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West Coast Publishing2011 LD Moral Obligation

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Resolved: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist peoplein need.

Hanne JensenWhitman College


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Summarized Topic Description

Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

This topic, more than most Lincoln-Douglas resolutions, will depend very much on how the affirmative andnegative choose to define the separate words in the resolution. More likely than not, debates on this topic willwhittle down to what are individuals rights and responsibilities as human beings and as members of a society.Legally, there is little doubt that most places in the world do not r equi r e any action to be taken by individuals forthe pure benefit of others, which is why this question falls into the moral spectrum.Understanding what constitutes morality and a moral obligation is difficult because morality means differentthings to different people. The various religions and cultures which compromise America, much less the world,show clearly how people s difference of opinions on the matter of what is right and wrong can show through theirlaws and customs. In order for a resolution such as this to have any weight as a moral maxim, it should beuniversal. This poses a dilemma because of the disagreements on the matter.In addition, the potentially (but not explicitly) limiting term of individuals allows for a variety of interpretations.

Individuals could mean persons acting solely individually or individuals contributing to a group or organization inorder to accomplish assistance on a larger scale. It could be argued that the use of the world individuals in theresolution means the exclusion of government or organizational involvement (that individuals r athe r than groupshave this moral obligation) or merely that individuals must have an involvement in the process, as there is no overtmention of mutual exclusivity.Determining the need of people can be tricky: in order to establish that a person is in need requires that either theperson in question consider themselves to be in need or that a third party observes them and deigns them to havea need. Both possibilities pose a problem for the affirmative and negative as one would mean that only peopleable to freely accept and express their need would be considered able to accept assistance, and the other wouldallow for the imposition of alien values and judgments on people who may not want, understand, or even needtheir assistance.The very concept of assistance is riddled with its own problems as it does not specify whether or not a person isrequired to make a substantial difference in the lives of people in need. Assistance could mean a comprehensiveand permanent solution to a need or it could mean a small but well-intentioned gesture of good will. Clearly, boththe negative and the affirmative debaters have their work cut out for them as far as interpreting and defining theresolution before even debating its merits and shortcomings.The affirmative debater would be best served by focusing on the natural equality of all people and the ability of almost all individuals to do something to help those in need. Keeping the expansive term assistance down tohelping others help themselves or mitigating extremely forceful pressures on the needy as well as interpretingpeople loosely, allowing it to be persons the individuals know or come into contact with daily life would make itdifficult for the negative to argue that there are not moral obligations to do small generosities. The affirmativecould successfully argue that it is more important for the individual to become involved with the fabric of humankind in a positive way than it is to solve every major world problem.In contrast, the negative should argue that while it is laudable for individuals to assist others in their communityand elsewhere that people have no moral obligations to assist others; the very reason that it is a good thing to do

and praiseworthy is because it is going above and beyond what is required. Additionally, the negative has theability to make many arguments of how individual involvement with be either ineffective or evencounterproductive to the overall goal of assisting the needy. The negative would do well to take the side of consequentialism, that all the good intentions in the world won t necessarily evoke any real change in thelandscape of the modern world; it is more important to cause change than it is to have an ethically motivatedpopulace.Once the angles of the debate are established, it will (as usual) come down to the values. Not getting too boggeddown in advantages or disadvantages to practical implementation of either case, truly hammering home the values


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will be the key to success in a large number of rounds. Make sure they are clearly defined, weighed, and impactedout throughout the entire speech.

Definitions

Individual

Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/individual)a particular being or thing as distinguished from a class, species, or collection: as (1) : a single humanbeing as contrasted with a social group or institution (2) : a singleorganism as distinguished from a group

Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/search?q=define+individual&FORM=DTPDIA)1. specific person: a specific person, distinct from others in a group

"belief in the individual's right to self-expression"2. any person: a human being, or a person of a specified type

"a panel consisting of four individuals""a very unfortunate individual"

3. separate thing: a separate entity or thing4. [biology] separate organism: an independent organism separate from a group

"The plant part contains the embryo, which gives rise to a new individual."

Although individuals is clearly not the most contentious term in the resolution, it is important to decide whetheror not to emphasize that individual is separate from a group. If so, the Merriam-Webster definition is probably thebest bet, but if the desired goal is to not draw attention to potential mutual exclusivity arguments, it may bepreferable to go with Bing s second definition.

Moral obligation

The Electric Law Library (http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/m142.htm)A duty which one owes, and which he ought to perform, but which he is not legally bound to fulfil.Theseobligations are of two kinds 1st. Those founded on a natural right; as, the obligation to be charitable,which can never be enforced by law. 2d. Those which are supported by a good or valuable antecedentconsideration; as, where a man owes a debt barred by the act of limitations, this cannot be recovered bylaw, though it subsists in morality and conscience; but if the debtor promise to pay it, the moral obligationis a sufficient consideration for the promise, and the creditor may maintain an action of assumpsit, torecover the money.

Moral

Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/dictionary/search?q=definition of moral&qpvt=definition+of+moral+&FORM=Z7FD)

1. involving right and wrong: relating to issues of right and wrong and to how individual people shouldbehave

2. derived from personal conscience: based on what somebody's conscience suggests is right or wrong,rather than on what rules or the law says should be done

3. according to common standard of justice: regarded in terms of what is known to be right or just, asopposed to what is officially or outwardly declared to be right or just"a moral victory."


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4. encouraging goodness and decency: giving guidance on how to behave decently and honorably5. good by accepted standards: good or right, when judged by the standards of the average person or

society at large6. able to tell right from wrong: able to distinguish right from wrong and to make decisions based on that

knowledge

7. based on personal conviction: based on an inner conviction, in the absence of physical proof "moral certainty"

Obligation

Bing Dictionary (http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/search?q=definition+of+obligation&form=QB)1. duty: something that must be done because of legal or moral duty2. state of being obligated: the state of being under a moral or legal duty to do something3. gratitude owed: something that somebody owes in return for something given, e.g. assistance or a favor4. [law] binding legal agreement: a legal agreement by which somebody is bound to do something,

especially pay a specified amount of money5. [law] legal contract: a legal document such as a mortgage or bond that contains the terms of an

obligation, usually including a penalty for failing to fulfill it

Included here together are the definitions of moral obligation, moral, and obligation. The first definition of the combined terms is probably the most useful as it considers both terms in relation to each other as opposed toseparately. Needless to say, it also will take less time to explain in a round. If, however, the case is constructed soto have significant debate into what constitutes a moral action or what an obligation is, it might be advisable todefine each word individually.

A ssist

Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assist?show=0&t=1310331776)t r ansitive ve rb : to give usually supplementary support or aid to int r ansitive ve rb : to give support or aid

The Free Dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/assist)To give help or support to, especially as a subordinate or supplement; aid: The clerk assisted the judge bylooking up related precedents. Her breathing was assisted by a respirator.

For arguments requiring that assistance be considered generic help of any size, using the verb in the intransitiveform is preferable. For arguments that assistance would be used supplementally, use the verb in the transitiveform. Technically, the use of assist in the resolution implies a transitive grammatical structure anyway.

People

Merriam-Webster (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/people)1. plural : human beings making up a group or assembly or linked by a common interest2. plural : human beings, persons often used in compounds instead of persons often used

attributively 3. plural : the members of a family or kinship4. plural : the mass of a community as distinguished from a special class often used by Communists to distinguish Communists from other people


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A ffirmative CaseHer e is an example affi r mative case which may b e used as it is const r ucted, as a sta r ting point fo r possi b leadditions, o r even just as an example.

Introduction As the world grows more populous, tight-knit communities become rarer and rarer. It is becoming more of anindividually focused world where no one owes anything to anyone but themselves. If everyone were completelyself sufficient, this would not be a problem. But in the modern world poverty, hunger, natural disasters, and othercompromising circumstances are making the likelihood that all people are living at an acceptable standard shrinkaway. A world where there can be no trust in other people, no possibility of shared experience in life with otherpeople, is not a hospitable world for anyone. Each person has a duty to help with what then can when they can.Because of this fact, individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

ValueQuality of Life"Glossary." The World Bank Group. World Bank, 2004 . Web. 10 Jul 2011..

People's overall well-being. Quality of life is difficult to measure (whether for an individual, group, or nation) because inaddition to material well-being (see standard of living) it includes such intangible components as the quality of the environment, national security, personal safety, and political and economic freedoms.

By assisting people in need, their quality of life will be improved because a wrong will be righted, their needsaided. They are not the only ones who will benefit , however: when the overall needs of the community areaddressed, everyone benefits and a higher standard of l iving and quality of life is achieved for all. Without qualityof life, life itself is meaningless. Because of this, it is the first thing that should be valued.

Value Criterion

Individual Responsibility"Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011 . Web. 10 Jul 2011..

(the social force that binds you to the courses of action demanded by that force ) " we must instill a sense of duty in ou r child r en "; " every right implies a responsibility; every opportunity, an obligation; every possession,a duty "- John D.Rockefelle r Jr

Everyone has the ability to help and if everyone does their part, then everyone will reap the benefits. Advocatingindividual responsibility is the only way that the quality of life can be raised to its fullest potential.


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Contention One: Without individual investment, communitiesdeteriorate

A . Individual apathy on matters of communal interest will create discord.The A tlantic , Internationally acclaimed social and political commentary periodical, March 1982http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/windows.html

We have difficulty thinking about such matters, not simply because the ethical and legal issues are so complex but because we havebecome accustomed to thinking of the law in essentially individualistic terms. The law defines my rights,punishes his behavior and is applied by that officer because of this harm. We assume , in thinking this way, that what is good forthe individual will be good for the community and what doesn't matter when it happens to oneperson won't matter if it happens to many. Ordinarily, those are plausible assumptions. But in cases wherebehavior that is tolerable to one person is intolerable to many others, the reactions of the others--fear, withdrawal, flight--may ultimately make matters worse for everyone, including the individualwho first professed his indifference.

Taking other persons wants and needs into consideration when deciding what our actions will be is the only wayto make a truly cohesive society that will benefit everyone. If people are wholly self-centric, nothing can beaccomplished and no progress can be made.

B. Without assistance by individuals, communities will deteriorate; famous brokenwindows theory proves.The A tlantic , Internationally acclaimed social and political commentary periodical, March 1982http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/archive/windows.html

Philip Zimbardo, a Stanford psychologist, reported in 1969 on some experiments testing the broken-window theory. He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx and acomparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California. The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its

"abandonment." The first to arrive were a fa mily--father, mother, and young son--who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-fourhours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began--windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholsteryripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car inPalo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Withina few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.

Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder and even for people whoordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx--its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen orbroken, the past experience of "no one caring"--vandalism begins much more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to

believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere oncecommunal barriers--the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility--are lowered by actionsthat seem to signal that "no one cares." We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdownof community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each

other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even afew months, to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is abandoned, weeds grow up, a window issmashed. Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in.Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People startdrinking in front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and is allowed to sleep it off . Pedestrians are approached bypanhandlers.

A society that is not aware of itself as a group where individuals can affect the well-beings of others is one that willslowly deteriorate. The opposite holds true as well: when people are invested in other people in the world, bondsare formed which are symbiotically beneficial.


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C. Individual participation in communities and societies helps to improve quality of life.Robert Costanza et al, various leaders in the fi eld of Anthropology, Sociology, etc. December 2008 For example, objective measures include indices of economic production, literacy rates, life expectancy, andother data that can be gathered without directly surveying the individuals being assessed. Objectiveindicators may be used singly or in combination to form summary indexes, such as the UN s Human Development Index (Sen, 1985; UNDP,

1998). While these measurements may provide a snapshot of how well some physical and social needsare met, they are narrow, opportunity-biased, and cannot incorporate many issues that contribute toQOL such as identity, participation , and psychological security. It is also clear that these so-called objectivemeasures are actually proxies for experience identified through subjective associations of decision-makers; hence the distinction between

objective and subjective indicators is somewhat illusory. Subjective indicators of QOL gain their impetus, in part, fromthe observation that many objective indicators merely assess the opportunities that individuals haveto improve QOL rather than assessing QOL itself. Thus economic production may best be seen as a means to a potentially(but not necessarily) improved QOL rather than an end in itself. In addition, unlike most objective measures of QOL, subjective measurestypically rely on survey or interview tools to gather respondents own assessments of their lived experiences in the form of self-reports of satisfaction, happiness, well-being or some other near-synonym. Rather than presume the importance of various life domains (e.g., lifeexpectancy or material goods), subjective measures can also tap the perceived significance of the domain (or need ) to the respondent. Diener

and Suh (1999) provide convincing evidence that subjective indicators are valid measures of wha t people perceive to be important to theirhappiness and well-being.

Action by governments and organizations are not enough to create true improvement in quality of life. Individualaction, individual care must be taken, because quality of li fe is not l imited to just the basic physical needs thatcomprise standards of living. Quality of life includes a semblance of connections between people, psychologicaland emotional well being. Merely reaching out is assisting those in need.


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Contention Two: Obligation is limited to ability and required of all

A. Kant instructs that the practical construction of morals insists that they must beuniversalizable.

Garth Kemerling , contributor to the online philosophical dictionary philosophypages.com, 2003 http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm

Constrained only by the principle of universalizability, the practical reason of any rational beingunderstands the categorical imperative to be: " A ct only according to that maxim whereby you can atthe same time will that it should become a universal law." That is, each individual agent regards itself as determining, by its decision to act in a certain way, that everyone (including itself) will always actaccording to the same general rule in the future. This expression of the moral law, Kant mai ntained, provides a concrete,practical method for evaluating particular human actions of several distinct varieties.

It would be unreasonable to argue that some people should contribute and some should not. The fact is, everyone

can assist those in need, and they don t have to (nor should they) go beyond their means to do so. Whether it is abillionaire donating substantial sums to a charitable organization or a child sharing a piece of her sandwich with ahomeless person, both are contributing.

B. Moral obligation does not depend on a certain position an individual occupies inlife.Olufemu Badru , Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65-e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111

In other words, from the foregoing, the point is that while obligation results from contract-like relations or simply contractarianism between the self and the other, duty results from the fact of occupying a position of responsibility ; dutyis a certain job of value expected of a person who occupies the position.

Moral obligations do not arise from people earning or losing certain rights. The difference between duty andobligation is that duty is something expected of a person because of who they are or what they are capable of doing. Obligation is a relationship between a person and another, based on the nature that they are both people.


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N egative

IntroductionIt is not unique to the modern condition that there are people in need all around the world. Now andthroughout history, there have been times when people have had to rely on each other survive, muchless live happily and contentedly. There is no dispute about that. A clarification must be made, though.While it is indeed formidable for one person to help another, to promote interpersonal relationships, itis not required. No person owes another anything just by nature of being alive. To claim otherwisewould be to nullify basic concepts such as freedom, autonomy, and justice. It is with this in mind that Iargue individuals have no mo r al o b ligation to assist people in need.

Value

Freedom"Wordnet." Princeton Wordnet 3.1. Princeton University, 2011 . Web. 10 Jul 2011.http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=freedom

the condition of being free; the power to act or speak or think without externally imposed restraints

Freedom is a prerequisite to individuals having any individual power whatsoever. To determine what obligationsan individual has, they must first be considered free actors, otherwise any agency is removed from the questionand the discussion of moral obligation of individual action is moot.

Value Criterion

AutonomyDictionary.com online dictionary 2011

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/autonomy

independence or freedom, as of the will or one's actions: the autonomy of the individual.

In order to have truly free individuals, they must be autonomous, capable of making their own decision with theirown free will. Anything less would be a result of coercion of the exertion of one will onto another s, an inherentlyimmoral act to begin with.


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Contention One: Individuals do not have a moral obligation to assistothers.

A . While it is commendable to assist the distant needy, people are not morallyobligated to do so; it is supererogatory.Olufemu Badru , Department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria, December 2009 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=7e70c8c7-36fa-47fa-ac65-e76d59278270%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111

Although it is the last in the listing of the principles that under pin the society of peoples, the duty of assistance is very important toRawl s internationalism. As stated in the earlier part of this work, it is the only principle that shows that the society of people s owe s anything at all to the distant other in the sense of positive action to bring the peoples inthe burdened societies out of their problems. Laudable as this principle might have otherwise been, its central defect lies inthe supererogatory implication. The principle grants a duty that do e s not morally obligat e soci e ty ofp e opl e s to h e lp th e distant n ee dy in those burdened societies. What it allows to get to those needy

peoples is just humanitarian services . Thus , the recipients of the assistance from the society of peoplesare deprived of any moral right to make a morally binding demand on the society of people if they failto fulfill this duty of assistance.

Although people in need may indeed have a right to receive aid, there is no obligation for individuals to give thataid. Even though this seems somewhat contradictory, it is a question of moral obligation for separate individualsand groups. People assisting those in need is laudable, it is not required.

B. The moral obligation to assist others is limited to not causing harm to ourselves.RJHoward , MD, Surgeon University of Florida School of Medecine, August 2006 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=d03cba5c-eff1-4dd9-b7e2-891a9cba96c4%40sessionmgr104&vid=2&hid=111

In developing his thoughts about the obligation to assist , Peter Singer separates preventing evil from promoting good and contends if it isin our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it . Slote argues that one has an obligation toprevent serious evil or harm wh e n on e can do so without s e riously int e rf e ring with on e s lif e plans or styl e and without doing any wrongs of commission .

To further the point, there is no call for people to give in a way that will negatively affect them. Because they arenot obligated to give anything, there is no way to claim any specific appropriate amount. For a person to givebeyond their means or to negatively affect their ability to give in the future would be counterproductive to thevery nature of aid.


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Contention Two: Competent individuals have the right to make theirown decisions .

A . Before autonomy can be usurped, incompetency to make decisions must bedetermined .TL Zutlevics , PhD in Philosophy Flinders University and PH Henning , MD Women s and Children s Hospital, Australia, December 2005 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=6a64c405-eba3-4b9f-a4d3-e99c550494e8%40sessionmgr113&vid=2&hid=111

If we are going to override someone s autonomy the general view is that we should have very good reasonsbefore doing so . One such reason would be if the person were deemed incompetent to make a decision. It is permissible to actin the interests of a person in a situation where they are deemed incompetent to make a decision .

An individual s autonomy is key to their freedom, and therefore should not be mitigated by others. The libertieswe give up in order to live in a certain societies are exempt from this rule because they are sacrificed by the choice

of the individual. To impose a moral obligation on someone against their will would undermine their autonomy,thus compromising their freedom.

B. Individuals should judge what they deem to be morally right and then actaccordinglyLarry Krasnoff , Professor of Philosophy at College of Charleston South Carolina, October 2010 http://ejournals.ebsco.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/Direct.asp?AccessToken=5WN4444TRZPSQYJJW66BQSUPZYPBTRN69U&Show=Object

Of course we ought to do what we judge to be good , and of course we ought to do it because of its goodness . Themodel here is one of recognition, drawn without fundamental alteration from the case of belief. Certainly we ought to exerciseour autonomous judgment about what to believe , but just as certainly we ought to believe what we judge to be true, independently of anything about ourselves. In the theoretical case, our thoughts arenecessarily directed towards objects beyond ourselves, and so the role of our will must be tosubordinate itself to our best judgments about the nature of the object.

Moral obligations must be the results of our reasoning and judgments. If that happens to coincide with thereasoning and judgments of everyone else in the world, then of course we should do what we deem to be good.But it is a decision that must be arrived at from within, not an externally advocated obligation.

C. N o moral obligation be universal in our culture, the only way it can be determined ison an individual basis .Ana Iltis, Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, 2003 http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=575822021&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=10&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310274871&clientId=48453

The multiplicity of autonomous selves do not sustain a single standard of morality . MacIntyre argues that wepossess the fragments of a conceptual scheme . We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to usemany of the key expressions. But we have very largely if not entirely lost our comprehension , boththeoretical and practical, of morality . The most striking feature of contemporary moral debates is that they apparently can find noterminus. There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture , The ongoing debateconcerning the morality of immorality of abortion is a clear example of this lack of agreement or spectrum of views. There are significant

disputes concerning the moral and legal permissibility of abortion . A successful account of moral integrity and moralresponsibility, therefore, cannot be universal but must be situated in a particular context. A bsent auniversal understanding of morality, no singl e s e ns e of moral obligation is a v ailabl e . There


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appears to be no framework within which we may justifiably assert that all individuals are morallyobligated in particular ways beyond a limited set of side constraints we may recognize as universal . Itnevertheless is the case that we routinely wish to attribute moral obligations to individuals and to understand the moral obligations particular

persons bear. We may understand particular individuals as having particular obligations only with anappreciation of their moral characters and moral integrity. Moral character allows us to attributemoral obligations, and moral integrity is the mechanism by which we can evaluate the extent to whichthey satisfy the obligations .

As each person experiences reality in a very different way and holds different values in higher esteem than others(examples include religion, politics, even this round), we each have different views of what constitutes moralaction. The concept of universal morality is an illusion, so saying that every individual has the same moralobligation (to assist those in need) is laughable. Only individual morality can exist.


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Contention Three: Mass individual giving is harmful to social reform

A . Charitable giving distracts from the real problem and PREVE N TS opportunities for

lasting change.BBCEthics Guide, 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml

Indeed charitable giving may even distract from finding the best solution - which might involve acomplex rethink of the way the world organises its economic relationships, and large-scalegovernment initiatives to change people's conditions . If that is so, then the effort put into charity mightbe better devoted to pressuring governments to bring about needed change. And governments might be morelikely to focus on dealing with poverty if they weren't being helped by charities.

By attempting to fix the effects of injustice without addressing the cause, people are creating an endless cycle of the very problems they are trying to prevent. Individuals do not have the capability to change the world alone;they may affect some changes on the micro scale, but cannot solve for corrupt governments, failing economies, orgenocides. Larger action is needed to solve the root problems.

B. A n influx in charity spending results in a certain area, the government will cutspending to areas that need it, stagnating growth. BBCEthics Guide, 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml

The argument goes something like this. If the charity sector increases spending in an area also funded bygovernment then there is a risk that government will choose to spend less in that area with the result thatgovernments save money, and extra benefits provided by the charity spend are reduced.

When aid is given to a certain area of need by individuals, governments will stop sending as much assistance sothat they may afford to help in other areas, leaving large problems to individual assistance. Not only will benefits

that only the government can offer be cut, but also the stability of aid will be compromised. If individual aid shifts,the area they were supporting will be left with nothing.

C. By individually assisting the needy, people will lose the desire to affect realcollective social reform and no real change will happen.BBCEthics Guide, 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml

This isn't a new argument: It is more socially injurious for the millionaire to spend his surplus wealth incharity than in luxury. For by spending it on luxury, he chiefly injures himself and his immediate circle, but by spending it in charity heinflicts a graver injury upon society . For every act of charity, applied to heal suffering arising from defectivearrangements of society, serves to weaken the personal springs of social reform, alike by the'miraculous' relief it brings to the individual 'case' that is relieved, and by the softening influence itexercises on the hearts and heads of those who witness it. It substitutes the idea and the desire of individual reform for those of social reform, and so weakens the capacity for collective self-help insociety, (J A Hobson, Work and Wealth, 1914).

If people are satiated by donating their five dollars a month to the AIDS foundation, they will assume their moralobligation has been fulfilled (and in some interpretations, it has). This will cause a complete stagnation of socialreform and the change needs to happen as advocated by the affirmative. Not only will individuals be lesspassionate about assisting the needy, but governments will cease to be pressured as heavily to effect real change.


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Individuals A re N ecessary in Evaluating Moral Obligations

Questions of morality are always ascribed to the individual.Jan N arveson , ethics philosopher, 2002 http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115724?seq=2

The question for morals is always and fundamentally cast in individual terms : what is this, that, or the otherperson to do? If we think that there are things which groups should do, those claims will say nothing toanyone unless there is some way of understanding that individuals, such as members of that group of persons affected by its behavior, have duties or rights or some other moral status in relation to it.

Individuals have a moral obligation to respect human rights, even if that meansdisregarding other considerations.

Thomas Pogge , German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs atYale University, Jan-Mar 2000http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/stable/25115635?seq=2

Persons have a moral duty to respect human rights, a duty that does not derive from a more generalmoral duty to comply with national or international legal instruments. (In fact, the opposite may hold:Conformity with human rights is a moral requirement on any legal order, whose capacity to createmoral obligations depends in part on such conformity. ) Second, human rights express weighty moralconcerns, which normally override other normative considerations . Third, these moral concerns are focused on humanbeings, as all of them and they alone have human rights and the special moral status associated therewith. Fourth, with respect to these moralconcerns, all human beings have equal status: They have exactly the same human rights, and the moral significance of these rights and theirfulfillment does not vary with whose human rights are at stake. Fifth, human rights express moral concerns that are unrestricted, i.e., theyought to be respected by all human agents irrespective of their particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or philosophy. Sixth, thesemoral concerns are broadly sharable, i.e., capable of being understood and appreciated by persons fr om different epochs and cultures as well

as by adherents of a variety of different religions, moral traditions, and philosophies. The notions of unrestrictedness and broad sharability arerelated in that we tend to feel more confident about conceiving of a moral concern as unrestricted when this concern is not parochial to someparticular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or philosophy.

A 2: Consequentialism

Morality is about the duty, not necessarily about what happens after.William Haines, Professor at University of Hong Kong, March 2006 http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/

Consequentialism is controversial. Various nonconsequentialist views are that morality is all about doing one s duty,

respecting rights, obeying nature, obeying God, obeying one s own heart, actualizing one s ownpotential, being reasonable, respecting all people, or not interfering with others no matter theconsequences.


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Moral Obligations Require Doing Something Good, N ot Just N ot DoingSomething Bad

We have moral duties not only to prevent from doing harm but also to take positiveaction.Thomas Pogge , German philosopher, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs atYale University, Jan-Mar 2000The first understanding conceives human rights as moral rights that every human being has againstevery other human being or perhaps, more generally, against every other human agent (where this also includescollective agents, such as groups, firms, or governments) . Given this understanding of human rights it matters greatlywhether one then postulates human rights that impose only negative duties (to avoid depriving) or whether one instead postulates human

rights that in addition impose positive duties (to protect and/or to aid). A human right to freedom from assault might thengive every human agent merely a weighty moral duty to refrain from assaulting any human being oralso an additional weighty moral duty to help protect any human beings from assaults and theireffects.

It is better to inadvertently cause harm while trying to help than to let current harmhappen and do nothing.Gerhard verland , expert in Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology, June 2008 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=106&sid=ab3a18c7-0387-4711-aed1-ca0914161581%40sessionmgr114Two questions call for extra attention, namely to determine the significance of being an innocent contributor to harm and the significance of

being a culpable bystander. Because although it is uncontroversial to assume severe implications following frombeing a culpable contributor, and no implications from being an innocent bystander, the significance of theseother two options are routinely challenged. I argue that by merely being an innocent contributor to harm oneacquires a duty to shoulder a fair share of the harm in question. Even though one innocently causesharm, one has a duty to shoulder a fifty percent of the harm, or risk of harm, and not to leave a victimto shoulder the whole load. I then go on to shed light on the significance of being a culpable bystander by evaluating situations inwhich we can choose between forcing contributors and bystanders. I propose that in a choice between imposing cost on aninnocent contributor and a culpable bystander, we should impose it on the latter. If I am right in this judgement, we have reason to believe that culpable bystanders may be subjected to substantial forceto ensure they help protect people in need.


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HUMAN S A RE MORA LLY OBLIGA TED TO CA RE FOR THE GOOD OF OTHERS

A. INDIVIDUALS ARE INEVITABLY PART OF COMMUNITIES AND MUST BE CONCERNED FOR OTHERSLinda Fisher, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice, Seton Hall UniversitySchool of Law, YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, 2000, p. 357-358.It is helpful to view the issue not only from the perspective of the individual, but also from a collectivevantage point. That is, individuals are inevitably part of many communities - national, ethnic, religious,and the like. Any complete picture of human life must capture the individual embedded within thoselarger structures, since no one can live in complete isolation. Thus recast, the issue becomes notwhether we as individuals desire communal life, or whether we think it is good, but what sort of community or communities we want. How can communities best ensure that they promote humanflourishing and well-being? The individual is no more fundamental or primary than the communities inwhich she is embedded. Etzioni appropriately emphasizes the need to balance autonomy with concern

for order.B. THE BENEFITS OF THE COMMON GOOD ARE AVAILABLE TO EVERYONEClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 3.As these examples suggest, the common good doe not just happen. Establishing and maintaining thecommon good requires the cooperative efforts of some, often of many, people. Just as keeping a parkfree of litter depends on each user picking up after himself, so also maintaining the social conditionsfrom which we all benefit requires the cooperative efforts of citizens. But these efforts pay off, for thecommon good is a good to which all members of society have access, and from whose enjoyment noone can be easily excluded. All persons for example, enjoy the benefits of clean air or an unpollutedenvironment, or any of our society's other common goods. In fact, something counts as a common goodonly to the extent that it is a good to which all have access.


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THE GEN ERA L PRIN CIPA L OF SELF-IN TEREST ISAN TI-DEMOCRA TIC

1. THE FOUNDING FATHERS VALUED THE COMMON GOOD ABOVE INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY Tim Fort,Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Spring 1999, p. 410.One of the most ardent Federalist judges, Samuel Chase, viewed the democratic principles coming fromthe atheistic and rationalistic French Revolution to be a dangerous corruption of virtue required for thesuccess of American government. Individual liberty was to flourish within the constraints of a commongood that allowed freedom to elect leaders. According to Presser, once leaders were elected, theEnglish notion of government insisted that leaders thereafter were not to be criticized. John Marshall'sinterpretation of the Constitution strongly in favor of individual liberties created an "originalmisunderstanding" of the Constitution - according to Presser -which rejected the divinely-directedrequirements of a citizen's life in favor of a Constitution understood only as a protector of individualfreedom. This original misunderstanding effectively divorced republicanism from liberalism because it

replaced support for the common good with protection of individual liberty.

2. RUTHLESS INDIVIDUALISM IS ANTI-DEMOCRATICClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 1.It is precisely this sense of common purpose and public spirit crucial to the guidance of institutions in ademocracy that is absent from our society today. A ruthless individualism, expressed primarily through amarket mentality, has invaded every sphere of our lives, undermining those institutions, such as thefamily or the university, that have traditionally functioned as foci of collective purposes, history, andculture. This lack of common purpose and concern for the common good bodes ill for a people claimingto be a democracy. Caught up in our private pursuits, we allow the workings of our major institutions --the economy and government -- to go on "over our heads." One way of summing up the difficulty

Americans have in understanding the fundamental roots of their problems is to say that they still have aLockean political culture, emphasizing individual freedom and the pursuit of individual affluence (theAmerican dream) in a society with a most un-Lockean economy and government. We have the illusionthat we can control our fate because individual economic opportunity is indeed considerable, especiallyif one starts with middle class advantages; and our political life is formally free. Yet powerful forcesaffecting the lives of all of us are not operating under the norm of democratic consent. In particular, theprivate governments of the great corporations make decisions on the basis of their own advantage, notof the public good. The federal government has enormously increased its power, especially in the formof the military industrial complex, in ways that are almost invulnerable to citizen knowledge, much lesscontrol, on the grounds of national defense. The private rewards and the formal freedoms haveobscured from us how much we have lost in genuine democratic control of the society we live in.

3. VALUING THE COLLECTIVE GOOD IS MOST DEMOCRATICAndrei Marmor, JD, THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, July 2001, p. 215.The concept of a collective good is the easiest to define: collective goods are those which require someform of collective action to produce. What marks this concept of a good only concerns its typicalproduction process. There is a considerable variety of goods in our societies which can only be producedcollectively, that is, by the concerted action of numerous individuals, institutions, and agencies.Consider, for example, the goods of national security, the protection of the environment, democraticdecision procedures, adequate health care, and perhaps also science and education; all these goods


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COMMON GOOD IS THE ON LY WA Y TOA DDRESS THE PROBLEMSHUMAN ITY FA CES

1. WE MUST FORGO OUR SELFISH INTERESTS TO SOLVE ISSUES THAT THREATEN HUMANITYClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 5.This reinvigoration of democracy is not proposed as an idealistic project but as a practical necessity. The authorswrite that nowhere is the need more evident than in the international sphere, where problems are beyond thecapacity of any single nation to solve. Our economic life is dominated by the dynamics of a vast world market thatcannot be controlled by the action of any single nation-state. Problems of environmental pollution transcendnational boundaries. The proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens the security of all. Vast disparities in globalwealth and power lead to petering conflicts that endanger economic health and political security around theworld. In a world of increasing complexity and interdependence, we can no longer afford "to go our own way."Rather, we need to exercise our capacity for developing institutions that recognize our interconnectedness,moving toward the creation of "the good society," "where the common good is the pursuit of the good incommon."

2. RAWL S NOTION OF THE PUBLIC GOOD PROTECTS THE MINORITIES FROM OPPRESSIONCarlos A. Ball, AssociateProfessor, University of Illinois College of Law, CORNELL LAW REVIEW, January 2000, p. 457.Rawls defines publicreason in a democracy as "the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires of society's basic structureof institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve." Rawls's view of public reason is consistent withhis original position heuristic, which posits that citizens who do not know their individual characteristics or theirplaces in society's economic and social hierarchies would serve as the optimal prototypes for establishingfundamental principles of justice. As citizens move from the original position to later stages in the creation of awell-ordered society, they can gradually lift the veil of ignorance. Even when citizens are at the last stage of theprocess, when they publicly debate particular policy issues within an established constitutional system, Rawls stillcalls for a separation between political values, which go to the right, and nonpolitical normative and moral values,which go to the good. Rawls explains that this separation protects the political discourse and democratic process,as well as individuals, from majoritarian definitions of the good.3. THE BENEFITS OF THE COMMON GOOD AREAVAILABLE TO EVERYONEClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 3.As these examples suggest, the common good doe not just happen. Establishing and maintaining the commongood requires the cooperative efforts of some, often of many, people. Just as keeping a park free of litter dependson each user picking up after himself, so also maintaining the social conditions from which we all benefit requiresthe cooperative efforts of citizens. But these efforts pay off, for the common good is a good to which all membersof society have access, and from whose enjoyment no one can be easily excluded. All persons for example, enjoythe benefits of clean air or an unpolluted environment, or any of our society's other common goods. In fact,something counts as a common good only to the extent that it is a good to which all have access.

4. FAILING TO HELP THOSE IN NEED IS MORALLY AKIN TO MURDERClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 5.

Giving aid to the poor in other nations may require some inconvenience or some sacrifice of luxury on the part of peoples of rich nations, but to ignore the plight of starving people is as morally reprehensible as failing to save achild drowning in a pool because of the inconvenience of getting one's clothes wet. In fact, according to Singer,allowing a person to die from hunger when it is easily within one's means to prevent it is no different, morallyspeaking, from killing another human being. If I purchase a VCR or spend money I don't need, knowing that I couldinstead have given my money to some relief agency that could have prevented some deaths from starvation, I ammorally responsible for those deaths. The objection that I didn't intend for anyone to die is irrelevant. If I speedthough an intersection and, as a result, kill a pedestrian, I am morally responsible for that death whether Iintended it or not.


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SELF-IN TERSET UN DERMIN ES THE COMMON GOOD

1. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDERMINE CIVIC VIRTUEThomas Franck, Murray and Ida Becker Professor of Law andDirector of the Center for International Studies at New York University's School of Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan-Feb2001, p. 192.Harvard professor Michael Sandel, in his recent book Democracy's Discontent, criticizes theaccommodations made by U.S. law -- judge-made law, in particular -- to an ethos of individual rights that, theclaims, undermines the civic virtues that sustain Americans' sense of communal responsibility. Sandel complainsthat the emphasis placed on individualism in recent years has neutered the state and elevated personal rightsabove the common good. At the international level, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad espouses avariation on the same theme. In 1997, he urged the U.N. to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights by revising or, better, repealing i t, because its human rights norms focus excessively on individualrights while neglecting the rights of society and the common good . Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt,too, says that the declaration reflects "the philosophical and cultural background of its Western drafters" and hascalled for a new "balance" between "the notions of freedom and of responsibility" because the "concept of rightscan itself be abused and lead to anarchy."2. WE MUST REPLACE SELF-INTEREST WITH CONCERN FOR THE PUBLICGOODTim Fort, Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Spring 1999, p.

396-397.The late-twentieth century republican revival in the U.S. has centered on developing a notion of citizenship based in the public good. The most prominent theme of the revival revolves around replacing self-interest with a notion of civic virtue. Interest group liberalism, the republicans argue, simply does not allow for aconversation about the public good. Instead, individuals, particularly members of the judiciary and intellectualelites, must replace the pursuit of self-interest with concern for the common good. This theme leads to the secondtheme of the republican revival. There must be a rethinking of our politics in order to create the room andincentives for consideration of the common good. The common good, the republicans argue, can be defined by adeliberative political structure in which discussion of the good itself becomes the defining feature of politics.

3. A FOCUS ON RIGHTS LEADS TO THE DISPLACEMENT OF INDIVIDUALS FROM THE COMMUNITYCarlos A. Ball,Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, CORNELL LAW REVIEW, January 2000, p. 443-444.Communitarians are critical of the priority that liberals give to individual rights; although communitarians donot deny that rights are important, they do question whether a society should emphasize individual rights overcommunal norms and responsibilities when confronting difficult questions of political morality and justice.Communitarians believe that the liberal focus on rights leads to the separation and displacement of individualsfrom the communities to which they belong. According to communitarians, rights are not preexisting, universalprinciples that are logically prior to community; instead, rights are internal to the shared traditions andunderstandings of particular societies.3. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE IS NOT INTRINSICALLY VALUABLEDaniel Bell, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Winter 2001,http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2001/entries/communitarianism, Accessed February 12, 2004, p. np.Communitarians can reply by casting doubt on the view that choice is intrinsically valuable, that a certain moralprinciple or communal attachment is more valuable simply because it has been chosen following deliberationamong alternatives by an individual subject. If we have a highest-order interest in choosing our central projectsand life-plans, regardless of what is chosen, it ought to follow that there is something fundamentally wrong withunchosen attachments and projects. But this view violates our actual self-understandings. We ordinarily think of

ourselves, Michael Sandel says, as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of thishistory, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic , social attachments that more oftenthan not are involuntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing, rational choice having played no rolewhatsoever on behalf of other peoples interests.


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N egative blocks

Individual Contributions and Charities A re More Trouble Than They re Worth

Individual monetary contributions lead to disorganization and mismanaged funding. Felix Salmon , Winner of the American Statistical Association s 2010 Excellence in Statistical Reporting Award, March 2011 http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/03/14/dont-donate-money-to-japan/

We went through this after the Haiti earthquake, and all of the arguments which applied there apply to Japan as well . Earmarking fundsis a really good way of hobbling relief organizations and ensuring that they have to leave large piles of money unspent in one place while facing urgent needs in other places. And as Matthew Bishop and Michael Greensaid last year, we are all better at responding to human suffering caused by dramatic, telegenic emergencies than to the much greater loss of

life from ongoing hunger, disease and conflict. That often results in a mess of uncoordinated N GOs parachuting into emergency areas with lots of good intentions, where a strategic official sector response would bemuch more effective. Meanwhile, the smaller and less visible emergencies where N GOs can do themost good are left unfunded.

Charities often only treat the consequences of injustices, masking the roots of theproblems.BBCEthics Guide, 2011http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/charity/against_1.shtml

The idea is that charity is wrong when it's used to patch up the effects of the fundamental injustices thatare built into the structure and values of a society. Charity , from this viewpoint, can sometimes be seen as actuallyaccepting the injustice itself, while trying to mitigate the consequences of the injustice.

Constant bombardment by charities makes people less inclined to give.Trevor Jockins, English Professor at Harper College and NYT contributor, July 2011 Linking the cash register to the heart seems to be an outgrowth of the peculiar fantasy that says if we just buy the right fair-trade coffee, the right $3 water, the right salvaged wood for our absolutelygorgeous new flooring, we can alleviate most of the suffering in the world along with our guilt forignoring the pleas for help that arrive in the mail and confront us on the street daily. For the richest of countries,shopping our way to moral purity would be a nice trick, but I have my doubts. Maybe if this weren t such a bigpart of our thinking, people wouldn t try to wring kindness from us at such odd times, or stand so boldly in the street hawking goodness. And

with a little less charity pollution around us, maybe giving wouldn t have to feel so much like beingtaken.


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A ssistance Can Be Detrimental and Should Be Minimized

A ssistance can take many forms, including coercion.Gerhard verland , expert in Philosophy, Anthropology, and Sociology, June 2008 http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&hid=106&sid=ab3a18c7-0387-4711-aed1-ca0914161581%40sessionmgr114A ssistance force is any force applied to ensure that a particular agent assists a person in need. But theterm denotes as well any force which has as a consequence that something happens to a person that will undo the need of another. Forcedassistance is the assistance that comes about as a result of assistance force. The assistance in questiondoes not need to be motivated for the right reasons, nor even be what we normally would callassistance. Pushing someone into a pool to save another person would qualify as assistance force. The fact that this saves Alice means

that the person who was pushed into the water renders what I call forced assistance even though he or she is merely used by Alice as a means

of getting out of the water. Moreover, assistance force may simply be used to alert people about certain needs,after which these people choose to assist because they now see the need for it. I have invented the first label inorder to have a neutral term which covers a variety of ways of using force to ensure help reaches a person or people in need, or at least thatthe bad that is about to happen to him or her is avoided. Whether assistance force is permissible in certain circumstances, and by what means,remains to be seen. In this respect it is on par with defensive force, which covers a variety of ways force can be used to save people from

aggressors, some permissible and some not. Structurally, assistance force might have things in common withcoercion, where people are compelled by force or threats to do things against their will.

A ssistance to foreign people, if given at all, should be minimal and have a clear cut-off point .Henry S. Richardson , Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, November 2005 http://www.iep.utm.edu/rawls/In The Law of Peoples [LP] (1999), Rawls relaxes the assumption that society is a closed system that coincides with a nation-state. Once this

assumption is dropped, the question that comes to the fore is: upon what principles should the foreign policy of adecent liberal regime be founded ? Rawls first looks at this question from the point of view of ideal theory, which supposes that allpeoples enjoy a decent liberal-democratic regime. At this level, with reference to a rather thinly-described global original position, Rawlsdevelops basic principles concerning non-intervention, respect for human rights, and assistance forcountries lacking the conditions necessary for a decent or just regime to arise . These principles govern onenation in its relations with others . He next discusses the principles that should govern decent liberal societies intheir relations with peoples who are not governed by decent liberalisms. He articulates the idea of a decentconsultation hierarchy to illustrate the sort of non-liberal society that is owed considerable tolerance by the people of a decent liberal society.In a part of the book devoted to non-ideal theory, Rawls impressively defends quite restrictive positions on the right of wa r and on the moral

conduct of warfare. Surprisingly, questions of global distributive justice are confined to one brief section of LP. In thatsection, Rawls treats quite dismissively two earlier attempts to extend his theoretical framework to questions of in ternational justice, those of Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1994). Drawing on the ideas of TJ, these philosophers had developed quite demanding principles of international

distributive justice. In LP, Rawls instead favors a relatively minimal duty of assistance, with a definitetarget and a cut-off point. LP at 119.


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Morality Invokes Religion, Problematic

Christian fundamentalists push morality as an answer to all the world s problems.Theodore Schick, Professor of Philosophy at Muhlenberg College, June 1997http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=12671755&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310402458&clientId=48453A lthough Plato demonstrated the logical independence of God and morality over 2,000 years ago in theEuthyphro, the belief that morality requires God remains a widely held moral maxim. In particular , it servesas the basic assumption of the Christian fundamentalist's social theory . Fundamentalists claim that allof society's ills-everything from A IDS to out-of-wedlock pregnancies-are the result of a breakdown inmorality and that this breakdown is due to a decline in the belief of God. Although many fundamentalists tracethe beginning of this decline to the publication of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859, others trace it to the Supreme Court's 1963decision banning prayer in the classroom.

A religious god is the only one who can determine a universal morality.Theodore Schick, Professor of Philosophy at Muhlenberg College, June 1997http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.whitman.edu:2048/pqdweb?index=0&did=12671755&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQ D&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1310402458&clientId=48453In an attempt to neutralize these purported sources of moral decay, fundamentalists across America are seeking to restore belief in God by

promoting the teaching of creationism and school prayer . The belief that morality requires God is not limited totheists, however. Many atheists subscribe to it as well. The existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, says that"If God is dead, everything is permitted." In other words, if there is no supreme being to lay down the moral law,each individual is free to do as he or she pleases . Without a divine lawgiver, there can be nouniversal moral law. The view that God creates the moral law is often called the "Divine Command Theory of Ethics." According tothis view, what makes an action right is that God wills it to be done. That an agnostic should find this theorysuspect is obvious, for, if one doesn't believe in God or if one is unsure which God is the true God, being told that one must do as Godcommands will not help one solve any moral dilemmas.

The Concept of Morality Itself Causes Violence, Conflicts

The most violent and difficult to solve conflicts continue to exist because of invokingmorals.Michelle Maiese , a graduate student of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder and a part of the research staff at the Conflict

Research Consortium, 2010Intractable conflicts are ones that remain unresolved for long periods of time and then become stuckat a high level of intensity and destructiveness. They typically involve many parties and concern an intricate s et of historical,religious, cultural, political, and economic issues. These matters are central to human social existence and typicallyresist any attempts at resolution. In fact, parties often refuse to negotiate or compromise with respectto such issues. A s a result, each side views the rigid position of the other as a threat to its veryexistence . They may develop a mutual fear of each other and a profound desire to inflict as muchphysical and psychological harm on each other as possible. This sense of threat and hostility often pervades theeveryday lives of the parties involved and overrides their ability to recognize any shared concerns they might have. Additional insights into the


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underlying causes of intractable conflicts are offered by Beyond Intractability project participants. A s conflict escalates, anytangible issues may become embedded within a larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures.Disputes about land, money, or other resources may take on increased symbolic significance. Over the course of conflict, the original issues caneven become irrelevant as new causes for conflict are generated by actions within the conflict itself. Those on opposing sides come to vieweach other as enemies and may resort to highly destructive means. Eventually, the parties become unable to separate different issues and may

see no way out of the conflict other than through total victory or defeat . Why do some conflicts become intractable? Manydescribe intractability in terms of the destructive relationship dynamics that govern the adversaries' interaction. For example, if one partyresorts to inhumane treatment in waging conflict, this deepens antagonism and may lead the opposing side to seek revenge. Likewise, whenextremist political leaders appeal to ethno-nationalist ideology to arouse f ear, this may increase support for the use of violence and contributeto intractability. Other factors that make some conflicts extremely difficult to resolve include the vast numbers of people involved, the large

number of complex issues to be r esolved, and a previous history of violent confrontation. But what are the underlying causes of these destructive conflict dynamics? What is common to all intractable conflicts is that they involveinterests or values that the disputants regard as critical to their survival. These underlying causesinclude parties' moral values , identities, and fundamental human needs. Because conflicts grounded in theseissues involve the basic molds for thought and action within given communities and culture, they areusually not resolvable by negotiation or compromise . This is because the problem in question is one that cannot beresolved in a win-win way. If one value system is followed, another is threatened. If one nation controls a piece of land, another does not. If onegroup is dominant, another is subordinate. While sharing is possible in theory, contending sides usually regard compromise as a loss. This isespecially true in societies where natural fear and hatred is so ingrained that opposing groups cannot imagine living with or workingcooperatively with the other side. Instead, they are often willing to take whatever means necessary to ensure group survival and protect theirway of life.

Morals and values are constructed by man and can be twisted into whatever thewielder wants for personal gain .Dale Wilkerson , Professor at University of North Texas, Denton, August 2009http://www.iep.utm.edu/nietzsch/#H4

Nietzsche s philosophy contemplates the meaning of values and their significance to human existence. Given that no absolutevalues exist , in Nietzsche s worldview , the evolution of values on earth must be measured by some othermeans. How then shall they be understood? The existence of a value presupposes a value-positing perspective, and values are created byhuman beings (and perhaps other value-positing agents) as aids for survival and growth. Because values are important for the

well being of the human animal, because belief in them is essential to our existence, we oftentimesprefer to forget that values are our own creations and to live through them as if they were absolute .For these reasons, social institutions enforcing adherence to inherited values are permitted to create self-serving economies of power, so long as individuals living through them are thereby made more secureand their possibilities for life enhanced. Nevertheless, from time to time the values we inherit are deemed no longer suitableand the continued enforcement of them no longer stands in the service of life . To maintain allegiance to such values , evenwhen they no longer seem practicable , turns what once served the advantage to individuals to a disadvantage, and what wasonce the prudent deployment of values into a life denying abuse of power . When this happens the human being mustreactivate its creative, value-positing capacities and construct new values.

A ll values are constructed and meaningless, only action matters.Alan Pratt , Professor of Philosophy at Embry-Riddle University, May 2005http://www.iep.utm.edu/nihilism/#H3

For Nietzsche, there is no objective order or structure in the world except what we give it. Penetrating thefaades buttressing convictions, the nihilist discovers that all values are baseless and that reason is impotent . E ve r y belief,every considering something-true, Nietzsche writes, is necessarily false because there is simply no t r ue wo r ld ( Will to Powe r [notes from1883-1888]). For him, nihilism requires a radical repudiation of all imposed values and meaning: Nihilism is . . . not only the belief thateverything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one s shoulder to the plough; one dest r oys (Will to Powe r ). The caustic strength of

nihilism is absolute, Nietzsche argues, and under its withering scrutiny the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is


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lacking, and Why finds no answer ( Will to Powe r ). Inevitably, nihilism will expose all cherished beliefsand sacrosanct truths as symptoms of a defective Western mythos .


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TO HA VEA SOCIETY THA T WORKS, THE COMMON GOOD CANN OTCOME BEFORE IN DIVIDUA LS

1. WE MUST DEFIN E IN DIVIDUA L RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE GOODCarlos A. Ball, Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, CORNELL LAW REVIEW, January2000, p. 444.State neutrality regarding different, and often conflicting, conceptions of what constitutes a "good life"is important to liberals because it allows individuals to choose the lives that they think are best for them.A state that is neutral as to ends does not impose its version of the good on its citizens. An impartialstate also acts as a neutral arbiter in resolving disputes among citizens. Thus, liberals demand that thestate separate issues of morality from political debates and definitions of rights. In other words, wemust define rights prior to, and independently of, the good.

2. COMMUN ITA RIAN ISM DOESN T WORK IN A PLURA LISTIC SOCIETYLinda Fisher, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice, Seton Hall UniversitySchool of Law, YALE LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, 2000, p. 354.Etzioni's premise in The New Golden Rule, the earlier of the two works, is that a communitarian societyflourishes when the inevitable tension between social responsibility and individual autonomy ismaintained in suitable equilibrium. The "New Golden Rule" - "respect and uphold society's moral orderas you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy" - is his general formulation of the properrelationship between these two values. As expressed, the rule is a maxim an individual can use as aguideline to appropriate behavior. Because the rule is very broadly phrased, however, further culturallyshared principles are needed to guide its application to particular situations, especially when the valuesof order and autonomy clash. Those values clash most acutely in diverse, pluralistic societies. Etzioni setsforth a number of core values shared by Americans, such as a commitment to democracy and theConstitution, but those values are often too general and abstract to support actual resolutions of contentious issues. Moreover, power disparities between groups exacerbate the negative consequencesof unresolved values conflicts.

3. THE IDEA OF A COMMON GOOD IS IN CON SISTEN T WITHA PLURA LISTIC SOCIETYClaire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, NQA, ISSUES IN ETHICS, Spring 1992, p. 3.First, according to some philosophers, the very idea of a common good is inconsistent with a pluralisticsociety like ours. Different people have different ideas abut what is worthwhile or what constitutes "thegood life for human beings," differences that have increased during the last few decades as the voices of

more and more previously silenced groups, such as women and minorities have been heard. Given thesedifferences, some people urge, it will be impossible for us to agree on what particular kind of socialsystems, institutions, and environment we will all pitch in to support. And even if we agree upon whatwe all valued, we would certainly disagree about the relative values things have for us. While a mayagree, for example, that an affordable health system a healthy educational system, and a cleanenvironment are all parts of the common good, some will say the, more should be invested in healththan in education, while others will favor directing resources to the environment over both health andeducation. Such disagreements are bound to undercut our ability to evoke a sustained and widespread


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commitment to the common good. In the face of such pluralism, efforts to bring about the commongood can only lead to adopting or promoting the views of some, while excluding others, violating theprinciple of treating people equally. Moreover, such efforts would force everyone to support somespecific notion of the common good, violating the freedom of those who do not share in that goal, and

inevitably leading to paternalism (imposing one group's preference on others), tyranny, and oppression.


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GOODShelly Woodward, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL,December 1996, p. 464.A third liberal rationale for free speech protection, closely intertwined with the marketplace of ideasand self-government rationales, is the idea of negative liberty. This approach posits that the importanceof individual rights, such as freedom of expression, lies in the ability to prohibit the state frominterfering in the exercise of individual autonomy. The philosophical roots of this approach may betraced to the social contract model of society. Under this model, presocial individuals in the state of nature enter society voluntarily, consenting to form a society that will protect individual rights.Individual rights, then, serve a "checking value," which ensures that the state does not overstep itslegitimacy by encroaching on the individual's ability to make autonomous choices.

2. THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IS BA SED ON THE VA LUE OFA UTON OMYShelly Woodward, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL,December 1996, p. 458.The marketplace of ideas theory asserts that the search for truth is best served by a free exchange of ideas. The philosophical roots of this idea can be traced to the liberal political philosophy of John Locke,John Milton, and John Stuart Mill. Justice Holmes further enunciated this philosophy in his famousdissent in Abrams v. United States, noting that "the theory of our Constitution" is that "the ultimategood desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -- that the best test of truth is the power of thethought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." According to this rationale, theimportance of protecting free speech rests on the importance of individual liberty to make autonomous

choices and to formulate and "pursue a rational plan of life" free from constraint. Only by ensuring thatindividuals have access to competing ideas -- even "false" ideas -- can we ensure that public discourse isrobust enough to produce the truth. Thus, the right has priority over the good. That is, encouraging thefree expression of ideas without government restraints protects the individual's capacity to choose herown conception of the good.

3. DEMOCRA CY IN EVITA BLY EN GEN DERS IN DIVIDUA LISMGeorge Kateb, ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2003, v. 6, i. 1, p. 275.Where democracy exists, there will be individualism. The historical record shows that democracyinevitably engenders individualism. This proposition will be challenged by those who think either thatindividualism can obtain in nondemocratic cultures or that democracy can exist without engenderingindividualism. The paper rejects both contentions. The defining characteristic of democracy is freedom,and the oldest democratic concept of freedom is the Greek one: To be free is to live as one likes.Versions of that definition are found wherever people are or aspire to be democratic. To live as one likesmeans that one is allowed to try out various roles in life. Each person is more than any single role,function, or place in society. Individualism consists in that idea. Only democracy inspires it. It is also truethat democracy, in reaction, produces antidemocratic individualism.

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