Owasp Top10 2010 rc1

The OWASP Foundation

ConfooConferenceMarch 10th Montreal

http://www.owasp.org/

OWASP Top 10 - 2010 rc1

The Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks

Antonio FontesOWASP Geneva Chapter Leader

antonio.fontes@owasp.org

Agenda

• 10 ways to attack web applications• The OWASP Top 10 rc1 Project• Integrating the Top 10 in an existing

SDLC/SALC• Q&A

Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010

About the OWASP

• Open Web Application Security Project• “Helping organizations secure their web

applications.”• Documentation and tools projects• 130 local chapters worldwide• http://www.owasp.org

About me…

• Antonio Fontes, from Geneva (Switzerland)• >1999: Web developer• >2005: Ethical hacker / Security analyst• >2008: Security & Privacy manager (banking

software ISV)• >2008: OWASP Geneva Chapter Leader • >2010: Information Security Consultant • SANS/CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous

Programming Errors contributorAntonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010

And about you?

• Coders? • Testers?• Managers?• Hardcore OWASP Top 10 users?

Just taking the temperature…©

Part 1: Top 10 major web application

attack techniques

Attacking the infrastructureAttacking the applicationAttacking the usersOther attacks

Attacking the infrastructurehitting the weakest layer

Web application

Application Server

Web Server

Operating System

Network devices

Are all unnecessary paths closed?Are all unnecessary ports closed?Is the admin interface reachable from the web?Can an administrative account be broken?Is the device up to date?

Are all unnecessary services disabled?Are all unnecessary accounts disabled?Have all default passwords been changed?Is the system up to date?

Are all unnecessary scripts removed?Are there any backup/test/unused resources?Is the web server up to date?Have all default passwords been changed?

Are all demo apps removed?Is the web server up to date?Is the admin area protected from external access?Is directory indexing been disabled?Were all default passwords changed?

Risk A6: Security misconfiguration

• What is the risk?– If there is a weaker link than the web application

itself, the attacker will switch to the flawed layer.

• What are the countermeasures?– Harden all layers• Reduce services and accounts to the minimum• No default passwords• Keep everything up to date• Apply security guidelines (OS security, Web server

security, Application server security, etc.)• Keep default web application configuration safe• “Deploy securely on a secure architecture”

Attacking the applicationinjecting hostile code…

what if?

SELECT * FROM users usr WHERE usr.username = 'admin ';-- ‘AND usr.password = ‘bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be’

what if?

Any user input is a potential attack vector.

Risk A1: Injections

• RISK?– Any application entry point can be used as a

vector to inject hostile content that will modify expected behaviors.

• GOOD TO KNOW– All non-binding query languages are exposed!

(LDAP and Xpath….)

• COUNTERMEASURES?– All input can be modified client-side. Be sure to

validate:• Querystring parameters• Form fields (hidden fields also count)• File submissions : if you’re expecting a picture, then

make sure it is a picture!• Cookies• HTTP headers: all fields, including referrer are “user

input”

COUNTERMEASURES? (cont’d)• Never paste user input into query commands (SQL,

Xpath, LDAP, OS commands, etc.):• Use binding variables such as SQL parameters:

• If no binding model, encode input before pasting:• Doubled quotes (‘’) for SQL server• Escaped quotes (\’) for MySQL (PHP addslashes is helpful!)• Etc.

COUNTERMEASURES ?(cont’d)• Choose best validation strategy!• Best: Whitelist– When all possible values are known (enums, if/else if

statements, regular expressions, …)• Graylist:– Enforce business rules:

• Type: string, numeric, byte, …• Range: >0, <MaxInt, [a-z]{3,20}

• Weakest: Blacklistif(input.IndexOf(“<script>”)>=0)

//reject

Attacking the applicationplaying with obvious identifiers…

what if?

99999999

what if?

1234567

Risk A4: Insecure direct object references

• What is the risk?– All references can modified client-side. An attacker

might be able to access and/or modify confidential information.

• What are the countermeasures?– Never send internal references to the browser:

• Use temporary or random number mapping (#0, #1, #2, #3, etc.)

– OR combine referenced access with access control:• SELECT * FROM item WHERE id = $id AND owner = $uID• UPDATE item … WHERE id = $id AND owner = $id

Attacking the applicationbreaking session and

authentication mechanisms…

what if?

Risk A3: Broken authentication or session

management

• What is the risk?– HTTP is a stateless protocol. Each request must

transmit ‘session’ information over the network.– Authentication mechanisms are highly targeted by

attackers , at all levels: forms, traffic, stored data.

• What are the countermeasures?– Use simple, centralized and standardized session

mechanism– Enable cookie security attributes (secure flag,

httponly flag, encryption and integrity control)– Validate session identifiers

• Is the sessionID coming from the right place?Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010

• countermeasures? (cont’d)– Make sure ‘logoff’ actually invalidates the session.– Prevent bruteforcing attacks, but also prevent

denial of service on legitimate accounts– Enforce secure password recovery• Authenticate before resetting

– Review, review, review authentication (and logoff) code manually!

Attacking the applicationfinding hidden “secret” URLs…

what if?

Risk A7: Failure to restrict URL access

• What is the risk?– URLs that lead to confidential resources can be

easily sent, stored (bookmarks), monitored (proxies, security devices) and sometimes, guessed.

• What are the countermeasures?– Completely disallow access to sensitive file types– Validate ALL incoming requests

• Authorize explicitly (web.xml, ASP.Net page lifecycle, etc.)

– Don’t expose physical documents with permanent or guessable URLs

Attacking the usersredirecting users elsewhere…

what if?

Risk A8: Non-validated redirects and

forwards

• What is the risk?– An attacker may use your website reputation as a

vector to redirect victims to a hostile website.

• What are the countermeasures?– Never allow absolute URL redirection.– If not possible: • Use a whitelist of valid hosts• Show a warning before redirecting the user

– If using a “web portal”, make sure redirect pages do not include sensitive information in URLs (aka single-signon-on information)

Attacking the usersrunning client hostile code in the

website…

what if?

Risk A2: Cross-site scripting

• What is the risk?– An attacker might inject client-side hostile code in

the web application, which will be returned to a victim.

What are the countermeasures?• Sanitize output. Encode to destination

format.– For HTML output, use HtmlEntities:• <div id=“comment”>Here is my

<div id=“comment”>Here is my <script>attack</script></div>

What are the countermeasures?• Sanitize output, encode to destination

format:– For XML output, use predefined entities:• <says>“here is my <script>”</says>

• <says>my input is <script></says> <says>my input is <script></says>

Attacking the usersreplaying predictable requests…

what if?

Risk A5: Cross-site Request Forgery

• What is the risk?– An attacker might build her own website and

trigger requests on the visitor’s browser. (yes, that’s exactly what it seems to be...)

What are the countermeasures?• Implement unpredictable requests for all

sensitive actions– Use temporary random hidden control fields:

– Link forms to the user session:if(!(Request.Form[“checker”]).Equals(SessionID))

// return error

– Use CAPTCHA– Use out-of-band verification:• SMS / Voice call / Cryptographic tokens, etc.

Other attacksbreaking weak cryptography…

what if?

Encrypting with Base64

$cookie = base64($sessionId);

It’s not encryption, it’s encoding!

what if?

Encrypting user passwords with AES256$password = encrypt($get_[“password”],AES256,key);

reversible encryption!

what if?

Hashing user passwords with md5

$password = md5($get_[“password”]);

weak algorithm!

what if?

Hashing user passwords with SHA-256$password = sha($get_[“password”]);

Missing seed!

what if?

Building keys with Math.RandomByte[] key = Math.RandBytes(128);

Weak random number generator!

what if?

Deriving a key from human entered secret$key = md5($GET_[“secret”]);

Weak key entropy!

what if?

Using ECB mode of operation$bytes = encrypt($text, key);// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}$bytes2 = encrypt($text, key);// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}

Weak mode of operation!

what if?

Using CBC mode of operation$bytes = encrypt($text, key);// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}$bytes2 = encrypt($text, key);// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}

Non-random initialization vectors!

what if?

Decrypting with internal secretString clearText = CryptUtils.Decrypt($bytes, Parameters.SecretKey);

Hard-coded secret!

what if?

blablabla

Another problem.

Risk A9: Insecure cryptographic storage

• What is the risk?– An attacker might not need as much time as you

expected to decrypt your data.– If one of these words sounds foggy to you, there is

a risk:• Asymmetric/symmetric encryption, offline encryption,

online encryption, CBC, key entropy, initialization vector, ECB, message authentication code, PBKDF2 (RFC2898), constant time operation, Rijndael, AES, 3DES, DSA, RSA, ECC, SHA, keyring, DPAPI, …

What are the countermeasures?• Don’t do cryptography by yourself– Use business level APIs:

Use open-source reference implementations (OpenSSL, Truecrypt, etc.)

Use expert-community-driven libraries (OWASP ESAPI, …)

• Take classes…

Other attacksobserving the environment…

r ?Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010

Risk A10: Insufficient transport layer

protection

• What is the risk?– Traffic eavesdropping, due to insufficient transport

layer protection.

• What are the countermeasures?– Require an SSL encrypted link.– Use appropriate certificates (signed and valid).– Prevent cookies from leaving the encrypted link

(“secure” flag enabled).

79 Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010

Security Misconfigurati

onInjection

Insecure Direct Object

References

Broken Authentication and

Session Management

Failure to Restrict URL

Access

Unvalidated Redirects and

Forwards

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Cross Site Request

Forgery (CSRF)

Insecure Cryptographic

Storage

Insufficient Transport Layer

Protection

WHAT IS THE RISK LEVEL ?LOW HIGH

Part 2: Assessing the risks induced by

these 10 attacks

Hopefully, someone did it…

rating the risks

Threat agent Attack vector Prevalance Detectability Technical Impact Business impact

?Easy Widespread Easy Severe

?Average Common Average ModerateDifficult Uncommon Difficult Minor

2 1 1 2

3 * 1.3 * 2 ? = 2,6x?

XSS (example)

A1: Injection

A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

A3: Broken Authentication and

Session Management

A4: Insecure Direct Object References

A5: Cross Site Request

Forgery (CSRF)

A6: Security Misconfigurati

A7: Failure to Restrict URL

Access

A8: Unvalidated Redirects and

Forwards

A9: Insecure Cryptographic

Storage

A10: Insufficient Transport Layer

Protection

OWASP Top 10 – 2010 RC1The top ten web application security risks

Risk Managers- exploitability- prevalence- detectability- impact (CIA, AAA)

Testers- search patterns- typical cases- myths

Developers- mitigation steps

(agnostic)- best practices

Teachers / Students- example scenarios

Advanced material- detailed attack scenarios- mitigation techniques (per

technology)- further references

Migration info- removed entries- new entries- gap analysis

Part 3: Integrating the Top 10 into an

existing software development / acquisition lifecycle

The Top 10 in your SDLC/SALC

Analyze Design Implement Verify Deploy Support

Secure design

Secure codingSecurity testing

Contract conditions

Design review reports

Security test results

Penetration test

SLA support

PERSONEL TRAINING

QUALITY ASSURANCE

Metrics analysis

Conclusion

Your web application will be hacked. ; )

Conclusion

But if you use the Top 10…

Conclusion

It won’t be the cheap way…

Conclusion

And it won’t be the embarrassing way…

Conclusion

You now know the 10 riskiest flaws in web applications.

Conclusion

But there’s still a lot to see…

WASC Threat Classification

CWE/SANS Top 25 Programming errors

Threat modeling

Open Software Assurance Maturity Model

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)

Conclusion

before becoming “secure”.

http://owasp.org/index.php/Top10(final version: end of March 2010)

thank you :)

Copyright

• You are free:– To share (copy, distribute, transmit)– To remix

• But only if: – You attribute this work– You use it for non-commercial purposes– And you keep sharing your result the

same way I did

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