CANON 6 of New Judicial Code

PROSECUTOR ROBERT M. VISBAL, versus JUDGE ROGELIO C. SESCON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City,

SC Ruling on Canon 6 Sec 5 - GUILTY of gross inefficiency for undue delay in rendering a decision and is FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with STERN WARNING that another repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004 expressly requires judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case, and undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary as well as lower its standards and brings it to disrepute.It reinforces in the minds of litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly, disabusing which should be the collective concern of all of us in the judiciary.

As correctly pointed out by the OCA, respondent cannot escape liability for the delay by passing the blame on his clerk-in-charge. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of court personnel.

Canon 3.05 and 3.09 of Old Code

Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

For a judge is responsible not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his courts efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions, he ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision, particularly those pending for more than ninety (90) days. That explains why Rule 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

All told, respondent Judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision which is classified as a less serious charge under Sec. 9 (1), Rule 140.[32] Section 11 (B) of the same Rule provides that the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Facts:

Complainant sues respondent for undue delay in rendering decisions wherein this Court imposed upon him a fine of P11,000.00 and sternly warned him that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

It appears that Eugenio Alaba, counsel for the defendant-appellant in the above-stated unlawful detainer case, inquired about the status of the appeal, by letter dated September 1, 2003 which was received by Rosalina M. Padilla, OIC Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 9. To the letter-inquiry, Padilla responded by letter dated September 4, 2003, attaching thereto respondents Order dated February 18, 2003 granting the defendant-appellant an extension of fifteen (15) days or until March 5, 2003 to file her Memorandum. Though that the unlawful detainer case was presumably submitted for resolution on January 9, 2003 after the filing by the defendant-appellants Memorandum. That even if the case was deemed submitted on March 5, 2003, the last day of the 15-day extension granted the defendant-appellant to submit her memorandum, respondent had already incurred a delay of one hundred eighty five (185) days or more than six months when he decided the case on September 5, 2003. In his Comment with Counter-Complaint dated December 18, 2003, respondent faults Delia Tayabas, his clerk-in-charge of civil cases, for failure to submit the case to him in time for his action. He, however, attributes Delias inadvertence to her state of health from November 15, 2002 until January 3, 2003 when she had a miscarriage, and when she got pregnant again during which she frequently got sick until she took her maternity leave of absence from August 26, 2003 up to October 24, 2003 and reported back for work on October 28, 2003. To his Comment, respondent attached the Affidavit of Delia attesting to such claim. By way of Counter-Complaint, respondent charges complainant, who he claims to be a well-known legal gadfly for filing administrative and criminal cases against RTC and Municipal Trial Court officials or personnel, his co-prosecutors, lawyers and other public officials and employees in Leyte purposely to extort money, goods or favor, present or future, with violation of Canons 1, 1.01, and 1.03 (sic) of the Code of Professional Responsibility for maliciously filing the instant case. Thus, respondent alleges that the present complaint against him was filed in order to intimidate him to grant favors relative to the cases filed by complainant and his wife which are now pending before his sala, thereby preventing him (respondent) from performing his duties and functions as Presiding Judge freely and without intervention from any external forces.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs.JUDGE HENRY J. TROCINO, Presiding Judge, JUDGE EDGARDO L. CATILO, Former Acting Presiding Judge, ATTY. JOSEPHINE MUTIA-HAGAD, Clerk of Court, and MS. EVELYN MONTOYO, MS. CLARITA LAMERA, MS. OFELIA GORANTES, and MR. EMEZER ARELLANO, Stenographers, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City, Negros Occidental, Respondents.

SC Ruling on Canon 6 Sec.5 - The Court finds Judge Edgardo L. Catilo, former Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City, Negros Occidental, guilty of undue delay in rendering decision and FINES him P20,000. The Court DIRECTS Judge Trocino and Judge Catilo to decide all the cases subject of the audit within 120 days from receipt of the Courts resolution and to submit to the Court a monthly accomplishment report.

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution states that all cases or matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three months from date of submission.

In this case, Judge Trocino failed to decide 71 cases submitted for decision during the first audit, 33 of which remained undecided during the second audit. On the other hand, Judge Catilo failed to decide 50 cases submitted for decision during the first audit, which was later reduced to 43 cases during the second audit. On the inherited cases, Judge Trocino failed to decide 8 of the 10 cases as of the second audit. Despite directives from the OCA, Judge Trocino and Judge Catilo failed to decide the cases. Judge Trocino also failed to resolve pending motions and dormant cases.

The absence or incompleteness of the transcript of stenographic notes is not a valid excuse for the delay in rendering judgment. Judges should personally take notes of the salient portions of the hearings and proceed to prepare decisions without waiting for the transcript of stenographic notes.3

On the inherited cases with incomplete transcript of stenographic notes, Judge Catilo and Judge Trocino, upon their assumption to office, should have directed the stenographers to speed up the transcription of the stenographic notes and report to the Court their non-compliance.4 A judges failure to take appropriate action shows incompetence in the supervision of court personnel.

Judge Trocino also claimed that he had no knowledge of the cases submitted for decision because Atty. Mutia-Hagad did not remind him of these cases. This is no excuse. Judges and branch clerks of court should conduct personally a physical inventory of the pending cases in their courts and examine personally the records of each case at the time of their assumption to office, and every semester thereafter on 30 June and 31 December.5 Judges ought to know which cases are submitted for decision and they are expected to keep their own record of cases so that they may act on them promptly.6 Moreover, judges cannot be excused by the acts of their subordinates because court employees are not the guardians of a judges responsibility.7 Judges should not rely on their clerks of court for the proper management of the courts business. Judge Trocino should have devised an efficient recording and filing system in his sala so that he would personally know the status of each case and be guided accordingly.

The designation of Judge Catilo and Judge Trocino as Acting Presiding Judges in other branches of the RTC and their heavy caseloads are not excuses for the delay.8 They could have asked the Court for an extension of time to decide the cases but they never did.9 Worse, Judge Trocino waited for the audit team to find out his gross inefficiency.

Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, a less serious charge, is punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.10

Facts:

Judge Marietta H. Alinio (Judge Alinio), who retired on disability on 27 December 1994, previously presided over the trial court. On 21 February 1995, Judge Edgardo L. Catilo (Judge Catilo) of the RTC, Branch 56, Himamaylan City was designated as Acting Presiding Judge until the appointment of Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino) as Presiding Judge on 8 February 1999.

The audit team reported that the trial court had a total caseload of 669 cases consisting of 415 criminal cases and 254 civil and other cases. The audit team found that the trial court had 131 cases submitted for decision which had not been decided within the 90-day reglementary period.1 The audit team also reported that the trial court had 24 motions for resolution and 119 cases which remained unresolved for a considerable length of time, and 25 cases with no initial action since the time of filing.

The audit team also observed that (1) the transcripts of stenographic notes in almost all of the cases were either lacking or incomplete; (2) the entries in the docket books for criminal, civil, and other cases were incomplete or not updated; (3) the records of disposed and archived cases were stockpiled together with the records of the active cases; (4) the monthly reports of cases and the docket inventory reports had erroneous and missing data; and (5) there was late submission of the docket inventory reports.

Judge Marietta H. Alinio (Judge Alinio), who retired on disability on 27 December 1994, previously presided over the trial court. On 21 February 1995, Judge Edgardo L. Catilo (Judge Catilo) of the RTC, Branch 56, Himamaylan City was designated as Acting Presiding Judge until the appointment of Judge Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino) as Presiding Judge on 8 February 1999.

The audit team reported that the trial court had a total caseload of 669 cases consisting of 415 criminal cases and 254 civil and other cases. The audit team found that the trial court had 131 cases submitted for decision which had not been decided within the 90-day reglementary period.1 The audit team also reported that the trial court had 24 motions for resolution and 119 cases which remained unresolved for a considerable length of time, and 25 cases with no initial action since the time of filing.1awphi1.nt

The audit team also observed that (1) the transcripts of stenographic notes in almost all of the cases were either lacking or incomplete; (2) the entries in the docket books for criminal, civil, and other cases were incomplete or not updated; (3) the records of disposed and archived cases were stockpiled together with the records of the active cases; (4) the monthly reports of cases and the docket inventory reports had erroneous and missing data; and (5) there was late submission of the docket inventory reports.

RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICEELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THECOURT OF APPEALS

ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA, versus ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS

SC Ruling on Canon 6 Sec. 5 - Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is SUSPENDED from office without pay, allowances and other monetary benefits for a period of THREE MONTHS.

The Constitution mandates lower collegiate courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within twelve months from date of submission.[26] Section 3, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court requires motions for reconsideration to be resolved within ninety days. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that (J)udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Indeed, the essence of the judicial function, as expressed in Section 1, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court is that justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.

The record shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent had not resolved seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration within the prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred seventy-nine (179) motions for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As of the same date, eighty-two (82) cases submitted for decision were still undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month period prescribed by the Constitution. He had also decided four hundred nine (409) cases beyond the one-year period. Notably, of the seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration pending resolution, forty-six were filed in 2004 or earlier, with one dating all the way back to 2000. Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in 2003, and thirteen in 2004. Respondents proffered justification is that the delay was caused by the reorganization of the CA, his assignment to the CA Cebu Station and his transfer back to Manila which, allegedly, caused some confusion in the assignment of cases and a lapse in the monitoring system. The explanation miserably fails to persuade because the CA reorganization took place only in 2004, and at that time, there were at least thirty-two (32) motions for reconsideration crying out for resolution.. This intolerable inaction is aggravated by misrepresentation. Upon his assignment to the CA Cebu Station, respondent listed only nine (9) cases allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the Investigator belie this assertion. The excuse that respondent was burdened by a heavy caseload, owing to the cases initially assigned to him, those raffled daily and those re-raffled from among the cases originally handled by promoted or retired justices, must also fall flat. As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice, other CA justices are likewise subjected to such a heavy caseload, and yet, have not incurred such inexcusable delay. As to respondents other administrative assignments, including organizing special events, the respondent should only be reminded that decision-making is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the judiciary.[28] The delay incurred by respondent Justice Asuncion in deciding or resolving the numerous cases and matters mentioned above is, therefore, unjustified. Even in the case of PNB v. NLRC and Archinas alone, the respondents failure to resolve PNBs June 13, 2001 motion for reconsideration until after the lapse of more than five (5) years, despite Archinas four (4) motions urging immediate resolution of the same, truly smacks of gross inefficiency and serious dereliction of duty. Worse, it invites suspicion of malice, and casts doubt on the justices fairness and integrity. We have already ruled that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency[29] which, if the case remains undecided for years, would become serious misconduct that would justify dismissal from the service.[30] In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in deciding or resolving such a staggering number of cases/matters assigned to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the respondent to the maximum administrative sanction.

FACTS:

From the record, it appears that respondent Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on May 24, 1999, and assumed office on May 25, 1999. On July 5, 2004, he was assigned as Chairman, 18th Division of the CA, stationed in Cebu City. In an order dated July 7, 2004, CA Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia directed that all Manila cases left by Justice Asuncion shall automatically be assigned to Justice [Monina Arevalo] Zenarosa.[4] On November 3, 2004, Justice Asuncion was re-assigned to Manila, as Chairman, 17th Division, CA. From August 4, 2006 to date, he has been Chairman, 11th Division, CA, Manila.

February 17, 2006 Hon. Artemio V. PanganibanChief Justice, Supreme CourtPadre Faura, Manila Sir: Please direct an immediate judicial audit on Court of Appeals Justice Elvi Asuncion. This magistrate has been sitting on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a year unless the parties come across. This CA Justice is an unmitigated disgrace to the judiciary. How he ever reached his lofty position is truly disconcerting. He is a thoroughly CORRUPT person who has no shame using his office to extort money from litigants. He is equally, if not more, deprave than Demetrio Demetria who was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Asuncion deserves not only dismissal but DISBARMENT as well. Because the law profession should also be purged of CROOKS like him. I hope you can terminate his service in the judiciary ASAP to save the institution. Thank you. Very truly yours, AN AGGRIEVED PARTY

To the foregoing complaint, respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated August 30, 2006[5] in which he strongly denied the charge of deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to him unless the parties came across. He adverted to the unsigned letter as the work of the same group that previously instigated false accusations which also resulted in my being investigated by the Supreme Court through the Hon. Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino. He admitted, however, to some delays in the resolution of some motions for reconsideration, and cited the following justifiable reasons: (1) The heavy caseload initially assigned to CA justices, coupled with the newly assigned cases raffled daily and the re-raffled cases originally handled by promoted or retired justices; (2) The reorganization of the CA and his assignment as Chairman of the 18th Division based in Cebu City, which created some confusion in the status of cases assigned to him; (3) The physical transfer of his office, aggravated by a lapse in the monitoring system of my office; and (4) The various administrative assignments, especially in helping organize special events, given to him by the CA Presiding Justice, which demanded time and attention.

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J As mentioned above, this second case is based on a verified complaint filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, charging Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice and gross ignorance of the law, in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC and Erlinda Archinas. The facts, as culled from the Investigating Justices Report[10], are as follows: On June 27, 2000, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decided in her favor the claim of Ms. Erlinda Archinas for reinstatement and payment of back wages against the Philippine National Bank (PNB), affirming in toto the ruling of Labor Arbiter Celestino Daing ordering her reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of back wages. On August 25, 2000, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the NLRC (CA-G.R. SP No. 60573).Meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment making final and executory the decision of the labor arbiter as of July 17, 2000, pursuant to Sec. 2[c], Rule VIII of the NLRC Rules. Ms. Archinas filed a motion for a writ of execution for the uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97. PNB opposed the motion. In view of the pending petition with the CA, the labor arbiter deferred action on the motion for execution. On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through respondent Justice Asuncion, dismissed the petition of PNB and affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC in favor of Ms. Archinas. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision, to which Ms. Archinas filed, on June 25, 2001, an opposition. On June 25, 2001, PNBs motion for reconsideration was deemed submitted for resolution. In the interim, on June 18, 2001, the labor arbiter granted Ms. Archinas motion for execution of the uncontested amount of P1,096,233.97, for which the Sheriff of the NLRC levied upon personal property of the PNB and scheduled an auction sale on July 25, 2001. Upon motion of PNB, on July 24, 2001, respondent Asuncion issued the questioned resolution, which granted a temporary restraining order to stop the auction sale by directing the labor arbiter to temporarily enjoin implementation of the writ of execution. It likewise ordered the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration.On October 30, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion issued another resolution which reiterated the July 24, 2001 resolution ordering the parties to maintain the status quo in this case pending resolution of PNBs motion for reconsideration. On November 5, 2001, Ms. Archinas filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution.Despite Ms. Archinas filing with the Court of Appeals of numerous motions for early resolution of the motion for reconsideration dated November 5, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion failed to act and resolve the motion.Finally, on August 7, 2006, respondent Justice issued a resolution denying PNBs motion for reconsideration dated June 13, 2001. It, however, failed to directly address and resolve Archinas November 5, 2001 motion for reconsideration. At any rate, it is noted that the denial of PNBs motion would render moot Mrs. Archinas motion for reconsideration.

Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City.

SC Ruling on Canon 6 - meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00 and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations

It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.[17]

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had become moot and academic.

Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,[18] Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that I was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office without due process. It also reads: Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the government service. Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an answer.[19] Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[21] Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic.[22] Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the Bench.

FACTS:

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal cases.[3] On even date, letters[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.[5]

In a letter[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINESADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183 DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11 This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM. x x x x After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.

It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondents direct participation, as it was upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities involved. Accordingly, respondents continuance in office becomes untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy hereof. Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five. (Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos) By the President: (Sgd.)TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. Executive Secretary[7] In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.

In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993[11] which was immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.

ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, complainant, vs. Judge FRANCISCO D. VILLANUEVA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, Quezon City, respondent.

Ruling on Canon 6 Sec. 5 (Undue Delay in Deciding a Case) - FINED P40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

A case is deemed submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the parties, unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.[16] Once a case is submitted for decision, a judge has three months to decide it.[17]

In the present case, the records reveal that Criminal Case No. 31285 was deemed submitted for decision on October 31, 1995, upon the simultaneous submission of the parties respective Memoranda. However, a Decision acquitting the accused was promulgated only on August 6, 1997, or about one year and six months after the lapse of the three-month prescriptive period.

Respondent, however, explained that the case was submitted for decision on February 23, 1996, the day he called the parties to a settlement conference inside his chamber. Assuming arguendo that the case was submitted for resolution on that date, respondent still cannot escape liability, because his Decision was promulgated only on August 6, 1997. Hence, the reglementary period to decide the case had long passed. It is a settled rule that it is not enough for judges to write their decisions; it is also important that they cause the immediate promulgation thereof and make this fact known to all concerned.[18]

Respondent cannot escape liability just because he had a heavy caseload. Nothing prevented him from seeking additional time to dispose of the case.[19] Within the reglementary period, he could have filed a request for an extension of time, but he did not do so. He must therefore face the consequences of his inefficiency and inaction.

Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary.[20] Thus, judges should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required period.[21] To uphold the integrity of their office, their work should at all times reflect the values of diligence and professional competence.

FACTS:

Complainant is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 31285, People versus Fe Floro Valino, for violation of Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law), as amended by P.D. No. 651, for having made false statements in the death certificate of the late Atty. Lope Adriano. The case was decided on May 20, 1997 acquitting the accused in the decision rendered by respondent Judge, which was promulgated on August 6, 1997.

Complainant is the wife of the late Atty. Lope E. Adriano who died while she and her children were abroad. Accused Fe Floro Valino in the criminal case (the live-in partner of the deceased for several years) representing herself as the wife of the deceased in the death certificate was able to have the remains of the deceased interred at the Manila Memorial Park without the complainants consent, thus denying her and her children the right to view him, pay their last respect and have him buried at the Holy Cross Memorial Park, Q.C. where the deceased had bought burial lots. Hence the criminal case that was filed against accused Fe Floro Valino.

Complainant avers that respondent Judge repeatedly delayed the decision in the criminal case that was submitted to him since February 23, 1996. According to her, respondent Judge set several conferences between the parties for a possible amicable settlement instead of rendering judgment within the ninety-day period. And before promulgation of the decision respondent Judge, in open court, advised both parties to settle their dispute, an act which is a clear violation of the law.

She alleges further that respondent Judge showed his ignorance when he acquitted the accused stating, among others, that she (accused) did not intend to falsify the death certificate of complainants husband, considering that what she violated was a special law where intent was not an element. She avers that by acquitting the accused, respondent Judge has condoned criminal acts occasioned by the erroneous entry in the death records of Quezon City.

Finally, complainant charges respondent with conduct unbecoming x x x a judge for cohabiting with another woman not his wife.

In his Answer[3] dated February 23, 1998, respondent explained that he held several conferences between the parties during pretrial and even after the case had been submitted for decision, because he wanted to settle the case amicably. He stated that after the defense rested its case on October 11, 1995, both parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on October 31, 1995. On February 23, 1996, he arranged another conference in his chamber, but the parties quarreled instead. He thus deemed the case submitted for decision.

Respondent acquitted the accused in his May 20, 1997 Decision, because it turned out that complainant had known all along that her spouse and the accused had lived together as husband and wife for more than fifteen years. Further, the accused did not intend to benefit from her alleged misrepresentation. Respondent reasoned that it was in fact complainant, not the accused, who had used her spouses death certificate to claim the benefits from his insurance, bank deposits and Social Security System.

Moreover, respondent attributed his delay in deciding the case to his full docket. He claimed that he had more than 2,900 pending cases as of December 31, 1997, and that he received 200 cases every month.

Finally, he denied he was living with a woman other than his wife. To disprove the charge, he attached his wifes Affidavit of Merit.[4]

CARMEN EDAO, versus Judge FATIMA G. ASDALA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Quezon City,

Ruling on Canon 3 (Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.)

SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, versus JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES,

Ruling on Canon 6 WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Partial Reconsideration of respondent, who in the meantime retired last May 23, 2010, is GRANTED. The Resolutions of April 28, 2008 and February 22, 2010 are SET ASIDE and another is rendered dismissing the complaint against respondent.

FACTS:

Subject of the present Resolution is the second Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Resolution issued on April 28, 2008 reading: The Court resolves to ADOPT and APPROVE the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, Court of Appeals, in the attached Sealed Report and Recommendation dated 31 March 2008 (Annex A). Accordingly, the Court (1) REPRIMANDS respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles for her unauthorized absences for failing to file the necessary leave on 3 May 2005 and 3 August 2005, when there were no subpoenas requiring her court attendance at the RTC of Manila, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely, and (2) DISMISSES the complaint against Judge Adoracion G. Angeles for falsification of certificates of service for lack of merit.[1] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Respondent, Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Caloocan Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121 (until her retirement on May 23, 2010), was charged by then Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (petitioner) with violation of Supreme Court Circulars, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically for unauthorized practice of law, unauthorized absences and falsification of certificate of service. Per the evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator[2] the charge of illegal practice of law was deemed without merit, hence, the Courts Third Division by Resolution of June 5, 2006[3] noted the recommendation and referred the complaint, viz: . . . resolve[d] to REFER this case to a Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records of this case.[4] The case was raffled to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Magdangal M. de Leon for investigation, report and recommendation. By petitioners allegation, respondent actively participated in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 04-230908, for libel, which was, on her complaint, filed against him before the Manila RTC, she appearing at Branch 26 thereof (to which the case was raffled) without her filing leaves of absence on the following dates February 2, 2005, May 3 and 19, 2005, June 14, 15, 22 and 30, 2005, July 12-13, 2005 and August 3 and 11, 2005.Petitioner thus concluded that when respondent indicated in her Certificates of Service that she had rendered service during the questioned dates, she is guilty of falsification and of violation of Canons 3 and 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 3, 7, 22 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[5] After concluding his investigation, the Investigating Justice considering only the remaining issues of falsification and incurring unauthorized absences, reported that respondent is guilty of unauthorized absences on May 3 and August 3, 2005. With respect to the rest of the questioned dates, he held that respondents absence thereon was legally justified as she merely complied with the subpoenas issued by the trial court. On her appearance at the trial court for the May 3, 2005 hearing, respondent asserted, however, that that date was merely an offshoot of an earlier postponed hearing which was covered by a subpoena. She thus concluded that a subpoena was not required for her to attend the hearing on May 3, 2005. As for her appearance at the trial court on August 3, 2005, respondent explained that she went there lunch time on her honest belief that a hearing was set that day, only to be told that it was not, hence, she immediately returned to her office at the Caloocan City RTC and reduced into writing the orders she gave in open court in the cases which were calendared/heard in the morning. The Investigating Justice brushed aside respondents explanation-justifications as lame. He concluded that by not filing any leave of absence to cover such fraction of her official time devoted to other activities outside of her functions as a Judge, she committed absences that are unauthorized, hence, is guilty of violating Canons 3, 7 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, as well as Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. On the charge of falsification of respondents Certificates of Service, the Investigating Justice dismissed the same as it was never shown, much less proven, that respondent judges failure to indicate in her Certificates of Service the fact of her attendance at the court hearings amounted to an obstinate refusal to disclose, or a deliberate concealment of such fact. The Investigating Justice thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for her unauthorized absences on May 3, 2005 and August 3, 2005 and that the charge of falsification be dismissed. As reflected early on, the Court, in its above-quoted Resolution of June 5, 2006, adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice and approved his Recommendation. Respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration which was denied by Resolution[6] of February 22, 2010 of the Court in this wise: Considering the Report and Recommendation dated 4 January 2010 of Investigating Justice Magdangal M. de Leon, Court of Appeals, Manila, on respondents motion for partial reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 April 2008, and it appearing that the lone issue raised by respondent in her motion for partial reconsideration is whether she incurred unauthorized absences during her attendance at the hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on 3 May 2005 (where her attendance thereat as a private complainant was without subpoena which resulted in her unjustified absence from her own court) and on 3 August 2005 (where respondent failed to file a leave of absence rationalizing that she was out only for a few minutes which she compensated by staying in the office and working beyond office hours and the forfeiture of her leave credits in the name of public service); that since her attendance at the hearing at the RTC of Manila was not in connection with her judicial functions at the RTC of Caloocan, the same should not be considered as an extension of her judicial duties but done in her personal capacity necessitating the filing of leave of absence, and considering further the case of Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Delia H. Panganiban (A.M. No. RTJ-96-1350, 18 August 1997), where the Court held that neither good faith nor long, unblemished and above average service in the judiciary can fully justify respondents lapses, and that as an officer of the Court, respondent should conduct herself strictly in accordance with the highest standards of ethics, the Court resolves to DENY respondents motion for partial reconsideration of the Resolution dated 28 April 2008. Hence, the present second Motion for Partial Reconsideration.[7] While as a general rule the Court does not give due course to second motions for reconsideration,[8] this is not without exceptions, as when there is an extraordinarily persuasive reason and after an express leave has been obtained, both of which are present in this case. In denying respondents first motion for partial reconsideration, the Court in its February 22, 2010 Resolution, applied the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Delia H. Panganiban where it was held that a Judges unblemished record will not justify her lapses. However, as correctly pointed out by respondent in her second motion for partial reconsideration, said case should not have been applied, as it presupposes that respondent indeed committed lapses which her long service and unblemished reputation would not justify while she has always maintained that she had not committed the act complained of, that is, the non-filing of the leaves of absence for May 3 and August 3, 2005 because she did not have to. Indeed, if respondent committed no lapse or violation, then the Courts denial of her first motion for partial reconsideration on the basis of the Panganiban decision deserves to be reviewed. After a considered, hard look at the case, the Court finds respondents second Motion for Partial Reconsideration to be impressed with merit. Respecting respondents presence at the trial court on May 3, 2005, while admittedly no subpoena was served on her to appear on said date, that was a re-scheduled date of hearing, the earlier-scheduled hearing having been postponed. There was thus no absolute need for her to be subpoenaed for the purpose. As to the Investigating Judges observation that assuming that respondents attendance in the May 3, 2005 hearing was covered by subpoena, she still needed to secure a Certificate of Service because she was the private complainant: The Court notes that this is merely a matter of practice for government employees who need such certification to show to their superiors that they indeed attended the hearing. In any case, the minutes of a hearing show the parties who are present, hence, such certification becomes a mere surplusage. Respecting respondents going to the trial court on August 3, 2005, the same did not require the filing of a leave of absence. The Investigating Justice himself noted that her absence involved only a fraction of her official time. Section 28 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave [Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292] promulgated by the Civil Service Commission on May, 2008, which reiterates earlier rules governing leaves, provides: Sec. 28. Actual service defined. The term actual service refers to the period of continuous service since the appointment of the official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously approved leave with pay. Leave of absence without pay for any reason other than illness shall not be counted as part of the actual service rendered: Provided, that in computing the length of service of an employee paid on the daily wage basis, Saturdays, Sundays or holidays occurring within a period of service shall be considered as service although he did not receive pay on those days inasmuch as his service was not then required. A fraction of one-fourth or more but less than three-fourth shall be considered as one-half day and a fraction of three-fourths or more shall be counted as one full day for purposes of granting leave of absence (amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998). (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) For a civil servant to thus be required to file a leave of absence, he/she should have been absent for a fraction of three-fourths or more of a full day. In the present case, complainant failed to prove that respondent was away from her office for at least six hours (3/4 of 8 hours working) on August 3, 2005. Upon the other hand, respondent reported for work in the morning, as shown by copies of orders which she issued in open court on cases calendared for consideration in the morning of August 3, 2005. AT ALL EVENTS, at most, respondents absence on August 3, 2005 amounted to half-day or undertime under the aforementioned CSC rule which does not require the filing of a leave of absence, albeit it is deductible against vacation leave credits.[9]