Authoritarian Redevelopment in Santiago, Chile Power Relations in Urban Decision-making: Neo-liberalism, 'Techno-politicians' Hugo Marcelo Zunino

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2006 43: 1825Urban StudHugo Marcelo Zunino

Authoritarian Redevelopment in Santiago, ChilePower Relations in Urban Decision-making: Neo-liberalism, 'Techno-politicians' and

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Power Relations in Urban Decision-making:Neo-liberalism, ‘Techno-politicians’ andAuthoritarian Redevelopment in Santiago, Chile

Hugo Marcelo Zunino

[Paper first received, February 2005; in final form, December 2005]

Summary. Taking as a subject of study an on-going urban development project in Santiago, Chile,the paper interprets how public and private actors came together in an urban decision-makingepisode which represented a particular power configuration. To consider both the structuralforms of constraint and the differential capacity of actors to exert power, an analyticalframework is constructed, derived from Giddens’ structuration theory and from Foucault’sapproach to power. The analysis of the specific relationships established between the project’sparticipants shows how individuals from the central state apparatus and private investors werecontrolling local redevelopment, relegating the local government (the municipality) and thepeople living near the project to non-influential positions. The concluding section considers thepotentials and limitations of the analytical framework deployed and the degree to which itsoutcome could be generalised to the Chilean situation.

Why are the deployments of power reduced[by society] simply to the procedure of thelaw of interdiction? Let me offer a generaland tactical reason that seems self-evident:power is tolerable only on condition that itmasks a substantial part of itself. Itssuccess is proportional to its ability to hideits own mechanisms (Foucault, 1979, p. 86).

1. Introduction

In advanced capitalist societies, localisedurban redevelopment strategies entailing themanipulation of meaning and the constructionof grandiose urban structures have commonlybeen deployed to attract capital investment(Basset et al., 2002; Hall and Hubbard,1996; Harvey, 1989a, 1989b; Hubbard,1996; McGovern, 2003; Roberts and Schein,1993; Short et al., 1993; Soja, 2000; Ward,

1997). This is not uncommon in the South(see, for instance, Acioly, 2001; Cariola andLacabana, 2003). In particular, during thepast two decades, the city of Santiago, Chile,has experienced an expeditious process ofurban change involving a number of public–private initiatives like the construction ofhigh-standard urban and interregional high-ways, the development of gated communitiesand ‘enclosed cities’ on the northern edge ofSantiago (Borsdorf and Hidalgo, 2004;Hidalgo, 2004; Ortiz and Morales, 2002).Most researchers have properly related thesechanges and their socio-spatial impacts tothe drastic neo-liberal reforms implementedsince the mid 1970s (De Mattos, 1996, 1998,1999, 2003; Dockemdorff et al., 2000;Rodriguez and Winchester, 2001).1

Following Silva (1995, pp. 190 and 196),the neo-liberal reform initiated by General

Urban Studies, Vol. 43, No. 10, 1825–1846, September 2006

Hugo Marcelo Zunino is in the Department of Geography, University of Chile, Portugal 84, Torre Chica, piso 3, Santiago, Chile.Fax: 56 2 978 3095. E-mail: [email protected].

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Augusto Pinochet stimulated major changesin the political, economic and social realms.While ‘political’ issues became marginalised,scientific methodology and positivist scienceacquired a predominant role in decision-making processes. Democratic governmentsthat followed the authoritarian administration(Patricio Aylwin 1990–94, Eduardo Frei1994–2000 and Ricardo Lagos 2000–06)did not alter substantially the scenario, main-taining fiscal austerity and incrementingopportunities for capital accumulation viafree trade agreements signed with the US,the European Union and several Latin Amer-ican countries. For Valdes (1995, pp. 253–254), Chilean society seems to have reacheda surprising consensual course of develop-ment that promises to remain stable in thefuture. The consensus that permeates main-stream politicians—including Lagos’ ‘thirdway’—does not question the basis of the econ-omic model.

Economic liberalisation and consensualpolitics have affected urban developmentstrengthening the market role and promotingthe use of strict technical criteria in the evalu-ation of urban initiatives. This can be readthrough the formal legislation promulgatedin the past couple of decades. The 1979national urban policy doubled Santiago’surban area and liberalised land markets. Inturn, the 2001 ‘Great Urban Reform’ pro-moted by the Ministry of Housing exaltedthe role of the private sector in urban develop-ment. New regulations enacted between 1997and 2004 such as the Conditional Urbanis-ation Areas (ZODUC) and Priority Areas forUrbanisation (ADUP) opened up opportu-nities for urbanising areas beyond the citylimits. Projects realised under the ZODUCor ADUC regulations involved building‘negotiation tables’ between private investorsand government representatives to discusstechnical matters such as how to internaliseexternalities and mitigation strategies.

The liberalisation of land markets and newregulations has exacerbated Santiago’s ten-dency of horizontal expansion and fragment-ation. In 1980, the urbanised area ofSantiago covered 33 000 hectares; by 2004,

it had almost doubled to 60 000 hectares(Hidalgo and Arenas, 2003). The Ministry ofHousing urban policies gained unfavourablepolitical and academic criticism for stimulatingurban sprawl and socio-spatial fragmentation(see Hidalgo, 2004; Sabatini, 1997). Santiagois, at present, facing a dual process: rapid hori-zontal extension of the upper and middleclasses in the northern side of the city and revi-talisation of centrally located areas throughdemand-oriented subsidies and direct publicintervention (Hidalgo and Zunino, 2005).

The case study selected—the Portal of theBicentenary Project—located in the Munici-pality of Cerrillos is part of the BicentennialProgramme, set up in the year 2000 by thecentral government to celebrate 200 years ofChile’s independence in 2010. Besides pro-viding a landmark to celebrate the progressof the nation, the project represents an effortto balance the centrifugal forces triggered byneo-liberal policies through a state-ledintervention. Its goal is to build a middle-class neighbourhood with high infrastructureand environmental standards in a centrallylocated area. Until 2004 the site was occupiedby a civilian-military airport; the 245 hectares(604 acres) vacated have a privileged locationin terms of accessibility. The site standsapproximately 15 kilometres from Santiago’sdowntown and a new urban highway systemwill increase its connectivity to the rest ofthe city and beyond. Planners expect to builda ‘new city’ with a population of nearly150 000 inhabitants before the end of thisdecade. The residential area surrounding theairport is composed of social housing andmarginal settlements; poverty affects approxi-mately 35 per cent of the population of theMunicipality of Cerrillos. Although theproject will be developed within the citylimits and, therefore, does not fall under theZODUC or ADUC regulations, the numberof actors involved and the political impli-cations resulting from being backed by influ-ential political figures (including potentialpresidential candidates), led to the formationof an informal decision-making entity (anegotiation table) that resembles urbanisationpractices beyond the city limits.

1826 HUGO MARCELO ZUNINO



To carry out the project and reach its politicalgoals, the central state apparatus created withinthe Ministry of Housing a special co-ordinationoffice headed by a general manager. Thisoffice’s specific goals were to co-ordinate anumber of public instances, to reach agree-ments with private investors and to open theproject to public participation and scrutiny. In2003, an informal master plan for the areawas approved by the Ministry of Housing andat present the Municipality of Cerrillos (thelocal government) is preparing the formalland use plan to accommodate the project.

At least at its discursive level, this projecthas the potential to reorient the urban develop-ment pattern towards a more equitable urban

structure, reducing spatial fragmentation andopening opportunities for social integration,making a sharp contrast with the developmentof gated communities and enclosed urbanareas on the northern edge of Santiago(Borsdorf and Hidalgo, 2004; Hidalgo, 2004;Hidalgo and Arenas, 2003). Moreoverpolitical figures have exalted this project,saying that it represents the ‘work of all’ andstressing that an ample range of actors haveconcurred in this initiative.

Figure 1 shows the location of the project inrelation to the traditional location of high-income sectors, the recently urbanised areasin the northern fringe of Santiago and thenew highway system.

Figure 1. The location of Cerillos within the city of Santiago. Source: based on Borsdorf and Hidalgo(2005).

URBAN DECISION-MAKING 1827



One of this investigation’s fundamentalarguments is that macro trends, like theadvancement of neo-liberal policies, are notenough to explain urban dynamics. Certainly,neo-liberal policies set the stage for decisionsaffecting urban patterns, but this relation is notquasi-mechanical or easily predictable. In thelast instance, cities are built by individualsholding particular agendas and interests. AsMarcuse (2000) asserts, cities and places arenot ‘disordered’; the issue at stake is ratherestablishing who is ordering the city, forwhat purposes, in the interest of what. In thiscase study, to reach such ‘progressive’ goalsas socio-spatial integration and participatoryplanning, one should expect important levelsof co-ordination/debate among the inhabi-tants of the Cerrillos area, authorities fromthe local government (the Mayor of the Muni-cipality of Cerrillos and the municipality pro-fessional employees), private investors andthe Ministry of Housing. Then, it is relevantto ask: who is controlling the decision-making processes? Who is being excludedand by which means? Can this urban govern-ing arrangement be a generalised practice inthe Chilean context? What are some of thepotential consequences of this interventionon the social and spatial layout of Santiago?

Just as structural influence cannot bedismissed, neither can researchers ignore therole of urban agents. Individuals participatingin decision-making bodies do not act in avacuum; they are part of a broader socialsystem that manages a set of possibilitiesand constraints. In my reading, a line ofinquiry that attempts to consider both struc-tural forms of constraint and how agents canmake a difference in the urban developmentprocess faces two related challenges: toresolve analytically the tension betweenstructure and agency; and, to decipher theways in which power is exercised in concretesituations. To account for the recursiverelationship between action and structure, inthe next section I will employ Giddens’(1979, 1984) structuration theory, which iscomplemented, in an overtly eclectic butconsistent analytical framework, by a Fou-cauldian approach to power. On the analytical

side, I suggest using Ostrom’s (1986) notionof ‘social rule’ as the heuristic device tointerpret the concrete ways in which knowl-edgeable actors are framed by the socialcontext (constraint and enabled in theirdecisions).

Social rules are here understood as formal(written) and informal (unwritten) prescrip-tions set up by actors to reach certain ends.Rules are not confined to a given level ofaction (the national, the regional, the local):they act across levels. For analytical purposes,I will consider three interconnected functionallevels: policy-making (broad political plotlines are given), co-ordination (the level atwhich certain actors co-ordinate the overallfunctioning of the project) and operation(where concrete decisions regarding theproject are taken). My purpose in establishingconnections between structure and action willbe to disclose how rules operating at higherlevels of abstraction relate to localisedpractices.

In section 3, I read the rules established ateach functional level. At the policy-makinglevel, I emphasise the way in which neo-liberal reforms have impacted on decision-making processes in terms of the informationused by governing bodies, the knowledge thatis considered as valid and public participation.I then move on to examine, at the co-ordina-tion level, the strategies deployed by thegeneral manager and his/her staff to attemptto control the project’s outcome. At the oper-ational level, I analyse the role and purpose ofadvisory committees—consultancy units thatare constituted under the discretion of actorsoperating at the co-ordination level—and therole of actors working for the municipality(the mayor and professionals). The identifi-cation of the rules of each functional leveland the interpretation of their interlockingwill allow me to define, in section 4, multi-level power relations and strategic nodes inwhich relationships of co-operation, domina-tion and subordination are being established.In the last section, I consider if the resultscan be generalised to the Chilean contextand revisit critically the analytical frameworkhere deployed.




This line of investigation differs signifi-cantly from mainstream urban research donein Latin America, which has related, ratherdeterministically, urban changes to neo-liberal policies. Without ruling out theinfluence of such macro processes, I movethe analytical attention to the social construc-tion of urban space and to the power relationsembedded in multilevel organisations. Thepolitic-administrative structures and powerrelationships in Latin America’s mega-citieshave received scant analytical attention(Ward, 1996, p. 54). In Chile, the first majorproject aimed at relating the emergence ofnew residential patterns in Santiago and Val-paraiso and the power configuration at workwill begin in 2006 (Hidalgo and Zunino,2005).

Underlying this investigation is the premisethat, just as cities are in constant transform-ation, so are the formal and informal rulesframing the functioning of governing bodies.Harvey’s (1982) argument that capitalismhas an intrinsic tendency towards contradic-tion, making it hard to achieve a ‘spatial fix’,could be extended to the difficulties in achiev-ing an ‘institutional fix’. Indeed, urban gov-erning bodies are constituted by an unstableset of social relationships, in a constant fluxof changes as each party deploys strategiesand tactics to achieve their particular ends.

This is what distinguishes my approach togovernment from studies, like those informedby regime theory (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989),which theorise the relative stability of govern-ing coalitions and usually end up with fixedcategorisations of governance arrangements.For this reason, I avoid using the termsregime and governance, commonly used inregime literature.2 However, even if it is con-sidered difficult to achieve fixed rules, certainsocial institutions are more permanent thanothers across time and space. Indeed, as illus-trated in the first part of this section, Chile’sneo-liberal social order exhibits importantdegrees of stability, as there is a relation ofcapillarity (see section 2) between macro-economic decisions taken at the policy-making level and the daily performance ofindividuals following the rules of the market.3

The findings here presented are based on abroader research project undertaken between2001 and 2003. The research strategy contem-plated identifying ‘strategic actors’ by exam-ining formal and informal positions andscope rules (see section 2) that give agentsthe ability and influence to affect outcomes.Next, I conducted semi-structured interviewswith 14 strategic actors or ‘positions’. At theco-ordination level, I interviewed the generalmanager and professionals from his/her stafftwice. Also at the co-ordination level, I con-ducted interviews with actors working forthe Regional Government of Santiago. TheRegional Government is headed by an ‘Inten-dente’ appointed by the President of theRepublic. The Intendente is the Head of theDirectorate of the Portal of the BicentenaryProject and has the task of co-ordinating theregional offices of the different ministries. Atthe operational level, I conducted interviewswith members of different advisory commit-tees, professionals working for the Municipal-ity of Cerrillos and direct advisors for theMayor of Cerrillos.

Following the categorisation of social rulesproposed by Ostrom (1986) actors participat-ing in the decision-making body at the co-ordination and operational levels were askedhow participants are chosen (position rules);under what conditions do participants enter/leave a position (boundary rules); what areeach participant’s main responsibilities/func-tions and what activity/ies is each participantrequired to perform (authority rules); whataspects of the project is each participant ableto modify and what decisions are beyondtheir area of influence (scope rules); how aredecisions taken (aggregation rules); whatinformation is considered in decision-making, who provides that information andto whom is this information distributed (infor-mation rules); how are the benefits and costsof the project distributed (pay-off rules). Therationale for this line of questioning derivesfrom the analytical framework that I con-structed in the next section. To complementthe information obtained from the semi-structured interviews, I conducted informalinterviews with members of five




neighbourhood associations in the area sur-rounding the former Cerrillos Airport.

2. Power, Social Rules and the Structuringof Social Life

Examining the process through whichmanners and customs spread in westernEurope since the Middle Ages, Elias makesan important comment

We see more clearly how relatively smallcircles at first formed the center of themovement and how the process then gradu-ally passed to broader strata. But this diffu-sion itself presupposed very specificcontacts, and therefore a quite definitivestructure of society. . . . The process thatemerges resembles in form—though not insubstance—those chemical processes inwhich a liquid, the whole of which issubjected to conditions of chemicalchange (e.g., crystallization), first takes oncrystalline form at a small nucleus, whilethe rest gradually crystallizes around thiscore. Nothing will be more erroneous thanto take the core of the crystallization forthe cause of the transformation (Elias,2000, p. 99).

Elias’ work suggests that there is a complexintermeshing between social practices andbroader structures. While certain actionsmight appear as expressions of the autonomyof the self, many—maybe most—decisionsand social processes are influenced by forcesbeyond our direct control. It appears difficult,however, completely to shut off alternatives,forcing human beings to react as machines.In the last resort, human beings have, withfew exceptions, the (illegal) option to termi-nate their existence. Certainly, the structure–agency dilemma poses substantial challengesto social researchers; depending on theirpoint of view, researchers will either searchfor the ‘laws of motion of society’ orimmerse their inquiry into the individualpsyche of subjects to interpret how they takeseemingly autonomous decisions.

Debates on the degree of determination ofsocial structures have been at the core of

sociological debate for decades. For some,social structures guide social relations to theextent that actors do not have the opportunityto choose between alternative courses ofaction. For others it is foolish to deny some-thing as obvious and evident as humanfreedom.4 What Elias is suggesting in hisanalysis of the diffusion of cultural habits isthat, although a social process might appearon the surface guided by a central core (suchas the capitalist system, the central state, anelite, a ‘general manager’), we can by nomeans reduce the phenomenon to a coreacting deterministically over other subordi-nated units. The transformation of theseunits, according to Elias, represents changesin human behaviour and attitudes that arenot deterministically driven by an overwhelm-ing force existing ‘out there’. Yet, these unitsdo participate in a general process, the trajec-tory of which is, to a lesser or greater extent,influenced by broader situations. Moreover,cultural diffusion would be impossible in theabsence of a social structure defining thechannels through which social processesspread. Translating this idea to the project,the general manager appears, at first glance,as the ‘core’ of the project, but the point isnot how this core is impacting on other units(the mayor, professionals from the regionaland local governments, political authorities)but rather how other units, through theiraction or inaction, are shaping specificpower configurations. Following the logicalconsequence of this point is the statementthat power is unequally distributed amongparticipants in a decision-making process,but it does not follow that the less powerful,the subordinated ones are mere recipients,subjects of power being exercised overthem: they are also an essential part in thereproduction/diffusion of a given social struc-ture; and for that diffusion to occur, they makeuse of the existing structure.

Elias’ concern with structures and the rolethat individuals and groups play in socialreproduction and diffusion, parallels, inimportant ways, Giddens’ theory of structura-tion. This approach offers a conception ofsocial practice and structural constraint that




can be useful in coming to terms with suchcontested issues as the notions of agency andsocial determination. Structuration rests onthe concept of duality of structure. Giddensseparates conceptually ‘structure’ from‘social system’. Structures are defined asorganised sets of rules (normative elementsand codes of signification) and resources(authoritative or allocative elements that canbe employed to exert power). Structuresexist out of time and space, existing—as atime–space presence—only through socialpractices: structures have no existence inde-pendent of the knowledge that agents haveabout what they do in their day-to-day activi-ties (Giddens, 1984, p. 26). The social system,in turn, comprises the more durable features ofsocieties; that is, a set of rules and resourcescontinually being reproduced through longtime-spans. Those practices that have thelargest time–space extension are referred toas institutions, representing institutionalisedrules and resources.

An important aspect in Giddens’ theoris-ation is that human agents are knowledgeable,founded basically on practical and discursiveconsciousness that can be traced throughsome kind of description actors can makeabout the situation surrounding them. Actorsdo understand the possibilities and limitationsthey face in a given historical and spatialcontext. Therefore, the properties of thesocial systems are transformed or reproducedthrough social practices of ‘structured or situ-ated agents’—that is, not slaves or free agents,but actors who are more or less aware of thelimits and possibilities for action. Thegeneral manager, then, is setting an array ofpossibilities and constraints for other actors,who are knowledgeable, or can becomeknowledgeable, about what is going onaround them and can take the necessarysteps to advance particularistic ends.

Structuration theory has been heavily criti-cised for emphasising practical over discur-sive knowledge leading to a weak conceptionof agency (Gregson, 1987; King, 1999;Storper, 1985), for not giving enough weightto social constraints (Clegg, 1989; Gregory,1980, 1985; Storper, 1985; Thompson, 1989;

Thrift, 1985), for introducing a non-structuraland/or misrepresented conception of power(Boyne, 1991; Storper, 1985), for aninadequate account of spatial relations(Gregory, 1985) and for not being an appropri-ate device to inform empirical research(Adams and Hastings, 2001; Dear, 1995;Gregson, 1987, 1989; Kellerman, 1989;Moos and Dear, 1986; Mouzelis, 1989; Philoand Parr, 2000; Waterstone, 1995, 1996).However, I argue that if some conceptualissues are worked out, structuration theorycan contribute to building a useful analyticalframework to investigate the operation of gov-erning arrangements embedded in given socialcontexts and the power relationships they rep-resent. The issue at stake is how to ‘ground’structuration theory. In my view, structurationtheory was too rapidly dismissed in the mid1990s as an appropriate framework to informempirical research (see, however, investi-gations conducted by Parker, 2001a, 2001b;Phipps, 2000).5

In the context of this investigation, there aretwo critical issues that need to be tackled:Giddens’ problematic approach to power;and, his blurred notion of rule.

Giddens’ conception of power seems toembrace, problematically, only the powerthat emerges from broader systems of domina-tion, restricting the scope of human action andweakening his construction of the situatedactor. Giddens claims that power is presentin the form of a dualism characterised by insti-tutionalised structures of domination on onehand and power used by participants tosucceed on the other. In his words

Even the most casual encounters instanceselements of the totality as structure of dom-ination: but such structural properties are atthe same time drawn upon and reproducedthrough, the activities of participants insystems of social interaction. I haveargued elsewhere that the concept ofaction is logically tied to that of power,where the latter is understood as a transfor-mative capacity (Giddens, 1979, p. 88).

Although Giddens argues that power must betreated in the context of the duality of the




structure, which is inscribed in the activity ofparticipants (see also Giddens, 1979, p. 91),power appears to emerge, ultimately, frompre-given structures of domination andactors can only exert power by relying onresources that carry structural properties.Giddens is quite explicit about this point

‘Power’ intervenes conceptually betweenbroader notions of transformative capacityon the one side, and of domination on theother: but only operates as such throughthe utilization of transformative capacityas generated by structures of domination(Giddens, 1979, p. 92; emphasis added).

These arguments convey the idea that there isa sort of underlying power configurationallowing structuration; that is, allowingcertain bounded agents to use power toachieve pre-defined ends. Power, therefore,appears divorced from agency, outside theprocess of structuration and ultimately deter-ministic. Indeed, in the first few pages ofThe Constitution of Society, Giddens (1984)portrays power as a property of actors, as anability to make a difference and as somethingthat is ‘prior to the subject’. We can think ofthis in terms of power containers shaped bystructures of domination that appear indepen-dent from social relationships and from thestructuration process itself. This interpretationis reinforced when Giddens considers struc-tures of signification and legitimisation,which also appear disconnected from socialpractices.

Secondly, Giddens falls short in providingconcrete research tools and his central notionof rules remains undertheorised and vague(see also Kellerman, 1989). Yet, by nomeans do I consider the notion of rules as auseless concept; quite the contrary, it can bea useful heuristic device to grasp adequatelythe ways in which actors ‘get structured’:enabled and constrained by the broadersystem of social interaction. Giddens (1989,p. 255) is certainly right in his assessmentthat social rules are not “quasi-mathematical”,but he does not immediately follow this bystating that rules cannot be specified. Whatseems to be missing is an operational or

working definition of rules; one that allowsreading, comparing and contrasting the struc-tural properties at a given historical andspatial moment and determining in whichways rules constrain and enable socialpractices.

I suggest using Ostrom’s (1986) categoris-ation of social rules as an analytical deviceto study the functioning of decision-makingbodies (see also, Waterstone, 1995, 1996).Ostrom defines rules as linguistic entitiesthat are constructed by a set of individuals toachieve order and predictability in definedsituations; that is to say, they are put togetherby certain individuals to achieve particularends. Ostrom suggests that implicit or explicitindividual efforts to achieve order and predict-ability entail: setting up a set of positions indecision-making bodies (position rules);defining how participants enter or leave a pos-ition (boundary rules); specifying the actionseach position is required, allowed or forbiddento take (authority rules); specifying the set ofoutcomes each position is required, forbiddenor allowed to affect (scope rules); prescribinghow collective decisions are taken (aggre-gation rules); defining channels of communi-cation and the types of information to beused (information rules); and describing howbenefits and costs are to be distributed (pay-off rules).

Rules can account for what Clegg (1989)refers to as the structural and the agencysides of power: the broader structures of dom-ination influencing (but not determining)social practices and the channels throughwhich actors can wield power to reproduceor challenge existing power configurationsand social structures. If we consider rulesnot as given mono-level prescriptions but asmultilayer social constructions, it will bepossible, then, by looking at broader-levelrules, to examine how actors operating atlower levels ‘get structured’. This approachto rules and power departs substantially fromGiddens’ position, embracing a productiveconception of power: the deployment ofpower is a way to create rules that shapesocial life and to produce a particular powerconfiguration. Rules emerge then as




instruments of power, as instruments toproduce, reproduce or dilute a particularsocial context. When Foucault puts forwardthe research questions in his book TheHistory of Sexuality, he illustrates the pro-ductive side of power and how it is inscribedinto particular social contexts

In a specific type of discourse on sex, in aspecific form of extortion of truth appearinghistorically and in specific places, (aroundthe child’s body, apropos of a woman’ssex, in connection with practices restrictingbirth, and so on), what were the mostimmediate, the most local power relationsat work? How did they make possiblethese kinds of discourses and, conversely,how were these discourses used to supportpower relations? (Foucault, 1979, p. 97).

In my reading of Foucault, power is not theproperty of some superstructure ‘condensed’in particular power relations at lower levels,nor is power confined to social practices at asingle micro-level; there is a relation ofmutual dependency between the macro andthe micro in the execution of power. Foucaulttakes a specific historical moment to illustratethis point

But what I meant was that in order for thereto be a movement from above to belowthere has to be a capillarity from below toabove at the same time. Take a simpleexample, the feudal form of power relation.Between the serfs tied to the land and thelord who levies rent from them, thereexists a local, relatively autonomousrelation, almost a tete-a-tete. For thisrelation to hold, it must indeed have thebacking of a certain pyramidal ordering ofthe feudal system. But it’s certain that thepower of the French kings and the appara-tuses of State which they gradually estab-lished from the eleventh century onwardshad as their condition of possibility arooting in the form of behaviour, bodiesand local relations of power which shouldnot at all be seen as a simple projection ofthe central power (Foucault, 1980, p. 201;emphasis added).

Even though there is a hierarchical, top–downform of social relation, in order for this socialform to exist over time, local power relationsmust hold a certain degree of autonomy frombroader power relations. Then, for capillarityto ‘stick’ across time and space, the socialpractices of the actors operating on top ofthe pyramid must go hand-in-hand with theperformance of individuals operating atlower hierarchical levels. If local-level actorsdecide not to reproduce this social relation-ship—for instance, by constructing rules thatcontradict what broader-level rules establishas permitted and forbidden—it would meana disruption of the existing system. Yet, animportant element to consider is that capillar-ity relations do not entail, necessarily, a con-scious reproduction of the social system:passivity, blind obedience, indifference ofindividuals acting locally are also ways ofreproducing the system. Moreover, it couldbe argued that the more durable features ofsociety—like the contemporary capitalistsystem or such institutions as the judicialsystem—are continually being reproducedlocally through the daily performance ofindividuals that just follow the course ofevents, which is the inertia of contemporarysocial life.

The degree to which the features of thesocial system are liable to disruption via rulechange is a matter of empirical investigation.From my point of view, movements fromabove and below are both necessary to chal-lenge effectively the more durable featuresof society. Structural changes alone (such asmodifying general policies) will be unproduc-tive if they do not trigger reactions in the samedirection at the local level; seemingly, localresistance will be futile if it is unable to‘scale up’ and permeate more general levels.In Discipline and Punish, Foucault complainsthat movements from below are rarely giventhe importance they deserve

One remembers the great legal affairs of the18th century, when enlightened opinionintervened in the person of philosophersand certain magistrates: Calas, Sirven andthe Chavalier de La Barre, for instance.




But less attention is given to the popularagitation caused by punitive practice.Indeed, they seldom spread beyond atown, or even a district. Yet they did havereal importance. Sometimes these move-ments, which originated from below,spread and attract the attention of morehighly placed persons who, taking themup, gave them a new dimension (Foucault,1995, p. 62; original emphasis).

This quote does not imply that broader move-ments affecting the general social situation(like the legislation in place) are less import-ant than movement from below: there is arelation of mutual hold between ‘the power-ful’ and ‘the subjugated subject’ and it is pre-cisely the nature of this mutual hold that needsto be investigated in concrete social settings toevaluate the potential of disruption and todetect strategic nodes where resistance canbe exerted more efficiently to change certaincourses of action.

Foucault’s approach allows the consider-ation of power as a consequence and a necess-ary condition for structuration to happen: therecursive relation among broader and morestable sets of rules and social practices is theresult of the operation of power relationshipsthat are both a pre-condition for practice,enabling and constraining social performance,and an effect produced by the application ofstrategies, tactics or, more generally, politicaltechnologies. In other words, a knowledgeableand situated actor who is engaged in thebusiness of governing others will face a setof possibilities and constraints originatingfrom broader levels and will decide upon aspecific course of action—for example, astrategy—that will have consequences interms of creating a particular set of rules andpower relationships, reconfiguring his/herand others’ bases to exert power and creatingthe conditions to resist, or not, structuralfeatures.

In the next section, I read the set of inter-locking social rules framing social practicesand producing power relationships in the gov-erning arrangement that promotes the Portalof the Bicentenary Project, considering for

analytical purposes three functional or insti-tutional levels (policy-making, co-ordinationand operation). I begin by examining thepolicy-making level and then move on toanalyse how the rules operating at this levelset possibilities and constraints for decision-making at lower levels. In section 4, Iexamine the power configuration at workand the particular capillarity relation existingin the Portal of the Bicentenary Project. Iend the paper by discussing whether the situ-ation encountered can be generalised to theChilean context and the consequences of thiskind of urban development for the socio-spatial configuration of the city of Santiago.I also revisit critically the analytical frame-work employed.

3. Techno-politicians at Work in Neo-liberal Chile

3.1 The Policy-making Level: Chile’s Neo-liberal Order and Social Rules

In his critical account of Chile’s neo-liberalmodel, Nef illustrates how many conservativegroups think about the country

For those mesmerised by the magic of themarketplace and the ‘end of history’, con-temporary Chile constitutes a remarkabledemonstration on the inevitable triumph ofeconomic and political liberalism. Democ-racy and capitalism seem to flourish. Offi-cial circles as far away as Eastern Europe,establishment intellectuals, and the main-stream media have praised the country asa model for Latin America, the developingworld, and beyond (Nef, 2003, p. 16).

For neo-liberal thought, the discipline ofeconomics is not value-based, reasserting therole of positive science and elevating theeconomists to an unquestionable position ofintellectual and political superiority (Valdes,1995). The notion of freedom becomeslimited to the option of choosing within anopen market. Following Valdes, the return toformal democratic rule in 1990 did not meanrenewed state controls on economic activity,rather, the return to democracy has been




conducted with strict adherence to macroeco-nomic equilibrium, the promotion of econ-omic growth, the attraction of foreigninvestment and the stimulation of nationalsavings. In contemporary Chile, then,decision-making is a depoliticised practice,as decisions are conceived as the outcome ofrational procedures (see also E. Silva, 1996;P. Silva, 1998).

For E. Silva, (1995, p. 200), the military gov-ernment left an enduring legacy of technocraticpolitical style, the ‘management of things’being the hallmark of the new democratic gov-ernment. Technocrats now focused on politicaldemobilisation and elite politics as the meansto consolidate democracy, stressing experteconomic management as a fundamental toolfor consolidating democracy and achievingsocial equity. Following Galjart and Silva(1995), I will regard technocrats as individualswith a high level of specialised academic train-ing, particularly in economics and engineering,who are based on the principle that most of theproblems of society can be solved by scientificexpertise rather than through politics and pol-itical awareness in society.6

In terms of rules, the implementation of aneo-liberal agenda has meant putting inplace a complex web of prescriptions. Themost pervasive effect of neo-liberalism hasbeen to restrict the type of information to beused in decision-making processes, regardingas valid only information derived from theapplication of strict technical procedures(information rules). For example, public pro-jects are evaluated following the prescriptionscontained in a technical manual that isannually updated with the latest economicindicators by technocrats working for theMinistry of National Planning. Despite someattempts in the early and mid 1990s to incor-porate social and environmental criteria inthe evaluation of public projects and topromote civic participation, the techno-economic machine remains and nodes ofpower constructed under the authoritarianregime have been reproduced under formaldemocratic ruling. As technocratic thoughtpenetrated deeply into public administration,the old bureaucracy was partially replaced

by ‘flexible’ public workers, professionalswith short-term contracts or acting as part-time advisors or consultants, marking animportant shift in terms of boundary rulesand blurring the public–private divide.

Political technologies deployed in contem-porary Chile can be interpreted through thesocial rules implanted by the multiple (andanonymous) designers of the system. Techno-crats hold important scope and authority rulesin the state apparatus: they have the power toaffect directly projects’ results by conductingnegotiation, setting the agendas, framing theproblems and creating positions through aset of boundary rules. With regard to aggrega-tion rules, decisions are taken by following astrict economic rationale and by meeting con-sensual solutions among political and econ-omic elites. While the use of economicrationale derives directly from the premiseof dominant ideology, to explain the ascen-dancy of a deeply engrained consensual styleof policy-making, it must also pay attentionto recent political developments.

Chile’s peaceful transition to democracy(1988–90) was facilitated by a negotiatedsettlement between Christian Democrats(centre party), segments of the socialist left(the ‘reinvented’ socialists) and portions ofthe economic elites who supported the author-itarian regime of General Augusto Pinochet.According to Cavarozzi (1992), this settle-ment was possible, in part, because of a politi-cal deadlock in the late 1980s with twoinfeasible maximalist proposals that could beovercome only through negotiation amongmembers of the economic and political elites.

For E. Silva (1995), the democratic adminis-trations were unable to modify the social struc-ture (the rules in place) because the 1980constitution instituted several mechanisms toguarantee conservative parties a majority ofrepresentatives in Congress and a dominantrole in decision-making, at least in the 1990s.These mechanisms included establishing con-stitutionally ranked principles and formalrules that only could be modified with 65 percent of the votes of parliamentarians and sena-tors, giving, in practice, a power of veto to theconservative forces in Congress. As a result,




political elites are framed by the politicalrationale of reaching consensus among partici-pants. Conflict avoidance through elitist dialo-gue and not engaging in ‘political’ discussionsare two of the main technologies of govern-ment employed in contemporary Chile toreproduce the structural context and toadvance a variety of interests, including thoseemerging from urban projects. Although noformal (written) rules frame this situation,informal rules encourage elitist consensusand permeate the work of public officials,private investors and the population as a whole.

In relation to public participation, both theuse of technocratic knowledge in decision-making and a policy-making style favouringconsensual solutions have acted jointly toreduce citizens’ level of engagement in pro-jects affecting their future. As Carruthers(2001) puts it, contemporary politics in Chileis characterised by a decline in public partici-pation and the reconsolidation of elitism, bothelements dictating that policy decisions takeplace in close negotiated processes betweenintellectual and political leaders. In thereading of Galjart and Silva (1995, pp. 3–4),the knowledge of economists aimed at provid-ing recipes for growth has led to an oligarchicmanner of filling leadership posts, illustratinghow technocracy turns out to be a substitutefor democracy (see also Taylor, 1998). AsSilva suggests

In trying to ‘clean up’ the state (by concen-trating attention on state finances andquality of the administration) this techno-cratic approach has almost totally neglectedcivil society. State technocrats believed thateconomic problems had to be resolved by‘experts’, without the ‘interference’ of thecitizenry which would represent an‘obstacle’ for the achievement of economicgoals (E. Silva, 1995, p. 28).

As illustrated in the introductory section, atpolicy-making level, the use of economicrationale and consensus between real estatedevelopers and bureaucratic elites is theleading force behind urban developmenttrends. Yet, this does not impact deterministi-cally over individuals and groups; rather,

actors keep their power to choose amongdifferent courses of action and deploy strat-egies that have effects in terms of producingor reproducing particular power configur-ations. Although the structural scenario setsa number of restrictions for co-ordinationand operational-level actors to conduct thePortal of the Bicentenary Project, there stillremain channels to challenge the urban gov-erning coalition and the system. It becomescritical, then, to analyse how co-ordinationand operational-level ‘structured agents’respond to defined situations encountered.

3.2 Redeveloping Cerrillos: The Co-ordinationand Operational Levels

Given its dimension and political significance,the Portal of the Bicentenary Project (PBP,hereafter) is being managed directly by thenational office of the Ministry of Housing(MINVU, hereafter) through a ‘generalmanager’. This technician was appointed bythe MINVU in the early 2000s and keptregular contact with high-ranking public offi-cials to achieve co-ordination among avariety of governmental units. The generalmanager acted, primarily, at the co-ordinationlevel, using formal and informal authorityrules to make strategic decisions regarding,for instance, the type of studies to carry out,what kind of information to produce, at whatmoment, how to handle and distribute theinformation produced and when to formspecial boards to work out controversialtopics (advisory committees).7

Co-ordination-level actors respondeddirectly to the central state apparatus and theway decisions were taken created a subtletension between the general manager and pro-fessionals from Santiago’s regional govern-ment. As a professional from the regionalgovernment illustrated, critiques were notuncommon

We must bear in mind that this projectemerged from a strong political will, notfrom the recognition of real market oppor-tunities. Here, the state intends to convinceprivate investors that the master plan will




guarantee interesting economic returns. . . .Before the project, no one saw Cerrillosas a space that could accommodate alarge-scale urban project. The studies thatwe have done demonstrate that the only rea-listic thing to do there is social housing(translated by the author).

On top of PBP’s hierarchical pyramid there isan informal instance called ‘The Directorateof the Portal of the Bicentenary Project’, pre-sided over by the Head of the MetropolitanGovernment of Santiago (Intendente) andconstituted by several ministers or their repre-sentatives. Although the Intendente, as presi-dent of this Directorate is empowered tomake decisions, his/her role has been rela-tively passive. He/she realises that PBP isMINVU’s project and will not interfere. Aprofessional who works for PBP as an externalconsultant stated

The Intendente will always support theMinister. He asks us where he can make adifference; then lets the project flow. TheDirectorate is not a formal entity. Whatthe central state and MINVU wants fromthis Directorate is to give the impressionthat there are important people supportinga good project, not a foolish idea. Thepeople who constitute the Directorate willnever say no to a general manager prop-osition; they know he speaks on behalf ofthe minister (translated by the author).

Yet, this Directorate has never met, existingonly virtually in the minds of decision-makers. Thus, critical decisions did not con-sider the effective participation of any entitybeyond the Minister of MINVU and thegeneral manager.

At the co-ordination level, the generalmanager and his/her small staff worked as aunit to store information and used it to movethe PBP forward. The PBP central office inSantiago represented a repository of infor-mation which was used to construct the tech-nical justification for the project and tocreate political effects that help certain poli-ticians to move their interests forward. Theconcentration of information was one of the

technologies of government used by thegeneral manager to control operational-levelactors. Indeed, since operational-level actorswere not experts in economics and did notmanage technical discourses, it was difficultfor them to challenge proposals coming fromco-ordination-level technocrats. Given theclose professional and political relationshipbetween the general manager and the Ministerof MINVU, other public authorities did notinterfere in the project.

At the operational level, the main discus-sion arenas were the advisory committees. Inthe past couple of years, several committeeshave been formed to discuss specific issues.The membership of these boards differed,depending on the types of problem put onthe agenda by co-ordination-level actors.The informal boundary rule at work pre-scribed that the general manager invited indi-viduals and/or organisations to attend thenegotiation table and reach consensual agree-ments. Positions were selected on an ad-hocbasis to discuss particular issues, such ashow to reconcile the project with Santiago’stransport plan or how to evaluate the econ-omic feasibility of alternative courses ofaction. Although there were no formal aggre-gation rules prescribing how to build consen-sus, advisory committees played a critical rolein validating the point of view of participantsholding important political or economicresources. In particular, investors had anopen instance for negotiating alternativesthat meant differential economic returns. Thegeneral manager of the PBP commented onthe function of these committees

We have formed several advisory commit-tees to talk over a variety of topics. Afterthe general guidelines of the project weredefined, we had an internal debate aboutwhat were the next steps to be taken, whatelements to consider in the master planand the adequate timing for the realisationof the different phases of the project. Tointegrate the first committee, we invitedthe private sector. This was not a formalinstance; it was a task force that had avery specific function, what we did was an




ample convocation of course. We invitedtwo real estate investors, an entrepreneurin close relation with the environmentalscenario, people from SECTRA [a govern-mental entity in charge of public transport]. . . The committees did not take decisionsbut they influenced quite a bit. We werenot fooling around. We invited them totalk, to take them seriously, not just tohear them and say: OK, that is it. We arenot inventing something that has no realconnection to the ground (translated bythe author; original emphasis).8

The statement “We are not inventing some-thing that has no real connection to theground” illustrates that the project becamefeasible only if the private sector was willingto invest (authority rules), which is thereason why the general manager grantedthem a position with enough power to influ-ence on the project.

One key aspect to the functioning of advi-sory committees is the absence of formalrules defining each participant’s action rangeand the way resolutions or recommendationswere to be taken. The general manager andhis/her staff played a number of centralroles, such as gathering the necessary infor-mation, framing the problem to be resolved,suggesting solutions, evaluating options andsuggesting a course of action to advisory com-mittees, the Minister of MINVU or, even-tually, to the Directorate of PBP.

Following the rationale of the generalmanager, one of the main achievements ofthese committees was that “people began torealise that this was an open project, notresponding to the intention of one person,but open to receive proposals and goodideas”. Yet, considering the existing bound-ary, scope, authority and information rules,actors from the local government (themayor) remained alienated from the project.A direct advisor to the general manager com-mented on the internal functioning of thesecommittees

We have periodic meetings, generally on aweekly basis, convened by the generalmanager. The municipality is usually

incorporated. Decisions are taken roundthe negotiation table based on a number ofspecialised studies: investment plans, infra-structure developments and how the inves-tors sense the project. In the final instance,however, it is the Minister of MINVUwho approves or rejects ideas (translatedby the author).

In relation to the role played by committees, aprofessional working for the Regional Gov-ernment stated

The committees do not ‘cut the cake’[Chilean colloquialism for not having anydecision power], they only recommend.Look, do you really want to know whatthe general manager wants? He wantsthese committees to exist so he does notappear as the only one taking decisions.He always wants to ask lots of people, sohe just goes on and calls them. . . . Thegeneral manager comes to the negotiationtable with a proposal and he wants everyoneto listen to him. And, since he has lots offriends, he already has a strong backupand is able to tell the minister: yes, wewent over this and we did it all together(translated by the author; originalemphasis).

In these two statements, the last one with animportant dose of sarcasm, it is possible toread two critical functions of the advisorycommittees and the political technologiesused to control a key decision-makinginstance. First, they functioned to engagepotential investors in direct dialogues andgather the necessary technical information toframe the project in accordance with whatinvestors wanted. For that purpose, positionsrelied on information facilitated by investorsand technical studies conducted by privateconsultants, hired directly by the co-ordinationoffice of PBP. Secondly, advisory committeesplayed the decisive role of legitimisingthe project by enabling the construction ofa discourse claiming that the PBP is ‘thework of all’, including the local government(the municipality).




The statements reproduced above make itpossible to access indirectly the finer detailsabout how these committees function. Thegeneral manager was backed by a number ofindividuals, organisations and public officers.The claim that “since he [the generalmanger] has lots of friends”, suggests thatchannels of negotiation operating outside theformal organisation were in place and usedto reach a consensus among elites and facethe ‘open’ negotiations with a more or lesssettled proposition.

Since the Municipality of Cerrillos holdsthe authority rule to elaborate land use plans,the general manager needed to align themayor and his/her technicians along the axisof the project. However, the municipality’sdegree of influence was quite limited.Although a position was always granted inthe advisory committees, there was littlespace left to exert influence (scope rule).One major explanation for the municipality’smodest scope is that it did not posses theresources to conduct its own studies and gen-erate information and technical knowledge tochallenge the ideas constructed by highly qua-lified co-ordination-level technicians. Accord-ing to the general manager, the municipalityparticipated in “each and every instance”,since this project was “ample and open”, inhis/her words

When we decide about the master plan, themunicipality will be there. We will analyseall the information coming from the Minis-try of Public Works, Santiago’s GeneralTransport Plan, etc.

Q: Including information from themunicipality?

No, no, no. How many times do I need torepeat it! No information is coming fromthe municipality; we will be lookingmainly at studies from professionals hiredas consultants. It is not the case that themunicipality has to deliver specific infor-mation; they go hand-in-hand with us.They are our partners in this entire story(translated by the author).

In this statement, it is possible to read a pater-nalistic relationship between the generalmanager and the municipality: the role ofthe municipality was limited to beinginformed about the project’s progress and tofollow the voice of the general manager.Given that the local government did nothave its own voice, it lost presence at the oper-ational level and was ‘pulled up’ to the co-ordination level where it stood as a subordi-nated unit. This strategy was aimed atmoving the project along a fast track, avoidingproblems with the municipality in the elabor-ation of the local land use plan. Indeed, sincethe municipality “participated” in “each andevery meeting”, it would be difficult foractors from the local government to challengedirectives coming from the co-ordinationoffice of the PBP. An advisor for the RegionalGovernment approached this issue explicitly

The project must incorporate the munici-pality. The idea is to collaborate with themunicipality from the beginning and thento inject resources to modernise it, so asto generate a sort of ‘fast track’ and todeal rapidly with all the paperworkinvolved in obtaining all necessarypermits. If you are generating powerfulinstruments to manage the area, you needto get around the fact that the municipalitytakes forever to elaborate local land useplans or to grant permits. Then, evidently,the PBP will work closely with the munici-pality (translated by the author).

With regard to the impact of the PBP, a directadvisor of the Mayor of Cerrillos commented

The Portal of the Bicentenary Project is,without doubt, a spectacular transformationfrom the urban and social standpoints. Ourmunicipality will become a growth pole, arich municipality. . . . The project willtrigger the allocation of commerce andhigh-standard housing. . . . All this willhelp us to attract investments and freshrevenues (translated by the author).

Municipal officers lacked, in general, acritical view of the project and they couldsay little about the specific ways in which




the municipality embarked on this initiative orabout the impact on the poor communities sur-rounding the airport. My informants from themunicipality had an implicit belief that newinvestments are always good and will benefitall. A co-ordination level member of thegeneral manager’s staff reflected on how themunicipality takes the project

The municipality will never be against thisinitiative, they are very interested, theywill not offer resistance. Dream: if theproject becomes a reality the Municipalityof Cerrillos will become a rich muni-cipality. . . . No one could be against aninitiative aimed at increasing the qualityof life, benefit the physical and mentalhealth of the people, decontaminate, aseries of things, all very ample and goodobjectives (translated by the author).

Following Contreras (2004), a strong econ-omic rationale dominates in the PBP and noinput from the surrounding community ormunicipality was considered in any meaning-ful way. Although advisors for the Municipal-ity of Cerrillos claimed that the project“actively involves the neighbours”, no evi-dence supported the idea that neighbourhoodassociations of the area had a role in thedecision-making process. Almost withoutexception, neighbours could only articulatetheir views about the project based on mediareports. Their understanding remainedrestricted to very general notions about theproject’s main features. Although the mayoris part of the team that can, eventually, influ-ence decisions, there are no instances of com-munication between municipal officers and theaffected community. As Contreras suggests

The internal participation process withinthe Municipality is restricted to the Mayorinforming the heads of different MunicipalDepartments through memorandums (Con-treras, 2003, p. 7).

No evidence was found that the municipalitypromoted the creation of local instances toanalyse and discuss the implications of thePBP.

4. Power Relationships in the Portal of theBicentenary Project

The backbone structuring PBP’s decision-making is a techno-politician, the generalmanager, holding a range of boundary, scope,authority and information rules that allowshim/her to deploy specific government tech-nologies to control key decision-makingnodes and tightly regulate the production andstorage of information. The operation of theserules gets concrete expression in the formationof a decision-making arrangement focused onreaching technical consensus between thegeneral manager and private investors.

The participation of the private sector inurban planning decisions appears to be con-sistent with rules derived from the predomi-nance of a neo-liberal mentality and with thepolitics of consensus prevailing in thecountry. Yet, the close relationship developedbetween investors and the general manager ofPBP is not explained only by broader rules,but also by the personal history of themanager, who has been active in academia,as a consultant for real estate investors, andin the contingent political sphere. The tete-a-tete, the direct and personal connection thatexists between the general manager and theinvestors, suggests that the public–privatedivision is not as clear-cut as it is sometimesportrayed in the literature.

In the interaction with the affected commu-nity (formally represented by the municipal-ity) the principal governmental techniquedeployed by the general manager to controlthe decision-making process was to ‘pull up’the municipality from the operational levelto the co-ordination level by assigning it aposition in advisory committees and makingit work as a close ‘partner’ to the generalmanager. This movement provoked, inten-tionally or not, a disconnection between themunicipality and the affected community. Atthe co-ordination level, the municipalityentered an arena of discussion where thelanguage of the economists and experts pre-vails over other voices (information rule),relegating non-technical voices to secondarypositions and binding the municipality to a




given course of action. This illustrates,indeed, the deep penetration of economicrationalities and how in contemporary Chiletechnocracy is a substitute for democracy(see also Galjart and Silva, 1995).

Citizens living near the Project’s siteremained isolated from decision centres andconceived the project largely in abstract terms,as something external that would not directlyaffect them. One evident reason for this situ-ation is that the Cerrillos airport remained as aself-contained area and ordinary citizenssensed no danger or opportunity. However,just as the Mayor of Cerrillos has been active(and responsible) in producing, reproducingand legitimising the set of rules giving shapeto an elitist and technocratic policy-makingstyle, ‘ordinary citizens’ are also part (and alsoresponsible) of the machinery reproducing thissituation. Despite the lack of incentives forpublic participation and involvement, theproject is ‘out there’; it is not hidden behindimpenetrable walls. The project is open for scru-tiny, for resisting manipulation attempts and forchallenging economic and political elites. Theactions and decisions of the general managercannot then be considered as acting determinis-tically over powerless individuals and margina-lising them from decision-making: the generalmanager is just setting the broader context ofpossibilities and constraints for action, not elim-inating options.

5. Final Remarks

To read the power relations embedded in gov-erning arrangements, I suggested examiningthe social rules operating at different func-tional levels. This analytical construction isnot aimed at disclosing the constellation ofrules constituting more stable institutions orinstitutional transformation over time (seeChild, 1997). Rather, the analytical focus ison how governing arrangements are createdand recreated by ‘situated agents’ operatingunder given structural scenarios. In the casestudy under scrutiny, actors operating at theco-ordination level took command of the pro-ject’s implementation giving form to a par-ticular power and rule configuration. The

strategies deployed by the technically and pol-itically skilled general manager to dominatekey decision-making nodes consisted offraming in technical ways the issues dis-cussed; controlling the information storage,production and distribution; and integratingthe municipality at the co-ordination level,where it stood as a subordinated unit withlittle power to affect the outcome. To movethe project along a ‘fast track’, the generalmanager tried to compromise capital invest-ment and put his/her efforts into avoidingconflicts with municipal actors and neighbour-ing communities.

The principal limitation of the analyticalframework here deployed is the difficulty indisclosing informal rules operating backstage.Although one can infer that informal channelsof negotiation existed between the generalmanager and private investors, there is nohard evidence that sheds light on how thesenegotiations unfolded and their consequences.Yet, this framework is capable of interpretingpower relationships that remain hidden tomore structurally driven frameworks. Even ifthe results may appear general, they do offerimportant information about the strategiesdeployed by each party, the key decision-making nodes taken and the points whereresistance can be more effectively used tochange or transform existing power configur-ations. As in any study using qualitative/inter-pretative methodologies, the results areinfluenced by what informants are willing toexpress and the interpretation is necessarilypredisposed by the researcher’s point ofview. From my perspective, more than beinga limitation, this is an unavoidable issue thatany investigation about the social constructionof space should recognise.

Therefore, the analytical framework heredeveloped shall not be taken as a rigidformula to arrive at a fixed and objectiverelation; rather, one must look at it as a stra-tegic device that can help in signalling themost noticeable points at which powerrelationships are being established and/orreproduced. The notion of social rules isspecific enough to identify the channels usedto exert power over population and urban




space. One important element is that thenotion of social rule can be a useful heuristicdevice to conduct comparative work and tofill a gap in urban literature in relation tohow mega-cities and urban projects aremanaged across different structural contexts.A researcher must come to terms with theso-called structured–agency debate toachieve this.

Although structuration theory createdenthusiasm as a framework to resolve thestructure–agency tension in the 1980s and1990s, it was prematurely dismissed as adevice to inform empirical studies, given itslimited conception of power and Giddens’ dif-ficulties in providing concrete research tools.Through the combined use of the notions ofsocial rules, functional and ‘situated actors’,I suggested here a way to advance in relatingstructural elements and the power of actors tomake decisions. The structural conditions atthe policy-making level were interpretedusing the same set of rules framing—but notdetermining—the performance of co-ordina-tion and operational-level actors, enablingthe relating of macro processes and microsituations. In the case study, structuralelements derived from the deep penetrationof neo-liberalism into Chile’s social bodyinfluenced decision-making procedures byreducing the scope and reach of the local gov-ernment and by de-stimulating public partici-pation. These two situations are not the resultof neo-liberalism; on the contrary, actorsoperating under a neo-liberal mentality wereable to deploy effectively strategies tocontrol local governmental instances and putin place a given agenda and power configur-ation. Then, the passivity of neighbours andthe mayor is responsible for creating a particu-lar form of capillarity, one in which local-level actors reproduce, maybe unconsciously,the general structure of the situation.

To what extent is this outcome generalisableto the Chilean context? To date, we only havepartial evidence. A study conducted in the cityof Concepcion shows that poor families suc-cessfully deployed strategies and tactics par-tially to control an urban project outcome andavoid eradication (Zunino, 2005). In Santiago,

an exploratory study conducted by Cortes(2005) shows that in the Municipality of Puda-huel (east side of Santiago) private investorsare controlling the production of urban spacethrough very specific and multi-level tacticsand strategies, which have relegated the munici-pality to being a spectator of urban and indus-trial developments. Based on these studies,one can conclude that the power configurationshaping urban decision-making entities variesfrom place to place, depending in the specificconditions in which projects unfold.

Although the constitution of governingarrangements may vary spatially, given thatactors do not react mechanically to structuralforces, the influence of general conditionsmust not be dismissed. In the case of Chile, asthe case study illustrates, the neo-liberal struc-tural context offers certain actors operating atthe policy and co-ordination levels ample chan-nels for the regulation of local governmentengagement in urban projects and for reducingthe incentives for public participation. Yet,more extensive empirical work is needed topermit generalisation, without losing sight ofthe fact that the potential to resist structural fea-tures and thus to depart from the general trendalways will exist: urban governing arrange-ments are a volatile achievement in a constantflux of change. This does not mean that somestructural features are more permanent thanothers across time and space.

Considering the deep penetration of neo-liberalism in Chile’s economic and sociallife, one could be tempted to read thePortal of the Bicentenary Project and itspower relationships as a ‘condensation’ ofbroader structural situations. However, likehuman creation, structures are subject tosudden changes and transformations. Toinsist on a central issue, there is no determi-nation of urban projects’ outcomes: there arealways open opportunities to choose amongdifferent courses of action, to resist goingalong with the designed rituals. Forexample, the mayor held a position withinadvisory committees, but he/she did notuse formal scope and authority rules to chal-lenge the political and economic elites articu-lating the project. Rules gave the




municipality the authority to formulate landuse plans, but no attempts were made touse this in a strategy to change the situationby, for example, demanding the redefinitionof channels through which information wasdisseminated (change of aggregation andinformation rules) or demanding moreresources from the central government toface the new challenges derived from thePBP (pay-off rules regarding the distributionof resourses from the central government). Inthe case of the Ribera Norte Project in Con-cepcion, Chile (Zunino, 2005), poor commu-nities were able to organise themselves,generate their own information and effec-tively exert pressure over co-ordination-level actors.

In section 2, I developed the notion of capil-larity to explain the mutual hold that usuallyexists between individuals operating at differ-ent hierarchical levels. In the case studied, noevidence was found that the local communityor the local government were resisting or chal-lenging in any significant way decisionscoming from broader hierarchical levels. Inthis case, the mutual hold is being sustainedby a passive community which, through itsinactivity, is reproducing and validating thesystem in place. The consequence of this situ-ation is a project sustained by a strong techni-cal and political mentality, but with nogrounding within the local community.Despite the claims that the project is ‘thework of all’ and the ‘progressive’ goals itembraces (such as socio-spatial integration),in practice we are witnessing a project thatresponds to the interests of particular econ-omic and political elites.

As shown in Figure 1, the development of‘fenced cities’ has been restricted to Santia-go’s northern fringe. In a situation wherelocal authorities appear functional to thegoals of decision-makers on the top of thepyramid, the project appears to be oncourse for creating an enclosed environment,replicating in the inner city the trends that areunfolding in the periphery. Indeed, to makethis project attractive to middle sectors,private investors might intend to createenclosed forms of development (gated

communities, condominiums with controlledaccess, private parks), which might reducespatial segregation—the relative proximityof different social groups—but which willmaintain important levels of social segre-gation. Despite the lack of major studies,the work of Cortes (2005) shows that San-tiago city is developing under parametersdefined by business interests, relegatinglocal communities to non-influential pos-itions. This is certainly not particular to theChilean context, what is specific here is thechannel used by actors to control, subordinateother actors and take command of the socialconstruction of the city of Santiago.

Notes

1. For studies in other Latin American cities, seeAcioly, 2001; Cariola and Lacabana, 2003;Ciccolella, 1999; Keeling, 1999.

2. As I argue elsewhere (Zunino, 2004), thenotion of structure of governance can be amore consistent conceptual device to capturethe recursive relation between action andstructure in urban decision-making. Since Ido not develop here the notion of structureof governance, to which I ascribe a veryspecific meaning, I have opted for usingmore general concepts like decision-makinginstances and governing arrangements.

3. Resistance to the neo-liberal model isrestricted to marginal anti-systemic move-ments, while mainstream politicians, includ-ing the ‘renovated’ socialists now in power,hold similar economic programmes. This isnot the case in other countries in LatinAmerica like Argentina, Brazil and Vene-zuela, where counter-discourses areengrained in the political agenda of majorpolitical parties and there are strong move-ments against the neo-liberal social order.

4. Despite its metaphysical overtones, in Stei-ner’s work (1976), I find a stimulating discus-sion about social constraint and a non-conventional explanation of freedom (see,especially, ch. 1).

5. Since the research questions leading theseinvestigations differ from the ones posedhere, I do not discuss how the authors’ usestructuration theory. As I argue elsewhere(Hidalgo and Zunino, 2005), in recent struc-turationalist work there is a tendency to over-emphasise structural forms of constraint,which is related to Giddens’ underdevelopednotion of power.




6. One caveat is in order. Technocratic mental-ity is not an exclusive phenomenon ofcountries that have undergone neo-liberalreforms. It is also relevant under differentideological systems. In the Chilean case,intellectuals and technocrats with closelinks to political parties have shaped policydemands and actively participated in policyformulation in a number of political exper-iments: from reform over revolution underChristian Democracy (1964–70), to revolu-tion over reform under the Chilean PopularUnit’s road to socialism (1970–73) and toneo-liberal economic and social restructuringunder military rule (1973–90) (see E. Silva,1995, p. 196). What distinguishes technoc-racy under neo-liberalism is its disdain ofother systems of knowledge.

7. This organisational structure departs from theway other projects in the Bicentennial Pro-gramme are being conducted. In the conven-tional case, there is a Direction of UrbanProjects (DUP) in each region. Through this,regional actors decide which projects toembark on and how to move them forward.According to one of the main advisors forthe general manager, the PBP is a ‘presiden-tial’ or ‘ministerial’ project, one that escapesthe scope of interests of any particular region.

8. The term ‘task force’ was used in English bythe interviewed.

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Documents

Authoritarian Redevelopment in Santiago, Chile Power Relations in Urban Decision-making: Neo-liberalism, 'Techno-politicians' Hugo Marcelo Zunino