Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding: The Case of · 2015-11-16 · CRPD Working Paper No. 36 2 Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding: The Case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Amnesty

Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) KU Leuven

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Timing and Sequencing in

Peacebuilding: The Case of

Nigeria’s Niger Delta Amnesty

Programme

Ukoha Ukiwo, Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation

Programme, British Council, Nigeria

CRPD Working Paper No. 36

2015


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Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding: The Case of Nigeria’s

Niger Delta Amnesty Programme

Abstract

This paper discusses the complex historical and political factors that informed the timing and

sequencing of the Nigeria’s Niger Delta amnesty programme. It argues that the amnesty

programme only became a feasible option for the Nigerian government and the militant groups

in the Niger Delta in 2009. This is because of the existence of the climate of rapprochement

that followed the inauguration of a new administration that was considered more sensitive to

the agitations in the region and was keen to explore the military option to solving the problem.

The paper provides some evidence of sequencing in the implementation of the amnesty

programme which to a large extent has helped stabilization efforts in the Niger Delta. There

was extensive deployment of military instruments to stabilize the region before commencement

of implementation of the amnesty programme. This was mainly to assert state sovereignty by

responding to mobilizations of militant groups to weaken and further erode state legitimacy.

The military option was pursued alongside dialogues mediated by Delta elite interlocutors who

helped to mobilize for support for the amnesty in the region. However, contingent factors that

developed ensured that the sequence was non-linear and complicated rather than phased.

While government would have preferred the phased approach given the culture of sequencing

in conflict management experience in Nigeria, the conflict dynamics themselves did not allow

for such controlled measure.

Author

Ukoha Ukiwo – Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme, British Council, Nigeria

[email: [email protected]]

This working paper is a draft version of the chapter ‘Timing and Sequencing in Peacebuilding:

The Case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Amnesty Programme’ in the book Building Sustainable

Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding, edited by

Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, Oxford University Press 2016.

The ‘Building Sustainable Peace’ project was made possible by a generous grant of Flanders

Department of Foreign Affairs.


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1. Introduction

Nigeria’s amnesty programme for Niger Delta militants has been described as a ‘homegrown’

DDR programme by its initiators and implementers (Kuku 2012; Abazie-Humphrey 2014). This

appellation indicates a distinction between the programme and contemporaneous DDR

programmes implemented under the auspices of the United Nations and regional

organizations such as the African Union, the European Union, etc. More fundamentally

however the appellation shows the resolve of the Nigerian state to affirm its capacity to address

its internal security challenges. The context for this conscious effort to affirm the principle of

non-interference was partly in response to the advocacy of social movements in the region for

an internationally mediated political settlement. The Nigerian state was keen to demonstrate

that it was able to address internal security challenges as it was positioning itself as the

preeminent African country that should be considered for the proposed permanent

membership of the Security Council. There was concern that allowing a UN-mediated process

would rob the country of the status of African’s great power. This is because Nigeria’s

application for the permanent member of the UN Security Council was partly hinged on its

leading role in regional stability and contribution to UN peacekeeping missions.

Also important in the decision to shun international involvement in the amnesty programme

were nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments. These sentiments which were borne out of the

country’s struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism as well as the perceived duplicitous

roles of the big powers during Nigeria’s civil war have made successive Nigerian governments

and the Nigerian public to be suspicious of international intervention. In fact, Nigeria’s massive

investments in regional stability evidenced by the country’s support for the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as peacekeeping missions in Liberia

and Sierra Leone have partly stemmed from a foreign policy objective of keeping ‘the big

powers’ at bay from the neighbourhood.

The historical experience of managing the post-conflict nation building process after the

Nigeria Civil War without dependence on international support also inspired state actors to

insist on Nigeria shouldering the amnesty programme. Like in 1970 when the civil war ended,

the Nigerian state was keen to limit international intervention which could have corrosive

effects on state legitimacy. The implementation of the amnesty programme was considered

another opportunity to further the nation building process and revive sagging legitimacy of the

state. By being at the driver’s seat of the amnesty programme, the Nigerian state wished to

regain the trust and confidence of groups in the Niger Delta region that had started seeking

succour elsewhere.


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Another important factor that influenced national ownership and implementation of the

amnesty programme is the fact that the country retained the fiscal capacity to implement the

programme. Unlike other countries where civil wars had created cash-strapped governments

without dependable sources of revenue, the Nigerian state could still depend on oil revenues

to run the programme. The global energy crises complicated by the conflicts in the Middle East

had raised demand for Nigerian oil. The Nigerian state reckoned there was a lot to gain by

directly managing the amnesty programme in order to stabilize the oil producing region,

resume oil production and ipso facto reap from rising oil prices.

Finally, emerging global norms which privileged regional and national initiatives to address

conflict and humanitarian emergencies were auspicious for Nigeria’s preference for a national

management of the process. Over-stretched by the proliferation of violent conflicts across the

world the big powers had from the 1990s relied on the agency of regional powers for

stabilization efforts. Nigeria had assumed this role for West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Its

decision to manage the amnesty programme was therefore unquestioned as it dovetailed with

global expectations.

However, although the Nigerian state led the process, the international community contributed

to the design of the programme and the general stabilization of the region. The UN, through

the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided some technical support for the

different consultations leading to the proclamation of the amnesty. Once it was proclaimed, the

UNDP supported the preparation of the ‘Strategic and Operational Plan for the DDR,’ which

defined the vision and operations of the amnesty programme. The UNDP also supported the

Office of the Special Assistant to the President on Niger Delta Affairs, which was charged with

the implementation of the amnesty programme. At the request of the Amnesty Implementation

Office, the UNDP provided technical experts to support the programme in the areas of

demobilization and reintegration (Onadipe 2013).

Before the amnesty programme commenced the EU, US, UK, and multilateral institutions like

the World Bank and the UN among other international partners were visible actors in

stabilization and development efforts in the region. Estimates of funding commitments by the

major development partners in the region was about $3 billion (Francis et al. 2011; Newsom

2011; Egwu 2013). Most of the focus of the international actors was improvement of

governance and capacity of institutions and human resources for sustainable development in

the region. This stemmed from a perspective that substantial resources had been channeled

to the region with the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation revenues and the enhanced


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portfolio of corporate social responsibility programmes introduced by the international oil

companies (Ukiwo 2008).

Since its proclamation about 30,000 young persons from the Niger Delta have been enlisted

into the programme and have undergone reorientation and capacity development. The

programme, which was billed to terminate in 2015 has elicited several assessments (see for

instance, Ikelegbe 2010; Oluwaniyi 2011; Kuku 2012; Oluduro and Oluduro 2012; Nwajiaku-

Dahou 2013; Abazie-Humphreys 2014 Peterside et al. 2015). The findings of the assessments

have suggested mixed outcomes. First, there is broad recognition that the programme has

enhanced resumption of oil production. The country recovered to its pre-2006 production level

of which averaged 2.2 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) that had dropped to about 700 bpd.

This has translated into windfalls in oil revenues with estimate pointing to Nigeria earning $39

billion in 2012. Second, there is also consensus that incidents of attacks on oil infrastructure

and personnel which was rife before the amnesty had significantly reduced. Third, the amnesty

had provided opportunities for the training of over 11,000 ex-militants in various professions.

However, the programme is perceived to have performed poorly in terms of delivery of human

security in the region. Analysts suggest that incidences of piracy, oil theft, arms proliferation,

and kidnapping have increased since the introduction of the amnesty programme. There is

also concern that the programme has promoted the culture of violence as rewarding the

perpetrators of violence has contributed to the distortion of socialization processes in the Niger

delta and beyond. Also the privileging of the ex-militants is perceived to have introduced new

systems of social inequalities with ex-militant leaders becoming nouveaux riches. Other

assessments have focused on the operational deficiencies of the programme, notably its

inability to plan for employment and reintegration of graduates of the programme.

While most studies of the amnesty programme have focused on its assessment, this paper

focuses on the timing and sequencing of peacebuilding initiatives in Nigeria with particular

reference of the amnesty programme. It seeks to identify and discuss the timing and

sequencing issues related to the amnesty programme, which came into force in October 2009.

The paper will seek to suggest factors that explain the timing of the amnesty programmme and

the sequencing of implementation of the programme.

The paper is divided into four sections. The second section examines the unexplored issue of

timing of the amnesty programme. It seeks to show why the amnesty programme was

implemented in 2009 and beyond rather than earlier. The third section discusses the

sequencing of events leading to the offer of the amnesty. In section four, I discuss the factors


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that influenced the making and take-off of the amnesty. These leads to some concluding

remarks that draw out possible lessons from the Nigerian experience to comparative studies

on sequencing and timing of DDR processes.

2. The Timing of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme

Since the early 1990s, Nigeria’s Niger Delta region has experienced various forms of violent

group mobilization. At the roots of the mobilizations are grievances associated with oil

exploitation in the region (Human Rights Watch 1999; UNDP 2006; International Crisis Group

2007). Community groups initially protested against mostly international oil companies (IOC)

over degradation of the environment and economic entitlements related to oil production. The

crisis was complicated by the repressive response of the Nigerian state as the Nigerian state

which was under military rule battled to extinguish all threats to its illegitimate hold on power

(Ibeanu and Luckham 2006).

However, the advent of civilian rule did not herald any cessation of hostilities in the Niger Delta.

Contrary to expectations, it culminated in the aggravation of the crisis of confidence that had

undermined relations between the Nigerian state, the IOCs and oil producing communities of

the Niger Delta. At the roots of the worsening state of affairs was the realignment of social

forces and the perception of the peoples of the Niger Delta that democratization had retained

the same ethno-class that fed fat on the ‘oil-blood’ at the detriment of the region (Ukiwo 2011).

First, the transition to civil rule in 1999 bridged the gap between the youths who led most of

the agitations and struggles of the 1990s and the emerging regional elites who took over the

reins of power in the region. Unlike military administrators and governors who derived

legitimacy from and owed allegiance to the military head of state, the governors and legislators

who ascended in 1999 saw themselves as representatives of the people and the region. They

were more disposed to aligning with popular forces to challenge the Federal Government and

the IOCs on redistributive mechanisms in Nigeria’s federal system. Worthy of mention is the

fact that some youth leaders and minority rights activists were appointed into governments and

became part of the ruling coalitions at state and federal levels. The cooptation of the youth

leaders into the new governments was a populist imperative. At the turn of the twenty-first

century, the legitimacy of mainstream traditional and political leadership in the Niger Delta had

been eroded by decades of collusion and corruption. Youths had become the rallying point of

popular mobilizations. The presence of youth leaders in the emergent regimes was therefore

expected to yield some political dividend.


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Second, there were misgivings in the region about the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as

president. Obasanjo, a former military head of state between 1976 and 1979, was generally

seen as a key member of the military oligarchy that had distorted and devalorized Nigeria’s

federal system by systematically driving centralization since the eve of civil war in 1967. More

pointedly, the circumstance that led to the emergence of Obasanjo as president lent credence

to this fear. Convicted and jailed by late Gen. Sani Abacha for alleged coup plot, Obasanjo

became the preferred candidate of the dominant faction of the military and political class that

was inclined to cede power to South-West geopolitical zone in order to appease the region for

the annulment of the 12 June 1993 elections. Although chief MKO Abiola, the presumed winner

of the election, won in most parts of the country, the draconian reactionary response of the

Nigerian state under Sani Abacha virtually extinguished dissenting views in most parts of the

country, except Abiola’s home-base in the South West. Obasanjo’s selection was perceived

as a ploy of the ruling class to concede power to the region, albeit through the imposition of a

trusted ally.

The litmus test for the crisis of confidence between Obasanjo and the Niger Delta region was

the implementation of the 1999 constitutional provision on revenue allocation formula. The

constitution, which was imposed by the departing military government of Gen. Abdulsalami

Abubakar stipulated that ‘not less than 13 per cent’ of national revenues will be allocated on

the basis of derivation. The delay in implementation of the constitutional provision caused so

much disquiet in the region. The crisis of confidence worsened when the Federal Government

eventually started implementation without backdating payments to 29 May 1999 when the new

constitution became effective. The government acquiesced to the demands of payment of

arrears after a protracted legal battle. Another legal battle ensued over application of the

derivation principle for revenues accruing from on-shore oil production. This is because of

international law statutes that vests ownership of territorial waters on sovereign states. While

the Federation of Nigeria laid claims to revenues of on-shore oil on the basis of International

Law, which was upheld by the Nigerian Supreme Court, the governments of coastal states in

the Niger Delta, claimed Nigeria’s ownership of territorial waters derived from the fact that the

waters were contiguous to the coastal states and the country’s rights stemmed from the coastal

states’ membership of Nigeria. Failing to secure a legal resolution, the Federal Government

under Obasanjo eventually accepted a political solution which made coastal states eligible to

receive derivation revenues from on-shore oil production. But this only happened after tempers

had risen and nerves were frayed in the region.

Relations between Abuja and the Niger Delta also suffered from delays in the enactment of

the Act for the Establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). This is


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because of the vacuum created by the abolition of the Oil Minerals Producing Areas

Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1999. The development agency had since its

establishment in 1993 served as a redistributive mechanism to channel some benefits of oil

production to oil producing communities. Although alleged corruption and nepotism eroded the

credibility of the development agency, delay in setting up an alternative agency raised fears of

termination of resources that accrued to the region through the instrumentality of OMPADEC

(Ozo-Eson and Ukiwo 2001).

What is more, the Obasanjo administration had to contend with the lingering issue of restive

youths who mobilized against oil companies and security agencies in oil production platforms

in order to secure benefits for themselves and their communities. On 11 December 1998, the

Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), easily the most organized youth network in the region, had given an

ultimatum to oil companies to vacate production sites by 30 December 1998. Efforts of the IYC

to enforce the ultimatum early in January 1999 through peaceful marches to mobilize public

support for the ‘Operation Climate Change’ resulted in a pre-emptive attack by Nigerian

security forces. The bloody encounter resulted in the death of scores of youths and some

soldiers. This armed confrontation had a catalytic effect in militarization of the conflict as it led

to the emergence of armed groups seeking to revenge killings of youths involved in non-violent

protest. The resort to the tradition of self-defense through the invocation of Egbesu, the Ijaw

deity, marked the beginning of militancy as armed groups openly confronted the Nigerian state

and its security apparatus. Reportedly backed by the mystically powers of Egbesu, armed

youths embarked upon attacks which helped to demystify the Nigerian military.

Several encounters between soldiers and police deployed to pacify the region and armed

groups claiming to represent community interest ensued throughout 1999 leading to deaths of

youths, soldiers, and policemen. The worst incident occurred in Odi in Bayelsa State early

November when irate youths allegedly killed seven policemen deployed to investigate a gang

of armed youths that operated from the community and had been implicated in various crimes

including killing of security personnel. In a bid to restore public order and stop what was

becoming incessant killings of security personnel by armed groups in the region, president

Olusegun Obasanjo ordered troops into Odi to arrest the leader and members of the militant

group allegedly responsible for the killing the seven policemen. The troop deployment occurred

after the expiration of the two-week ultimatum the president had issued to the Bayelsa State

Government to produce the killers of the policemen. The ultimatum, which was not met,

reflected the lack of confidence between Federal Government and the State Government.

Clearly, the president was peeved by what seemed to be the tacit approval of the government

of the state and some opinion leaders in the state to the recent development. This is more so


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as the militant group was reportedly mobilizing youths into camp for training to revenge the

alleged attack and killing of some Ijaw residents in Lagos by members of the Odua Peoples’

Congress (OPC). The troop deployment resulted in serious collateral damage as more than

300 persons were reportedly killed and there was mass destruction of property.

The Odi killings further undermined relations between the Federal Government and the

government and peoples of the regions. It was perceived to reflect the personal biases and

hostility of the president against the people of the region and privileging of members of his own

Yoruba ethnic group. Consequently, the influential IYC mobilized against Obasanjo’s re-

election in 2003. Chief DSP Alameiyeseigha, governor of Bayelsa State also allegedly

mobilized to use the votes of the Ijaw to stop Obasanjo’s re-election. Alameiyeseigha was

suspected to be the arrow head of the plot of some governors who were mobilizing support for

vice president Abubakar Atiku to challenge Obasanjo in the 2003 polls. In return for his support,

Atiku was supposed to select Alameiyeseigha as vice presidential candidate to actualize a

North-South ticket. In. this context, president Obasanjo reportedly courted other Niger Delta

governors to checkmate Alameiyeseigha. He was able to win Dr. Peter Odili of Rivers State to

his side. Concerned about Alameiyeseigha’s growing influence among youths in the region,

Odili had started reaching out to youth groups. Odili was particularly interested in the IYC,

whose membership, mandate, and influence were felt in all Niger Delta states with substantial

Ijaw populations. It is against this background that he reportedly sponsored the emergence of

Asari Dokubo as president of IYC in 2001. The sponsorship of a Rivers born Ijaw youth for the

post for an organization which was dominated by Bayelsa elements was intended to reduce

the influence of Alameiyeseigha. This is because Alameiyeseigha had taken up the title of

‘Governor-General of the Ijaw’ by virtue of his position as the only Ijaw among governors of six

Niger Delta states with indigenous Ijaw population. Linked to this motive of reducing the

influence of a rival politician, was the expectation of influencing the agenda of IYC.

Thus, during the 2003 elections, Odili sought to influence the IYC leadership to support the

candidacy of Obasanjo without success as the Asari-led leadership insisted on only working

for Odili’s re-election as governor and not Obasanjo’s re-election due to the latter’s reported

disastrous footprints in the region. The conflict over the 2013 elections eventually culminated

into violence in the Niger Delta and in Rivers State in particular as rival armed youth groups

for and against election of Odili and Obasanjo clashed. Leading the armed confrontation were

Asari Dokubo, who had formed a movement called the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force

(NDPVF) and Ateke Tom of the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV). Efforts to broker a truce between

the groups were unsuccessful because Dokubo alleged that Odili had sponsored Ateke Tom

to eliminate him on account of his decision to oppose Obasanjo’s re-election. Although,


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Obasanjo later brokered a truce between the warring groups, this did not improve his credibility

in the region. The truce floundered shortly afterwards when Asari Dokubo claimed Ateke Tom

was not surrendering weapons during the disarmament process brokered by president

Obasanjo and governor Odili. Asari Dokubo abandoned the peace process alleging a

conspiracy to disarm his group while other armed groups in the region allegedly connected to

the president and the governor retained their arms.

Furthermore, the perception of insincerity of the Obasanjo administration in addressing the

quest of the people’s of the Niger Delta for resource control is also linked to the failure of the

National Political Reform Conference in 2005. The conference was convened by the Obasanjo

to address lingering crisis of the Nigerian state, which had led to conflicts in post-military

Nigeria. The government and groups in the Niger Delta like other groups had mobilized

massively to the conference. They had wished that the conference, which was supposed to

midwife a new constitution for the country, would serve as an opportunity to renegotiate the

fiscal arrangement of Nigeria’s federalism to ensure that more revenues are allocated to the

regions of extraction and production. The conference adjourned sine die over the deadlock

between the largely oil producing states in the South South and South East Nigeria and the

rest of the country over revenues accruing from oil.

Although there was clear evidence that social forces and groups from Northern and South

West geopolitical zones, who were already worried about rising horizontal inequalities created

by the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula, undermined the proposal for

increment of the derivation funds to 50 per cent, agitating groups in the Niger Delta believed

the proposal failed to sail through because it did not have the backing of the Obasanjo

administration. This is partly because the narrative of the political blocs against transfer of

more funds to the Niger Delta was that Niger Delta elites had corruptly enriched themselves

with the 13 per cent already allocated to the region. The anti-resource control argumentation

that there was no evidence that more resource transfers to the Niger Delta which had

exacerbated regional inequalities had promoted prosperity was identical with the position of

the Obasanjo administration. The administration had developed this line of response following

persistent anti-federal government mobilizations in the region. The Obasanjo administration

increasingly considered the whole gamut of the youth protest movements and agitations for

more resources as diversionary mechanisms designed by the ruling elites in the region to direct

popular attention and aggression at so-called external ‘exploiters’ and ‘oppressors’ while

occluding their malfeasance from the public. It is against this background that the Obasanjo

administration deployed the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the anti-


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corruption agency to investigate the administration of oil revenues allocated to their states and

local government areas.

This further alienated the regional elites and youth groups allied to them from the Obasanjo

administration as they accused the Obasanjo government of selective targeting and

prosecution of Niger Delta elites and politicians. This was the sentiment that overshadowed

the controversial detention and escape of Alameiyeseigha from London as well as his

subsequent impeachment as governor of Bayelsa State in December 2005. The allegation that

Alameiyeseigha was wanted to answer charges of corruption and money laundering was

overshadowed by perceptions that president Obasanjo masterminded the impeachment

process to punish a political opponent. Furthermore, the arrest and imprisonment of chief

Ebitimi Banigo, another Ijaw businessman for diverting investor’s fund in his bank for personal

use in late 2004 was also considered another evidence of Obasanjo’s targeting of Ijaw elites

for prosecution. The arrest of the prominent Ijaw elites subsequently served as the trigger

factor for the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND),

which declared total armed struggle against the Nigerian State in early 2006 (Ukiwo 2007).

The armed struggle which featured attacks on oil installations and security agencies deployed

to protect them led to drastic fall in oil production levels and hemorrhage of oil revenues (Asuni

2009; Sayne 2013).

Consequently, the crisis of confidence between the Obasanjo administration and Niger Delta

youth and elites undermined several efforts to end the militancy in the region. Some residual

expectation of rapprochement rested in the possibility that Obasanjo might support emergence

of one of his allies among the Niger Delta governors to succeed him. This appeared plausible

as the president whose third term campaign was botched by the insistence of the northern

power bloc to regain power in 2007 seemed to have encouraged some politicians from the

Niger Delta and South East to contest for the presidency to spite the North. One of the

politicians in the region who appeared to have earned the trust of Obasanjo was Dr. Peter Odili

who was completing his tenure as governor of oil rich Rivers State. Odili became the front

runner in the race for the presidency as ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) mobilized for

the primaries scheduled for December 2006. However, Obasanjo’s volte face on Odili’s

candidacy on eve of the primaries sealed any hopes of emergence of a Niger Delta president

in 2007. While Obasanjo advertized allegations of corruption as the main reason for his

withdrawal of support to Odili—allegations for which Odili was never prosecuted—there were

indications that Obasanjo was pressured to abide by power sharing arrangement between

North and South after realizing that it might be a herculean task to impose a southern


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successor. There were also permutations that Obasanjo dumped Odili after realizing the

underhand role Odili played in undermining the third term agenda.

The sudden emergence of Umar Musa Yar Adua, the governor of Katsina State as PDP

presidential candidate helped to stabilize the Nigerian polity from the perspective of North-

South relations. However, the recognition that dissent in the Niger Delta would undermine

macroeconomic stability and regime effectiveness influenced the ruling party to zone the

position of vice presidency to the South South geopolitical zone. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, who

became governor of Bayelsa State after Alameiyeseigha’s impeachment, was selected as

running mate of Yar Adua to appease the Niger Delta, especially the Ijaw the most populous

ethnic group in the region. The selection of an ethnic Ijaw was also strategic as MEND was

essentially an amalgamation of Ijaw militia groups. Leaders of the ruling party also thought

selection of an Ijaw was expected to placate the region and engender the platform for

overcoming broken relationship. Many expected that the time had come for the decade-old

crisis of confidence to be resolved.

It is against this background that Yar Adua during his campaign prioritized restoring peace and

stability in the Niger Delta. Among other campaign promises, Yar Adua committed his

administration to implementing the Niger Delta Development Master Pan (NDDMP) developed

under the auspices of the Obasanjo administration. This undertaking became one of the Seven

Point Agenda of the Yar Adua administration (Dode 2010). In order to move beyond the politics

of the implementation of the 13 per cent derivation formula, Yar Adua also committed to

establishing a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs that will drive development in the region (Kuku

2012: 111–112).

On assumption of office, Yar Adua was faced by the reality of falling oil production levels which

had fallen by 25 per cent as a result of sustained attacks by insurgents on oil installations

(Egwu 2013). There were concerns that the situation would worsen as the militants had

enhanced capability to strike at choice targets. For instance, militants linked to MEND had

breached security at Bonga Oil Field, the country’s biggest off-shore oil platform. Enhanced

sophistication of the militant groups was inversely proportional to declining capability of

Nigeria’s security agencies in protecting oil facilities and fighting the creek wars. Not only were

security forces perceived to be corrupt, their brutality alienated members of the oil-bearing

communities and ipso facto starved them of vital intelligence. On the contrary the militant

groups improved on their intelligence gathering. They were able to intercept information from

oil companies. For instance, the militants tapped information on when there is oil in the

pipelines and sabotage and theft will yield maximum dividends. They also infiltrated the


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security forces and gathered intelligence on military strategy and troop deployment. Notable

in this respect was the interception of an official internal memorandum of strategy to be

adopted by the Joint Task Force against militancy. These developments in the security sector

clearly convinced the fledgling Yar Adua of the futility of security approach to tackling the

militancy.

There was also mounting pressures from the international community, which faced by the

protracted Middle East crisis and surging oil prices, looked to the Gulf of Guinea for oil.

Pressures were evidenced by increased development assistance to address governance

challenges in the region as well as the United States mobilization to establish a base of the

AFRICOM in the region to secure oil production and export and stem the rising tide of

organized crime and weapons proliferation. In summary, the transition to a new government,

limitations of the security approach, global energy crisis, and pressures from the international

community at the historical juncture created the impetus for the amnesty programme. In the

section that follows, I discuss the sequence of events that preceded and followed the

declaration of amnesty for repentant Niger Delta militants.

3. Sequencing Issues in the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme

Conventional practice in peacebuilding usually envisages a sequence of events which proceed

from the three stages of peacebuilding, namely peacekeeping, peacemaking, and

peacebuilding. The peacemaking phase is dominated by activities to maintain order and

stabilize the environment through separation of competing groups, suppression of armed

groups, and securing of ceasefires. Military and hard security instruments usually dominate

this phase. This is usually followed by the peacekeeping phase where the objective is to secure

political settlement and put together a politico-constitutional framework for sustainable peace

in the post-conflict period. Activities in this phase include peace dialogues, commissions of

enquiry, national dialogue, constitutional conferences, and mediation. The main instruments

are political, psycho-social, and legal in nature. Finally, the peacebuilding phase focusses on

addressing structural drivers of conflict. It entails the deployment of developmental, economic,

and political instruments to cement peace agreements and prevent reoccurrence of violent

conflict. Key activities in this phase are those linked to economic growth and development;

employment provisioning, new power and resource sharing arrangements, and reconstruction

of infrastructure. The discussion in this section will explore the extent to which the

peacebuilding programme in Nigeria’s Niger Delta followed this phased approach.


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As noted in the previous section, the emergence of Yar Adua offered new opportunities for

engagement with the Niger Delta. During the campaign for the presidency, Yar Adua came to

the realization that the security approach adopted by the Obasanjo administration to address

the challenges was becoming counter-productive as it had led to the militarization of the region.

Armed groups in the region appeared to be in an arms race with the Nigerian military in

acquisition of weapons and hard wares. Given the access they had to illicit revenues from

‘blood oil,’ the militants seemed to be at a relative advantage in weapons procurement (Hazen

and Horner 2007; Asuni 2009; Sayne 2013). Both the fact that militants were relatively well-

armed and that Nigeria’s military response drew a lot of criticism by the international

community because of alleged human rights violations, were important factors for Yar Adua to

start seeking dialogue with aggrieved groups in the region.

The conciliatory approach of the government manifested in three key major strategies adopted

very early in the life of the administration (International Crisis Group 2007). First, the new

government prioritized facilitation of the release from detention of Asari Dokubo and

Alameiyeseigha in response to the demands of militant groups especially those who belong to

the MEND alliance. Second, since the gesture, which divided both provincial and national

opinion, did not yield any peace dividends, the government also started exploring whether offer

of amnesty to the militants will help stabilization efforts in the region. However, offer of amnesty

stalled for a number of reasons. It polarized Nigerian public opinion with many commentators

wondering whether it would not encourage aggrieved groups to resort to violence. There was

also concern about the vagueness of the offer as there was not blueprint on the proposed

amnesty.

A key question raised by diverse social groups was whether all militants would benefit or

whether a distinction would be made between the so-called ‘real militants’ and criminals

masquerading as militants. There was also the concern among militant groups that the offer

might be a ruse to hoodwink them to disarm especially since the offer was not backed by a

published government whitepaper on the amnesty. The context for the misgivings was the

arrest, prosecution, and detention of Asari in 2004 by the Obasanjo government after a

controversial failed settlement pact with militants. Third, was the decision to dialogue with the

militant groups as soon as it assumed office. The most celebrated of the talks was vice

president Goodluck Jonathan’s visit to Okerenkoko in the creeks of the delta to meet with

MEND leader Government Ememupolo (popularly called Tompolo) on 27 June 2007. These

overtures failed to stop hostilities as rival factions continued attacks to assert their

independence and signify other militant leaders did not represent them. There were also


15

misgivings by some militant groups that the vice president who was delegated with the militants

privileged Ijaw groups over other groups.

After failing to secure cessation of hostilities through individual contacts the new administration

tried to formalize the process of negotiations through the establishment of a twenty-member

peace and conflict resolution committee. The committee was to coordinate with similar

committees established by state governments at the instance of the Federal Government to

reach out to militant groups, mediate in conflicts between the groups, and also secure release

of hostages taken by militant groups. The committee appeared to be most successful in

securing release of hostage, often after payment of huge ransom. Its modus operandi easily

alienated some groups who claimed committee members had linked with the hostage takers

and benefitted from deals to release hostages. The crisis of confidence that set in not only led

to calls for its disbandment but also resulted in increasing boycott of its sittings by some

militants groups.

Part of the crisis of confidence stemmed from fears among groups in the region that the new

government had not taken any steps to implement its substantial campaign promises with

regard to the Niger Delta. Rather than implementing its campaign promises, the Yar Adua

government introduced new plans for the region, including most notably the Marshall Plan for

the Niger Delta, which was introduced at the G8 Summit in June 2007. Yar Adua’s new plan

created confusion and concern among various militant groups because it seemed to replace

the Niger Delta Development Master Plan, which was launched by the departing President

Obasanjo and which Yar Adua himself had endorsed during his electoral campaign. There was

also concern that the government had not established the Ministry of Niger Delta as promised

during the campaign. In the context of alleged failed or unfulfilled promises by successive

governments, the impatience with Yar Adua was understandable. However, the government

was also a victim of its own lack of a policy framework. Given the circumstance of his sudden

emergence as presidential candidate of the ruling party, Yar Adua who had entertained no

ambition to be president, lacked any clear vision of governance. The Seven Point Agenda he

sold to voters as manifesto was hurriedly developed in response to criticisms by the opposition

and civil society groups. It was lacking in work plans and milestones, leaving the public to

guess delivery dates of the promises.

The administration was also a victim of its own naivety and ignorance of the complexity of the

conflicts. It did not understand the context of the conflict, the multiplicity of actors and the

conflict dynamics. Lack of conflict sensitivity manifested, for instance, in the assumption that

vice president Jonathan would be acceptable to all interests and groups in the region. Several


16

costly false steps of the administration also stemmed from lack of stakeholder mapping before

commencement of initiatives. This led to disputations about appointments and contacts that

undermined proposed initiatives.

A case in point is the Niger Delta Summit Initiative that Yar Adua promised to convene to chart

the pathway for his handshake with the region. Yar Adua leveraged on existing international

goodwill on addressing the conflicts in the Niger Delta to turn it into an international event. After

meetings with the UN Secretary-General at the margins of the G8 summit in June 2007 and

UN General Assembly in September 2007, he requested UN’s support for peacebuilding efforts

in the Niger Delta (Onadipe 2013). As earlier noted, the Government of Nigeria emphasized

the national character of the conflict and stated support should be of a technical nature rather

than political and military. It is against this background that the government decided to choose

a Nigerian staff member of the UN to lead the summit on the region. However, this initiative

was aborted as a result of the protests that trailed the appointment of Prof. Ibrahim Gambari,

Nigerian-born UN Undersecretary-General as Convener of the Summit. While Yar Adua felt

Gambari would bring his international exposure, experience, and patriotism to bear on the

assignment, leaders and social movements in the Niger Delta rejected the appointment over

fears that Gambari would not be sensitive to the interest of the region. This was based on

claims that Gambari played a leading role in mobilizing support for the Abacha regime over

the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa and seven other Ogoni activists in his capacity as Nigeria’s

Representative at the UN in the 1990s.

Angst over Gambari’s appointment culminated in the wholesale rejection of the idea of the

summit by vocal and influential Niger Delta stakeholders. They justified their decision to throw

away the baby with the bath water on the grounds that the region was no longer in need of

ideas to develop and stabilize it. Niger Delta leaders and social movements argued that several

summits and panels had been established to address the challenge of development in the

region even before the country’s independence. Successive administrations in the country had

lacked the political will to fully implement these recommendations. Rather than convene

another ‘circus’ at the expense of oil bearing communities who want oil wealth to be applied

for the transformation of their destinies, Niger Delta leaders insisted there will be more value

for money if the Yar Adua administration reviewed and abreast itself of the findings and

recommendations of previous committees and panels on development, peace, and security in

the Niger Delta.

Apart from the uproar over Gambari’s appointment, some groups within the region opposed

the summit on the grounds that the government had failed to implement some of the


17

agreements reached with committees and delegations. Notable in this respect were purported

agreements to prepare a roadmap for troop withdrawal in the region, further release of

detained militants, and reconstruction of eight communities damaged during face-off between

militants and security agencies (International Crisis Group 2007).

The plan to organize the summit or convene a technical committee in lieu of it was further

delayed by two other major factors. First, is the alleged marginalization of vice president

Jonathan in the administration as a result of his purported replacement as the government’s

interlocutor in the region. This is because the Secretary to the Federal Government (SFG)

temporarily took over as mediator between the government and the region after rancorous

reactions to some of Jonathan’s visits to the creeks to meet with militants and allegations he

favoured his own Ijaw ethnic group. The ascendancy of the SFG provoked resentments as

Babagana Kingibe who held the post of the SFG was a Kanuri from North East Nigeria.

Kingibe, who was vice presidential candidate in the 12 June 1993 presidential elections, was

infamous for reportedly abandoning his principal to serve in the Abacha regime after the

annulment of the elections. The appointment of Yayale Ahmed, the Minister of Defence to

replace Kingibe did not help matters but further alienated groups in the region who claimed it

was indicative of the government’s insistence on treating the Niger Delta crisis as a security

rather than developmental challenge. This perception of government’s securitization of the

Niger Delta crisis (Ibeanu 2008) was further driven by provisional allocation of the sum of $3.4

billion for ‘security and the Niger delta’ in the 2008 appropriation bill. Groups in the region

claimed the lumping of the Delta budget with the security budget as well as the massive sum

for the military and police indicated plans of the administration to privilege a military response

to a developmental response. The groups cited the fact that only about $560 million was

budgeted for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Federal Government’s

development intervention agency in the region (International Crisis Group 2007; Kuku 2012:

122).

The second factor that slowed progress on convening of the summit or technical committee

was the deteriorating health condition of Yar Adua. This not only slowed decision-making but

also triggered power tussle within the kitchen cabinet. One of the effects of this power tussle

manifested as the marginalization of vice president Jonathan. Not surprisingly, Kingibe who

initially displaced Jonathan as liaison with the Niger Delta was sacked few months later for

suspected ambition to take over from Yar Adua in the event of his death or incapacitation from

the terminal ailment he was suffering from.


18

The delays and flip-flops in the administration’s responses contributed in no small measure in

eroding the credibility of the administration in the Niger Delta. This threatened expectations

raised that the departure of Obasanjo signaled new vistas for the resolution of the Niger Delta

crisis. Symptomatic of the declining social capital was deterioration of security conditions in

the region from July 2007. The upsurge in incidents of kidnapping, hostage taking, attacks on

oil facilities, piracy, inter-gang violence, and armed confrontations with security agencies. All

these resulted in further disruption of oil production, decline in oil revenues, and flight of

investments from the region. The government reacted by deploying more military force. For

instance, in August 2007 the Joint Task Force was deployed to tackle the menace of cultists

and gangs that had engulfed the region, especially Port Harcourt, arguably the centre of gravity

of the oil producing region.

However, the military solution while providing some relief to maintenance of order in urban

centres did not end the security challenge across the region, especially the disruption of oil

production, which the militants and criminal elements who had local knowledge of the network

of pipelines sabotaged at will. The militant groups became more sophisticated and daring in

their operations traversing both on-shore and off-shore locations. The Nigerian government

and oil operators were shocked when MEND for instance carried out its most daring attack on

Shell’s Bonga oil facility in June 2008. The facility is located 120 kilometers from the coastlines

of the Niger Delta. Paradoxically, while the deployment of troops was the result of declining

security conditions, the militants continued to demand withdrawal of troops and demilitarization

as conditions for further negotiations. For good measure, militants and some elites in the region

continued to allege that security forces deployed to keep peace were not only violating rights

but were feeding fat on the state of insecurity.

It is against this background that the Yar Adua administration was forced to continue exploring

the parallel track of negotiation and conciliation. It eventually acquiesced to demands for a

Technical Committee on the Niger Delta to review findings and recommendations of previous

panels and committees; and suggest the way forward. Given the embarrassment that the idea

of the summit generated, president Yar Adua distanced himself from the process. He

delegated vice president Goodluck Jonathan to inaugurate the Committee on 8 September

2008—roughly sixteen months behind the proposed commencement of the summit.

Importantly also the administration allowed the committee to elect its leadership after initial

controversies surrounding the purported appointment of Dr. Idika Kalu, a former IMF economist

and finance minister, who was not from the core Niger Delta region. The preferred chair elected

by the committee was Mr. Ledum Mittee, who was incumbent president of the Movement for

the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP). The inaugural address of the Vice President


19

indicated the urgency of the assignment as well as government’s concern to ensure it does

not derail like other initiatives:

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a very important assignment and time is of vital essence.

[…] As you may be aware, this initiative of a Technical Committee on the Resolution of

the Niger Delta Crisis is a suggestion from the people of the Niger Delta. The Committee,

is, therefore, expected to collate, review and distil the various reports, suggestions and

recommendations on the Niger Delta […]. Wherever a report on the Niger Delta exists,

and you can reach it, I urge you to have them ferreted out; examined as thoroughly as

you can and make suggestions for Government’s necessary and urgent action. On

behalf of the Government, I want to assure you that your recommendations will not be

treated with levity. […] You are to appoint your own chairperson and secretary and also

evolve the mechanisms through which you can bring about the necessary collation,

findings and suggestions. Government will not interfere with the workings of the

Technical Committee and expects that you will submit your report to it within ten days of

your first sitting (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008: iv–v).

The committee eventually sought extension and with support from development partners

operated for three months and submitted its report on November 2008. The committee also

went beyond its terms of reference of focusing on documentary analysis by interfacing with

both armed and non-armed groups in the region. The interface was deemed necessary to

validate findings and recommendations of previous reports and garner the buy in of key

stakeholders for the recommendations of the committee. The conclusion of the committee

underscored the need for implementation of its recommendations:

In conclusion, it is clear that though governments, since 1958, have set up very high

powered committees to look into the problems of the Niger Delta and the Committees

have submitted far-reaching and comprehensive reports, they have suffered the same

fate: non implementation. In cases where some of the recommendations have been

considered at all, they have been taken out of context and implemented piecemeal or

without the required enthusiasm, consistency and monitoring. Some of the reports were

not even touched at all; no White Paper was issued, and no follow-up implementation

and monitoring mechanisms were set up by Government. This meant that the will and

required enthusiasm to set in motion processes for a developed, peaceful and

progressive Niger Delta were absent. […] The Committee believes that, if unlike in the

past, the recommendations outlined in TOR 3 of this Report receive a different treatment

and priority attention from the authorities in power, it is possible to achieve meaningful


20

change and reverse the dislocation, decay and deterioration of the Niger Delta as a

whole, and its creeks in particular (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008: 55).

However, the extent to which government was dependent on the committee to push ahead

with its crises management plan was called to question when the government took steps to

fulfill one of its campaign promises by announcing the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta

Affairs in October 2008. The government’s decision partly stemmed from misgivings about the

possibility of acceptance of report by other ethnoregional and political groups in the country.

There were indications that the president was not happy that all members of the committee

were from the Niger Delta and that the committee was allowed to select its own leadership

(Kuku 2012). The convention in the country was for all government committees to have a

semblance of representation of interests from different parts of the country and for government

to appoint leadership of such committees and panels.

The possible fears of president Yar Adua were confirmed as the committee made more far

reaching recommendations than the government would have envisaged. It was therefore left

for the government to pick and choose which of the recommendations it considered imperative

in the resolution of the violence in the region at least in the short foreseeable future. Kuku

(2012: 117) who was closely associated with the process as a result of his perceived agency

and social networks argues that the recommendations that Yar Adua took seriously were: 1)

Increase of derivation revenues from 13 per cent to 25 per cent; 2) Open trial and bail for Henry

Okah; and 3) Disarming process for youths involved in militancy through a DDR programme.

Since the first recommendation required constitutional amendment, only the remaining two

were feasible pragmatic options for the president in the short term. Moreover, the president

was willing to give approval for the release of Okah because he was implicated in most security

reports and diplomatic intelligence especially from countries in the Gulf of Guinea as the leader

of group that undermined security in the entire Gulf of Guinea (Kuku 2012). Similarly a

conditional amnesty for militants who agreed to lay down arms would secure the region and

create the environment for improved revenues. This instrumentalist approach characterized

by securing agreements with identified trouble makers to buy peace also manifested in the

decision of Yar Adua to release Dokubo and Alameiyeseigha. As we shall see, it would also

be influential in shaping the character and outcomes of the amnesty programme.

4. The Making of the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme


21

There is no evidence that the Yar Adua administration published a White Paper on the report

of the Technical Committee. However, as earlier noted, since the president was positively

inclined to securing the commitment of persons and groups linked to the militancy for the

restoration of peace and security, he proceeded to set up a Presidential Panel on Amnesty on

5 May 2009 to advise government on modalities for granting amnesty to Niger Delta militants.

The committee, which was headed by General Godwin Abbe (rtd), Minister of Interior, held

wide consultations within and outside the region to ensure acceptance of the proposed

amnesty. It also mobilized the participation of relevant security agencies, federal government

agencies and Niger Delta state governments in the implementation of the amnesty programme.

The committee proposed a timetable and plan for the commencement of programme. Once

proclaimed by the president, militants will have a sixty day period to respond to the offer. Only

those who accepted the amnesty would be pardoned and enlisted into the programme. On the

expiration of the period given for acceptance of military, disarmament centres for collection of

weapons will be established in the different Niger Delta states where militants will hand over

their weapons in groups under their leadership. The weapons surrender and handover process

would be devoid of cash exchanges. Disarmed militants and militant groups will be invited to

a demobilization and orientation camp where they will be reoriented and their training needs

for reintegration in society determined. The successful ex-militants will be sent on training and

subsequently integrated by private sector and government ministries, departments, and

agencies (MDAs). For good measure, the panel also proposed a budget of N50 billion for the

programme and estimated that 10,000 militants will benefit.

The panel clearly executed the brief of the government to serve the purpose of demonstrating

that the Federal Government was in control of developments. This is evidenced by the panel’s

modus operandi and recommendations. It avoided open public sessions with militants during

its consultations. It rejected any proposed conditionality, notably the demand for withdrawal of

the Joint Task Force (JTF), for the acceptance of amnesty. The panel also rejected the

possibility of negotiation with mediators proposed by the militants especially MEND’s so-called

Aaron Team, made up of Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka and Rear Admiral Mike Akhigbe (rtd).

The panel further opposed any involvement of international organizations as proposed by the

militants. In these respects, therefore, it was in stark contrast to the Technical Committee on

the Niger Delta. It is therefore not surprisingly that the government did not delay in the

wholesale implementation of the recommendations. While receiving the report, president Yar

Adua announced that implementation of the panel’s recommendations will commence within

two weeks. The period was given to allow for drafting of legal instruments and legitimation of

the amnesty proclamation. Crucial for legitimation was the convening of the National Council


22

of States, a constitutional non-partisan broad-based body of eminent persons, charged with

affirming executive decisions on potentially nationally divisive issues such as presidential

exercise of prerogative of mercy, conduct of general elections, and national population census.

Following the affirmation of the National Council of States, president Yar Adua proclaimed

‘amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated

in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta’ on 25 June

2009. A window period of sixty days was offered to militants to submit their reports and stop

militant activities between 6 August when weapons collection centres will be set up and 4

October when they will wind down. Any group that took arms against the Nigerian state, private

individuals, and private business after October 2009 was to be treated as a criminal even

though the person claimed the action was in furtherance of the cause of the Niger Delta. Apart

from the DDR process, the amnesty package encompassed actions to prevent and address

environmental degradation; develop infrastructure and redistributive transfers of proceeds

from oil rents to the people of the Niger Delta (Ajibola 2015).

The responses of militants to the offer of amnesty were mixed. While some eagerly embraced

it, others foot-dragged expecting the government to implement the full course of

recommendations proposed by the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. For instance,

MEND initially rejected the amnesty offer but declared a thirty days ceasefire in July 2009 after

the release of one its leaders Henry Orkar by the Federal Government. However, at the

expiration of the window period, 20,192 persons and the major militant groups had accepted

the offer of amnesty and submitted about 20,000 items of ammunition (Ikelegbe 2010; Kuku

2012: 127).

Three factors were critical in the relative success of the disarmament and demobilization phase

of the DDR process. First, was the scale-up of military pressure on the militants that

commenced in June 2008 after president Yar Adua directed the military to crack down on

recalcitrant militant groups in the region. The military offensive was characterized by targeted

deployments against specific militant camps in the creeks in quick succession. Between June

2008 when MEND attached the Bonga Oil Field and June 2009 when the president made the

proclamation, the military had attacked the camps of notable militants such as Farah Dagogo,

Sabomabo Jackrich, Ateke Tom, Boyloaf, and Tompolo. The military’s most prized victory was

the dislodgment of Tompolo, feared leader of MEND from Camp 5 in the creeks of Delta State

on 12 May 2009. This is because the militant base was previously considered invincible. To

be sure, MEND did not give up easily as it inflicted massive loss in equipment including two

helicopters and three gun boats and personnel on the military. Several commentators have


23

argued that that the military deployments were not significant but merely contributed to

prolongation of the violence. For instance, Ikelegbe (2010: 43) has argued that the devastating

response of MEND which increased attacks on oil facilities crippling production in the process,

made the ‘limited military success seemingly hollow and pyrrhic.’

However, there is no doubt that the military build-up added pressure on the militants, making

them to appreciate the risks of continuation of the armed struggle. This is more so as the

militants were aware of increase in the military budget and procurement of more sophisticated

weapons and the recruitment of foreign security consultants (allegedly from Israel and Russia),

which increased the capability of the Nigerian security forces. While the militants criticized the

build-up and claimed it was evidence that the government was not serious about a political

and developmental solution, the government denied it was privileging military approaches to

resolution. The Federal Government claimed the military was on a ‘search and rescue mission’

to tackle criminal elements who were taking advantage of the genuine struggles of the Niger

Delta people for a better life to commit crime and perpetrate violence. Although there was no

rigorous distinction between political militants and criminals, the narrative that state violence

were directed at so-called criminals ultimately influenced the militant groups to accept the

amnesty even when the state failed to meet the demands for demilitarization, devolution, and

development.

The second factor was the behind the scenes overtures of government emissaries to militants.

While the government officials openly talked tough and claimed there will be no negotiations,

government deployed politicians, youth leaders, and retired security officials who had good

contacts with the militants to reach to them and influence them to accept the amnesty. The

acceptability of the programme was enhanced by the fact that some of these key actors,

notably Timi Alaibe and Kingsley Kuku, were appointed into key positions to oversee the

delivery of the amnesty programme. The overtures to leaders of the militant groups were

spiced not just with offers of protection and non-prosecution which the general amnesty offer

implied, but with other compensation packages that were not made public. In the fullness of

time, these offers openly manifested as some ex-militant leaders were appointed to caretaker

committees of local government councils and awarded surveillance contracts to protect oil

facilities. This is in addition to the undisclosed payoffs and discretionary oversight roles for

dispensing benefits to their followers given to them.

Third and linked to the second is the relative trust that Yar Adua enjoyed in the region. His

dovish personality and Spartan outlook made him appear believable to most groups. This is

especially the case as the reference point to him was Obasanjo and preceding military


24

dictators. The element of trust was crucial in the survival of the amnesty programme amidst

the stormy waters it had to navigate—especially as his allies in the region were also trusted by

the key actors. As Ikelegbe (2010: 60) aptly observes:

The Amnesty was based on some trust in the political will, sincerity and commitment of

the late president Umaru Yar’Adua, the vice President and presidential adviser on the

Amnesty Programme. Although the content of the private discussions between militant

leaders who embraced amnesty and the presidency were not made known, the

discussions and the promises and clarifications made therein, clearly provided some

basis of trust and hopes about the resolution of militancy and the region’s problems. This

was besides the honesty of the late president in acknowledging the grievances of the

region, the mistakes of earlier administrations and the anger that transformed into armed

militancy.

After acceptance of the amnesty, demobilization activities commenced with the setting up of

the implementation office and encampment of the ex-militants. However, the demobilization

and reorientation phase was stalled as a result of the declining health of the president who had

personally led the process. This was especially the case when the ensuing power play initially

led to the sidelining of vice president Jonathan. However, the appointment of the vice president

Jonathan as acting president and his subsequent confirmation as substantive president after

the death of Yar Adua on 5 May 2010 was a timely development that helped the resuscitation

of the comatose amnesty programme.

5. Conclusions

The foregoing analysis provides some evidence of sequencing in the implementation of the

amnesty programme which to a large extent has helped stabilization efforts in the Niger Delta.

The government clearly invested some efforts in using military instruments to stabilize the

region before going ahead with implementation of the amnesty programme. This was mainly

to assert state sovereignty by responding to mobilizations of militant groups to weaken and

further erode state legitimacy. However, contingent factors that developed ensured that the

sequence was non-linear and complicated rather than phased. While the government would

have preferred the phased approach given the culture of sequencing in conflict management

experience in Nigeria, the conflict dynamics themselves did not allow for such controlled

measure.


25

The imperative to react to recurrent threats to security, which had the capacity to undermine

nascent regime legitimacy, influenced the government to adopt different measures to quench

the fires. Typical peacekeeping operations have never really ended in the region as the Joint

Task Force continues to operate with identical extended mandates. Emergence of new groups

and reneging on agreements by existing groups has meant that peacemaking type activities

continue indefinitely. Moreover, impatience with government borne out of decades of

disappointments influenced government to embark on initiatives intended to address structural

drivers when the fires had not quenched. Thus, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs which was

supposed to focus on leading implementation of the forward-looking master plan for the region

was drawn into immediate intervention in road construction to appease militants and members

of the public.

Similar dynamics of contingency, conjunctures, and coincidences are evident in timing issues

around the amnesty. Crucial in this respect is the emergence of Yar Adua as president in 2007

and its conjuncture with the selection of a son of the soil of the region as vice president. When

it seemed the amnesty programme was floundering the coincidental emergence of Jonathan

as president in 2010 was crucial in its revival. Also important were the contemporaneous global

energy crises and global quest for security in the Gulf of Guinea.


26

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