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1
Ward PageCPOF Program Manager
DARPA
Richard HayesPresident
Evidence Based Researchwww.ebrinc.com
William WrightPrincipal
InvestigatorDARPA CPOF
Visual Insights Inc.
By Permission
Command Post of the FutureLimited Objective Experiment - One (LOE-1)
Some Results
2
Most of the presentation materials herewere provided by Ward Page and Dick Hayes.
Acknowledgement
3
• Command Post of the Future
• Limited Objective Experiments
• Scenario Space
• Data Collection
• Significant Findings
• Summary
Overview
4
Command Post of TodayCommand Post of Today(What the services are developing)
4th Infantry Division
Ft. Hood, TX
Forward TAC
Division Advanced
WarfightingExperiment
Main TOC Planning Cell
5
Command Post of TodayCommand Post of TodayCurrent Limitations
• Characteristics– 60+ Workstations, 100+ people– People are flooded by individual data streams– Disjointed data systems; fragmented pictures of the battlefield– No portrayal of uncertainties, inconsistencies or unknowns– Requires too many people, too much communication
• Consequences– Disjointed systems can cause negative situational awareness– Increased time to comprehend significance on information– Incomplete, inaccurate understanding of the battlefield– Delayed decisions while waiting for more data, understanding
Mismatch between available data and Commander’s cognitive model.
Mismatch between available data and Commander’s cognitive model.
6
Command Post of the FutureCommand Post of the FutureOperational Impact
• Increased Operational Tempo– Faster recognition and better understanding of significant
battlefield changes
– Faster and more complete exploration of available courses of action
– More rapid and more accurate dissemination of commands
• Smaller, More Mobile Command Structures– Fewer staff members
– Smaller support trail & reduced deployment requirements
– More mobile, distributed command organizations
• Increased Span of Control
7
• Command Post of the Future (CPOF) is a DARPA program that aims to:
• Increase Speed and Quality of Command Decisions– Faster recognition and better understanding of changing battlefield situation– Faster and more complete exploration of available courses of action
• Provide More Effective Dissemination of Commands– COA capture for dissemination of commander’s intent– Status and capability feedback from deployed operators
• Enable Smaller, More Mobile and Agile Command Structures– More mobile, distributed command element– Smaller support tail & reduced deployment requirements
The goal of CPOF is to shorten the commander’s decision cycle to stay ahead of the adversary’s ability to react.
Command Post of the Future
8
CPOF Will Create Design Rules Enabling a New Interface Metaphor for C2 After Next
Visualization and Human-Visualization and Human-Computer InteractionComputer Interaction
From Other Programs:
Analysis Tools and Planning Aids;
Information Management;Networking and Comms
18”18”
“We Own The Last 18 Inches”
9
Command Post of the FutureCommand Post of the FutureTailored Visualizations
• Immediate Understanding– Match user’s cognitive model– Data => Information => Knowledge– Intuitive visual presentations
• Abstract as well as geospatial• Temporal as well as static
• Decision-Centered– Information tailored to decisions– Show decision-relevant details – Highlight relevant changes,
anomalies, exceptions– Uncover battlespace patterns– Portray uncertainties
• Tailored to User– Current echelon, task & situation– User’s functional role – User’s background & preferences
10
CPOFCPOFTechnologyTechnology
CPOFCPOFTechnologyTechnology
ControlControlConditionConditionControlControl
ConditionCondition
Known Situation
AsymmetricAsymmetric• Threat (IW or BIO)Threat (IW or BIO)• Chem/Bio attackChem/Bio attack• Info warfare attackInfo warfare attack
GuerrillaGuerrilla• Dispersed guerilla forceDispersed guerilla force• Threatened urban attackThreatened urban attack
HADRHADR• Urban disasterUrban disaster
Peace KeepingPeace Keeping• StabilityStability• Imminent attackImminent attack
SustainedSustainedEngagementEngagement• Opportunity to attackOpportunity to attack• Multiple avenues of attackMultiple avenues of attack• Random forcesRandom forces
Noise
PedigreePedigreeCompletenessCompletenessAccuracyAccuracyConsistencyConsistencyPerishabilityPerishability
xx
• CPOF Aces (8-15)CPOF Aces (8-15)• Battle Lab Students (40)Battle Lab Students (40)
UsersUsers
Decision PerformanceDecision Performance
TimeTime
Situation
Situation
Awareness
Awareness
S
M
L
C1 C2 T1 T2 T3
Trial MatrixTrial Matrix
Trial Conditions
Tim
eC
on
dit
ion
s
ExpertsStudents Core HypothesesCore Hypotheses
Improve Decision Speed & QualityImprove Decision Speed & Quality• H1: Improve Situation AwarenessH1: Improve Situation Awareness• H2: Improve COA GenerationH2: Improve COA Generation• H3: Improve COA SelectionH3: Improve COA Selection• H4: Improve COA CommunicationH4: Improve COA Communication
CPOF Experiments
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Hypothesis: • Tailored visualizations will improve Situation Awareness
MOE:• Correctness of Situation Awareness comprehension
• Quality of Pattern Recognition
• Greater Entity Retention
Limited Objective Experiment - 1(LOE -1)
12
Force-on-ForceForce-on-Force
InsurgencyInsurgency
LOE-1 Scenario SpaceLOE-1 Scenario Space
Situation 13Situation 13Situation 10Situation 10
Situation 5Situation 5Situation 4Situation 4
Less Less ComplexComplex
More More ComplexComplex
13
F on FTreatment BBlobs, 3D
14
Bn - enemy
Co - enemy
Pt - enemy
Bn - friend
Co - friend
Pt - friend
Legend
F on FTreatment AColor Coded
15Haiti Sit4B - 5 Critical Events
InsurgencyTreatment BTime-Space-Event View
16
Insurgent activity in Haiti by category and region
•Significant preparatory activity in Port-au-Prince •Military activity only in the North•Dormant South
CivilPreparatoryMilitary
InsurgencyTreatment ADrill Down
17
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
C-140C-133
C-126C-119
C-112C-105
C-98C-91
C-84C-77
C-70C-63
C-56C-49
C-42C-35
C-28C-21
C-14C-7
Current
Week
Nu
mb
er o
f in
cid
ents
Civil
Preparatory
Military
Insurgent activity in Haiti by week and category
•Increase in preparatory activity (last 9 weeks)•Decrease in civil activity•Low level military activity
18
Preparatory incidents by week and type
•Very active recruiting•Increasing propaganda and logistics•Leadership activity throughout the period
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Week
Nu
mb
er o
f in
cid
ents
Recruiting
Leadership
Logistics
Arms shipment
Propaganda
Pre
par
ato
ry t
ype
C-140C-133
C-126C-119
C-112C-105
C-98C-91
C-84C-77
C-70C-63
C-56C-49
C-42C-35
C-28C-21
C-14C-7
Current
19
• Visualization technologies generated better Situation Awareness– CPOF strongest in complex situations– CPOF strongest in force-on-force situations– CPOF strongest in understanding adversary’s situation
• Different Strengths Emerged from Alternative CPOF technologies– Treatment B strongest where force ratio is important in force-on-force
scenarios– Treatment A strongest in overall sketch scores in insurgency situations– Treatment A strongest in overall Situation Awareness scores in
insurgency situations
Significant Findings
20
• Time Issues and Others– Some changes due to control scores getting worse rather than
CPOF scores greatly improving
– Time appeared to help in case where visualization technique introduced new concept
– Longer viewing time did not always result in higher scores
Significant Findings (cont.)
21
Interpretation• CPOF Technologies generated:
– Better situation awareness (higher mean or x)– CPOF Technologies performance improves for prompted
CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Overall
Scores
CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Overall
Scores
Prompted
23.8923.89 25.6225.62
21.4121.41
33.8633.86
N=157 p=.007
Unprompted
22.3022.30 23.4023.40
17.77 17.77
25.8025.80
N=157 p=.058
ss
xx
ControlCPOF Technologies
22
CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Complex
Situations
CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperform Control in Complex
Situations
Interpretation• CPOF Technologies generated:
– Better situation awareness (higher mean or x) in complex situations
Unprompted Prompted
6.286.28 18.5318.53
3.953.95
17.2417.24
N=78 p=.000
8.858.85 18.2818.28
5.105.10
19.9619.96
N=78 p=.000
ss
x
ControlCPOF Technologies
23
Unprompted
11.8711.87 16.9516.95
10.10 10.10
18.5518.55
N=78 p=.020
Prompted
19.3719.37 21.5121.51
16.7316.73
29.6929.69
N=78 p=.019
ss
xx
ControlCPOF Technologies
CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperformed Control inForce-on-force Situations
CPOF Technologies SignificantlyOutperformed Control inForce-on-force Situations
Interpretation• CPOF Technologies generated:
– Significantly better situation awareness than Control for both prompted and unprompted in Force-on-Force situations
24
CPOF Treatments Vs.Control for Enemy Representation in
Insurgency
CPOF Treatments Vs.Control for Enemy Representation in
Insurgency
Treatment A Vs. Control
17.58 18.20
33.13
22.25
Treatment B Vs. Control
17.58 21.55
35.13
22.25
Control
Treatment A/B
Interpretation• Treatments A and B significantly outperformed control
in representing enemy force information
25
Treatment B outperforms Treatment A in Overall Situation Awareness in
Situation 13
Treatment B outperforms Treatment A in Overall Situation Awareness in
Situation 13
15.93 15.00
22.93 22.93
12.2112.21
14.85 12.06
29.66
12.7112.71
ss
xx
Treatment BTreatment A
Interpretation• Treatment A used icon visualization scheme (color coded) that subjects stated was confusing.
Unprompted Prompted
N=29 p=.073 N=29 p=.002
26
30.9330.93 24.8824.88
30.8330.83
N= 59 p=.05
45.4845.48
Differences between Treatments A & B
in Insurgency Situations
Differences between Treatments A & B
in Insurgency Situations
Overall Sketch Score Prompted Situational Awareness
s
x
Treatment BTreatment A
N=59 p=.07
Interpretation• In Insurgency Situations:
• Treatment A outperforms Treatment B in overall sketch score• Treatment A significantly outperforms Treatment B in prompted overall Situational Awareness
17.1317.13
72.272.200
16.2116.21
64.8764.87
27
Situation 10
8%8%
Situation 13
23%23%
39%39%
20%20%
Situation 4 Situation 5
More Time is Not Always Better
More Time is Not Always Better
(Percent of instances where time did not help, when significant differences between times were found)
Interpretation• In less complex situations, more reversals in performance between times were found
(subjects performed worse when given 5 minutes when compared with 3 minutes) with force on force, situation 10, containing the highest percentage of instances.
28
More Time Helped Only in More Complex SituationsMore Time Helped Only in More Complex Situations
Simple
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 3 5
Minutes
% C
orre
ct
Treatment A Treatment B Control
Complex
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1 3 5
Minutes
% C
orre
ct
Treatment A Treatment B Control
29
Situation 4Situation 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1 3 5
Minutes
% C
orre
ct
Treatment A Treatment B Control
30
Situation 5Situation 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 3 5
Minutes
% C
orre
ct
Treatment A Treatment B Control
31
Situation 10Situation 10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1 3 5
Minutes
% C
orre
ct
Treatment A Treatment B Control
32
Situation 13Situation 13
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 3 5
Minutes
% C
orre
ct
Treatment A Treatment B Control
33
• CPOF technologies appear to make a difference
• CPOF experimental approach captures the strengths and weaknesses
• CPOF technologies appear to improve subjects’ overall Situation Awareness when compared to traditional methods
• CPOF experimental approach captures strengths and weaknesses of each treatment
Summary