (hile the private respondents sent her a letter of termination through her husband, theyadmittedly had no authority to do so. As the &ourt of Appeals aptly observed:

(e agree with defendants1appellants, however, (5#( (5) s5o*l% $o( 5# ) ))$ 5)l% li# l) (o pl#i$(i -#pp)ll)) or %# # )s. @efendants1appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff1appellee and the latter wasaware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to her through her husband by defendants1appellants had

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no legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from reporting for wor#. (hat is more, it wassubsequently repudiated by the !oard of @irectors which directed her to report for wor#. $here was, therefore,no reason why she did not continue with her teaching in the school. 3o evidence had been presented to showthat defendants1appellants prevented her from reporting for wor#. $he fact that defendants1appellants hadvery person must, in the e?ercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 62. >very person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shallindemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 6+.Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

$he &ourt of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner%s discontinuance from teaching was her own choice(hile the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically preventher from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school%s !oard of @irectors. $hat the school principal and =r.(iertB disagreed with the !oard%s decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign enmasse, even if true, did not ma#e them liable to her for damages. $hey were simply e?ercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the !oard%s decision. $heir acts were not contrary to law, morals, goodcustoms or public policy. $hey did not

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1== ?#ro$s 0#rE)(i$ s. CA

@octrine: $est of Abuse of 4ight. Y odern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful,are anti1social. $here is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is e?ercised for the only purpose of prejudicingor injuring another. (hen the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under theguise of e?ercising a right. $he principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose causedamage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and

just. Hence, every abnormal e?ercise of a right, contrary to its socio1economic purpose, is an abuse that willgive rise to liability. $he e?ercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it wasestablished, and must not be e?cessive or unduly harshC there must be no intention to injure another.

ltimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound e?ercise of their discretion, will have to determine allthe facts and circumstances when the e?ercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right

=acts:

- August -+, + 0-. "laintiff "hilippine @odge appointed @efendant FpetitionerE !arons as one of its

dealers of electrical wires and cables effective 'eptember +, + 0-- !arons was given a /2 day credit for its purchase of plaintiffKs electrical products.- @uring the period covering @ecember + G/ to August +0, + G0, !arons purchased, on credit, from

plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of "7,+26,7-G.-2- $hese wires and cables were in turn sold, pursuant to previous arrangements, by defendant to

>4A5&8, the former being the accredited supplier of the electrical requirements of the latter - 'eptember 0, + G0, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of "-22,222.22 out of its total purchases as

above1stated- 8n several occasions, plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment of its outstanding obligations due

plaintiff - !arons wrote plaintiff on 8ctober , + G0 requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding account in

monthly installments of " 22,222.22 plus +\ interest per month commencing on 8ctober + , + G0 until

full payment. "laintiff, however, rejected !aronsK offer and accordingly reiterated its demand for the fullpayment of !aronsK account.- "laintiff filed a complaint before the 4$& "asig for the recovery of -.Gm peses plus attorneyKs fees of

6 \ from damage and e?emplary damage to at least +22#- 4$& ruled in favor of "laintiff - &A modified in view of typographical errors in damages F-.+ million was awarded by 4$&E

Issue: (83 "laitiff is guilty of &reditorKs abuse*

Held: 3o.

4ation:- "etitioner does not deny private respondentKs rights to institute an action for collection and to claim full

payment. Indeed, petitionerKs right to file an action for collection is beyond cavil.L M 5i#ewise, privatrespondentKs right to reject petitionerKs offer to pay in installments is guaranteed by Article +67G of the&ivil &ode which states:

- A4$. +67G. nless there is an e?press stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelledpartially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. 3either may the debtor be requiredto ma#e partial payments.

- However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated, the creditor may demand and thedebtor may effect the payment of the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.

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- nder this provision, the prestation , i.e., the object of the obligation, must be performed in one act, notin parts.

- "artial "restations. ) 'ince the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance, unlessotherwise stipulated, the creditor who refuses to accept partial prestations does not incur in delay ormora accipiendi, e?cept when there is abuse of right or if good faith requires acceptance.L/M

- Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article + of the &ivil &ode, prescribes a primordial limitation on all

rightsJ by setting certain standards that must be observed in the e?ercise thereof .L0M $hus:- A4$. + . >very person must, in the e?ercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with

justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

- !oth parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under Article + the defendant must act with badfaith or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. $hey cite the following comments of $olentino as their authority:

- $est of Abuse of 4ight. Y odern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, areanti1social. $here is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is e?ercised for the only purpose ofprejudicing or injuring another. (hen the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot beconcealed under the guise of e?ercising a right. $he principle does not permit acts which, without utility

or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidaritywhich considers law as rational and just. Hence, every abnormal e?ercise of a right, contrary to itssocio1economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to liability. $he e?ercise of a right must be inaccordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be e?cessive or unduly harshCthere must be no intention to injure another. ltimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sounde?ercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the e?ercise ofa right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.L++M

- $he question, therefore, is whether private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when itrejected petitionerKs offer and filed the action for collection.

- (e hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and thatthe burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same.L+6M In the case at bar, petitionerhas failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. "etitionerKs allegation that privaterespondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that privaterespondent itself may deal directly with eralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most,such supposition is merely speculative.

- oreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejectingpetitionerKs offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by privatrespondent, the corporation had its own cash position to protect in order for it to pay its ownobligations.J $his is not such a lame and poor rationaliBationJ as petitioner purports it to be. =or ifprivate respondent were to be required to accept petitionerKs offer, there would be no reason for the

latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. &learly, this would be inimical to the interests of anyenterprise, especially a profit1oriented one li#e private respondent. It is plain to see that what we havehere is a mere e?ercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. nder these circumstances, we do not deemprivate respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as toviolate the provisions of Article 6+ of the &ivil &ode.

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1=6 ?pi s '#

=acts:

Atty marasigan was a bpi credit card holder He had a credit limit of -# then it was increased to # Atty marasigan was of the habbit of paying his bills in post dated chec#s, and according to him, the

ban# did not complain. $heir contractual relations went on smoothly until his statement of account for 8ctober, + G amounting

to "G, G0.G7 was not paid in due time 8n 3ovember 6G, + G , defendant served plaintiff a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the

temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number intheir &aution 5ist. He was also told to refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid anyinconvenience;embarrassment and that unless he settles his outstanding account with the defendantwithin days from receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently cancelled

He then issued a post dated chec# li#e he would normally do &onfident that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated chec#, plaintiff invited

some guests on @ecember G, + G and entertained them at &af] Adriatico. pon payment of the bill, the card was dishonored, one of his guests had to pay the bill. He then wrote a letter to bpi, requesting the return of the chec#, and that they give a proper accounting

of his indebtedness so that he may fully settle it. 3o settlement was reached between the parties Hence atty marasigan filed a complaint for damages against the ban#. After trial, the trial court ruled for private respondent, finding that herein petitioner abused its right in

contravention of Article + of the &ivil &ode $he trial court said: , upon failure of the cardholder to pay his outstanding obligation for more than thirty

F-2E days, the defendant can automatically suspend or cancel the credit card, that reserved right shouldnot have been abused, as it was in fact abused, in plaintiff%s case. After the communication of atty marasigan to a certain miss 5orenBo, there was no indication that the

card would already be cancelled. $he ca merely affirmed the rtc decision

'c ruling:

nder the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by the private respondent, any card withoutstanding balances after thirty F-2E days from original billing;statement shall automatically besuspended.

It is clear that atty marasigan did not pay for the 6 billings before his card was finally cancelled. !y his own admission, private respondent made no payment within thirty days for his originalbilling;statement dated 60 'eptember + G . 3either did he ma#e payment for his originalbilling;statement dated 60 8ctober + G . &onsequently, as early as 6G 8ctober + G , thirty days fromthe non1payment of his billing dated 60 'eptember + G , petitioner corporation could automaticallysuspend his credit card.

$opic:

=inally, we find no legal and factual basis for private respondent%s assertion that in canceling the creditcard of the private respondent, petitioner abused its right under the terms and conditions of thecontract.

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$o find the e?istence of an abuse of right under Article + the following elements must be present: F+E $here is a legal right or dutyC F6E which is e?ercised in bad faithC F-E for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another As early as 6G 8ctober + G , petitioner could have suspended private respondent%s card outright

Instead, petitioner allowed private respondent to use his card for several wee#s. "etitioner had evennotified private respondent of the impending suspension of his credit card and made specialaccommodations for him for settling his outstanding account. As such, petitioner cannot be said to havecapriciously and arbitrarily canceled the private respondent%s credit card.

$he sc ruled that atty marasigan indeed suffered some damage. ay pag#a#aiba ang damages sa injury In%ur$ is the illegal invasion of a legal rightC da a5e is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury da a5es are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered $hus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the

result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injuredperson alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to alegal injury or wrong. $hese situations are often called da nu absque in%uria.

$he underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured incontemplation of law. $hus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awardedC i and the breach of such duty should be the pro?imatecause of the injury.

In this case it was the own doing of atty marasigan which caused his embarrassment. $he agreementwas that he settle his passed due indebtedness, instead of paying, he paid using a post dated chec#.

'ettled is the doctrine that a chec# is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of suchan instrument does not, by itself operate as payment. ii $his is especially true in the case of a postdatedchec#.

IN VI !F TH F!R G!ING , the decision of the &ourt of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay private

respondent "+22,222.22 as moral damages, " 2,222.22 as e?emplary damages and "62,222.22 asattorney%s fees, is '>$ A'I@>. "rivate respondent is @I4>&$>@ to pay his outstanding obligation withthe petitioner in the amount of "+7,7- .7+.

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1=7 R*iD s S)'r)(#r

T!"IC A'(s Co$(r# ?o$*s 0or)s l) )$(s

G.R. No. L-1==26 &)') )r 28, 1963

"!N NT "#r)%)s, .

AUTH!R : twin#le

38$>': V>4D 'H84$ &A'>

FACTS

+. $he 4epublic of the "hilippines entered into a contract with Allied $echnologists, Inc. Fcorporation,for shortE, for the construction of the Veterans emorial Hospital. 4uiB and Herrera werestoc#holders and officers of the corporation. $he construction of the hospital was terminated in + .

6. $wo civil cases were filed by 4uiB and Herrera against the 'ecretary of 3ational @efense, &ol.3icolas 9imeneB F>ngineerE, the =inance 8fficer, and the Auditor of the @ept. of 3ational @efense"ablo @. "anlilio and Allied $echnologists, Inc.

-. =irst &ivil &ase: dismissed by the &=IC '& affirmed dismissal.7. 'econd &ivil &ase: dismissed by &=I. &A reversed the dismissal, under the impression that the real

controversy was confined merely between defendant "anlilio and plaintiffs 4uiB and Herrera over the+ \ of the contract price, which was retained by the @epartment of 3ational @efense. $he retentionof the + \ of the contract price in the sum of "-7,072.22 was made to answer for any claim or lienthat might arise, in the course of the construction. &A remanded &=I for further proceedings.

. "anlilio and the corporation filed their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by the@epartment of 3ational @efense was already paid to defendant corporation, as sought for by theplaintiffs in their complaint. In view of this development, the trial court invited the parties to conference, in which the plaintiffs indicated their conformity, to the dismissal of the complaint witrespect to the retention of the + \ of the contract priceC but insisted upon the hearing of the secondquestion, which sought the declaration and recognition of plaintiffs 4uiB and Herrera, as two of thethree architects of the hospital. $he trial court, nevertheless, dismissed the complaint, for beingalready academic and moot. Hence, this appeal by plaintiffs1appellants, who alleged in their loneassignment of error that 4$8 $H> A >3@>@ &8 "5AI3$ of defendant Allied $echnologists, Inc., also alleges

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$echnologists, Inc. the amounts retained by the @epartment of 3ational @efense is academic,groundless, unfounded and malicious

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1=8 #ss )r . V)l)D

"l)#s) No() F3ot included in the caseE Article 6+ refers to acts contra bonos ores and has the followingelements: F+E an act which is legalC F6E but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or pubpolicyC and F-E is done with intent to injure. $he common element under Articles + and 6+ is that the accomplained of must be intentional, and attended with malice or bad faith. $here is no hard and fast rule whichcan be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invo#ed. $he question of whether or not this principle has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 62 and 6+, or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. 0#(# . A r# #$() G.R. No. 147=97

August /, 622G

T5is is # s5or( '#s)

? ATRI ". ASS0 R, plaintiff1appellee, vs.FRANCISC! O. V L , defendant1appellant.

F#'(s

$he facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planningand serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

=rancisco R. VeleB and !eatriB ". (assmer decided to get married and set 'eptember 7, + 7 8n 'eptember 6, + 7 VeleB left this note for his bride1to1be:

@ear !et )

(ill have to postpone wedding ) y mother opposes it. Am leaving on the &onvair today.

"lease do not as# too many people about the reason why ) $hat would only createa scandal.

"aquing

'eptember -, he sent her another telegram:

38$HI3 &HA3 >@ 4>'$ A'' 4>@ 4>$ 43I3 V>4D '883 A"858 IT>A A "A"A 58V> .

"AUI3

VeleB did not appear nor was he heard from again. !eatriB sued by for damages.

Issue: (83 (essmer is liable for breach of promise to marry.

Held: Des. $he e?tent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 6+ of said &ode provides that ?hs. A, A1+E. $heir wedding was set for 'eptember 7, + 7. Invitations were

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printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances F$sn., C >?h. &E. $he bride1to1be%s trousseauparty drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased F$sn., 01GE. @resses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. !ridal showers weregiven and gifts received F$sn., /C >?h. >E. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who wasthen 6G years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating:

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+

$itle: A"!L!NI! TAN ANC!, petitioner,vs.H!N. C!URT !F A"" ALS #$% ARAC LISANT!S, respondents.G.R. No. L-1863; &)') )r 17, 1966$opic: !reach of "romise to arry, 'eductionand 'e?ual Assault

Puic# 3otes;@octrine: $he essential feature is seduction,that in law is more than mere se?ual intercourse, or a breachof a promise of marriageC it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidenceon the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded

=acts: =rom @ecember, + 0, Apolonio $anjanco, courted the Araceli 'antos, both being of adult ageC that

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committed by the &ourt of =irst Instance in dismissing the complaint.

$o constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and t e wo anust $ield because o+ t e pro ise or ot er induce ent . If she consents merely from carnal lust and the

intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction F7- &ent. @ig. tit. 'eduction, par. /E. 'he must beinduced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which arecalculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the

se?ual embraces of her seducer 8f course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to thechild of the Araceli against Apolonio, if any. 8n that point, this &ourt ma#es no pronouncement, since thechild%s own rights are not here involved.

4atio :@ispositive "ortion: =84 $H> =84> 8I3 4>A'83', the decision of the &ourt of Appeals is reversed, andthat of the &ourt of =irst Instance is affirmed. 3o costs

4elation;"ertinent 5aw :

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16; G.R. No. 1;1749 *l 1;, 1992C!NRA&! ?UNAG, R., petitioner, vs. H!N. C!URT !F A"" ALS, Firs( &i isio$, #$% NAI&A ?.CIRIL!, respondents.

&!CTRIN An action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,)not actionable)apart fromthe right to recover money or property a