View
0
Download
0
Category
Preview:
Citation preview
UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title PageDateTime
06/06/200611:29:18AM
S-0902-0001 -04-00001
Expanded Number S-0902-0001 -04-00001
Title items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - communication with theforeign ministers of the Five Western Powers
Date Created 23/02/1979
Record Type Archival Item
Container S-0902-0001: Peacekeeping-Africa 1963-1981
Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit
SWAPQ MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS
OF THE FIVE WESTERN POWERS, NEW YORK, 20TH MARCH, 1979.
Considering the fact that the Secretary-General
is still considering the composition of the military component
of UNTAG, SWAPO would like to state its position on two important
issues raised in the report of the Secretary-General concerning
the implementation of the Security Council resolutions 435 (1978)
and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia.1)/
The recent Luanda communique^ issued as a resul_t
of the Fr MjTj jSummjLt which was called to discuss the problem
of Namibiajhas made it ex£l_tcitly clear that the Frontline
States and SVAPO__are committed to ensure that the cease-fire
agreement between South Africa and SWAPO will be scrupulously
observed.
SVTAPO will ensure that all of its armed cadres in
neighbouring countries will be under strict order to adhere to
all the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. The Frontline
States have also given their solemn assurances that they will
work in close co-operation with SWAPO to see to it that there
-2-
will be no acts of cease-fire violation emanating from theiri
territories.
In our view, this solemn pledge; by both SWAPO and
the Frontline States should be accepted by both the Five Western
powers and South Africa as being made in good faith.
In paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's Report
S/13120 of 26 February, 1979, there is a clause which says
that "all SWAPO armed forces in the neighbouring countries will,
on "the commencement of the cease-fire.be restricted to base in
these countries." If this clause means that SWAPO will, in
co-operation with the host countries, keep its own forces under
strict order so as not to violate the cease-fire agreement
in any manner, then SWAPO will have no quarrel with the clause.
If, on the other hand, the clause means that the proposed liaisont *
officers in neighbouring countries will be in any way involvedt ~ f
in the controlling of SWAPO armed forces outside Namibia, then
SWAPO cannot accept, the said clause of the report of the
Secretary-General.
With regard to paragraph thirteen (13) of the said
document, SWAPO has no objection.to the Secretary-General's
;>roposal to have civilian liaison officers in the nieghbouring
countries to facilitate communication between the Special
Representative and Governments of the three Countries regarding
tho implementation of the United Nations plan.
Therefore, assuming that the necessary adjustments
are made in the composition of the logistic units of the
military component of UNTAG, SWAPO has no difficulty to
accept the Secretary-General's report as presented in
Security Council document S/13120.
Ths President, of the Security Council presents
liis ccruplinvents to the uie:;.]j£;cG of the Security Council
£ivd has the honour to transmit herewith, for tncii*
informetion, a cop;/ of a letter dated 6 March }.97?
frcrii thii Charge d.^ ai5j:airsr: of fclia ?ern?>nerrt Mi^-r;:.ori
of Souta Africa to the I'-'iii.ted slations adfire-'ssefi to the
Sscretcvrv-GonoraJ,,, v^iiich h^s bean b^ro^ght tc the
attention of the P™Gsi-i!£\f::.; .of tns Security CrjU^?;Jl =
This cs;.:nunicEitiori will !:•: issvied as s d..~cw.riei;v '.f i-he
Securit;/- Council under tl.o Eyr^ool S/1314S at C6OO hours
on S March 1979,.
PERMANENT SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
3OO EAST -42™ STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. IOOI7
6 March 1979
Excellency,
The enclosed is the text of a statement delivered by the
South African Prime Minister, the Honourable P.W. Botha,
in the House of Assembly, Cape Town, on 6 March 1979-
I would appreciate it if this letter and its annexure could
be circulated as an official document of the Security
Council.
Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.
ADRIAAN EKSTEEN
Charge d'Affaires
H E Mr Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General of the
United Nations
NEW YORK N Y 10017
STA TEMEHT BY THE SOUTH A F R I C A N P R I M E M I N I S T E R , THE H O N O R A B L E
P V! BOTHA, IM THE HOUSE OF A S S E M B L Y ON 6 M A R C H 1979
''THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH WEST A F R I C A SHALL D E T E R M I N E T H E I ?. 0'.:'N F U T U R E ' 1
THIS ONE SEMTEHCE C A P T U R E S THE E S S E N C E OF SOUTH A F R I C A ' S
A P P R O A C H TO THE SOUTH WEST A F R I C A N I-SS'JE.
SOUTH - A F R I C A DOES MOT C L A I M DUE INCH OF TERR ITORY ' lij SOUTH
'.JEST'AFRICA. SOUTH A F R I C A DOES HOT ITSELF I N T R U D E INTO THE
I N T E R N A L POLITICAL C U R R E N T S IM THE T E R R I T O R Y . SOUTH A F R I C A
DOES HOT P R L S C R i n E W H A T F O R M OF C O N S T I T U T I O N A L S T R U C T U R E THE
PEOPLE OF SOUTH UEST A F R I C A ARE TO ACCEPT FOR THEIR INDEPENDENCE.-
WE R E S P E C T AND PROTECT THE RIGHT OF THE INHAB I T A N T S TO P R A C T I S E
THEIR POLITICS FREELY AfJD OPENLY AND TO E X E R C I S E T H E I R RIGHT
OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT ANY II! T lill D AT ION FROil ANY SOURCE.
IT WAS THIS DEMOCRATICALLY IH C LIM E 0 AND MORALLY UNASSAILABLE
A P P R O A C H THAT MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR N E G O T I A T I O N S TO BE C O N D U C T E D
WITH THE W E S T E R N POWERS FROM APRIL 1977 IN AN E F F O R T TO D E T E R M I N E
W H E T H E R AN A G R E E M E N T COULD 3E R E A C H E D THAT WOULD BE A C C E P T A B L E
TO THE UN WITHOUT C O M P R O M I S I N G THE SECURITY OF THE T E R R I T O R Y AMD
THE F R E E E X E R C I S I N G BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-
D E T E R M I N A T I O N .
E V E R Y R E A S O N A B L E PERSON WILL A G R E E THAT 'CONCEPTS SUCH AS F R E E D O M
AND F R E E ELECTIONS WITH U N I V E R S A L S U F F R A G E WILL R E M A I N HOLLOW
SLOGANS U N L E S S I • J P R A C T I C E THEY ARE I M P L E M E N T E D C O M P L E T E L Y
OPENLY AND EXPOSED TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY. THE SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T
HAS COiHTTED ITSELF A C C O R D I N G L Y AND R E G A I N S SO C O M M I T T E D .
IF SOUTH A F R I C A IS TO BE PUNISHED AND V I C T I M I Z E D FOP, ITS H O N O U R A B L E
AND F I R M C O M M I T M E N T TO ITS A S S U R A N C E S AND U N D E R T A K I N G S T O W A R D
THE I N H A B I T A N T S OF A N E I G H B O U R I N G STATE, IT IS P R E P A R E D TO ACCEPT
THE C O N S E Q U E N C E S OF ITS V I E W P O I N T R A T H E R THAN FOLLOW THE PATH
OF DISHONOUR AND 3E B R A N D E D BY THE N A T I O N S OF SOUT H E R f l A F R I C A
AS AN U N R E L I A B L E N E I G H B O U R P R E P A R E D TO PLACE ITS OWN T R A N S I T O R Y
S A L V A T I O f l A B O V E THE I N T E R E S T S OF THE OTHER N A T I O N S OF THE R E G I O N .
WE SHOULD EXPECT THE F O R E I G N M E D I A TO S E R V E UP U N D I S G U I S E D
LIES AF30UT THE COURSE OF EVENTS If] ORDER TO PUT THE BLAME FOR THE
C U R R E N T STATE OF A F F A I R S Of.' US. WHY A F T E R ALL SHOULD THE DENI-
O R A T O R S CHANGE THEIR TUNE O V E R N I G H T .
YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ASK SO HE P Ef! E T R A T If;G QUESTIONS IN THIS R E G A R D .
WHAT HAS H A P P E N E D ? l/HAT HAS GONE W R O N G ? I W O U L D LIKE TO GIVE
YOU A C H R O N O L O G I C A L O U T L I N E OF E V E N T S S I M C E 21 D E C E M B E R 1978.
MY COLLEAGUE THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S AND I l-IENT TO W I N D H O E K
CD 21 D E C E M B E R 1978 TO I N F O R M THE N E ML Y-EL EC TE D C O N S T I T U E N T
ASSEMBLY OF DEVELOPMEMTS IN THE UN IM RESPECT OF THE SOUTH WEST
A F R I C A QUESTION. WE ALSO B R I E F E D THE M E M B E R S ON THE DISCUSSIONS HELD
BY THE MI M I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S IN THE US WITH P R E S I D E N T CARTER,
DR W A L D I I E I M AT.'D MR CYRUS V A N C E , THE A M E R I C A N F O R E I G N M I N I S T E R .
OUR FIA I f l PURPOSE, HOWEVER, WAS TO P E R S U A D E THE CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY TO C O O P E R A T E IN THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF '
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 NOT W I T H S T A N D I N G THE SERIOUS
MISGIVINGS THEY MIGHT H A R B O U R ABOUT THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE UN
AMD OTHER DELICATE ISSUES. IT HAS fiO EASY ASSIGNMENT. ON THE
CONTRARY, IT WAS AWKWARD, ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEVIED AGAINST THE
B A C K G R O U N D OF SUAPO'S PUBLIC S T A T E M E N T S TO THE E F F E C T THAT THE
T E R R O R I S T O R G A N I S A T I O N WOULD C O N T I N U E WITH ITS C A M P A I G N OF V I O L E N C E
AND T E R R O R A G A I N S T THE PEOPLE- OF SOUTH WEST A F R I C A . F U R T H E R M O R E ,
IT WAS E M B A R R A S S I N G B E C A U S E THE l i E n H E R S OF THE C O N S T I T U E N T A S S E M B L Y
HAD JUST BEEN E L E C T E D IN AN ELECTION IN W H I C H 80.3 P E R C E N T OF THE
R E G I S T E R ED VOTERS S U P P O R T E D THEM.
B E C A U S E THE F U T U R E OF E V E R Y O N E IN SOUTH WEST A F R I C A D E P E N D E D SO
M U C H ON THE OUTCOME AND SINCE T H F. S E C U R I T Y OF THE T E R R I T O R Y WOULD
NOT RE C O M P R O M I S E D IF THE C L E A R AND PRECISE STIPULATIONS OF THE
S E T T L E M E N T P L A N W E R E H O N O U R E D , l-J E C O N S I D E R E D IT It; THE I N T E R E S T
•'• r :. ';;i7;;: ;:f; /. r R [ r. A AT L. •":•"? '•"' ° .-.''! j •.;/;•:> tl T!:^ C C.-r, 3 T I Ti; T £ ,'; T ASHr-^LV
TO' C O O P E R A T E in THE E X P E D I T I O U S I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF S E C U R I T Y C O U i i C l L
R E S O L U T I O N 435. BY THIS A C T I O N WE S IMUL T A II E 0 U S L Y H O N O U R E D OUR
U N D E R T A K I N G TO THE W E S T E R N POWERS.
THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G M A F F A I R S DAS /'.RLE TO I N F O R M THE UN
S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L OH 22 D E C E M B E R 1978 OF THE SOUTH A F R I C A N
G O V E R N M E N T ' S DECISION TO C O O P E R A T E IN THE I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF
SECURITY C O U N C I L R E S O L U T I O N 435. IT I/AS EMPHASIZED IfJ THE
S A M E C O M M U N I C A T I O N THAT FLOWING FROM OUR D E C I S I O N - AMD I
NOU QUOTE THE P R E C I S E W O R D I N G -
1 1 I. T H E R E SHALL BE NO R E D U C T I O N OF THE SOUTH A F R I C A N TROOP
STRENGTH IN THE TERRITORY UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A COMPREHENSIVE
CESSATION OF V I O L E N C E AMD HOSTILITIES.
II. A DATE FOR AN ELECTION l.'ILL BE D E T E R M I N E D IN CONSULTATION
B E T W E E N THE SPECIAL R E P R E S E N T A T I V E OF THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L AND
THE A D M I N I S T R A T O R - G E N E R A L ON THE UN D E R S T AM D I f! G THAT THE E L E C T I O N
WILL TAKE PLACE NOT LATER THAN 3D SEPTEMBER 1979.
III.' QUESTIONS OK WHICH THERE SHOULD BE F U R T H E R C O N S U L T A T I O N ,
SUCH AS THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE M I L I T A R Y C O M P O N E N T
OF UNTAG, AND OTHER M A T T E R S W H I C H H A V E A L R E A D Y BEEN BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE W E S T E R N POWERS, BE R E S O L V E D S A T I S F A C T O R I L Y
WITH THE A D M I N I S T R A T O R - G E N E R A L . SPECIAL R E F E R E N C E IS M A D E TO
PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN ACCEPTED BY THE SOUTH A F R I C A N
G O V E R N M E N T ON 25 APRIL 1978 VJITH A V E IV,' TO M O N I T O R I N G OF SWAPQ
3ASES IN NEIGHBOURING STATES,
*
IV. THE M A I N T E N A N C E OF LAW AND ORDER IN SOUTH WEST A F R I C A /
N A M I B I A R E M A I N S THE P R I M A R Y RESPONSIBILITY OF THE E X I S T I N G
POLICE FORCES,
V. THE A D M I N I S T R A T O R - G E N E R A L SHALL E X E R C I S E THE L E G I S L A T I V E AND
A D M I N I S T R A T I V E , A U T H O R I T Y III SOUTH '.JEST A F R I C A / N A M I B I A D U R I N G THE
T R A N S I T I O N A L P ERIOD UNTIL I N D E P E N D E N C E . 1 1 '
T l i T M I N I S T E R O F FQpr.IGN A F F A I R S , I M C O N C L U S I O N , I N V I T E D T H E
o". Cr;C TAP Y -.;-,£ l i L F : A L TO A R R A N G E F 0 H I'.?. A H !" I S A ,'. I TO V V I S I T SOUTH
A F P I C A AND SOUTH WEST A F R I C A WITH E X P E D I T I O N IN O R D E R TO COMPLETE
cGNsuLTAT IONS on THE OUTS T A M O IMG ISSUES. THE HOST I M P O R T ANT OUT-
S T A N D I N G ISSUES AT THAT T I M E V! E R E THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF
UNTAG, THE E M P L A C E M E N T OF ITS P E R S O N N E L AND THE COMPLETION OF THE
STATUS A G R E E M E N T .
A SECOf.'D LETTER WAS A D D R E S S E D TO DR W A L D H E I M OM 22 D E C E M B E R 1978
IN W H I C H S E V E R A L V I E W P O I N T S OF THE C O N S T I T U E N T A S S E M G L Y W E R E
C O N V E Y E D TO THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L FOR C O N S I D E R A T I O N .
ON 30 D E C E M B E R 1973 A 30M3 WAS D E T O N A T E D ON B U S I N E S S P R E M I S E S
IN S W A K O P M U N D . f l O R E THAN 30 PEOPLE W E R E I N J U R E D . A PROTEST IN
THE STRONGEST TERMS WAS LODGED WITH OR WALDMEI.-J Of." THE S A il E DAY
O V E R THIS SENSELESS AND D A S T A R D L Y ACT OF V I O L E N C E nv SWAPG,FOLLOWING THE S T A T E M E N T 3Y THE O R G A N I S A T I O N ' S L E A D E R IN DAR-ES-
S A L A A f l ON 23 D E C E M B E R 1973 THAT SWAPO WOULD NOT ONLY CONTINUE
WITH ITS C A M P A I G N OF V I O L E N C E BUI f .MOREOVER, I N T E N S I F Y IT.
THE FOLLOW IMG ARE SOME E X A M P L E S OF A T R O C I T I E S WH1C1! WILL C O N F I R M
S '.) A P 0 ' S V I 0 L E fJ T C H A R A C T E R :
23 AUGUST 1973 ATTACK A G A I N S T K A T I M A HULILO M I L I T A R Y BASE
TEN M E M B E R S OF SOUTH A F R I C A N D E F E N C E F O R C E
W E R E KILLED AND 10 W E R E I N J U R E D .
12 SEPTE F I B E R 1973. M I N E E X P L 0 S 10 N »EAR 0 N D A NG W A KILLING 2
C I V I L I A N S AND I N J U R I N G 4.
15 OCTOBER 1973 TWO N I N E EXPLOSIONS NE A F ; OIIDULU R E S U L T I N G INTHE DEATH OF 17 M E M B E R S OF THE C I V I L I A NPOPULATION.
16 OCTODER 1978 A B D U C T I O N OF 4 C I V I L I A N S N E A R E E N H A N A OF WHOM
2 W E R E S U B S E Q U E N T L Y M U R D E R E D .
1 D E C E M B E R 1978 TWO E X P L O S I O N S IN W I N D H O E K I N J U R I N G 14 PEOPLE
3G D E C E M B E R 1978 SA GOTAGE IN S W A K O P M U N D WHEN A BOM3 WAS DETO-
: 0 P L E .
F E B R U A R Y 1979
- 5 —
ATTACK Of; N KONGO I l I L I T A R Y BASE BY
A P P R O X I f i A T E L Y 25 G TERRORISTS.
27 F E B R U A R Y 1979 ATTACK Of] ELUNDU MILITARY BASE
J A N / F E B 1979 : D R A M A T I C I N C R E A S E 111 Sl-.'APO T E R R O R I S T
A C T I V I T I E S - 17 C A S E S OF S A B O T A G E A G A I N S T
. E L E C T R I C , TELECOMMUNICATION' AND V J A T E R
INSTALLATIONS, 9 I N S T A N C E S OF A G D U C T I C F i OF
M E M B E R S OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, 24 LAUD
MINE INCIDENTS, 15 CASES OF I ii T Ii"i ID AT ION
R E S U L T I N G I?I THE DEATH OF AT LEAST 3
TRIBAL CHIEFS.
OM 1 J A N U A R Y 1979, DR WALDHEIi-i R E S PON D E D -TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S
LETTER OF 22 D E C E M B E R 1978. HIS LETTER HAD A G E N E R A L L Y POSITIVE
T E ?-l 0 R HE STATED HIS B E L I E F THAT A C O M P R E H E N S I V E C E S S A T I O N OF ALL
HOSTILE ACTS UAS AN ESSENTIAL P R E R E Q U I S I T E TO THE I n P L EME f] T AT I 0 N
OF S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. OM THE Q U E S T I O N OF A DATE FOR
THE E L E C T I O N THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L A G R E E D THAT IT SHOULD 3E SET AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH C O N S U L T A T I O N BETWEEN MR A H T I S A A R I AND THE
AD.-iliilSTRATOR-GENERAL. HE ALSO A G R E E D THAT AN E L E C T I O N DATE OF NOT
L A T E R THAN 30 S E P T E M B E R 1979 AS PROPOSED BY US WAS C O N S I S T E N T WITH
THE SETTLEMENT PLAN. FROM THIS IT FOLLOWED, I*! OR V.'ALDHEIM'S
WORDS, THAT THE E M P L A C E M E N T OF UN TAG MUST C O M M E N C E B E F O R E THE END
OF F E B R U A R Y WITH ALL THE PRIOR STEPS ENVISAGED IN A C C O R D A N C E WITH*
THE SETTLEMENT PLAN A L R E A D Y COMPLETED.
WE U E R E ALSO I N F O R M E D BY DR U A L D H E I M THAT IT WAS HIS INTENTION THAT
MR A H T I S A A R I SHOULD VISIT SOUTH A F R I C A AND SOUTH I-,'E S T A F R I C A IN
J A N U A R Y T O C O M P L E T E N E G O T I A T I O N S O N O P E R A T I O N A L R E Q U I R E M E N T S .
-6-
iilTH R E G A R D TO THE E X T R E M E L Y I :i P 0 f; T A M T OIIESTIO.'I OF T H L M O N I T O R I N G
OF SWAPO BASES If-! NE I G M B O U R ING STATES W H I C H - W A S P E R T I N E N T L Y
STATED IN U N A M B I G U O U S L A N G U A G E If; THE F O R E I G N '.', 1 M I 5 T E C ' S L E T T E R
OF 22 D E C E M B E R 1973, DR UAL DM El." R E S P O N D E D in E Q U A L L Y C L E A R
L A N G U A G E , AS FOLLOWS :
•'CERTAINLY P A R A G R A P H 12 OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL IS A
V E R Y I M P O R T A N T ELEMENT, AMD I HA V E BEEN A S S U R E D BY
R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S OF THE STATES WHICH B O R D E R 0!! N A M I B I A
THAT THEY WILL C O O P E R A T E FULLY 1) IT H THE UNITED N A T I O N S
IN E tl S U R I M G THAT U M T A G IS ABLE TO C A R R Y OUT ITS MA f I D ATE. 1 '
COULD T H E R E 3E ANY DOUBT A B O U T THE M E A N I N G OF THIS C A T E G O R I C
S T A T E M E N T BY PR WAL D H E I M ? HE TOLD US THAT THE N E I G H B O U R I N G STATES
HAD A S S U R E D HIM OF THEIR FULL COOPERATION WITH UMTAG
FOR THE E X E C U T I O N OF ITS M A N D A T E . WHAT IS THIS M A N D A T E ? IT
IS THE MANDATE WHICH IS OUTLINED IN' CLEAR AND PRECISE
L A N G U A G E IN THE Afif'EXURE TO THE S E T T L E M E N T PL AH NAMELY,' 1..
MONITORING OF BOTH SOUTH A F R I C A N AMD SWAPO TROOP RE S T R I C T I O N S . ' 1
Q U E S T I O N : W H E R E AMD HOl-i SHOULD THIS HAi/uATL RE E'XECUTED? A G A I N
WE ARE G U I D E D BY THE WORDS OF THE SETTLEsEWT PLAN If: R E S P E C T
OF THE R E S T R I C T I O N TO BASE OF SUAPO TROOPS. THE L A N G U A G E IS
PRECISE, U N A M B I G U O U S AND C L E A R . SUAPO SHOULD PULL BACK AND BE
R E S T R I C T E D TO ITS CASES AND THAT R E S T R I C T I O N TO BASE SHOULD BE
M O N I T O R E D RY UMTAG. THE PLAN C O N T A I N S MO WORD, NO R E F E R E N C E
W H A T S O E V E R , TO AMY POSSIBLE E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF BASES FOR S'JAPO
TROOPS WHO" MAY FORTUITOUSLY 3E I ii THE T E R R I T O R Y ON THE D A T E OF
C O n i l E M C E M E M T OF THE I HP L E i- E M T A T I 0 N P R O G R A M . AT HO T I il E WAS T H E R E
ANY M E N T I O N OR R E F E R E N C E TO THIS I f J ANY OF THE N E G O T I A T I N G
SESSIONS WITH THE FIVE. N E I T H E R WAS T H E R E Af;Y f i E M T I O M A BOUT IT
IT! TALKS WITH DR W A L D H E I M OR MR A H T I S A A R I : f.'O D E N I A L OR D I S C L A I M E R S
OR QUEST ION ING ON THIS POINT DURING MR AHTISAARI'S TALKS WITH
US IN J A N U A R Y 1979. F U R T H E R M O R E THE F O R E I G N MIII IS T E R S Or THE
F I V E W E S T E R N P O W E R S W R O T E T O T H E M I N I S T E R O F F O R E I G N A F F A I R S O N
-7-
•5 F E B R U A R Y 1979 I •: P O S I T I V E T E f . ' M S '.-' I T I! .'i iJ I C 0 f. T P A D I C T I N G THF ilF ED TO
nor:iTOR SWAPO BASES.
THE F O R E I G N n i.r; i STEP A D D R E S S E D F U R T H E R C O M M U N I C A T I O N S TO DRWALDHEIr; Of! 6 F E B R U A R Y , ft F E B R U A R Y AND 14 F E B R U A R Y 1979. THE
S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L R E S P O N D E D OH 8 F E B R U A R Y AND 17 F E B R U A R Y 1979
AND A G A I N - T H E R E HAS KO D I S C L A I M I N G OF THE E S T A B L I S H E D POSITION
Ofl THE M O N I T O R I N G OF SVJAPO BASES.
BY 2Q F E B R U A R Y , H O W E V E R , IT B E C A M E KfiOWN THAT SVJAPO WAS R E F U S I M G
TO ALLOU ITS CASES IN N E I G H B O U R I N G STATES TO BE M O N I T O R E D AND
THAT IT INSISTED OK THE E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF BASES IMSIDE SOUTH UEST
A F R I C A .
If! HIS LETTER OF 2H F E B R U A R Y 1979 THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S
PROTESTED STROfjGLY TO DR W A L D H C I M A G A I N S T THIS LATEST SWAPO
POSITION A f J D P R O V I D E D C H A P T E R AND V E R S E TO SHOW THAT THE S E T T L E M E N T
PLAN S T I P U L A T E D EXPLICITLY THAT S'JAPO SHOULD RE C O N F I N E D TO ITS
BASES AMD THAT THE R E S T R I C T I O N SHOULD BE M O N I T O R E D BY U M T A G If' THE
SAME. H A M M E R AS THE R E S T R I C T I O N OF SOUTH A F R I C A N TROOPS. HE I N F O R M E D
THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L THAT E M P L A C E M E N T OF U N T A G VJ AS OUT OF THE
GUEST I Or,1 IF IT W E R E TO O C C U R ON T H E . U N I L A T E R A L L Y D E T E R M I N E D AND
R A D I C A L f!EU CO N D I T I O N S OF SWAPO.
WHAT HAS SINCE COME'TO OUR A T T E N T I O N CAN ONLY RE D E S C R I B E D AS
SHOCKING. WE BECAME A W A R E OF THE FIRST SIGNS OF SCHEMING BEHIND
THE S C E N E S OK 21 F E B R U A R Y 1979. THE F I V E W E S T E R N NATIONS, SHORTLY
B E F O R E THIS DATE AND WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE, H A N D E D TO DR UALDHEI il
A DOCUFiEf-jT If] W H I C H C E R T A I N ASPECTS OF THE S E T T L E M E N T P R O P O S A L
WERE, AS THEY PUT IT, ' ' CLARI F I ED ' ' . FROM THIS DOCUMENT IT IS
C L E A R THAT THE F I V E W I T H O U T ANY A T T E M P T AT C O N S U L T I N G SOUTH
A F R I C A WERE HO'.,1 SUPPORTING THE AS TOM I SUING CONCEPT THAT SWAPO
P E R S O N N E L WHO HAPPEN TO F I N D T H E M S E L V E S III SOUTH V.1 E S T A F R I C A AT THE
TI.'iE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED 111 BASES INSIDE
THE T E R R I T O R Y . THE D O C U M E N T ALSO S T A T E S C A T E G O R I C A L L Y THAT THE
M I L I T A R Y COMPONENT OF UNTAG IS IJOT R E Q U I R E D TO MONITOR THE
R E S T R I C T I O N OF SU'APO TO BASE O U T S I D E SOUTH WEST A F R I C A . T H E R E
AT. r ;. i.sr. \.~\\t.'-. ' ' n.»', r- •• r i CAT io::r,' ' ir; T;J\ cocur::. :;T '..'i'lcii C O N F L I C TU I T M THE E X P R E S S U ; i D E R S T AM 0 I i I G f. W H I C H HAD REEt; R E A C H E D B E T W E E N
SOUTH APR ICA AND THE FIV E .
-8-
'..'E ALSO L E A R N T ON 21 F E B R U A R Y T H A T D R U A L D H C I M HAD D E S P A T C H E D AL E T T E R AMD ANNEXl'RE TO THE H E A D S OF STATE OF- THE F I V E S O - C A L L E D1 ' P R O M T LIf;E '' STATES, THE F I V E H E S T E P. 11 P O W E R S Af.'D ALSO TO N I G E R I AAND S U D A N , IN UlilCH HE I N T E R ALIA E M P H A S I Z E D THAT THE S E T T L E M E N TPROPOSAL C CIST A I TIED NO STIPULATION T H A T SWAPO 3 A S E S OUTSIDE SOUTHV;EST A F R I C A SHOULD BE M O N I T O R E D . A R M E D SWAPO P E R S O N N E L IMSIDESOUTH WEST A F R I C A AT THE TIME OF THE C E A S E F I R E WOULD H O W E V E R BER E S T R I C T E D TO 3ASE WITHIN SOUTH 1,'EST A F R I C A AT SITES TO 3E DESIGNATEDBY MR A H T I S A A R I AND WOULD BE M O N I T O R E D BY UfJ T A G .
If] THE M E A N T I M E IT ALSO C A M E TO OUR NOTICE THAT THE R E P O R T R E L E A S E DBY DR WALDHEI." OH 26 F E B R U A R Y 1979 HAD BEEN P R E C E D E D 3Y FOUR D R A F TREPORTS. T!i^T IN ITSELF IS NOT STRANGE. WHAT IS IMPORTANT, ARETHE CONTENTS OF C E R T A I N P A R A G R A P H S WHICH WERE OMITTED F R O M THEF I N A L REPORT. P A R A G R A P H S 22 TO 24 OF THE FOURTH D R A F T REPORT DETAILSWAPO POIMTS-OF-VIEU ON A N U M B E R OF THE MOST I M P O R T A N T ASPECTSOF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THOSEP A R A G R A P H S WOULD SHOW SWAPO UP IN A V E R Y U N F A V O U R A B L E LIGHT.
W H A T . I S OF IMPORTANCE, IS THAT THE F I N A L R E P O R T IS W O R D E D IN SUCHA M A N N E R THAT Si;APO CAN BE TOLD THAT ITS MOST IMPORTANT C L A I M SCAN RE MET WITHOUT P U B L I C I T Y B E I N G GIVEN TO THEM. ON THEOTHER HAND SOUTH A F R I C A IS BEING TOLD THAT SUAPO'S E X T R A V A G A N TCLAIMS W E R E CERTAHJLY HOT A C C E D E D TO.
WHAT ARE THESE CLAIMS AND POINTS OF VIEW? IN THE FO U R T H D R A F TREPORT, W H I C H HAS MOT I N T E N D E D TO B E C O M E PUBLICLY KNOWN, THEY ARESET OUT AS FOLLOWS :
AS R E G A R D S TROOP C O N F I N E M E N T AND M O N I T O R I N G OF SWAPO B A S E S
''SWAPO WOULD U N D E R T A K E TO S U B J E C T ITS 2 500 G U E R I L L A F O R C E S TO
COIIF INEHEKT TO BASES INSIDE N A M I B I A AND n O N l T O R I N G BY UMTAG.
THF. 2 5QO SWAPO A R M E D F O R C E S WOULD ALL HE C O N F I N E D WITH ALL THEIR
A R M S AF.'D AfhiU!: ITIOM . SWAPO'S G U E R I L L A A R M Y , HEING MODILH, HAD NO
D ~A^s. TNE.-M". F O R E TO.? 7!;r. r'!j::r:..<3:: T;F
-9-
l i i P L E H E N T I N G THE UN PLAN, IT HAD ?, \. E N A G R E E D UPON D U R I N G THE
N E G O T I A T I O N S BETWEEN' SV.'APO AND THE FIVE THAT SPECIFIC BASES '..'OULD
H A V E TO BE I D E N T I F I E D TO W H I C H SWAPO A R M E D F O R C E S WOULD BE
C O N F I N E D . SWAPO WOULD WISH ITS TROOPS TO BE C O N F I N E D TO THE
FOLLOWING A R E A S : W I N D H O E K , OH D A N G W A , K A T I i i A MULILO, TSUME3 AMD
RUf.'DU. SVIAPO WOULD P R O V I D E M I L I T A R Y LIAISON O F F I C E R S If; O R D E R
TO E N S U R E E F F E C T I V E C O O R D I N A T I O N AMD CONSULTATION WITH THE1
M I L I T A R Y C O M P O N E N T OF- UN TAG. 1'
RET U R N OF EXILES
''ALL NAMIBIA};? PRESENTLY L I V I N G OUTSIDE THE C O U N T R Y W O U L D BE
EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HO.",ES OR ANY OTHER PLACE
OF THEIR CHOICE AND NOT TO S P E C I A L 'RECEPTION C E N T R E S ' . THE
U N H C R HAY ASSIST IN P R O V I D I N G T R A N S P O R T A T I O N AND OTHER N E C E S S A R Y
F A C I L I T I E S TO. ENABLE ALL R E T LJ R N E E S TO R E A C H THEIR HOMES.' 1
jAS R E G A R D S THE C E A S E - F I R E \
1 1 IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS BY THE C O M M A N D E R OF THE M I L I T A R Y COMPONENT
OF UNTAG, THE P R E S I D E N T OF SWAPO STATED THAT THE C E A S E - F I R E W H I C H
WAS TO BE D E C L A R E D S I M U L T A N E O U S L Y BY SOUTH A F R I C A AND SWAPO SHOULD
BE C O N S I D E R E D BINDING ONLY ON SOUTH A F R I C A W I T H I N THE T H R E E WEEKS
FOLLOWING ITS DECLARATION AND NOT ON SWAPO, SINCE SWAPO WOULD
E X P E R I E N C E D I F F I C U L T I E S IN T R A N S M I T T I N G P A S S A G E OF I fi FOR MAT I ON
ON THE CEASE-F IP. E TO ALL ITS F R E E D O M F I G H T E R S IN ••JAM I HI A IN TIME.
THE T H R E E W E E K S WOULD BE N E E D E D TO R E - G R O U P THE F I G H T E R S AND TO
M O V E THEM TO R A S E S TO BE E S T A B L I S H E D IN V A R I O U S L O C A T I O N S
W I T H I N N A M I B I A . HE F U R T H E R S T A T E D THAT ONLY A F T E R RE-GR0UPING WOULD
SWAPO BE ABLE TO R E S T R I C T ITS TROOPS T O T A L L I N G ABOUT 2 50Q TO BASES
TO BE E S T A B L I S H E D AT THE F O L L O W I N G A R E A S : W I N D H O E K , K A T I M A MULILO,
O N D A N G W A , TSUMEP. A.ND R U N D U . 1 '
-10-
fi F SWAPO TROOPS
''lilTH R E G A R D TO THE P E A C E F U L R E P A T R I A T I O N OF SWAPO F R E E D O M F I G H T E R S ,
THE P R E S I D E N T OF SWAPO S A I D THAT IT WAS SWAPO'S UN D E R S T A N D I fj G THAT
THEIR F R E E D 0 N F I G H T E R S III (J E I G H 8 0 U R 111G C O U N T R I E S AT THE TIME OF THE
C E A S E F - I R E WOULD R E T U R N TO MA HIS IA WITH ALL THEIR V.'&APOMS, EQUIP-
MENT AND A i i r i U N I T I O N . " T H E Y W O U L D ALSO BRING THE t - i E C E S A R R Y M A T E R I A L
TO ESTABLISH RASES AND WOULD H A V E THE RIGHT TO P R O V I D E ALL
N E C E S S A R Y SUPPLIES FOR THESE NEW HASES, IF N E C E S S A R Y F R O M A B R O A D .
THE PRESIDENT OF SWAPO HADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY E F F O R T TO D I S A R M
THE R E T U R N I N G F R E E D O i l F I G H T E R S WOULD BE F O R C E F U L L Y R E S I S T E D .
THE D E C L A R E D O B J E C T I V E OF S V,1 A P 0 V.1 A S , THAT AS SOUTH A F R I C A I! I T H D R E I,1
ITS F O R C E S F R O M N A M I B I A , SWAPO WOULD R E T U R N ITS F I G H T E R S F R O M
N E I G H B O U R I N G C O U N T R I E S INTO BASES 111 N A M I B I A , TRAIM THEM AND
E V E N T U A L L Y C O N V E R T THEM 'INTO R E G U L A R TROOPS. 1 1
THE D R A S T I C D E P A R T U R E S FROM THE SETTLEMENT PL AM C O N T A I N E D IN THE
C A R E F U L W O R D I N G OF THE FINAL VERSION OF DR W A L D H I E I M ' S
REPORT TAKE Oil A COMPLETELY MEW LIGHT AGAINST THE B A C K G R O U N D OF
SV.'APO'S WHOLE A P P R O A C H AS OUTLINED TO MR A H T I S A A R I . l.'HQ CAN NO!.1
DOUBT THE M E A N I N G OF THE NEW P R O V I S I O N S WHICH
(A) CONTAIN NO A S S U R A N C E OF E F F E C T I V E M O N I T O R I N G OF SWAPO BASES
IN f-.'EIGHGOURING STATES?
(B) GIVE SWAPO THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN BASES It! SOUTH WEST A F R I C A
W H E R E THEY HAD N E V E R P R E V I O U S L Y HAD A BASE AND W H E R E THEY HAD
N E V E R BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A BASE?
THE WORST ASPECT OF THE HATTER IS T H A T THE F I V E 'J E S T E R N P O W E R S
ARE SUPPORT I fIG THESE OBVIOUS AMD P U R P O S E F U L DEV I AT I 0NS>• R E G A R D ING
THEM AS B EING PART OF A R E A S O N A B L E A i J D F A I R SOLUTION. W H E N
R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S OF THE F I V E W E S T E R N P O W E R S W E R E T R Y I N G TO C O N V I N C E
THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S on 24 F E B R U A R Y 1979 THAT THESED E V I A T I O N S W E R E IN F A C T NO D E V I A T I O N S AT ALL, HE I N F O R M E D THEM THATT I - = .',c.'ijT!i :\??-ir?,\i novrn;;;;ri,T HAD L O S T . A L L CC.-NF i D E N C E if; THE A B I L I T YOf Ti iE ;.;E^T 70 H O N O U R ITS U.'-i f> £ R T AK I NG S .
-11-
I WILL [JOT B L A M E T H ?. L f. A D E R S OF SOUTH M E S T A F R I C A IF T HEY W O U L D
WISH TO F U R T H E R N E G O T I A T E WITH THE F I V E . ON THE C 0 i) T R A R Y , IT HAS
A L L A L O H G BEE:; T H E I R I N H E R E N T P.IGIIT T O D E C I D E o ; s T H E I R out; F U T U R E
AND TO NEGOTIATE l.'ITH WHOM THEY WISHED D U R I i J G THE PROCESS.
T H E R E F O R E WE, FROM OUR SIDE, INDICATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO
O B J E C T I O N IF THE CONSTITUENT A S S E M B L Y SHOULD D E C I D E TO H E A R THE
I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF THE W E S T E R N P O W E R S OF THE
LATEST R E P O R T OF THE S E C R E T A R Y GENERAL. Hi OTHER W O R D S WE P U R P O S E L Y
TRIED TO AVOID THE SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T SUBSEQUENTLY BEING
A C C U S E D OF H A V I N G G I V E N A ONE-SIDED ANALYSIS OF D R I! A L D H E I M ' S
R E P O R T TO THE C O N S T I T U E N T ASSEMBLY. WE EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO
SUGGEST TO I N D I V I D U A L M E M B E R S NOT TO INSIST' ON THE R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S
OF THE F I V E A D D R E S S I N G THEM AS A F O R M A L 30DY IN V I E W OF THE K N O W N
POLITICAL R E S E R V A T I O N S O F T H E F I V E I N - T H I S R E G A R D ./
ALTHOUGH WE DC NOT A G R E E WITH THE A T T I T U D E OF THE FIVE R E G A R D I N G
R E C O G N I T I O N OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, WE N E V E R T H E L E S S DID MOT
WANT A TECHNICAL - J U R I D I C A L APPROACH TO STAND If: THE WAY OF
DISCUSSIONS DETWEEH THE F I V E AND M E M B E R S OF THE CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY.
THE SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T HAS T H E R E F O R E NOTED WITH A P P R E C I A T I O N
THE TROUBLE TO WHICH R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S OF THE FIVE H A V E GONE D U R I N G
THE PAST W E E K E N D TO P R O C E E D TO W I N D H O E K IN O R D E R TO I N F O R M THE
L E A D E R S OF THE POLITICAL P A R T I E S D'IRECTLY OF THE ATTITUDES OF T H E I R
G O V E R N M E N T S IN R E G A R D TO THE LAT E S T REPORT OF DR W A L D H E I M AMD TO
A N S W E R QUESTIONS.
I WOULD ALSO M E N T I O N THAT B E F O R E OUR D E P A R T U R E FROM W I N D H O E K iiY
C O L L E A G U E AND I (1ET B R I E F L Y WITH THE L E A D E R S OF THE SWAPO-
DEiiOCRATS AND THE NAMIBIA NATIONAL FRONT TO DISCUSS THE U A L D H E I n
R E P O R T WITH THEii. ON T H E I R P A R T THEY E X P R E S S E D THE HOPE. THAT WE
WOULD C O N T I N U E TO W O R K FOR A P E A C E F U L S E T T L E M E N T . AT THE S A M E
TI:"E H O W E V E R ROTH P A R T I E S C O N V E Y E D T H E I R V I E W P O I N T S ON THE Q U E S T I O N -
OP SWAPO BASES TO US. THESE V I E W S W E R E C O M T A I N E D IN PRESS STATEMENTS
ISSUED ?,Y THE TWO PAR TIE'S B E F O R E WE HAD MET WITH THEIR L E A D E R S .
-12-
BOTH S T A T E M E N T S UILL BE: T A B L E D ADD IT -JILL RE N O T I C E D THAT GOTHTHESE PARTIES ARE OPPOSED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SWAPO RASES INTHE T E R R I T O R Y . IN FACT, THE f-JNF D E C L A R E D THAT SUCH A D E V E L O P M E N T1 'WOULD F U R T H E R M O R E C O N S T I T U T E A F UN D A;', E .'! T A L B R E A C H OF AN EXPLICITLY
AND U N E Q U I V O C A L U N D E R T A K I N G G I V E N TO THE ?!NF GY R E P R E S E N T A T I V E SOF THE FIVE W E S T E R N POWERS ON THE 31 ST M A R C H 1973, TO THE E F F E C T
THAT NO S'JAPO BASES WOULD 3E P E R M I T T E D WITH IM N A M I B I A . 1 1
I
AS YOU HILL i<NOl;, THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY Y E S T E R D A Y A D O P T E D A
MOTION W H I C H WILL ALSO CE TAFiLED. IT UILL RE O B S E R V E D THAT THE
MOTION INTER ALIA FOCUSES A T T E N T I O N UPON S E R I O U S D E V I A T I O N S F R O M
THE S E C R E T A R Y ^NhRAL'S 5C T TLCnr. f• T PL A!;, E S P E C I A L L Y IN R E L A T I O N TO THE
E S T A f J L I S H M E f l T OF SUAPO RASES IM THE T E R R I T O R Y AND THE
R E Q U I R E M E N T THAT SUAPO BASES ACROSS THE BORDER SHOULD ALSO BE
E F F E C T I V E L Y MONITORED.
IT IS THEIR DPI fi ION THAT SHOULD THESE D E V I A T I O N S BE A C C E P T E D ,
THE F A I R N E S S OF THE. PROPOSED ELECTION UILL BE SERIOUSLY A F F E C T E D
AND THE S A F E T Y OF THE I N H A B I T A N T S WILL BE J E O P A R D I S E D .
THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S T R A N S M I T T E D THE REPLY OF THE SOUTH
A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T TO THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L OF THE U MIT E D N A T I O N S
Y E S T E R D A Y . I AH AL SO T A 3L I N'G TH I S .
THIS REPLY DOES MOT SLAM DOORS, EVEN ON THE D I F F I C U L T Q U E S T I O N .
OF THE COMPOSITION OF U N T A G WE H A V E BENT OVER B A C K W A R D S TO BE
ACCOMMODATING,. THIS If; SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IN THE COURSE OF
O U R CONTACTS SOUTH A F R I C A P R O P O S E D S E V E R A L A F R I C A N C O U N T R I E S ,
N O M E OF WHICH WAS A C C E P T E D . IT ALSO S U G G E S T E D S E V E R A L ASIAN, L A T I N
A M E R I C A N AND W E S T E R N E U R O P E A N C O U N T R I E S - ALL OF OUR S U G G E S T I O N S
F A L L I N G WITHIN THE P A T T E R N OF EGUITAE1LE G E O G R A P H I C A L D I S T R I B U T I O N -
A N D Y E T A G A I N N O N E W A S A C C E P T E D .
W H E R E DO WE GO FROM H E R E ? OUR POSITION R E M A I N S U N C H A N G E D . WE STAND
P.Y OUR E X P R E S S U N D E R T A K I N G S . V.1 E STAND 3Y THE S E T T L E M E N T PROPOSAL
W H I C H WE A C C E P T E D Of! 25 A P R I L 1973. WE S T A N D BY OUR U N D E R T A K I N G S
sra?*: 5 ^
-13-*
T.G THE PEOPLE OF SOU Til WEST A F R I C A THAT W E WILL HOT ALLOW A
P O L I T I C A L SOLUTION TO ?! E F O R C E D OK T H E M F R O f i O U T S I D E . HE STAND P,Y
THE P R O V I S I O N S OF THE S E T T L E M E N T P R O P O S A L WHICH C L E A R L Y S T I P U L A T E
THAT SVIAPO PERSONNEL BE R E S T R I C T E D TO THEIR EXISTING BASES AND
THAT SVJAPO'S R E S T R I C T I O N TO THOSE BASES BE ilOf! 1 TC R E D . WE. STAND RY
THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL WHICH C O N T A I N S NO STIPULATION, D I R E C T L Y OR
INDIRECTLY, EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIED, THAT Sl.'APO PE R SO !!N EL WHO HAY,
E I T H E R F O R T U I T O U S L Y OR FOR A SHORT DURATION, DE III -THE T E R R I T O R Y
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ARE ENTITLED SUDDENLY TO CO.'iE F O R W A R D
ON THE DAY OF THE C E A S E - F I R E WITH A C L A I M TO BE A S S I G N E D TO CAMPS
WHICH 'DO NOT EXIST AND If-! SO 'DOING A C H I E V E THE E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF
BASES IN SOUTH WEST A F R I C A THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING
THROUGH F O R C E OF ASHS.
SOUTH A F R I C A HAS, BEFORE TODAY, BEEN LEFT IN THE LURCH CY THE F I V E
W E S T E R N POWERS. T H E R E WAS THE U N D E R T A K I N G '..'MICH 1JE W E R E GIVEN ON
THE QUESTION OF l-JALVIS BAY. D U R I N G OUR N E G O T I A T I O N S WITH THE F I V E
THEY UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO KEEP THE QUESTION OF VJALVIS RAY OUT
OF THE S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL AND D E C L A R E D THAT IF THE QUESTION SHOULD
ARISE, THEY UOULD TAKE THE V I E W THAT IT V!AS A M A T T E R WHICH COULD
3E SETTLED BETWEEN THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH Vi E S T A F R I C A AND THE
SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T AT A LATER STAGE. T H E FIVE OPE N L Y
B R E A C H E D THIS U N D E R T A K I N G WHEN THEY SPONSORED AND V O T E D FOR A
SECURITY COUNCIL R E S O L U T I O N WHICH D E C L A R E D THAT W A L V I S RAY ttUST HE1 ' R E I N T E G R A T E D 1 ' IHTO SOUTH WEST A F R I C A . THE RE S O L U T I O N F U R T H E R
SUPPORTED THE IMITATION OF STEPS N E C E S S A R Y TO E N S U R E E A R L Y
A C H I E V E M E N T OF THE DECISION. • .
A SECOND EXAMPLE OF THE B R E A C H OF AM UNDERSTANDING IS THE WEST'S
SILENCE' W H E N DR W A L D H E I M , W I T H O U T ANY C O N S U L T A T I O N WITH SOUTH
A F R I C A , TO WHI C H HE WAS ROUND, D E C I D E D TO I N C L U D E 7 500 UN TROOPS
IN THF. UN TASK FORCE. THE HIGHEST F I G U R E WHICH HAD REEN
M E N T I O N E D ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST D U R I N G OUR LGF-IG N E G O T I A T I O N S
WITH THEN, WAS 3 000. E V E N THIS F I G U R E VJAS , AT THAT STAGE
(IT WAS AT THE END OF 1977, E A R L Y 1973) .UNACCEPTABLE TO US.
T H E R E F O R E , IT WAS It! GOOD F A I T H AGREF.D THAT THE M U R D E R OF UN TROOPS
'..'AS A H A T T E R W H I C H SHOULD BE S E T T L E D B E T W E E N THE SPECIAL
'": F ?.• r :.: AL ^i'7. I !'. AN? T:!" •"• > '.' 1 '•': L G T T •', "TO F! - G " N G R /• L .
-14-
J.'EITHER SOUTH A F R I C A liOf? T l i E - F I V E (I E 5 T L F: N PO:;£f!S AT ANY TIME
F O R E S A W THAT THE F I G U R E W OULD RE M O R E THAN 5 DOO. THIS HOTWITH-
C T A N D I N G ADD B E C A U S E SO MUCH WAS AT STAKE, SOUTH A F R I C A E V E N T U A L L Y
A C C E P T E D A F I G U R E OF 5 500 TROOPS OF WHICH UP TO OW20 PER CENT
COULD, lit P R A C T I C E , BE Of,1 L E A V E .
A N O T H E R EXAflPLE OF A C A T E G O R I C A L A S S U R A N C E WHICH THE F I V E W E S T E R N
POWERS G A V E TO US WAS THAT THE O R D I N A R Y WEAPONS OF* CITIZEN
FORCE HEflBERS WOULD MOT H A V E TO BE SUP. REiiO E RED . ONLY WE A P O N S
R E Q U I R I N G O P E R A T I O N BY TLJO OR CORE PERSONS, W E R E INVOLVED.
NO',,' WE B E L I E V E THAT THE FIVE, IN A C L A R I F Y I N G M E M O R A N D U M TO
DR UALDHEIH, H A V E -STATED THAT ALL W EAPONS, l.'ITHOUT Q U A L I F I C A T I O N ,
SHOULD RE S U R R E N D E R E D .
THERE ARE OTHEH EXAMPLES. T H E R E IS THE HISTORY OF HOW IT CAT-IE ABOUT
THAT WE A G R E E D TO THE R E D U C T I O N OF OUR TROOPS. INITIALLY WE W E R E
TOLD THAT WE 1-,'QULP BE R E S P O N S I B L E FOR THE S E C U R I T Y OF THE T E R R I T O R Y
UNTIL I N D E P E N D E N C E . FOR THE UN IT UQULD S U F F I C E IF THEY COULD
STATION O F F I C I A L S UITH'OUF! UNITS TO O B S E R V E THAT THE L A T T E R DID
NOT I N T E R F E R E IN THE D O M E S T I C POLITICAL PROCESS, SO THAT THE
O F F I C I A L S WOULD BE IN A POSITION A F T E R . THE E L E C T I O N TO C E R T I F Y THAT
NO INT If! I DAT ION HAD TAKEN PLACE ON THE PART OF SOUTH A F R I C A .
THE F I V E W E S T E R N POUERS, H O W E V E R , ALSO A3AHDOMF.D THIS APPROACH.
IN A C O O P E R A T I V E SPIRIT AND FOR THE SAKE OF A P E A C E F U L SOLUTION,
WE A G A I N M O D I F I E D OUR POSITION AND A G R E E D TO A NEW BASIS FOR
M A I N T A I N I N G SECURITY : WE N E G O T I A T E D A TROOP R E D U C T I O N ON THE
EXPLICIT CONDITION THAT A SITUATION OF TOTAL PEACE WOULD FIRST BE
EST A B L I S H E D IN THE T E R R I T O R Y , THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT PEACE
WOULD O B V I A T E THE N E E D FOR L A R G E F O R C E S .
ALL A L O N G THE ROAD ARE THE W R E C K S OF S H A T T E R E D E X P E C T A T I O N S ,
WHICH WE IN GOOD F A I T H N U R T U R E D IN THE BELIEF THAT THE WEST WOULD
STAND DY THEIR U N D E R T A K I N G S .
THE LATEST B R E A C H OF AN U N D E R T A K I N G WAS NOT ONLY "THE LAST S T R A W .
IT WAS H U C I I .MORE. IT TOUCHES THE C O R N E R - S T O N E OF THE MOST
I M P O R T A N T ASPECT OF THE S E T T L E M E t i T PROPOSAL N A M E L Y THAT P E A C E MUST
;T -:L!^T ^E v i r. I.^LE . IT T O U C H E S T!;1: o r: •:. p F. r T F A C T O R
-15-
• i.J.ITltOlJT U H I C H S U C C E S S F U L I [1 P L £ u E N T A T I 0 M 'IS HOT POSSIHLE N A M E L Y
• C O N F I D E N C E IN E A C H O T H E R ' S f l O T I V E S , THE E L E M E N T OF GOOP F A I T H AND
M U T U A L TRUST.
EVEN NOW SOUTH A F R I C A STANDS 3Y ITS U N D E R T A K I N G . WE I MS 1ST ON
THE EXECUTION OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AS PRESENTED TO US AND
A C C E P T E D 3Y US. IF THERE ARE OTHERS WHO D E V I A T E F R O M IT, THEY
r-UST B E A R THE C 0 N S E Q UE [•• C E S . SOUTH A F R I C A , FOR THE .SAKE OF THE
W E L F A R E AMD MUTUAL TRUST OF ALL M A T~10 U S OF SOUTHERN A F R I C A ,
R E F U S E S TO B E C O M E A P A R T Y TO ANY C O V E R T A R R A i i G E f i E N T '..'HEREBY THE
F R E E L Y E X P R E S S E D UISHES OF A N E I G H B O U R I N G N A T I O N ARE SuGTHEREu.
IT; THE FINAL INSTANCE V.'E THUS ALSO STAiiD EY THE UISHES OF THE
PEOPLE OF SOUTH WEST A F R I C A .
14 MaWrch 1979
TO: The Secretary-General,
1. Attached is a revision of the suggested composition of
the military component of UNTAG. You will see that we have
tried to reorganize the logistics side to take in more African
or non-NATO countries, only Tunisia has so far responded.
2. While this meets to some extent the wishes expressed by
the OAU and Front Line summit, there is a danger that South
Africa will see these changes as another example of bending
over backwards to meet the wishes of SWAPO. It might be
wise, therefore, if the Security Council took a large part
of the responsibility for the final decision.
3. Canada is not included in this list, not only because
it is a NATO country but also because so far there is no firm
offer from Canada.
Brian Urquhart
SUGGESTED COMPOSITION OF FORCE
1. infantry Battalion
a. Africa; Ghana (acceptable to parties)
Second AfricanUnit from one of: Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco or possibly
Senegal (to be cleared with Secco andparties)
b. Western Europe; Finland (acceptable)
c. Eastern Europe; Yugoslavia (to be finally cleared withSecco and parties)
d. Asia; Bangladesh (acceptable)
India (to be cleared with Secco andparties)
e. latin America; Panama (acceptable)
2. Logistic Units
a. Transport company - 4oo )
b. Movement Control - 3o * Sweden (acceptable)
c. postal unit - lo )
d. Administrative Company- 12O - Denmark (acceptable)
e. Engineer Company - 33O - Australia (Secco notified)might be replaced by Egypt(no reply yet) or some otherAfrican country or Romania(no reply yet)
f. Maintenance Company - Civilian - 30O) Tunisia (Secco and
g. supply cc any - - 14O> %££*" *° -
h. Signal Unit - 12O India ''' N* \ ^ j
i. Medical Company - 22O Switzerland (requestedbut no response yet)
j. Air unit - 450 To be civilianized
2.
3. Status of Other Requests
a. Nigeria - supply company and Maintenance company -no reply received yet.
b. India - Supply company - declined. Signal Unit -awaiting reply. ~ ~
c. Romania - Engineer company - to reply after meetingSWAPO.
d. Holland - Medical company - declined.
e. Egypt - Engineer, Signal, Supply and MaintenanceUnits - no reply yet.
tr ^
f. Algeria - Supply company - awaiting reply.
g. Switzerland - Medical Unit - awaiting reply.e-
(we are informed that it would be wise, if possible, notto have FRG.)
Sir,
Mr. Ahtisaari has brou%hjk_.J:he attachedpaper on the civilians/component of
UNTAG and suggests (jfhat you read itbe fore the SecurjUzy Cauncil consul-
tations. He would also like to see?tjJaamaMst3= ~.j.-JHjrv—
you for a couple of minutes before
you go down.
/h
12 March
CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF UNTAG
As indicated in my report of 29 August 1978
(document S/12827), adopted by Security Council resolu-
tion 435 (1978), the ciyil an component of UNTAG will
consist of two elements. One will be the civil police
whose function will be to assist my Special
Representative in implementing the tasks set out in the
proposal for a settlement (S/12636).
It has been estimated that approximately 360
experienced police officers will be required for the
monitoring functions summarised in the proposal. It is
my hope that police officers will be made available on a
secondment basis, bearing in mind the accepted principle
of equitable geographical representation, as well as the
language and other requirements of the assignment. On
the basis of approaches which I have made to Governments,
on a provisional basis, I can inform the Council that it
seems likely that the estimated number of appropriately
qualified police monitors can be made available to UNTAG.
The countries which have indicated the likely
availability of such police monitors are j/ustria, Barbados,
Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Jamaica, Netherlands, Sudan and
Sweden. Several other Governments which I had approached
were unable to make police available for UNTAG. One
Government is still considering my request. As I stated
in my report of 29 August 1978, one factor to which I
had to give especial consideration was that of language.
The official languages in Namibia are Afrikaans, German
and English.
The non-police element of the civilian component of
UNTAG will have a variety of duties as set out in
document S/12827. Its deployment will proceed by
phases, based on the successive stages of the tasks to
be performed. The first phase of deployment will
commence on the date of emplacement of UNTAG. 'The staff
required for this phase will establish the headquarters
of UNTAG and its centres and sub-centres in different
parts of the Territory. For this phase approximately 170
professional officers, llo general service and 100
field service staff will be required. The second phase
of civilian deployment will commence with the beginning
of the official electoral campaign which is scheduled
approximately 13 weeks after the emplacement of UNTAG.
For this phase approximately a further 200 professional
ofjficers will be required to augment the staff at the
various UNTAG centres. Their functions will be to
assist in monitoring the electoral process throughout the
Territory.
I regard it as being especially important that
staff selected for the first phase should in almost all
cases come from within the United Nations system. I
hope that as many of the second wave staff as possible
will also come from within the United Nations family of
organisations.
During the actual period of the elections a third
phase of civilian deployment will take place. This will
consist of a further 6OO professional officers. Such
persons will remain in the Territory for an approximate
period of four weeks encompassing the time of the
election itself, which is scheduled to be held seven
months after the emplacement of UNTAG. This final group
will, I hope, be seconded by Governments to supervise and
control the process of polling, tabulation and publica-
tion of voting results. In seeking the civilian
contingents for this part of the operation I shall bear
in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical
representation, as well as the language and other require-
ments of the situation.
3.
I should also like to refer to the electoral
process itself. As is made clear in the proposal for a
settlement (S/12636), adopted in resolution 435 (1978),
the elections to a Constituent Assembly will be under
the supervision and control of the United Nations in
that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral
process, the elections themselves, and the certification
of their results, my Special Representative will have to
satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and
appropriateness of all measures affecting the political
process at all levels of administration before such
measures take effect. Moreover, my Special Representative
may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of
the political process. He will report to me, keeping me
informed and making such recommendations as he considers
necessary with respect to the dischargee of his
responsibilities. I, in accordance with the mandate
entrusted to me by the Security Council, will keep the
Council informed. The official electoral campaign will
commence only after my Special Representative has
satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness
of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the
electoral process, including the proper registration of
voters and the proper and timely tabulation and
publication of voting results will also have to be con-
ducted to the satisfaction of my Special Representative.
THE FORTHCOMING PROXIMITY TALKS
It is becoming evident that the Western Five are vorking on the following
scenario for the forthcoming "Proximity talks."
i
I. The Meetings
They would like the following procudure:*j
(l) Western Five with Secretary-General. / &
(2) Western Five with "African Six" (i.e. Frontline States and Nigeria).
(3) Simultaneously :-
(a) Western Five with F.M. Botha
(b) African Six with SWAPO
(k) Western Five with SWAPO
(5) Western Five with Secretary-General.
II. What is needed
They would like to have:-
(a) I Commitment from SWAPO that her troops in Angola and Zambia will be
I confined to base and monitored by those countries.
(b) A statement from both Angola and Zambia that they will see to it
that the ceasefire is scrupulously enforced.
(c) A statement from Angola and Zambia saying hov they will reinforce the
ceasefire and the prevention of infiltrations by SWAPO within their own
borders .
III. The Issues for Discussions
(l) SWAPO bases inside Namibia - The Five do not see how they can persuadei
SWAPO to drop the whole idea. They might try to do so through the
"African Six".
^
^
- 2 -
If they fail, they might ask South Africa to choose a location where
SWAPO armed personnel vill be "confined".
i(2) Composition of Troops - They feel that South Africa vill never accept
Nigeria. They might try to ask Nigeria not to press the issue or even
ask the Secretary-General to talk to General Obassanjo about it.
(This issue - of composition - should probably be discussed at
the end of the talks, they feel.)
(3) Date of Ceasefire/Emplacement - They feel that F.M. Botha will not be in
a position to say anything about the date at this time. He will argue
that he needs to go back to consult with the "leaders" of the Territory.
(The "Constituent Assembly" is due to meet on April 2, 1979.)
They would nevertheless want to propose a date for the ceasefire and
emplacement. The date has not been agreed upon within their own group.
U N I T E D N A T I O N SDistr.
S E C U R I T Y < GENERAL
COUNCILa«J \-S *e> I N V»o 3 *• _
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1979 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TOTHE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA
I have received your letter of 15 March 1979 (see S/13172). I regret to notethat in spite of my letter of 8 March 1979 (S/13156), you still maintain theposition expressed in your statement of 6 March to the South African Parliament(see S/131 8).
As regards your questions concerning the Proposal adopted by the SecurityCouncil (S/12636), I wish to reply as follows:
1. I think there is no question that the Proposal does provide for therestriction to base of all forces of the parties. Indeed you will find that thispoint was also made explicitly in paragraphs 11 and 12 of my recent report(S/13120).
2. As regards your second question it is quite clear that UNTAG will monitorthe restriction to base of all forces within Namibia. The question that has arisenconcerns forces outside Namibia where the Proposal makes no specific provision formonitoring by UNTAG. This is, I understand, the position of the five WesternPowers who negotiated the Proposal.
3- I believe your third question refers to paragraph 11 of my above-mentionedreport. I wish to assure you once again that the relevant sentence of thisparagraph concerning ''any SWAPO armed forces in Namibia at the time of thecease-fire" referred precisely to such forces and was designed exclusively to solvethe practical problem that might be created by the presence of any such forces. Itake it from the numerous reports I have received from your Government of armedSWAPO activity within Namibia, that you agree that there may be some such forcespresent in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire.
It. As regards your question h, I can only refer you to paragraphs ih and 17of my recent report which gave, I believe3 a reasonable proposal for a workablecease-fire arrangement.
5. I believe that the answer to your fifth question is set out insubparagraphs B and C of paragraph 7 of the original Proposal (S/12636).
6. The normal process of consultation concerning United Nations militaryforces has been explained on numerous occasions to your representatives and has been
79-067 2
U N I T E D N A T I O N S^^
S C r \ \ D I T V (1 33 1 GENERALC v- U K I I T wmS^n^
C /~\ i i bk. i /•- i i WSoocD il' 3/13172O U N L I L ^^±^^ 15 March 1979
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1979 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THEPERMANENT MISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
At the request of the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, theHonourable R. F. Botha, I attach the reply dated 15 March 1979 from the SouthAfrican Prime Minister, the Honourable P. ¥. Botha, to Your Excellency's letter of8 March 1979 (S/13156).
I would appreciate it if this letter and its annexure could be circulated asa document of the Security Council.
^
(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEENCharge d'Affaires
79-06737
Memo for the File
To : The Secretary-General
From: William B. Buf fum
Date: 19 March 1979/ v
Secretary Vance telephoned me March 19th and asked that I conveyto you the results of his breakfast meeting this morning with ForeignMinister Botha of South Africa. The two of them discussed the Namibiannegotiations for an hour but Botha is postponing his meeting with theFive until this afternoon because of Security Council meetings thismorning (Botha will not attend the meeting personally but will senda letter outlining South Africa's position).
When Botha meets with you later today you may anticipate he willbe taking the following positions:
1. The composition of UHTAG can still be regarded as an openquestion; Botha definitely does not consider this is"~a~~closedmatter.
2. Regarding SWAPO bases in Namibia, Botha continues to maintainthat there should be no SWAPO bases inside the country whatsoever
_ "—i " • . •~"""»iiiiinim»hiini-ii i-niS Sii"irm-if ••*•»-• •JJglyga''KJia*a'"-l;f''M'JI"r''tJ'J - •TC***~':~'ff'~fa*TJ~-- •'- .i-*uj,-4,,«ir* i."Kv>v«-j3!''--'M""' ''*- '••*••' lv *r-*»»r,<n-'a&M»Jjmii-jM.-i*"
under the proposaZsancThe will continue to insist on thisposition.
3. Regarding external bases, Botha argues that the proposals providea basis for UNTAG joining with the governments of the neighbouringstates in monitoring the agreement. Secretary Vance told Botha heconsiders there is no possibility of getting such an arrangementand recommended that South Africa drop the idea. In lieu of sucharrangements Vance suggesteda) that the neighbouring states be encouraged to flesh out their
commitment regarding the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire;
b) Vance also suggested that there could be improved bordersurveillance following the example set in the SinaTTTor"
•»*wiw*«i .«v«a-s'Hsnj<' ••->-...,.f.t
instance by using black boxes .
Botha reiterated his earlier charges that there had beenduplicity in pursuing the original proposals of the Five. Vancedenied this and told Botha it is a waste of time to pursue suchallegations. Vance argued further that South Africa should inany event forget about the past and concentrate on the presentpossibility for a peaceful settlement which they would otherwiserisk losing forever.
LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1979 FROM THE PRESIDENT \OF SWAPOADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL/ J1—''
Your Excellency,
In accordance with, established principle of geographical representationregarding tr005-0ontributing countries to UUTAG, SWAFO would like to makeadjustments and concessions to its recommendations submitted to the UNSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General, on February 10, 1979 inLuanda, as follows:
Africa: Ghana
Asia: Bangladesh
Western Europe: Finland
Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia
Latin America: Panama
With regard to the other two infantry battalions to be added, afterconsultations, we propose Nigeria from Africa and Jamaica from Latin America.In addition, SWAPO wishes to suggest that the 200 monitors required, as wellas a deputy military commander of UHTAG, be drawn from the proposed Higeriancontribution.
Concerning logistic units, SWAPO proposes:
an engineering company
a medical company
a supply unit
a signal unit
SWAPO is in agreement with Your Excellency in respect of the tasksenvisaged for Sweden and Denmark.
I will submit to Your Excellency, in due course, our proposals withregard to air-force and maintenance units.
It remains our understanding that /o ily'those SJHAPO armed__fgcc.ejLji.nsideat the time of the cease-fire *vu?£L be~ confined and monitored bjt--
UNTAXTwith their arms and ammunition. L/ ( /
SWAPO strongly feels that it should be consulted regularly on allrelevant issues concerning the entry into force of the cease-fire and theemplacement of UNTAG.
In this regard, SWAPO is still awaiting the letter on the cease-fire,as indicated in paragraph 18 of document S/13120 of 26 February 1979. Weshall, accordingly, send our reply. Suffice it to say here that SWAPO1sviews on cease-fire are well-known and were reiterated only recently inLuanda on 10 February 1979-
- 2 -
Until and unless the outstanding issiies mentioned above are resolvedsatisfactorily, SWAPO will find it difficult to co-operate in the proposedimmediate commencement of the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia.
In conclusion, I wish to request Your Excellency to circulate thisletter to the members of the Security Council for their information.
Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Yours sincerely,
Signed: Sam NujomaPresident of SWAPO
TO:A:
THROUGH:S/C DE:
U N I T E D N A T I O N S
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
JThe Seeretaryf General
N A T I O N S U N I E S
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR
DATE: 6 March 1979
REFERENCE: 1 t 2OPIU
FROM: Ellen Lukas's Office, ERD, DPIDE:
PT: s- African response to Secretary-General's ceasefire proposals
URG E MT ,(VM : /" AV T7"1 r~ « 1 ' / j t rW ____ I,. / _ /', J. _ -. '••• e I-* __£"_-_ J
1" T ] ! T pnn /vrr-royr i A pp n*--* ** - • ' . ' ' • - • — — • t— i • • . ' -
" TT T rv
FEU
L' r-'IES CAF p ) - LF - - FP I f £ If' A.FA-IT ? A V O I R ? v T ARD I A'_' S E C R E T A I R " HE N E P A L DF. . .L ' P ^ U ^L" IL A C C r n T * T T S_ADROPO ,CTT 10 ^ D '! 'M C^7SF'F7 L17 FE!1 F M f • ' A v I P f F CF f~5 "~^D "? .^ 0 i- tpnp^ ^
" QQ MP TT TO ?' P'!Tr ~L"A. cr,i p A r f r p T ' MT T C[ T C L"'"1
D ' U0.?T IL ITE A CFTTE [~-"Fr/E [MTF.,,' F.T LF. F.M C j KURT= = CETTE R E P O M S E DE L " A F P I ? n E DIJ Snn / \ LA p P O D n r i T I O " °"F h ' .UALD. ' iE l " A V A I T r A I T E LE 2^ FE"PIER L'.'I A FTE ADnE'7?!" "Anr I P.-^F1 LTw j n i P T F E DES A F F A I P E S E T P A N G E R E S D ' A F P . I ^ f ' E D ' . ' ^'T1
s " . "IK P . O T ' J A ,DA"S L"''E LETTPE PEM!9E PAP r /! . A D R I A A N E X S T E E M , C"AD";I D ' A F F A T P C C DL ' A F R I C U E D U SLID A L ' O N U .»ATI0 1 T !.'!'IES C ' .V . ) V3 C A F P ) - T O P T E F O I S . " . 3 0 T M A R ' l JFTTZ D A ' ! C
SA R E P O - ' S E D E U X DEE 1 FF .OPOriT 10 i-'f.' F r E C I S E ^ F^ ITF? PA^ ^« "ALC ' ? F I M"
POUR LA ^'ISE EH OEUVRE DU P L A M E'-L L 'O'! ' ! *-' D"
D r i r Tor !A V TM A E ^ I B I E A L " I ' 'P ZPZ ''D A ?!CE ^N D E C L ' 7 ' A - M T -^I 'F rFLL'?r '-CO "FORTES At' P L A T 1 O C C I D E N T A L A C C E P T E £ L ' O R T . I 'T PSUR LEMUEL LE PL A?' DE L ' O M U EST 3 ASF .
(GROL 'FE D ' A S S I S T A N C E DE L ' b l i M POl'P LA P E R I O D " DZ TZ A"S IT 10 ;','COMPOSE DE CASCL 'ES E L E i ' S ET DE C O V T R . C L Z ' ' P S ri ' . / iLD C O N T R O L " L ' r
CATTO^'E^E-T DES EASES " I L I T A I R F S DE LA S'/ 'AFO D A ; ' r LZS y-A^V O I S I i ' S , ET S 'OPPOSE A LA C R E A T I O N DZ "ASES .? L * ™TER T E t ' P D!'T E R R I T O I R E P O U R LZ P E R S O N N E L AR^E DE LA S v ' A P C c LZ PL A!" V A L P X E I ' 1 'P R O P O S A I T O U E L E S CL'ERR I L L E P O C D Z L A S ' / 'APO S Z T R n r ' V ' A f ' T E N S 'A V I ' " ' IES O I Z f ' T R E G R O H F E S ET C A ' ' ! T O M f ] E S D A N ' S DES "ASZS S"P LE T Z R P I T ^ I P E .
LE [" I BISTRE S U D - A F R I C A IN , R E P R E M A M T LES AR^'J^I^'TS DE
CLAUSE P E R T ' E T T R A I T A DES G U E R R I L L E P ; OS D Z ? L A S V ' A P O "!.!IS ' I V F I L T R E P A I Z " T D A " ? LE T E R R I T O I P E , 01 T "UI v A t T A l Z P T P Z ' Z T R E Zr !VUE D ' O P E R A T I O N S DF S A D O T A S Z , D" PEVZLZ r : LZl 'P P R E S E N C E A" J O f ' P DMCESSEZ-LE Hi!' F O I ' R SZ V O I P FOUR "IIP: D A M S LZ T Z r ^ I T O I R r D17:0 ?ASZSQ U ' I L S ! ! ' A V A I E M T PAS P ' ! E T A P L I R A M P A P M.'iV'T P«^- ^^^ OP":" A T I o ' i " ^M I L I T A I R E S . ~ - - . -
^. P.OTHA P-'SIS'TE PAP AILLZt . 'RS PO"R PUZ LZ C A N A D A SO IT I f !CLl T SPAR!1* I LES D E U X P A Y S i^L'I " * O M T PAS E M C O R Z ZTZ DZ^110 ' -"Z0 nOl !P L. ?
F O M R I ' I T U R E DE C ^ S ^ l ' Z ^ P L Z U S D Z S T I M Z 1 ^ ,^ °~TT r O P F P f T T O ' ' r''' M A-1V!Ir IE,AWT/JMQ
AFP C617 1 0
continued from earlier bulletin (9:4Oam) —
MR BOTHA RELEASED THE TEXT OF HIS G O V E R N M E N T S REPLY TOMR WALDHEIM S PROPOSALS, IK EFFECT R E J E C T I N G THEM AND S A Y I N GTHAT THIS ALSO WAS THE POSITION OF LOCAL P O L I T I C A L L^AD^RS INSOUTHWEST AFRICA.
THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN W I N D H O E K , tLECTED LAST DECEMBERIN A POLL DEEMED MULL AMD VOID BY THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S , HASSAID THAT UJLESS THE O R I G I N A L U. N. SETTLE ME
MR BOTHAB R I T A I N , THEWEST G E R M A N YFOR THE FIRS
AMBASSADORS OF B R I T A I N , THE UNITED STATES AND WESTGERMANY FLEW TO WI D OEK FROM CAPi TOWN FOR WEEKEND T A L K SAIMED AT P E R S U A D I N G LOCAL PARTIES TO ACCEPT THt W A L D H E I MPROPOSALS. BUT THEY FAILED.
WESTERN D I P L O M A T I C SOURCES SAID I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF TH^U.N. PLAN — I N V O L V I N G UP TO 7,500 TROOPS AND 1,000 OFFICIALS —MIGHT HAVE TO Bb. DELAYED BEYOND THE T A R G E T DATE OF M A R C H 15.
ACCUSED THE F I V E - N A T I O N W E S T E R N C O N T A C T G R O U PU N I T E D SATES, FRANCci , C A N A D A A N D
OF L E A V I N G SOUTH A F R I C A IN TH^ LURCH - - AND NOTTIME.
"ALL ALONG THK R O A D (OF N E G O T I A T I O N S ) ARE THi W R E C K SOF SHATTERED E X P E C T A T I O N S W H I C H WE N U R T U R E D IS GOOD F A I T H I«J THEBELIEF THAT THE WEST WOULD STAND BY T H E I R U D E R T A K I N G S .THERL HAS BEEN S OCKING SCHEMING B E H I N D THi SCENES," HE SAID.
IN SPITE OF THIS, SOUTH A F R I C A STOOD BY ITS UNDERTAKINGS."WE INSIST ON THE IMPLEMENT AT IT N OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN ASPRESENTED TO US AMD ACCEPTED BY US.
"WL STAND BY OUR U W D E R T A K I G TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH WcSTAFRICA THAT WE WILL NOT ALLOW A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO B^ FORCEHON THEM FROM OUTSIDE."
MR BOTHA SAID SWAPO S I N T E N T I O N TO SET UP BASES IN THET E R R I T O R Y AFTER T»
A DRAFT ON W H I C H MR W A L D H E I M S F E B R U A R Y 26 REPORT TO THE SECURITYCOUNCIL - - C O N T A I N I N G THt. C O N T R O V E R S I A L CEflStFIRl ' PROPOALS - -WAS BASED.
THE PRIME M I N I S T E R SAID THESE PARMRABHS^ O M I T T E D FR QMTHE F I N A L REPORT, QUOTEDLsj^APO^PRL'SlPrNT SAM MUJQMft AS T I L L I N G THEU.N^_T_HAT TH'i. C-EASKFIRh. SHOULD BE COWSTHFRm RTjJD.T'BftSOUTH AFRICA"
SASKFIR^ SHOULD BE_C_ONS,FOR THE FIRSTTHREii WE£.KS.
TTrrS~T70~ULD ENABL* SWAPO^TO I N F O R M ITS FORCES IN THLTERRITORY OF THE CEASEFIRE AND TO "Rn-GROUP THE F I G H T E R S ANDMOVE THEM TO BASES TO Be. E S T A B L I S ED IN V A R I O U S L O C A T I O N S W I T H I N
AFTER T H I S Rt-GROUPIJJfi-WHWl SWAPO Bt ABLr. TO R E S T R I C TITS TROOPS, T O T A L L I N G ABOUT/2,500JJ&h, TO BASES W H I C H SHOULDBE ESTABLISHED AT gJVE_1^^^»--»ttflf1TnTMB W I N D H O E K , THE C A P I T A L ,MR BOTHA QUOTED THE DRAFT AS SHYING.
SWAPO ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT ITS FORCES IN N E I G H B O U R I N GCOUNTRIES AT THE TIME OF CEASEFIRE WOULD R E T U R N TO THL T E R R I T O R YWITH ALL THEIR WEAPONS AMD EQUIPMENT AND NECESSARY M A T E R I A LTO ESABLISH BASES.MORE PM PFS AS
UU LFD VGA EWA UKP HAG CAW CCC1629:T£RRITORY-LtAD BASES 6 CAP.- T O W N :
"THE PRESIDENT OF SWAPO MADE IT CLEAR T H A T ANYEFFORT TO D I S A R M THE R E T U R N I N G FREEDOM F I G H T E R S WOULD B£FORCEFULLY RESISTED . . . .AS SOUTH A F R I C A W I T H D R E W ITS FORC.-.SFROM N A M I B I A , SWAPO WOULD R E T U R N ITS F I G H T E R S FROM N E I G H B O U R I N GCOUNTRIES I N T O BASES I N N A M I B I A , T R A I N T H - M A N D E V E N T U A L L YCONVERT THEM I N T O R E G U L A R TROOPS," SAID MR BOTHA.
THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IN 1.TBHT_QF T H T SOR SWJVPO J SDRfi-ST/C DEPARTURES FROM TH^ O R I G I N A L PLAJLJLJ1 ORDER lp_ACCeWMODATc. SWAPQ WITHOUT SPFr.TfTTP.f l l T.Y S f l V T W B SQ-
"THE F I N A L REPORT IS WORDED IN SUCH A M A N N E R T H A T S W A P OCAN BE TOLD THAT ITS MOSTIMPORTANT C L A I M S CAN BE MET W I T H O U TPUBLICITY B E I N G GIVc-N TO THEM. ON THE OTHER H A N D , SOUTH A F R I C AIS B E I N G TOLD T H A T SWAPO S E X T R A V A G A N T C L A I M S W E R E C E R T A I N L YWOT ACCEDED TO ," MR BOTH SAID. ,,
THE PRIME M I N I S T E R DID NOT DISCLOSE HOW THE C O N F I D E N T I A L 1U.N. DRAFT CAME INTO THE G O V E R N M E N T S POSSESSION. jREUTER PM PFS AS
Note for the file 5 March 1979
Mr. El Tawil phoned me on Saturday evening and informed me
of the following message from Mr. Farah:
Mr. ITujoma did not return to Nairobi on Friday. He will not be
going to Luanda, instead he has asked his Vice-President to go to
Luanda. Mr. Hujoma himself will travel on Sunday or Monday to
Lusaka and travel from there to Lagos. The Commissioner for
Foreign Affairs of Nigeria confirmed this information to Mr. Farah.
The Commissioner also told that he could not find anything wrong
in the Secretary-General's report. He supported SWAPO's view that
UNTAG could not monitor SWAPO (this must mean monitoring of SWAPO
bases in neighbouring countries which, by the way, is not part of
the Secretary-General's proposal anyway). With regard to composition
the Commissioner repeated his Government's interest to provide an
engineering unit and a signals unit. The Secretary-General of the
OAU will be sending very soon a list of the countries who are
willing and able to contribute to UHTAG. Mr. Farah further reported
that Secretary-General's report has received a rather favourable
reception. There have been no adverse comments except one or two
remarks made by Mr. Wujoma.
On the•Tanzania/Uganda issue, no progress was made, the
matter was referred back to the OAU Extraordinary Meeting of the
Heads of State of the Liberation Committee. Mr. Farah further
informed that he would be staying in Lagos up to midnight Monday.
PERMANENT SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
3QO EAST 4ZVP STREET
NEW YORK, N. Tl IOOI7
5 March 1979
Excellency,
At the request of the South African Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the Honourable R F Botha, I am enclosing the
text of a letter he has addressed to Your Excellency on
5 March 1979.
Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.
J ADRIAAN EKSTEENCharge d' Affaires
H E Mr Kurt WaldheimSecretary-General of theUnited NationsNEW YORK N Y 10017
LETTER DATED 5 MARCH 1979 FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Shortly after receipt of Your Excellency's Report (S/1312O)
on 26 February 1979 the South African Government conveyed
its contents to, and discussed it with, the political parties
in the territory committed to a peaceful solution.
As you know, it has consistently been the policy of the South
African Government to consult fully with the people of South
West Africa. Their interests are at stake. They must decide
on their future. This procedure was followed on all occasions
when serious issues arose in connection with the negotiations
and consultations. For example: in April 197& before accepting
the Western Proposal in its final and definitive form, and also
in December 1978 before informing Your Excellency of the South
African Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious
implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).
Leaders of the various political parties also held meetings over
the past weekend with representatives of the five Western Powers
involved in the negotiations. These political parties have made
their position clear to the South African Government indicating
how in their opinion the whole envisaged process is being in-
fluenced by the introduction of new elements in document S/13120,
The leaders of the people of South West Africa, as represented
in the Constituent Assembly, formulated their position in a
motion adopted today by the Constituent Assembly. I attach a
copy../2
— 2 —
copy.
They emphasized the serious deviations in Your Excellency's
report of 26 February 1979 as compared with the settlement
plan (S/12636) relating, inter alia, to the establishment
of SWAPO bases in the Territory and the monitoring of SWAPO
bases in neighbouring countries. They expressed the belief
that should these deviations be accepted, the fairness of the
envisaged election \vould be affected seriously and the safety
of the inhabitants jeopardized.
In a statement issued on 1 March 1979 the Executive of the
NNF stated, inter alia, that the establishment of an armed
SWAPO force within South West Africa would constitute a funda-
mental breach of an explicit and unequivocal undertaking given
to the NNF by representatives of the five Western Powers on 31
March 1978, to the effect that no SWAPO bases would be per-
mitted within South West Africa.
SWAPO (D) has also indicated that it is not prepared to accept
an arrangement allowing only one of the parties participating
in the election to have an armed force restricted to bases in
the Territory.
Before receipt of Your Excellency's Report (S/13120), I indicated
in my letter to you on 2O February 1979 (S/13105), that in the
view of the South African Government there were no outstanding
issues of such a nature as to prevent the commencement of the
implementation of the settlement plan. I could foresee no impedi-
ment to the conclusion of the status agreement. It would have
been more satisfactory and also more practicable if our latest
suggestion in regard to jurisdiction had been accepted. The
South African Government did not and does not wish to make this
an obstacle to the implementation of the settlement plan. I am
convinced that the status agreement could now be formally com-
pleted.
The /
- 3 -
The question of composition likewise could be solved without
undue difficulty, bearing in mind the reasonable and flexible
attitude that had been adopted by the South African Government.
In view of the most recent developments in regard to composition,
I feel that I should once again record South Africa's position
on this matter. Over many months of negotiations with the five
Western Powers and later with you yourself, South Africa has been1 assured that its views on composition would be taken into account
fully provided only the principle of equitable geographical dis-
tribution would be observed.
We were also informed that the practice of consultation on com-
position was based on long-standing UN precedence, recognising
the views of the host country. It was emphasized that practi-
calities and the importance of ensuring the co-operation of the
receiving country ruled out the emplacement of specific contin-
gents without its agreement. To avoid any future misunderstand-
ing the South African Government wishes to reiterate our. inti-f.
I mations that it would not be willing to accept countries which
I had in the past identified themselves too closely and actively
I with the aims and activities of SWAPO. Such forces could not
/ be expected to act with absolute impartiality.
Your Excellency will recall that in our recent contacts with
You and your personnel on the question of composition, we lent
over backwards to be accommodating.
In the course of our contacts South Africa proposed several
African countries, none of which was accepted. It also suggested
several Asian, Latin American and Western Europe.an countries -
all of our suggestions falling within the pattern of equitable
geographical distribution - and yet again none was accepted.
In spite of all this, the South African Government as a token of
our ..
our desire to be accommodative, would still be prepared to
consider the UNTAG composition announced by you on 1 March
1979? on the understanding that
(a) the settlement proposal in its final and definitive
v form is not
(b) the composition as announced by Your Excellency, un-
favourable as it is from the South West African and
South African point of view, is not altered to the
further detriment of the South West African parties
committed to a peaceful solution; and
(c) South Africa can reasonably accept the two further
countries to be added to the list.
In regard to the "two further countries", it is significant that
the list of countries to provide infantry forces announced by you
on 1 March 1979 > omits Canada, a country included in the original
working model and accepted by South Africa. Is this because Ca-
nada is a member of NATO, SWAPO having in the meantime made clear
its attitude as far as NATO countries are concerned? If this is
the case, how can South Africa be expected to accept a member of
the Warsaw Pact countries?
As you know, the South African Government has consistently indi-
cated that "the moment SWAPO undertakes to stop violence and in
fact carries out its undertaking, action against SWAPO by the
South African Forces would cease" (S/12854 ). On that basis, I
can confirm that South Africa is in agreement with Your Excellency's
proposal that at OOOOhours on 15 March 1979 a comprehensive cessa-
tion of all hostile acts should take effect. This naturally implies
that Your Excellen "y~Wo"tlT'd"T "t me know in good time whether in
fact SWAPO has also accepted the cease-fire proposal.
The ../5
The position of the South African Government on implementation
of the settlement proposal remains unaltered. The proposal was
accepted by my Government in its final and definitive form. If
there are others who deviate from it, they must bear the con-
sequences. My Government stands by the proposal which means:
(a) SWAPO armed personnel, like the South African*"3H .-,-',-.. 7 E-... .1-. K, -tt
forces, are to be restricted to existing bases.**!**<hii*«iwi»uw<a rj»;isw ^
The restriction to base is to be monitored by
UNTAG as is unambiguously provided for in the
proposal and confirmed in Your Excellency's
reply to me dated 1 January 1979- (S/13002).
This was also made clear to you in my letter
of 20 February 1979 (S/13105).
(b) SWAPO would have no right to create bases or be'
designated bases in South West Africa. The settle-
ment proposal contains no provision directly or
indirectly, expressly or implied that SWAPO forces
who may accidentally or for a short duration be in
the Territory for the purpose of sabotage are en-
titled suddenly to come forward on the day of the
cease-fire with a claim to be assigned to camps
which do not exist and in so doing achieve the
establishment of bases in South West Africa.
(c) As stated in Your Excellency's letter of 1 January
1979i "A comprehensive cessation of all hostile
acts" is an essential prerequisite to the implemen-
tation of resolution
(d) In regard to the envisaged electionqaagau wfliis.'.a-g>vts?cj'''v ig"r' "
later than 30 September 1979 which, in terms of«*«MB!» *K*m»»' ^
Yours Excellency's letter of 1 January 19795 you
considered. . /6
- 6 -
considered to be "consistent with the proposal",
I wish to recapitulate my plea so often conveyed
to you since December 19?8 that time was running
out. In particular, I wish to draw Your Excellency's
attention to my letter of 20 February 1979 (S/13105),
in which I stated, inter alia,
"it will not be possible for the South AfricanGovernment to associate itself with any moveto delay the elections beyond the end of Sep-tember 1979 and thus further postponing ordenying the people of South West Africa theright to independence".
(e) [| That political detainees in neighbouring countries
be allowed to return to South West Africa and to
participate in the election process.
It will be observed that the views expressed by the political
parties in South West Africa committed to a peaceful solution
are in essence consistent with the South African Government's
attitude as outlined above.
R. F. B0THA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TEXT OF MOTION ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF
SOUTH WEST AFRICA ON 5 MARCH 1979:
The assembly.
Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 26
February 1979 concerning the implementation of Security
Council resolution 435 (1978) and of the letter from the
Western countries dated 28 February 1979 to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Soiith Africa.
Cognisant (a) Of the fact that SWAPO has made certain
new demands in recent statements;
(b) Of the fact that the Secretary-General,
as a result, consulted only with the
Five Western countries and then took the
decisions in paragraphs 8 to 18 of
his report of 26 February 1979;
Is convinced that certain decisions contained in that report
deviate seriously from the provisions of the Report of the
Secretary-General as accepted in resolution ^35- In particular
the assembly focuses attention on the following:
(a) Paragraph 11, which makes provision for the restric-
tion of SWAPO armed forces which happen to be in
South West Africa at the time of the cease-fire, to
bases at places which will be determined by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, after
consultation, and the fact that the movement of the
SWAPO armed forces to these bases will not be regarded
at a tactical movement in terms of the cease-fire
agreement;
(b) Paragraph 12, in which it is alleged that there is
no/ 2
no specific provision for the monitoring of SWAPO bases
in neighbouring States.
Confirms,
(a) That there are no SWAPO bases inside South West Africa;
(b) That SWAPO armed forces which happen to be in South West
Africa at the time that the cease-fire agreement takes
effect, must return to their existing bases, in terms
of the original proposal;
(c) That these bases, which are situated in the neighbouring
States, must be effectively monitored by UNTAG. In this
connection, reference is made to:
i) The following provision in the annexure to Security
Council document S/12636 of 10 April 1978 - "As
soon as possible United Nations Special Representa-
tive and staff (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia to assume
duties. UN military personnel commence monitoring
of cessation of hostile acts and commence monitoring
of both South African and SWAPO troop restrictions";
ii) Paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's report
S/1282? of 29 August 1978, which reads as follows:
"To monitor the cessation of hostilities effectively,
to maintain surveillance of the territory's vast borders
and to monitor the restriction to base of the armed
forces of the parties concerned, the co-operation and
the support of the neighbouring countries will be
necessary. Such co-operation will be most important
particularly during the early stages".
Is of the opinion that, should the latest deviating proposals
of the Secretary-General be accepted, the fairness of the election
will/
- 3 -
be seriously affected and the safety of the inhabitants
will be endangered.
Is shocked by the letter from the Five Western Powers dated
28 February 1979j in which they support the latest decisions
of the Secretary-General and describe them as fair and reason-
able: "It reflects a positive approach and makes practical
proposals which we support." In this way, their inability to
defend and abide by agreements and understandings which they
themselves have reached with the parties concerned is again
demonstrated. As a result, the inhabitants of South West Africa
are losing theisr confidence in the Five Western Powers as a
contact group.
Requests the South African Government to:
(a) Make no concessions whatsoever in respect of para-
graphs 11 and 12 of the Secretary-General's report
of 26 February 1979;
(b) Ensure that the election for a Constituent Assembly
in terms of resolution ^35 is held not later than 30
September 1979;
(c) Insist that political detainees in neighbouring States
be allowed to return to their country to participate
in the election process;
(d) Allow no withdrawal of the South African Defence Force
to take place until a situation of visible peace reigns
in the territory.
Decides, in the event that the settlement plan has not been
initiated by 15 March 19795 and in the light of the desire of
the inhabitants of South West Africa to achieve independence
for South West Africa as quickly as possible, to convene this
Assembly on 2 April 1979 to consider the steps necessary to
lead South West Africa to independence.
The recent Front-line Summit
The Presidents of Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique, and thei
Vice-President of Tanzania, met in Luanda, Angola from March 3 - ^ > 1979.
President Nyerere of Tanzania, who is the Chairman of- the Frontline
Presidents, was unable to attend. He was represented by his Yice-President
Aboud Jumbe. The meeting, which was chaired by President Kaunda of
'Zambia, was convened with the purpose of discussing the current developments
in Namibia and especially the Secretary-General's report of 26 February
19 79-
Mr. Nujoma, President of SWAPO, was requested to give his views with
regard to the Secretary-General's report. He expressed the following view-
points :
(1) That SWAPO was not accepting the proposed composition of
the military component of UNTAG, and especially the
logistical component, which, in his view, was only composed
of NATO countries.
(2) He complained that the Secretary-General had not consulted
SWAPO prior to presenting his list of the military component.
He went on to accuse the Secretary-General and Secretariat
for collaborating with the imperialists, i.e. the Western
Five.
(3) He rejected Ghana and Bangladesh as not good representatives
of their groups. He insisted on having Nigeria and India
instead.
- 2 -
(h) Mr. Nujoraa asked the frontline Presidents to reject the
Secretary-General's proposal of "liaison officers" in the
neighbouring countries of Angola and Zambia. He said that
SWAPO forces in those countries will never subject themselvesi
to UN monitors.
(5) He asked the Presidents to reject the whole notion of
"reception centres" which he claimed were nothing but
"concentration camps" manned and controlled by the South
African authorities.
(6) He was also opposed to the "Western observers" who will be
stationed in Windhoek during the transition period.
President Neto
The Angola President exhibited some solidarity with the SWAPO leader
to the extent that he, initially rejected the idea of reception centres
and "liaison officers". It turned out that President Neto had been mis-
informed about the role and function of the Liaison officers. His
impression was that they were coming to monitor not only SWAPO bases but
also Angoland troops as well. The other Presidents showed him their
copies of the letter that they had received from the Secretary-General
on the matter. He seemed satisfied. Still the Chairman, President Kaunda,
promised to telephone the Secretary-General for further clarification.
Private Meeting
At that point it was decided to hold a private meeting of only the
five Presidents. It was during that meeting that the five Presidents
- 3 -
reached a great deal of agreement as reflected in the Joint Communique.
They:
(a) Disagreed with SWAPO vith regard to the functions of the
reception centres.t
(b) Agreed that there would be no UN monitors in Angola and
Zambia, but urged the two countries to accept the "Liaison
officers" , i.e. after some clarifications from the Secretary-
General.
(c) Felt that they would not discuss the matter of Western
observers since it was not part of the Secretary-General's
report.
(d) Asked SWAPO to accept the infantry composition as proposed
by the Secretary-General and that as far as the logistical
component, elements could be drawn from any states, provided
that the principle of equitable geographical distribution
was observed.
(e) Advised SWAPO to start thinking in terms of the election
campaign and all matters related thereto.
c
i RCA MAR 02 1024*237249 SWAPM URMOM
/7n: '2-0. 74HILT ELS ADDIS*237249 SWAPM UR
MARCH 2ND 1979
si
o
TELEX NO. 237249 SWAPO URSWAPO URNEW YORK (USA)
KINDLY FORWARD THE FOLLOWNQ/MESS AGE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL,DR. KURT WALDHEIM, ON OfFIjd^A^IMPLEMENTAJIONOF^^ S EXCELLENCY,""^r^^^f^^^^ETMr^SE^^/^Kf^G ENERAL, U N I T E D NATIONS, NEW YORKSTOP SJJAPOOF^AmBJ^lWPf^ALLY^REJECTS PROPOSAL BYGENERATTTa
TtTFO U N T R I E 5 I N T H E M I L I T A R Y
-rfERATESCOMPONENTrrrREcowS I T S P OS ITI ON ON
miMi!. Mijmmrrr'TTT"™'*™""™^ 1 i —r--i—i —'— M«e««*«-«j)-*eesn>a. . . . , „ , _,,.^ ^ - , , . .
W^TROOP-CONTRIBUTING C O U N T R I E S ^ NAMELY, 'ANGO'rA, TANZANIA,
OF
A, INDIA, IRAQ, JAMAICA,,LL ALONG, SWAPO'SG OF SWAPO ARMED FORCES
FORCES I N S I D E N A M I B I A ARE
fAN D ING R E G ARDIM G~C OHFIN EM EN THAS BEEN THAT ONLY THOSE
TO BE C O N F I N E D AMD M O N I T O R E DWITH THEIR ARMS AND AMJgJJNITION AND NOT Tjj^J|^N^HE JJEI GHBOURINGCOUNTRIES STOP UNTJUL/ALU THE AB^ETTsslTES ARE "RES'B'Lv'Eb "s'WAPO' FINDS
bLXJ&JSASjd^^^COMMENCEMENT OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF U N T A G ' l N NAMIBIA' ON
STOP ONCE AGAIN, I RE-ASSURE YOU, Y O U R EXCELLENCY, 'IN YOUR EFFORTS TO HAVE R E S O L U T I O NS WAP0 S
435 (1978)TTLL C O - O P E R A T I O N
IMPLEMENTED1 '
O
SAM NUJOMAPRESIDENT OF SWAPO
— - • t ~ r>'~r\ri •: i t tc iiL'-Uiiir.ri
\J?
The Romanian Ambassador hopes that in his reference
to the Romanian battalion in the Security council
the Secretary-General could say that 'Romania in the
present circumstances is not ready to participate in UNTAG,
but this does not mean any change of attitude towards the• •rtnr-nze"*1 *~" Pi" "*••'<—'«-**•-•*
whole operation.
NOTE FOR THE PILE
1. At 1030 hrs on 1 March 1979, Mr. Goritza of the Romanian Mission
called to express his Government's decision to withdra,w its_offer to
make available an infantry battalion for service with UNTAG. He gave
the following reasons for this decision:
a) at the time of the offer the Government of Romania thought
that the operation was going to "be a. smooth one, but because of the
uncertainties that have characterized the decision to proceed with
the operations, the Romanian authorities have had to reconsider
their decision to participate in the operations
b) the failure of the two parties to openly announce their acceptance
of Romania to contribute a contingent to the Force
c) the inability of the Romanian authorities to pre-judge the
option of the members of the Security Council on the composition of
the Force
d) technical and material difficulties to prepare and equip a unit of
battalion size at such short notice for despatch to Namibia.
2. I would like in this connexion to mention that I have all along been
in contact with Mr. Vlasceanu, of the Mission of Romania, who has all
along assured me of his Government's willingness to participate in
UNTAG. It is pertinent to mention that the present decision of the
Romanian authorities was in response to further consultations held with
Mr. Goritza at 3:30 p.m. on 28 February to discuss practical matters
relating to the preparation of the Romanian contingent.
1 March 1979 (T.K. Dibuama)
AKU/MS
bf: AR/FMG
CONFIDENTIAL
* V
NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
Liviu Bota, Centre for Disarmament, has asked
me to relay the following information to you:
A member of the Mission of Romania was informally
approached last night and asked if Romania would be
willing to provide a batallion for the Namibia operation.
In consultation with his Government, it was decided
that Romania was not in the position at the present time
to contribute troops to the operation due to the short
notice given and due to the fact that not all parties
favoured Romania's participation in the Namibia operation.
Romania would, however, like to express her thanks3
| for this request for participation. At the same time, she
j would like to reaffirm her Government's favourable attitude
I towards United Nations efforts in Namibia and its support>i
* ! of the Secretary-General personally.
Angela Knippenberg-Uther
1 March 1979
TH ~T' - '~ o^^ni—rr,r>'-IU: inc. ocuXclKrvi
ZairAinU^ jL?, . Jrtfei>&Jia
SOLIDARITY — FREEDOM — JUSTICE
MAR 1 1979
SWAPO'S PRELIMINARY REACTION CONCERNING THE LATEST
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON NAMIBIA
MARCH 1,1979.
PRESS RELEASE: EMBARGOED UNTIL 10:45 A.M.
In his report published on 26 February 1979, as a
Security Council document (S/13120), the U.N. Secretary
General offered his own suggestions in the hope that they
would provide a basis on which the outstanding issues on
the implementation of the U.N. plan for the independence of
Namibia might be resolved.
However, even before the report came out, the painstaking
and delicate efforts of the Secretary-General, reflected
therein and which are aimed at overcoming the differing positions
of SWAPO and South Africa, have been subjected to savage
propaganda barrage of threats, blackmail and diktat by the
Pretoria fanatics.
As a result of this customary arrogant and belligerent
behaviour of the racist usurpers, as evidenced by recent
utterances in South Africa itself and in communications to
2/S.W.A.P.O. of Namibia Observer Mission to the U.N. « 801 Second Avenue, Room 1401, N.Y.C.^N.Y. 10017, Tel: 212 986-7863
s-2-
the Secretary-General, the fate of the U.N. plan is now
precariously hanging in uncertainty.
Presently, as always in the past, South Africa remainst
the obstacle: Under the circumstances, the objective
realities in Namibia are such that, utilizing its preponderant
presence in and massive military occupation of Namibia, the
illegal ruling clique of South Africa poses a clear and
immediate obstruction to the early independence of Namibia.
This situation further allows that regime to exercise final
veto against the genuine liberation of Namibia.
Just like the previous fascist regimes before it, Botha's
regime constantly draws succour and sustenance, in its
continued intransigence, from the well-calculated reluctance
of certain major Western powers, who otherwise purport to be
peacemakers, to be tough with Pretoria.
Actually, the existing differences between SWAPO and
South Africa arise, to a large extent, from the deliberate
ambiguities in the Western Proposal, which allow for con-
flicting interpretations.
The latest political chicanery as well as the extraneous
and untenable demands of the Bothas must strongly be condemned
and rejected.
On its part SWAPO has, once again, re-assured the Secretary
General and his staff about its commitment to co-operate in
the efficacious implementation of the U.N. plan, so as to
hasten the decolonisation of Namibia.
-3-
The report in question is, at the present time, under
a serious and meticulous study and SWAPO's views in this
regard will be made known in due course.
Obviously, the composition of UNTAG is a substantive
issue. The entry into force of the cease-fire and the
emplacement of UNTAG are directly linked to the satisfactory
conclusion of consultations in the Security Council on the
sii military component. It is only then that the terms of thef\cease-fire can become operative.
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
28 February 1979
Mr. President,
In my report of 26 February 1979 on theimplementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978)and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia, I stated that,before the commencement of the United Nations operationin Namibia, I would submit to the Security Council, inaccordance with established practice, the proposedcomposition of the military component of UNTAG.I also indicated that in drawing up the list of thecontributing countries, I would take into account theviews of the parties while seeking to balance thosefactors I considered essential in the case, such as theprinciple of equitable geographic representation, thewillingness of the troop contributing countries toparticipate and, in the case of logistics, the capacityto perform the required tasks. In view of the possibilitythat UNTAG's emplacement may start in the near future,I feel I should now consult the Security Council on thismatter.
As I had previously reported to the SecurityCouncil (S/12827 and S/12869), seven self-sufficientinfantry battalions of about 700 all ranks each arerequired for the military component of UNTAG. One ofthese battalions will be held in reserve in its homecountry as a reinforcement unit. Some 13 Member Stateshave offered to provide battalions in this connexion.During the consultations with the parties, it was notpossible to work out, on the basis of the available offers,a list of contributing countries which would be fullyacceptable to both sides. Taking into account the viewsof the two parties to the fullest possible extent andbearing in mind all the other factors involved, I wouldpropose that the first five infantry battalions to beemplaced should be provided by the following countries:
Africa: GhanaAsia: BangladeshEast Europe: RomaniaWest Europe: FinlandLatin America: Panama
His ExcellencyMr. Abdalla Yaccoub BisharaPresident of the Security Council
,
- 2 -
I shall pursue my consultations with a view to obtainingthe other two infantry battalions required, one from asecond African State and one from another region. Thiswill not affect the commencement of the operation, sincethe infantry battalions are to be introduced graduallyby stages.
The search for logistic units has created an evengreater problem because such units require especiallytrained, personnel and, in certain cases, specialequipment. Despite all my efforts, only the followingoffers have been obtained:
Australia: an engineering company of about33O men
Denmark: an administrative company ofabout 120 men
Federal Republic of Germany: a medical companyof about 220 men (to be composedof civilians)
Sweden: a transport company (about 4OO),a movement control unit (about 3O),and a postal unit (about 1O)
United Kingdom: a signal unit (about SO)
No offers can be secured from any government foran air unit of about 450 men, a maintenance company ofabout 35O men and a supply unit of about 14O men, whichv/ould also be required for the military component.
In these circumstances and since the logistic unitsmust be emplaced at the initial stage of the operation,I would have no alternative but to accept all the offersreceived concerning logistic units. I shall pursue myconsultations with possible contributing countries, par-ticularly African States, for the provision of the otherlogistic units required.
In addition to the infantry battalions and thelogistic units, 200 monitors will be required for themilitary component. I plan to obtain those monitorsfrom the countries providing contingents. However, if
these countries are not in a position to supply allthe monitors required, I may avail myself of an offerfrom the Government of Ireland, which is willing toprovide up to 20 officers to serve in this capacity.
As indicated in my report of 29 August 1S73(3/12327) , it rnay "be necessary, in the initial stages,to draw upon officers already serving with otherexisting United Nations operations, to serve asmonitors or as staff officers. In this case, it wouldbe ray intention to ask the United Nations TruceSupervision Organization (UNTSO) to provide a limitednumber of observers from countries other than thePermanent Members of the Security Council to servewith UNTAG for a limited time. This,of course, wouldbe done only after securing the necessary clearancefrom the contributing countries concerned.
If the Council has no objection, I would proceedalong the lines outlined above in setting up themilitary component of UNTAG. I should be grateful ifyou would bring this matter to the attention of themembers of the Security Council.
Yours sincerely,
Kurt Waldheim
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
28 February 1979
Mr. President,
In my report of 26 February 1979 on theimplementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978)and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia, I stated that,before the commencement of the United Nations operationin Namibia, I would submit to the Security Council, inaccordance with established practice, the proposedcomposition of the military component of UWTAG.I also indicated that in drawing up the list of thecontributing countries, I would take into account theviews of the parties while seeking to balance thosefactors I considered essential in the case, such as theprinciple of equitable geographic representation, thewillingness of the troop contributing countries toparticipate and, in the case of logistics, the capacityto perform the required tasks. In view of the possibilitythat UNTAG's emplacement may start in the near future,I feel I should now consult the Security Council on thismatter.
As I had previously reported to the SecurityCouncil (S/12827 and S/12869), seven self-sufficientinfantry battalions of about 7OO all ranks each arerequired for the military component of UNTAG. One ofthese battalions will be held in reserve in its homecountry as a reinforcement unit. some 13 Member Stateshave offered to provide battalions in this connexion.During the consultations with the parties, it was notpossible to work out, on the basis of the available offers,a list of contributing countries which would be fullyacceptable to both sides. Taking into account the viewsof the two parties to the fullest possible extent andbearing in mind all the other factors involved, I wouldpropose that the first five infantry battalions to beemplaced should be pi^bvided by the following countries:
America:
GhanaBangladeshRomaniaFinlandPanama
His ExcellencyMr. Abdalla Yaccoub BisharaPresident of the Security Council
- 2 -
I shall pursue ray consultations with a view to obtainingthe other two infantry battalions required, one from asecond African State and one from another region. Thiswill not affect the commencement of the operation, sincethe infantry battalions are to be introduced graduallyby stages.
fhe search for logistic units has created an evengreater problem because such units require especiallytrained personnel and, in certain cases, specialequipment. Despite all my efforts, only the followingoffers have been obtained:
Australia:
Denmark:
an engineering company of about33O men
an administrative company ofabout 120 men
Federal Republic of Germany: a medical companyof about 220 men (to be composedof civilians)
Sweden: a transport company (about 400),a movement control unit (about 3O),and a postal unit (about 1O)
United Kingdom: a signal unit (about SO)-aNo offers can be secured from any government for
an air unit of about 45O men, a maintenance company ofabout 35O men and a supply unit of about 14O men, whichwould also be required for the military component.
In these circumstances and since the logistic unitsmust be ernplaced at the initial stage of the operation,I would have no alternative but to accept all the offersreceived concerning logistic units. I shall pursue myconsultations with possible contributing countries, par-ticularly African States, for the provision of the otherlogistic units required.
In addition to the infantry battalions and thelogistic units, 200 monitors will be required, for themilitary component. I plan to o?otain those monitorsfrom the countries providing contingents. However, if
- 3 -
these countries are not in a position to supply allthe monitors required, I may avail myself of an offerfrom the Government of Ireland, which is willing toprovide up to 2O officers to serve in this capacity.
As indicated in my report of 29 August 1978(S/12827), it may be necessary, in the initial stages,to draw upon officers already serving with otherexisting United Nations operations, to serve asmonitors or as staff officers. In this case, it wouldbe my intention to ask the United Nations TruceSupervision Organization (UNTSO) to provide a limitednumber of observers from countries other than thePermanent Members of the Security Council to servewith UNTAG for a limited time. This, of course, wouldbe done only after securing the necessary clearancefrom the contributing countries concerned.
It is my intention, subject to the usualconsultations, to proceed along the lines outlinedabove in setting up the military component of UNTAG.I shall report to the Council on further developments.
I should be grateful if you would bring this matterto the attention of the members of the Security Council.
Yours sincerely,
Kurt Waldheim
U N I T E D N A T I O N SDistr.
S r" <f \ \ r» I T \J ^un l: ^^ GENERALE C U R I T YC O I ! N C \ \ - WsS^W 26 February 1979\*f W 11 ^1 >— I L. ^^-^^gp'
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ^35 (1978) and 1*39 (l9?8) ON
THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA
1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) concerningthe situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary forForeign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from23 to 2k November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November, respectively (S/12950).The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution ^35 (1978),by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate withthe Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as onparagraphs h and 5 of Security Council resolution U39 (1978) by which theSecurity Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections ithad planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africaco-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in theimplementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), ^31 (1978) and ^35 (1978).
2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister ofForeign Affairs of South Africa informed me that the Government of South Africahad decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Councilresolution Ij35 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to"proceed to South Africa and South VJest Africa1 ' as soon as possible for thepurpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that,following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementationof Security Council resolution 1+35 (1978), I intended to requestMr. Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative, to visit South Africa andHamibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for thedeployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).
3. My Special Representatives accompanied by the Commander of the MilitaryComponent of UNTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africaand Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on thetransitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of theNamibian situation (S/12636) and the operational requirements for the deploymentof UNTAG.
U. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my SpecialRepresentative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relatingto Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talksin Lagos from 11-12 February.
79-OU837
UNITED N A T I O N S^~r~~^ Distr.
S C (T \ I D I T V /Sf^W^Wl GENERALt L U K I I Y CroO^I
C O U N C I I W§3w /^6/ebruary 1979v.* x^ w y v^ i L. ^c| _i< ;4g5' / sORIGINAL: ENGLISH
\REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THF. IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS it 35 (1978) and ^39 H9Y~tl) ON
THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA
1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) concerningthe situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary forForeign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from23 to 2k November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November, respectively (S/12950).The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution it 35 (1978),by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate withthe Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as onparagraphs k and 5 of Security Council resolution H39 (1978) by which theSecurity Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections ithad planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africaco-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in theimplementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), it31 (1978) and 1*35 (1978).
2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister ofForeign Affairs of South Africa informed me that the Government of South Africahad decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Councilresolution it35 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to"proceed to South Africa and South West Africa'1 as soon as possible for thepurpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that,following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementationof Security Council resolution it 35 (1978), I intended to requestMr. Martti Ahtisaari , my Special Representative, to visit South Africa andNamibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for thedeployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UMTAG).
3. My Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the MilitaryComponent of UMTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africaand Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on thetransitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of theNamibian situation (8/12636) and the operational requirements for the deploymentof UMTAG.
it. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my SpecialRepresentative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relatingto Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talksin Lagos from 11-12 February.
79-0 837
Note of Consultation Meeting of the Security Council held on Friday,2 March 1979.
The President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider theletter of the Secretary-General of 28 February containing his proposalsregarding the composition of the military component of UNTAG.
The Secretary-General told the Council that he had Just received a cablefrom SWAPO giving its formal answer to his report. The answer was some-what negative. There had been no formal answer as yet from South Africa;though there had been some public noises. The Secretary-General then readSWAPO's cable to the Council. He said that he would also inform theCouncil that he had tried to clarify the position of the neighbouringcountries in regard to the matter of monitoring by confirming that res-ponsibility for such monitoring lay with the neighbouring countries. He hadalso sought their agreement to establish UNTAG offices there. He saidthat President Kaunda had agreed to the proposal that SWAPO forces inZambia be monitored by Zambian forces. A similar answer had been receivedfrom Botswana. For technical reasons he had been unable to contactPresident Heto but was now in touch with the Angolan Ambassador with aview to clarifying the situation. He said that his proposal respected thesovereignty of the neighbouring countries while also providing for contactswith the US forces. He said that SWAPO's proposal contained nothing newin regard to troop composition; as always it was the opposite of SouthAfrica's position. However, he also felt that as there was no answer fromSouth Africa he was for the time being unable to proceed any further. Hewould wish to have the Council's views on these matters as also on hisproposed timetable. The representative of Zambia said that he would liketo put some questions: SWAPO was negative in regard to the proposals forcountries providing logistics support. Did their response extend to thecountries providing infantry battalions? Had the Secretary-General receivedany other offers in regard to logistical elements? The Secretary-Generalreferred to his letter of 28 February and read the list of infantry battalionsset out there. He noted that Rumania had, the previous day, informed himthat it would be unable to provide a battalion. He noted that the SWAPOlist was for battalions and that only Finland and Panama were contained inhis and SWAPO's lists. Regarding logistics, he had encountered tremendousdifficulties. He said that with the exception of Australia and Swedenall the countries offering logistical support were NATO countries. If therewere any further offers, he said, he would be glad to hear of them. Itwould also be necessary to evaluate such offers from the standpoint ofpracticability. The United States Ambassador said that SWAPO's cable did notmean that the efforts of the Secretary-General or the consultations shouldcease. Nothing, he said, has changed. The UU had a continuing responsibilityto seek a solution to the matter. The UN should press parties for a basisfor proceeding. He said that there was a jockeying for position on the partof the parties. This would not cease but would rather increase. At the sametime problems would get more difficult rather than become easier. He saidthat he did not accept the possibility of any one party vetoing the presentproceedings. He said that he accepted the importance of SWAPO but that theCouncil had not anointed SWAPO. SWAPO was just one of the parties whichwas to compete for political power.
Circulation: The Secretary-Ge neralMr. UrquhartMr. Ahtisaari Mr. Thornberry
- 2 -
The USSR Ambassador said that he also believed there should be furtherefforts to come to an agreement but that there vere evident objectionsby the parties, not only to the proposed composition but also to thereport. He said that he could not see how the Security Council couldas such take any further action until there had been further contacts•with the parties concerned. For the Soviet delegation SWAPO's positionwas very important if not decisive, having regard to the UN's stanceas to their position. It would therefore be difficult for the Councilto come up with any decisions until there had been fertile efforts tobring about agreement on all these issues.
The Ambassador of Kuwait said that from the legal point of view Namibiawas an international territory for which responsibilityis based in the Council for Namibia. Thus, it was quite correct thatneither side had a right of veto. However from the practical point ofview the Plan necessitated the co-operation of the parties. He wondered.therefore, whether the Council could now proceed, given the negativeresponse from SWAPO. He asked whether the Council could impose its willon the two parties. He foresaw great risks and pitfalls unless therewas a concurrence of the parties. He suggested that the discussionshould be adjourned until the other party responded.
The Ambassador of France said that the Secretary-General's list ofbattalions as set out in his letter of 28 February would not includeany NATO countries. It surely seemed, therefore, that SWAPO'srejection related to the list of countries for logistics.
The Ambassador of Zambia said that it was important to see the matterin perspective. SWAPO had not rejected the Secretary-General's report,it had objected to a few elements in it and in part to the Secretary-General's proposal in regard to logistics. Even then it was objectingto only two or three of the five countries concerned. He said thatthe whole question of monitoring in neighbouring countries was beingconsidered. The main issue, therefore, was composition, especiallyas to logistics. He thought it to be unfortunate for the SecurityCouncil to give up on this important matter. Consultations shoulddetermine whether equitable geographical distribution could be compliedwith. He said that it might not in the end be possible to satisfy all theparties. Neither could have a veto power. However, SWAPO was recognizedby the United Nations while South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia.The Council should be the arbitrator in these matters.
The Ambassador of France asked whether any of the countries named bySWAPO had made an offer on logistics.
The Secretary-General said that it was clear from the cable that SWAPOwas preoccupied with NATO participation in logistics. However, in thesame cable it had also reiterated its position setting out a list ofacceptable countries which, for battalions, included only Panama andFinland. This impossible situation had now gone on for several monthswhatever one party accepts the other rejects. He had finally tried tocut this gordian knot by making honest efforts to achieve some sortof settlement. From SWAPO's list only Sweden had offered logisticsupport. He said that the concurrence of the parties was necessary in
- 3 -
going forward. The UN could not impose its will "because that wouldend up in a shooting match with UN forces between the parties. Hebelieved that SWAPO's negative answer set out in the cable wouldnot involve a general rejection of his report and his proposals.The Secretary-General reiterated the last sentences of SWAPO's cable.However, it would raise the monitoring aspect once again. He saidthat there were three problems - composition, monitoring of SWAPOforces outside the country and the way the ceasefire would come intoforce. He would sum up by saying that he felt that he should continuewith his contacts and various efforts to clarify the open questions,while having no illusions as to the difficulties. However, he said,his time-table could not be implemented for the objective was to have , ,a ceasefire enter into force on 15 March 1979 and the ceasefire letter/lo besent out in the next few days. He said his time-table would nowdepend on how quickly he received answers from the parties on thematters for clarification.
The UK Ambassador said that both sides were jockeying for positionand both were trying to get things they were not able to get in thelast few years. Neither expected to have a peace-keeping forcealong the lines it now proposed. The Secretary-General's reportwas an extremely balanced document. He thought the Council shouldgive the Secretary-General an indication that his manner of proceedingso far had been acceptable. He thought that the test should be, notwhat the parties would like but what they would both finally acquiescein. The Secretary-General could not go and seek agreementbetween the parties for this would not happen. He said also
that it would be impossible to get the parties to face upto matters until they were obliged to take decisions. The UK feltthat the Secretary-General's letter should go out. That would be whenan answer would be forthcoming, not at the present stage.
The USSR Ambassador said that the question raised by SWAPO relatednot only to composition but also to the report. The proceedin;;s onnjM'Ai'.jia had always been conducted on the assumption that the parties'co-operation would be obtained. In his view, to send out the ceasefireletter now without knowing the conditions in which the ceasefire vouldtake place, would be to put the cart before the horse. He thoughtthat the logical thing would be to request the Secretary-General tocontinue consultations. He wished to raise -mother question;, lie thoughtthat the question of civilian personnel was also equal in significance.Some African countries have doubts regarding the people who would beat voting stations and checking the correctness of what was going on.He said that given the size of the undertaking, the largest and mostcomplex since the Congo, and in the light of experience since the Congo,he would associate himself with those who would ask the Secretary-Generaland Ahtisaari to continue their efforts.
The U.S.- Ambassador said that it was necessary to have the cooperationof the parties. There was a difference between approval and co-operation.
- l i -
lt would be a formula for disaster to seek approval all along the line.The report of the Secretary-General had recognized the difficultiespresented "by the parties. He had given his ideas on how to proceed.He thought that the parties should be faced with the need to makedecisions instead of allowing them to postpone and say "yes, but".He also said that the longer the matter continued the more difficultit was likely to become; and perhaps even impossible.
The Norwegian Ambassador said that he accepted fully the SG's reportand its outline of composition. He said that the SG deserved allcredit for these matters. He said that he was intrigued by thedistinction between agreement and acquiesensce. He thought acquiesensceshould be the standard.
The Ambassador of France said that agreement was virtually impossibleto get. It was very hard for either of the parties to give up theirprevious public positions. He felt that this was one of the areasin which the UN had an important role. He said that he would notthink that the Council could get any written paper endorsing the SG'sproposal but that it might get something indicating acquiesensce.
The USSR Ambassador asked how the Council would find out whether it hadobtained such acquiesensce ?
The Secretary-General again quoted the cable from SWAPO and in particularthe phrase which contained the words "it will be difficult for SWAPO".He said that probably the question was to find out what SWAPO meantby "difficult". He said that he felt it was necessary to await an answerfrom South AFrica.
The Jamaican Ambassador said it was vitally important to get a responsefrom South Africa. The situation arose from South AFrica"s continuingillegal position. One object of what was going on was to impose pressureon South Africa. Any acquiesensce of the parties must be constructiveacquiesensce. The UN must aim to put the Namibian people back in posessionof their territory.
The Ambassador of Bangladesh said he felt that progress had been made. HisGovernment felt that it could make contribution in its offer of infantrybattalion.
The Ambassador of Nigeria said that the Secretary-General would informmembers of the Council when he had received a reply from South Africaand the Council would then resume its consultations as soon as possible,thereafter. He hoped that South Africa would pay attention to the decisionsof the Council in sending a reply.
The meeting adjourned at 1257 hours.
UNITED N A T I O N SDistr.
S E C U R I T Y
C O M M O N 26 .February 1979\J U IN V^ I L ^^-^_^s?
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
REPORT OF THE SECRETAEY- GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ^35 (1978) and h39 (1978) ON
THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA
1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) concerningthe situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary forForeign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from23 to 2k November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November, respectively (S/12950).The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution ^35 (1978),by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate withthe Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as onparagraphs k and 5 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) by which theSecurity Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections ithad planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africaco-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in theimplementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), 4 31 (1978) and 35 (1978).
2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister ofForeign Affairs of South Africa informed me that the Government of South Africahad decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Councilresolution ^35 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to"proceed to South Africa and South West Africa" as soon as possible for thepurpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that,following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementationof Security Council resolution 1*35 (1978), I intended to requestMr. Martti Ahtisaari , my Special Representative, to visit South Africa andNamibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for thedeployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).
3. My Special Representatives accompanied by the Commander of the MilitaryComponent of UNTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africaand Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on thetransitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of theNamibian situation (S/12636) and the operational requirements for the deploymentof UNTAG.
h. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my SpecialRepresentative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relatingto Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talksin Lagos from 11-12 February.
79-OU837
Draft
PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
To be held in the Security Council Chamber at Headquarterson
1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in the occupied Arab territories
Letter dated 23 February 1979 from the PermanentRepresentative of Jordan to the United Nationsaddressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13115)
UNITED N A T I O N S
S E C U R I T Y
C O U N C I L
Distr.GENERAL
S/1311523 February 1979t
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1979 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OFJORDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL
I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to request you toconvene a meeting of the Security Council t« consider the most ominous andaccelerating erosion of the status of Jerusalem and the_ rest of the «ccupied Arab
' ' in consequence of the Israeli • ccupatien -snTEn vitieg'''' systematic" ' **relentless and deliberate policy and practice of s/ertlemenys and colonizationof those territories which constitute a grave thre itO_j«*orT"d pea.ce and security.
(Signed) Hazem IIUSEIBEHAmbassador
Permanent Representative
Recommended