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S-0902-0001 -04-00001

Expanded Number S-0902-0001 -04-00001

Title items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - communication with theforeign ministers of the Five Western Powers

Date Created 23/02/1979

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0902-0001: Peacekeeping-Africa 1963-1981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit

SWAPQ MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

OF THE FIVE WESTERN POWERS, NEW YORK, 20TH MARCH, 1979.

Considering the fact that the Secretary-General

is still considering the composition of the military component

of UNTAG, SWAPO would like to state its position on two important

issues raised in the report of the Secretary-General concerning

the implementation of the Security Council resolutions 435 (1978)

and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia.1)/

The recent Luanda communique^ issued as a resul_t

of the Fr MjTj jSummjLt which was called to discuss the problem

of Namibiajhas made it ex£l_tcitly clear that the Frontline

States and SVAPO__are committed to ensure that the cease-fire

agreement between South Africa and SWAPO will be scrupulously

observed.

SVTAPO will ensure that all of its armed cadres in

neighbouring countries will be under strict order to adhere to

all the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. The Frontline

States have also given their solemn assurances that they will

work in close co-operation with SWAPO to see to it that there

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will be no acts of cease-fire violation emanating from theiri

territories.

In our view, this solemn pledge; by both SWAPO and

the Frontline States should be accepted by both the Five Western

powers and South Africa as being made in good faith.

In paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's Report

S/13120 of 26 February, 1979, there is a clause which says

that "all SWAPO armed forces in the neighbouring countries will,

on "the commencement of the cease-fire.be restricted to base in

these countries." If this clause means that SWAPO will, in

co-operation with the host countries, keep its own forces under

strict order so as not to violate the cease-fire agreement

in any manner, then SWAPO will have no quarrel with the clause.

If, on the other hand, the clause means that the proposed liaisont *

officers in neighbouring countries will be in any way involvedt ~ f

in the controlling of SWAPO armed forces outside Namibia, then

SWAPO cannot accept, the said clause of the report of the

Secretary-General.

With regard to paragraph thirteen (13) of the said

document, SWAPO has no objection.to the Secretary-General's

;>roposal to have civilian liaison officers in the nieghbouring

countries to facilitate communication between the Special

Representative and Governments of the three Countries regarding

tho implementation of the United Nations plan.

Therefore, assuming that the necessary adjustments

are made in the composition of the logistic units of the

military component of UNTAG, SWAPO has no difficulty to

accept the Secretary-General's report as presented in

Security Council document S/13120.

Ths President, of the Security Council presents

liis ccruplinvents to the uie:;.]j£;cG of the Security Council

£ivd has the honour to transmit herewith, for tncii*

informetion, a cop;/ of a letter dated 6 March }.97?

frcrii thii Charge d.^ ai5j:airsr: of fclia ?ern?>nerrt Mi^-r;:.ori

of Souta Africa to the I'-'iii.ted slations adfire-'ssefi to the

Sscretcvrv-GonoraJ,,, v^iiich h^s bean b^ro^ght tc the

attention of the P™Gsi-i!£\f::.; .of tns Security CrjU^?;Jl =

This cs;.:nunicEitiori will !:•: issvied as s d..~cw.riei;v '.f i-he

Securit;/- Council under tl.o Eyr^ool S/1314S at C6OO hours

on S March 1979,.

PERMANENT SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

3OO EAST -42™ STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y. IOOI7

6 March 1979

Excellency,

The enclosed is the text of a statement delivered by the

South African Prime Minister, the Honourable P.W. Botha,

in the House of Assembly, Cape Town, on 6 March 1979-

I would appreciate it if this letter and its annexure could

be circulated as an official document of the Security

Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my

highest consideration.

ADRIAAN EKSTEEN

Charge d'Affaires

H E Mr Kurt Waldheim

Secretary-General of the

United Nations

NEW YORK N Y 10017

STA TEMEHT BY THE SOUTH A F R I C A N P R I M E M I N I S T E R , THE H O N O R A B L E

P V! BOTHA, IM THE HOUSE OF A S S E M B L Y ON 6 M A R C H 1979

''THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH WEST A F R I C A SHALL D E T E R M I N E T H E I ?. 0'.:'N F U T U R E ' 1

THIS ONE SEMTEHCE C A P T U R E S THE E S S E N C E OF SOUTH A F R I C A ' S

A P P R O A C H TO THE SOUTH WEST A F R I C A N I-SS'JE.

SOUTH - A F R I C A DOES MOT C L A I M DUE INCH OF TERR ITORY ' lij SOUTH

'.JEST'AFRICA. SOUTH A F R I C A DOES HOT ITSELF I N T R U D E INTO THE

I N T E R N A L POLITICAL C U R R E N T S IM THE T E R R I T O R Y . SOUTH A F R I C A

DOES HOT P R L S C R i n E W H A T F O R M OF C O N S T I T U T I O N A L S T R U C T U R E THE

PEOPLE OF SOUTH UEST A F R I C A ARE TO ACCEPT FOR THEIR INDEPENDENCE.-

WE R E S P E C T AND PROTECT THE RIGHT OF THE INHAB I T A N T S TO P R A C T I S E

THEIR POLITICS FREELY AfJD OPENLY AND TO E X E R C I S E T H E I R RIGHT

OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT ANY II! T lill D AT ION FROil ANY SOURCE.

IT WAS THIS DEMOCRATICALLY IH C LIM E 0 AND MORALLY UNASSAILABLE

A P P R O A C H THAT MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR N E G O T I A T I O N S TO BE C O N D U C T E D

WITH THE W E S T E R N POWERS FROM APRIL 1977 IN AN E F F O R T TO D E T E R M I N E

W H E T H E R AN A G R E E M E N T COULD 3E R E A C H E D THAT WOULD BE A C C E P T A B L E

TO THE UN WITHOUT C O M P R O M I S I N G THE SECURITY OF THE T E R R I T O R Y AMD

THE F R E E E X E R C I S I N G BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-

D E T E R M I N A T I O N .

E V E R Y R E A S O N A B L E PERSON WILL A G R E E THAT 'CONCEPTS SUCH AS F R E E D O M

AND F R E E ELECTIONS WITH U N I V E R S A L S U F F R A G E WILL R E M A I N HOLLOW

SLOGANS U N L E S S I • J P R A C T I C E THEY ARE I M P L E M E N T E D C O M P L E T E L Y

OPENLY AND EXPOSED TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY. THE SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T

HAS COiHTTED ITSELF A C C O R D I N G L Y AND R E G A I N S SO C O M M I T T E D .

IF SOUTH A F R I C A IS TO BE PUNISHED AND V I C T I M I Z E D FOP, ITS H O N O U R A B L E

AND F I R M C O M M I T M E N T TO ITS A S S U R A N C E S AND U N D E R T A K I N G S T O W A R D

THE I N H A B I T A N T S OF A N E I G H B O U R I N G STATE, IT IS P R E P A R E D TO ACCEPT

THE C O N S E Q U E N C E S OF ITS V I E W P O I N T R A T H E R THAN FOLLOW THE PATH

OF DISHONOUR AND 3E B R A N D E D BY THE N A T I O N S OF SOUT H E R f l A F R I C A

AS AN U N R E L I A B L E N E I G H B O U R P R E P A R E D TO PLACE ITS OWN T R A N S I T O R Y

S A L V A T I O f l A B O V E THE I N T E R E S T S OF THE OTHER N A T I O N S OF THE R E G I O N .

WE SHOULD EXPECT THE F O R E I G N M E D I A TO S E R V E UP U N D I S G U I S E D

LIES AF30UT THE COURSE OF EVENTS If] ORDER TO PUT THE BLAME FOR THE

C U R R E N T STATE OF A F F A I R S Of.' US. WHY A F T E R ALL SHOULD THE DENI-

O R A T O R S CHANGE THEIR TUNE O V E R N I G H T .

YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ASK SO HE P Ef! E T R A T If;G QUESTIONS IN THIS R E G A R D .

WHAT HAS H A P P E N E D ? l/HAT HAS GONE W R O N G ? I W O U L D LIKE TO GIVE

YOU A C H R O N O L O G I C A L O U T L I N E OF E V E N T S S I M C E 21 D E C E M B E R 1978.

MY COLLEAGUE THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S AND I l-IENT TO W I N D H O E K

CD 21 D E C E M B E R 1978 TO I N F O R M THE N E ML Y-EL EC TE D C O N S T I T U E N T

ASSEMBLY OF DEVELOPMEMTS IN THE UN IM RESPECT OF THE SOUTH WEST

A F R I C A QUESTION. WE ALSO B R I E F E D THE M E M B E R S ON THE DISCUSSIONS HELD

BY THE MI M I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S IN THE US WITH P R E S I D E N T CARTER,

DR W A L D I I E I M AT.'D MR CYRUS V A N C E , THE A M E R I C A N F O R E I G N M I N I S T E R .

OUR FIA I f l PURPOSE, HOWEVER, WAS TO P E R S U A D E THE CONSTITUENT

ASSEMBLY TO C O O P E R A T E IN THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF '

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 NOT W I T H S T A N D I N G THE SERIOUS

MISGIVINGS THEY MIGHT H A R B O U R ABOUT THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE UN

AMD OTHER DELICATE ISSUES. IT HAS fiO EASY ASSIGNMENT. ON THE

CONTRARY, IT WAS AWKWARD, ESPECIALLY WHEN VIEVIED AGAINST THE

B A C K G R O U N D OF SUAPO'S PUBLIC S T A T E M E N T S TO THE E F F E C T THAT THE

T E R R O R I S T O R G A N I S A T I O N WOULD C O N T I N U E WITH ITS C A M P A I G N OF V I O L E N C E

AND T E R R O R A G A I N S T THE PEOPLE- OF SOUTH WEST A F R I C A . F U R T H E R M O R E ,

IT WAS E M B A R R A S S I N G B E C A U S E THE l i E n H E R S OF THE C O N S T I T U E N T A S S E M B L Y

HAD JUST BEEN E L E C T E D IN AN ELECTION IN W H I C H 80.3 P E R C E N T OF THE

R E G I S T E R ED VOTERS S U P P O R T E D THEM.

B E C A U S E THE F U T U R E OF E V E R Y O N E IN SOUTH WEST A F R I C A D E P E N D E D SO

M U C H ON THE OUTCOME AND SINCE T H F. S E C U R I T Y OF THE T E R R I T O R Y WOULD

NOT RE C O M P R O M I S E D IF THE C L E A R AND PRECISE STIPULATIONS OF THE

S E T T L E M E N T P L A N W E R E H O N O U R E D , l-J E C O N S I D E R E D IT It; THE I N T E R E S T

•'• r :. ';;i7;;: ;:f; /. r R [ r. A AT L. •":•"? '•"' ° .-.''! j •.;/;•:> tl T!:^ C C.-r, 3 T I Ti; T £ ,'; T ASHr-^LV

TO' C O O P E R A T E in THE E X P E D I T I O U S I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF S E C U R I T Y C O U i i C l L

R E S O L U T I O N 435. BY THIS A C T I O N WE S IMUL T A II E 0 U S L Y H O N O U R E D OUR

U N D E R T A K I N G TO THE W E S T E R N POWERS.

THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G M A F F A I R S DAS /'.RLE TO I N F O R M THE UN

S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L OH 22 D E C E M B E R 1978 OF THE SOUTH A F R I C A N

G O V E R N M E N T ' S DECISION TO C O O P E R A T E IN THE I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF

SECURITY C O U N C I L R E S O L U T I O N 435. IT I/AS EMPHASIZED IfJ THE

S A M E C O M M U N I C A T I O N THAT FLOWING FROM OUR D E C I S I O N - AMD I

NOU QUOTE THE P R E C I S E W O R D I N G -

1 1 I. T H E R E SHALL BE NO R E D U C T I O N OF THE SOUTH A F R I C A N TROOP

STRENGTH IN THE TERRITORY UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A COMPREHENSIVE

CESSATION OF V I O L E N C E AMD HOSTILITIES.

II. A DATE FOR AN ELECTION l.'ILL BE D E T E R M I N E D IN CONSULTATION

B E T W E E N THE SPECIAL R E P R E S E N T A T I V E OF THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L AND

THE A D M I N I S T R A T O R - G E N E R A L ON THE UN D E R S T AM D I f! G THAT THE E L E C T I O N

WILL TAKE PLACE NOT LATER THAN 3D SEPTEMBER 1979.

III.' QUESTIONS OK WHICH THERE SHOULD BE F U R T H E R C O N S U L T A T I O N ,

SUCH AS THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE M I L I T A R Y C O M P O N E N T

OF UNTAG, AND OTHER M A T T E R S W H I C H H A V E A L R E A D Y BEEN BROUGHT

TO THE ATTENTION OF THE W E S T E R N POWERS, BE R E S O L V E D S A T I S F A C T O R I L Y

WITH THE A D M I N I S T R A T O R - G E N E R A L . SPECIAL R E F E R E N C E IS M A D E TO

PARAGRAPH 12 OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN ACCEPTED BY THE SOUTH A F R I C A N

G O V E R N M E N T ON 25 APRIL 1978 VJITH A V E IV,' TO M O N I T O R I N G OF SWAPQ

3ASES IN NEIGHBOURING STATES,

*

IV. THE M A I N T E N A N C E OF LAW AND ORDER IN SOUTH WEST A F R I C A /

N A M I B I A R E M A I N S THE P R I M A R Y RESPONSIBILITY OF THE E X I S T I N G

POLICE FORCES,

V. THE A D M I N I S T R A T O R - G E N E R A L SHALL E X E R C I S E THE L E G I S L A T I V E AND

A D M I N I S T R A T I V E , A U T H O R I T Y III SOUTH '.JEST A F R I C A / N A M I B I A D U R I N G THE

T R A N S I T I O N A L P ERIOD UNTIL I N D E P E N D E N C E . 1 1 '

T l i T M I N I S T E R O F FQpr.IGN A F F A I R S , I M C O N C L U S I O N , I N V I T E D T H E

o". Cr;C TAP Y -.;-,£ l i L F : A L TO A R R A N G E F 0 H I'.?. A H !" I S A ,'. I TO V V I S I T SOUTH

A F P I C A AND SOUTH WEST A F R I C A WITH E X P E D I T I O N IN O R D E R TO COMPLETE

cGNsuLTAT IONS on THE OUTS T A M O IMG ISSUES. THE HOST I M P O R T ANT OUT-

S T A N D I N G ISSUES AT THAT T I M E V! E R E THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF

UNTAG, THE E M P L A C E M E N T OF ITS P E R S O N N E L AND THE COMPLETION OF THE

STATUS A G R E E M E N T .

A SECOf.'D LETTER WAS A D D R E S S E D TO DR W A L D H E I M OM 22 D E C E M B E R 1978

IN W H I C H S E V E R A L V I E W P O I N T S OF THE C O N S T I T U E N T A S S E M G L Y W E R E

C O N V E Y E D TO THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L FOR C O N S I D E R A T I O N .

ON 30 D E C E M B E R 1973 A 30M3 WAS D E T O N A T E D ON B U S I N E S S P R E M I S E S

IN S W A K O P M U N D . f l O R E THAN 30 PEOPLE W E R E I N J U R E D . A PROTEST IN

THE STRONGEST TERMS WAS LODGED WITH OR WALDMEI.-J Of." THE S A il E DAY

O V E R THIS SENSELESS AND D A S T A R D L Y ACT OF V I O L E N C E nv SWAPG,FOLLOWING THE S T A T E M E N T 3Y THE O R G A N I S A T I O N ' S L E A D E R IN DAR-ES-

S A L A A f l ON 23 D E C E M B E R 1973 THAT SWAPO WOULD NOT ONLY CONTINUE

WITH ITS C A M P A I G N OF V I O L E N C E BUI f .MOREOVER, I N T E N S I F Y IT.

THE FOLLOW IMG ARE SOME E X A M P L E S OF A T R O C I T I E S WH1C1! WILL C O N F I R M

S '.) A P 0 ' S V I 0 L E fJ T C H A R A C T E R :

23 AUGUST 1973 ATTACK A G A I N S T K A T I M A HULILO M I L I T A R Y BASE

TEN M E M B E R S OF SOUTH A F R I C A N D E F E N C E F O R C E

W E R E KILLED AND 10 W E R E I N J U R E D .

12 SEPTE F I B E R 1973. M I N E E X P L 0 S 10 N »EAR 0 N D A NG W A KILLING 2

C I V I L I A N S AND I N J U R I N G 4.

15 OCTOBER 1973 TWO N I N E EXPLOSIONS NE A F ; OIIDULU R E S U L T I N G INTHE DEATH OF 17 M E M B E R S OF THE C I V I L I A NPOPULATION.

16 OCTODER 1978 A B D U C T I O N OF 4 C I V I L I A N S N E A R E E N H A N A OF WHOM

2 W E R E S U B S E Q U E N T L Y M U R D E R E D .

1 D E C E M B E R 1978 TWO E X P L O S I O N S IN W I N D H O E K I N J U R I N G 14 PEOPLE

3G D E C E M B E R 1978 SA GOTAGE IN S W A K O P M U N D WHEN A BOM3 WAS DETO-

: 0 P L E .

F E B R U A R Y 1979

- 5 —

ATTACK Of; N KONGO I l I L I T A R Y BASE BY

A P P R O X I f i A T E L Y 25 G TERRORISTS.

27 F E B R U A R Y 1979 ATTACK Of] ELUNDU MILITARY BASE

J A N / F E B 1979 : D R A M A T I C I N C R E A S E 111 Sl-.'APO T E R R O R I S T

A C T I V I T I E S - 17 C A S E S OF S A B O T A G E A G A I N S T

. E L E C T R I C , TELECOMMUNICATION' AND V J A T E R

INSTALLATIONS, 9 I N S T A N C E S OF A G D U C T I C F i OF

M E M B E R S OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, 24 LAUD

MINE INCIDENTS, 15 CASES OF I ii T Ii"i ID AT ION

R E S U L T I N G I?I THE DEATH OF AT LEAST 3

TRIBAL CHIEFS.

OM 1 J A N U A R Y 1979, DR WALDHEIi-i R E S PON D E D -TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S

LETTER OF 22 D E C E M B E R 1978. HIS LETTER HAD A G E N E R A L L Y POSITIVE

T E ?-l 0 R HE STATED HIS B E L I E F THAT A C O M P R E H E N S I V E C E S S A T I O N OF ALL

HOSTILE ACTS UAS AN ESSENTIAL P R E R E Q U I S I T E TO THE I n P L EME f] T AT I 0 N

OF S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. OM THE Q U E S T I O N OF A DATE FOR

THE E L E C T I O N THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L A G R E E D THAT IT SHOULD 3E SET AS

SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH C O N S U L T A T I O N BETWEEN MR A H T I S A A R I AND THE

AD.-iliilSTRATOR-GENERAL. HE ALSO A G R E E D THAT AN E L E C T I O N DATE OF NOT

L A T E R THAN 30 S E P T E M B E R 1979 AS PROPOSED BY US WAS C O N S I S T E N T WITH

THE SETTLEMENT PLAN. FROM THIS IT FOLLOWED, I*! OR V.'ALDHEIM'S

WORDS, THAT THE E M P L A C E M E N T OF UN TAG MUST C O M M E N C E B E F O R E THE END

OF F E B R U A R Y WITH ALL THE PRIOR STEPS ENVISAGED IN A C C O R D A N C E WITH*

THE SETTLEMENT PLAN A L R E A D Y COMPLETED.

WE U E R E ALSO I N F O R M E D BY DR U A L D H E I M THAT IT WAS HIS INTENTION THAT

MR A H T I S A A R I SHOULD VISIT SOUTH A F R I C A AND SOUTH I-,'E S T A F R I C A IN

J A N U A R Y T O C O M P L E T E N E G O T I A T I O N S O N O P E R A T I O N A L R E Q U I R E M E N T S .

-6-

iilTH R E G A R D TO THE E X T R E M E L Y I :i P 0 f; T A M T OIIESTIO.'I OF T H L M O N I T O R I N G

OF SWAPO BASES If-! NE I G M B O U R ING STATES W H I C H - W A S P E R T I N E N T L Y

STATED IN U N A M B I G U O U S L A N G U A G E If; THE F O R E I G N '.', 1 M I 5 T E C ' S L E T T E R

OF 22 D E C E M B E R 1973, DR UAL DM El." R E S P O N D E D in E Q U A L L Y C L E A R

L A N G U A G E , AS FOLLOWS :

•'CERTAINLY P A R A G R A P H 12 OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL IS A

V E R Y I M P O R T A N T ELEMENT, AMD I HA V E BEEN A S S U R E D BY

R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S OF THE STATES WHICH B O R D E R 0!! N A M I B I A

THAT THEY WILL C O O P E R A T E FULLY 1) IT H THE UNITED N A T I O N S

IN E tl S U R I M G THAT U M T A G IS ABLE TO C A R R Y OUT ITS MA f I D ATE. 1 '

COULD T H E R E 3E ANY DOUBT A B O U T THE M E A N I N G OF THIS C A T E G O R I C

S T A T E M E N T BY PR WAL D H E I M ? HE TOLD US THAT THE N E I G H B O U R I N G STATES

HAD A S S U R E D HIM OF THEIR FULL COOPERATION WITH UMTAG

FOR THE E X E C U T I O N OF ITS M A N D A T E . WHAT IS THIS M A N D A T E ? IT

IS THE MANDATE WHICH IS OUTLINED IN' CLEAR AND PRECISE

L A N G U A G E IN THE Afif'EXURE TO THE S E T T L E M E N T PL AH NAMELY,' 1..

MONITORING OF BOTH SOUTH A F R I C A N AMD SWAPO TROOP RE S T R I C T I O N S . ' 1

Q U E S T I O N : W H E R E AMD HOl-i SHOULD THIS HAi/uATL RE E'XECUTED? A G A I N

WE ARE G U I D E D BY THE WORDS OF THE SETTLEsEWT PLAN If: R E S P E C T

OF THE R E S T R I C T I O N TO BASE OF SUAPO TROOPS. THE L A N G U A G E IS

PRECISE, U N A M B I G U O U S AND C L E A R . SUAPO SHOULD PULL BACK AND BE

R E S T R I C T E D TO ITS CASES AND THAT R E S T R I C T I O N TO BASE SHOULD BE

M O N I T O R E D RY UMTAG. THE PLAN C O N T A I N S MO WORD, NO R E F E R E N C E

W H A T S O E V E R , TO AMY POSSIBLE E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF BASES FOR S'JAPO

TROOPS WHO" MAY FORTUITOUSLY 3E I ii THE T E R R I T O R Y ON THE D A T E OF

C O n i l E M C E M E M T OF THE I HP L E i- E M T A T I 0 N P R O G R A M . AT HO T I il E WAS T H E R E

ANY M E N T I O N OR R E F E R E N C E TO THIS I f J ANY OF THE N E G O T I A T I N G

SESSIONS WITH THE FIVE. N E I T H E R WAS T H E R E Af;Y f i E M T I O M A BOUT IT

IT! TALKS WITH DR W A L D H E I M OR MR A H T I S A A R I : f.'O D E N I A L OR D I S C L A I M E R S

OR QUEST ION ING ON THIS POINT DURING MR AHTISAARI'S TALKS WITH

US IN J A N U A R Y 1979. F U R T H E R M O R E THE F O R E I G N MIII IS T E R S Or THE

F I V E W E S T E R N P O W E R S W R O T E T O T H E M I N I S T E R O F F O R E I G N A F F A I R S O N

-7-

•5 F E B R U A R Y 1979 I •: P O S I T I V E T E f . ' M S '.-' I T I! .'i iJ I C 0 f. T P A D I C T I N G THF ilF ED TO

nor:iTOR SWAPO BASES.

THE F O R E I G N n i.r; i STEP A D D R E S S E D F U R T H E R C O M M U N I C A T I O N S TO DRWALDHEIr; Of! 6 F E B R U A R Y , ft F E B R U A R Y AND 14 F E B R U A R Y 1979. THE

S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L R E S P O N D E D OH 8 F E B R U A R Y AND 17 F E B R U A R Y 1979

AND A G A I N - T H E R E HAS KO D I S C L A I M I N G OF THE E S T A B L I S H E D POSITION

Ofl THE M O N I T O R I N G OF SVJAPO BASES.

BY 2Q F E B R U A R Y , H O W E V E R , IT B E C A M E KfiOWN THAT SVJAPO WAS R E F U S I M G

TO ALLOU ITS CASES IN N E I G H B O U R I N G STATES TO BE M O N I T O R E D AND

THAT IT INSISTED OK THE E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF BASES IMSIDE SOUTH UEST

A F R I C A .

If! HIS LETTER OF 2H F E B R U A R Y 1979 THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S

PROTESTED STROfjGLY TO DR W A L D H C I M A G A I N S T THIS LATEST SWAPO

POSITION A f J D P R O V I D E D C H A P T E R AND V E R S E TO SHOW THAT THE S E T T L E M E N T

PLAN S T I P U L A T E D EXPLICITLY THAT S'JAPO SHOULD RE C O N F I N E D TO ITS

BASES AMD THAT THE R E S T R I C T I O N SHOULD BE M O N I T O R E D BY U M T A G If' THE

SAME. H A M M E R AS THE R E S T R I C T I O N OF SOUTH A F R I C A N TROOPS. HE I N F O R M E D

THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L THAT E M P L A C E M E N T OF U N T A G VJ AS OUT OF THE

GUEST I Or,1 IF IT W E R E TO O C C U R ON T H E . U N I L A T E R A L L Y D E T E R M I N E D AND

R A D I C A L f!EU CO N D I T I O N S OF SWAPO.

WHAT HAS SINCE COME'TO OUR A T T E N T I O N CAN ONLY RE D E S C R I B E D AS

SHOCKING. WE BECAME A W A R E OF THE FIRST SIGNS OF SCHEMING BEHIND

THE S C E N E S OK 21 F E B R U A R Y 1979. THE F I V E W E S T E R N NATIONS, SHORTLY

B E F O R E THIS DATE AND WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE, H A N D E D TO DR UALDHEI il

A DOCUFiEf-jT If] W H I C H C E R T A I N ASPECTS OF THE S E T T L E M E N T P R O P O S A L

WERE, AS THEY PUT IT, ' ' CLARI F I ED ' ' . FROM THIS DOCUMENT IT IS

C L E A R THAT THE F I V E W I T H O U T ANY A T T E M P T AT C O N S U L T I N G SOUTH

A F R I C A WERE HO'.,1 SUPPORTING THE AS TOM I SUING CONCEPT THAT SWAPO

P E R S O N N E L WHO HAPPEN TO F I N D T H E M S E L V E S III SOUTH V.1 E S T A F R I C A AT THE

TI.'iE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED 111 BASES INSIDE

THE T E R R I T O R Y . THE D O C U M E N T ALSO S T A T E S C A T E G O R I C A L L Y THAT THE

M I L I T A R Y COMPONENT OF UNTAG IS IJOT R E Q U I R E D TO MONITOR THE

R E S T R I C T I O N OF SU'APO TO BASE O U T S I D E SOUTH WEST A F R I C A . T H E R E

AT. r ;. i.sr. \.~\\t.'-. ' ' n.»', r- •• r i CAT io::r,' ' ir; T;J\ cocur::. :;T '..'i'lcii C O N F L I C TU I T M THE E X P R E S S U ; i D E R S T AM 0 I i I G f. W H I C H HAD REEt; R E A C H E D B E T W E E N

SOUTH APR ICA AND THE FIV E .

-8-

'..'E ALSO L E A R N T ON 21 F E B R U A R Y T H A T D R U A L D H C I M HAD D E S P A T C H E D AL E T T E R AMD ANNEXl'RE TO THE H E A D S OF STATE OF- THE F I V E S O - C A L L E D1 ' P R O M T LIf;E '' STATES, THE F I V E H E S T E P. 11 P O W E R S Af.'D ALSO TO N I G E R I AAND S U D A N , IN UlilCH HE I N T E R ALIA E M P H A S I Z E D THAT THE S E T T L E M E N TPROPOSAL C CIST A I TIED NO STIPULATION T H A T SWAPO 3 A S E S OUTSIDE SOUTHV;EST A F R I C A SHOULD BE M O N I T O R E D . A R M E D SWAPO P E R S O N N E L IMSIDESOUTH WEST A F R I C A AT THE TIME OF THE C E A S E F I R E WOULD H O W E V E R BER E S T R I C T E D TO 3ASE WITHIN SOUTH 1,'EST A F R I C A AT SITES TO 3E DESIGNATEDBY MR A H T I S A A R I AND WOULD BE M O N I T O R E D BY UfJ T A G .

If] THE M E A N T I M E IT ALSO C A M E TO OUR NOTICE THAT THE R E P O R T R E L E A S E DBY DR WALDHEI." OH 26 F E B R U A R Y 1979 HAD BEEN P R E C E D E D 3Y FOUR D R A F TREPORTS. T!i^T IN ITSELF IS NOT STRANGE. WHAT IS IMPORTANT, ARETHE CONTENTS OF C E R T A I N P A R A G R A P H S WHICH WERE OMITTED F R O M THEF I N A L REPORT. P A R A G R A P H S 22 TO 24 OF THE FOURTH D R A F T REPORT DETAILSWAPO POIMTS-OF-VIEU ON A N U M B E R OF THE MOST I M P O R T A N T ASPECTSOF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THOSEP A R A G R A P H S WOULD SHOW SWAPO UP IN A V E R Y U N F A V O U R A B L E LIGHT.

W H A T . I S OF IMPORTANCE, IS THAT THE F I N A L R E P O R T IS W O R D E D IN SUCHA M A N N E R THAT Si;APO CAN BE TOLD THAT ITS MOST IMPORTANT C L A I M SCAN RE MET WITHOUT P U B L I C I T Y B E I N G GIVEN TO THEM. ON THEOTHER HAND SOUTH A F R I C A IS BEING TOLD THAT SUAPO'S E X T R A V A G A N TCLAIMS W E R E CERTAHJLY HOT A C C E D E D TO.

WHAT ARE THESE CLAIMS AND POINTS OF VIEW? IN THE FO U R T H D R A F TREPORT, W H I C H HAS MOT I N T E N D E D TO B E C O M E PUBLICLY KNOWN, THEY ARESET OUT AS FOLLOWS :

AS R E G A R D S TROOP C O N F I N E M E N T AND M O N I T O R I N G OF SWAPO B A S E S

''SWAPO WOULD U N D E R T A K E TO S U B J E C T ITS 2 500 G U E R I L L A F O R C E S TO

COIIF INEHEKT TO BASES INSIDE N A M I B I A AND n O N l T O R I N G BY UMTAG.

THF. 2 5QO SWAPO A R M E D F O R C E S WOULD ALL HE C O N F I N E D WITH ALL THEIR

A R M S AF.'D AfhiU!: ITIOM . SWAPO'S G U E R I L L A A R M Y , HEING MODILH, HAD NO

D ~A^s. TNE.-M". F O R E TO.? 7!;r. r'!j::r:..<3:: T;F

-9-

l i i P L E H E N T I N G THE UN PLAN, IT HAD ?, \. E N A G R E E D UPON D U R I N G THE

N E G O T I A T I O N S BETWEEN' SV.'APO AND THE FIVE THAT SPECIFIC BASES '..'OULD

H A V E TO BE I D E N T I F I E D TO W H I C H SWAPO A R M E D F O R C E S WOULD BE

C O N F I N E D . SWAPO WOULD WISH ITS TROOPS TO BE C O N F I N E D TO THE

FOLLOWING A R E A S : W I N D H O E K , OH D A N G W A , K A T I i i A MULILO, TSUME3 AMD

RUf.'DU. SVIAPO WOULD P R O V I D E M I L I T A R Y LIAISON O F F I C E R S If; O R D E R

TO E N S U R E E F F E C T I V E C O O R D I N A T I O N AMD CONSULTATION WITH THE1

M I L I T A R Y C O M P O N E N T OF- UN TAG. 1'

RET U R N OF EXILES

''ALL NAMIBIA};? PRESENTLY L I V I N G OUTSIDE THE C O U N T R Y W O U L D BE

EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HO.",ES OR ANY OTHER PLACE

OF THEIR CHOICE AND NOT TO S P E C I A L 'RECEPTION C E N T R E S ' . THE

U N H C R HAY ASSIST IN P R O V I D I N G T R A N S P O R T A T I O N AND OTHER N E C E S S A R Y

F A C I L I T I E S TO. ENABLE ALL R E T LJ R N E E S TO R E A C H THEIR HOMES.' 1

jAS R E G A R D S THE C E A S E - F I R E \

1 1 IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS BY THE C O M M A N D E R OF THE M I L I T A R Y COMPONENT

OF UNTAG, THE P R E S I D E N T OF SWAPO STATED THAT THE C E A S E - F I R E W H I C H

WAS TO BE D E C L A R E D S I M U L T A N E O U S L Y BY SOUTH A F R I C A AND SWAPO SHOULD

BE C O N S I D E R E D BINDING ONLY ON SOUTH A F R I C A W I T H I N THE T H R E E WEEKS

FOLLOWING ITS DECLARATION AND NOT ON SWAPO, SINCE SWAPO WOULD

E X P E R I E N C E D I F F I C U L T I E S IN T R A N S M I T T I N G P A S S A G E OF I fi FOR MAT I ON

ON THE CEASE-F IP. E TO ALL ITS F R E E D O M F I G H T E R S IN ••JAM I HI A IN TIME.

THE T H R E E W E E K S WOULD BE N E E D E D TO R E - G R O U P THE F I G H T E R S AND TO

M O V E THEM TO R A S E S TO BE E S T A B L I S H E D IN V A R I O U S L O C A T I O N S

W I T H I N N A M I B I A . HE F U R T H E R S T A T E D THAT ONLY A F T E R RE-GR0UPING WOULD

SWAPO BE ABLE TO R E S T R I C T ITS TROOPS T O T A L L I N G ABOUT 2 50Q TO BASES

TO BE E S T A B L I S H E D AT THE F O L L O W I N G A R E A S : W I N D H O E K , K A T I M A MULILO,

O N D A N G W A , TSUMEP. A.ND R U N D U . 1 '

-10-

fi F SWAPO TROOPS

''lilTH R E G A R D TO THE P E A C E F U L R E P A T R I A T I O N OF SWAPO F R E E D O M F I G H T E R S ,

THE P R E S I D E N T OF SWAPO S A I D THAT IT WAS SWAPO'S UN D E R S T A N D I fj G THAT

THEIR F R E E D 0 N F I G H T E R S III (J E I G H 8 0 U R 111G C O U N T R I E S AT THE TIME OF THE

C E A S E F - I R E WOULD R E T U R N TO MA HIS IA WITH ALL THEIR V.'&APOMS, EQUIP-

MENT AND A i i r i U N I T I O N . " T H E Y W O U L D ALSO BRING THE t - i E C E S A R R Y M A T E R I A L

TO ESTABLISH RASES AND WOULD H A V E THE RIGHT TO P R O V I D E ALL

N E C E S S A R Y SUPPLIES FOR THESE NEW HASES, IF N E C E S S A R Y F R O M A B R O A D .

THE PRESIDENT OF SWAPO HADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY E F F O R T TO D I S A R M

THE R E T U R N I N G F R E E D O i l F I G H T E R S WOULD BE F O R C E F U L L Y R E S I S T E D .

THE D E C L A R E D O B J E C T I V E OF S V,1 A P 0 V.1 A S , THAT AS SOUTH A F R I C A I! I T H D R E I,1

ITS F O R C E S F R O M N A M I B I A , SWAPO WOULD R E T U R N ITS F I G H T E R S F R O M

N E I G H B O U R I N G C O U N T R I E S INTO BASES 111 N A M I B I A , TRAIM THEM AND

E V E N T U A L L Y C O N V E R T THEM 'INTO R E G U L A R TROOPS. 1 1

THE D R A S T I C D E P A R T U R E S FROM THE SETTLEMENT PL AM C O N T A I N E D IN THE

C A R E F U L W O R D I N G OF THE FINAL VERSION OF DR W A L D H I E I M ' S

REPORT TAKE Oil A COMPLETELY MEW LIGHT AGAINST THE B A C K G R O U N D OF

SV.'APO'S WHOLE A P P R O A C H AS OUTLINED TO MR A H T I S A A R I . l.'HQ CAN NO!.1

DOUBT THE M E A N I N G OF THE NEW P R O V I S I O N S WHICH

(A) CONTAIN NO A S S U R A N C E OF E F F E C T I V E M O N I T O R I N G OF SWAPO BASES

IN f-.'EIGHGOURING STATES?

(B) GIVE SWAPO THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN BASES It! SOUTH WEST A F R I C A

W H E R E THEY HAD N E V E R P R E V I O U S L Y HAD A BASE AND W H E R E THEY HAD

N E V E R BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A BASE?

THE WORST ASPECT OF THE HATTER IS T H A T THE F I V E 'J E S T E R N P O W E R S

ARE SUPPORT I fIG THESE OBVIOUS AMD P U R P O S E F U L DEV I AT I 0NS>• R E G A R D ING

THEM AS B EING PART OF A R E A S O N A B L E A i J D F A I R SOLUTION. W H E N

R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S OF THE F I V E W E S T E R N P O W E R S W E R E T R Y I N G TO C O N V I N C E

THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S on 24 F E B R U A R Y 1979 THAT THESED E V I A T I O N S W E R E IN F A C T NO D E V I A T I O N S AT ALL, HE I N F O R M E D THEM THATT I - = .',c.'ijT!i :\??-ir?,\i novrn;;;;ri,T HAD L O S T . A L L CC.-NF i D E N C E if; THE A B I L I T YOf Ti iE ;.;E^T 70 H O N O U R ITS U.'-i f> £ R T AK I NG S .

-11-

I WILL [JOT B L A M E T H ?. L f. A D E R S OF SOUTH M E S T A F R I C A IF T HEY W O U L D

WISH TO F U R T H E R N E G O T I A T E WITH THE F I V E . ON THE C 0 i) T R A R Y , IT HAS

A L L A L O H G BEE:; T H E I R I N H E R E N T P.IGIIT T O D E C I D E o ; s T H E I R out; F U T U R E

AND TO NEGOTIATE l.'ITH WHOM THEY WISHED D U R I i J G THE PROCESS.

T H E R E F O R E WE, FROM OUR SIDE, INDICATED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO

O B J E C T I O N IF THE CONSTITUENT A S S E M B L Y SHOULD D E C I D E TO H E A R THE

I N T E R P R E T A T I O N OF THE W E S T E R N P O W E R S OF THE

LATEST R E P O R T OF THE S E C R E T A R Y GENERAL. Hi OTHER W O R D S WE P U R P O S E L Y

TRIED TO AVOID THE SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T SUBSEQUENTLY BEING

A C C U S E D OF H A V I N G G I V E N A ONE-SIDED ANALYSIS OF D R I! A L D H E I M ' S

R E P O R T TO THE C O N S T I T U E N T ASSEMBLY. WE EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO

SUGGEST TO I N D I V I D U A L M E M B E R S NOT TO INSIST' ON THE R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S

OF THE F I V E A D D R E S S I N G THEM AS A F O R M A L 30DY IN V I E W OF THE K N O W N

POLITICAL R E S E R V A T I O N S O F T H E F I V E I N - T H I S R E G A R D ./

ALTHOUGH WE DC NOT A G R E E WITH THE A T T I T U D E OF THE FIVE R E G A R D I N G

R E C O G N I T I O N OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, WE N E V E R T H E L E S S DID MOT

WANT A TECHNICAL - J U R I D I C A L APPROACH TO STAND If: THE WAY OF

DISCUSSIONS DETWEEH THE F I V E AND M E M B E R S OF THE CONSTITUENT

ASSEMBLY.

THE SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T HAS T H E R E F O R E NOTED WITH A P P R E C I A T I O N

THE TROUBLE TO WHICH R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S OF THE FIVE H A V E GONE D U R I N G

THE PAST W E E K E N D TO P R O C E E D TO W I N D H O E K IN O R D E R TO I N F O R M THE

L E A D E R S OF THE POLITICAL P A R T I E S D'IRECTLY OF THE ATTITUDES OF T H E I R

G O V E R N M E N T S IN R E G A R D TO THE LAT E S T REPORT OF DR W A L D H E I M AMD TO

A N S W E R QUESTIONS.

I WOULD ALSO M E N T I O N THAT B E F O R E OUR D E P A R T U R E FROM W I N D H O E K iiY

C O L L E A G U E AND I (1ET B R I E F L Y WITH THE L E A D E R S OF THE SWAPO-

DEiiOCRATS AND THE NAMIBIA NATIONAL FRONT TO DISCUSS THE U A L D H E I n

R E P O R T WITH THEii. ON T H E I R P A R T THEY E X P R E S S E D THE HOPE. THAT WE

WOULD C O N T I N U E TO W O R K FOR A P E A C E F U L S E T T L E M E N T . AT THE S A M E

TI:"E H O W E V E R ROTH P A R T I E S C O N V E Y E D T H E I R V I E W P O I N T S ON THE Q U E S T I O N -

OP SWAPO BASES TO US. THESE V I E W S W E R E C O M T A I N E D IN PRESS STATEMENTS

ISSUED ?,Y THE TWO PAR TIE'S B E F O R E WE HAD MET WITH THEIR L E A D E R S .

-12-

BOTH S T A T E M E N T S UILL BE: T A B L E D ADD IT -JILL RE N O T I C E D THAT GOTHTHESE PARTIES ARE OPPOSED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SWAPO RASES INTHE T E R R I T O R Y . IN FACT, THE f-JNF D E C L A R E D THAT SUCH A D E V E L O P M E N T1 'WOULD F U R T H E R M O R E C O N S T I T U T E A F UN D A;', E .'! T A L B R E A C H OF AN EXPLICITLY

AND U N E Q U I V O C A L U N D E R T A K I N G G I V E N TO THE ?!NF GY R E P R E S E N T A T I V E SOF THE FIVE W E S T E R N POWERS ON THE 31 ST M A R C H 1973, TO THE E F F E C T

THAT NO S'JAPO BASES WOULD 3E P E R M I T T E D WITH IM N A M I B I A . 1 1

I

AS YOU HILL i<NOl;, THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY Y E S T E R D A Y A D O P T E D A

MOTION W H I C H WILL ALSO CE TAFiLED. IT UILL RE O B S E R V E D THAT THE

MOTION INTER ALIA FOCUSES A T T E N T I O N UPON S E R I O U S D E V I A T I O N S F R O M

THE S E C R E T A R Y ^NhRAL'S 5C T TLCnr. f• T PL A!;, E S P E C I A L L Y IN R E L A T I O N TO THE

E S T A f J L I S H M E f l T OF SUAPO RASES IM THE T E R R I T O R Y AND THE

R E Q U I R E M E N T THAT SUAPO BASES ACROSS THE BORDER SHOULD ALSO BE

E F F E C T I V E L Y MONITORED.

IT IS THEIR DPI fi ION THAT SHOULD THESE D E V I A T I O N S BE A C C E P T E D ,

THE F A I R N E S S OF THE. PROPOSED ELECTION UILL BE SERIOUSLY A F F E C T E D

AND THE S A F E T Y OF THE I N H A B I T A N T S WILL BE J E O P A R D I S E D .

THE M I N I S T E R OF F O R E I G N A F F A I R S T R A N S M I T T E D THE REPLY OF THE SOUTH

A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T TO THE S E C R E T A R Y - G E N E R A L OF THE U MIT E D N A T I O N S

Y E S T E R D A Y . I AH AL SO T A 3L I N'G TH I S .

THIS REPLY DOES MOT SLAM DOORS, EVEN ON THE D I F F I C U L T Q U E S T I O N .

OF THE COMPOSITION OF U N T A G WE H A V E BENT OVER B A C K W A R D S TO BE

ACCOMMODATING,. THIS If; SPITE OF THE FACT THAT IN THE COURSE OF

O U R CONTACTS SOUTH A F R I C A P R O P O S E D S E V E R A L A F R I C A N C O U N T R I E S ,

N O M E OF WHICH WAS A C C E P T E D . IT ALSO S U G G E S T E D S E V E R A L ASIAN, L A T I N

A M E R I C A N AND W E S T E R N E U R O P E A N C O U N T R I E S - ALL OF OUR S U G G E S T I O N S

F A L L I N G WITHIN THE P A T T E R N OF EGUITAE1LE G E O G R A P H I C A L D I S T R I B U T I O N -

A N D Y E T A G A I N N O N E W A S A C C E P T E D .

W H E R E DO WE GO FROM H E R E ? OUR POSITION R E M A I N S U N C H A N G E D . WE STAND

P.Y OUR E X P R E S S U N D E R T A K I N G S . V.1 E STAND 3Y THE S E T T L E M E N T PROPOSAL

W H I C H WE A C C E P T E D Of! 25 A P R I L 1973. WE S T A N D BY OUR U N D E R T A K I N G S

sra?*: 5 ^

-13-*

T.G THE PEOPLE OF SOU Til WEST A F R I C A THAT W E WILL HOT ALLOW A

P O L I T I C A L SOLUTION TO ?! E F O R C E D OK T H E M F R O f i O U T S I D E . HE STAND P,Y

THE P R O V I S I O N S OF THE S E T T L E M E N T P R O P O S A L WHICH C L E A R L Y S T I P U L A T E

THAT SVIAPO PERSONNEL BE R E S T R I C T E D TO THEIR EXISTING BASES AND

THAT SVJAPO'S R E S T R I C T I O N TO THOSE BASES BE ilOf! 1 TC R E D . WE. STAND RY

THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL WHICH C O N T A I N S NO STIPULATION, D I R E C T L Y OR

INDIRECTLY, EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIED, THAT Sl.'APO PE R SO !!N EL WHO HAY,

E I T H E R F O R T U I T O U S L Y OR FOR A SHORT DURATION, DE III -THE T E R R I T O R Y

FOR THE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ARE ENTITLED SUDDENLY TO CO.'iE F O R W A R D

ON THE DAY OF THE C E A S E - F I R E WITH A C L A I M TO BE A S S I G N E D TO CAMPS

WHICH 'DO NOT EXIST AND If-! SO 'DOING A C H I E V E THE E S T A B L I S H M E N T OF

BASES IN SOUTH WEST A F R I C A THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING

THROUGH F O R C E OF ASHS.

SOUTH A F R I C A HAS, BEFORE TODAY, BEEN LEFT IN THE LURCH CY THE F I V E

W E S T E R N POWERS. T H E R E WAS THE U N D E R T A K I N G '..'MICH 1JE W E R E GIVEN ON

THE QUESTION OF l-JALVIS BAY. D U R I N G OUR N E G O T I A T I O N S WITH THE F I V E

THEY UNDERTOOK TO TRY TO KEEP THE QUESTION OF VJALVIS RAY OUT

OF THE S E C U R I T Y COUNCIL AND D E C L A R E D THAT IF THE QUESTION SHOULD

ARISE, THEY UOULD TAKE THE V I E W THAT IT V!AS A M A T T E R WHICH COULD

3E SETTLED BETWEEN THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH Vi E S T A F R I C A AND THE

SOUTH A F R I C A N G O V E R N M E N T AT A LATER STAGE. T H E FIVE OPE N L Y

B R E A C H E D THIS U N D E R T A K I N G WHEN THEY SPONSORED AND V O T E D FOR A

SECURITY COUNCIL R E S O L U T I O N WHICH D E C L A R E D THAT W A L V I S RAY ttUST HE1 ' R E I N T E G R A T E D 1 ' IHTO SOUTH WEST A F R I C A . THE RE S O L U T I O N F U R T H E R

SUPPORTED THE IMITATION OF STEPS N E C E S S A R Y TO E N S U R E E A R L Y

A C H I E V E M E N T OF THE DECISION. • .

A SECOND EXAMPLE OF THE B R E A C H OF AM UNDERSTANDING IS THE WEST'S

SILENCE' W H E N DR W A L D H E I M , W I T H O U T ANY C O N S U L T A T I O N WITH SOUTH

A F R I C A , TO WHI C H HE WAS ROUND, D E C I D E D TO I N C L U D E 7 500 UN TROOPS

IN THF. UN TASK FORCE. THE HIGHEST F I G U R E WHICH HAD REEN

M E N T I O N E D ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST D U R I N G OUR LGF-IG N E G O T I A T I O N S

WITH THEN, WAS 3 000. E V E N THIS F I G U R E VJAS , AT THAT STAGE

(IT WAS AT THE END OF 1977, E A R L Y 1973) .UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

T H E R E F O R E , IT WAS It! GOOD F A I T H AGREF.D THAT THE M U R D E R OF UN TROOPS

'..'AS A H A T T E R W H I C H SHOULD BE S E T T L E D B E T W E E N THE SPECIAL

'": F ?.• r :.: AL ^i'7. I !'. AN? T:!" •"• > '.' 1 '•': L G T T •', "TO F! - G " N G R /• L .

-14-

J.'EITHER SOUTH A F R I C A liOf? T l i E - F I V E (I E 5 T L F: N PO:;£f!S AT ANY TIME

F O R E S A W THAT THE F I G U R E W OULD RE M O R E THAN 5 DOO. THIS HOTWITH-

C T A N D I N G ADD B E C A U S E SO MUCH WAS AT STAKE, SOUTH A F R I C A E V E N T U A L L Y

A C C E P T E D A F I G U R E OF 5 500 TROOPS OF WHICH UP TO OW20 PER CENT

COULD, lit P R A C T I C E , BE Of,1 L E A V E .

A N O T H E R EXAflPLE OF A C A T E G O R I C A L A S S U R A N C E WHICH THE F I V E W E S T E R N

POWERS G A V E TO US WAS THAT THE O R D I N A R Y WEAPONS OF* CITIZEN

FORCE HEflBERS WOULD MOT H A V E TO BE SUP. REiiO E RED . ONLY WE A P O N S

R E Q U I R I N G O P E R A T I O N BY TLJO OR CORE PERSONS, W E R E INVOLVED.

NO',,' WE B E L I E V E THAT THE FIVE, IN A C L A R I F Y I N G M E M O R A N D U M TO

DR UALDHEIH, H A V E -STATED THAT ALL W EAPONS, l.'ITHOUT Q U A L I F I C A T I O N ,

SHOULD RE S U R R E N D E R E D .

THERE ARE OTHEH EXAMPLES. T H E R E IS THE HISTORY OF HOW IT CAT-IE ABOUT

THAT WE A G R E E D TO THE R E D U C T I O N OF OUR TROOPS. INITIALLY WE W E R E

TOLD THAT WE 1-,'QULP BE R E S P O N S I B L E FOR THE S E C U R I T Y OF THE T E R R I T O R Y

UNTIL I N D E P E N D E N C E . FOR THE UN IT UQULD S U F F I C E IF THEY COULD

STATION O F F I C I A L S UITH'OUF! UNITS TO O B S E R V E THAT THE L A T T E R DID

NOT I N T E R F E R E IN THE D O M E S T I C POLITICAL PROCESS, SO THAT THE

O F F I C I A L S WOULD BE IN A POSITION A F T E R . THE E L E C T I O N TO C E R T I F Y THAT

NO INT If! I DAT ION HAD TAKEN PLACE ON THE PART OF SOUTH A F R I C A .

THE F I V E W E S T E R N POUERS, H O W E V E R , ALSO A3AHDOMF.D THIS APPROACH.

IN A C O O P E R A T I V E SPIRIT AND FOR THE SAKE OF A P E A C E F U L SOLUTION,

WE A G A I N M O D I F I E D OUR POSITION AND A G R E E D TO A NEW BASIS FOR

M A I N T A I N I N G SECURITY : WE N E G O T I A T E D A TROOP R E D U C T I O N ON THE

EXPLICIT CONDITION THAT A SITUATION OF TOTAL PEACE WOULD FIRST BE

EST A B L I S H E D IN THE T E R R I T O R Y , THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT PEACE

WOULD O B V I A T E THE N E E D FOR L A R G E F O R C E S .

ALL A L O N G THE ROAD ARE THE W R E C K S OF S H A T T E R E D E X P E C T A T I O N S ,

WHICH WE IN GOOD F A I T H N U R T U R E D IN THE BELIEF THAT THE WEST WOULD

STAND DY THEIR U N D E R T A K I N G S .

THE LATEST B R E A C H OF AN U N D E R T A K I N G WAS NOT ONLY "THE LAST S T R A W .

IT WAS H U C I I .MORE. IT TOUCHES THE C O R N E R - S T O N E OF THE MOST

I M P O R T A N T ASPECT OF THE S E T T L E M E t i T PROPOSAL N A M E L Y THAT P E A C E MUST

;T -:L!^T ^E v i r. I.^LE . IT T O U C H E S T!;1: o r: •:. p F. r T F A C T O R

-15-

• i.J.ITltOlJT U H I C H S U C C E S S F U L I [1 P L £ u E N T A T I 0 M 'IS HOT POSSIHLE N A M E L Y

• C O N F I D E N C E IN E A C H O T H E R ' S f l O T I V E S , THE E L E M E N T OF GOOP F A I T H AND

M U T U A L TRUST.

EVEN NOW SOUTH A F R I C A STANDS 3Y ITS U N D E R T A K I N G . WE I MS 1ST ON

THE EXECUTION OF THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AS PRESENTED TO US AND

A C C E P T E D 3Y US. IF THERE ARE OTHERS WHO D E V I A T E F R O M IT, THEY

r-UST B E A R THE C 0 N S E Q UE [•• C E S . SOUTH A F R I C A , FOR THE .SAKE OF THE

W E L F A R E AMD MUTUAL TRUST OF ALL M A T~10 U S OF SOUTHERN A F R I C A ,

R E F U S E S TO B E C O M E A P A R T Y TO ANY C O V E R T A R R A i i G E f i E N T '..'HEREBY THE

F R E E L Y E X P R E S S E D UISHES OF A N E I G H B O U R I N G N A T I O N ARE SuGTHEREu.

IT; THE FINAL INSTANCE V.'E THUS ALSO STAiiD EY THE UISHES OF THE

PEOPLE OF SOUTH WEST A F R I C A .

14 MaWrch 1979

TO: The Secretary-General,

1. Attached is a revision of the suggested composition of

the military component of UNTAG. You will see that we have

tried to reorganize the logistics side to take in more African

or non-NATO countries, only Tunisia has so far responded.

2. While this meets to some extent the wishes expressed by

the OAU and Front Line summit, there is a danger that South

Africa will see these changes as another example of bending

over backwards to meet the wishes of SWAPO. It might be

wise, therefore, if the Security Council took a large part

of the responsibility for the final decision.

3. Canada is not included in this list, not only because

it is a NATO country but also because so far there is no firm

offer from Canada.

Brian Urquhart

SUGGESTED COMPOSITION OF FORCE

1. infantry Battalion

a. Africa; Ghana (acceptable to parties)

Second AfricanUnit from one of: Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco or possibly

Senegal (to be cleared with Secco andparties)

b. Western Europe; Finland (acceptable)

c. Eastern Europe; Yugoslavia (to be finally cleared withSecco and parties)

d. Asia; Bangladesh (acceptable)

India (to be cleared with Secco andparties)

e. latin America; Panama (acceptable)

2. Logistic Units

a. Transport company - 4oo )

b. Movement Control - 3o * Sweden (acceptable)

c. postal unit - lo )

d. Administrative Company- 12O - Denmark (acceptable)

e. Engineer Company - 33O - Australia (Secco notified)might be replaced by Egypt(no reply yet) or some otherAfrican country or Romania(no reply yet)

f. Maintenance Company - Civilian - 30O) Tunisia (Secco and

g. supply cc any - - 14O> %££*" *° -

h. Signal Unit - 12O India ''' N* \ ^ j

i. Medical Company - 22O Switzerland (requestedbut no response yet)

j. Air unit - 450 To be civilianized

2.

3. Status of Other Requests

a. Nigeria - supply company and Maintenance company -no reply received yet.

b. India - Supply company - declined. Signal Unit -awaiting reply. ~ ~

c. Romania - Engineer company - to reply after meetingSWAPO.

d. Holland - Medical company - declined.

e. Egypt - Engineer, Signal, Supply and MaintenanceUnits - no reply yet.

tr ^

f. Algeria - Supply company - awaiting reply.

g. Switzerland - Medical Unit - awaiting reply.e-

(we are informed that it would be wise, if possible, notto have FRG.)

Sir,

Mr. Ahtisaari has brou%hjk_.J:he attachedpaper on the civilians/component of

UNTAG and suggests (jfhat you read itbe fore the SecurjUzy Cauncil consul-

tations. He would also like to see?tjJaamaMst3= ~.j.-JHjrv—

you for a couple of minutes before

you go down.

/h

12 March

CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF UNTAG

As indicated in my report of 29 August 1978

(document S/12827), adopted by Security Council resolu-

tion 435 (1978), the ciyil an component of UNTAG will

consist of two elements. One will be the civil police

whose function will be to assist my Special

Representative in implementing the tasks set out in the

proposal for a settlement (S/12636).

It has been estimated that approximately 360

experienced police officers will be required for the

monitoring functions summarised in the proposal. It is

my hope that police officers will be made available on a

secondment basis, bearing in mind the accepted principle

of equitable geographical representation, as well as the

language and other requirements of the assignment. On

the basis of approaches which I have made to Governments,

on a provisional basis, I can inform the Council that it

seems likely that the estimated number of appropriately

qualified police monitors can be made available to UNTAG.

The countries which have indicated the likely

availability of such police monitors are j/ustria, Barbados,

Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Jamaica, Netherlands, Sudan and

Sweden. Several other Governments which I had approached

were unable to make police available for UNTAG. One

Government is still considering my request. As I stated

in my report of 29 August 1978, one factor to which I

had to give especial consideration was that of language.

The official languages in Namibia are Afrikaans, German

and English.

The non-police element of the civilian component of

UNTAG will have a variety of duties as set out in

document S/12827. Its deployment will proceed by

phases, based on the successive stages of the tasks to

be performed. The first phase of deployment will

commence on the date of emplacement of UNTAG. 'The staff

required for this phase will establish the headquarters

of UNTAG and its centres and sub-centres in different

parts of the Territory. For this phase approximately 170

professional officers, llo general service and 100

field service staff will be required. The second phase

of civilian deployment will commence with the beginning

of the official electoral campaign which is scheduled

approximately 13 weeks after the emplacement of UNTAG.

For this phase approximately a further 200 professional

ofjficers will be required to augment the staff at the

various UNTAG centres. Their functions will be to

assist in monitoring the electoral process throughout the

Territory.

I regard it as being especially important that

staff selected for the first phase should in almost all

cases come from within the United Nations system. I

hope that as many of the second wave staff as possible

will also come from within the United Nations family of

organisations.

During the actual period of the elections a third

phase of civilian deployment will take place. This will

consist of a further 6OO professional officers. Such

persons will remain in the Territory for an approximate

period of four weeks encompassing the time of the

election itself, which is scheduled to be held seven

months after the emplacement of UNTAG. This final group

will, I hope, be seconded by Governments to supervise and

control the process of polling, tabulation and publica-

tion of voting results. In seeking the civilian

contingents for this part of the operation I shall bear

in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical

representation, as well as the language and other require-

ments of the situation.

3.

I should also like to refer to the electoral

process itself. As is made clear in the proposal for a

settlement (S/12636), adopted in resolution 435 (1978),

the elections to a Constituent Assembly will be under

the supervision and control of the United Nations in

that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral

process, the elections themselves, and the certification

of their results, my Special Representative will have to

satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and

appropriateness of all measures affecting the political

process at all levels of administration before such

measures take effect. Moreover, my Special Representative

may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of

the political process. He will report to me, keeping me

informed and making such recommendations as he considers

necessary with respect to the dischargee of his

responsibilities. I, in accordance with the mandate

entrusted to me by the Security Council, will keep the

Council informed. The official electoral campaign will

commence only after my Special Representative has

satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness

of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the

electoral process, including the proper registration of

voters and the proper and timely tabulation and

publication of voting results will also have to be con-

ducted to the satisfaction of my Special Representative.

THE FORTHCOMING PROXIMITY TALKS

It is becoming evident that the Western Five are vorking on the following

scenario for the forthcoming "Proximity talks."

i

I. The Meetings

They would like the following procudure:*j

(l) Western Five with Secretary-General. / &

(2) Western Five with "African Six" (i.e. Frontline States and Nigeria).

(3) Simultaneously :-

(a) Western Five with F.M. Botha

(b) African Six with SWAPO

(k) Western Five with SWAPO

(5) Western Five with Secretary-General.

II. What is needed

They would like to have:-

(a) I Commitment from SWAPO that her troops in Angola and Zambia will be

I confined to base and monitored by those countries.

(b) A statement from both Angola and Zambia that they will see to it

that the ceasefire is scrupulously enforced.

(c) A statement from Angola and Zambia saying hov they will reinforce the

ceasefire and the prevention of infiltrations by SWAPO within their own

borders .

III. The Issues for Discussions

(l) SWAPO bases inside Namibia - The Five do not see how they can persuadei

SWAPO to drop the whole idea. They might try to do so through the

"African Six".

^

^

- 2 -

If they fail, they might ask South Africa to choose a location where

SWAPO armed personnel vill be "confined".

i(2) Composition of Troops - They feel that South Africa vill never accept

Nigeria. They might try to ask Nigeria not to press the issue or even

ask the Secretary-General to talk to General Obassanjo about it.

(This issue - of composition - should probably be discussed at

the end of the talks, they feel.)

(3) Date of Ceasefire/Emplacement - They feel that F.M. Botha will not be in

a position to say anything about the date at this time. He will argue

that he needs to go back to consult with the "leaders" of the Territory.

(The "Constituent Assembly" is due to meet on April 2, 1979.)

They would nevertheless want to propose a date for the ceasefire and

emplacement. The date has not been agreed upon within their own group.

U N I T E D N A T I O N SDistr.

S E C U R I T Y < GENERAL

COUNCILa«J \-S *e> I N V»o 3 *• _

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1979 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TOTHE PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA

I have received your letter of 15 March 1979 (see S/13172). I regret to notethat in spite of my letter of 8 March 1979 (S/13156), you still maintain theposition expressed in your statement of 6 March to the South African Parliament(see S/131 8).

As regards your questions concerning the Proposal adopted by the SecurityCouncil (S/12636), I wish to reply as follows:

1. I think there is no question that the Proposal does provide for therestriction to base of all forces of the parties. Indeed you will find that thispoint was also made explicitly in paragraphs 11 and 12 of my recent report(S/13120).

2. As regards your second question it is quite clear that UNTAG will monitorthe restriction to base of all forces within Namibia. The question that has arisenconcerns forces outside Namibia where the Proposal makes no specific provision formonitoring by UNTAG. This is, I understand, the position of the five WesternPowers who negotiated the Proposal.

3- I believe your third question refers to paragraph 11 of my above-mentionedreport. I wish to assure you once again that the relevant sentence of thisparagraph concerning ''any SWAPO armed forces in Namibia at the time of thecease-fire" referred precisely to such forces and was designed exclusively to solvethe practical problem that might be created by the presence of any such forces. Itake it from the numerous reports I have received from your Government of armedSWAPO activity within Namibia, that you agree that there may be some such forcespresent in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire.

It. As regards your question h, I can only refer you to paragraphs ih and 17of my recent report which gave, I believe3 a reasonable proposal for a workablecease-fire arrangement.

5. I believe that the answer to your fifth question is set out insubparagraphs B and C of paragraph 7 of the original Proposal (S/12636).

6. The normal process of consultation concerning United Nations militaryforces has been explained on numerous occasions to your representatives and has been

79-067 2

U N I T E D N A T I O N S^^

S C r \ \ D I T V (1 33 1 GENERALC v- U K I I T wmS^n^

C /~\ i i bk. i /•- i i WSoocD il' 3/13172O U N L I L ^^±^^ 15 March 1979

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1979 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THEPERMANENT MISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

At the request of the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, theHonourable R. F. Botha, I attach the reply dated 15 March 1979 from the SouthAfrican Prime Minister, the Honourable P. ¥. Botha, to Your Excellency's letter of8 March 1979 (S/13156).

I would appreciate it if this letter and its annexure could be circulated asa document of the Security Council.

^

(Signed) J. Adriaan EKSTEENCharge d'Affaires

79-06737

Memo for the File

To : The Secretary-General

From: William B. Buf fum

Date: 19 March 1979/ v

Secretary Vance telephoned me March 19th and asked that I conveyto you the results of his breakfast meeting this morning with ForeignMinister Botha of South Africa. The two of them discussed the Namibiannegotiations for an hour but Botha is postponing his meeting with theFive until this afternoon because of Security Council meetings thismorning (Botha will not attend the meeting personally but will senda letter outlining South Africa's position).

When Botha meets with you later today you may anticipate he willbe taking the following positions:

1. The composition of UHTAG can still be regarded as an openquestion; Botha definitely does not consider this is"~a~~closedmatter.

2. Regarding SWAPO bases in Namibia, Botha continues to maintainthat there should be no SWAPO bases inside the country whatsoever

_ "—i " • . •~"""»iiiiinim»hiini-ii i-niS Sii"irm-if ••*•»-• •JJglyga''KJia*a'"-l;f''M'JI"r''tJ'J - •TC***~':~'ff'~fa*TJ~-- •'- .i-*uj,-4,,«ir* i."Kv>v«-j3!''--'M""' ''*- '••*••' lv *r-*»»r,<n-'a&M»Jjmii-jM.-i*"

under the proposaZsancThe will continue to insist on thisposition.

3. Regarding external bases, Botha argues that the proposals providea basis for UNTAG joining with the governments of the neighbouringstates in monitoring the agreement. Secretary Vance told Botha heconsiders there is no possibility of getting such an arrangementand recommended that South Africa drop the idea. In lieu of sucharrangements Vance suggesteda) that the neighbouring states be encouraged to flesh out their

commitment regarding the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire;

b) Vance also suggested that there could be improved bordersurveillance following the example set in the SinaTTTor"

•»*wiw*«i .«v«a-s'Hsnj<' ••->-...,.f.t

instance by using black boxes .

Botha reiterated his earlier charges that there had beenduplicity in pursuing the original proposals of the Five. Vancedenied this and told Botha it is a waste of time to pursue suchallegations. Vance argued further that South Africa should inany event forget about the past and concentrate on the presentpossibility for a peaceful settlement which they would otherwiserisk losing forever.

LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1979 FROM THE PRESIDENT \OF SWAPOADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL/ J1—''

Your Excellency,

In accordance with, established principle of geographical representationregarding tr005-0ontributing countries to UUTAG, SWAFO would like to makeadjustments and concessions to its recommendations submitted to the UNSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General, on February 10, 1979 inLuanda, as follows:

Africa: Ghana

Asia: Bangladesh

Western Europe: Finland

Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia

Latin America: Panama

With regard to the other two infantry battalions to be added, afterconsultations, we propose Nigeria from Africa and Jamaica from Latin America.In addition, SWAPO wishes to suggest that the 200 monitors required, as wellas a deputy military commander of UHTAG, be drawn from the proposed Higeriancontribution.

Concerning logistic units, SWAPO proposes:

an engineering company

a medical company

a supply unit

a signal unit

SWAPO is in agreement with Your Excellency in respect of the tasksenvisaged for Sweden and Denmark.

I will submit to Your Excellency, in due course, our proposals withregard to air-force and maintenance units.

It remains our understanding that /o ily'those SJHAPO armed__fgcc.ejLji.nsideat the time of the cease-fire *vu?£L be~ confined and monitored bjt--

UNTAXTwith their arms and ammunition. L/ ( /

SWAPO strongly feels that it should be consulted regularly on allrelevant issues concerning the entry into force of the cease-fire and theemplacement of UNTAG.

In this regard, SWAPO is still awaiting the letter on the cease-fire,as indicated in paragraph 18 of document S/13120 of 26 February 1979. Weshall, accordingly, send our reply. Suffice it to say here that SWAPO1sviews on cease-fire are well-known and were reiterated only recently inLuanda on 10 February 1979-

- 2 -

Until and unless the outstanding issiies mentioned above are resolvedsatisfactorily, SWAPO will find it difficult to co-operate in the proposedimmediate commencement of the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia.

In conclusion, I wish to request Your Excellency to circulate thisletter to the members of the Security Council for their information.

Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Signed: Sam NujomaPresident of SWAPO

TO:A:

THROUGH:S/C DE:

U N I T E D N A T I O N S

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

JThe Seeretaryf General

N A T I O N S U N I E S

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

DATE: 6 March 1979

REFERENCE: 1 t 2OPIU

FROM: Ellen Lukas's Office, ERD, DPIDE:

PT: s- African response to Secretary-General's ceasefire proposals

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AFP C617 1 0

continued from earlier bulletin (9:4Oam) —

MR BOTHA RELEASED THE TEXT OF HIS G O V E R N M E N T S REPLY TOMR WALDHEIM S PROPOSALS, IK EFFECT R E J E C T I N G THEM AND S A Y I N GTHAT THIS ALSO WAS THE POSITION OF LOCAL P O L I T I C A L L^AD^RS INSOUTHWEST AFRICA.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IN W I N D H O E K , tLECTED LAST DECEMBERIN A POLL DEEMED MULL AMD VOID BY THE U N I T E D N A T I O N S , HASSAID THAT UJLESS THE O R I G I N A L U. N. SETTLE ME

MR BOTHAB R I T A I N , THEWEST G E R M A N YFOR THE FIRS

AMBASSADORS OF B R I T A I N , THE UNITED STATES AND WESTGERMANY FLEW TO WI D OEK FROM CAPi TOWN FOR WEEKEND T A L K SAIMED AT P E R S U A D I N G LOCAL PARTIES TO ACCEPT THt W A L D H E I MPROPOSALS. BUT THEY FAILED.

WESTERN D I P L O M A T I C SOURCES SAID I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF TH^U.N. PLAN — I N V O L V I N G UP TO 7,500 TROOPS AND 1,000 OFFICIALS —MIGHT HAVE TO Bb. DELAYED BEYOND THE T A R G E T DATE OF M A R C H 15.

ACCUSED THE F I V E - N A T I O N W E S T E R N C O N T A C T G R O U PU N I T E D SATES, FRANCci , C A N A D A A N D

OF L E A V I N G SOUTH A F R I C A IN TH^ LURCH - - AND NOTTIME.

"ALL ALONG THK R O A D (OF N E G O T I A T I O N S ) ARE THi W R E C K SOF SHATTERED E X P E C T A T I O N S W H I C H WE N U R T U R E D IS GOOD F A I T H I«J THEBELIEF THAT THE WEST WOULD STAND BY T H E I R U D E R T A K I N G S .THERL HAS BEEN S OCKING SCHEMING B E H I N D THi SCENES," HE SAID.

IN SPITE OF THIS, SOUTH A F R I C A STOOD BY ITS UNDERTAKINGS."WE INSIST ON THE IMPLEMENT AT IT N OF THE SETTLEMENT PLAN ASPRESENTED TO US AMD ACCEPTED BY US.

"WL STAND BY OUR U W D E R T A K I G TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH WcSTAFRICA THAT WE WILL NOT ALLOW A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO B^ FORCEHON THEM FROM OUTSIDE."

MR BOTHA SAID SWAPO S I N T E N T I O N TO SET UP BASES IN THET E R R I T O R Y AFTER T»

A DRAFT ON W H I C H MR W A L D H E I M S F E B R U A R Y 26 REPORT TO THE SECURITYCOUNCIL - - C O N T A I N I N G THt. C O N T R O V E R S I A L CEflStFIRl ' PROPOALS - -WAS BASED.

THE PRIME M I N I S T E R SAID THESE PARMRABHS^ O M I T T E D FR QMTHE F I N A L REPORT, QUOTEDLsj^APO^PRL'SlPrNT SAM MUJQMft AS T I L L I N G THEU.N^_T_HAT TH'i. C-EASKFIRh. SHOULD BE COWSTHFRm RTjJD.T'BftSOUTH AFRICA"

SASKFIR^ SHOULD BE_C_ONS,FOR THE FIRSTTHREii WE£.KS.

TTrrS~T70~ULD ENABL* SWAPO^TO I N F O R M ITS FORCES IN THLTERRITORY OF THE CEASEFIRE AND TO "Rn-GROUP THE F I G H T E R S ANDMOVE THEM TO BASES TO Be. E S T A B L I S ED IN V A R I O U S L O C A T I O N S W I T H I N

AFTER T H I S Rt-GROUPIJJfi-WHWl SWAPO Bt ABLr. TO R E S T R I C TITS TROOPS, T O T A L L I N G ABOUT/2,500JJ&h, TO BASES W H I C H SHOULDBE ESTABLISHED AT gJVE_1^^^»--»ttflf1TnTMB W I N D H O E K , THE C A P I T A L ,MR BOTHA QUOTED THE DRAFT AS SHYING.

SWAPO ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT ITS FORCES IN N E I G H B O U R I N GCOUNTRIES AT THE TIME OF CEASEFIRE WOULD R E T U R N TO THL T E R R I T O R YWITH ALL THEIR WEAPONS AMD EQUIPMENT AND NECESSARY M A T E R I A LTO ESABLISH BASES.MORE PM PFS AS

UU LFD VGA EWA UKP HAG CAW CCC1629:T£RRITORY-LtAD BASES 6 CAP.- T O W N :

"THE PRESIDENT OF SWAPO MADE IT CLEAR T H A T ANYEFFORT TO D I S A R M THE R E T U R N I N G FREEDOM F I G H T E R S WOULD B£FORCEFULLY RESISTED . . . .AS SOUTH A F R I C A W I T H D R E W ITS FORC.-.SFROM N A M I B I A , SWAPO WOULD R E T U R N ITS F I G H T E R S FROM N E I G H B O U R I N GCOUNTRIES I N T O BASES I N N A M I B I A , T R A I N T H - M A N D E V E N T U A L L YCONVERT THEM I N T O R E G U L A R TROOPS," SAID MR BOTHA.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IN 1.TBHT_QF T H T SOR SWJVPO J SDRfi-ST/C DEPARTURES FROM TH^ O R I G I N A L PLAJLJLJ1 ORDER lp_ACCeWMODATc. SWAPQ WITHOUT SPFr.TfTTP.f l l T.Y S f l V T W B SQ-

"THE F I N A L REPORT IS WORDED IN SUCH A M A N N E R T H A T S W A P OCAN BE TOLD THAT ITS MOSTIMPORTANT C L A I M S CAN BE MET W I T H O U TPUBLICITY B E I N G GIVc-N TO THEM. ON THE OTHER H A N D , SOUTH A F R I C AIS B E I N G TOLD T H A T SWAPO S E X T R A V A G A N T C L A I M S W E R E C E R T A I N L YWOT ACCEDED TO ," MR BOTH SAID. ,,

THE PRIME M I N I S T E R DID NOT DISCLOSE HOW THE C O N F I D E N T I A L 1U.N. DRAFT CAME INTO THE G O V E R N M E N T S POSSESSION. jREUTER PM PFS AS

Note for the file 5 March 1979

Mr. El Tawil phoned me on Saturday evening and informed me

of the following message from Mr. Farah:

Mr. ITujoma did not return to Nairobi on Friday. He will not be

going to Luanda, instead he has asked his Vice-President to go to

Luanda. Mr. Hujoma himself will travel on Sunday or Monday to

Lusaka and travel from there to Lagos. The Commissioner for

Foreign Affairs of Nigeria confirmed this information to Mr. Farah.

The Commissioner also told that he could not find anything wrong

in the Secretary-General's report. He supported SWAPO's view that

UNTAG could not monitor SWAPO (this must mean monitoring of SWAPO

bases in neighbouring countries which, by the way, is not part of

the Secretary-General's proposal anyway). With regard to composition

the Commissioner repeated his Government's interest to provide an

engineering unit and a signals unit. The Secretary-General of the

OAU will be sending very soon a list of the countries who are

willing and able to contribute to UHTAG. Mr. Farah further reported

that Secretary-General's report has received a rather favourable

reception. There have been no adverse comments except one or two

remarks made by Mr. Wujoma.

On the•Tanzania/Uganda issue, no progress was made, the

matter was referred back to the OAU Extraordinary Meeting of the

Heads of State of the Liberation Committee. Mr. Farah further

informed that he would be staying in Lagos up to midnight Monday.

PERMANENT SOUTH AFRICAN MISSION

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

3QO EAST 4ZVP STREET

NEW YORK, N. Tl IOOI7

5 March 1979

Excellency,

At the request of the South African Minister of Foreign

Affairs, the Honourable R F Botha, I am enclosing the

text of a letter he has addressed to Your Excellency on

5 March 1979.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my

highest consideration.

J ADRIAAN EKSTEENCharge d' Affaires

H E Mr Kurt WaldheimSecretary-General of theUnited NationsNEW YORK N Y 10017

LETTER DATED 5 MARCH 1979 FROM THE MINISTER OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Shortly after receipt of Your Excellency's Report (S/1312O)

on 26 February 1979 the South African Government conveyed

its contents to, and discussed it with, the political parties

in the territory committed to a peaceful solution.

As you know, it has consistently been the policy of the South

African Government to consult fully with the people of South

West Africa. Their interests are at stake. They must decide

on their future. This procedure was followed on all occasions

when serious issues arose in connection with the negotiations

and consultations. For example: in April 197& before accepting

the Western Proposal in its final and definitive form, and also

in December 1978 before informing Your Excellency of the South

African Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious

implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

Leaders of the various political parties also held meetings over

the past weekend with representatives of the five Western Powers

involved in the negotiations. These political parties have made

their position clear to the South African Government indicating

how in their opinion the whole envisaged process is being in-

fluenced by the introduction of new elements in document S/13120,

The leaders of the people of South West Africa, as represented

in the Constituent Assembly, formulated their position in a

motion adopted today by the Constituent Assembly. I attach a

copy../2

— 2 —

copy.

They emphasized the serious deviations in Your Excellency's

report of 26 February 1979 as compared with the settlement

plan (S/12636) relating, inter alia, to the establishment

of SWAPO bases in the Territory and the monitoring of SWAPO

bases in neighbouring countries. They expressed the belief

that should these deviations be accepted, the fairness of the

envisaged election \vould be affected seriously and the safety

of the inhabitants jeopardized.

In a statement issued on 1 March 1979 the Executive of the

NNF stated, inter alia, that the establishment of an armed

SWAPO force within South West Africa would constitute a funda-

mental breach of an explicit and unequivocal undertaking given

to the NNF by representatives of the five Western Powers on 31

March 1978, to the effect that no SWAPO bases would be per-

mitted within South West Africa.

SWAPO (D) has also indicated that it is not prepared to accept

an arrangement allowing only one of the parties participating

in the election to have an armed force restricted to bases in

the Territory.

Before receipt of Your Excellency's Report (S/13120), I indicated

in my letter to you on 2O February 1979 (S/13105), that in the

view of the South African Government there were no outstanding

issues of such a nature as to prevent the commencement of the

implementation of the settlement plan. I could foresee no impedi-

ment to the conclusion of the status agreement. It would have

been more satisfactory and also more practicable if our latest

suggestion in regard to jurisdiction had been accepted. The

South African Government did not and does not wish to make this

an obstacle to the implementation of the settlement plan. I am

convinced that the status agreement could now be formally com-

pleted.

The /

- 3 -

The question of composition likewise could be solved without

undue difficulty, bearing in mind the reasonable and flexible

attitude that had been adopted by the South African Government.

In view of the most recent developments in regard to composition,

I feel that I should once again record South Africa's position

on this matter. Over many months of negotiations with the five

Western Powers and later with you yourself, South Africa has been1 assured that its views on composition would be taken into account

fully provided only the principle of equitable geographical dis-

tribution would be observed.

We were also informed that the practice of consultation on com-

position was based on long-standing UN precedence, recognising

the views of the host country. It was emphasized that practi-

calities and the importance of ensuring the co-operation of the

receiving country ruled out the emplacement of specific contin-

gents without its agreement. To avoid any future misunderstand-

ing the South African Government wishes to reiterate our. inti-f.

I mations that it would not be willing to accept countries which

I had in the past identified themselves too closely and actively

I with the aims and activities of SWAPO. Such forces could not

/ be expected to act with absolute impartiality.

Your Excellency will recall that in our recent contacts with

You and your personnel on the question of composition, we lent

over backwards to be accommodating.

In the course of our contacts South Africa proposed several

African countries, none of which was accepted. It also suggested

several Asian, Latin American and Western Europe.an countries -

all of our suggestions falling within the pattern of equitable

geographical distribution - and yet again none was accepted.

In spite of all this, the South African Government as a token of

our ..

our desire to be accommodative, would still be prepared to

consider the UNTAG composition announced by you on 1 March

1979? on the understanding that

(a) the settlement proposal in its final and definitive

v form is not

(b) the composition as announced by Your Excellency, un-

favourable as it is from the South West African and

South African point of view, is not altered to the

further detriment of the South West African parties

committed to a peaceful solution; and

(c) South Africa can reasonably accept the two further

countries to be added to the list.

In regard to the "two further countries", it is significant that

the list of countries to provide infantry forces announced by you

on 1 March 1979 > omits Canada, a country included in the original

working model and accepted by South Africa. Is this because Ca-

nada is a member of NATO, SWAPO having in the meantime made clear

its attitude as far as NATO countries are concerned? If this is

the case, how can South Africa be expected to accept a member of

the Warsaw Pact countries?

As you know, the South African Government has consistently indi-

cated that "the moment SWAPO undertakes to stop violence and in

fact carries out its undertaking, action against SWAPO by the

South African Forces would cease" (S/12854 ). On that basis, I

can confirm that South Africa is in agreement with Your Excellency's

proposal that at OOOOhours on 15 March 1979 a comprehensive cessa-

tion of all hostile acts should take effect. This naturally implies

that Your Excellen "y~Wo"tlT'd"T "t me know in good time whether in

fact SWAPO has also accepted the cease-fire proposal.

The ../5

The position of the South African Government on implementation

of the settlement proposal remains unaltered. The proposal was

accepted by my Government in its final and definitive form. If

there are others who deviate from it, they must bear the con-

sequences. My Government stands by the proposal which means:

(a) SWAPO armed personnel, like the South African*"3H .-,-',-.. 7 E-... .1-. K, -tt

forces, are to be restricted to existing bases.**!**<hii*«iwi»uw<a rj»;isw ^

The restriction to base is to be monitored by

UNTAG as is unambiguously provided for in the

proposal and confirmed in Your Excellency's

reply to me dated 1 January 1979- (S/13002).

This was also made clear to you in my letter

of 20 February 1979 (S/13105).

(b) SWAPO would have no right to create bases or be'

designated bases in South West Africa. The settle-

ment proposal contains no provision directly or

indirectly, expressly or implied that SWAPO forces

who may accidentally or for a short duration be in

the Territory for the purpose of sabotage are en-

titled suddenly to come forward on the day of the

cease-fire with a claim to be assigned to camps

which do not exist and in so doing achieve the

establishment of bases in South West Africa.

(c) As stated in Your Excellency's letter of 1 January

1979i "A comprehensive cessation of all hostile

acts" is an essential prerequisite to the implemen-

tation of resolution

(d) In regard to the envisaged electionqaagau wfliis.'.a-g>vts?cj'''v ig"r' "

later than 30 September 1979 which, in terms of«*«MB!» *K*m»»' ^

Yours Excellency's letter of 1 January 19795 you

considered. . /6

- 6 -

considered to be "consistent with the proposal",

I wish to recapitulate my plea so often conveyed

to you since December 19?8 that time was running

out. In particular, I wish to draw Your Excellency's

attention to my letter of 20 February 1979 (S/13105),

in which I stated, inter alia,

"it will not be possible for the South AfricanGovernment to associate itself with any moveto delay the elections beyond the end of Sep-tember 1979 and thus further postponing ordenying the people of South West Africa theright to independence".

(e) [| That political detainees in neighbouring countries

be allowed to return to South West Africa and to

participate in the election process.

It will be observed that the views expressed by the political

parties in South West Africa committed to a peaceful solution

are in essence consistent with the South African Government's

attitude as outlined above.

R. F. B0THA

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

TEXT OF MOTION ADOPTED BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF

SOUTH WEST AFRICA ON 5 MARCH 1979:

The assembly.

Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 26

February 1979 concerning the implementation of Security

Council resolution 435 (1978) and of the letter from the

Western countries dated 28 February 1979 to the Minister

of Foreign Affairs of Soiith Africa.

Cognisant (a) Of the fact that SWAPO has made certain

new demands in recent statements;

(b) Of the fact that the Secretary-General,

as a result, consulted only with the

Five Western countries and then took the

decisions in paragraphs 8 to 18 of

his report of 26 February 1979;

Is convinced that certain decisions contained in that report

deviate seriously from the provisions of the Report of the

Secretary-General as accepted in resolution ^35- In particular

the assembly focuses attention on the following:

(a) Paragraph 11, which makes provision for the restric-

tion of SWAPO armed forces which happen to be in

South West Africa at the time of the cease-fire, to

bases at places which will be determined by the

Special Representative of the Secretary-General, after

consultation, and the fact that the movement of the

SWAPO armed forces to these bases will not be regarded

at a tactical movement in terms of the cease-fire

agreement;

(b) Paragraph 12, in which it is alleged that there is

no/ 2

no specific provision for the monitoring of SWAPO bases

in neighbouring States.

Confirms,

(a) That there are no SWAPO bases inside South West Africa;

(b) That SWAPO armed forces which happen to be in South West

Africa at the time that the cease-fire agreement takes

effect, must return to their existing bases, in terms

of the original proposal;

(c) That these bases, which are situated in the neighbouring

States, must be effectively monitored by UNTAG. In this

connection, reference is made to:

i) The following provision in the annexure to Security

Council document S/12636 of 10 April 1978 - "As

soon as possible United Nations Special Representa-

tive and staff (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia to assume

duties. UN military personnel commence monitoring

of cessation of hostile acts and commence monitoring

of both South African and SWAPO troop restrictions";

ii) Paragraph 13 of the Secretary-General's report

S/1282? of 29 August 1978, which reads as follows:

"To monitor the cessation of hostilities effectively,

to maintain surveillance of the territory's vast borders

and to monitor the restriction to base of the armed

forces of the parties concerned, the co-operation and

the support of the neighbouring countries will be

necessary. Such co-operation will be most important

particularly during the early stages".

Is of the opinion that, should the latest deviating proposals

of the Secretary-General be accepted, the fairness of the election

will/

- 3 -

be seriously affected and the safety of the inhabitants

will be endangered.

Is shocked by the letter from the Five Western Powers dated

28 February 1979j in which they support the latest decisions

of the Secretary-General and describe them as fair and reason-

able: "It reflects a positive approach and makes practical

proposals which we support." In this way, their inability to

defend and abide by agreements and understandings which they

themselves have reached with the parties concerned is again

demonstrated. As a result, the inhabitants of South West Africa

are losing theisr confidence in the Five Western Powers as a

contact group.

Requests the South African Government to:

(a) Make no concessions whatsoever in respect of para-

graphs 11 and 12 of the Secretary-General's report

of 26 February 1979;

(b) Ensure that the election for a Constituent Assembly

in terms of resolution ^35 is held not later than 30

September 1979;

(c) Insist that political detainees in neighbouring States

be allowed to return to their country to participate

in the election process;

(d) Allow no withdrawal of the South African Defence Force

to take place until a situation of visible peace reigns

in the territory.

Decides, in the event that the settlement plan has not been

initiated by 15 March 19795 and in the light of the desire of

the inhabitants of South West Africa to achieve independence

for South West Africa as quickly as possible, to convene this

Assembly on 2 April 1979 to consider the steps necessary to

lead South West Africa to independence.

The recent Front-line Summit

The Presidents of Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique, and thei

Vice-President of Tanzania, met in Luanda, Angola from March 3 - ^ > 1979.

President Nyerere of Tanzania, who is the Chairman of- the Frontline

Presidents, was unable to attend. He was represented by his Yice-President

Aboud Jumbe. The meeting, which was chaired by President Kaunda of

'Zambia, was convened with the purpose of discussing the current developments

in Namibia and especially the Secretary-General's report of 26 February

19 79-

Mr. Nujoma, President of SWAPO, was requested to give his views with

regard to the Secretary-General's report. He expressed the following view-

points :

(1) That SWAPO was not accepting the proposed composition of

the military component of UNTAG, and especially the

logistical component, which, in his view, was only composed

of NATO countries.

(2) He complained that the Secretary-General had not consulted

SWAPO prior to presenting his list of the military component.

He went on to accuse the Secretary-General and Secretariat

for collaborating with the imperialists, i.e. the Western

Five.

(3) He rejected Ghana and Bangladesh as not good representatives

of their groups. He insisted on having Nigeria and India

instead.

- 2 -

(h) Mr. Nujoraa asked the frontline Presidents to reject the

Secretary-General's proposal of "liaison officers" in the

neighbouring countries of Angola and Zambia. He said that

SWAPO forces in those countries will never subject themselvesi

to UN monitors.

(5) He asked the Presidents to reject the whole notion of

"reception centres" which he claimed were nothing but

"concentration camps" manned and controlled by the South

African authorities.

(6) He was also opposed to the "Western observers" who will be

stationed in Windhoek during the transition period.

President Neto

The Angola President exhibited some solidarity with the SWAPO leader

to the extent that he, initially rejected the idea of reception centres

and "liaison officers". It turned out that President Neto had been mis-

informed about the role and function of the Liaison officers. His

impression was that they were coming to monitor not only SWAPO bases but

also Angoland troops as well. The other Presidents showed him their

copies of the letter that they had received from the Secretary-General

on the matter. He seemed satisfied. Still the Chairman, President Kaunda,

promised to telephone the Secretary-General for further clarification.

Private Meeting

At that point it was decided to hold a private meeting of only the

five Presidents. It was during that meeting that the five Presidents

- 3 -

reached a great deal of agreement as reflected in the Joint Communique.

They:

(a) Disagreed with SWAPO vith regard to the functions of the

reception centres.t

(b) Agreed that there would be no UN monitors in Angola and

Zambia, but urged the two countries to accept the "Liaison

officers" , i.e. after some clarifications from the Secretary-

General.

(c) Felt that they would not discuss the matter of Western

observers since it was not part of the Secretary-General's

report.

(d) Asked SWAPO to accept the infantry composition as proposed

by the Secretary-General and that as far as the logistical

component, elements could be drawn from any states, provided

that the principle of equitable geographical distribution

was observed.

(e) Advised SWAPO to start thinking in terms of the election

campaign and all matters related thereto.

c

i RCA MAR 02 1024*237249 SWAPM URMOM

/7n: '2-0. 74HILT ELS ADDIS*237249 SWAPM UR

MARCH 2ND 1979

si

o

TELEX NO. 237249 SWAPO URSWAPO URNEW YORK (USA)

KINDLY FORWARD THE FOLLOWNQ/MESS AGE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL,DR. KURT WALDHEIM, ON OfFIjd^A^IMPLEMENTAJIONOF^^ S EXCELLENCY,""^r^^^f^^^^ETMr^SE^^/^Kf^G ENERAL, U N I T E D NATIONS, NEW YORKSTOP SJJAPOOF^AmBJ^lWPf^ALLY^REJECTS PROPOSAL BYGENERATTTa

TtTFO U N T R I E 5 I N T H E M I L I T A R Y

-rfERATESCOMPONENTrrrREcowS I T S P OS ITI ON ON

miMi!. Mijmmrrr'TTT"™'*™""™^ 1 i —r--i—i —'— M«e««*«-«j)-*eesn>a. . . . , „ , _,,.^ ^ - , , . .

W^TROOP-CONTRIBUTING C O U N T R I E S ^ NAMELY, 'ANGO'rA, TANZANIA,

OF

A, INDIA, IRAQ, JAMAICA,,LL ALONG, SWAPO'SG OF SWAPO ARMED FORCES

FORCES I N S I D E N A M I B I A ARE

fAN D ING R E G ARDIM G~C OHFIN EM EN THAS BEEN THAT ONLY THOSE

TO BE C O N F I N E D AMD M O N I T O R E DWITH THEIR ARMS AND AMJgJJNITION AND NOT Tjj^J|^N^HE JJEI GHBOURINGCOUNTRIES STOP UNTJUL/ALU THE AB^ETTsslTES ARE "RES'B'Lv'Eb "s'WAPO' FINDS

bLXJ&JSASjd^^^COMMENCEMENT OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF U N T A G ' l N NAMIBIA' ON

STOP ONCE AGAIN, I RE-ASSURE YOU, Y O U R EXCELLENCY, 'IN YOUR EFFORTS TO HAVE R E S O L U T I O NS WAP0 S

435 (1978)TTLL C O - O P E R A T I O N

IMPLEMENTED1 '

O

SAM NUJOMAPRESIDENT OF SWAPO

— - • t ~ r>'~r\ri •: i t tc iiL'-Uiiir.ri

\J?

The Romanian Ambassador hopes that in his reference

to the Romanian battalion in the Security council

the Secretary-General could say that 'Romania in the

present circumstances is not ready to participate in UNTAG,

but this does not mean any change of attitude towards the• •rtnr-nze"*1 *~" Pi" "*••'<—'«-**•-•*

whole operation.

NOTE FOR THE PILE

1. At 1030 hrs on 1 March 1979, Mr. Goritza of the Romanian Mission

called to express his Government's decision to withdra,w its_offer to

make available an infantry battalion for service with UNTAG. He gave

the following reasons for this decision:

a) at the time of the offer the Government of Romania thought

that the operation was going to "be a. smooth one, but because of the

uncertainties that have characterized the decision to proceed with

the operations, the Romanian authorities have had to reconsider

their decision to participate in the operations

b) the failure of the two parties to openly announce their acceptance

of Romania to contribute a contingent to the Force

c) the inability of the Romanian authorities to pre-judge the

option of the members of the Security Council on the composition of

the Force

d) technical and material difficulties to prepare and equip a unit of

battalion size at such short notice for despatch to Namibia.

2. I would like in this connexion to mention that I have all along been

in contact with Mr. Vlasceanu, of the Mission of Romania, who has all

along assured me of his Government's willingness to participate in

UNTAG. It is pertinent to mention that the present decision of the

Romanian authorities was in response to further consultations held with

Mr. Goritza at 3:30 p.m. on 28 February to discuss practical matters

relating to the preparation of the Romanian contingent.

1 March 1979 (T.K. Dibuama)

AKU/MS

bf: AR/FMG

CONFIDENTIAL

* V

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Liviu Bota, Centre for Disarmament, has asked

me to relay the following information to you:

A member of the Mission of Romania was informally

approached last night and asked if Romania would be

willing to provide a batallion for the Namibia operation.

In consultation with his Government, it was decided

that Romania was not in the position at the present time

to contribute troops to the operation due to the short

notice given and due to the fact that not all parties

favoured Romania's participation in the Namibia operation.

Romania would, however, like to express her thanks3

| for this request for participation. At the same time, she

j would like to reaffirm her Government's favourable attitude

I towards United Nations efforts in Namibia and its support>i

* ! of the Secretary-General personally.

Angela Knippenberg-Uther

1 March 1979

TH ~T' - '~ o^^ni—rr,r>'-IU: inc. ocuXclKrvi

ZairAinU^ jL?, . Jrtfei>&Jia

SOLIDARITY — FREEDOM — JUSTICE

MAR 1 1979

SWAPO'S PRELIMINARY REACTION CONCERNING THE LATEST

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON NAMIBIA

MARCH 1,1979.

PRESS RELEASE: EMBARGOED UNTIL 10:45 A.M.

In his report published on 26 February 1979, as a

Security Council document (S/13120), the U.N. Secretary

General offered his own suggestions in the hope that they

would provide a basis on which the outstanding issues on

the implementation of the U.N. plan for the independence of

Namibia might be resolved.

However, even before the report came out, the painstaking

and delicate efforts of the Secretary-General, reflected

therein and which are aimed at overcoming the differing positions

of SWAPO and South Africa, have been subjected to savage

propaganda barrage of threats, blackmail and diktat by the

Pretoria fanatics.

As a result of this customary arrogant and belligerent

behaviour of the racist usurpers, as evidenced by recent

utterances in South Africa itself and in communications to

2/S.W.A.P.O. of Namibia Observer Mission to the U.N. « 801 Second Avenue, Room 1401, N.Y.C.^N.Y. 10017, Tel: 212 986-7863

s-2-

the Secretary-General, the fate of the U.N. plan is now

precariously hanging in uncertainty.

Presently, as always in the past, South Africa remainst

the obstacle: Under the circumstances, the objective

realities in Namibia are such that, utilizing its preponderant

presence in and massive military occupation of Namibia, the

illegal ruling clique of South Africa poses a clear and

immediate obstruction to the early independence of Namibia.

This situation further allows that regime to exercise final

veto against the genuine liberation of Namibia.

Just like the previous fascist regimes before it, Botha's

regime constantly draws succour and sustenance, in its

continued intransigence, from the well-calculated reluctance

of certain major Western powers, who otherwise purport to be

peacemakers, to be tough with Pretoria.

Actually, the existing differences between SWAPO and

South Africa arise, to a large extent, from the deliberate

ambiguities in the Western Proposal, which allow for con-

flicting interpretations.

The latest political chicanery as well as the extraneous

and untenable demands of the Bothas must strongly be condemned

and rejected.

On its part SWAPO has, once again, re-assured the Secretary

General and his staff about its commitment to co-operate in

the efficacious implementation of the U.N. plan, so as to

hasten the decolonisation of Namibia.

-3-

The report in question is, at the present time, under

a serious and meticulous study and SWAPO's views in this

regard will be made known in due course.

Obviously, the composition of UNTAG is a substantive

issue. The entry into force of the cease-fire and the

emplacement of UNTAG are directly linked to the satisfactory

conclusion of consultations in the Security Council on the

sii military component. It is only then that the terms of thef\cease-fire can become operative.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

28 February 1979

Mr. President,

In my report of 26 February 1979 on theimplementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978)and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia, I stated that,before the commencement of the United Nations operationin Namibia, I would submit to the Security Council, inaccordance with established practice, the proposedcomposition of the military component of UNTAG.I also indicated that in drawing up the list of thecontributing countries, I would take into account theviews of the parties while seeking to balance thosefactors I considered essential in the case, such as theprinciple of equitable geographic representation, thewillingness of the troop contributing countries toparticipate and, in the case of logistics, the capacityto perform the required tasks. In view of the possibilitythat UNTAG's emplacement may start in the near future,I feel I should now consult the Security Council on thismatter.

As I had previously reported to the SecurityCouncil (S/12827 and S/12869), seven self-sufficientinfantry battalions of about 700 all ranks each arerequired for the military component of UNTAG. One ofthese battalions will be held in reserve in its homecountry as a reinforcement unit. Some 13 Member Stateshave offered to provide battalions in this connexion.During the consultations with the parties, it was notpossible to work out, on the basis of the available offers,a list of contributing countries which would be fullyacceptable to both sides. Taking into account the viewsof the two parties to the fullest possible extent andbearing in mind all the other factors involved, I wouldpropose that the first five infantry battalions to beemplaced should be provided by the following countries:

Africa: GhanaAsia: BangladeshEast Europe: RomaniaWest Europe: FinlandLatin America: Panama

His ExcellencyMr. Abdalla Yaccoub BisharaPresident of the Security Council

,

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I shall pursue my consultations with a view to obtainingthe other two infantry battalions required, one from asecond African State and one from another region. Thiswill not affect the commencement of the operation, sincethe infantry battalions are to be introduced graduallyby stages.

The search for logistic units has created an evengreater problem because such units require especiallytrained, personnel and, in certain cases, specialequipment. Despite all my efforts, only the followingoffers have been obtained:

Australia: an engineering company of about33O men

Denmark: an administrative company ofabout 120 men

Federal Republic of Germany: a medical companyof about 220 men (to be composedof civilians)

Sweden: a transport company (about 4OO),a movement control unit (about 3O),and a postal unit (about 1O)

United Kingdom: a signal unit (about SO)

No offers can be secured from any government foran air unit of about 450 men, a maintenance company ofabout 35O men and a supply unit of about 14O men, whichv/ould also be required for the military component.

In these circumstances and since the logistic unitsmust be emplaced at the initial stage of the operation,I would have no alternative but to accept all the offersreceived concerning logistic units. I shall pursue myconsultations with possible contributing countries, par-ticularly African States, for the provision of the otherlogistic units required.

In addition to the infantry battalions and thelogistic units, 200 monitors will be required for themilitary component. I plan to obtain those monitorsfrom the countries providing contingents. However, if

these countries are not in a position to supply allthe monitors required, I may avail myself of an offerfrom the Government of Ireland, which is willing toprovide up to 20 officers to serve in this capacity.

As indicated in my report of 29 August 1S73(3/12327) , it rnay "be necessary, in the initial stages,to draw upon officers already serving with otherexisting United Nations operations, to serve asmonitors or as staff officers. In this case, it wouldbe ray intention to ask the United Nations TruceSupervision Organization (UNTSO) to provide a limitednumber of observers from countries other than thePermanent Members of the Security Council to servewith UNTAG for a limited time. This,of course, wouldbe done only after securing the necessary clearancefrom the contributing countries concerned.

If the Council has no objection, I would proceedalong the lines outlined above in setting up themilitary component of UNTAG. I should be grateful ifyou would bring this matter to the attention of themembers of the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

Kurt Waldheim

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

28 February 1979

Mr. President,

In my report of 26 February 1979 on theimplementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978)and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia, I stated that,before the commencement of the United Nations operationin Namibia, I would submit to the Security Council, inaccordance with established practice, the proposedcomposition of the military component of UWTAG.I also indicated that in drawing up the list of thecontributing countries, I would take into account theviews of the parties while seeking to balance thosefactors I considered essential in the case, such as theprinciple of equitable geographic representation, thewillingness of the troop contributing countries toparticipate and, in the case of logistics, the capacityto perform the required tasks. In view of the possibilitythat UNTAG's emplacement may start in the near future,I feel I should now consult the Security Council on thismatter.

As I had previously reported to the SecurityCouncil (S/12827 and S/12869), seven self-sufficientinfantry battalions of about 7OO all ranks each arerequired for the military component of UNTAG. One ofthese battalions will be held in reserve in its homecountry as a reinforcement unit. some 13 Member Stateshave offered to provide battalions in this connexion.During the consultations with the parties, it was notpossible to work out, on the basis of the available offers,a list of contributing countries which would be fullyacceptable to both sides. Taking into account the viewsof the two parties to the fullest possible extent andbearing in mind all the other factors involved, I wouldpropose that the first five infantry battalions to beemplaced should be pi^bvided by the following countries:

America:

GhanaBangladeshRomaniaFinlandPanama

His ExcellencyMr. Abdalla Yaccoub BisharaPresident of the Security Council

- 2 -

I shall pursue ray consultations with a view to obtainingthe other two infantry battalions required, one from asecond African State and one from another region. Thiswill not affect the commencement of the operation, sincethe infantry battalions are to be introduced graduallyby stages.

fhe search for logistic units has created an evengreater problem because such units require especiallytrained personnel and, in certain cases, specialequipment. Despite all my efforts, only the followingoffers have been obtained:

Australia:

Denmark:

an engineering company of about33O men

an administrative company ofabout 120 men

Federal Republic of Germany: a medical companyof about 220 men (to be composedof civilians)

Sweden: a transport company (about 400),a movement control unit (about 3O),and a postal unit (about 1O)

United Kingdom: a signal unit (about SO)-aNo offers can be secured from any government for

an air unit of about 45O men, a maintenance company ofabout 35O men and a supply unit of about 14O men, whichwould also be required for the military component.

In these circumstances and since the logistic unitsmust be ernplaced at the initial stage of the operation,I would have no alternative but to accept all the offersreceived concerning logistic units. I shall pursue myconsultations with possible contributing countries, par-ticularly African States, for the provision of the otherlogistic units required.

In addition to the infantry battalions and thelogistic units, 200 monitors will be required, for themilitary component. I plan to o?otain those monitorsfrom the countries providing contingents. However, if

- 3 -

these countries are not in a position to supply allthe monitors required, I may avail myself of an offerfrom the Government of Ireland, which is willing toprovide up to 2O officers to serve in this capacity.

As indicated in my report of 29 August 1978(S/12827), it may be necessary, in the initial stages,to draw upon officers already serving with otherexisting United Nations operations, to serve asmonitors or as staff officers. In this case, it wouldbe my intention to ask the United Nations TruceSupervision Organization (UNTSO) to provide a limitednumber of observers from countries other than thePermanent Members of the Security Council to servewith UNTAG for a limited time. This, of course, wouldbe done only after securing the necessary clearancefrom the contributing countries concerned.

It is my intention, subject to the usualconsultations, to proceed along the lines outlinedabove in setting up the military component of UNTAG.I shall report to the Council on further developments.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matterto the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

Kurt Waldheim

U N I T E D N A T I O N SDistr.

S r" <f \ \ r» I T \J ^un l: ^^ GENERALE C U R I T YC O I ! N C \ \ - WsS^W 26 February 1979\*f W 11 ^1 >— I L. ^^-^^gp'

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ^35 (1978) and 1*39 (l9?8) ON

THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) concerningthe situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary forForeign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from23 to 2k November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November, respectively (S/12950).The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution ^35 (1978),by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate withthe Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as onparagraphs h and 5 of Security Council resolution U39 (1978) by which theSecurity Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections ithad planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africaco-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in theimplementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), ^31 (1978) and ^35 (1978).

2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister ofForeign Affairs of South Africa informed me that the Government of South Africahad decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Councilresolution Ij35 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to"proceed to South Africa and South VJest Africa1 ' as soon as possible for thepurpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that,following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementationof Security Council resolution 1+35 (1978), I intended to requestMr. Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative, to visit South Africa andHamibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for thedeployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

3. My Special Representatives accompanied by the Commander of the MilitaryComponent of UNTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africaand Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on thetransitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of theNamibian situation (S/12636) and the operational requirements for the deploymentof UNTAG.

U. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my SpecialRepresentative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relatingto Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talksin Lagos from 11-12 February.

79-OU837

UNITED N A T I O N S^~r~~^ Distr.

S C (T \ I D I T V /Sf^W^Wl GENERALt L U K I I Y CroO^I

C O U N C I I W§3w /^6/ebruary 1979v.* x^ w y v^ i L. ^c| _i< ;4g5' / sORIGINAL: ENGLISH

\REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THF. IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS it 35 (1978) and ^39 H9Y~tl) ON

THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) concerningthe situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary forForeign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from23 to 2k November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November, respectively (S/12950).The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution it 35 (1978),by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate withthe Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as onparagraphs k and 5 of Security Council resolution H39 (1978) by which theSecurity Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections ithad planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africaco-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in theimplementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), it31 (1978) and 1*35 (1978).

2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister ofForeign Affairs of South Africa informed me that the Government of South Africahad decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Councilresolution it35 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to"proceed to South Africa and South West Africa'1 as soon as possible for thepurpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that,following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementationof Security Council resolution it 35 (1978), I intended to requestMr. Martti Ahtisaari , my Special Representative, to visit South Africa andNamibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for thedeployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UMTAG).

3. My Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the MilitaryComponent of UMTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africaand Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on thetransitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of theNamibian situation (8/12636) and the operational requirements for the deploymentof UMTAG.

it. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my SpecialRepresentative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relatingto Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talksin Lagos from 11-12 February.

79-0 837

Note of Consultation Meeting of the Security Council held on Friday,2 March 1979.

The President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider theletter of the Secretary-General of 28 February containing his proposalsregarding the composition of the military component of UNTAG.

The Secretary-General told the Council that he had Just received a cablefrom SWAPO giving its formal answer to his report. The answer was some-what negative. There had been no formal answer as yet from South Africa;though there had been some public noises. The Secretary-General then readSWAPO's cable to the Council. He said that he would also inform theCouncil that he had tried to clarify the position of the neighbouringcountries in regard to the matter of monitoring by confirming that res-ponsibility for such monitoring lay with the neighbouring countries. He hadalso sought their agreement to establish UNTAG offices there. He saidthat President Kaunda had agreed to the proposal that SWAPO forces inZambia be monitored by Zambian forces. A similar answer had been receivedfrom Botswana. For technical reasons he had been unable to contactPresident Heto but was now in touch with the Angolan Ambassador with aview to clarifying the situation. He said that his proposal respected thesovereignty of the neighbouring countries while also providing for contactswith the US forces. He said that SWAPO's proposal contained nothing newin regard to troop composition; as always it was the opposite of SouthAfrica's position. However, he also felt that as there was no answer fromSouth Africa he was for the time being unable to proceed any further. Hewould wish to have the Council's views on these matters as also on hisproposed timetable. The representative of Zambia said that he would liketo put some questions: SWAPO was negative in regard to the proposals forcountries providing logistics support. Did their response extend to thecountries providing infantry battalions? Had the Secretary-General receivedany other offers in regard to logistical elements? The Secretary-Generalreferred to his letter of 28 February and read the list of infantry battalionsset out there. He noted that Rumania had, the previous day, informed himthat it would be unable to provide a battalion. He noted that the SWAPOlist was for battalions and that only Finland and Panama were contained inhis and SWAPO's lists. Regarding logistics, he had encountered tremendousdifficulties. He said that with the exception of Australia and Swedenall the countries offering logistical support were NATO countries. If therewere any further offers, he said, he would be glad to hear of them. Itwould also be necessary to evaluate such offers from the standpoint ofpracticability. The United States Ambassador said that SWAPO's cable did notmean that the efforts of the Secretary-General or the consultations shouldcease. Nothing, he said, has changed. The UU had a continuing responsibilityto seek a solution to the matter. The UN should press parties for a basisfor proceeding. He said that there was a jockeying for position on the partof the parties. This would not cease but would rather increase. At the sametime problems would get more difficult rather than become easier. He saidthat he did not accept the possibility of any one party vetoing the presentproceedings. He said that he accepted the importance of SWAPO but that theCouncil had not anointed SWAPO. SWAPO was just one of the parties whichwas to compete for political power.

Circulation: The Secretary-Ge neralMr. UrquhartMr. Ahtisaari Mr. Thornberry

- 2 -

The USSR Ambassador said that he also believed there should be furtherefforts to come to an agreement but that there vere evident objectionsby the parties, not only to the proposed composition but also to thereport. He said that he could not see how the Security Council couldas such take any further action until there had been further contacts•with the parties concerned. For the Soviet delegation SWAPO's positionwas very important if not decisive, having regard to the UN's stanceas to their position. It would therefore be difficult for the Councilto come up with any decisions until there had been fertile efforts tobring about agreement on all these issues.

The Ambassador of Kuwait said that from the legal point of view Namibiawas an international territory for which responsibilityis based in the Council for Namibia. Thus, it was quite correct thatneither side had a right of veto. However from the practical point ofview the Plan necessitated the co-operation of the parties. He wondered.therefore, whether the Council could now proceed, given the negativeresponse from SWAPO. He asked whether the Council could impose its willon the two parties. He foresaw great risks and pitfalls unless therewas a concurrence of the parties. He suggested that the discussionshould be adjourned until the other party responded.

The Ambassador of France said that the Secretary-General's list ofbattalions as set out in his letter of 28 February would not includeany NATO countries. It surely seemed, therefore, that SWAPO'srejection related to the list of countries for logistics.

The Ambassador of Zambia said that it was important to see the matterin perspective. SWAPO had not rejected the Secretary-General's report,it had objected to a few elements in it and in part to the Secretary-General's proposal in regard to logistics. Even then it was objectingto only two or three of the five countries concerned. He said thatthe whole question of monitoring in neighbouring countries was beingconsidered. The main issue, therefore, was composition, especiallyas to logistics. He thought it to be unfortunate for the SecurityCouncil to give up on this important matter. Consultations shoulddetermine whether equitable geographical distribution could be compliedwith. He said that it might not in the end be possible to satisfy all theparties. Neither could have a veto power. However, SWAPO was recognizedby the United Nations while South Africa was illegally occupying Namibia.The Council should be the arbitrator in these matters.

The Ambassador of France asked whether any of the countries named bySWAPO had made an offer on logistics.

The Secretary-General said that it was clear from the cable that SWAPOwas preoccupied with NATO participation in logistics. However, in thesame cable it had also reiterated its position setting out a list ofacceptable countries which, for battalions, included only Panama andFinland. This impossible situation had now gone on for several monthswhatever one party accepts the other rejects. He had finally tried tocut this gordian knot by making honest efforts to achieve some sortof settlement. From SWAPO's list only Sweden had offered logisticsupport. He said that the concurrence of the parties was necessary in

- 3 -

going forward. The UN could not impose its will "because that wouldend up in a shooting match with UN forces between the parties. Hebelieved that SWAPO's negative answer set out in the cable wouldnot involve a general rejection of his report and his proposals.The Secretary-General reiterated the last sentences of SWAPO's cable.However, it would raise the monitoring aspect once again. He saidthat there were three problems - composition, monitoring of SWAPOforces outside the country and the way the ceasefire would come intoforce. He would sum up by saying that he felt that he should continuewith his contacts and various efforts to clarify the open questions,while having no illusions as to the difficulties. However, he said,his time-table could not be implemented for the objective was to have , ,a ceasefire enter into force on 15 March 1979 and the ceasefire letter/lo besent out in the next few days. He said his time-table would nowdepend on how quickly he received answers from the parties on thematters for clarification.

The UK Ambassador said that both sides were jockeying for positionand both were trying to get things they were not able to get in thelast few years. Neither expected to have a peace-keeping forcealong the lines it now proposed. The Secretary-General's reportwas an extremely balanced document. He thought the Council shouldgive the Secretary-General an indication that his manner of proceedingso far had been acceptable. He thought that the test should be, notwhat the parties would like but what they would both finally acquiescein. The Secretary-General could not go and seek agreementbetween the parties for this would not happen. He said also

that it would be impossible to get the parties to face upto matters until they were obliged to take decisions. The UK feltthat the Secretary-General's letter should go out. That would be whenan answer would be forthcoming, not at the present stage.

The USSR Ambassador said that the question raised by SWAPO relatednot only to composition but also to the report. The proceedin;;s onnjM'Ai'.jia had always been conducted on the assumption that the parties'co-operation would be obtained. In his view, to send out the ceasefireletter now without knowing the conditions in which the ceasefire vouldtake place, would be to put the cart before the horse. He thoughtthat the logical thing would be to request the Secretary-General tocontinue consultations. He wished to raise -mother question;, lie thoughtthat the question of civilian personnel was also equal in significance.Some African countries have doubts regarding the people who would beat voting stations and checking the correctness of what was going on.He said that given the size of the undertaking, the largest and mostcomplex since the Congo, and in the light of experience since the Congo,he would associate himself with those who would ask the Secretary-Generaland Ahtisaari to continue their efforts.

The U.S.- Ambassador said that it was necessary to have the cooperationof the parties. There was a difference between approval and co-operation.

- l i -

lt would be a formula for disaster to seek approval all along the line.The report of the Secretary-General had recognized the difficultiespresented "by the parties. He had given his ideas on how to proceed.He thought that the parties should be faced with the need to makedecisions instead of allowing them to postpone and say "yes, but".He also said that the longer the matter continued the more difficultit was likely to become; and perhaps even impossible.

The Norwegian Ambassador said that he accepted fully the SG's reportand its outline of composition. He said that the SG deserved allcredit for these matters. He said that he was intrigued by thedistinction between agreement and acquiesensce. He thought acquiesensceshould be the standard.

The Ambassador of France said that agreement was virtually impossibleto get. It was very hard for either of the parties to give up theirprevious public positions. He felt that this was one of the areasin which the UN had an important role. He said that he would notthink that the Council could get any written paper endorsing the SG'sproposal but that it might get something indicating acquiesensce.

The USSR Ambassador asked how the Council would find out whether it hadobtained such acquiesensce ?

The Secretary-General again quoted the cable from SWAPO and in particularthe phrase which contained the words "it will be difficult for SWAPO".He said that probably the question was to find out what SWAPO meantby "difficult". He said that he felt it was necessary to await an answerfrom South AFrica.

The Jamaican Ambassador said it was vitally important to get a responsefrom South Africa. The situation arose from South AFrica"s continuingillegal position. One object of what was going on was to impose pressureon South Africa. Any acquiesensce of the parties must be constructiveacquiesensce. The UN must aim to put the Namibian people back in posessionof their territory.

The Ambassador of Bangladesh said he felt that progress had been made. HisGovernment felt that it could make contribution in its offer of infantrybattalion.

The Ambassador of Nigeria said that the Secretary-General would informmembers of the Council when he had received a reply from South Africaand the Council would then resume its consultations as soon as possible,thereafter. He hoped that South Africa would pay attention to the decisionsof the Council in sending a reply.

The meeting adjourned at 1257 hours.

UNITED N A T I O N SDistr.

S E C U R I T Y

C O M M O N 26 .February 1979\J U IN V^ I L ^^-^_^s?

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETAEY- GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ^35 (1978) and h39 (1978) ON

THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) concerningthe situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary forForeign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from23 to 2k November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November, respectively (S/12950).The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution ^35 (1978),by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate withthe Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as onparagraphs k and 5 of Security Council resolution ^39 (1978) by which theSecurity Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections ithad planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africaco-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in theimplementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), 4 31 (1978) and 35 (1978).

2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister ofForeign Affairs of South Africa informed me that the Government of South Africahad decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Councilresolution ^35 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to"proceed to South Africa and South West Africa" as soon as possible for thepurpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that,following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementationof Security Council resolution 1*35 (1978), I intended to requestMr. Martti Ahtisaari , my Special Representative, to visit South Africa andNamibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for thedeployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

3. My Special Representatives accompanied by the Commander of the MilitaryComponent of UNTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africaand Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on thetransitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of theNamibian situation (S/12636) and the operational requirements for the deploymentof UNTAG.

h. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my SpecialRepresentative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relatingto Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talksin Lagos from 11-12 February.

79-OU837

Draft

PROVISIONAL AGENDA FOR THE TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

To be held in the Security Council Chamber at Headquarterson

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the occupied Arab territories

Letter dated 23 February 1979 from the PermanentRepresentative of Jordan to the United Nationsaddressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13115)

UNITED N A T I O N S

S E C U R I T Y

C O U N C I L

Distr.GENERAL

S/1311523 February 1979t

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1979 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OFJORDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE

SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to request you toconvene a meeting of the Security Council t« consider the most ominous andaccelerating erosion of the status of Jerusalem and the_ rest of the «ccupied Arab

' ' in consequence of the Israeli • ccupatien -snTEn vitieg'''' systematic" ' **relentless and deliberate policy and practice of s/ertlemenys and colonizationof those territories which constitute a grave thre itO_j«*orT"d pea.ce and security.

(Signed) Hazem IIUSEIBEHAmbassador

Permanent Representative