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IS TODAYS GLOBALISATION DIFFERENT
FROM WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE?
Martin Wolf1
Is the globalisation of today really different from anything that has gone before and, if so,
in what way? Even well-informed contemporary observers assume that todays
globalisation is quite new. The purpose of the present paper is to assess how far and in
what way - this is true.
In an excellent discussion of globalisation and global governance, Vincent Cable, former
chief economist of Shell and head of the international economics programme of Londons
Royal Institute of International Affairs and now a Liberal Democrat member of parliament,
argues (1999, 15) that:
[W]ith all the necessary qualifications to the hyperbole about globalisation,
something important is happening: two overlapping trends of considerable
momentum.
One is technological, the speeding up of communications. Many
communications improvements have been taking place over the last half-
century, but the contemporary speed of change, the enlargement of capacity
for information (and capital) transmission and the proliferation of
communications media have not been experienced before.
1 Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator,Financial Times, London
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The other is a change in the policy environment: a liberalisation
revolution, a freeing up of markets and reduction in the role of government
in terms of ownership and control over production of goods and services.
As Figure 1 indicates, the process of integration was powerful in the 1990s, JUST as Mr
Cable argues. Moreover, this has been a continuation of post-war trends. The share of trade
in global output increased from about 7 per cent in 1950 to over 20 per cent by the mid-
1990s. Between 1950 and 1998, the volume of world production rose by 530 per cent and
of world output of manufactures by 820 per cent. Over the same period, the volume of
world merchandise exports rose by 1,840 per cent and the volume of world exports of
manufactures by 3,500 per cent.
The history of globalisation
It is easy to assume that what we experience today is unprecedented, as Mr Cable himself
does. But globalisation itself is certainly not new. It has been a dominant theme of the
history of the past five hundred years. It can be said to have begun with the voyages of
European discovery of the 15th and 16th centuries. In the last decade of the 15 th century,
Christopher Columbus reached the Americas and the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean.
Since then peoples that had been previously been isolated have become increasingly
closely interconnected. This has been true of relations among the civilisations of the
Eurasian land-mass. It has been still truer of relations between Eurasia and the hitherto
largely - or entirely - isolated continents of Africa, the Americas and Australasia. Humanity
has become aware both of itself and of the globe, as a whole.2
2 Jared Diamond (1997) provides a brilliant explanation of why ecological advantages gave the inhabitantsof the Eurasian land mass a decisive advantage over inhabitants of other continents in the development ofsophisticated economies and states. Maddison (2001, 23) discusses the technological advances that gave the
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This process of growing interconnection began when a number of peripheral European
countries Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Britain and France - exploited their superior
military organisation and technology, partly developed in intra-European conflict, to
achieve control over much of the world. From the beginning, they sought wealth through
plunder and trade.
Out of their quest came great empires. In the long run, commerce proved more enduring
and more fruitful: empires came and then went, as the costs of control rose and the rewards
fell; but trade and investment remained. The ultimate result was the incorporation of much
of the world into an economic system whose centre was, until the 20 th century, Europe, then
Europe and North America, and today, though dominated by the west, includes advanced
east Asian countries, particularly Japan.3
The one-way arrow of technology
Globalisation then is a long-term historical process, not something that began yesterday.
Behind it have been huge and progressive declines in the costs of transport and
communications. Without the advances of the worlds of sails and of steam, of aircraft and
the motor vehicle, of the telegraph, the telephone, the satellite and the Internet, global
integration could never have happened. Before the modern age, the worlds most important
global trading route was probably the Silk Road. By the standards of what followed, the
communication and commerce this facilitated was a brook to the Amazon.
European powers mastery of the sea.
3 William H McNeill (1982) argues that the last millennium as a whole and the second part of themillennium, in particular, was the period when market processes remade the world, in alliance with theincreasingly powerful states that growing wealth and improving technology brought forth.
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The fall in costs of transport and communications is a consequence, as well as a cause, of
market-led integration. In the economic jargon, it is endogenous. Science and technology
have developed in response to economic opportunities and have then, in turn, created new
ones. This was true of the Portuguese advances in navigation of the 15 th century, just as it
was of the telecommunications revolution of the late 20th. These economic forces have, in
turn, been strongly influenced by the ambitions of governments. Chinas decision to turn
away from inter-continental trade while Europe was turning towards it ensured a half-
millennium of western technological as well as economic domination.4
While transport and communications technologies improved substantially from the 15th to
the 18th centuries, developments in the 19th and 20th were far more rapid and dramatic. Just
as the rate of growth of the world economy accelerated sharply in the 19th century, so did
the rate of decline in costs of transport and communications. Indeed, it is difficult to think
of the industrial revolution except in terms of transport and communications. The steam
train, the steam ship and the intercontinental telegraph cable are as symbolic of progress in
the 19th century as the motor car, telephones, radio, aircraft, television and the internet are
of the 20th.
There were substantial and continuing reductions in costs of transport and communications
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries (Figure 2). Harley (1980) estimates that the cost
of shipping a bushel of wheat from New York to Liverpool was halved between 1830 and
1880 and then halved again between 1880 and 1914. The first transatlantic cable was laid
4 William H. McNeill (1982, 42-48) discusses the growth of the Chinese navy and its subsequentabandonment in the 15th century. From 1371 to 1567, sailing to foreign lands was forbidden by the imperialcourt.
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in 1866. By the turn of the century, the world was cabled, reducing communication times
from months to minutes.
There were huge further improvements in technology and concomitant reductions in the
costs of transport and communications in the 20th century (see Figure 3). The cost of a
three-minute telephone call from New York to London fell from about $250 in 1930 to a
few cents today in current prices (Cairncross 1997). The number of voice paths across the
Atlantic has risen from 100,000 in 1986 to over 2m today. The number of Internet hosts has
risen from 5,000 in 1986 to perhaps 100m now. The implication is that the potential for the
international flow of information, in particular, and so for the integration of production,
sales and finance across borders has grown consistently and rapidly and by orders of
magnitude - over the past two centuries.
Ups and downs of globalisation
If technology were the only force driving globalisation, we would have seen a continuous
advance over the past two centuries. In fact, we have not. The story is intriguingly
different. There was a large increase in economic globalisation in the 19th century, reaching
its peak in the Edwardian age. Then, with the two world wars and the Great Depression,
came a massive relapse. This was then followed by another rise in globalisation or, more
prosaically, international economic integration - over the past half century.
Trade
First, as is shown in Table 1, ratios of trade to GDP in money terms reached high levels for
several of the then advanced economies by 1910, before collapsing in the malign
environment of the great depression and the Second World War. For almost all of the
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advanced countries (the most significant exception being Japan) trade ratios are now
somewhat higher than ever before. But they are not all that much higher. Among the big
countries, the most important exception to the general rule that openness is not vastly
greater today than a century ago is the United States, with a trade ratio of 11 per cent in
1910 and 24 per cent in 1995. That may explain the relatively greater controversy about
globalisation in that country. A similar case is Italy, with a trade ratio of 28 per cent in
1910 and 49 per cent in 1995.
The evidence for trade in money terms (or current prices) is somewhat misleading,
however, as is shown by the data in constant prices in Table 2. These data confirm the
picture of a decline in trade intensity between 1913 and 1950. But it shows the world much
more integrated at the end of the 20th century than it had been at the beginning. The
explanation for this is the progressive decline in the relative prices of tradable goods,
particularly manufactures, where much of the productivity growth of the century was
concentrated. The picture of dynamism of world trade ever since the second world war,
exceeding even that of the pre-first-world war period, is reinforced by Table 3.
The overall conclusion on trade then is that the world is more integrated today than ever
before, after a collapse in the first half of the 20th century. This conclusion is reinforced
when one takes into account the composition of world trade, with a very high level of intra-
industry trade in manufactures, as production processes have been integrated across the
globe.
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Capital
Second, capital market integration was already highly advanced in the late 19th century,
before collapsing in the inter-war period. As a share of gross domestic product the capital
outflow from the UK at an average of 4.6 per cent of GDP between 1870 and 1913 - has
no contemporary parallels among the larger economies, even Japan (see Table 4). At its
peak, British overseas investment ran at 9 per cent of GDP (Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim
1998, 4). The same was true for the capital importers. Argentina, for example, ran a current
account deficit averaging 18.7 per cent of GDP between 1870 and 1889 and 6.2 per cent of
GDP between 1890 and 1913 (Baldwin and Martin, 8). More revealing perhaps, the
correlation between domestic investment and savings a measure of self-sufficiency in
savings was lower between 1880 and 1910 than in any subsequent period, up to 1990 (See
Figure 4). A related point is made in Figure 5, which shows that the gross value of the
foreign capital stock in todays developing countries is lower today, as a share of the
recipients GDP than it was in 1914. This reflects the slow recovery of such investment in
developing countries after the collapse in the first half of the 20th century. This is partly
explained by the deliberate refusal of most newly independent countries to accept inward
investment in the early years of independence.
The composition of capital flows has also changed. Capital mobility is today much greater
for short-term instruments than it was in the earlier period. This is well demonstrated by the
turnover of the foreign exchange market, at several hundred trillion dollars a year. Nothing
similar has happened before, which explains the huge rise in foreign assets as a share of
world GDP over the past two decades (see Table 5). Moreover, the composition of long-
term flows was also somewhat different in the earlier period from todays (Bordo,
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Eichengreen and Kim 1998, 16-18): investment was more in tangible assets than in
intangible ones; by far the greater part of the earlier flows took the form of bonds, while
today stocks and bonds are of roughly equal importance; portfolio flows predominated over
direct investment in the earlier period, while direct investment has greatly exceeded
portfolio investment since the Second World War; and, finally, before 1914 direct
investment was largely undertaken by free-standing companies, particularly in mining and
transportation, while today multi-national companies predominate, with a very large
proportion of their investment in services (Baldwin and Martin 1999, 19).
On balance, however, it is difficult to argue that overall capital mobility is much greater
today than it was a century ago, even though there have been big changes in its
composition.
People
Third, Hirst and Thompson (1999, 23) note that the greatest era for recorded voluntary
mass migration was the century after 1815. Around 60m people left Europe for the
Americas, Oceania, and South and East Africa. An estimated 10m voluntarily migrated
from Russia to Central Asia and Siberia. A million went from Southern Europe to North
America. About 12m Chinese and 6m Japanese left their homelands and emigrated to east
and South Asia. One and a half million left India for South East Asia and South and West
Africa.
Baldwin and Martin (1999, 19) note that during the 1890s, a high point for population
movement, the inflows of people into the US were equal to 9 per cent of the initial
population equivalent to an immigration of 25m today (see Table 6). In Argentina, the
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comparable figure was 26 per cent; in Australia, it was 17 per cent. In the same decade, the
UKs outflow was 5 per cent of the initial population, Spains was 6 per cent and Swedens
was 7 per cent. In the 1990s, however, the US was the only country in the world with a
high immigration rate equal to about 4 per cent of the initial population over the decade.
Assessment
Thus, for all the changes that have occurred over the course of a century, neither the
markets for goods and services nor those for factors of production are significantly more
integrated today than they were a century earlier: they seem to be somewhat more
integrated for trade than they were, at least in the advanced countries (though not yet in
most developing countries), no more integrated for capital, despite the important changes in
the composition of capital flows, and far less integrated for labour.
Role of policy
If technology has consistently increased the potential for global exchange, but that is not, in
fact, what has happened an explanation must be found in policy. Globalisation is, it
appears, chosen more than it is destined. So what has happened to trade policy, policy
towards capital mobility and controls on movements of people over the past century?
Trade
In trade policy, 19th century liberalisation diffused from the United Kingdom to the
continent between 1846 and 1870. However, protectionism returned to continental Europe
after 1878 and never left the United States (see Table 7). There has again been substantial
liberalisation throughout the world over the past two decades. This followed a long period,
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after the Second World War, when the advanced countries liberalised their trade barriers,
while the developing countries and members of the socialist bloc did not. By the early
1980s, however, acceptance of the superiority of liberal trade over protectionism had
become global. By the late-1990s, no significant country had a government with a
commitment to protection as a principle. Exceptions are pariah states, such as North Korea
and Iraq. The liberalisation that occurred in China, India and the countries of the former
Soviet Union, in the course of the 1990s, was a powerful indicator of this change in
opinion. Today, high protection of merchandise trade is largely restricted to manufactures
in developing countries and agricultural commodities in the advanced countries, though
protection of services, particularly financial services also remains high in many developing
countries
Capital
Capital markets were open in the 19th and early 20th centuries, partly because governments
did not have the means to control capital flows, even if they had wished to do so. Controls
over capital flows were then introduced (and, with ups and downs, intensified) between
1914 and 1945. Liberalisation of capital flows commenced in a restricted number of
advanced countries during the 1950s and 1960s. However, the big wave of liberalisation
began in the late 1970s, spreading across the high-income countries, much of the
developing world and the former communist countries. Notwithstanding a very large
number of financial crises over this period, this trend has remained intact.5 Developing
5 Financial crises were also common in the pre-1914 period. But the recent ones seem to have been moredestructive, probably because of the impact of collapsing exchange rates (Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin1999, 53).
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countries that tried desperately to keep private foreign capital out of their economies two
decades ago are now trying, as desperately, to draw it back in.
People
While trade and some capital flows are arguably more liberally treated and bigger in
relation to global economic activity, the reverse is unquestionably true for movement of
people. All the high-income countries operate controls on immigration that vary between
tight and very tight. The mass mobility of people is largely in the form of refugees moving
among (or even within) relatively poor countries. An exception is the movement (largely
illegal) of Mexicans into the United States.
Nevertheless, there has been some important liberalisation of movement of people among
high-income countries. The most important example is the liberalisation that has occurred
within the European Union, where movement of people is one of the four freedoms
guaranteed by the founding treaties.
Assessment
If we are to understand the apparently limited increase in the extent of globalisation but
rather the ups and downs of a century we must look at policy. The reaction to the
disasters of the first half of the 20th century was to close down international economic
interdependence. Then in the second half, there was a steady opening of barriers to
movement of goods, services and capital, though far less so of people. What has happened
reflects this pattern of liberalisation.
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Novelties of todays globalisation
It would be wrong, however, to see the world as having gone through nothing more than a
long cycle of first closing and then re-opening economies. Mr Cable is right in important
respects. First and perhaps most important in the long run, technology does offer
opportunities for integration never seen before. Second, other changes have also occurred
that make todays world of globalisation different from the late 19 th century in certain
important respects.
The decline and fall of world money
The first difference is negative for globalisation namely the loss of the stability and
predictability inherent in the move from the gold standard of the 1870-1914 era to the
generalised floating of today. As Table 8 shows, international monetary history has been
extraordinarily complex, as governments have struggled to cope with the international
implications of the post-first world war move to managed money. The gold standard seems
to have been exceptionally successful in encouraging long-term capital flows, particularly
bond finance. Moreover, the vast scale of short-term finance is probably both a
consequence of exchange-rate instability and an important contributory cause.
Rise of the multi-national company
The second difference is positive for globalisation: it is the dominant role of multi-national
companies in organising todays structure of production and exchange (see Table 9). The
rise of the multi-national company in manufacturing and services reflects several important
economic changes of the past century.
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One is the rise of the corporation itself an organisational form that was still relatively new
in the 19th century. Another is the need of all countries for access to the technological know
how and markets controlled by big corporations. Yet another is the ability of corporations
to exploit modern communications and production technology to organise the chain of
production within the firm, but across frontiers. A well-known by-product has been the
universal increase in intra-industry trade. The incentive for organising such chains of
production has also been increased by the growth in wage gaps among countries across the
last century.
Rise of global institutions
A third novelty is also positive for globalisation: it is the rise of global institutions. Just as
multi-national companies organise private exchange, so international institutions organise
and discipline the international face of national policy. The World Trade Organisation, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, the North American
Free Trade Arrangement and so forth underpin habits of co-operation among states and
consolidate commitments to liberalise. The 19th century was a world of unilateral policy.
The late 20th was, by comparison, a world of multilateral policy.
Rise of the welfare state
The final big difference is perhaps neutral for globalisation: it is the changing role of the
state between today and a century ago. The rising regulatory and welfare role of the state is
probably somewhat hostile to globalisation, since it implies an increasingly exclusive
concern with the welfare of citizens that has accompanied democracy. Public spending has,
on average, quadrupled as a share of GDP in advanced countries, from 12 per cent in 1913
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to 46 per cent in the 1990s. At the same time, there has been a relative decline in the
importance of the warfare state, which probably increases the ability of states, at least
democratic ones, to co-operate with one another. But just as the old liberal order was
brought down by the clash between international integration and nationalism, so does the
same threat exist today, if to a different and more limited extent.
Conclusions
1. Cost of transport and communications fell fast in the 19th century and continued to fall
further in the 20
th
century. The potential for rewarding international exchange has
grown correspondingly, as protagonists of globalisation argue.
2. Yet, there has been no linear relationship between these technological developments
and global economic integration. On the contrary, despite continued falls in costs of
transport and communications in the first half of the 20th century, integration went into
reverse, in all respects: trade, the movement of people and the movement of capital all
became less free. A new era of globalisation began with the liberalisation of the
postwar era and accelerated, while becoming increasingly global, in the 1980s and
1990s. But this did not include the movement of people, to anything like the extent of
the late 19th century.
3. The level of economic integration today is both different from that of a century ago and
further advanced in important respects, notably in trade and in the scale of gross capital
movements. However, it is difficult to accept that it is totally different in nature.
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4. There have been some fundamental changes, mostly favourable to sustained
integration, since the late 19th century. These changes are political, organisational and
technological
5. Policy and the institutions that underpin it have been the principal determinant of the
extent and pace of integration. Globalisation is not pre-destined, but chosen.
Correspondingly, states, far from being at the mercy of omnipotent forces of
globalisation, are free to choose whether or not to open their economies to the rest of
the world.
6. Last but not least, all the periods of rapid economic growth have been accompanied by
increased integration (Table 10). Whether the next two or three decades are successful
for the population of the globe will depend both on how far integration proceeds and on
how well it is managed.
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REFERENCES
Bairoch, Paul. 1989. European Trade Policy, 1815-1914, in P.Mathias and S. Pollard
(eds). Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VII. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.
Baldwin, Richard and Philippe Martin. January 1999. Two Waves of Globalisation:
Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences. National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 6904.
Bordo, Michael D, Barry Eichengreen and Jongwoo Kim. September 1998. Was there
Really an Earlier Period of Inernational Financial Integration Comparable to Todays?
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6738.
Bordo, Michael D, Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin. 1999. Is Globalization Today
Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago? National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 7195.
Cable, Vincent. 1999. Globalisation and Global Governance. Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London.
Cairncross, Frances. 1997. The Death of Distance. Orion, London.
Crafts, Nicholas. Globalisation and Growth in the Twentieth Century. 2000. IMF Working
Paper WP/00/44. Washington D.C., International Monetary Fund.
Diamond, Jared. 1997. Guns, Germs and Steel: the Fate of Human Societies. W.W. Norton
& Company, New York and London.
Green, A and M. Urquhart. 1976. Factor and commodity flows in the international
economy of 1817-1914.Journal of World Economic History, 36, pp. 217-252.
Harley. C. 1980. Transportation, the world wheat trade and the Kuznets cycle, 1850-1913,Explorations in Economic History, 17, pp. 218-250.
Hirst, Paul and Grahame Thompson. 1999. Globalization in Question: the International
Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, 2nd edition. Polity Press, Cambridge.
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McNeill, William H. 1982. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society
since A.D. 1000. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: a Millennial Perspective. OECD
Development Centre, Paris.
Taylor, A. 1996. International Capital Mobility in History: the Savings-Investment
Relationship. Working Paper 5743. National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 5743.
United Nations. 2000. World Investment Report. UN, New York and Geneva.
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18
FIGURE 1
INTEGRATION OF T HE WORLD ECONOM
1990s
3.6
6.07.0
15%
20%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
W orld Output W orld Trade in
Goods
W orld Trade in
S ervices
Foreign Direct
Investment
Internet
Connections
Monthly Growth R ateMonthly Growth R ate
S ource: WTO
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19
FIGURE 2
TRANSPORT COSTS, 1830-1910
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1830 1850 1880 1910
Wheat Bar Iron Iron Goods Cotton thread Cotton Textile
Source: Bairoch (1989)
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20
FIGURE 3
TRANSPORTATION VERSUS COMMUNICATION COSTS, 1920-1950
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1920 1930 1940 1950 1969 1970 1980 1990
Ocean freight Air Transatlantic phone SatelliteSource: World Bank
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21
FIGURE 4
CORRELATION BETWEEN DOMESTIC INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS SINCE
1870
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1870-79 1880-89 1890-99 1900-09 1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89
Source: Taylor (1996)
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22
FIGURE 5
GROSS VALUE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL STOCK IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF AFRICA, ASIA AND
LATIN AMERICA, 1870-1998
$40.1
$235.4
$63.2
$495.2
$3,030.7
$0.0
$500.0
$1,000.0
$1,500.0
$2,000.0
$2,500.0
$3,000.0
$3,500.0
1870 1914 1950 1973 1998
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
Stock in 1990 prices ($bn)
Stock as share of developing country GDP
Source: Maddison (2001)
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TABLE 1
TOTAL TRADE TO GDP(current prices, per cent)
1870 1910 1950 1995
UK 41 44 30 57
France 33 35 23 43
Germany 37 38 27 46
Italy 21 28 21 49
Denmark 52 69 53 64
US 14 11 9 24
Canada 30 30 37 71
Japan 10 30 19 17
Source: Baldwin and Martin (1999)
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TABLE 2
TOTAL TRADE TO GDP(constant prices, per cent)
Region 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998
Western Europe 8.8 14.1 8.7 18.7 35.8
Western Offshoots 3.3 4.7 3.8 6.3 12.7
Eastern Europe and
former USSR
1.6 2.5 2.1 6.2 13.2
Latin America 9.7 9.0 6.0 4.7 9.7
Asia 1.7 3.4 4.2 9.6 12.6
Africa 5.8 20 15.1 18.4 14.8
World 4.6 7.9 5.5 10.5 17.2
Source: Maddison (2001)
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TABLE 3
GROWTH IN VOLUME OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS,WORLD AND MAJOR REGIONS, 1870-1998
(annual average compound growth rates, per cent)
Region 1870-1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-98
Western Europe 3.24 -0.14 8.38 4.79
Western Offshoots 4.71 2.27 6.26 5.92
Eastern Europe and
former USSR
3.37 1.43 9.81 2.52
Latin America 3.29 2.29 4.28 6.03
Asia 2.79 1.64 9.97 5.95
Africa 4.37 1.90 5.34 1.87
World 3.4 0.90 7.88 5.07
Source: Maddison (2001)
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TABLE 4
CAPITAL FLOWS SINCE 1870
(average absolute value of current account as per cent of
GDP)
UK USA Argentina Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan
1870-1889
4.6 0.7 18.7 8.2 7.0 2.4 1.7 1.2 0.6
1890-1913
4.6 1.0 6.2 4.1 7.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.4
1919-1926
2.7 1.7 4.9 4.2 2.5 2.8 2.4 4.2 2.1
1927-1931
1.9 0.7 3.7 5.9 2.7 1.4 2.0 1.5 0.6
1932-1939
1.1` 0.4 1.6 1.7 2.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 1.0
1947-1959
1.2 0.6 2.3 3.4 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.3
1960-1973
0.8 0.5 1.0 2.3 1.2 0.6 1.0 2.1 1.0
1974-1989
1.5 1.4 1.9 3.6 1.7 0.8 2.1 1.3 1.8
1989-1996
2.6 1.2 2.0 4.5 4.0 0.7 2.7 1.6 2.1
Source: Taylor (1996)
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TABLE 5
FOREIGN ASSETS OVER WORLD GDP (per cent)
1870 6.9
1900 18.6
1914 17.5
1930 8.4
1945 4.9
1960 6.4
1980 17.7
1995 56.8
Source: Crafts (2000)
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TABLE 6
DECADAL MIGRATION
(per cent of initial population, 1880-1910)
Per cent of initialpopulations
1880s 1890s 1900s
Senders
UK -3.05 -5.2 -2.04
Italy -1.65 -3.37 -4.87
Spain -1.51 -6.01 -5.18
Sweden -2.90 -7.20 -3.51
Portugal -3.52 -4.16 -5.94
Receivers
US 5.69 8.94 4.02
Canada 2.27 4.89 3.71
Australia 11.28 16.59 0.77
Argentina 4.50 25.60 9.50
Brazil 1.98 3.82 8.44
N.Zealand 53.52 4.08 4.15
Source: Green & Urquhart (1976)
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TABLE 7
AVERAGE TARIFFS ON IMPORTED MANUFACTURED GOODS
(per cent)
1875 1913 1931 1950 Pre-UruguayRound
Post-UruguayRound
France 12-15 20 30 18 -- --
Germany 4-6 17 21 26 -- --
Italy 8-10 18 46 25 -- --
UK 0 0 n.a. 23 -- --
EU -- -- -- -- 5.7 3.6
US 40-50 44 48 14 4.6 3.0
Source: Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin (1999)
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TABLE 8
HISTORY OF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES
REGIME PERIOD
I. International Gold Standard 1879-1914
II. Interwar instability 1918-1939
Floating 1918-1925
Return to gold 1925-1931
Return to Floating 1931-1939
III. Semi-fixed rate dollar standard 1945-1971
Establishing convertibility 1945-1958
Bretton Woods system proper 1958-1971
IV. Floating rate dollar standard 1971-1984
Failure to agree 1971-1974
Return to floating 1974-1984
V. EMS and greater D-Mark zone 1979-1993
VI. Plaza-Louvre intervention accords 1985-1993
VII. Towards Renewed Floating and Emu 1993-
Broad multilateral surveillance 1993-1997
End of dollar pegs 1997-
Monetary union in the EU 1999-
Source: Hirst and Thompson (1999, 33)
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TABLE 9
RISE AND RISE OF MULTI-NATIONAL COMPANIES(Selected Indicators of FDI and International Production
billions of dollars and percentages)
1982 1990 1999
FDI inward stock 594 1,761 4,772
Sales of foreignaffiliates
2,462 5,503 13,564
Gross product offoreign affiliates
565 1,419 3,045
Exports of foreignaffiliates
637 1,165 3,167
GDP at factor cost 10,611 21,473 30,061
Exports of goodsand non-factorservices
2,041 4,173 6,892
Source: UN (2000)
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TABLE 10
PERFORMANCE IN THE THREE MOST SUCCESSFUL PHASES
IN THE CAPITALIST EPOCH(annual average compound growth rate of GDP per head)
1950-73
Golden Age
1973-98
Neo-Liberal Order
1870-1913
Liberal Order
Western Europe 4.08 1.78 1.32
Western Offshoots 2.44 1.94 1.81
Japan 8.05 2.34 1.48
Resurgent Asia 2.61 4.18 0.38
Advanced capitalist
and resurgent Asia
2.93 1.91 1.36
Faltering Economies 2.94 -0.21 1.16
World 2.93 1.33 1.30
Source: Maddison (2001)
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