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Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) KU Leuven
Parkstraat 45, box 3602, 3000 Leuven, Belgium Phone: +32 16 32 32 50; Fax: +32 16 32 30 88; http://www.kuleuven.be/crpd
Timing and Sequencing in
Peacebuilding: The Case of
Nigeria’s Niger Delta Amnesty
Programme
Ukoha Ukiwo, Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation
Programme, British Council, Nigeria
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
2015
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
2
Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding: The Case of Nigeria’s
Niger Delta Amnesty Programme
Abstract
This paper discusses the complex historical and political factors that informed the timing and
sequencing of the Nigeria’s Niger Delta amnesty programme. It argues that the amnesty
programme only became a feasible option for the Nigerian government and the militant groups
in the Niger Delta in 2009. This is because of the existence of the climate of rapprochement
that followed the inauguration of a new administration that was considered more sensitive to
the agitations in the region and was keen to explore the military option to solving the problem.
The paper provides some evidence of sequencing in the implementation of the amnesty
programme which to a large extent has helped stabilization efforts in the Niger Delta. There
was extensive deployment of military instruments to stabilize the region before commencement
of implementation of the amnesty programme. This was mainly to assert state sovereignty by
responding to mobilizations of militant groups to weaken and further erode state legitimacy.
The military option was pursued alongside dialogues mediated by Delta elite interlocutors who
helped to mobilize for support for the amnesty in the region. However, contingent factors that
developed ensured that the sequence was non-linear and complicated rather than phased.
While government would have preferred the phased approach given the culture of sequencing
in conflict management experience in Nigeria, the conflict dynamics themselves did not allow
for such controlled measure.
Author
Ukoha Ukiwo – Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, British Council, Nigeria
[email: uukiwo@hotmail.com]
This working paper is a draft version of the chapter ‘Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding:
The Case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Amnesty Programme’ in the book Building Sustainable
Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding, edited by
Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, Oxford University Press 2016.
The ‘Building Sustainable Peace’ project was made possible by a generous grant of Flanders
Department of Foreign Affairs.
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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1. Introduction
Nigeria’s amnesty programme for Niger Delta militants has been described as a ‘homegrown’
DDR programme by its initiators and implementers (Kuku 2012; Abazie-Humphrey 2014). This
appellation indicates a distinction between the programme and contemporaneous DDR
programmes implemented under the auspices of the United Nations and regional
organizations such as the African Union, the European Union, etc. More fundamentally
however the appellation shows the resolve of the Nigerian state to affirm its capacity to address
its internal security challenges. The context for this conscious effort to affirm the principle of
non-interference was partly in response to the advocacy of social movements in the region for
an internationally mediated political settlement. The Nigerian state was keen to demonstrate
that it was able to address internal security challenges as it was positioning itself as the
preeminent African country that should be considered for the proposed permanent
membership of the Security Council. There was concern that allowing a UN-mediated process
would rob the country of the status of African’s great power. This is because Nigeria’s
application for the permanent member of the UN Security Council was partly hinged on its
leading role in regional stability and contribution to UN peacekeeping missions.
Also important in the decision to shun international involvement in the amnesty programme
were nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments. These sentiments which were borne out of the
country’s struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism as well as the perceived duplicitous
roles of the big powers during Nigeria’s civil war have made successive Nigerian governments
and the Nigerian public to be suspicious of international intervention. In fact, Nigeria’s massive
investments in regional stability evidenced by the country’s support for the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as peacekeeping missions in Liberia
and Sierra Leone have partly stemmed from a foreign policy objective of keeping ‘the big
powers’ at bay from the neighbourhood.
The historical experience of managing the post-conflict nation building process after the
Nigeria Civil War without dependence on international support also inspired state actors to
insist on Nigeria shouldering the amnesty programme. Like in 1970 when the civil war ended,
the Nigerian state was keen to limit international intervention which could have corrosive
effects on state legitimacy. The implementation of the amnesty programme was considered
another opportunity to further the nation building process and revive sagging legitimacy of the
state. By being at the driver’s seat of the amnesty programme, the Nigerian state wished to
regain the trust and confidence of groups in the Niger Delta region that had started seeking
succour elsewhere.
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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Another important factor that influenced national ownership and implementation of the
amnesty programme is the fact that the country retained the fiscal capacity to implement the
programme. Unlike other countries where civil wars had created cash-strapped governments
without dependable sources of revenue, the Nigerian state could still depend on oil revenues
to run the programme. The global energy crises complicated by the conflicts in the Middle East
had raised demand for Nigerian oil. The Nigerian state reckoned there was a lot to gain by
directly managing the amnesty programme in order to stabilize the oil producing region,
resume oil production and ipso facto reap from rising oil prices.
Finally, emerging global norms which privileged regional and national initiatives to address
conflict and humanitarian emergencies were auspicious for Nigeria’s preference for a national
management of the process. Over-stretched by the proliferation of violent conflicts across the
world the big powers had from the 1990s relied on the agency of regional powers for
stabilization efforts. Nigeria had assumed this role for West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Its
decision to manage the amnesty programme was therefore unquestioned as it dovetailed with
global expectations.
However, although the Nigerian state led the process, the international community contributed
to the design of the programme and the general stabilization of the region. The UN, through
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided some technical support for the
different consultations leading to the proclamation of the amnesty. Once it was proclaimed, the
UNDP supported the preparation of the ‘Strategic and Operational Plan for the DDR,’ which
defined the vision and operations of the amnesty programme. The UNDP also supported the
Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Niger Delta Affairs, which was charged with
the implementation of the amnesty programme. At the request of the Amnesty Implementation
Office, the UNDP provided technical experts to support the programme in the areas of
demobilization and reintegration (Onadipe 2013).
Before the amnesty programme commenced the EU, US, UK, and multilateral institutions like
the World Bank and the UN among other international partners were visible actors in
stabilization and development efforts in the region. Estimates of funding commitments by the
major development partners in the region was about $3 billion (Francis et al. 2011; Newsom
2011; Egwu 2013). Most of the focus of the international actors was improvement of
governance and capacity of institutions and human resources for sustainable development in
the region. This stemmed from a perspective that substantial resources had been channeled
to the region with the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation revenues and the enhanced
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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portfolio of corporate social responsibility programmes introduced by the international oil
companies (Ukiwo 2008).
Since its proclamation about 30,000 young persons from the Niger Delta have been enlisted
into the programme and have undergone reorientation and capacity development. The
programme, which was billed to terminate in 2015 has elicited several assessments (see for
instance, Ikelegbe 2010; Oluwaniyi 2011; Kuku 2012; Oluduro and Oluduro 2012; Nwajiaku-
Dahou 2013; Abazie-Humphreys 2014 Peterside et al. 2015). The findings of the assessments
have suggested mixed outcomes. First, there is broad recognition that the programme has
enhanced resumption of oil production. The country recovered to its pre-2006 production level
of which averaged 2.2 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) that had dropped to about 700 bpd.
This has translated into windfalls in oil revenues with estimate pointing to Nigeria earning $39
billion in 2012. Second, there is also consensus that incidents of attacks on oil infrastructure
and personnel which was rife before the amnesty had significantly reduced. Third, the amnesty
had provided opportunities for the training of over 11,000 ex-militants in various professions.
However, the programme is perceived to have performed poorly in terms of delivery of human
security in the region. Analysts suggest that incidences of piracy, oil theft, arms proliferation,
and kidnapping have increased since the introduction of the amnesty programme. There is
also concern that the programme has promoted the culture of violence as rewarding the
perpetrators of violence has contributed to the distortion of socialization processes in the Niger
delta and beyond. Also the privileging of the ex-militants is perceived to have introduced new
systems of social inequalities with ex-militant leaders becoming nouveaux riches. Other
assessments have focused on the operational deficiencies of the programme, notably its
inability to plan for employment and reintegration of graduates of the programme.
While most studies of the amnesty programme have focused on its assessment, this paper
focuses on the timing and sequencing of peacebuilding initiatives in Nigeria with particular
reference of the amnesty programme. It seeks to identify and discuss the timing and
sequencing issues related to the amnesty programme, which came into force in October 2009.
The paper will seek to suggest factors that explain the timing of the amnesty programmme and
the sequencing of implementation of the programme.
The paper is divided into four sections. The second section examines the unexplored issue of
timing of the amnesty programme. It seeks to show why the amnesty programme was
implemented in 2009 and beyond rather than earlier. The third section discusses the
sequencing of events leading to the offer of the amnesty. In section four, I discuss the factors
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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that influenced the making and take-off of the amnesty. These leads to some concluding
remarks that draw out possible lessons from the Nigerian experience to comparative studies
on sequencing and timing of DDR processes.
2. The Timing of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme
Since the early 1990s, Nigeria’s Niger Delta region has experienced various forms of violent
group mobilization. At the roots of the mobilizations are grievances associated with oil
exploitation in the region (Human Rights Watch 1999; UNDP 2006; International Crisis Group
2007). Community groups initially protested against mostly international oil companies (IOC)
over degradation of the environment and economic entitlements related to oil production. The
crisis was complicated by the repressive response of the Nigerian state as the Nigerian state
which was under military rule battled to extinguish all threats to its illegitimate hold on power
(Ibeanu and Luckham 2006).
However, the advent of civilian rule did not herald any cessation of hostilities in the Niger Delta.
Contrary to expectations, it culminated in the aggravation of the crisis of confidence that had
undermined relations between the Nigerian state, the IOCs and oil producing communities of
the Niger Delta. At the roots of the worsening state of affairs was the realignment of social
forces and the perception of the peoples of the Niger Delta that democratization had retained
the same ethno-class that fed fat on the ‘oil-blood’ at the detriment of the region (Ukiwo 2011).
First, the transition to civil rule in 1999 bridged the gap between the youths who led most of
the agitations and struggles of the 1990s and the emerging regional elites who took over the
reins of power in the region. Unlike military administrators and governors who derived
legitimacy from and owed allegiance to the military head of state, the governors and legislators
who ascended in 1999 saw themselves as representatives of the people and the region. They
were more disposed to aligning with popular forces to challenge the Federal Government and
the IOCs on redistributive mechanisms in Nigeria’s federal system. Worthy of mention is the
fact that some youth leaders and minority rights activists were appointed into governments and
became part of the ruling coalitions at state and federal levels. The cooptation of the youth
leaders into the new governments was a populist imperative. At the turn of the twenty-first
century, the legitimacy of mainstream traditional and political leadership in the Niger Delta had
been eroded by decades of collusion and corruption. Youths had become the rallying point of
popular mobilizations. The presence of youth leaders in the emergent regimes was therefore
expected to yield some political dividend.
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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Second, there were misgivings in the region about the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as
president. Obasanjo, a former military head of state between 1976 and 1979, was generally
seen as a key member of the military oligarchy that had distorted and devalorized Nigeria’s
federal system by systematically driving centralization since the eve of civil war in 1967. More
pointedly, the circumstance that led to the emergence of Obasanjo as president lent credence
to this fear. Convicted and jailed by late Gen. Sani Abacha for alleged coup plot, Obasanjo
became the preferred candidate of the dominant faction of the military and political class that
was inclined to cede power to South-West geopolitical zone in order to appease the region for
the annulment of the 12 June 1993 elections. Although chief MKO Abiola, the presumed winner
of the election, won in most parts of the country, the draconian reactionary response of the
Nigerian state under Sani Abacha virtually extinguished dissenting views in most parts of the
country, except Abiola’s home-base in the South West. Obasanjo’s selection was perceived
as a ploy of the ruling class to concede power to the region, albeit through the imposition of a
trusted ally.
The litmus test for the crisis of confidence between Obasanjo and the Niger Delta region was
the implementation of the 1999 constitutional provision on revenue allocation formula. The
constitution, which was imposed by the departing military government of Gen. Abdulsalami
Abubakar stipulated that ‘not less than 13 per cent’ of national revenues will be allocated on
the basis of derivation. The delay in implementation of the constitutional provision caused so
much disquiet in the region. The crisis of confidence worsened when the Federal Government
eventually started implementation without backdating payments to 29 May 1999 when the new
constitution became effective. The government acquiesced to the demands of payment of
arrears after a protracted legal battle. Another legal battle ensued over application of the
derivation principle for revenues accruing from on-shore oil production. This is because of
international law statutes that vests ownership of territorial waters on sovereign states. While
the Federation of Nigeria laid claims to revenues of on-shore oil on the basis of International
Law, which was upheld by the Nigerian Supreme Court, the governments of coastal states in
the Niger Delta, claimed Nigeria’s ownership of territorial waters derived from the fact that the
waters were contiguous to the coastal states and the country’s rights stemmed from the coastal
states’ membership of Nigeria. Failing to secure a legal resolution, the Federal Government
under Obasanjo eventually accepted a political solution which made coastal states eligible to
receive derivation revenues from on-shore oil production. But this only happened after tempers
had risen and nerves were frayed in the region.
Relations between Abuja and the Niger Delta also suffered from delays in the enactment of
the Act for the Establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This is
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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because of the vacuum created by the abolition of the Oil Minerals Producing Areas
Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1999. The development agency had since its
establishment in 1993 served as a redistributive mechanism to channel some benefits of oil
production to oil producing communities. Although alleged corruption and nepotism eroded the
credibility of the development agency, delay in setting up an alternative agency raised fears of
termination of resources that accrued to the region through the instrumentality of OMPADEC
(Ozo-Eson and Ukiwo 2001).
What is more, the Obasanjo administration had to contend with the lingering issue of restive
youths who mobilized against oil companies and security agencies in oil production platforms
in order to secure benefits for themselves and their communities. On 11 December 1998, the
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), easily the most organized youth network in the region, had given an
ultimatum to oil companies to vacate production sites by 30 December 1998. Efforts of the IYC
to enforce the ultimatum early in January 1999 through peaceful marches to mobilize public
support for the ‘Operation Climate Change’ resulted in a pre-emptive attack by Nigerian
security forces. The bloody encounter resulted in the death of scores of youths and some
soldiers. This armed confrontation had a catalytic effect in militarization of the conflict as it led
to the emergence of armed groups seeking to revenge killings of youths involved in non-violent
protest. The resort to the tradition of self-defense through the invocation of Egbesu, the Ijaw
deity, marked the beginning of militancy as armed groups openly confronted the Nigerian state
and its security apparatus. Reportedly backed by the mystically powers of Egbesu, armed
youths embarked upon attacks which helped to demystify the Nigerian military.
Several encounters between soldiers and police deployed to pacify the region and armed
groups claiming to represent community interest ensued throughout 1999 leading to deaths of
youths, soldiers, and policemen. The worst incident occurred in Odi in Bayelsa State early
November when irate youths allegedly killed seven policemen deployed to investigate a gang
of armed youths that operated from the community and had been implicated in various crimes
including killing of security personnel. In a bid to restore public order and stop what was
becoming incessant killings of security personnel by armed groups in the region, president
Olusegun Obasanjo ordered troops into Odi to arrest the leader and members of the militant
group allegedly responsible for the killing the seven policemen. The troop deployment occurred
after the expiration of the two-week ultimatum the president had issued to the Bayelsa State
Government to produce the killers of the policemen. The ultimatum, which was not met,
reflected the lack of confidence between Federal Government and the State Government.
Clearly, the president was peeved by what seemed to be the tacit approval of the government
of the state and some opinion leaders in the state to the recent development. This is more so
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
9
as the militant group was reportedly mobilizing youths into camp for training to revenge the
alleged attack and killing of some Ijaw residents in Lagos by members of the Odua Peoples’
Congress (OPC). The troop deployment resulted in serious collateral damage as more than
300 persons were reportedly killed and there was mass destruction of property.
The Odi killings further undermined relations between the Federal Government and the
government and peoples of the regions. It was perceived to reflect the personal biases and
hostility of the president against the people of the region and privileging of members of his own
Yoruba ethnic group. Consequently, the influential IYC mobilized against Obasanjo’s re-
election in 2003. Chief DSP Alameiyeseigha, governor of Bayelsa State also allegedly
mobilized to use the votes of the Ijaw to stop Obasanjo’s re-election. Alameiyeseigha was
suspected to be the arrow head of the plot of some governors who were mobilizing support for
vice president Abubakar Atiku to challenge Obasanjo in the 2003 polls. In return for his support,
Atiku was supposed to select Alameiyeseigha as vice presidential candidate to actualize a
North-South ticket. In. this context, president Obasanjo reportedly courted other Niger Delta
governors to checkmate Alameiyeseigha. He was able to win Dr. Peter Odili of Rivers State to
his side. Concerned about Alameiyeseigha’s growing influence among youths in the region,
Odili had started reaching out to youth groups. Odili was particularly interested in the IYC,
whose membership, mandate, and influence were felt in all Niger Delta states with substantial
Ijaw populations. It is against this background that he reportedly sponsored the emergence of
Asari Dokubo as president of IYC in 2001. The sponsorship of a Rivers born Ijaw youth for the
post for an organization which was dominated by Bayelsa elements was intended to reduce
the influence of Alameiyeseigha. This is because Alameiyeseigha had taken up the title of
‘Governor-General of the Ijaw’ by virtue of his position as the only Ijaw among governors of six
Niger Delta states with indigenous Ijaw population. Linked to this motive of reducing the
influence of a rival politician, was the expectation of influencing the agenda of IYC.
Thus, during the 2003 elections, Odili sought to influence the IYC leadership to support the
candidacy of Obasanjo without success as the Asari-led leadership insisted on only working
for Odili’s re-election as governor and not Obasanjo’s re-election due to the latter’s reported
disastrous footprints in the region. The conflict over the 2013 elections eventually culminated
into violence in the Niger Delta and in Rivers State in particular as rival armed youth groups
for and against election of Odili and Obasanjo clashed. Leading the armed confrontation were
Asari Dokubo, who had formed a movement called the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force
(NDPVF) and Ateke Tom of the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV). Efforts to broker a truce between
the groups were unsuccessful because Dokubo alleged that Odili had sponsored Ateke Tom
to eliminate him on account of his decision to oppose Obasanjo’s re-election. Although,
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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Obasanjo later brokered a truce between the warring groups, this did not improve his credibility
in the region. The truce floundered shortly afterwards when Asari Dokubo claimed Ateke Tom
was not surrendering weapons during the disarmament process brokered by president
Obasanjo and governor Odili. Asari Dokubo abandoned the peace process alleging a
conspiracy to disarm his group while other armed groups in the region allegedly connected to
the president and the governor retained their arms.
Furthermore, the perception of insincerity of the Obasanjo administration in addressing the
quest of the people’s of the Niger Delta for resource control is also linked to the failure of the
National Political Reform Conference in 2005. The conference was convened by the Obasanjo
to address lingering crisis of the Nigerian state, which had led to conflicts in post-military
Nigeria. The government and groups in the Niger Delta like other groups had mobilized
massively to the conference. They had wished that the conference, which was supposed to
midwife a new constitution for the country, would serve as an opportunity to renegotiate the
fiscal arrangement of Nigeria’s federalism to ensure that more revenues are allocated to the
regions of extraction and production. The conference adjourned sine die over the deadlock
between the largely oil producing states in the South South and South East Nigeria and the
rest of the country over revenues accruing from oil.
Although there was clear evidence that social forces and groups from Northern and South
West geopolitical zones, who were already worried about rising horizontal inequalities created
by the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula, undermined the proposal for
increment of the derivation funds to 50 per cent, agitating groups in the Niger Delta believed
the proposal failed to sail through because it did not have the backing of the Obasanjo
administration. This is partly because the narrative of the political blocs against transfer of
more funds to the Niger Delta was that Niger Delta elites had corruptly enriched themselves
with the 13 per cent already allocated to the region. The anti-resource control argumentation
that there was no evidence that more resource transfers to the Niger Delta which had
exacerbated regional inequalities had promoted prosperity was identical with the position of
the Obasanjo administration. The administration had developed this line of response following
persistent anti-federal government mobilizations in the region. The Obasanjo administration
increasingly considered the whole gamut of the youth protest movements and agitations for
more resources as diversionary mechanisms designed by the ruling elites in the region to direct
popular attention and aggression at so-called external ‘exploiters’ and ‘oppressors’ while
occluding their malfeasance from the public. It is against this background that the Obasanjo
administration deployed the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the anti-
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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corruption agency to investigate the administration of oil revenues allocated to their states and
local government areas.
This further alienated the regional elites and youth groups allied to them from the Obasanjo
administration as they accused the Obasanjo government of selective targeting and
prosecution of Niger Delta elites and politicians. This was the sentiment that overshadowed
the controversial detention and escape of Alameiyeseigha from London as well as his
subsequent impeachment as governor of Bayelsa State in December 2005. The allegation that
Alameiyeseigha was wanted to answer charges of corruption and money laundering was
overshadowed by perceptions that president Obasanjo masterminded the impeachment
process to punish a political opponent. Furthermore, the arrest and imprisonment of chief
Ebitimi Banigo, another Ijaw businessman for diverting investor’s fund in his bank for personal
use in late 2004 was also considered another evidence of Obasanjo’s targeting of Ijaw elites
for prosecution. The arrest of the prominent Ijaw elites subsequently served as the trigger
factor for the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND),
which declared total armed struggle against the Nigerian State in early 2006 (Ukiwo 2007).
The armed struggle which featured attacks on oil installations and security agencies deployed
to protect them led to drastic fall in oil production levels and hemorrhage of oil revenues (Asuni
2009; Sayne 2013).
Consequently, the crisis of confidence between the Obasanjo administration and Niger Delta
youth and elites undermined several efforts to end the militancy in the region. Some residual
expectation of rapprochement rested in the possibility that Obasanjo might support emergence
of one of his allies among the Niger Delta governors to succeed him. This appeared plausible
as the president whose third term campaign was botched by the insistence of the northern
power bloc to regain power in 2007 seemed to have encouraged some politicians from the
Niger Delta and South East to contest for the presidency to spite the North. One of the
politicians in the region who appeared to have earned the trust of Obasanjo was Dr. Peter Odili
who was completing his tenure as governor of oil rich Rivers State. Odili became the front
runner in the race for the presidency as ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) mobilized for
the primaries scheduled for December 2006. However, Obasanjo’s volte face on Odili’s
candidacy on eve of the primaries sealed any hopes of emergence of a Niger Delta president
in 2007. While Obasanjo advertized allegations of corruption as the main reason for his
withdrawal of support to Odili—allegations for which Odili was never prosecuted—there were
indications that Obasanjo was pressured to abide by power sharing arrangement between
North and South after realizing that it might be a herculean task to impose a southern
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
12
successor. There were also permutations that Obasanjo dumped Odili after realizing the
underhand role Odili played in undermining the third term agenda.
The sudden emergence of Umar Musa Yar Adua, the governor of Katsina State as PDP
presidential candidate helped to stabilize the Nigerian polity from the perspective of North-
South relations. However, the recognition that dissent in the Niger Delta would undermine
macroeconomic stability and regime effectiveness influenced the ruling party to zone the
position of vice presidency to the South South geopolitical zone. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, who
became governor of Bayelsa State after Alameiyeseigha’s impeachment, was selected as
running mate of Yar Adua to appease the Niger Delta, especially the Ijaw the most populous
ethnic group in the region. The selection of an ethnic Ijaw was also strategic as MEND was
essentially an amalgamation of Ijaw militia groups. Leaders of the ruling party also thought
selection of an Ijaw was expected to placate the region and engender the platform for
overcoming broken relationship. Many expected that the time had come for the decade-old
crisis of confidence to be resolved.
It is against this background that Yar Adua during his campaign prioritized restoring peace and
stability in the Niger Delta. Among other campaign promises, Yar Adua committed his
administration to implementing the Niger Delta Development Master Pan (NDDMP) developed
under the auspices of the Obasanjo administration. This undertaking became one of the Seven
Point Agenda of the Yar Adua administration (Dode 2010). In order to move beyond the politics
of the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula, Yar Adua also committed to
establishing a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs that will drive development in the region (Kuku
2012: 111–112).
On assumption of office, Yar Adua was faced by the reality of falling oil production levels which
had fallen by 25 per cent as a result of sustained attacks by insurgents on oil installations
(Egwu 2013). There were concerns that the situation would worsen as the militants had
enhanced capability to strike at choice targets. For instance, militants linked to MEND had
breached security at Bonga Oil Field, the country’s biggest off-shore oil platform. Enhanced
sophistication of the militant groups was inversely proportional to declining capability of
Nigeria’s security agencies in protecting oil facilities and fighting the creek wars. Not only were
security forces perceived to be corrupt, their brutality alienated members of the oil-bearing
communities and ipso facto starved them of vital intelligence. On the contrary the militant
groups improved on their intelligence gathering. They were able to intercept information from
oil companies. For instance, the militants tapped information on when there is oil in the
pipelines and sabotage and theft will yield maximum dividends. They also infiltrated the
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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security forces and gathered intelligence on military strategy and troop deployment. Notable
in this respect was the interception of an official internal memorandum of strategy to be
adopted by the Joint Task Force against militancy. These developments in the security sector
clearly convinced the fledgling Yar Adua of the futility of security approach to tackling the
militancy.
There was also mounting pressures from the international community, which faced by the
protracted Middle East crisis and surging oil prices, looked to the Gulf of Guinea for oil.
Pressures were evidenced by increased development assistance to address governance
challenges in the region as well as the United States mobilization to establish a base of the
AFRICOM in the region to secure oil production and export and stem the rising tide of
organized crime and weapons proliferation. In summary, the transition to a new government,
limitations of the security approach, global energy crisis, and pressures from the international
community at the historical juncture created the impetus for the amnesty programme. In the
section that follows, I discuss the sequence of events that preceded and followed the
declaration of amnesty for repentant Niger Delta militants.
3. Sequencing Issues in the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme
Conventional practice in peacebuilding usually envisages a sequence of events which proceed
from the three stages of peacebuilding, namely peacekeeping, peacemaking, and
peacebuilding. The peacemaking phase is dominated by activities to maintain order and
stabilize the environment through separation of competing groups, suppression of armed
groups, and securing of ceasefires. Military and hard security instruments usually dominate
this phase. This is usually followed by the peacekeeping phase where the objective is to secure
political settlement and put together a politico-constitutional framework for sustainable peace
in the post-conflict period. Activities in this phase include peace dialogues, commissions of
enquiry, national dialogue, constitutional conferences, and mediation. The main instruments
are political, psycho-social, and legal in nature. Finally, the peacebuilding phase focusses on
addressing structural drivers of conflict. It entails the deployment of developmental, economic,
and political instruments to cement peace agreements and prevent reoccurrence of violent
conflict. Key activities in this phase are those linked to economic growth and development;
employment provisioning, new power and resource sharing arrangements, and reconstruction
of infrastructure. The discussion in this section will explore the extent to which the
peacebuilding programme in Nigeria’s Niger Delta followed this phased approach.
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
14
As noted in the previous section, the emergence of Yar Adua offered new opportunities for
engagement with the Niger Delta. During the campaign for the presidency, Yar Adua came to
the realization that the security approach adopted by the Obasanjo administration to address
the challenges was becoming counter-productive as it had led to the militarization of the region.
Armed groups in the region appeared to be in an arms race with the Nigerian military in
acquisition of weapons and hard wares. Given the access they had to illicit revenues from
‘blood oil,’ the militants seemed to be at a relative advantage in weapons procurement (Hazen
and Horner 2007; Asuni 2009; Sayne 2013). Both the fact that militants were relatively well-
armed and that Nigeria’s military response drew a lot of criticism by the international
community because of alleged human rights violations, were important factors for Yar Adua to
start seeking dialogue with aggrieved groups in the region.
The conciliatory approach of the government manifested in three key major strategies adopted
very early in the life of the administration (International Crisis Group 2007). First, the new
government prioritized facilitation of the release from detention of Asari Dokubo and
Alameiyeseigha in response to the demands of militant groups especially those who belong to
the MEND alliance. Second, since the gesture, which divided both provincial and national
opinion, did not yield any peace dividends, the government also started exploring whether offer
of amnesty to the militants will help stabilization efforts in the region. However, offer of amnesty
stalled for a number of reasons. It polarized Nigerian public opinion with many commentators
wondering whether it would not encourage aggrieved groups to resort to violence. There was
also concern about the vagueness of the offer as there was not blueprint on the proposed
amnesty.
A key question raised by diverse social groups was whether all militants would benefit or
whether a distinction would be made between the so-called ‘real militants’ and criminals
masquerading as militants. There was also the concern among militant groups that the offer
might be a ruse to hoodwink them to disarm especially since the offer was not backed by a
published government whitepaper on the amnesty. The context for the misgivings was the
arrest, prosecution, and detention of Asari in 2004 by the Obasanjo government after a
controversial failed settlement pact with militants. Third, was the decision to dialogue with the
militant groups as soon as it assumed office. The most celebrated of the talks was vice
president Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to Okerenkoko in the creeks of the delta to meet with
MEND leader Government Ememupolo (popularly called Tompolo) on 27 June 2007. These
overtures failed to stop hostilities as rival factions continued attacks to assert their
independence and signify other militant leaders did not represent them. There were also
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15
misgivings by some militant groups that the vice president who was delegated with the militants
privileged Ijaw groups over other groups.
After failing to secure cessation of hostilities through individual contacts the new administration
tried to formalize the process of negotiations through the establishment of a twenty-member
peace and conflict resolution committee. The committee was to coordinate with similar
committees established by state governments at the instance of the Federal Government to
reach out to militant groups, mediate in conflicts between the groups, and also secure release
of hostages taken by militant groups. The committee appeared to be most successful in
securing release of hostage, often after payment of huge ransom. Its modus operandi easily
alienated some groups who claimed committee members had linked with the hostage takers
and benefitted from deals to release hostages. The crisis of confidence that set in not only led
to calls for its disbandment but also resulted in increasing boycott of its sittings by some
militants groups.
Part of the crisis of confidence stemmed from fears among groups in the region that the new
government had not taken any steps to implement its substantial campaign promises with
regard to the Niger Delta. Rather than implementing its campaign promises, the Yar Adua
government introduced new plans for the region, including most notably the Marshall Plan for
the Niger Delta, which was introduced at the G8 Summit in June 2007. Yar Adua’s new plan
created confusion and concern among various militant groups because it seemed to replace
the Niger Delta Development Master Plan, which was launched by the departing President
Obasanjo and which Yar Adua himself had endorsed during his electoral campaign. There was
also concern that the government had not established the Ministry of Niger Delta as promised
during the campaign. In the context of alleged failed or unfulfilled promises by successive
governments, the impatience with Yar Adua was understandable. However, the government
was also a victim of its own lack of a policy framework. Given the circumstance of his sudden
emergence as presidential candidate of the ruling party, Yar Adua who had entertained no
ambition to be president, lacked any clear vision of governance. The Seven Point Agenda he
sold to voters as manifesto was hurriedly developed in response to criticisms by the opposition
and civil society groups. It was lacking in work plans and milestones, leaving the public to
guess delivery dates of the promises.
The administration was also a victim of its own naivety and ignorance of the complexity of the
conflicts. It did not understand the context of the conflict, the multiplicity of actors and the
conflict dynamics. Lack of conflict sensitivity manifested, for instance, in the assumption that
vice president Jonathan would be acceptable to all interests and groups in the region. Several
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
16
costly false steps of the administration also stemmed from lack of stakeholder mapping before
commencement of initiatives. This led to disputations about appointments and contacts that
undermined proposed initiatives.
A case in point is the Niger Delta Summit Initiative that Yar Adua promised to convene to chart
the pathway for his handshake with the region. Yar Adua leveraged on existing international
goodwill on addressing the conflicts in the Niger Delta to turn it into an international event. After
meetings with the UN Secretary-General at the margins of the G8 summit in June 2007 and
UN General Assembly in September 2007, he requested UN’s support for peacebuilding efforts
in the Niger Delta (Onadipe 2013). As earlier noted, the Government of Nigeria emphasized
the national character of the conflict and stated support should be of a technical nature rather
than political and military. It is against this background that the government decided to choose
a Nigerian staff member of the UN to lead the summit on the region. However, this initiative
was aborted as a result of the protests that trailed the appointment of Prof. Ibrahim Gambari,
Nigerian-born UN Undersecretary-General as Convener of the Summit. While Yar Adua felt
Gambari would bring his international exposure, experience, and patriotism to bear on the
assignment, leaders and social movements in the Niger Delta rejected the appointment over
fears that Gambari would not be sensitive to the interest of the region. This was based on
claims that Gambari played a leading role in mobilizing support for the Abacha regime over
the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and seven other Ogoni activists in his capacity as Nigeria’s
Representative at the UN in the 1990s.
Angst over Gambari’s appointment culminated in the wholesale rejection of the idea of the
summit by vocal and influential Niger Delta stakeholders. They justified their decision to throw
away the baby with the bath water on the grounds that the region was no longer in need of
ideas to develop and stabilize it. Niger Delta leaders and social movements argued that several
summits and panels had been established to address the challenge of development in the
region even before the country’s independence. Successive administrations in the country had
lacked the political will to fully implement these recommendations. Rather than convene
another ‘circus’ at the expense of oil bearing communities who want oil wealth to be applied
for the transformation of their destinies, Niger Delta leaders insisted there will be more value
for money if the Yar Adua administration reviewed and abreast itself of the findings and
recommendations of previous committees and panels on development, peace, and security in
the Niger Delta.
Apart from the uproar over Gambari’s appointment, some groups within the region opposed
the summit on the grounds that the government had failed to implement some of the
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
17
agreements reached with committees and delegations. Notable in this respect were purported
agreements to prepare a roadmap for troop withdrawal in the region, further release of
detained militants, and reconstruction of eight communities damaged during face-off between
militants and security agencies (International Crisis Group 2007).
The plan to organize the summit or convene a technical committee in lieu of it was further
delayed by two other major factors. First, is the alleged marginalization of vice president
Jonathan in the administration as a result of his purported replacement as the government’s
interlocutor in the region. This is because the Secretary to the Federal Government (SFG)
temporarily took over as mediator between the government and the region after rancorous
reactions to some of Jonathan’s visits to the creeks to meet with militants and allegations he
favoured his own Ijaw ethnic group. The ascendancy of the SFG provoked resentments as
Babagana Kingibe who held the post of the SFG was a Kanuri from North East Nigeria.
Kingibe, who was vice presidential candidate in the 12 June 1993 presidential elections, was
infamous for reportedly abandoning his principal to serve in the Abacha regime after the
annulment of the elections. The appointment of Yayale Ahmed, the Minister of Defence to
replace Kingibe did not help matters but further alienated groups in the region who claimed it
was indicative of the government’s insistence on treating the Niger Delta crisis as a security
rather than developmental challenge. This perception of government’s securitization of the
Niger Delta crisis (Ibeanu 2008) was further driven by provisional allocation of the sum of $3.4
billion for ‘security and the Niger delta’ in the 2008 appropriation bill. Groups in the region
claimed the lumping of the Delta budget with the security budget as well as the massive sum
for the military and police indicated plans of the administration to privilege a military response
to a developmental response. The groups cited the fact that only about $560 million was
budgeted for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Federal Government’s
development intervention agency in the region (International Crisis Group 2007; Kuku 2012:
122).
The second factor that slowed progress on convening of the summit or technical committee
was the deteriorating health condition of Yar Adua. This not only slowed decision-making but
also triggered power tussle within the kitchen cabinet. One of the effects of this power tussle
manifested as the marginalization of vice president Jonathan. Not surprisingly, Kingibe who
initially displaced Jonathan as liaison with the Niger Delta was sacked few months later for
suspected ambition to take over from Yar Adua in the event of his death or incapacitation from
the terminal ailment he was suffering from.
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18
The delays and flip-flops in the administration’s responses contributed in no small measure in
eroding the credibility of the administration in the Niger Delta. This threatened expectations
raised that the departure of Obasanjo signaled new vistas for the resolution of the Niger Delta
crisis. Symptomatic of the declining social capital was deterioration of security conditions in
the region from July 2007. The upsurge in incidents of kidnapping, hostage taking, attacks on
oil facilities, piracy, inter-gang violence, and armed confrontations with security agencies. All
these resulted in further disruption of oil production, decline in oil revenues, and flight of
investments from the region. The government reacted by deploying more military force. For
instance, in August 2007 the Joint Task Force was deployed to tackle the menace of cultists
and gangs that had engulfed the region, especially Port Harcourt, arguably the centre of gravity
of the oil producing region.
However, the military solution while providing some relief to maintenance of order in urban
centres did not end the security challenge across the region, especially the disruption of oil
production, which the militants and criminal elements who had local knowledge of the network
of pipelines sabotaged at will. The militant groups became more sophisticated and daring in
their operations traversing both on-shore and off-shore locations. The Nigerian government
and oil operators were shocked when MEND for instance carried out its most daring attack on
Shell’s Bonga oil facility in June 2008. The facility is located 120 kilometers from the coastlines
of the Niger Delta. Paradoxically, while the deployment of troops was the result of declining
security conditions, the militants continued to demand withdrawal of troops and demilitarization
as conditions for further negotiations. For good measure, militants and some elites in the region
continued to allege that security forces deployed to keep peace were not only violating rights
but were feeding fat on the state of insecurity.
It is against this background that the Yar Adua administration was forced to continue exploring
the parallel track of negotiation and conciliation. It eventually acquiesced to demands for a
Technical Committee on the Niger Delta to review findings and recommendations of previous
panels and committees; and suggest the way forward. Given the embarrassment that the idea
of the summit generated, president Yar Adua distanced himself from the process. He
delegated vice president Goodluck Jonathan to inaugurate the Committee on 8 September
2008—roughly sixteen months behind the proposed commencement of the summit.
Importantly also the administration allowed the committee to elect its leadership after initial
controversies surrounding the purported appointment of Dr. Idika Kalu, a former IMF economist
and finance minister, who was not from the core Niger Delta region. The preferred chair elected
by the committee was Mr. Ledum Mittee, who was incumbent president of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP). The inaugural address of the Vice President
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19
indicated the urgency of the assignment as well as government’s concern to ensure it does
not derail like other initiatives:
Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a very important assignment and time is of vital essence.
[…] As you may be aware, this initiative of a Technical Committee on the Resolution of
the Niger Delta Crisis is a suggestion from the people of the Niger Delta. The Committee,
is, therefore, expected to collate, review and distil the various reports, suggestions and
recommendations on the Niger Delta […]. Wherever a report on the Niger Delta exists,
and you can reach it, I urge you to have them ferreted out; examined as thoroughly as
you can and make suggestions for Government’s necessary and urgent action. On
behalf of the Government, I want to assure you that your recommendations will not be
treated with levity. […] You are to appoint your own chairperson and secretary and also
evolve the mechanisms through which you can bring about the necessary collation,
findings and suggestions. Government will not interfere with the workings of the
Technical Committee and expects that you will submit your report to it within ten days of
your first sitting (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008: iv–v).
The committee eventually sought extension and with support from development partners
operated for three months and submitted its report on November 2008. The committee also
went beyond its terms of reference of focusing on documentary analysis by interfacing with
both armed and non-armed groups in the region. The interface was deemed necessary to
validate findings and recommendations of previous reports and garner the buy in of key
stakeholders for the recommendations of the committee. The conclusion of the committee
underscored the need for implementation of its recommendations:
In conclusion, it is clear that though governments, since 1958, have set up very high
powered committees to look into the problems of the Niger Delta and the Committees
have submitted far-reaching and comprehensive reports, they have suffered the same
fate: non implementation. In cases where some of the recommendations have been
considered at all, they have been taken out of context and implemented piecemeal or
without the required enthusiasm, consistency and monitoring. Some of the reports were
not even touched at all; no White Paper was issued, and no follow-up implementation
and monitoring mechanisms were set up by Government. This meant that the will and
required enthusiasm to set in motion processes for a developed, peaceful and
progressive Niger Delta were absent. […] The Committee believes that, if unlike in the
past, the recommendations outlined in TOR 3 of this Report receive a different treatment
and priority attention from the authorities in power, it is possible to achieve meaningful
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20
change and reverse the dislocation, decay and deterioration of the Niger Delta as a
whole, and its creeks in particular (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008: 55).
However, the extent to which government was dependent on the committee to push ahead
with its crises management plan was called to question when the government took steps to
fulfill one of its campaign promises by announcing the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta
Affairs in October 2008. The government’s decision partly stemmed from misgivings about the
possibility of acceptance of report by other ethnoregional and political groups in the country.
There were indications that the president was not happy that all members of the committee
were from the Niger Delta and that the committee was allowed to select its own leadership
(Kuku 2012). The convention in the country was for all government committees to have a
semblance of representation of interests from different parts of the country and for government
to appoint leadership of such committees and panels.
The possible fears of president Yar Adua were confirmed as the committee made more far
reaching recommendations than the government would have envisaged. It was therefore left
for the government to pick and choose which of the recommendations it considered imperative
in the resolution of the violence in the region at least in the short foreseeable future. Kuku
(2012: 117) who was closely associated with the process as a result of his perceived agency
and social networks argues that the recommendations that Yar Adua took seriously were: 1)
Increase of derivation revenues from 13 per cent to 25 per cent; 2) Open trial and bail for Henry
Okah; and 3) Disarming process for youths involved in militancy through a DDR programme.
Since the first recommendation required constitutional amendment, only the remaining two
were feasible pragmatic options for the president in the short term. Moreover, the president
was willing to give approval for the release of Okah because he was implicated in most security
reports and diplomatic intelligence especially from countries in the Gulf of Guinea as the leader
of group that undermined security in the entire Gulf of Guinea (Kuku 2012). Similarly a
conditional amnesty for militants who agreed to lay down arms would secure the region and
create the environment for improved revenues. This instrumentalist approach characterized
by securing agreements with identified trouble makers to buy peace also manifested in the
decision of Yar Adua to release Dokubo and Alameiyeseigha. As we shall see, it would also
be influential in shaping the character and outcomes of the amnesty programme.
4. The Making of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
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There is no evidence that the Yar Adua administration published a White Paper on the report
of the Technical Committee. However, as earlier noted, since the president was positively
inclined to securing the commitment of persons and groups linked to the militancy for the
restoration of peace and security, he proceeded to set up a Presidential Panel on Amnesty on
5 May 2009 to advise government on modalities for granting amnesty to Niger Delta militants.
The committee, which was headed by General Godwin Abbe (rtd), Minister of Interior, held
wide consultations within and outside the region to ensure acceptance of the proposed
amnesty. It also mobilized the participation of relevant security agencies, federal government
agencies and Niger Delta state governments in the implementation of the amnesty programme.
The committee proposed a timetable and plan for the commencement of programme. Once
proclaimed by the president, militants will have a sixty day period to respond to the offer. Only
those who accepted the amnesty would be pardoned and enlisted into the programme. On the
expiration of the period given for acceptance of military, disarmament centres for collection of
weapons will be established in the different Niger Delta states where militants will hand over
their weapons in groups under their leadership. The weapons surrender and handover process
would be devoid of cash exchanges. Disarmed militants and militant groups will be invited to
a demobilization and orientation camp where they will be reoriented and their training needs
for reintegration in society determined. The successful ex-militants will be sent on training and
subsequently integrated by private sector and government ministries, departments, and
agencies (MDAs). For good measure, the panel also proposed a budget of N50 billion for the
programme and estimated that 10,000 militants will benefit.
The panel clearly executed the brief of the government to serve the purpose of demonstrating
that the Federal Government was in control of developments. This is evidenced by the panel’s
modus operandi and recommendations. It avoided open public sessions with militants during
its consultations. It rejected any proposed conditionality, notably the demand for withdrawal of
the Joint Task Force (JTF), for the acceptance of amnesty. The panel also rejected the
possibility of negotiation with mediators proposed by the militants especially MEND’s so-called
Aaron Team, made up of Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka and Rear Admiral Mike Akhigbe (rtd).
The panel further opposed any involvement of international organizations as proposed by the
militants. In these respects, therefore, it was in stark contrast to the Technical Committee on
the Niger Delta. It is therefore not surprisingly that the government did not delay in the
wholesale implementation of the recommendations. While receiving the report, president Yar
Adua announced that implementation of the panel’s recommendations will commence within
two weeks. The period was given to allow for drafting of legal instruments and legitimation of
the amnesty proclamation. Crucial for legitimation was the convening of the National Council
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22
of States, a constitutional non-partisan broad-based body of eminent persons, charged with
affirming executive decisions on potentially nationally divisive issues such as presidential
exercise of prerogative of mercy, conduct of general elections, and national population census.
Following the affirmation of the National Council of States, president Yar Adua proclaimed
‘amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated
in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta’ on 25 June
2009. A window period of sixty days was offered to militants to submit their reports and stop
militant activities between 6 August when weapons collection centres will be set up and 4
October when they will wind down. Any group that took arms against the Nigerian state, private
individuals, and private business after October 2009 was to be treated as a criminal even
though the person claimed the action was in furtherance of the cause of the Niger Delta. Apart
from the DDR process, the amnesty package encompassed actions to prevent and address
environmental degradation; develop infrastructure and redistributive transfers of proceeds
from oil rents to the people of the Niger Delta (Ajibola 2015).
The responses of militants to the offer of amnesty were mixed. While some eagerly embraced
it, others foot-dragged expecting the government to implement the full course of
recommendations proposed by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. For instance,
MEND initially rejected the amnesty offer but declared a thirty days ceasefire in July 2009 after
the release of one its leaders Henry Orkar by the Federal Government. However, at the
expiration of the window period, 20,192 persons and the major militant groups had accepted
the offer of amnesty and submitted about 20,000 items of ammunition (Ikelegbe 2010; Kuku
2012: 127).
Three factors were critical in the relative success of the disarmament and demobilization phase
of the DDR process. First, was the scale-up of military pressure on the militants that
commenced in June 2008 after president Yar Adua directed the military to crack down on
recalcitrant militant groups in the region. The military offensive was characterized by targeted
deployments against specific militant camps in the creeks in quick succession. Between June
2008 when MEND attached the Bonga Oil Field and June 2009 when the president made the
proclamation, the military had attacked the camps of notable militants such as Farah Dagogo,
Sabomabo Jackrich, Ateke Tom, Boyloaf, and Tompolo. The military’s most prized victory was
the dislodgment of Tompolo, feared leader of MEND from Camp 5 in the creeks of Delta State
on 12 May 2009. This is because the militant base was previously considered invincible. To
be sure, MEND did not give up easily as it inflicted massive loss in equipment including two
helicopters and three gun boats and personnel on the military. Several commentators have
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
23
argued that that the military deployments were not significant but merely contributed to
prolongation of the violence. For instance, Ikelegbe (2010: 43) has argued that the devastating
response of MEND which increased attacks on oil facilities crippling production in the process,
made the ‘limited military success seemingly hollow and pyrrhic.’
However, there is no doubt that the military build-up added pressure on the militants, making
them to appreciate the risks of continuation of the armed struggle. This is more so as the
militants were aware of increase in the military budget and procurement of more sophisticated
weapons and the recruitment of foreign security consultants (allegedly from Israel and Russia),
which increased the capability of the Nigerian security forces. While the militants criticized the
build-up and claimed it was evidence that the government was not serious about a political
and developmental solution, the government denied it was privileging military approaches to
resolution. The Federal Government claimed the military was on a ‘search and rescue mission’
to tackle criminal elements who were taking advantage of the genuine struggles of the Niger
Delta people for a better life to commit crime and perpetrate violence. Although there was no
rigorous distinction between political militants and criminals, the narrative that state violence
were directed at so-called criminals ultimately influenced the militant groups to accept the
amnesty even when the state failed to meet the demands for demilitarization, devolution, and
development.
The second factor was the behind the scenes overtures of government emissaries to militants.
While the government officials openly talked tough and claimed there will be no negotiations,
government deployed politicians, youth leaders, and retired security officials who had good
contacts with the militants to reach to them and influence them to accept the amnesty. The
acceptability of the programme was enhanced by the fact that some of these key actors,
notably Timi Alaibe and Kingsley Kuku, were appointed into key positions to oversee the
delivery of the amnesty programme. The overtures to leaders of the militant groups were
spiced not just with offers of protection and non-prosecution which the general amnesty offer
implied, but with other compensation packages that were not made public. In the fullness of
time, these offers openly manifested as some ex-militant leaders were appointed to caretaker
committees of local government councils and awarded surveillance contracts to protect oil
facilities. This is in addition to the undisclosed payoffs and discretionary oversight roles for
dispensing benefits to their followers given to them.
Third and linked to the second is the relative trust that Yar Adua enjoyed in the region. His
dovish personality and Spartan outlook made him appear believable to most groups. This is
especially the case as the reference point to him was Obasanjo and preceding military
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24
dictators. The element of trust was crucial in the survival of the amnesty programme amidst
the stormy waters it had to navigate—especially as his allies in the region were also trusted by
the key actors. As Ikelegbe (2010: 60) aptly observes:
The Amnesty was based on some trust in the political will, sincerity and commitment of
the late president Umaru Yar’Adua, the vice President and presidential adviser on the
Amnesty Programme. Although the content of the private discussions between militant
leaders who embraced amnesty and the presidency were not made known, the
discussions and the promises and clarifications made therein, clearly provided some
basis of trust and hopes about the resolution of militancy and the region’s problems. This
was besides the honesty of the late president in acknowledging the grievances of the
region, the mistakes of earlier administrations and the anger that transformed into armed
militancy.
After acceptance of the amnesty, demobilization activities commenced with the setting up of
the implementation office and encampment of the ex-militants. However, the demobilization
and reorientation phase was stalled as a result of the declining health of the president who had
personally led the process. This was especially the case when the ensuing power play initially
led to the sidelining of vice president Jonathan. However, the appointment of the vice president
Jonathan as acting president and his subsequent confirmation as substantive president after
the death of Yar Adua on 5 May 2010 was a timely development that helped the resuscitation
of the comatose amnesty programme.
5. Conclusions
The foregoing analysis provides some evidence of sequencing in the implementation of the
amnesty programme which to a large extent has helped stabilization efforts in the Niger Delta.
The government clearly invested some efforts in using military instruments to stabilize the
region before going ahead with implementation of the amnesty programme. This was mainly
to assert state sovereignty by responding to mobilizations of militant groups to weaken and
further erode state legitimacy. However, contingent factors that developed ensured that the
sequence was non-linear and complicated rather than phased. While the government would
have preferred the phased approach given the culture of sequencing in conflict management
experience in Nigeria, the conflict dynamics themselves did not allow for such controlled
measure.
CRPD Working Paper No. 36
25
The imperative to react to recurrent threats to security, which had the capacity to undermine
nascent regime legitimacy, influenced the government to adopt different measures to quench
the fires. Typical peacekeeping operations have never really ended in the region as the Joint
Task Force continues to operate with identical extended mandates. Emergence of new groups
and reneging on agreements by existing groups has meant that peacemaking type activities
continue indefinitely. Moreover, impatience with government borne out of decades of
disappointments influenced government to embark on initiatives intended to address structural
drivers when the fires had not quenched. Thus, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs which was
supposed to focus on leading implementation of the forward-looking master plan for the region
was drawn into immediate intervention in road construction to appease militants and members
of the public.
Similar dynamics of contingency, conjunctures, and coincidences are evident in timing issues
around the amnesty. Crucial in this respect is the emergence of Yar Adua as president in 2007
and its conjuncture with the selection of a son of the soil of the region as vice president. When
it seemed the amnesty programme was floundering the coincidental emergence of Jonathan
as president in 2010 was crucial in its revival. Also important were the contemporaneous global
energy crises and global quest for security in the Gulf of Guinea.
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26
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