Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes€¦ · Law enforcement in the United States...

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UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcessesReporttotheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityJuly2014

Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes

AboutThisReport

TheauthorsofthisreportareDavidCarter,Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniversity;SteveChermak,Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniversity;JeremyCarter,Ph.D.,IndianaUniversity‐PurdueUniversityIndianapolis;JackDrew,MichiganStateUniversity.Questionsaboutthisreportshouldbedirectedtoinfostart@start.umd.edu.ThisreportispartoftheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)project,“FactorsimpactingtheU.S.IntelligenceProcess.”ThisresearchwassupportedbytheDepartmentofHomelandScienceandTechnologyDirectorate’sOfficeofUniversityProgramsthroughAwardNumber2012‐ST‐061‐CS0001,CenterfortheStudyofTerrorismandBehavior(CSTAB)2.13madetoSTARTtoinvestigatetheunderstandingandcounteringofterrorismwithintheU.S.Theviewsandconclusionscontainedinthisdocumentarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeinterpretedasnecessarilyrepresentingtheofficialpolicies,eitherexpressedorimplied,oftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurityorSTART.

AboutSTARTTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)issupportedinpartbytheScienceandTechnologyDirectorateoftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecuritythroughaCenterofExcellenceprogrambasedattheUniversityofMaryland.STARTusesstate‐of‐the‐arttheories,methodsanddatafromthesocialandbehavioralsciencestoimproveunderstandingoftheorigins,dynamicsandsocialandpsychologicalimpactsofterrorism.Formoreinformation,contactSTARTatinfostart@start.umd.eduorvisitwww.start.umd.edu.

CitationsTocitethisreport,pleaseusethisformat:Carter,David,andSteveChermak,JeremyCarter,JackDrew.“UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses,”ReporttotheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.CollegePark,MD:START,2014.

Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes

ContentsExecutiveSummary..............................................................................................................................................................................1

Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................................3

DataandMethodology.........................................................................................................................................................................4

Demographics.....................................................................................................................................................................................6

DataMeasures....................................................................................................................................................................................6

Results.........................................................................................................................................................................................................7

PerceptionsofTerroristThreats................................................................................................................................................7

InformationSharingIssues...........................................................................................................................................................9

IndicatorsofPreparedness........................................................................................................................................................11

AnalyticStrategy.................................................................................................................................................................................13

Discussion..............................................................................................................................................................................................15

References..............................................................................................................................................................................................18

Appendix.................................................................................................................................................................................................19

Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes 1

ExecutiveSummaryTheSeptember11thattacksimpactedsocietygenerally,andlawenforcementspecifically,indramaticways.Oneofthemajortrendshasbeenchangingexpectationsregardingcriminalintelligencepracticesamongstate,local,andtribal(SLT)lawenforcementagencies,andtheneedtocoordinateintelligenceeffortsandshareinformationatalllevelsofgovernment.Despiteclearevidenceofsignificantchanges,verylittleresearchexiststhatexaminesissuesrelatedtotheintelligencepracticesofSLTlawenforcementagencies.ImportantquestionsonthenatureoftheissuesthatimpactSLTintelligencepracticesremain.WhilethereissomeuncertaintyamongSLTlawenforcementaboutcurrentterrorismthreats,thereiscertaintythatthesethreatsevolveinalargelyunpredictablepattern.Asaresultthereisanongoingneedforconsistentandeffectiveinformationcollection,analysisandsharing.Littleinformationisknownaboutperceptionsofhowinformationisbeingsharedbetweenagenciesandwhethertechnologieshaveimprovedorhurtinformationsharing,andlittleisknownaboutwhetheragenciesthinktheyarecurrentlypreparedforaterroristattack,andthekeyfactorsdistinguishingthosethatthinktheyarecomparedtothosewhodonot.Thisstudywasdesignedtoaddresstheseissues,andabetterunderstandingoftheseissuescouldsignificantlyenhanceintelligencepracticesandenhancepublicsafety.TodevelopabetterunderstandingofperceptionsaboutterroristthreatsthatSLTagenciesfaceandtheireffortstopreventterrorism,theresearchteamdistributedquestionnairesviaaweb‐designedsurveytotwoseparategroupsoflawenforcementpersonnel.Developmentofthesurveyinvolvedseveralpreliminarydrafts.FeedbackwassoughtfromSLTintelligenceworkersaboutquestioncontentandcoverage,andspecificallywhetherquestionswereambiguousordifficulttoanswer.Aftermakingrevisions,thefinalInstitutionalReviewBoardapprovedinstrumenthad48structured,semi‐structured,oropen‐endedquestions.Thesurvey,despiteitslength,enabledrespondentstoshareinformationaboutissuessuchasperceptionsofterroristthreats,inter‐agencyinteractions,informationsharing,intelligencetraining,andagencypreparedness.Additionalquestionsaskedaboutcharacteristicsoftherespondentandtherespondent’sagency.Therearethreefindingsthatarequiteinteresting.First,lawenforcementperceptionsaboutwhatisaseriousthreatintheircommunityhaschangedsignificantlyovertime.Lawenforcementismuchmoreconcernedaboutsovereigncitizens,Islamicextremists,andmilitia/patriotgroupmemberscomparedtothefringegroupsofthefarright,includingChristianIdentitybelievers,reconstructedtraditionalists(i.e.,Odinists),idiosyncraticsectarians(i.e.,survivalists),andmembersofdoomsdaycults.Infact,sovereigncitizenswerethetopconcernoflawenforcement,buttheconcernaboutwhethermostgroupswereaseriousterroristthreatactuallydeclinedformostgroups(e.g.,theKKK;ChristianIdentity;Neo‐Nazis;RacistSkinheads;ExtremistEnvironmentalists;ExtremeAnimalRightsExtremists).

Second,whenexaminingwhethertherespondentsthoughtthatvariousagenciesandsourceswereusefulintheircounterterrorismefforts,theagenciesthatappeartobemostusefultoSLTlawenforcementincludestate/localfusioncenters,theFBI’sJointTerrorismTaskForce(s),theFBI,andDHSOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysis.Overall,theinternetandtheuseofopensourcematerials,humanintelligencesources,andthemediawereperceivedasprovidingthemostusefulinformation.Securityclearances,adequatepersonnel,adequatetraining,adequateresources,adequatetime,ortheorganizationalculturewereallperceivedasbarriersforthesharingofintelligenceandinformationacrossagencies.Third,severalfactorsimpactedwhetheranagencywaspreparedforaterroristattack.Agencieswithsatisfiedworkingrelationshipswithstateorganizationsweretwiceaslikelytobeprepared,agenciesthatproducethreatassessmentsandriskassessmentsmorefrequentlyarethree‐and‐a‐halftimesmorelikelytobepreparedthanagencieswhocreatethemlessfrequently,andthecreationofvulnerabilityassessmentsalsoappearstobeapredictorofpreparednessastheymorethanquadrupleanagency’spreparednesslikelihood.Inaddition,asagenciesexperienceproblemsrelatedtopersonnel,training,andresources,thelikelihoodtheywillconsiderthemselvespreparedisreducedbyapproximatelythree‐fold.Agenciesthatfelttheywerenotpreparedhighlightedproblemswithresources,training,andqualityofworkingrelationshipswithotherorganizations.Particularlyforpractitioners,themostimportantaspectofthisresearchmaynotbethefindingsonthevariableanalyses,perse,butonthebenchmarksidentifiedintrendsfoundinthedata.Somecleartrendsemergedwhichindicateprogrammaticsuccessesforinformationsharingandintelligence,aswellasareaswhereproblemsremain.Whenconsideringthesefindingsinthecontextofresearchonorganizationaldevelopment,itisclearthatorganizationalleadershipisanimportantfactorfororganizationalsuccessesininformationsharingaswellasforpreparedness.Iftheleadershipofalawenforcementagencyiswillingtoexpendtheefforttotrainpersonnel,developpartnerships,andparticipateinstate,regionalandnationalinformationsharinginitiatives,thengreaterlevelsofsuccesswillbeachieved.Whileonewouldintuitivelyassumethis,thedataempiricallysupportsit.

IntroductionTheSeptember11thattacksimpactedsocietygenerally,andlawenforcementspecifically,indramaticways.Oneofthemajortrendshasbeenchangingexpectationsregardingcriminalintelligencepracticesamongstate,local,andtribal(SLT)lawenforcementagencies,andtheneedtocoordinateintelligenceeffortsandshareinformationatalllevelsofgovernment.TheNationalCommissiononTerroristAttacksUpontheUnitedStates’(2004)“9/11CommissionReport”highlightedthatdespitetheUnitedStates’sprawlinglawenforcementcommunity,veryfewagenciesotherthantheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)engagedinanytypeofcounterterrorismeffortspriortotheattacks.TheCommissionReportalsostressedthatenhancingintelligenceeffortsandimprovinginformationsharingwerecriticaltothepreventionofterroristacts.LawenforcementintheUnitedStatesisdecentralized,whichposesincrediblechallengesintermsofeffectivelysharinginformationacrossjurisdictionalboundaries,butsuchdecentralizationisalsoanopportunity.AnincreasingnumberofSLTlawenforcementagencieshaveexpandedtheirinformationcollectionandintelligenceanalysispractices,andtherehavebeenfundamentalchangesinthenational,state,andlocalinformationsharinginfrastructure.Despiteclearevidenceofthesedramaticchanges(U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,2011;U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,2013),lawenforcement’sexpandedroleincounterterrorism,andtheacknowledgementthatlocalintelligenceiscriticaltothepreventionanddeterrenceofterroristacts,verylittleresearchexiststhatexaminesissuesrelatedtotheintelligencepracticesofSLTlawenforcementagencies.ThegrowthofintelligencepracticesinSLTagencieshascoincidedwithanincreasingacknowledgementwithinfederallawenforcement,andinsomeinstancestheintelligencecommunity,oftheimportanceofstate,local,andtriballawenforcementforenhancingthevalueofintelligencerelatedtoterrorism.TheimportanceofSLT’scontributiontotheintelligenceprocesscanbehighlightedinseveralways.First,althoughtheFBIistheleadagencyfortheinvestigationofterrorism,thetypesofinformationprovidedbyvarioussourcesandthesheernumberofcasesandleadsrequiringfollow‐up,highlightstheimportanceofinvolvinglocallawenforcementinterroristinvestigations(Davisetal.,2004).Second,itiscriticaltonotethatterrorismisalocalevent,andthusSLTlawenforcementisinauniquepositiontocontributeimportantintelligencebecauseoftheirknowledgeaboutindividuals,groups,andorganizationsoperatinginlocalcommunities(CarterandCarter,2009a;2009b).Inaddition,thelocalnatureofterrorismclearlyhighlightsthatSLTlawenforcementagenciesmusthaveaccesstotimelyandactionableintelligenceforthepreventionandresponsetoterroristacts.Third,criticalinfrastructuresandhigh‐valuetargetsaredispersedwidelyintheUnitedStates,andmanyofthesepotentialtargetsarelocatedinruralandless‐populatedareas.Locallawenforcementagenciesinthesecommunitiesareinthebestpositiontorecognizewhensuspicioussituationsoccurnearthesecriticaltargets.Fourth,surveyresearchindicatesthattheterrorismexperiencesandexpectationsregardingintelligenceworkofstateandlocalagenciesincreasedafterSeptember11th(Davisetal.,2004).Indeed,theFBIasacknowledgedtheimportanceofSLTlawenforcementincounterterrorism

effortsthroughthepresenceofstateandlocallawenforcementofficerswhoaremembersofeveryFBIJointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF).ImportantquestionsonthenatureoftheissuesthatimpactSLTintelligencepracticesremain.WhilethereissomeuncertaintyamongSLTlawenforcementaboutcurrentterrorismthreats,thereiscertaintythatthesethreatsevolveinalargelyunpredictablepattern.Asaresultthereisanongoingneedforconsistentandeffectiveinformationcollection,analysisandsharing.Second,littleinformationisknownaboutperceptionsofhowinformationisbeingsharedbetweenagenciesandwhethertechnologieshaveimprovedorhurtinformationsharing.Finally,littleisknownaboutwhetheragenciesthinktheyarecurrentlypreparedforaterroristattack,andthekeyfactorsdistinguishingthosethatthinktheyarecomparedtothosewhodonot.Thisstudywasdesignedtoaddresstheseissues,andabetterunderstandingoftheseissuescouldsignificantlyenhanceintelligencepracticesandenhancepublicsafety.

DataandMethodologyTodevelopabetterunderstandingofperceptionsaboutterroristthreatsthatSLTagenciesfaceandtheireffortstopreventterrorism,theresearchteamdistributedquestionnairesviaaweb‐designedsurveytotwoseparategroupsoflawenforcementpersonnel.ThefirstgroupincludedindividualswhohadattendedtrainingsthroughtheMemorialInstituteforthePreventionofTerrorism(MIPT).Anon‐profitorganization,MIPTwascreatedaftertheOklahomaCitybombingstoincreaseknowledgeaboutterrorismprevention.Inlinewiththisgoalitofferstraditionalandonlineeducationprogramstolawenforcementofficers,especiallywithrespecttosuspiciousactivityreporting;todate,19,000officershaveundertakenthesetrainings.1TheresearchteamthereforeapproachedrepresentativesofMIPTwitharequesttoconductsurveyresearchwithinthispopulationandMIPTsubsequentlyagreedtocontactindividualswhohadregisteredforitstrainingprogramswithaninvitationtoparticipateinthestudy.ThesecondgroupconsistedofindividualswhohadreceivedtrainingfromtheSchoolofCriminalJusticeatMichiganStateUniversity.FundedbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,theLawEnforcementIntelligenceToolboxprogramoperatedfrom2005until2011withover4,500officersfrom2,100agenciesenrollingduringthistime(Carter,2013).Manyoftheseindividualshadbeenselectedbytheirdepartmenttolearnhowtodevelopanintelligencecapacity.Thistrainingprovidedtheresourcesandinformationtofamiliarizeparticipantswithimportantissuessurroundingintelligencepractices.Inrelationtothestudy,thissampleisappropriatebecauseitcomprisespersonnelwithanunderstandingofintelligenceconceptsandrequirements,whoareawareoforganizationaleffortstoutilizeknowledgeaboutlawenforcementintelligence.Thisresearchusedapurposivesample,thereforethereisselectionbias;however,itwasintended.Comparativelyfewlawenforcementofficershaveworkedwiththeintelligenceprocess.Evenfewerhaveexperiencewiththeneweststandardsandguidelines.Usingarandomsampleofabroadpopulationof

1https://www.mipt.org/

lawenforcementofficers,generally,wouldprovidenovaluableresults.Asaresult,useofthissamplingframeprovidedaccesstoapopulationwhereintheresearchteamknewtherespondentshadbeenexposedtobothlawenforcementintelligenceandthecurrentstandardsandpractices.PersonsinboththeMIPTandMSUsampleshadreceivedtrainingusingthesamenationalstandardsandprograms.Moreover,bothtrainingprogramswerefundedbytheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritywhichhadexactingstandardsfortrainingcoursecontentandapprovalaswellasarequirementthattrainingprogramshadtobedeliveredinamannerthatwasconsistent.Thevalueofthesefactorsfromaresearchperspectiveisthatitstrengthensinternalvalidityofthemeasuresandexternalvaliditytothepopulationoflawenforcementofficerswithcontemporaryexperienceinlawenforcementintelligence.Developmentofthesurveyinvolvedseveralpreliminarydrafts.FeedbackwassoughtfromSLTintelligenceworkersaboutquestioncontentandcoverage,andspecificallywhetherquestionswereambiguousordifficulttoanswer.Aftermakingrevisions,thefinalInstitutionalReviewBoardapprovedinstrumenthad48structured,semi‐structured,oropen‐endedquestions.Thesurvey,despiteitslength,enabledrespondentstoshareinformationaboutissuessuchasperceptionsofterroristthreats,inter‐agencyinteractions,informationsharing,intelligencetraining,andagencypreparedness.Additionalquestionsaskedaboutcharacteristicsoftherespondentandtherespondent’sagency.Datacollectioninvolvedthepreparationofaweb‐basedsurveyandthenthetransmissionofemailstoindividualsinbothsamples.Inordertopreservetheconfidentialityofstudyparticipants,MIPTdistributedemailstothefirstsamplewhiletheresearchteamsentemailstotheToolboxsample.Collectionbeganwithaninvitationemailthatoutlinedthepurposeoftheresearchandaskedtheaddresseetocompleteaself‐administered,onlinequestionnaire.ItalsoincludedaURLthatstudyparticipantscouldusetoaccesstheonlinesurvey.Asthestudyprogressed,twosetsoffollowupemailsatmonthlyintervalsweresent.Thenumberofresponsesbyintelligenceworkerswas327fortheMIPTsampleand190responsesfortheToolboxsample.However,asthestudy’sunitofanalysisisattheagencylevel,werecordedcountsfordistinctorganizationsrepresentedbyindividualsinbothsamplingframes.Thus,theresearchteamdeterminedtheMIPTsampleconsistedof597targetand179respondingagencies,whiletheToolboxsampleconsistedof302targetand124respondingagencies.Theresponseratewastherefore30.0percentfortheMIPTsampleand40.6percentfortheToolboxsample.Theseresponseratesarepromisinggivenresponseratestocrosssectionalsurveyshavedeclined(BrickandWilliams,2013)andthatpolicepersonnelworkinginintelligencearehighlysensitivetorespondingtoquestionsregardinginformationsharingpractices(Chermaketal.,2013).Priortoanalysis,submissionswereremovedwherethelawenforcementagencynamecouldnotbeidentified.Thisleft364responsesfromindividualswhoworkedat175agencies,ofwhichresponsesforsevenagencieswereincludedinbothsamples.

Demographics

Table1showscategoricalcountsfortheswornstatus,role,andtenureofthestudyparticipants.MostoftheMIPTrespondentsindicatedtheywereswornofficers(66.2%).Manywereinvestigators(39.7%)oranalysts(32.4%),andveryfewheldadministrativepositions(6.9%).Approximately18percentoftherespondentsrepresentedstateagencies,54percentmunicipalagencies,and28percentrepresentedcountyagencies.Roughlyhalfoftherespondentsalsoreportedservingformorethan15yearswiththeircurrentagency.Conversely,thevastmajorityofToolboxrespondentswerealsoswornofficers(80%)andmosthadservedfor15yearsormore(58.5%).However,mostheldrolesassupervisors(31.3%),investigators(27.3%),oradministrators(25.8%).

Table1:SwornStatus,RoleandTenurewithintheirAgency MIPT ToolboxTraining n Percenta n Percenta

Swornstatus Sworn 151 66.2 108 80.0Non‐sworn 77 33.8 27 20.0Role Administrator 15 6.9 33 25.8Supervisor 47 21.5 40 31.3Investigator 86 39.7 35 27.3Analyst 71 32.4 20 15.6Tenure Lessthanayear 3 1.3 0 01‐3years 16 7.0 2 1.54‐9years 57 25.0 20 14.810‐15years 52 22.8 34 25.2Morethan15years 100 43.9 79 58.5aPercentagesmaynotequal100.0duetorounding.

DataMeasures

Effortstocombatterrorismamongstateandlocallawenforcementagencieshavebeenadifficultareatoempiricallyassess.Concernsoversecurityandthesensitivityofinformationcoupledwithhighfidelityofsuchpracticesacrossagencieshashamperedresearchers’abilitytoprovideinsightsonsuchpracticesascomparedtomoretraditionalaspectsofpolicing.Withthisinmind,thereisvalueinpresentingbothdescriptiveandinferentialinsightsfromthedatagathered.First,descriptivedataispresentedaboutstateandlocallawenforcements’perceptionsofthreats,informationsharingrelationshipsandnetworkedsystems.Second,criticalfactorsareidentifiedthatleadtothebeliefthatanagencywaseither“Prepared”or“NotPrepared”foraterroristattack.

Results

PerceptionsofTerroristThreats

In2009,Freilich,Chermak,andSimonepublishedresultsfromaDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)studythatexaminedseveralissues,includinglawenforcementperceptionsofterroristthreatsintheUnitedStates.Datawerecollectedforthisresearchin2006‐2007.Oneofthegoalsofthecurrentprojectwastoagainasklawenforcementofficersabouttheirconcernsaboutseveralpotentialterroristthreatsbytypeofgroupandtypeofincident.TheresultsfrombothstudiesarepresentedinTables2and3forcomparativepurposes.InTable2,respondentswereaskediftheyagreedthatanyoftheseventeenextremistgroupslistedwereaseriousterroristthreat.Inthistable,themeanscoresarepresentedona4‐pointscale(1=stronglydisagreeto4=stronglyagree)andthe(rankorder)ofofficerconcerns.Thereareseveralinterestingfindings.First,thereiswidevariationaboutwhatgroupsareperceivedtobeaseriousterroristthreat.Lawenforcementismuchmoreconcernedaboutsovereigncitizens,Islamicextremists,andmilitia/patriotgroupmemberscomparedtothefringegroupsofthefarright,includingChristianIdentitybelievers,reconstructedtraditionalists(i.e.,Odinists),idiosyncraticsectarians(i.e.,survivalists),andmembersofdoomsdaycults.Second,themajorconcernsoflawenforcementhavechangedconsiderablyovertime.Forexample,whenexaminingthe2006‐07surveyresults,lawenforcement’stopconcernwasIslamicextremists.

Table2.PerceivedThreatofExtremistGroupsbyTypeofGroupTypeofGroup PotentialThreat(2013‐14) PotentialThreat(2006‐07)SovereignCitizens 3.20(1) 2.49(7)IslamicExtremists/Jihadists 2.89(2) 3.13(1)Militia/Patriot 2.67(3) 2.61(6)RacistSkinheads 2.58(4) 2.82(3)Neo‐Nazis 2.56(5) 2.94(2)ExtremeAnimalRightists 2.54(6) 2.79(4)ExtremeEnvironmentalists 2.51(7) 2.74(5)KluxKluxKlan 2.38(8) 2.47(8)Left‐WingRevolutionaries 2.36(9) 2.04(13)ExtremeAnti‐Abortion 2.36(9) 2.30(11)BlackNationalists 2.34(11) 2.35(10)ExtremeAnti‐Tax 2.33(12) 2.47(8)ExtremeAnti‐Immigration 2.33(12) 2.41(9)ChristianIdentity 2.19(13) 2.59(8)IdiosyncraticSectarians 2.19(13) 2.13(12)Millennial/DoomsdayCults 2.17(15) 1.93(14)ReconstructedTraditions 2.13(16) 2.04(13)

The2013‐14studyresultsshowthatlawenforcement’stopconcernissovereigncitizens.AlthoughIslamicextremistsremainamajorconcernforlawenforcement,theyarenolongertheirtopconcern.Approximately39percentofrespondentsagreedand28percentstronglyagreedthatIslamicextremistswereaseriousterroristthreat.Incomparison,52percentofrespondentsagreedand34percentstronglyagreedthatsovereigncitizenswereaseriousterroristthreat.Thisisinterestingbecausesovereigncitizenswererankedastheeighthhighestgroupofconcernamongthe2006‐07sample.Third,althoughestimatesaboutsomegroupswereaseriousterroristthreatincreasedcomparingthetwotimeperiods,(e.g.,Left‐WingRevolutionaries;ExtremeAnti‐AbortionExtremists),theconcernaboutwhethermostgroupswereaseriousterroristthreatactuallydeclinedformostgroups(e.g.,theKKK;ChristianIdentity;Neo‐Nazis;RacistSkinheads;ExtremistEnvironmentalists;ExtremeAnimalRightsExtremists).Thechangeisinterestingastherewassignificantconcernabouttheresurgenceoftheradicalfarright(asevidencedbythe2006‐07survey,aswellasadditionalconcernsraisedafterthe2008electionofPresidentBarackObama),butitappearsasthoughlawenforcementis,atpresent,lessconcernedaboutthesegroups.Suchchangingperceptionsaboutwhatisaseriousterroristthreatisanimportantfindingbecauseidentifyingandprioritizingathreatisakintohittingamovingtargetandevolvesasnewintelligence,data,andeventsdevelop.Lawenforcementmustbesteadfastinidentifyingmajorconcerns,substantiatingtheconcerns,providingproductsandresourcestobetterunderstandthenatureofthethreat,andsupportingeffortstorespondtosuchconcerns.Table3presentsfindingsoftheperceivedlikelihoodofvarioustypesofterroristincidentscomparingthe2006‐07and2013‐14surveyresults.Ingeneral,lawenforcementperceptionsonthelikelihoodofvarioustypesofterroristincidentaresimilarwhencomparingthetwoperiods,althoughtheirtopconcernschanged.Inthe2006‐07survey,lawenforcementofficersratedanattackwithconventionalexplosivedevicesandcyberterrorismasthetwomostlikelyeventsinthatorder.Althoughthemeanaverageforcyberterrorismwasidenticalinthe2013‐14surveyresults,concernabouttheuseofconventionalexplosivedevicesdeclinedsomewhat.Similarly,theresultsfromthe2013‐14surveyshowthatlawenforcementwassomewhatlesslikelytothinkthatmostothertypesofincidentweregoingtooccur,comparedtothe2006‐07results.

Table3.PerceptionsofLikelihoodofTerrorism‐RelatedCrimesbyTypeofIncidentTypeofIncident LikelihoodofIncident

(2013‐14)LikelihoodofIncident(2006‐07)

Cyberterrorism 3.09(1) 3.09(2)ConventionalExplosiveDevices 2.85(2) 3.18(1)MilitaryWeaponsIncident 2.60(3) 2.50(5)Biological 2.37(4) 2.47(7)Agroterrorism(food) 2.35(5) 2.56(3)Agroterrorism(disease) 2.26(6) 2.56(3)Chemical 2.25(7) 2.50(5)Radiological 2.13(8) 2.13(8)

InformationSharingIssues

Table4presentsthefindingsonwhethertherespondentsthoughtthattheagenciesandsourceslistedwereusefultothemintheircounterterrorismefforts.Respondentswereaskedtheiropinionsaboutbothspecificagenciesaswellassourcesofinformation.Meanvaluesona4‐itemLikertscaleareprovidedwith4meaningthattheinformationprovidedbyatypeofsourceoragencywasveryuseful.Overall,thelawenforcementrespondentsthoughtthattheagencieslistedwereusefulorveryusefulsourcesofinformationoncounterterrorismissues.Therewassomevariationofusefulnesscomparingacrossagency.TheagenciesthatappeartobemostusefultoSLTlawenforcementincludestate/localfusioncenters,theFBI’sJointTerrorismTaskForce(s),theFBI,andDHSOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysis.Theothersourcesaskedaboutwereconsideredtobesomewhatlessusefulcomparedtoagencyinformation.Overall,theinternetandtheuseofopensourcematerials,humanintelligencesources,andthemediawereperceivedasprovidingthemostusefulinformation.

Table4.UsefulnessofInformationfromAgenciesandSourcesAgency Score Source ScoreState/LocalFusionCenters 3.53 Internet 3.40FBI’sJointTerrorismTaskForce 3.42 Media 3.14FederalBureauofInvestigation 3.34 SourcesontheStreet 3.12DepartmentofHomelandSecurityOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysis

3.27 Pro.LEPublications 3.06

BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,andFirearms 3.18 LEO 2.95DrugEnforcementAdministration 3.15 Non‐LawEnforcement

Books2.78

ImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement 3.13 RISS.net 2.76LawEnforcementProsecutors 3.06 AlternativeLiterature 2.70StateOfficeofHomelandSecurity 3.01 RiskAssessments 2.67CustomsandBorderProtection 2.69 HSIN.Intell 2.66StateAttorneyGeneralAnti‐terrorismTaskForce 2.62 Theresearchteamaskedwhethertherespondentwassatisfiedwiththerelationshiptheyhadwithvariouslawenforcementandgovernmentagencies.Table5presentstheseresultsona5‐pointscalewith5meaningverysatisfied.Theresultsshowthatrespondentsoverallwhereverysatisfiedwiththeworkingrelationshipwithmostofthelawenforcement,government,andevenprivatesectoragenciesthatwereaskedabout.Infact,thescoreswereoverfourformostagencies.Someofthehighestaverageswereforstateandlocallawenforcementagencies,state/localfusioncenters,andtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.Respondentswereaskedaboutseveralissuesandwhethertheyposedsignificantproblemstothesharingofinformation.Theseissuesincludedsecurityclearances,adequatepersonnel,adequatetraining,adequateresources,adequatetime,ortheorganizationalculturecausedaproblemtothesharingofintelligenceandinformationacrossagencies.Athreeitemscalewasused,withnotaproblem

(0),somewhatofaproblem(1),andsignificantproblem(2)astheresponseoptions.Theresultsindicatethatmostoftheseissuesremainasignificantchallengetoeffectivelysharinginformationandintelligence.Themeanaveragesfortheitemswereasfollows:securityclearance(.82);adequatepersonnel(1.31);adequatetraining(1.19);adequateresources(1.22);adequatetime(1.32);andorganizationalculture(1.17).

Table5.SatisfiedwiththeWorkingRelationshipAgency Score Agency ScoreLocalLawEnforcement 4.47 NationalGuard 4.12State/LocalFusionCenter 4.45 StateOfficeofHomelandSecurity 4.10StateLawEnforcement 4.37 HomelandSecurityInvestigation 4.10DepartmentofHomelandSecurity 4.22 Hospitals 4.08FederalBureauofInvestigation 4.15 PublicTransportation 4.03EmergencyManagement 4.18 PublicWorks 3.99FireMarshals 4.18 PrivateSectorAgencies 3.97DepartmentofCorrections 4.14 PublicHealth 3.93CriticalInfrastructureSecurity 4.01 InternalRevenueService 3.74TribalLawEnforcement 3.99 Finally,variousinformationsystemsandnetworkswereexaminedthatareusedtoshareintelligenceandinformationandwhethertherespondentsweresatisfiedwiththeiruse.Table6presentstheseresults.2InColumn2,theresultsreportthepercentageofrespondentswhodonotusearespectivesystem.Approximatelyone‐thirdoftherespondentshavenotusedATIX,FBINET,orLLIS.Approximately15

2 A brief description of each system follows: ATIX – Automated Trusted Information Exchange. A secure, but unclassified, information and messaging system, managed by RISS, to provide users with access to homeland security, disaster, and terrorist threat information. FBINET – The Federal Bureau of Investigation Network which is a global-wide area network used for communicating classified information at the Secret level, including investigative case files and intelligence pertaining to national security; it also runs administrative applications. Most predominantly used by state and local law enforcement officers in fusion centers and HIDTA intelligence centers. LLIS – Lessons Learned Information Sharing, operated by the Department of Homeland Security, is accessible by law enforcement and emergency response personnel and contains a wide variety of information on best practices, after action reports, relevant alerts and news and a secure communications system. LLIS includes an area specifically for law enforcement intelligence fusion centers. RISS – Regional Information Sharing System operates a secure intranet, known as RISS.NET, to facilitate law enforcement communications and information sharing nationwide. RISS local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agency personnel have online access to share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many locations across jurisdictional lines. HSIN – Homeland Security Information Network is a secure internet-based system of integrated communication networks designed to facilitate information sharing between DHS and other Federal, state, county, local, tribal, private sector commercial, and other non-governmental organizations involved in identifying and preventing terrorism as well as in undertaking incident management activities. LEO – Law Enforcement Online, operated by the FBI, is a secure, Internet-based information sharing system for agencies around the world that are involved in law enforcement, first response, criminal justice, anti-terrorism, and intelligence. With LEO, members can access or share sensitive but unclassified information anytime and anywhere. OSC – Open Source Center the focal point for the intelligence community's exploitation of open source material. It also aims to promote the acquisition, procurement, analysis, and dissemination of open source information, products and services throughout the U.S. Government.

percentoftherespondentshaveneverusedRISS,HSIN,ortheOpenSourceCenter.Only9percentoftherespondentshaveneverusedLEO.Whenarespondentstatedthattheyusedaparticularnetworkorsystem,theyweregenerallyverysatisfiedwithit.TheresponseoptionswereafouritemLikertscalefrom“NotatAllSatisfied(1)”to“VerySatisfied(4).”Therespondentswereatleastsatisfiedwithallofthenetworkandsystems,butweregenerallymoresatisfiedwithLEOandtheOpenSourceCenter.

Table6.DoesNetworkedSystemsMeetInformationSharingNeeds?NetworkedSystem SystemNotUsed LevelofSatisfactionLEO 8.8% 3.33RISS 14.6% 3.28OpenSourceCenter 14.8% 3.31HSIN 15.7% 3.23FBINET 28.3% 3.11ATIX 35.7% 3.04LLIS 32.4% 2.94

IndicatorsofPreparedness

Surveyrespondentswereasked“Inyouropinion,howpreparedisyourorganizationforterroristorcriminalextremistthreatsinyourregion?”Responseoptionsrangedfrom“notatallprepared”to“veryprepared”alongafive‐pointscale.Twodichotomousdependentvariableswerecreatedusingtheresponsestothisquestion.Onlyagenciesindicatingtheywere“veryprepared”werecodedasbeing“Prepared,”andonlytheagenciesindicatingtheywere“notatallprepared”werecodedas“NotPrepared.”Theresearchteamthenexploredwhatcharacteristicsincreasedthelikelihoodthatanagencywaspreparedornotpreparedforthethreatsintheirregion.Theanalysisexploredwhetherthreats,relationships,ororganizationalfactorsaffectthesetwodependentmeasures.Threatsarerepresentativeofseriousandlikelythreatstotherespondingagency’sjurisdiction(seeTable1).Thisthreatvariablewasrecodedintofourcategories.Respondentswereaskedifanumberofterrorist/extremistgroupsposedaseriousthreattotheirjurisdictionwithresponseoptionsrangingfrom“stronglydisagree”to“stronglyagree”alongafour‐pointscale.“Right‐wing”isanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetoMilitia,SovereignCitizens,3KluKluxKlan,ChristianIdentity,IdiosyncraticSectarians,Neo‐Nazi,ReconstructedTraditions,andRacistSkinheadsthreats(α=.917;singlefactoreigenvalue=5.156).“Left‐wing”isanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetoLeft‐WingRevolutionary,BlackNationalist,ExtremeEnvironmental,andExtremeAnimalRightsthreats(α=.910;singlefactoreigenvalue=3.150).Single‐Issueisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetoExtremeAnti‐Tax,ExtremeAnti‐Abortion,ExtremeAnti‐Immigration,andDoomsdayCultsthreats(α=.913;

3AlthoughmostorganizationsgroupSovereignCitizenswithotherrightwinggroups,theyarequiteunique.Sovereignsdonotspecificallysharethe“supremacist”viewsoftheKlan,etc.Theirfocusisnotonindividuals(e.g.,minorities,Jews,etc.)rathertheirfocusisongovernmentdysfunctionandabuseofauthority.Theiranti‐governmentideologyisarguablymoreakintoleftwinganarchiststhanrightwingKlansmen.

singlefactoreigenvalue=3.717).Jihadisanagency’sresponsetoasingleitemofanIslamicExtremists/Jihadthreat.Respondentswerealsoaskedifanumberoftypesofattackswerelikelytooccurintheirjurisdictionwithinthenextfiveyears.Chemical,Biological,Radiological/Nuclear,andExplosive–CBRNE–isanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetothesefourtypesofattacks(α=.856;singlefactoreigenvalue=2.839).Relationshipvariablesarerepresentativeoftheextenttowhichanagencyhassatisfiedworkingrelationshipswithorganizationsacrosssectorsandlevelsofgovernment.Whilerelationshipsbetweenindividualagenciesareimportant,preparednessislikelyreliantonrelationshipswitharangeoforganizationsacrossdifferentlevelsandsectors.Respondentswereaskedtoindicatehowsatisfiedtheywerewiththeirworkingrelationshipwithavarietyoforganizations.Responsesrangedfrom“wehavenorelationship”to“verysatisfied”alongafive‐pointscale.Federalrelationshipsisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetorelationshipswiththeFederalBureauofInvestigation,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,HomelandSecurityInvestigations,InternalRevenueService,andNationalGuard(α=.790;singlefactoreigenvalue=2.768).Staterelationshipsisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetorelationshipswithStateLawEnforcement,StateFusionCenter,StateGovernmentOfficials,CriticalInfrastructure,DepartmentofCorrections,EmergencyManagement,andStateOfficeofHomelandSecurity(α=.869;singlefactoreigenvalue=3.981).Publicrelationshipsisanadditiveindexofanagency’sresponsetorelationshipswithHospitals,PublicHealthAgencies,PublicWorks,andPublicTransportation(α=.852;singlefactoreigenvalue=2.791).Privatesectorrelationshipisasingleitemofagencyresponsestotheirrelationshipswiththeprivatesector.Organizationalfactorsrepresentavarietyofagencycharacteristicslikelytoinfluencepreparedness.Trainingisanadditivescalerepresentativeofthetotalnumberoftrainingprogramsattendedbypersonnelfromtherespondingagency.ThesetrainingprogramsincludedFundamentalsofIntelligenceTraining,FederalLawEnforcementTrainingCenterAnalystCourse,DepartmentofHomelandSecurityCriticalThinkingaswellasReportWriting,DrugEnforcementAdministrationFederalLawEnforcementAnalystTraining,FederalBureauofInvestigationNationalAcademyaswellasCenterforIntelligenceTraining,NationalWhite‐CollarCrimeCenterIntelligenceAnalystCourse,StateandLocalAnti‐TerrorismTraining,BureauofJusticeAssistance28CFR23,andtheRegionalCounterdrugTrainingAcademy(α=.778;singlefactoreigenvalue=3.560).Threatassessments,threatwarnings,vulnerabilityassessments,andriskassessmentsareanalyticproductscreatedbytherespondingagencyonafive‐pointfrequencyrangeof“never”to“daily.”Respondingagencieswereaskedtoindicatetheextenttowhichanumberofissueswereseriousproblemsintheiragency,rangingfrom“notaproblematall”to“significantproblem.”Theseorganizationalproblemsincludedpersonnel,training,resources,andagencyculture.Respondingagenciesalsoindicatedwhetherornottheyhadreceivedexternalfundingfromfederal,state,orlocalorganizationsinsupportoftraining,personnel,orequipment.Lastly,respondingagenciesindicatedthe

numberoftotalpersonnelemployedbytheirorganizationasoneofsixtotalemployeebrackets.Themodalagencysizeresponsewas501to3,000totalpersonnel.Thetablethatpresentsthedescriptiveforthesevariablesisprovidedasanappendix.

AnalyticStrategyBivariateanalyseswereconductedtoexploretherelationshipbetweenagencypreparednessandjurisdictionalthreats,relationships,andorganizationalfactors.Giventhelimitedempiricalworkinthisarea,onlybivariatelogisticregressionswereemployedtotestwhetherindividualthreats,relationships,andorganizationalfactorspredictedanagency’sperceptionofbeingpreparedornotprepared.ResultsofthesebivariaterelationshipsarepresentedinTable7.DescriptiveinformationforthevariablesincludedisprovidedintheAppendixinTableA.Theresultsareinsightfulandsupportintuitivesuppositions.Withrespecttofactorspredictingpreparedness,agencieswithsatisfiedworkingrelationshipswithstateorganizations(O.R.=2.67)weretwiceaslikelytobeprepared.Itappearsthat,atthebivariatelevel,asagenciesproducethreatassessments(O.R.=3.59)andriskassessments(O.R.=3.61)morefrequently,theyarethree‐and‐a‐halftimesmorelikelytobepreparedthanagencieswhocreatethemlessfrequently.Thecreationofvulnerabilityassessmentsalsoappearstobeapredictorofpreparednessastheymorethanquadrupleanagency’spreparednesslikelihood(O.R.=4.60).Lastly,asagenciesexperienceproblemsrelatedtopersonnel(O.R.=‐3.42),training(O.R.=‐2.71),andresources(O.R.=‐2.45)thelikelihoodtheywillconsiderthemselvespreparedisreducedbyapproximatelythree‐fold.Anumberoffactorsappeartocontributetoanagencybeingnotprepared.Clarificationoftheinterpretationofthesefindingsisneeded.First,wheninterpretingoddsratiosforlogisticregression,thepercentabove1.0indicatesamorelikelyeffectwhilethepercentbelow1.0indicatesaless‐likelyeffect.Ifanoddsratioisnegative,itsimplymeansthepredictinglikelihoodisincreasedinthenegative,oropposite,direction.Second,thereisadifferencebetweenpredictinganagencythatispreparedandnegativelypredictinganagencythatisnotprepared.Whilethepresenceofacertainfactormaynotstatisticallydrivethepredictionofbeingprepared,itspresencemaybestrongenoughtodeteragenciesfrombeingnotprepared.ForexampleinTable7,perceptionsofthesatisfactionofrelationshipswithfederalorganizationsdonotpredictanagencybeingprepared.However,thissameperceptiondoespredictthatagenciesaremorethansixtimes(O.R.=‐6.48)aslikelytobenotprepared.Thusitcouldbeassumedthattheperceptionoffederalrelationshipsamongpreparedagencieswasnotstrongenoughtoindicatewhytheywereprepared,whileagenciesthatdidperceivefederalrelationshipsassatisfactoryweresix‐timesaslikelytoindicatetheywerenotwellprepared.Thisisadramaticdifferenceinperceptionandalsoappliestostate(O.R.=‐5.84),public(O.R.=‐.490),andprivatesector(O.R.=‐5.10)relationships.Itappearsthatasagenciesperceivetobeworkingsatisfactorilywithorganizationsacrosslevelsofgovernmentand

sectors,theywillnotperceivetheagencyasnotbeingprepared.Suchfindingslendsupporttotheimportanceofworkingrelationshipswithexternalorganizations.

Table7.BivariateRelationshipsofFactorsInfluencingAgencyPreparedness Prepareda NotPreparedb

Threats Coef OddsRatio Coef OddsRatioRight‐Wing .092 1.39 ‐.097 ‐1.84Left‐Wing .104 1.19 ‐.124 ‐1.87Single‐Issue .131 1.31 ‐.125 ‐1.26Jihad .233 .76 ‐.272 ‐1.36CBRNE .246 1.91 ‐.156 ‐1.84 Relationships Federal .223 1.84 ‐.262 ‐6.48***State .236 2.67** ‐.234 ‐5.84***Public .203 1.67 ‐.227 ‐4.90***Private .835 1.80 ‐.807 ‐5.10*** Organizational Training .043 .47 ‐.304 ‐3.85***ThreatAssessments .847 3.59*** ‐.829 *2.65**ThreatWarnings .347 1.65 ‐.525 ‐4.01***VulnerabilityAssessments .964 4.60** ‐1.287 ‐2.75**RiskAssessments .678 3.61*** ‐1.501 ‐2.87**PersonnelProblem ‐1.169 ‐3.42*** .414 2.25*TrainingProblem ‐1.122 ‐2.71** .733 4.03***ResourcesProblem ‐.886 ‐2.45* .446 2.83**AgencyCultureProblem ‐.394 ‐1.28 .706 3.81***ReceivedFederalFunding .834 1.33 .105 .21ReceivedStateFunding 1.231 1.36 ‐.088 ‐.15ReceivedLocalFunding ‐.094 ‐.09 ‐.014 ‐.02AgencySize .242 1.50 ‐.131 ‐.82

aThereferencegroupforthe“Prepared”dichotomousdependentvariableisrepresentativeofanagencyindicatingtheiragencyis“veryprepared”toapreparednessquestion.bThereferencegroupforthe“NotPrepared”dichotomousdependentvariableisrepresentativeofanagencyindicatingtheiragencyis“notatallprepared”or“notprepared”toapreparednessquestion.

***p<.001,**p<.01,*p<.05

Attendanceattrainingprogramsalsohasadramaticimpactontheperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Asattendanceattrainingprogramsincreases,theperceptionofbeingnotpreparedisreducedbyalmostfour‐times.Moreover,analyticproductsalsoreducethelikelihoodthatanagencyperceivestobenotprepared.Asthreatassessments,threatwarnings,vulnerabilityassessments,andriskassessmentsareproducedmorefrequently,thereisapproximatelyathree‐foldreductioninanagency’sperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Lastly,problemswithintheagencythatinhibitinformationsharingappeartoincreasetheperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Problemsrelatedtopersonnel(O.R.=2.25)andresources(O.R.=2.83)doublethelikelihoodofanagencyindicatingtheyarenotprepared.Trainingproblems(O.R.=4.03)hasaquadruplingeffectonbeingnotpreparedwhileproblemsrelatedtotheagency’sculture(O.R.=3.81)leadstoamorethanthree‐foldincreaseinbeingnotprepared.

DiscussionParticularlyforpractitioners,themostimportantaspectofthisresearchisnotthefindingsonthevariableanalyses,perse,butonthebenchmarksidentifiedintrendsfoundinthedata.Somecleartrendsemergedwhichindicateprogrammaticsuccessesforinformationsharingandintelligenceaswellasindicatorsofareaswhereproblemsremain.Whenconsideringthesefindingsinthecontextofresearchonorganizationaldevelopment,itisclearthatorganizationalleadershipisanimportantfactorfororganizationalsuccessesininformationsharingaswellasforpreparedness.Iftheleadershipofalawenforcementagencyiswillingtoexpendtheefforttotrainpersonnel,developpartnerships,andparticipateinstate,regionalandnationalinformationsharinginitiatives,thengreaterlevelsofsuccesswillbeachieved.Whileonewouldintuitivelyassumethis,thedataempiricallysupportsit.Thefindingsprovideindicatorsofprogressthathasbeenmadeinthedomesticintelligenceenterpriseaswellasobstaclesthatremaintobeovercome.Thereaderiscautionedtonotexclusivelyjudgeone’sownagencybaseduponthefindingsofoneortwovariablesinthisstudy.Thefindingscollectivelyreflectapointintimeonacontinuumofdevelopment.Ratherthanjudgehowone’sagencyratesonaspecificvariable–forexample,thenatureofpublic‐privatepartnershipsinthejurisdiction–thereadershouldviewallpreparednessvariablesandmakeajudgmentofprogressandusethefindingsasaroadmaptoincreasepreparednessandfunctionalityoftheintelligenceprocess.Acoreresponsibilityofstrategicintelligenceistoidentifychangesinthethreatpicture,whetherthatistheemergenceofnewthreats,changesinthemethodologyofcurrentthreats,oradiminishedthreatfromsomegrouporideology.Thefindingsindicatethatrespondentsbelievethatthechangingnatureofthreatsisofcontinuedconcerntolawenforcement.Respondentsalsoindicatedthenatureofthechangingthreatshavebeeneffectivelyidentifiedinthestrategicintelligenceprocessandsharedwithofficersthroughbulletinsandintelligenceproducts.Thus,itappearstheintelligenceprocessisproducingactionablestrategicresults.

Akeyissueforlawenforcementinthepost‐9/11environmenthasbeen“informationsharing”–therehadlongbeenachorusthatinformationsharingamongstateandlocallawenforcementwaslimited,butitwasvirtuallynon‐existentwithfederallawenforcement.Inthisstudy,SLTlawenforcementrespondentsclearlyindicatethatthecounterterrorisminformationsharinginfrastructureandprocessesputinplacepost‐9/11(oftenreferredtotheDomesticIntelligenceEnterprise)havebeenworkingtoprovideinformationamonglawenforcementagenciesatalllevelsofgovernment.Anecdotally,thecurrentconcernisnotaboutinformationsharingprocesses,butoftenaboutthequalityoftheinformation.Forexample,anFBIorDHSintelligenceproductwillbewidelydisseminatedtostateandlocallawenforcement,butitisoftenofthenaturethatofficersshouldbe“onalert”forcertaintypesofthreats,withoutmorespecificdetails.Conversely,federallawenforcementoftendoesnothaveanymoredetailaboutthreatstoprovide.Respondentsindicatedtheywerehighlysatisfiedwiththeirrelationshipswithotherlawenforcementagencies,governmentagenciesandselectedprivatesectorpartnersintheircounterterrorismactivities.Stateandlocallawenforcementagencies,state/localfusioncenters,andtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityreceivedthehighestlevelsofsatisfactioninmutualrelationships.Despitethesenotablesuccesses,therearestillbarrierstoeffectiveinformationsharingthatneedtobeaddressedintheeyesofSLTlawenforcement.Themostprominentare:securityclearancesforSLTpersonnel,adequatestaffingoftheintelligencefunction,theneedforadequatepre‐assignmenttrainingandin‐servicetraining,adequateresourcestoeffectivelyperformtheintelligenceprocessandchangingtheorganizationalculturetoutilizetheintelligenceprocess.Interestingly,withtheexceptionofsecurityclearances,themajorbarriersasviewedbytherespondentswerefactorswithinthelawenforcementagencies.Hence,thesearebarriersthatcanbemoreeasilyovercomethansystemicbarriers.Perhapsthegreatestchallengeischangingtheorganizationalculture,whichistrueforvirtuallyanytypeoforganizationalchange.Acoreinvestmentbythefederalgovernmenttoincreaseinformationsharinghasbeendevelopingorenhancingelectronicinformationsharingsystemsandnetworks.Intheunclassifiedenvironmentthisincludes,mostnotably,RISSnet,4LawEnforcementOnline(LEO)5andtheHomelandSecurityInformationNetwork(HSIN).6Thefindingsindicatethatmanyoftheinformationsharingnetworksandsystemsappeartobesomewhatunderutilized.Anecdotally,analystsandinvestigators,whilehavingaccesstoallofthesesystems,typicallyrelypredominantlyononeofthesystemsforsimplicity,despitethefactthateachsystemwillhavesomewhatdifferentinformation.7However,thosewhousethosenetworksandsystemsarehighlysatisfiedwiththeiroperationsandvalue.

4http://www.riss.net5http://www.fbi.gov/about‐us/cjis/leo6http://www.dhs.gov/homeland‐security‐information‐network7Acommoncomplaintofusersofthesesystemsistheinconvenienceofthelogonprocessesaswellasauto‐logoffifthesystemhasbeenidle.EffortsofdevelopingaSingleSignOnhavebeenunsuccessful.

Theresearchteammeasuredseveralfactorsonthegeneralvariableof“preparedness”toassessthekindsofknowledge,relationships,andtacticalplansthatwereinplaceforattacksbyvariousgroupsandmethods.Overall,respondentsstatedtheiragenciesweregenerallywellprepared,althoughthereisalwaysroomforimprovement.Itisprobablethatpreparednessisalsocorrelatedwithagencysizeandresources;however,thisconclusioncannotbevalidatedbythecurrentdata.Nonetheless,itisclearthattheinformationsharingstructuresandprocessesaswellasothertrainingandtechnicalassistanceprovidedtolawenforcementagenciespost‐9/11hasincreasedbothawarenessandpreparednessinresponsetothreatsbycriminalextremists.Inparticular,thefindingsshowthatthoseagencieswhichproduceregularthreatassessmentsandriskassessmentsarethemostprepared.Aconclusionthatmightbedrawnfromthisfindingisthatnotonlydotheassessmentsidentifythreatsandrisks,butleadersofagenciesthatrequiresuchassessmentsaremoreattunedtopreparedness.Respondentshadattendedanumberoftrainingprogramsrelatedtointelligenceandcounterterrorism.Interestingly,asattendanceattrainingprogramsincreases,theperceptionofbeingnotpreparedisreducedbyalmostfour‐times.Whiletrainingiscertainlyacomponentofpreparedness,therearemanyotherpolicyandresourcefactorsthatcontributetooverallagencypreparedness.However,consistentlytherespondentstothisstudyviewedunderstandingthethreatandresponsestothreatsviatrainingasanimportantcomponentinoverallagencypreparedness.Similarly,respondentsindicatedthatanalyticproductsalsosupporttheperceptionthattheagencyispreparedforthreats.Ideally,thismeansthreatswerebeingrecognizedandtacticalresponsestothreatsbeingdeveloped.However,pragmaticallyonemustalsoconsiderthefactthatmereknowledgeofthreatscontributedtotherespondents’perceptionofpreparedness.Interestingly,asthreatassessments,threatwarnings,vulnerabilityassessments,andriskassessmentsareproducedmorefrequently,thereisapproximatelyathree‐foldreductioninanagency’sperceptionofbeingnotprepared.Thissuggeststhatanagencywhichdevotestimeandexpertisetoanalysisandinformationsharingwithrespecttoitsthreatenvironmentseesvalueinthistypeofintelligenceand,consequently,wouldpresumablyactonthatinformationtopreventormitigatethreats.Thefindingspresentedhereareconsistentwithpreviousexaminationsoflawenforcement’sprogressinimprovinginformationsharingandintelligencepracticesatamoremacro‐level(seeU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(2011)andtheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonHomelandSecurity(2013)).Collectivelythefindingsshowsignificantprogressamonglawenforcementagenciesfordevelopingandsharingintelligenceandinformationrelatedthreatsbycriminalextremists.Notsurprisingly,barriersstillremain,yettheprogressissignificantinseveralfronts.

References Brick, J. M. and Williams, D. (2013). Explaining rising nonresponse rates in cross-sectional surveys. The

ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 645(1), 36-59. Carter, D. L. and Carter, J. G. (2009a). Intelligence-led policing: Conceptual considerations for public policy.

Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20(3), 310-325. Carter, D. L. and Carter, J. G. (2009b). The intelligence fusion process for state, local and tribal law

enforcement. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36(12), 1323-1339 Carter, J. G. (2013). Intelligence-Led Policing: A Policing Innovation. El Paso, TX: LFB Scholarly. Chermak, S, Carter, J. G., Carter, D. L., McGarrell, E. F. and Drew, J. (2013). Law enforcement’s information

sharing infrastructure: A national assessment. Police Quarterly, 16(2), 211-244. Davis, L. M., Riley, J. K., Ridgeway, G., Pace, J., Cotton, S. K., Steinberg, P. S., Damphousse, K. and Smith. B.

L. (2004). When terrorism hits home: How prepared are state and local law enforcement? Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report.

Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2011). Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations. Progress

Report. Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. House of Representatives. (2013). Majority Staff Report on the National Network of Fusion Centers.

Washington, DC: Committee on Homeland Security.

Appendix

Table A. Descriptives Variable Mean S.D. Min Max Prepared 0.08 0.27 0 1 Not Prepared 0.15 0.36 0 1 Threats

Right-Wing 19.76 4.91 8 32 Left-Wing 9.74 2.84 4 16 Single-Issue 11.27 3.18 5 20 Jihad 2.89 0.90 1 4 CBRNE 9.56 2.36 4 16

Relationships

Federal 17.79 4.89 5 25 State 27.55 5.85 7 35 Public 15.01 3.89 4 20 Private 3.65 1.20 1 5

Organizational

Training 3.20 2.65 0 11 Threat Assessments 2.52 1.23 1 5 Threat Warnings 3.16 1.43 1 5 Vulnerability Assessments 2.25 1.10 1 5 Risk Assessments 2.33 1.14 1 5 Personnel Problem 1.47 0.85 0 3 Training Problem 1.36 0.86 0 3 Resources Problem 1.39 0.87 0 3 Agency Culture Problem 1.36 0.91 0 3 Received Federal Funding 0.41 0.49 0 1 Received State Funding 0.08 0.27 0 1 Received Local Funding 0.11 0.31 0 1

Note: Modal agency category is 501-3000.

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