भारतीय वायुसेना-FLIGHT SAFETY

Air Chief Marshal PV Naik PVSM VSM ADC

I am happy to know that that the Institute of Flight Safety is publishing its Golden Jubilee issue of ‘Aerospace Safety’ magazine. Over the years, the contribution of this magazine in

spreading safety awareness has been phenomenal.

The IAF is in the midst of a comprehensive modernization with acquisitions of latest weapon platforms and sensors to meet our expanding interests, responsibilities and capabilities. However, a superior arsenal is no guarantee for success, unless we have the right human element with the right orientation for operations as well as flight safety aspects. Any aviation accident or incident is a huge setback as it directly affects our combat potential. We need to relentlessly pursue our safety concepts and put them to practice at all times. Let us be passionate about safety. Only then will we achieve the desired safety record. Flight Safety has to be an attitude and a way of life for each and every Air Warrior and not just those directly associated with operations.

Let us renew our commitment to the growth and consolidation of our Aerospace Power and with a hope and prayer that for every take off there must be a happy landing!

Jai Hind !

Air Chief MarshalChief of the Air Staff

Air Marshal AS Karnik AVSM VM

It gives me immense pleasure in launching this ‘Golden Jubilee’ issue of ‘Aerospace Safety’ magazine. Its publication began in 1961 with a sole aim to create and constantly improve the safety environment in our

organization. It provided a common platform for all our air warriors to share their experiences in their field of operation, so that relevant safety lessons could be learnt and imbibed in our functioning. I can say with conviction that this journal has always lived up to its expectations and has attained international acclaim.

Over the years its scope and circulation has increased manifold. The content varies from new concepts, HE-VOLREPs to anything which directly or indirectly affects aerospace safety. This publication has a cascading effect in spreading the aerospace safety awareness down to its lowest level. Though any safety measure has intangible results, I am sure this magazine has been instrumental in avoiding many incidents and accidents.

The IAF inventory and doctrine has gone through a sea change since its formative years. We are in the process of acquiring and inducting state of the art aircraft and equipment. In this hi-tech and cost-intensive environment any incident or accident is absolutely undesirable. To create ever safer environment for our air warriors my branch is working on a multi-pronged strategy and this magazine is one of its prongs.

I take this opportunity to once again reiterate to all the patrons of this esteemed publication to bring out their experiences having safety connotation. You never know you may be the instrument in preventing a future accident.

Happy reading!!!

AS KarnikAir MarshalDG(I&S)

IND IAN A IR FORCE6 Aerospace Safety Year Book - April 2 0 11

Flight Safety Jan 1997

IND IAN A IR FORCE 72 0 1 1 April - Year Book Aerospace Safety

The Republic Day flypast staged before Beating Retreat ceremony and the Air power demonstration

brought back many memories of my association with the Indian Air Force. However, today I will only mention those relating to its early days.

The first flypast in Independent India was carried out without any rehearsal on 15th August, 1947 when the late Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, unfurled the new national flag on the western ramparts of the Red Fort. The flypast consisted of 12 Tempest aircraft. It was led in three sections of four aircraft each. The aircraft flew through many flocks of birds and it was sheer chance that none was hit. Over that densely populated area any accident could have had quite disastrous results. Due to these dangers, no flypast has been carried out over the Red Fort thereafter.

During World War II, the Air Force was having trouble in getting recruits in adequate numbers for pilot and other training. To make people air-minded “a Display Flight” was started with a distinguished pilot, the late Wg Cdr Majumdar as its Commanding Officer; he was killed doing aerobatics in a display over Lahore. On his death I took over and gave aerobatic displays with a single Harvard aircraft. How times have changed and skills improved over these years. The Thunderbolts, led by Wg Cdr Brar and equipped with 8 Hunter jets put up an aerobatic display which could be the envy of any Air force.

What a change from the days when I went to the Royal Air Force College,

Cranwell, England, In 1938. Before I left for my flying training I was given advice by relatives and friends to “fly low and fly slow”. During training, we had more accidents due to these two causes, that is, flying slow and stalling and flying low and hitting trees and electric cables even with those World War I vintage airplanes.

The Second World War started on 3rd September, 1939, when I was still under training at Cranwell. The same night there was an Air Raid alert and we spent most of the night sitting in an open trench. Later it was discovered that it was an English aircraft returning from France but declared hostile by the control setup through panic.

After commissioning, I stayed on in England for further training during the so called ‘twilight’ period of the war. However, early in 1940 I joined No. 1 Squadron, the only squadron the Indian Air Force had, despite the fact that it was formed in the early thirties. The build-up of this squadron had been really slow adding two or three pilots each year. It was commanded by Squadron Leader Mukerjee, the first Indian to command this unit. The squadron was in a delicate position as there was always an attempt to compare it, at times with some built-in prejudices, with British Air Force units based at the station. I remember that for the first fortnight with the squadron, I was not allowed to fly an aircraft but only clean it. Within a few days it was sparkling in the sun. When a decision was taken presumably by the squadron commander that I may fly the aircraft I had flown during my training days, I was tested by three squadron pilots including himself


before giving me the green light to go solo. Such care and thoroughness was responsible for maintaining high standards in the squadron.

With the war on in Europe, there were signs of the dark clouds of war building up in the East. The build-up of the Defence Forces in India had started to meet the challenge in the East and thereby help the war effort in Europe and the Middle East. Additional facilities for training pilots were built up and the Indian Air Force had to be given some operational training. For that purpose, the North West Frontier was an ideal place where the Pathans had continued their valiant fight against the British and Indian troops for many decades. One also got the feeling that the British were not keen to stop fighting as it gave them a place or battle experience. It was with this aim in view that No. 1 Squadron, of which I was a member, moved to the North West Frontier. We all had high regard for the Pathan. We considered him a very honourable man and a courageous fighter. The Air Force went into action only when movement of our troops supplying our forward posts was interfered with. At times Pathans were using modern arms captured from our troops and they used them with great effect. I had personal experience of this when I was flying in support of our troops guarding a road to a military camp. When I was diving and firing my machine guns, the engine fluttered and then stopped, I had some extra speed so I climbed up and looked around for a place where I could put down the aircraft with the dead engine.

I ultimately landed in a dry river bed. When our troops arrived, they counted 16 bullet marks in and around the engine. The Pathans firing captured machine guns had scored handsomely and downed in aircraft. Such cases were not common but we had many aircraft returning with a couple of bullets.

We pilots had great respect for the Pathan. The civil administration had some contacts with them and I remember that once we had arranged a shooting competition against them on our firing range. We were surprised that in this organized way, our shooting was a little more accurate than theirs.

While we were getting some operational training on the Western frontier, the war in East was approaching our borders. The Japanese were advancing fast and there was much panic in India. The Defence Forces in India were hardly prepared to face a well-equipped enemy. However, frantic efforts were in hand in India and the Indian Air Force was equipping, training and expanding to meet that threat. No.1 Squadron, under the command of that daring officer, Squadron Leader Majumdar, was despatched to Burma to help our retreating army to delay the Japanese advance. From then onwards the Indian Air Force was fully engaged on the Eastern front, the climax being reached during 1944. Though I was flying to Burma mostly for communication work during 1942, it was not till 1944 that I got fully involved in the war on the Eastern border.


I was commanding No. 1 Squadron at Koha, when towards the end of the 1943 we got orders to move to Imphal during the first week of January 1944. Though based in India, most of our flying was over Burma. Flying over thick tropical jungle is quite unnerving. The pilots knew that in case of engine trouble, the chance of survival were rather remote. I remember that we were given a number of lectures on how to survive in the jungle. Getting out of a thick jungle is quite a problem as one loses orientation. Another problem is food. Though we carried some rations, these could be lost during a crash or parachuting. So we also learnt how kill and live on snakes and there is no shortage of such creatures in jungle.

During my time at Imphal as Commanding Officer of No. 1 Squadron, another incident comes to my mind. My squadron was equipped with Hurricane aircraft. However I was keen to fly a Spitfire which had earned even more fame in the Battle of Britain. The Headquarters in Imphal Valley had a Spitfire. After taking permission from the boss I did a couple of sorties locally. It was a very pleasant and more powerful aircraft to fly. The desire of most pilots is to fly higher and faster. To satisfy my ego further I took up an operation over Burma. I saw a truck on a jungle road and started attacking it with cannon fire. Immediately after the attack and during the process of levelling and pulling out, my engine fluttered and stopped. I was sweating with fright, as the countryside down below was

thick jungle and hostile. In a frenzy I moved my hands to many knobs which pilots are trained to check in such an emergency. When I moved the knob of the extra fuel tank, the engine picked up just before the aircraft reached the stalling speed. I became normal within a few minutes though when I look back I still vividly remember with awe my foolhardy act and the good luck I had on that day.

Lastly, I may mention just another incident. When the Imphal Valley was surrounded, our forces were expecting an attack for its capture at any time. I and another pilot were returning in a twin sortie over Burma about half an hour before sunset when I saw hordes of soldiers pouring down the slopes. They were undoubtedly the attacking Japanese forces making a dash for taking up positions for a night attack. Later we learnt that their objective was the Corps Headquarters. I informed the control about this force and they ordered every aircraft of No. 1 Squadron to take off and attack. By sunset all our aircraft—sixteen of them—were attacking the invaders. We later learnt that the invaders turned back after heavy casualties and thereafter no such daring attack was launched on the valley.

This action of No. 1 Squadron, in my opinion saved the Imphal Valley from capture by the Japanese and being a part of the squadron, I always look back on it with nostalgia and satisfaction.

- Reproduced from Flight Safety published in Jan 1997, written by the Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh DFC.


Flight Guardian Jan 1962


INTRODUCTION

The problem has been dealt within three phases :

Phase I: The causes of inefficiency �Phase II: Detection of these causes �Phase III: Correction of faults �

leading to inefficiency

The subject has been dealt with reference to already qualified pilots as distinct from cadet pilots, under training. Cadet pilots offer a simpler problem as any gross, permanent unsuitability leads to screening out. Qualified officer pilots, on the other hand, offer very serious problems when inefficiency of a major nature is found. Their discharge is extremely wasteful, and their retention in other branches of the service, although indicated from a flying safety point of view, is not altogether desirable as it provides a dangerous precedent as a way out of moral responsibilities leading to the undermining of the dedication and spirit of a fighting service.

Of all the causes of inefficiency, fear maybe considered to be the most difficult to eradicate, rather to bring down to the normal levels wherein it may be controlled without the danger of a psychological breakdown. Basically, fear will be felt as a fear of death or injury. In considering this basic fear it must be remembered that fear itself is a natural human characteristic, necessary for the survival of the species, and must be accepted as one of the built-in mechanisms of the human body. However, when this fear becomes excessively intense, is unduly prolonged, or is caused by trivial stimuli, it is then abnormal

and undesirable. If the fear is uncontrollable, leading to Panic and breakdown, it becomes a matter for purely medical or psychological treatment, but when it is just sufficiently abnormal to merely cause a strong dislike for certain aspects of flying, or for flying in general, it will then result in an inefficiency which is undesirable from both the operational and flying safety points of view, even though the individual may continue to appear an entirely normal and stable personality.

PROFESSIONAL ANXIETY

By professional anxiety is meant the anxiety of a balanced competent man who fears that he will be unable to make the grade required of a successful pilot. Assuming that the individual is mentally and physically capable, this anxiety should normally be the result of inexperience or ignorance. Generally, this anxiety should therefore be met with only during basic training, a time when the student pilot does not know his flying capabilities and is easily discouraged. If basic intelligence, muscular co-ordination and physical fitness are satisfactory, such anxieties should disappear after the first solo or mid-term test stages. Occasions and circumstances may arise, however,


when even qualified pilots are confronted with the same anxieties and, though otherwise competent, the fear of being found lacking will sometimes show in a positive deterioration of flying skill. If not caused directly by some new, unfamiliar type of flying in which the individual suddenly finds himself engaged it may also be caused by the effect of an instructor or Flight Commander who refuses to be pleased and whose criticisms are destructive and unfair.

The net result is a loss of confidence the onset of the anxiety and a loss of flying efficiency.

EMOTIONAL UPSET

By emotional upset is meant the factors other than flying itself. They would be presumably, of a matrimonial, pre-matrimonial or financial nature. As far as a normally adjusted individual is concerned, the causes of such worries would be of a magnitude which is likely to have a major effect on his life or career. Even worries of a minor nature may suffice to cause the upset if the individual has a distorted sense of values. In either case, the final effect is a change in outlook, enthusiasm and concentration. Less attention will be paid to the job and

“As far as a normally adjusted individual is

concerned, the causes of such worries would be of a magnitude which is likely to have a major effect on his life or career. Even worries of a minor nature may suffice to cause the upset if the individual has a distorted sense of values. In either case, the final effect is a change in outlook, enthusiasm and concentration. Less attention will be paid to the job and flying efficiency will suffer.


flying efficiency will suffer. In extreme cases, the upset may be so severe as to become obsessional. The hazard involved in making such a person fly is correspondingly greater.

LACK OF TRAINING

Lack of training is an obvious factor causing lack of flying proficiency. What is worth noting is that it arises through various reasons, some of which are not generally thought of. In general the training of a student pilot is conducted according to laid down syllabi and programmes and any inherent defects that exist is this training on account of considerations of safety, have to be accepted. For example, limitations are imposed with regard to very low level navigation or flying in dangerous weather, merely because the risks involved are too great, even though under operational conditions they may have to be taken. Such losses of training are acceptable, but beyond this, there may be a still further loss of training for which there is no valid excuse. For example such occurrences when a course is pushed through on account of an end-of course deadline, Pupils are made to fly several sorties a day, usually at advanced exercises, and eventually learn very little on account of staleness and fatigue.

At the same time careful observation, not only in the air, but also on the ground in all aspects of his daily life should be resorted to with the object of judging his behaviour with reference to the five causes given in Phase 1. For example, signs of unusual nervousness while riding in a car may prove significant. A marked change in his normal habits may

point to emotional upset. A disregard or contempt for the service in general may show poor motivation for flying. On the other hand, persistent recklessness while operating a car or motor cycle will help dismiss any theories as to the existence of abnormal fear for his life.

The whole problem simplifies when those of the five causes which obviously do not apply are eliminated. Considering the fact that the inefficiency is overall, the chances are that the final cause will narrow down to either abnormal fear or emotional upset. An emotional upset, if present, should not be too difficult to detect provided a sympathetic atmosphere exists. Finally if the inefficiency is long-lasting and shows no signs of diminishing, abnormal fear is very likely to be part, if not the whole, of the cause.

SPECIFIC INEFFICIENCY

When it is established that the inefficiency is restricted to a particular aspect of flying or a particular exercise, the analysis becomes simpler but more critical. It becomes simpler because emotional upset and lack of interest may be ruled out. This is particularly so when the pilot’s performance in OTHER difficult aspects is of a high

oint to emotional upset A disregard or


standard. Professional anxiety, if it is a possibility, is not serious, provided the pilot is taught properly and handled correctly. In this case only experience is needed to overcome his inefficiency and his cure is, therefore, only a matter of time.

However, if the inefficiency is caused by fear or lack or training, the analysis becomes critical particularly in the former case. For example, a pilot who shows up very poorly in dog-fights, tail-chase and aerobatic exercises may not necessarily be incapable at those exercises. If his imagination has crystallized his fear of death into the spinning process, his failure may be due to an abnormal fear of going into a spin, and no amount of training at dog-fights will improve him unless he first conquers his spin phobia. On the other hand pilot’s imagination or previous experience may cause him to apply his fear of death essentially to the process of touching down, in which case his entire circuit flying upto and including the landing may be adversely affected, particularly at night.

In such cases, therefore, analysis into the causal factor must not merely stop at fear of the exercise itself, but should continue until the pilot’s peculiar phobia becomes clear. I.F. sorties according to the laid down pattern are specially helpful in pinpointing these

phobias, PROVIDED that the pilot’s basic ability to fly on instruments is good. Some pilots will show marked nervousness at high altitude only, others only during recovery from unusual attitudes, others only at the latter part of the let-down.

These peculiarities become significant when linked with similar performances noticed during other kinds of sorties.

Finally, during this analysis, attempts must be made to discover gaps in the pilot’s training. Spin phobia may be coupled to a poor aerobatic background. While nothing can be directly done about the spin phobia, the poor aerobatic background can be corrected and improved.

Pilots suffering from a severe emotional upset should not be permitted to fly until their difficulties are resolved or until they may safely be considered reconciled to any change in their life pattern. In such cases the granting of leave, together with direct assistance, where possible, should provide the solution.

Simple lack of interest is finally a disciplinary responsibility of the immediate superior. Professional anxiety is essentially short-lived provided there is no willful destruction of the pilot’s confidence and morale.

Lack of training by itself will also offer no special difficulty provided it is corrected by the right man in the right manner. The affected pilot must necessarily be put into the hand of a competent, sensitive instructor pilot

standard Professional anxiety if it is a

pthflSmhofrop


who cannot only teach but also build up confidence by proper reassurance and the demonstration of a healthy attitude towards flying. In order to remove the restrictions applying to a mechanical flyer, he must not only be capable of identifying himself with the aircraft; he must also be aware of the need to make this quality manifestly clear and to urge the affected pilot to develop an outlook wherein the aircraft is considered as an extension of his own body rather than as a separate entity which is controlled remotely and mechanically according to rules. In essence, the correcting pilot should be a natural flyer who is aware of and can teach, or put over, the natural flyers qualities.

The last and most difficult correction to be applied is that for abnormal fear. The mental factors causing the fear are probably deep rooted and the mental processes controlling it are likely to be so complex as to require professional psychoanalysis. If the fear is chronic to the extent that a psychological breakdown is imminent, or if it is sufficiently severe to turn even a simple sortie into a mental ordeal, the Squadron Commander should immediately refer the case to the M.O. for his decision regarding

psychological treatment. One thing which is certain is that forcing such a man to fly with vague exhortations to go forth and do-or-die, will achieve no good at all.

The Squadron and Flight Commanders’ concern will consequently apply mainly to those pilots who are suffering from a fear which is just sufficiently abnormal to reduce their flying ability to a standard below normal. In such cases it would not appear advisable to directly attempt making the pilot conquer his fear. This amounts to a mature psychoanalysis and the attempt is likely to become ridiculous. The only action open to them is to arm the pilot with more experience and more confidence, in an effort to give him a more powerful weapon to use in controlling his fear. This must necessarily be a slow process and must not be hastened. The use of unlimited dual instruction is invaluable. The more skilled he becomes the greater will be his control over his fear, which will be followed, in turn, by a reduction in the intensity of his fear.

The use of a simulator may also prove additionally valuable as the increase in skill can now be achieved under conditions where there is no danger of death at all. Attempts to directly restore the balance, of the individuals mind must be left in the hands of the M.O., or carried out strictly according to his advice.

- Reproduced from Flight Guardian Published in Jan 1962, written by then Sqn Ldr D. A. La. Fontaine.

who cannot only teach but also build


History of aviation has been colourful and enchanting from the very beginning. On its broad and extensive canvas the artist would depict brilliant flashes of

colour, strong lines of contours and curves, significant and enchanting designs, as also a few blobs and blotches perhaps in black.

This history has been made by the people who fly, and those who design and manufacture the aircraft. Those who are in design and manufacture are proverbially the back-room boys. Those who fly are obviously the prominent characters in this panorama. Let’s talk about them.

Now, this business of talking can be rather difficult unless we know whom we are talking about. It seems we can talk freely about the fliers in general, as also about those who are not bothered as to what we say. In any case, as per the Ten Commandments of service customs, we shan’t talk about our superiors.

Flight Guardian Oct - Dec 1969


So we come to our young pilots and those who couldn’t care less about us.

You know very well that fliers have abilities of various descriptions. In fact many of them are versatile in the air, and some of them even more so while on ground, over here.

The primary ability which makes a flier is the ability to fly aircraft—aircraft of various shapes and sizes, of different vintages and manufacture, of various performances and limitations. They fly such aircraft as the aircraft should be flown, and sometimes in manners in which the aircraft do not wish to be flown.

They proceed to their destination generally on the ETA, occasionally ahead of it, and sometimes well behind. In some cases they come to a conclusion before the destination, causing a lot of confusion and frustration for the administration.

In every such case everybody wonders as to what happened. Sometimes they find mechanical and physical defects and deficiencies. In some cases they find that the flier was enticed away from his stipulated course of activities.

If the pilot has been enticed away, the inducement must have been very interesting. Of course we know about the instances when just a “waving-date” with the popsie or the fiancée —who would be standing on her rooftop—had been inducement enough for a diversion and descent to an uncomfortably low level.

Talking about inducements, we happen to come to many peculiar variations, and some of them are capable of no logical explanations. We hardly have a pilot who is a botanist or a forestry-man. But some have collected branches and foliage from tree tops. Harvesting is by no means the recorded speciality of any of our pilots, but a few of them have been ploughing the fields. None has ever trained a pilot to do surf-riding in an aircraft, but some of them have really managed it.

You would readily believe that a bevy of beautiful girls on a beach deserve a real close look while you are on ground. But it is surprising that even a deserted sandy beach has sometimes been inducement enough for the chap in the air to scratch his underbelly with it. The spans of bridges and the familiar hangars (with their doors wide-open on both sides) —have also been sportive inducements in more countries than one.


Be that as it may, shall we talk of what all this involves?

Now, there was a fellow by the name Newton, who had a lot of imagination. He thought and talked about action and reaction. And in fact he discovered for the world a vital (and universal) solution for this problem of action and reaction.

You would probably chuckle when

you hit your knuckle with the other fellow or head. But the pain is not one-sided, knuckle gets the pain just as much as fellow’s nut. The “feeling” of pain may be somewhat different as between these two, but the “impact force” of action and reaction is just the same. It amounts to the head hitting the knuckle with some speed (as the knuckle did) and thus cause the pain.

If you hit a stone while running fast,

it might break a bone and put you in plaster-cast. Frankly speaking, the stone was merely there on the ground, at rest. You hit it at considerable speed. But that had the effect as the stone speeding fast and hitting you!!

The substance of all this was

summarised by Newton in what is called the third law of motion which says “action and reaction are equal and opposite”.

Now you see it? The action you take

is “RETURNED” with full force. The impact you make on the others may cause destruction (and damnation) to you in an EQUAL measure! Well then, coming to brass tacks, how is the force and what can it do?

I am sure you don’t like Maths, nor

do I. So let’s forget about Maths, and

talk in terms of simpler things that don’t deserve your wrath.

Let’s take a small branch of a tree,

weighing just 40 lbs/20 kg. If you hit it while flying at 300 mph, the branch “hits you back” and the momentum of impact is terrific, which is the equivalent of a motor-cycle hitting headlong a dead-wall at 30 mph. Now you can make a fair estimate of the damage that this impact is going to cause to the hitting part of the aircraft.

If you happened to be flying at 600

mph, the impact-force would clearly be twice of that thing; and unfortunately the damage or destruction would also be correspondingly more devastating.

Hitting anything that has weight is

troublesome. The trees, the standing crops, water, or the soil/sand on the earth’s surface—all have weight. If the surface of the earth has pebbles or stones in place of loose soil—well; I think your imagination is catching-up with the probable effects of the situation.

If you consider the incidents when the wing hits anything (like the pylon of a bridge or the side of a hangar), you will agree that there would be two different types of effects. Firstly


of course is the momentum of the action- and-reaction business together with the damage arising therefrom; and secondly, that this force acts as a tremendous bending-moment— twisting the aircraft through how many hundred degrees I don’t know—resulting in that inevitable spin down to the earth.

Whatever be the type of effect that

you consider, the trouble becomes much greater in-deed when you fly at higher speed. A bird-hit may be a small problem at low speeds and thus a matter of “caution”; but come to sonic and supersonic speeds—and it can cause considerable destruction!

If you fail to notice “hail” while in the

air, it might cause dents, cracks and holes but you will still be here. Should you disregard the “stones” while super-sonic, the effect of the plague may be just bubonic. The faster you go, the less should be your ego. Give a wide berth to everything you see, to ensure your own safety.

You know very well that a pilot

becomes well-worth the designation of “A Pilot” when he really becomes capable of “manoeuvering” his aircraft.

He must be in a position to takeoff and land, twist and turn, climb and dive, and perhaps do all sorts of other things as directed—within the limitations of the aircraft, and the orders of the superiors.

Added on to this would be his own

limitations—individual and physical. They say, when you have a fever, you shouldn’t favour the idea of a drenching or ducking. When you are fit as a fiddle, they would rather recommend the measure, and enjoy the fun of it with great pleasure.

In old-school Sanskrit they have

a catch- phrase which says that the advisability of any and everything has to depend on the place, the time and the person concerned.

So, let us now-onwards distinguish

between advisability or otherwise of anything you have the ability to do—depending on the place, the time and you—the person concerned. Should you do it here and now?

The answer must come from you

and you alone! You have the ability, but have you

thought of the advisability of it? Look around and think!

- Reproduced from Flight Guardian Published in Oct - Dec 1969 written by then Gp Capt S Das Sarma.


Safety Journal Nov 1977


The CO was obviously in a vile mood, as was evident from the scowl he had on his usually

cheerful face.

“Peter! I’ve just got a rocket from Command about yesterday’s Suryalanka Task. They tore a strip off me for the delay. Seems the poor missile guys were delayed for their dinner”. The last was said in a sneering tone. The CO was impatient with guys who did not appreciate the aviator’s problem.

“Sir ! I am sorry about that snafu but, you know that the aircraft went duff at the last moment, and bundle had to change aircraft and belt like a bat out of hell to make up the lost time”.

“I know ! I know !” replied the CO testily. But try and get the Command guys to understand that ! As far as they are concerned, the Canberra is not 25 yrs old; it has no business to get unserviceable. ‘Preventive Maintenance my boy, Preventive

Maintenance is the answer’ they tell me in smug tones. The blighters are trying to teach their grandmothers to suck eggs” he exploded in wrathful indignation.

Peter tried to pour oil over troubled waters by making soothing (or so he thought) noises and he could see the Boss making an effort to get his ruffled feathers back to normal.

“Okay Peter! Today you will have two aircraft earmarked for tonight’s sortie even, if all other flying is brought to a halt. Brief whoever is flying to come well in time. I don’t care even if he reaches fifteen minutes early but not one minute late”.

“Very well Sir” replied Peter.

After the CO had left Peter called Bundle. “Bundle I’m putting you down tonight again for Suryalanka. You’re fit I hope”.

“No problem Sir, fit as a fiddle” was the jovial answer from Bundle. He was

“Okay Peter! Today you will have two aircraft earmarked for tonight’s sortie even, if all other flying is brought to a halt. Brief whoever is flying to come well in time. I don’t care even if he reaches fifteen minutes early but not one minute late”.


always full of bounce, cheerful to a fault perhaps, and a hog as far as flying was concerned.

“Okay ! the TOT is 1900; you take off to leave yourself a margin of fifteen minutes for any last minute snags. You must ensure that you get airborne on time Bundle. The CO is piley as it is over last night’s snafu.” “Don’t worry Sir” said Bundle mustering all the seriousness he could on his normally carefree face. He ambled off to prepare his maps along with his navigator.

After a bit of computation it was decided that a take off by 1830 would get them there with time to spare. Bundle decided that they must go to the aircraft by 1800, so as to give himself ample time to change the aircraft should some snag crop up after start up.

Bundle was well in time and with the externals completed he strapped up and commenced his left to right checks. Everything was in order and the port engine started up sweetly, oil pressures, JPT and RPM were normal. Suddenly the G4B compass started going round like a berserk dervish. He called out to the airmen outside and soon an instrument tradesman was battling with the recalcitrant compass. Precious minutes ticked by but the G4B could not be tamed. Finally, the airman threw up his hands in defeat and told Bundle to shut down. This he did quickly and was soon unstrapped and charging off to the standby aircraft with the navigator, burdened by his bulging navigation bag, manfully trying to keep pace.

Bundle told his navigator to do the externals and hauled himself into the cockpit to strap up and start up. He noticed that he still had time. It was just 1815 and fifteen minutes were ample to start up, taxy out and take off. He raced through his checks, gave the signal for start up and pressed the port starter. Nothing happened. He reset the starter and tried again. Silence. With a sinking feeling he tried a third time. Once again, no luck. He switched off port ignition and gave thumbs up to the airmen outside. He watched with rising impatience as the old starter cartridge was removed and a fresh one loaded. It seemed to have taken a long time to do so but he realised that it was his rising impatience to taxy out which was distorting the dimensions of time. Almost with fingers crossed he got ready to start the port engine once again. He pressed the starter button. No joy. He was beginning to sweat. He reset the starter and pressed again. The firing of the cartridge caught him unawares and there was a slight delay before he pushed the HP cock forward. He anxiously watched the JPT go past 520, climb to 560, waver and then almost reluctantly drop back to the normal. In the periphery of his vision he noticed a lamp glowing. He discovered that the port generator had not cut in although the RPM had stabilised at 2750. He called out and soon an electrician was fiddling in the electrical bay. The lamp glowed with malevolent brilliance as if mocking his efforts to leave the dispersal. He toyed with the thought of starting up the starboard engine and taxying out with the port generator tripped. He decided against this action since he would be on a night sortie. It would be his luck to have the second generator


also packing up on him! He heaved a sigh of relief as the lamp finally went off and the generator cut-in. The starboard engine started up without any fuss. He glanced at his watch and noted with dismay that the time was now 1835. He still had some time but he would not now be able to take off with a fifteen minute margin as briefed. Anyway, he would try to make up the lost time in flight. He decided to do his vital actions while taxying to the take off point. It was still not dark and he would have no difficulty in taxying while doing his VAs. He called them out and told his navi-gator to cross check with the checklist

His fingers went over the canopy jettison switch through the guard. It was okay.

He had reached the ORP and he concentrated on positioning the aircraft for the tyre check. He put on the parking brakes, gave a ‘thumb-up’ signal for the airmen to check the wheels and recommenced the vital actions where he had left off. He put on the pumps of all tanks, selected undercarriage to ‘Live’ position and put the ‘Canopy Jettison master’ switch on.

There was a flash and muffled

explosion. Bundle was for a moment dazed but he soon realised what had happened. He looked down to his left at the canopy jettison switch. It was wire locked but the switch was not through the slot. Some idiot, he realised, had forced the cover down and wire locked it in the ‘ON’ position. But this was no consolation to him; he could well imagine the court of inquiry concluding “Pilot Error”. Who was to know the pressures that caused it.

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Nov 1977, written by then Wg Cdr HS Soorma VM.


(The original article appeared in the MAC Flyer Jan 1978, now adapted to suit our environment)

If You’ve ever worked for somebody like the guy in the picture, then you know what a Pinger is. Read on to learn how the over- reactive manager affects himself and his unit.

“Flight Lieutenant, get me the Senior Signals Officer right now”, boomed the senior Ops Officer.

“I saw him in the Mess sir” The duty officer nervously replied.

“ I don’t care. Get hold of him and tell him to get his butt in here. I want to know why his transmitter vehicles are still here and why hasn’t he moved it away”, the heavy handed Wing Commander shouted.

The subject of the Wing Commander’s tirade had just settled

Safety Journal March 1981


in for a belated lunch when the Mess phone rang. He answered with a deflated, “Squadron Leader Venket”.

“Sir, this is Flight Lieutenant Kumar, Wingco wants you in here right away. He’s really bouncing off the wall.” “Yeah, I figured he would be but with present Radio Check at 1430 hrs.... Well hell — I might as well come in and take my beating”.

Anyone who has worked around an over reactive manager can probably recall a similar experience. The Senior Ops Officer in this case is the type of person that we sometimes call a “Pinger”, because he seems to ricochet around his office each time something goes wrong. He makes snap judgements; he specializes in crisis management and usually can browbeat his subordinates into obedience squelching loyal dissent. He may fool his superiors by looking effective over the short haul, but the faults in his style will eventually catch up with him.

Don’t confuse the Pinger with the leader who expects a lot from his staff. The manager who insists on completed work and expects his subordinates to use their initiative is not overreacting; neither is the busy supervisor who expects his people to come to him with problems and proposed solutions. It is normal for a Manager to express anger occasionally and some situations do require crisis Management or quick decisions; these actions do not make this guy an over reactor. The identifying characteristic of the Pinger is consistent; negative, violent and frequently profane response to any situation which deviates from the norm.

When a Pinger temporarily runs out of crisis, he may Manufacture some. This works very well if the crisis can be constructed from the remarks of a more senior Manager.

Master Warrant Officer Peer Singh is this kind of supervisor. This morning the Squadron Engineering Officer mentioned that his squadron’s two aircraft had been delayed this week for some minor snags. MWO Singh perceived this as a crisis for the Daily Inspections staff. He rushed back and quickly established new procedures for Daily Inspections. For the next month SNCO’s would be watching two stripers removing panels at 0330 hrs in the morning, checking various systems & fitting the panels back again.

Escape and Evasion

Psychologists tell us that most people attempt to avoid unpleasant situations and usually work towards pleasure. This holds true in the work environment.

The folks who work for the overreacting Manager will usually try


to evade or escape. Both solutions have an effect on SAFETY.

The Pinger’s subordinates often isolate him in the management system by constructing an informal chain of command around him when they can, and if they can’t, they probably will do their best to hide problems. When things finally get so bad that they require the attention of the over reactor, the subordinates will grit their teeth and take the problem to him. This gives the Pinger another chance to ricochet, manage a crisis and reinforce his over reactive behaviour and his negative opinion of his subordinates.

In this isolated position, the over reactor may believe that the operation is running smoothly and safely. His subordinates will do their best to keep him thinking that way, till something disastrous happens, like an aircraft accident. Because of his isolation, The Pinger may be unable to take the Management actions that could prevent that accident. Also, his actions may apply direct pressure on his people to make unsafe decisions, both to avoid expected ridicule and to keep up the appearance of smooth mission accomplishment.

The other option open to these who work for the over reactive manager is escape. Workers often begin looking for a posting, or a change of section, when a new boss, who proves to be a Pinger, takes over. The personnel retention rate in the over reactor’s organisation will probably drop. These trends mean that the unit will consistently have a low experience level and continual retraining will be required.

Fewer Retirement Checks

“Up tight” is one term that might be used to describe the over reactor. “Type A” personality is a term used by Doctor Friedman and Rosenman in their book, “Type A Behaviour and your Heart”. Type A may also describe ‘The Pinger’. The Pinger is wound up tight, and this has definite effects on his body and Psycho Medical research shows that being up tight continuously can lead to high cholesterol levels, hypertensions (high blood pressure) and possible heart attack. The Pinger lives in a state of constant nonspecific fear and may incur a variety of Psychological problems whose symptoms appear in the social world as alcoholism, chain smoking, drug abuse, etc.

The cumulative effects, psychological and physical can lead to the premature termination of body function and the big PCS.

Above His Level

We have to ask, how does a guy get so up tight ? Psychologists provide a wide variety of explanations depending on their particular inclination. The freedom psychologist might tend to blame this self destructive behaviour on experience during early childhood. The behaviourist might point out that the over reactor is receiving some type of reward for his actions. Also the behaviourist may mention that the Pinger is emulating another seemingly successful person he knew, this is known as behaviour modelling. Another explanation


comes from Dr Lawrance M. Peter, author of The Peter Principle; The Pinger may be reacting to having to a risen position above his level of competency.

There is Hope

The Pinger may one day be recognized as ineffective and hazardous by his superiors. They may tactfully move him to a position where his ricochet won’t cause problems or to a position of lower responsibility where he can cope. If these upper level managers don’t find an isolated large gray desk for The Pinger somewhere, then the Air Force Inspection and Safety Directorates may get to record his effectiveness in a mishap report: “Cause, Operations, Factor, supervision (Direct)”. In either case, the over reactive Manager will probably not continue to be a problem for that particular unit. Managers should look for over reactors and attempt to resolve the incurred management problem before they lead to disaster. And there is hope for this individual who has developed an uptight life style. Whether you’re a loadmaster, a pilot, a commander or a clerk, might periodically ask yourself.

Some Questions

Do I make snap decisions when �adequate time for contemplation is available ?

Do I react violently when �confronted by new problems, when restraint is really appropriate?

Do I drink, smoke or more than I �should ?

Did the doctors do a double take �at my blood pressure my last Medical Examination ?

Do I take problems home with me �after work ?

If you answer yes to a lot of

the questions, then you’ve got the symptoms. It’s probably time to take a look at the way you run your life, the way you manage and lead, and your own personal goals.

And what about our opening dramas. Sqn Ldr Venkat received a thorough mastication from ‘Ricochet” S. Ops. O. Since Venkat was short, he told our Ricochet what he thought of him, his operations, and his style of leadership. Also, Sqn Ldr Venkat declared his signals equipment non ops due to move, thus messing up the transmitting schedule considerably and drawing the AOC’s attention to a not so smooth operations. The Senior Ops Officers now has several new problems to reset to and he’s enjoying it.

MWO Peer Singh’s boss is not an over reactor. Fortunately he stopped the DI people from the extra, unwarranted early morning systems checks, thus eliminating a Flight Safety Hazard of a panel being left loose in the semi-derlined, by a half awake two stipper.

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Mar 1981, written by then Sqn Ldr RK Halder.


Cpl Mathai was a great bloke. He knew his aircraft, and the way it worked , very well. He

knew even better than the brain who wrote the book. That’s why he has own way of doing the jobs. His ways were quicker and they worked. He had proved that they worked by doing them lots of times, and nothing ever went wrong. Until one day, when he was doing one of these jobs the way he had always done it, for some reason it didn’t work. In fact he broke a piece of his aeroplane and hurt his hand, cost us a lot of money and kept the jet off the flight line for quite a spell.

LAC Kesavan was a good sort too. Bright and nippy and well aware that the quicker he fixed snags the sooner

the jet would be back in the flying programme. So he found two ways of beating the book. He was sure that his ways were just as safe : “If they weren’t safe I wouldn’t use them”, he told himself. But one day a test that he had done the quick way finished up causing two failures in the air : first the kit and then the pilot’s sense of humour.

I could go on and on, quoting real cases instead if these two imagi-nary ones, but you know what I’m getting at. Tradesmen all over the IAF are finding ways of doing work which are better or quicker than the procedures given in Aircraft Servicing Manuals and Servicing Procedures. Usually they tell their SNCO or STO, their suggestion is checked out, a proposal

Safety Journal Mar 1981


for amendment is sent to the Engineering Authority/CSDO who double check and eventually the book is altered. Provided, that is, that the new methods are really better— not just quicker or easier, but at least as safe.

But quite a few say nothing. Perhaps they can’t be bothered, or perhaps they think it’s not down to them or whatever.

They may be good at their jobs, they may be aces even, but they are dangerous.

A lot of thought and hard work goes into the writing of our APs. That’s why they cost so much. That’s also why, by and large, they are right, even though the way they tell us to do things may look a bit pernickety. Of course there are errors in the books. They are written by people like you and me, and we all make mistakes. But there is a simple system for putting them right. As far as the workers are concerned it couldn’t be simpler- just tell somebody—tell your SNCO or your STO. They will sort out. If your ideas turns out well, bully for you. If not—well at least it will have been looked into and you will be told why. No one will think any the less of you quite the contrary.

There is a snag. Amendments do take a long time to come through. But if it is important that the book is altered quickly—for instance if you have found that the torque leading quoted for a nut is wrong there is a thing called an SI, which is even quicker. Have you seen any lately?

What do you do until the book changed? Why, you just go on doing things the way the book says, if the error is really vital, the book will be changed very rapidly indeed—before that particular job comes up again. If it is less critical then going on the same way for a bit won’t do any serious harm and your proposal might be changed in some details before it comes out as an amendment. Let’s face it, you might not have thought of everything. You don’t want to change from bad to worse, do you? Better the devil, etc.

So Remember :

If the book is wrong tell your SNCO �or your STO.

Until the book is changed, carry on �doing what it says.

When it is changed, then work to �the new text.

This way nobody gets hurt. �

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Mar 1981,

written by Anonymous.


Safety Journal 1-2/1989


Ours is a no nonsense and a serious profession. Yet in the course of our day to day work,

we come across many a lighter moment, mostly thrown up inadvertently.

Once in the thick of traffic, an Air OP helicopter was heading towards us. The controller in a bid to vector him clear of the traffic asked him, “Helicopter 60, request your course.” The helicopter answered “Course 67th NDA.”

In the East, with the land-line communications being what they are, the ADC (Air Defence Clearance) of an Army VIP helicopter had expired and a fresh ADC was not obtained. The VIP arrived and found that the helicopter had not started up. So he queried the pilot “What’s the problem ?” Pilot answered, “Sir, our ADC has expired.” VIP answered, “I’m so sorry to hear that.”

The IAC ac operating in the East had co-pilot of the fairer sex whose R/T transmissions broke the monotony of our work. In one instance, after her transmissions ended there was a loud whistle emitted by one of our flying brethren, the controller then butted in “DAK—there is a loud whistling noise in your R/T.”

Once a new controller was on duty and an IAC ac had lined up for take-off and asked the ATC “Request ATC” (meaning Air Traffic Clearance or departure instructions). The controller mistook it for ADC answered, “ADC 252”. The pilot was confused mistaking that for standard instrument departure instructions. After some silence, he asked again “Request ATC”. Controller

answered, “Alpha Delta Charlie 252.” Pilot, “Negative, sir, request ATC.” Controller thought that the pilot was pulling his leg answered, “Sir, this a Jodhpur ATC.”

We face the problem of R/T contact when the ac are in the pens. In this case, the tester was checking the R/T and could not get an answer so he carried on and on “Tower, tester, how do you read ?” Meanwhile an ac pulling out of a dummy dive OH screamed “Fire”. The tester acknowledged “Roger strength FIVE sir.”

An ac carrying out a sortie over range asked the RSO for the Dive Angle Range and pull out height. The RSO gave him the dive angle and put-out height. The ac asked, “Request range.” The RSO answered, “This is SK Range.”

Jafna airfield of Sri Lanka had a dog menace. With the battle going around the airfield, the dogs had wandered onto the airfield. The IAF authorities could do nothing about it. After landing, an ac complained, “There are plenty of dogs on the R/W.” The frustrated controller answered. “These are dogs of war.”

A pilot desperate to get home asked the ATC for start up clearance. The controller answered, “Not cleared to start, wx below your minima.” Pilot, “I’ll fly above the weather.”

Pilot asking a new controller, “Request for a free let-down.” Controller, “We do not charge for let downs.”

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Jan - Feb 1989, written by then Flt Lt Nair.


Safety Journal Feb 1997


Later half of December 1996 was full of newspaper reports and articles regarding the 25th Anniversary of

the 1971 Indo-Pak War. These brought back nostalgic memories of some of the most exciting incidents and moments that I had handled/experienced as an Air Traffic Controller operating from SIRSA, then a satellite airfield for HINDAN. Despite the lapse of two & quarter decades, the picture of these is so vividly clear in my mind that these incidents still give me tremendous thrill & excitement whenever these flash across, to borrow from William Wordsworth, “the inward eye”.

INCIDENT 1

It was the evening of 4th Dec 1971 and I was on duty at the improvised make-shift 15Ft high Air Traffic Control Tower. Around 2030hrs I had only two MiG from the base airborne, which were expected to rejoin around 2100hrs. I was admiring the crescent moon in an absolutely cloudless sky, when, in the background of the Moon I spotted the outline of an aircraft at quite a distance. Fixing my gaze I reconfirmed within myself that what I saw was right. Sure enough the aircraft kept closing in and instinctively I said that it had to be an enemy aircraft approaching from the ‘West’ as no other known traffic was expected from that direction. I promptly informed the Base Commander, late Air Cmde KK Malik, then Wg Cdr on the Hotline. In utter disbelief he utterred “Impossible! (as no Radar had informed about any intruder)”. Keeping my gaze fixed at the aircraft I directed all the ATC personnel except the ops clerk, to take shelter in the respective trenches, and time & again kept reporting to the Base Cdr about the approaching aircraft urging him to act. Loo behold at 2033-

34 hrs the intruder arrived overhead and very cunningly dropped delay fuse bombs during this in-bound run, one of which fell a few yards away from my tower. Soon afterwards the first bomb-explosion was heard and a few seconds later I saw the same aircraft going back in the same direction from where it had approached dropping many more live bombs. As the first bomb exploded, the Hotline buzzed and the voice in excitement asked, “what is it”, I said “the same aircraft on its way back after completing his mission” and he exclaimed “On Sh....”. And almost simultaneously, I saw the most beautiful sight, never seen before. The entire Airfield was covered with the tracer bullets fired by the Ack- Ack guns, as if by a Magic Wand the day had dawned. The entire airfield was momentarily illuminated, but in vain. The brave Pak Pilot had managed to harmlessly get away, & I watched helplessly. The MiGs, meanwhile contacted & were diverted to HINDAN as at that point of time, the damage to the R/W was not known.

Those 35 Mts of Utter Suspense

Once the sound & fury of the bombardment and the Ack-Ack guns had died down, the Hotline buzzed & I was directed to go for Runway Inspection. I summoned the ALR jeep and commenced the R/W Inspection which took approx 35 mts driving at slowest possible speed. Those 35 mts I spent on the R/W appeared like never ending eternity, and were full of fear, tension and apprehension. Fear of inadvertently driving over an unexploded bomb, apprehension of a second attack, and tension due to the possibility of the unexploded bomb exploding in the close proximity of the jeep. In that deadly silence of the night even the sound of a passing vehicle sounded so loud giving an


impression of an approaching “attacker”. With the heart in the mouth and prayer on the lips, I completed that MOST nerve- wrecking Runway Inspection and on reaching back to the Tower heaved the biggest sigh of relief. To our utter relief and amazement not a single of the 16 Bombs had fallen on the R/W or the Taxi track. The Base Cdr must have heard a much bigger sigh of relief on hearing from me ! The silence of the night was broken 3-4 times during the night when the delay fuse bombs kept exploding.

INCIDENT II

It was probably 6th or 7th Dec 71. Two Mysteres led by then Wg Cdr ML Trehan & Flt LT Vashist, popularly known as Pundit, had got airborne for a dusk offensive mission. As a SOP the Dusk CAP of 2 MiGs was orbiting over the base. I was looking at the setting Sun and admiring the changing colour pattern that the setting sun was majestically creating. And suddenly I spotted two aircraft at a distance almost at tree-top level heading towards my base from the ‘West’. I immediately called the Mystere Mission on all channels, and after getting no response, informed the CAP aircraft. One of the CAP pilots was the then Flt LT DS Sant heard some transmission between CAP 1 &2, and finally that Joyous call, “Bogey spotted, getting into position”. And after few moments monitored the transmission from Sant “calling off”. By this time the two aircraft had come overhead, and these were our own Mysteres ! It was later revealed that Sant had recognised these aircraft just before pressing the trigger! Why the Mysteres approached at tree-top level without R/T contact ? Yes, you guessed it right. They had complete R/T Failure. Why were they coming at virtually supersonic speed at tree-top level ? Because they were being chased by Pak

Fighters and the Mysteres were running away for their lives & in that panic just carried on at the lowest level they could fly. I shudder still to think of the grave consequences if Flt Lt Sant had delayed the recognition by few seconds & fired his Missile ! Indeed a providential escape for the two Mystere pilots.

INCIDENT III

I do not now remember the exact date of this incident. It happened during the second week of December 1971. I was on duty at the Control Tower in the afternoon shift. I heard that someone is calling in very low voice “Chou” “Chou”. I got up from my chair, looked around if someone was playing games with me. Finding no one around, I sat down and again heard the call “Chou” “Chou”. Realising that some one is calling on the RT, I put the volume control of all channels on Maximum. No sooner I had done that I recognised the voice of Flt Lt Vashist calling “Chou, chou” on Alpha Channel. Flt LT Vashist had been airborne in a Mystere for an operational Mission. I responded to his call. He was desperately wanting some kind of help as he was being chased by Pakistani Fighters and that he was already on the inbound leg. I spontaneously transmitted on Alpha and all other channels “Pundit do not worry, I have already scrambled two MiGs towards your direction & gave some calls to that effect to the two imaginary MiGs & kept repeating some instructions whatever came to my mind with the solitary air of boosting Pundits’ Morale & confidence and with a desperate hope that the Pakis do monitor my calls being transmitted on all channels! As Vashisht came closer his transmissions became clearer and even the Homer started indicating. He was cleared to make a direct landing. Soon after landing, probably the first thing that


Vashisht did was to come to the Tower to meet me & thank me for firstly being able to monitor his faint calls and secondly for scrambling the MiGs. Before leaving he asked me the position of the MiGs. I said “which MiGs”. “The ones you had scrambled for me”. I informed him that no MiGs were scrambled and that all those transmissions to MiGs were bogey calls, which were made to boost up his morale. He was stunned and the complete facial expression reflected a deep sense of gratitude. As I write this, I still vividly recollect the glint of gratitude in his eyes and that smile which said so much without uttering a word !

INCIDENT IV

This episode pertains to the 6th sense of human beings, specially of the wives and mothers. It is often said that when a bad thing happens, wives and mothers come to know about it almost immediately, even if thousand of miles away. During one of those early days of the war, then Sqn Ldr JD Kumar & Flt Lt Mukerjee had gone across the border in Mystere aircraft for a day ops mission from SIRSA. Almost at the same time when I was expecting to establish contact with the Mission Leader on their in-bound leg, Pulok Mukerjee, who was No 2, transmitted asking for Homing. On enquiry by me regarding the position of his Leader, Pulok informed that No 1 had been shot down in Pakistani territory. Yes, relevant to mention here that most of the pilots and the ground staff had come to SIRSA from HINDAN, leaving behind the families at Hindan. As soon as Pulok finished his transmission regarding the shooting down of his Leader-Sqn Ldr JD Kumar—the Ops clerk informed me that Sqn Ldr Nayak, the Senior Accts Officer, Hindan wants to urgently talk to the DATCO. What Sqn Ldr Nayak asked me,

baffled me. He said that Mrs. JD Kumar had asked him to find out from SIRSA the news about her husband. With a deep sense of sorrow and guilt I could only say “presently he has gone for a Mission”. That call from Sqn Ldr Nayak on a fervent personal request of Mrs. Kumar was a mere coincidence or a perfect example of the 6th sense referred to earlier. Personally, I rule out co-incidence.

And to conclude, I must mention how in the early evening of 3rd Dec 1971, we were informed about the commencement of the Hostilities. A large number of officers had been positioned at SIRSA from middle of November 1971. 7-8 of us had formed a card-playing group and we played regularly in the afternoons. The game continued even when the air-raid warnings were sounded, as few of the earlier one had turned out to be false alarms. The same routine was in progress in the afternoon of 3rd Dec 71 too. We ignored the air-raid warning sounded on 3rd late afternoon. Suddenly an anxious and excited Base Cdr, the then Wg Cdr KK Malik barged into the room and shouted “You B... & Bs... are not getting up. The War has begun”. It stunned us all, and we got up all together to run for the nearest trench, forgetting about the Money, Purse & the Cards. Those of the readers who had the privilege of working with late Air Cmde KK Malik, nicknamed as “Nibboo Malik”, kindly fill up the blanks yourself and pay a silent respect to the departed soul.

Note From the Author

All names & incidents mentioned are True. There could be an error of a day or so regarding dates.

- Reproduced from Safety Journal Published in Feb 1997 written by then Wg Cdr Divakar Chaudhri (Retd).


This incident occurred almost a decade ago but is still fresh in my mind. We were lucky enough

to get away with no damage to man or machine. But if lady luck was not with us then may be the events could have taken a different turn.

It was a bright sunny afternoon and the newly posted young Pilot Officer K P was getting ready for his 2nd pre solo taxy run on Ajeet M K.

Since there was no type trainer ac for Ajeet M K, the pre-solo dual checks were flown in a Hunter trainer a/c. Before going solo every pilot had to do two taxy runs to get used to braking technique and effect of tail chute on landing run.

Young K P was left with 2 more Dual Checks before being cleared for solo. However in the meantime Flt Cdr decided to complete the formality of two taxy runs. First taxy run was uneventful. For 2nd taxy run the ac was to be accelerated to 100 kts at full throttle and then process of slowing down was to commence with throttle fully back, tail chute deployed and judicious use of brakes. Young K P was knifed regarding operation of tail chute lever (in fact over- briefed) and was despatched to his a/c. Quite wisely the a/c had only 800 Ltr of ATF so as to simulate landing fuel state after a normal notice.

After a supervised start-up, K P taxied out of R/W 35 and I pushed off

Safety Journal Mar 1997


to ATC for SFS duty. DATCO gave me a surprised look because there was no a/c in the air and no further flying was planned. Obviously he felt that Senior Flying Supervisor is not required to be in the ATC for a taxy run. Any how there I was to monitor this simple exercise and give assistance, if required.

Soon K P was at the line-up point and accelerating on the R/W full power. I was ready to remind him in case he forgot to use the Tail Chute. I saw the chute coming out and getting jettisoned immediately. An R/T call was made to inform K P that the chute has got jettisoned. It was expected that the pilot would slow down by using foot brakes however there was no apparent reduction in speed and hence another R/T call was made to inform him that he should make use of brakes and slow down. However, I noticed that when the a/c crossed in front of the ATC, it was accelerating and then it occurred to me that in all probability K P has forgotten to throttle back. It was too late to make any corrections now since more than half the R/W had already been used up. One more crisp R/T call was made and K P was asked to “ease up”. The a/c had attained flying speed and was airborne immediately. There was one and only one problem facing us and that was to recover the a/c some how, since there was very little fuel left to practice handling of control.

Flt Cdr was asked to rush to ACP to monitor his Approach & Landing and assist if required. A few R/T calls were made to reduce the anxiety of the pilot and soon he was reporting D/W for R/W 35. Act, Approach & Landing was being monitored from ATC, ACP

and of course hopefully by the pilot. Aircraft was recovered safely and asked to switch off at the ORP since there was practically zero fuel left in the fuel tanks.

I had heard about the test pilot getting airborne during the first taxy run of F-16 ac (proto). Well, we also made our contribution to history.

Young K P was brought back to Sqn in the aircrew van and was “Debriefed” by Flt Cdr and self. He wrote in the Blue Book—”Mistake made—Got airborne while doing a taxy run. Lesson Learnt—Do not get airborne when doing taxy run.”

That was in lighter vein but there were many lessons learnt by all of us which are as follows:

Always be prepared for the �unexpected (No one knew that a pilot would get airborne while doing a taxy run).

Be calm when facing an emergency �situation.

Over briefing can lead to fixation �towards a particular aspect.

Follow the correct sequence for �training exercises. Pre solo taxy runs should have been undertaken only after the pilot was cleared for solo.

SFS is mandatory when �inexperienced pilots are handling the aircraft.

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Mar 1997, written by then Sqn Ldr RK Rana.


The Big Chief summoned the DFS and said “Yet another one! You might as well wind up

your directorate as I don’t see any improvement.”

The DFS pleaded for some time to figure out the root cause of the accidents. Having been given a root of a plant as a mock gift during one of the graduation parties at FIS, he prided himself on being able to get to the bottom of any problem.

“OK! 48 hrs is all you got”, said the Big Chief. After much introspection and brainstorming, however, the DFS was at the end of his tether. He felt that the problem was too complex and it was better to refer the matter to an old sage who seemed to have an answer for everything.

The sage said “I was expecting you much earlier, but never mind, it is better late than never. “

“So what are the reasons?” asked the DFS, jumping straight to the point.

“Reason? You mean for the accidents?”, said the all knowing sage. “There is only one reason, which is the root reason. Those who do not have the wisdom to understand it, tend to give it a multi-dimension”.

The DFS, having been left with just 8 hrs for the dead line, was relieved to know that there was just one cause to be resolved.

“Oh! thanx, tell me what’s this singular reason?”

“Not taking charge-that’s the reason” said the sage calmly as he prepared to go into deep meditation.

DFS was perplexed and wanted to

know more. So he pleaded, “Tell me-who is not taking charge?, and I will fix him”.

“I knew you would say that, “said the sage.

“No, that was just an off-the-cuff remark- I did not mean that, but tell me, aren’t you oversimplifying a bit?”

“OK, fine,” said the sage. “I will make it more technical. The people are more concerned with problems that lie in their area of concern than attending to those within their area of authority.

“Does that sound better?”

“Looks like the CDM has rubbed off on you too”, said the DFS, “Can you illustrate this with an example?”

Safety Journal Jun 2002


“No problem”, said the visibly warmed up sage.” I had gone to an op sqn and inquired about the competence of the younger pilots that get inducted each year. They said -no good, go and ask MOFT for reason. So I went to MOFT and they said stage IIA doesn’t send them good stuff. So I went to stage IIA who blamed stage II. Stage II put the blame on stage I, who in turn cribbed that QFIs passing out of FIS are not as good as they used to be. So I went to FIS who said- go to op sqn and see for yourself what is the level of the so called experienced lot who come here for training. I did not want to go to another op sqn for a second opinion because it is very tiring”.

The DFS was amazed by such a simple and effective tool employed by the sage in finding a reason for a difficult problem. Knowing that the Big Chief would expect not only the reason but also the solution, the DFS made one last attempt to awaken the sage who was drifting into deep meditation.” Can I have the solution please?” asked the DFS.

The sage with closed eyes said, “IN...TRO.. .SPE.. .C. . .T. . .and T...A...K...E... CHARGE. The solution normally lies within the reason itself.”

“You mean, not falling into the ‘Blame it on Rio’ syndrome by all of us will help matters?”, mumbled the DFS. But by then the sage had achieved

‘lock on’ and was in a complete state of meditation. The much chastened DFS walked away with this wisdom and vowed to spread the message to one and all before reporting to the Big Chief.

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Jun 2002, written by DFS.


Safety Journal Sep 2002


Sqn Ldr Vikramaditya (Vicky) did not give up. He once again raised the 901 — and went back

to the cemetery along with the ‘recovery party’. He wrenched Betal from the tree top by using the same Giraffe ladder and by using the same old technique which had become a well practiced SOP by this time. Without any grudge, he once again went through the same monotonous procedure of raising the issue voucher, making the gate pass etc. and then he booked out from the gate.

As he marched off from the cemetery, Betal yelled in his ears “Come on Vicky! Don’t tell me you are not tired! I have told you so many stories and asked you so many questions. But every time you have locked on to the correct answer and I could escape from your clutches. But every time you come right back to take me along. You seem to be totally steadfast and valiant, as your Air Force pilots. I will now tell you a story about two such valiant pilots. Flt Lt Josh and Fg Offr Hosh. They were detailed to ferry out a trainer on detachment. A thorough preflight briefing was carried out. The destination and enroute weather was absolutely fine and in- flight visibility was unlimited. The departure and enroute phases were uneventful. Well during the ferry, Josh spotted the airfield from miles. He was famililiar with the destination which had two parallel runways. True to his characteristic name, Josh enthusiastically asked Hosh, “Hey buddy, can you see those beautiful black strips about twelve thirty to one O’clock?”

Young Fg Offr Hosh, true to his name, replied in a composed tone “Josh Sir, I can faintly see the strips coming up, but my radio compass locking bang on at twelve o’clock. I will just cross check the other leading-in features”.

Josh said, “Come on Hosh”. You seem to have forgotten the preflight briefing. Their NDB is off the air for maintenance. I have tuned the AIR station of the town which is about five to seven miles left of the runway. That’s why your radio compass is locking to the left, and runway is now coming up one O’ clock. Hosh interrupted promptly “Yes Sir, contact with the runway. You are absolutely right”.

Elated by this acknowledgment by Hosh, Josh’s spirit soared high. He confirmed to the controller that they had the runway in sight and asked permission to descend.

Since there was no other traffic, the controller promptly cleared them to descend. Josh asked Hosh to carry out descent/landing checks and decided to call long finals. Once they were positioned on long finals, Josh realised that they were too high, hence he asked Hosh to carry out a ‘S’ turn but did not transmit this to the ATC. The controller, who had also spotted the aircraft on long finals, noticed the aircraft carrying out a turn. He quickly transmitted, “Sir, I think you are approaching the wrong runway. The runway in use is 30 R, I repeat 30 R”. He also picked up the EPAX and briefed the runway controller that if the


aircraft approached the wrong runway, he should fire a red cartridge.

Josh got impatient and blurted to Hosh, “Just ask this guy to cool it yaar. Tell him we are approaching runway 30 R. Don’t worry”.

The controller replied in a relieved tone, “Roger, call finals for 30 R, surface winds are calm”. Once on the finals Hosh called out “On finals for 30 R, three greens”.

The controller confirmed that the undercarriage was down and cleared the aircraft to land.

At this point of time, Hosh noticed the runway controller firing a red cartridge. He quickly asked Josh, “Jo Sir, the runway controller has fired a red shot, I think we must go around”.

Josh curtly said, ‘I think this runway controller has gone crazy. We are on the correct runway, the controller has already cleared us to land’.

Without loosing his cool, Hosh said, “Sir, I think we can cross check that later, but now we must go around”.

Josh did not budge, he took over the RT and once again gave the finals call. The controller once again cross checked and cleared them to land.

The landing was uneventful and while taxying to the dispersal, Josh sharply asked Hosh, “Hey buddy, why did you panic? Everything was OK, we need not have gone around.”

Hosh said in decisive voice, “Sir, I agree, but I still think we should have gone around, am I wrong?”

After narrating the incident, Betal asked Vicky, “Now tell me from your experience, who was right? Josh Or Hosh?

Vicky thought for a moment, then he began to speak in a low but determined tone, “Since they were cleared by the controller not once, but twice, Josh

“The very fact that the red cartridge was fired,

for whatever reason, he correctly advised Josh to go around. Thus, Josh was theoretically right but Hosh was practically right. Moreover, the golden rule is: whenever in doubt, one should play safe and go around.


was right in concluding that they were approaching the correct runway and hence they should go ahead and land. But I think, in the given situation, Hosh was also right when he said that they could have cross checked why the runway controller fired the red cartridge at a later stage. The very fact that the red cartridge was fired, for whatever reason, he correctly advised Josh to go around. Thus, Josh was theoretically right but Hosh was practically right. Moreover, the golden rule is: whenever in doubt, one should play safe and go around.

There was no problem of fuel. Since flight safety is of paramount importance, they could have gone around and landed on the next approach...”

Thus, while answering Betal, Vicky broke his silence, hence Betal flew out from his shoulder and performing a perfect ‘vertical Charlie vanished into the eternal sky!

- Reproduced from Safety Journal published in Sep 2002, written by then Sqn Ldr SR Gharpure.


Introduction

The Institute of Flight Safety (IFS) was established in 1981 to promote flight safety not only to all personnel of the Indian Air Force, but also other agencies in the aviation sector. This is achieved through the conduct of training and education, publicity campaigns to increase awareness and research into various aspects of aircraft accidents and failures of components to predict potential

hazard as well as analysis of trends. As a key recommendation of EXCOM report to improve flight safety, Crash Laboratory has been set up at IFS to impart practical hands-on training to officers of Flight safety and Accident Investigation course. Training Wing

The Training Wing is responsible for imparting training and education to Officers and PBORs and their


equivalents in other services on matters of aviation safety and aircraft accident investigation through various courses of study conducted throughout the year. The following courses of study are conducted at IFS: -

Flight Safety &Accident Investigation �Course (FS&AI) for officers.

Flight, Maint & Adm Safety Course �(FMASO) for officers.

Human Factors Capsule Course �(HFCC) for officers.

Technical Safety Supervisors �Course (TSSC) for SNCOs.

Human Factors & Accident �Investigation (HF&AI) for senior officers.

Courses of study at IFS are for a week except the FS&AI and HF&AI courses which are for six weeks and three days, respectively.

Publicity Wing

The Publicity Wing is responsible for spreading Flight Safety awareness. This is done by publishing and

distributing a monthly magazine and other various Flight Safety promotional materials. The monthly Aerospace Safety Magazine is of a very high quality and the design and contents of the magazine have been appreciated by all readers including those of foreign Air Forces. The demand for the magazine is steadily increasing.

Research and Analysis Wing

The R&A wing prepares an annual review and fleet-wise compendia of all incidents and accidents in the IAF. The following compendia have been prepared and distributed to field units.

Fighter Aircraft: - Jaguar, Mirage- �2000 and all variants of MiG-21/ 23/27/29.

Transport Aircraft: - Dornier, AN- �32, AVRO and IL-76.

Helicopters:- Cheetah/Chetak, �Mi-8, 17 and 17 1V, Mi-25/35.

Trainers: - Kiran and HPT-32. �

Crash Laboratory

As a key recommendation of EX-COM report for improvement of Flight Safety, it was proposed to set up a Crash Lab and an aviation safety psychology wing at the Institute of Flight Safety, to impart practical hands-on training on air accident Investigation and human factors respectively. The Crash Lab set up would mainly comprise study


of investigation techniques through non-destructive testing, material analysis, cause-effect analysis and understanding of crash dynamics through FDR analysis software, sequential photographic evidence and conduct of a practice COI on wreckage collected from crash site.

The Aviation Safety Psychology Wing

With modernization of equipment and increased reliability, man is being seen increasingly as a causal factor in aviation accidents. Therefore, it is imperative that all aspects of human factors are studied and understood so that the ‘performance envelope’ of the human being is expanded. Human Factors lessons are being disseminated through the institute to educate operators on their capabilities and limitations. The Aviation Safety Psychology Wing endeavours to achieve the following tasks:-

Make personnel understand and �apply the tenets of human factors in aviation.

Analyze all aviation accidents �and recommend suitable remedial measures.

Conduct workshops and seminars �to bring about awareness on accident prone behaviors and mindsets.


Administration

The institute library is stocked with latest books on aviation safety, crash dynamics and human factors. All computers in IFS are networked and data is exchanged through this network.

An independent computer section

has been established at IFS. The use of advanced software in design, graphics and video editing has improved the functional capability of the Institute. Adequate numbers of computers are made available to the trainees for project work. Use of modern equipment like advanced interactive multimedia projection system at the class room has resulted in improvement in the quality of training.

ISO Certification

IFS has been awarded ISO 9001:2000 certification by UKAS, UK in Feb 2008

for the Training Wing and in Apr 2008 for the Publicity and R&A Wings. This has enabled us to standardise our procedures along international lines without compromising our Air Force character.

Conclusion

IFS is a premier organisation engaged in the promotion of flight safety in the IAF as well as in the aviation sector in general. Various activities carried out by the IFS and its long term plans have been enumerated above. The Institute continually strives to meet high standards in training and awareness measures on flight safety issues. A number of steps have been initiated that will enable the institute to become an institution of repute amongst aviation community world-wide.

- Written by Editorial Board Aerospace Safety magazine.

Food For

Thought


Flight Guardian is the Flight Safety Magazine of the IAF and it has some Very Important Readers. They include:

Chief of Air Staff PSOs, AOs C-in-c Station CommandersAircrew Ground Crew Test Pilots Scientists Technicians And some people we can’t name!

VERY IMPORTANT PEOPLE, all vitally concerned that our aircrew fly well and that our aircraft and equipment work efficiently. You are one of them.

FLIGHT GUARDIAN is produced directly for you in the service, who fly and YOU who keep them flying. It is YOUR magazine. It is intended to be a platform for your experience, to share your ideas and problems, to let you know what people like you are thinking and doing and what is being done to help you do your job well.

FLIGHT GUARDIAN NEEDS YOU

Not only as a reader but also as a contributor. We want those ideas of yours, those arguments, those stories, those photographs and accounts of what you are doing. We don’t get enough of them. If you’ve got something interesting to say about flying or maintenance in the IAF, let us have it. Tell us if you like YOUR Flight Guardian and if you don’t say what you’d like to see in YOUR magazine. If you’ve a suggestion for a good article, push it along - direct to the Editor, Flight Guardian, Directorate of Flight safety, Air Headquarters, New Delhi.

THERE ARE ROUGHLY 25,000 WORDS IN AN ISSUE OF FLIGHT GUARDIAN - YOUR’S SHOULD BE SOME OF THEM

PS: FOR THOSE IN HIGH PLACES: Please don’t forget that in the Flight Guardian you can pass on the distilled wisdom of your experience to the younger generation.

LET US NOT LOSE THESE PRICELESS BENEFACTIONS FOR EVER.

Documents

भारतीय वायुसेना-FLIGHT SAFETY