02 NCC #1 & #2 Tanada vs Tuvera

8/6/2019 02 NCC #1 & #2 Tanada vs Tuvera

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2NCC #1

Tanada v Tuvera G.R. No. 63915. April 24, 1985.07/06/20100 Comments

Facts: The subject of the petition is to compel the performance of a public duty and petitioners maintain they need not showany specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The right sought to be enforced by petitioners is a public rightrecognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the generalpublic adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. (see actualcase)b] Letter of Instructions Nos.c] General Orders Nos.d] Proclamation Nos.e] Executive Orders Nos.f] Letters of Implementation Nos.g] Administrative Orders Nos.

Issue: Can the people invoke the right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IVof the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OfficiaGazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or cause the publication in the OfficialGazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of

implementation and administrative orders.

Held: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidentialissuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable."

Ratio: The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden onthe people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. The Chief Justice's qualified concurrence goes nofurther than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. He isnot in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expresslyrecognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the OfficialGazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative

enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislativeor executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

The Court had consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to beinformed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation," (People vs.de Dios, G.R. No. L-11003, August 31, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras) citing the settled principle based on due processenunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents. especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation orcircular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties." Without officiapublication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and Revised Administrative Code, there would be nobasis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of thelaw are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses noone from compliance therewith."

Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizesthat each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, alaw may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. Moreover, Commonwealth Act No. 638 doesnot provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes areequal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No.638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will takeeffect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume the role.

In view of the petitioner's standing

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have nolegal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing thatpetitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances inquestion 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

RENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,

N. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capac

Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau

nting, respondents.COLIN, J.:

oking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be publisheOfficial Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respon

blic officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letttructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

ecifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,

733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 111166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1821829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 1173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-23241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 4438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 6610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-94964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752,1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 18161825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1961968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-5522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 59594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.


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f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

e respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground thatitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the ab

any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication osidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this

ndamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the RCourt, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfuneglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting frooffice, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a righoffice to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remthe ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the pcourt alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done toProtect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by rof the wrongful acts of the defendant.

on the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its objcompel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be givenurse.

e issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case ofSeverino vs. Governor General, 3 thurt held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only inses where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,ependent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply ft when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the queone of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people aarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need nott he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such

erested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

us, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to thendamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position ofnicipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent s

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that therelator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to beenforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicto the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to aparticular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particcircumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and relupon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel fo

respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the UnStates, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other persocould be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appand represent the people in cases of this character.

e reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apuarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public rightognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceould indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor Gengovernment officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for responden

s case.


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spondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for theectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that sincesidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in cial Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil C

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication iOfficial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

e interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of

cisions,4

this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where theslation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determininge of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the den it goes into effect.

spondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the facblication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily react said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itselfvides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts aresolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive andadministrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as maydeemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents orclasses of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documenclasses of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ..

e clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws wto regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basapplication of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive on

rhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vitalnificance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed sothe legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in theasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity

companies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means ofowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themshe specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacionnerica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Realeines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

e very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Officialzette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty musorced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given subst

d reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our minves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publicatio

e publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.viously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impoden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuancesch apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not

blished on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

s needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"uirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be official

ecifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of theof the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official


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Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all suchdecrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official specific contents.

e Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, ve no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect thcision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published oing the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity app

D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar

ations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainagetrict vs. Baxter Bank8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been founbe unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposinduties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 1U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, howthat such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must betaken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, isoperative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannoalways be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as toinvalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,

private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of priordeterminations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the lthe nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. Thesequestions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courtsand federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of aprinciple of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

nsistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under theratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this C

milarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazetteoperative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be era

a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cann

tified."m the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought bitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,

37 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs cacertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed thahese unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 1

urt, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents onal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this h

apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the governa matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been publishOfficial Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take eff

mediately.

HEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidentiuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect

ORDERED.

lova, J., concurs.

uino, J., took no part.

ncepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

parate Opinions

RNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):


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ere is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escoliunable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Offi

zette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

hall explain why.

t is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to applyversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force aect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the

gmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It doow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidentcree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold wme, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such aslative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There

ch requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now apy to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possiblesconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force orectivity.

t is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets foat to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not requpublication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said

ugh that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be boundreby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not thcise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the et it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. Thismentary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in thecial Gazette. 2

t suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must becertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futilitynted out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. Whaprepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose o

estion of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereuld be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisiolegal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems couse. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemedtled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.ere such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its

st facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the duecess aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential dec

ecutive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not alwaysccessfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such atainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional applicatioat is as far as it goes.

Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essentiaeffectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that s

blication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule s taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject t

ception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, RepuNo. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or

ecutive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decreesecutive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That

in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself


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refore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

m authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opin

kasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

EHANKEE, J., concurring:

oncur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rw connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarlycumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consisteessed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must borded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settnciple based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, espepenal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and speciallyormed of said contents and its penalties.

hout official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revisedministrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository whey are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

spondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as ir effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The p

t and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of theblication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by t

itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutionaluirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwt it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreadingost laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette iscessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essentuirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivearlier effectivity date in the law itselfbefore the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the pnerally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

LENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

gree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to beblished. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentihe decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. The

ould be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

ANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

e Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike snstitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affeties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette

e process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any sa prerequisite for their effectivity, ifsaid laws already provide for their effectivity date.

cle 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of theirblication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided" Two things may be said of this provision: Firsviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognt each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode oice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

mmonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must bblished in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distrihe Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines itquency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thelso enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and


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olutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders anclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are requ

be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law doesvide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for alltutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such asmmonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision n as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

ine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no

son should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar ds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

evas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

oncur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in tcial Gazette.

LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

oncur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or generalplicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

parate OpinionsRNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

ere is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escoliunable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Offi

zette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

hall explain why.

t is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to applyversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force aect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From thegmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It doow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidentcree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold wme, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such aslative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There

ch requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now apy to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possiblesconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force orectivity.

t is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets foat to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not requpublication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be saidugh that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound

reby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not thcise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the et it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. Thismentary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in thecial Gazette. 2

t suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must becertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futilitynted out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. Whaprepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose o

estion of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior there


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uld be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisiolegal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems couse. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemedtled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision.ere such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its

st facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the duecess aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential dec

ecutive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always

ccessfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such atainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional applicatioat is as far as it goes.

Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essentiaeffectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that s

blication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule s taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject t

ception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, RepuNo. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or

ecutive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees

ecutive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myselfrefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

m authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opin

kasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

EHANKEE, J., concurring:

oncur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rw connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarlycumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consisteessed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must borded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settnciple based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, espepenal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and speciallyormed of said contents and its penalties.

hout official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revisedministrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository whey are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

spondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as ir effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The pt and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of theblication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by t

itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutionaluirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwt it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreadingost laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette iscessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essentuirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivearlier effectivity date in the law itselfbefore the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the pnerally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

LENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

gree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be


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blished. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentihe decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. The

ould be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

ANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

e Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike snstitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affe

ties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazettee process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any sa prerequisite for their effectivity, ifsaid laws already provide for their effectivity date.

cle 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of theirblication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided" Two things may be said of this provision: Firsviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognt each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode oice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

mmonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must bblished in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distrihe Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines itquency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thelso enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts andolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders anclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are requ

be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law doesvide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for alltutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such asmmonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision n as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

ine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for noson should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar ds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

evas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

oncur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in tcial Gazette.

LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

oncur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or generalplicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

otnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be

recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official actransactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may bprovided by law.

2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; AlmarioCity Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Com95 SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486;Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vsSocial Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.


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5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 1Phil. 150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jthe Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respecdates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No rehas been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of otherpresidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection ArticSec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 AL1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publicationstatute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. Wvs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
http://tmp/svlc9.tmp/javascript:history.back(1)


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2NCC #2

Summary: Tanada v. Tuvera (GR L-63915, 29 December 1986)

Tanada v. Tuvera

[GR L-63915, 29 December 1986]

Resolution En Banc, Cruz (J) : 8 concur

Facts:On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential

issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was

concurred only by 3 judges. Tanada, et al. moved for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions.

Issue:Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided," in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity or to the

requirement of publication itself.

Held:The clause "unless it is otherwise provided," in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the

requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make

the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and

not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do

not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only

to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Publication requirements applies to (1) all

statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the

President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred

by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant

also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly

affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which thatbody is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal

in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by

administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their

duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies, assignments of personnel, etc. Municipal ordinances are not

covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose

is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of

the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,

and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. It should be published in the Official


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Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the

laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of

publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law.

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationG.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986LORENZO M. TA;ADA vs. JUAN C. TUVERARepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.

(MABINI),p e titio n e rs,vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,

HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to thePresident, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL.,re sp o n de n ts.

R E S O L U T I O N

CRUZ,J .:Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of

presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so

when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that theywere to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this caseon April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these

decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move forreconsideration/clarification of that decision.1 Specifically, they ask the following

questions:


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1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which arenot?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinctionbetween laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication meanscomplete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official

Gazette.2In the Comment3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motionwas a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on themerits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code

meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,

when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any casethe subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently notbinding. This elicited a Reply4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February

Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view ofthe supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,

he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of agovernment agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; thatpublication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not

supported by eight members of this Court.5The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of theirpublication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall

take effect one year after such publication.After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the

original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not tothe requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause

does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately uponapproval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion

provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the originaldecision,6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its

publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general ruledid not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed withaltogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it

would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislaturecould validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval

notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after


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publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a resultand they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they

did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as iscommonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on

prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect beforethey can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is tohave any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 ofthe Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public

concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, thelegislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, forstrictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do notapply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,

like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surelycannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionablydoes not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public

interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, ifhe is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing onthe public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as anu ltra

vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interesteven if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore thata ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws,shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after

publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by thePresident in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated

by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrativerules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce orimplement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only thepersonnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.

Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by

administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it appliesto only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of thatplace. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a

public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions orrequirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they aremeant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that

body is supposed to enforce.However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of

Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laiddown by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his

personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances arenot covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.


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We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the

petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of suchdecree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,

and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publicationrequirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably

of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.7 Theevident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categoricallyfor publication in the Official Gazette8 and that six others felt that publication could bemade elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed.9 One reserved his

vote10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication withoutindicating where it should be made.11 It is therefore necessary for the present

membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down abinding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in theOfficial Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,

newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a widerreadership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication

is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendmenthas been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed tosuch a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet

been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal ormodify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the

legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved

by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribedprocedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of

the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and notelsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication

or after a different period provided by the legislature.We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as

possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered

unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause itspublication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at

this time.Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request foran advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once againan open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny andavailable always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remaindemocratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority

emanating from them.Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority toreview the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,


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through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if theacts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in theshadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules

cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by avalid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.

The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the nakedblade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediatelyupon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the OfficialGazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another

date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., andParas, JJ., concur.

Separate OpinionsFERNAN,J .,co n cu rrin g:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member ofthe defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by

which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands ofdecrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power

which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whimsand caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in

those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidentialdecrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In

point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's

nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped withairconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also onMarch 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and

Dennis George StillThe categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law maybe made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the sametime, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information

on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J.,co n currin g:I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice IsaganiA. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of

what the Court is saying.A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately uponapproval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon

publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Suchstatute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effectimmediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so tointerpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by thedue process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to andunknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common

tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom


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a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a governmentand its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the OfficialGazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general

circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. Thestatutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced bySection 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative

Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publicationmay therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a

constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, forpublication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in thecountry. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Codemust be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other

medium.

Separate OpinionsFERNAN,J .,co n cu rrin g:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member ofthe defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner bywhich the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of

decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making powerwhich traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims

and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, inthose days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential

decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. Inpoint is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,

1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President'snephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with

airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also onMarch 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and

Dennis George StillThe categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law maybe made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the sametime, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information

on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J.,co n currin g:I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice IsaganiA. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of

what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately uponapproval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon

publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Suchstatute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effectimmediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so tointerpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by thedue process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to andunknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common

tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom


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a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a governmentand its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the OfficialGazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general

circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. Thestatutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced bySection 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised AdministrativeCode. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication

may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating aconstitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, forpublication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in thecountry. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Codemust be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other

medium.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 242-250.

2Ib id, pp. 244-248.

3Id, pp. 271-280.

4Id, pp. 288-299.

5Id, pp. 320-322.

6 136 SCRA 27,46.

7 Rollo, p. 24,6.

8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo Relova.9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, VicenteAbad-Santos, Efren 1. Plana Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.

10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation WebRep

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