THE SUFFICIENCY OF SPINOZISTIC ATTRIBUTES FOR THEIR …

Síntesis.RevistadeFilosofía.IV(1) (enero-julio2021);pp.133-155

Artículodeinvestigación

DOI:10.15691/0718-5448Vol4Iss1a350

THESUFFICIENCYOFSPINOZISTIC

ATTRIBUTESFORTHEIRFINITEMODES

MichaelAnthonyIstvanJr.1AustinCommunityCollege

Recibido:28.10.2018–Aceptado:30.10.2019

ABSTRACT

SomepassagesthroughoutSpinoza’sbodyofworkssuggestthatanattributeinitsabsolutenatureprovidesasufficientconditionforallofitsmodes,includingthefiniteones.Otherpassagessuggestthatanattributeinitsabsolutenaturefailstoprovideasufficientcondi-tion for its finitemodes.Myaim is todispel thisapparent tension. Iargue thatall finitemodesareultimatelyentailedbytheabsolutenatureoftheirattribute.Furthermore,Iex-plainhowtheSpinozisticpositionsthatappearincompatiblewiththisviewareinfactcom-patible.AsIseeit,weshouldreadthosepassageswhereSpinozasaysthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeassayingmerelythatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsinone-by-onefashion,independentofaninfiniteseriesofothermodes,fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Keywords:Spinoza;Attribute;Mode;Necessitarianism;ExplanatoryRationalism.

-------------------------------------------- 1 michael.istvan@gmail.com

MICHAELANTHONYISTVAN-THESUFFICIENCYOFSPINOZISTICATTRIBUTESFORTHEIRFINITEMODES 134

SÍNTESIS.REVISTADEFILOSOFÍAIV(1)2021;pp.133-155 e-ISSN:2452-4476

1.INTRODUCTORYREMARKS

Therearestrongreasonstobelievethat,forSpinoza,nofinitemodeisulti-matelyentailedbytheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Inotherwords,andas several commentatorshaveargued,2 thereare strong reasons to thinkthatanattribute,consideredinitsabsolutenature(thatis,asontologicallypriortoitsmodes:see1p5d),isnotsufficientforitsfinitemodes(see1p21-23,1p28,1p28d,2p30d,4p4d;KV1.2I/34).3Ontheotherhand,andassev-eralcommentatorshavealsoargued,4 therearestrongreasons tobelievethatanattribute,considered in itsabsolutenature,does in factprovideasufficientconditionforallofitsmodes(includingthefiniteones)(see1p17s,1p25s,1p29,1appII/77;KV1.3.2,KV1.4.8;KV1.6.3I/41/23,CM1.3I/243;Ep.12,Ep.21,Ep.43,Ep.81,Ep.83).Myaiminthispaperistodispelthis

-------------------------------------------- 2SeealsoDea2008,603-628;Donagan1973,241-258;Friedman1986,371-401;

Fullerton1894,254;Miller2001,779-814.Forhelpfulbackgroundsee,especially,Curley1969,101-118.ForastatementofthedifficultyconcerningwhetherSpinozisiticattributesaresufficientfortheirfinitemodes,seeCurley1988,48-50.ForahintofhowthisissueistiedupwiththeissueofSpinoza’snecessitarianism,seeCurley-Walski,1999.

3AllSpinozacitationsarefromGebhardt’sLatincriticaleditionSpinozaOperaandusethefollowingformat:abbreviatedworktitlefollowedbyOperavolumenumber,pagenumber,and linenumber.Thetitleabbreviationsarestandard:LettersandReplies(Ep);Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TdIE); Short Treatise (KV); MetaphysicalThoughts(CM);Theological-PoliticalTreatise(TTP);PoliticalTreatise(TP);HebrewGram-mar(HG);Descartes’sPrinciplesofPhilosophy(DPP).So,forexample,“DPP1/263/5”isDes-cartes’sPrinciplesofPhilosophy:volume1,page263,line5oftheOpera.Followingstandardpractice,citationsfromtheEthicsusuallyreferonlytotheformalapparatusoftheEthicsitself—thefirstArabicnumeralindicatingthepartofthebookandthefollowingletterab-breviationsindicatingthetypeofpassage:“a”foraxiom;“app”forappendix;“c”forcorollary,“d”fordefinition(whenitcomesrightafterthepartnumeral)ordemonstration(formost,butnotall,oftheotherpositions);“lem”forlemma;“p”forproposition;“pref”forpreface;“s”forscholium;“exp”forexplication.Hence“3p59sd4exp”istheexplicationofthefourthdefinitionofthescholiumtothefifty-ninthpropositionofEthicspartthree.Withexceptiontotheoccasionalmodificationofmyown,translationsarefromCurley.ForLetters29-84IrefertoShirley’stranslation.

4 See Carriero 1991; Deleuze 1988, 93-94; Della Rocca 1996, 95-96; Della Rocca2008, 69-78;Garrett 1999, 103-130;Griffin2008, 71-93;Hampshire1970;Huenemann1999, 224-240; Koistinen 1998, 66; Koistinen 2003, 283-310; Lovejoy 1964, 151-157;Nadler2006,84-121;Newlands2007;Steinberg1981,35-68;Viljanen2008,412-437.

apparenttension,thusattemptingtoavoidtheconclusion,temptingtosomecommentators,5thatSpinozaisguiltyofcontradictiononthematter.

Afterafewquickpointsofclarification(Section2),Imaketwogeneralmoves.First,Iarguethattheevidencefortheviewthatanattributeinitsabsolutenatureprovidesasufficientconditionforallofitsmodesisstrongerthantheevidencefortheviewthatanattributeinitsabsolutenaturedoesnotprovideasufficientconditionforitsfinitemodes(Sections3and4).AsImakeclear,Spinozastatesthatanattributeinitsabsolutenatureprovidesasufficientconditionforallofitsmodesmorefrequentlythanheseemstostate thatanattribute in itsabsolutenaturedoesnotprovideasufficientconditionforitsfinitemodes.Perhapsmoreimportantly,theviewthatanattributeinitsabsolutenaturedoesnotprovideasufficientconditionforitsfinitemodesconflictswithoneofthecorefeaturesofSpinoza’sphilosophi-calvision: thoroughgoingexplanatoryrationalism.Second, Iproposehowwemightexplainawaythosepassagessuggestingthatfinitemodesarenotultimatelyentailedby theabsolutenatureof theirattribute (Section5). IsuggestthatwereadthosepassageswhereSpinozasaysthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeassayingsome-thingmore specific: that no finitemodeultimately follows in one-by-onefashion(asopposedtoaspartofaninfiniteseriesoffinitemodes)fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.

2.POINTSOFCLARIFICATION

First,here iswhat ImeanwhenIspeakofonething,A,beingasufficientconditionorreasonorcauseforanotherthing,B.AisthesufficientconditionforBifthebeingortruthofAissufficientfor(orenoughtohave)thebeingortruthofB.Thatistosay,AisthesufficientconditionforBifBisoristruewheneverAisoristrue.Inthiscase,ifAisthesufficientconditionforB,thenifAobtains,happens,hasbeing, is true,orwhatever, thenBmustneces-sarily—isguaranteedto—obtain,happen,havebeing,betrue,orwhatever.6

Second,whenIsaythatamodeisorisnotultimatelyentailedbyx,Imean(asperhapsgoeswithoutsaying)thatamode—initscompleteness,initsbeingentirelywhatitis—isorisnotultimatelyentailedbyx.Sosaythatmodeyisultimatelyentailedbyx.Iamsaying,inthiscase,thatxonlyify;thatis,ifx,theny.

-------------------------------------------- 5SeeBennett1984,111-124;Jarrett1978,55-56;Matson1979,76-83.6SeeIstvan2021a,section2.

Technically,Idonotneedtheterm“ultimately.”ButwithitImakeclearthatwhenIsaythatxissufficientfory,Iamnotlimitingmyselftosayingthattherecanbenointermediatestepsbetweenxandy.Itcouldbethatxissufficientforyinthesensethatxissufficientforqandqissufficientfory.

Now,inadditiontotheterm“ultimately”Ialsohaveaninclinationtoaddtheterm“completely,”asin:yultimatelyandcompletelyfollowsfromx.Unfortunately,addingtheterm“completely”hasproventocausemorecon-fusionthanclarification.Sounliketheterm“ultimately,”Iwillnotuseitfromhereout.Nevertheless,itmightbehelpfultounderstandwhyIhavethisin-clination.Theissueunderdiscussioninthispaperiswhetherfinitemodesultimately(andcompletely)followfromtheabsolutenatureofGod.Iliketothinkoftheterms“ultimately”and“completely”workingtogetherhereasfollows.TheultimatecauseofagivenfinitemodeistheabsolutenatureofGod.Sothroughhowevermanyintermediatesteps—intermediaryinfinitemodes(see1p21-1p23)—theremaybebetweenafinitemodeback(backorpriornottemporallyinthiscase,butontologically)totheabsolutenature,thatabsolutenatureistheultimatecause:thebuckstopsattheabsolutena-ture;thereisnocausefurtherback(“vertically,”thatis,ontologically)thanthatnature.Now,Iaminclinedtoaddintheterm“completely”toindicatethatthisultimatecause(thisultimatecausethatistheabsolutenature)allbyitself, that is,withoutthehelpofanythingelseonthesameontologicallevel (and alsowithout the help of randomness), is enough for the finitemodeinquestion.Ineedtomakethisclearbecauseofhowpeoplesome-timesspeak.Itistypicalforonetosay,forexample,thatstrikingthematchwassufficientforfiretoappear.TheabsolutenatureofGodisnotsufficientfor its finitemodes inthisway(inthis loosesenseofbeingsufficient). Inorderforthefireinquestiontoappearitisnot,technically,enoughsimplythatthematchbestruck.Thereneedstobeoxygenandvariousotherfactorsinplaceaswell.Tosay,however,thatabsolutenatureofGodissufficientforagivenmodeistosaythattheabsolutenaturecompletely,thatis,withoutthehelpofanyotherfactoronthesameultimateontologicallevel,producesthatfinitemode.

Why,then,doIscraptheterm“completely”?SomereadershavetakenmyclaimthattheabsolutenatureofGodcompletelyproducesagivenfinitemodeoasrulingoutthepossibilitythatowasproducedbytemporallypre-viousfinitemodes.ButaccordingtohowIseetheterm“completely”oper-atinghere,myclaimthattheabsolutenatureofGodcompletelyproducesagivenfinitemodeoiscompatiblewiththepossibilitythatowasproducedbytemporallypreviousfinitemodes.Forexample,itcouldbethatoisover-determined,havingasufficientexplanationonthevertical-ontologicalorder

(asufficientexplanationultimatelyintheabsolutenatureofGod)andhav-ingasufficientexplanationon thehorizontal-temporalorder(asufficientexplanation inpaststatesof theworld).Or itcouldbethat therearetwowaystolookathowoiscaused:horizontally,thatisintermsofpastmodes,orvertically,thatis,intermsultimatelyoftheabsolutenatureofGod.

3.EVIDENCEFORTHEINSUFFICIENCY

Spinozaseemstodenythatafinitemodecanultimatelyfollow—thatis,ei-therdirectlyorindirectly—fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Hisrea-sonisthat,sincewhateverultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofanattributemust be infinite and eternal (1p21-1p23), finite and durationalmodeswouldnotbefiniteanddurational(theywouldbeinfiniteandeter-nal)iftheydidultimatelyfollowfrom,thatis,iftheydidhavetheirsufficientsourcein,theabsolutenatureoftheirattribute(1p28and1p28d,1p21-23,2p30d,4p4d;KV1.2I/34).Nofinitemodeisultimatelyentailedbytheab-solutenatureofitsattribute,soSpinozaseemstosuggest.Instead,eachfi-nitemodeisentailedbypreviousfinitemodesadinfinitum.

Everysingularthing,oranythingwhichisfiniteandhasadetermi-nateexistence,canneitherexistnorbedeterminedtoproduceanef-fectunlessitisdeterminedtoexistandproduceaneffectbyanothercause,whichisalsofiniteandhasadeterminateexistence;andagain,thiscausealsocanneitherexistnorbedeterminedtoproduceanef-fectunlessitisdeterminedtoexistandproduceaneffectbyanother,whichisalsofiniteandhasadeterminateexistence,andsoon,toin-finity. . . . [W]hat is finiteandhasdeterminateexistencecouldnothavebeenproducedbytheabsolutenatureofanattributeofGod[orbyanythingthathasbeenproducedbytheabsolutenatureofanat-tributeofGod(see1p21-1p23)].(1p28-1p28d)

Leibnizreadsthesepassagesinthesameway.Thisisevidentbytheobjectionheraisesagainstthem.Hisobjectionismainlythatfiniteindivid-ualsareintruthsufficientlyexplainedbythe“vertical”oremanativecausalorder,notmerely—andashethinksSpinozabelieves—bythe“horizontal”chainofpreviousworldstatesandtheirlaws.

[O]neparticularthingisnotdeterminedbyanotherinaninfinitepro-gression[asitisforSpinoza]forinthatcasethingswouldalwaysre-mainindeterminate,nomatterhowfaryoucarrytheprogression.AllparticularthingsareratherdeterminedbyGod.7

In several places Spinoza seems to corroborate the view that finitethingsdonotultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattribute(2p30d,4p4d;KV1.2I/34).8AtKV1.2,forexample,Spinozasuggeststhat,besidestheattributeitself,finitemodesareneededtobringaboutagivenfinitemode.Theattributeinitsabsolutenaturedoes,Spinozamakesclearhere,“cause”eachofitsfinitemodes,butsimplyinthesensethattheattrib-uteinitsabsolutenatureisaconditionrequiredforeachofitsfinitemodesto be. The attribute is thusmerely agrounding ornecessary condition; itmerelymakesafinitemodecapableofexistence.Theattributeinitsabsolutenature isnotasufficientcondition,soSpinozamightbe takentosuggest.HereistheKVpassageinquestion:

[A]lthoughinorderthata[finite]thingmayexistthereisrequiredaspecialmodificationandathingbesidetheattributesofGod,forallthat,Goddoesnotceasetobeabletoproduceathingimmediately.For,ofthenecessarythingswhicharerequiredtobringthingsintoexistence,somearethereinorderthattheyshouldproducethething,andothers inorder that the thingshouldbecapableofbeingpro-duced.(KV1.2I/34)

CurleysummarizesSpinoza’spointhereasfollows.

[Al]thoughthefinitemodesareproducedbyotherfinitemodes,anddonotfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofGod,theydostilldependonhim.9

4.EVIDENCEFORTHESUFFICIENCY

Aswesaw,1p28and1p28d(inlightof1p21-1p23)suggest,apparentlyinlinewithafewotherpassages(suchastheKVonejustdiscussed),thatno

-------------------------------------------- 7LeibnizAVI, iv,1774-75. Inhis1678Decorporumconcursu,Leibniznotes: “the

entireeffectisequipollenttothefullcause,ortheyhavethesamepower....Notethat,inmetaphysicalrigor,theprecedingstateoftheworldorsomeothermachineisnotthecauseofthefollowing[state],butGod[isthiscause],althoughtheprecedingstateisasureindi-cationthatthefollowingwilloccur”(Leibniz1994,145-146).

8At2p30d,togiveoneofthestrangerexamples,Spinozasaysthatourbody’sdura-tion,andso(byCM1.4I/244/20-21)itstotalexistence,isnotdeterminedby(orevende-pendenton)God’sabsolutenature.

9Curley1985,433n59.

finitemodeisultimatelyentailedbytheabsolutenatureof itsattribute.10ThisispuzzlinginthelargercontextofPart1oftheEthics.Onseveralocca-sionsSpinozaclaimsthateverything—andsoeveneachfiniteindividual—ultimately follows from the absolute nature of its attribute (see 1p17s,1p25s,1p29,1appII/77;KV1.3.2,KV1.4.8;KV1.6.3I/41/23,CM1.3I/243;Ep.12,Ep.21,Ep.43,Ep.81,Ep.83).

ThisisdefinitiveinthefollowingpassagefromtheAppendixtoPart1.“[A]llthingshavebeenpredetermined[(praedeterminata)]byGod...fromGod’sabsolutenature,orinfinitepower”(myemphases,1appII/77).NoticeherethatSpinozacitesGod’sabsolutenatureasthecauseofitsfinitemodes.Herehedoesnotmean,bytheway,thattheabsolutenatureisacauseinthemeresenseofagroundingornecessarycondition.Afterall,heexplicitlysaysthateachmodehasbeenpredetermined,literallyfixedbeforehand,bythatabsolutenature.Amerenecessaryconditionforxdoesnotpredeterminex.Onlyasufficientconditionforxcanpredeterminex.

Weseesomethingveryclosetothis intheTTP,whereSpinozasaysthattheeternaldecreeofGodhaspredeterminedallthings.“Theeternalde-cree of God, by which he has predetermined all things.” (TTP 16.20III/199/18) The key is noting not only that the eternal decree predeter-minesallthings,butalsothattheeternaldecreemustultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofGod.Theeternaldecreemustultimatelyfollowfromthe absolute nature of God either in that it is one of the infinite-eternalmodes(whethermediateorimmediate)thatultimatelyfollowfromtheab-solutenatureofGodorinthatitistheabsolutenatureofGoditself.

Anotherpassage,fromearlierinPart1oftheEthics,isequallydefini-tive:

FromGod’ssupremepower...allthingshavenecessarilyflowed...bythesamenecessityandinthesamewayasfromthenatureofatriangleitfollows,frometernitytoeternity,thatitsthreeanglesareequaltotworightangles.”(1p17s2)

Thatthispassageisasdefinitiveasthepreviousoneisclearsolongasweattend to the fact that its phrase “God’s supreme power” (summaDei po-tentia)isbutastylisticvariantof—butnonethelessequivalentto—“God’sabsolutenature”(absolutaDeinatura).Thattheoneisastylisticvariantoftheothermakessense in itselfand is in factguaranteedby the following

-------------------------------------------- 10Wemust be careful to note the possibility that the two following assessments

shouldnotbeconflated:(1)finitemodesdonotfollowfromanattributeconsideredinitsabsolutenatureand(2)theattribute,consideredinitsabsolutenature,isnotsufficientforfinitemodes.

equations when taken together (as premises): (a) God’s supreme powerequals(sive)God’s infinitenature(1p17sII/62/15-16);(b)natureequals(sive)power(5p25d);(c)God’sinfinitepowerequals(sive)God’sabsolutenature(1appII/77).11

Thefollowingpassageisdefinitiveaswell,ascomesintoreliefwhenweteaseouttheimplications:“Godmustbecalledthecauseofallthingsinthesamesenseinwhichheiscalledcauseofhimself”.(1p25s)ThisquotesaysthatGodcauseseachthing—evenme—inthesamesenseinwhichGodcauses himself. In otherwords, each thing follows fromGod in the samesenseinwhichGodfollowsfromhimself.InwhatsenseisGodself-caused?Thatis,inwhatsensedoesGodfollowfromhimself?Godfollowsfromhim-selfbyhisabsolutenatureand thusbyabsolutenecessity.12BecauseGod

-------------------------------------------- 11Onemightthinkthatmyfindingsomanywide-rangingequivalencyclaimsinSpi-

nozaissuspect.Afterall,Spinozaisaphilosopherwhoseemsatleasttobelievein,aswellaswanttoactualize,thepossibilityforaclearandunivocalphilosophicallanguage.Myre-sponse?Spinozausesstylisticvariantsofcertainclaimspreciselyforclarity.Heusesstylis-ticvariantsatleastpartiallyforthesamereasonthatteacherswilldefineakeytermusingdifferentexpressions:tobeclearincommunicatingtoawideaudienceandtoteaseoutla-tentimplications.Somephraseswilldrawsomereadersin,otherphraseswillbetterregis-terwithotherreaders.Usingstylisticvariants,moreover,isawaytoclarifywhattheonephraseissaying.Yourunderstandingofthemeaningof“ifx,theny”isheightenedwhenyousee,forexample,that“ifnoty,thennotx”meansthesamething.Tosaywhatdeterminismis,forexample,Ineedtouseotherwords.Determinismistheviewthatthefutureisfixedbythepast.AndImightuseevenmorewordstodrivethepointhome(say,ifthereiscon-fusionabouttheword“fixed”):determinismistheviewthatthepastguaranteesthefuture.Relatedly,usingstylisticvariantsisalsoawaytopreventmisinterpretation.Withonlyonewayofputtingsomething(callit“o”),themisconceptionthatthereadermayhaveaboutomightremainunchecked.ButwhenSpinozasaysthatphraseAreallyjustmeansphraseB,thatservesasasortoftesttowhichthereadercansubjecthisunderstandingofphaseA,anunderstandingthatcaneasilybefraughtwithbaggage.Ofcourse,Spinozacouldjustkeepsaying“God,”forexample,insteadofgoingwith“Nature”atothertimes.Butthatmightin-creasethelikelihoodofreadershavingall-too-orthodoxnotionsinmindwhentheyhear“God.”Icouldgiveadeeper,andmorespecificallySpinozistic,indicationofwhyusingsty-listicvariantsisimportant.Butthepointshouldbeclearenough.

12Ofcourse,itisawkwardtospeakof“Godfollowingfromhimself.”NotonlydoesSpinozaneverseemtousethatphrase,butitalsorisksbeingreadasacontradiction.Forthatwhichfollowsfromsomethingelseistypically,andinmostcases,amode.SotosaythatGodfollowsfromhimselfmightsuggestthatanonmodeisamode.Ofcourse,Godfollowingfromhimselfisonespecialcasewheretheeffectisnotamode.Itmayseemstrange,forthesamereasonthattalkingaboutself-causedthingsisstrange—sostrangethatitistypicalinthehistoryofphilosophyupuntilthepresentdaytoignoretheself-causationoptionandsimplysaythattherearetwoandonlytwooptions:somethingiseithercausedbyanother(other-caused)orsomethingiscausedbynothing(uncaused).JustasinmostcasesandformostpeoplethatwhichfollowsfromAisnotidenticaltoA,inmostcasesandformostpeo-plethatwhichiscausedbyAisnonidenticaltoA.Nevertheless,ifsuchtalkof“Godfollowsfromhimself”isabothertoreaders,simplyunderstandthistomeanGodcauseshimself,asSpinozaexplicitlysays(1p34d)andwhichisentailedbyhismetaphysics.FormoreonwhatitmeanstosaythatiSpinoza’sGodisself-caused,seeIstvan2021b,section1.2.

followsfromhimselfbyhisabsolutenature,eachthing—evenme—followsfromGod’sabsolutenatureandthusbyabsolutenecessity.

Now,onemightthinkthatthispassageneednotbereadasstronglyasIamreadingithere.TosaythatGodcausesthingsinthesamesensethathecauseshimselfis,accordingtoaweakerreading,tosaysimplythatGodis,necessarily, thecauseofeverything.Perhaps.But Ihavereservations.Myreservationsarenotonlybecauseof theotherpassages inmypaper thatsupportthereadingthateachthingfollowsfromGod’sabsolutenature.MyreservationsarebasedonwhatIseeinthe1p25passagesandthepassagestowhichSpinozarefersreaders inthosepassages. Inthecontextof1p25SpinozaisnotsayingmerelythatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeverything.Heissaying(i)thatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeverything(including—asshouldgowithoutsaying,eventhoughitisimportanttosay—everythingabouteverything)and,inparticularthat(ii)thatthenecessityofthedivinenature isnecessarily the causeof everything (including everything abouteverything).BeforeIexplainwhythesetwoclarificationsmotivatemyres-ervations, letme layout the textualreasonswhyIseementitled tomaketheseclarifications.1p25makesclearthatGodisthecausenotonlyoftheexistencebuttheveryessenceofeverything.Sinceathingisexhaustedbyitsexistenceplusitsessence(thereisnothirdaddition),tosaythatGodisnecessarilythecauseofboththeexistenceandtheessenceofeverythingisthereforetosaythatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeverything(includingeverythingabouteverything)(pointi).Now,at1p25sSpinozasaysthathisproofforGodismoreclearlydemonstratedsimplyby1p16.At1p16Spinozasays that the necessity of the divine nature necessarily entails infinitelymanymodes(entailswhatevercanfallunderaninfiniteintellect)(1p16es-peciallyinlightof1p16d).Sinceeverything(includingeverythingabouteve-rything)canfallunderaninfiniteintellect,thenecessityofthedivinenatureis necessarily the cause of everything (including everything about every-thing(pointii).Now,whymightallthisberelevanttosupportingmyreser-vation?Well,ifwetakethedivinenaturediscussedhere,thatis,thedivinenatureinitsnecessity,astheabsolutenatureofGod(whichseemsatleastreasonable),thenthismeansthat1p25isindeedclaiming,atleastimplicitlywhenwelooktothepassagescited,thattheabsolutenatureofGodisnec-essarilythecauseofeverything(includingeverythingabouteverything).ItshouldbeclearwhyIambeingfastidiousherewithsuchtalkof“everythingabouteverything.”SuchtalkmakesclearthatthereisnothinginexcesstoanythingthatfailstobenecessarilycausedbytheabsolutenatureofGod.Wearrive,therefore,backtomyoriginalreadingof1p25s.Insteadofmerelymaking therather tameclaim(tamerelative towhatSpinozahasalready

saidatthispointintheEthics)thatGodisnecessarilythecauseofeachthing,at1p25sSpinozaissayingthattheabsolutenatureofGodisnecessarilythecauseofeachthingand,indeed,ofeveryaspectofeachthing.The“every-aspect”qualifier, it shouldbeclear,undercuts themainviablealternativeview: that theabsolutenatureofGod ismerelyagroundingornecessaryconditionforfinitemodes.PerhapsiftheabsolutenatureofGodwerethecauseofeachthingbutonlyinsomerespect(saytheiressencebutnotexist-ence),thenthatreadingwouldhavemoretraction.Spinozaisinsteadsug-gestinginthese1p25passages,however,thatnoaspectofanythingfailstobecausedbytheabsolutenatureofGod.

Inlightofthesepassages(andfurtherconsiderationstocome),Itakeitthatthefollowingpassagesreportthesameidea,eventhoughinthemweseenoexplicitreferencetoGod’sabsolutenature.

[A]ll thingshavebeendetermined fromthenecessityof thedivinenature.(myemphasis1p29)

[A]llthingsemanatefromGodbyaninevitablenecessity.(Ep.43)

ThateveryfinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeiscorroboratedwithequaldefinitivenessinSpinoza’sfollowingremarktoBlyenbergh.

MeanwhileIrecognizesomethingwhichgivesmethegreatestsatis-factionandpeaceofmind:thatallthingscometopassastheydobythepowerofasupremelyperfectBeingandbyitsimmutabledecree.(Ep.21).

Thatthisremarkisequallydefinitiveisclearsolongasweattendtothefactthatitsphrase“thepowerofasupremelyperfectBeinganditsimmutabledecree”isastylisticvariantofeitherthephrase“God’sabsolutenature”orthephrase“God’sabsolutenatureandhisinfinite-eternalmodes.”Thattheoneisastylisticvariantofeitherthefirstorthesecondisguaranteedbythefollowingfacts,takentogether.(1)Thereis,bydefinition,nopowergreaterthanthepowerofwhatissupremelyperfect,andGod’sabsolutenatureistheonlythingthatissupremelyperfect.Note,inlinewiththis,thatthepowerofa supremely perfect Being is just another way of saying God’s supremepower.Thatissignificantbecause,asIexplainedintheabovediscussionof1p17s2,“God’ssupremepower”isastylisticvariantof“God’sabsolutena-ture.”(2)Whatisimmutablecanbe,inSpinoza’smetaphysics,onlytheab-solute nature of God or the infinite-eternalmodes that ultimately followfromthatnature(recalltheabovediscussionoftheeternaldecreeofGodatTTP16).—Now,ifthephrase“thepowerofasupremelyperfectBeingand

itsimmutabledecree”isastylisticvariantsimplyofthephrase“God’sabso-lutenature,”thentheabovepassageindicatesthateveryfinitemodeulti-matelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.For,inthiscase,thepassagewouldsaythatallthingscometopassbyGod’sabsolutenature.If,ontheotherhand,thephrase“thepowerofasupremelyperfectBeinganditsimmutabledecree”isastylisticvariantofthephrase“God’sabsolutena-tureandhisinfinite-eternalmodes,”thentheresultturnsouttobethesame.For,inthiscase,thepassagewouldsaythatallthingscometopassbyGod’sabsolutenatureandhisinfinite-eternalmodes.Sinceinfinite-eternalmodesallultimatelyfollowfromGod’sabsolutenature,tosaythatallthingscometo pass byGod’s absolute nature and his infinite-eternalmodes is to saysimplythatallthingscometopassbyGod’sabsolutenature—thefirsten-tailsthesecond.

ConsidernowSpinoza’s conversationwithTschirnhaus (Ep. 81-83).Disambiguatingwhatismeantbyhisclaimthat“everythingdependsononesinglecause”(KV1.6.3I/41/23),13hereSpinozaexplainstotheincredulousTschirnhaushowallbodies—evenfiniteones—arededuciblefromtheab-solutenatureofExtension.Spinozasaysthatthisfollowsfromthefactthattrue Extension, unlikeCartesian Extension, is fundamentally dynamic, in-trinsicallycontainingmotionandrest(seeEp.64).SpinozaadmitsthatthevarietyofbodiescannotbedemonstratedapriorifromtheCartesiancon-ceptionofExtensionasaninertmass.

“[F]romExtensionasconceivedbyDescartes,towit,aninertmass,itisnotonlydifficult,asyousay,butquiteimpossibletodemonstratetheexistenceofbodies.Formatteratrest,asfarasinitlies,willcon-tinue tobeatrest,andwillnotbeset inmotionexceptbyamorepowerfulexternalcause.”(SpinozaEp.81)

Spinozasuggests,however,thatitispreciselybecausemotionisaninherentfeatureofExtension—Extensionashehimselfunderstandsit—thatallbod-iescanbededucedfromitsabsolutenature.

Withregardtoyourquestionastowhetherthevarietyofthingscanbedemonstratedapriorisolely fromtheconceptionof [Cartesian]Extension[asaninertmass(seeLetter81)], I thinkIhavealreadymadeitquiteclearthatthisisimpossible.ThatiswhyDescartesiswrongindefiningmatterthroughExtension;itmustnecessarilybeexplicatedthroughanattributewhichexpresseseternalandinfiniteessence....Astowhatyouadd,thatfromthedefinitionofanything,

-------------------------------------------- 13SeeKoistinen2003,290-291.

consideredinitself,wecandeduceonlyoneproperty,thismayholdgoodinthecaseofthemostsimplethings,orinthecaseofmentalconstructs(entiarationis),inwhichIincludefigures,butnotinthecaseofrealthings.SimplyfromthefactthatIdefineGodasanEntitytowhoseessenceexistencebelongs,Iinferseveralpropertiesofhim.(Ep.83)

ConsiderLetter12aswell.HereSpinozadescribestwoversionsofthecosmologicalargument:theversionfoundintheancients(andwhichSpi-nozaaccepts),andtheversionthat“recentperipatetics”falselyattributetotheancients(andwhichSpinozarejects).Astherecentperipateticsseethecosmologicalargument,theremustbeafirstcause—God—sinceanactualendlesssequenceofcauses into thepast isabsurd.As theancientssee it,however,whatisabsurdisnottherealityofanactualendlesssequenceofcauses,butratherthatthemembersofthissequencefailtobedeterminedbythatwhichexistsbyitsownnature:God.Hereisthepassage:

“[T]hemorerecentPeripateticshave...misunderstoodthedemon-stration bywhich the Ancients tried to prove God’s existence. . . .[T]heforceofthisargumentdoesnotlieintheimpossibilityoftherebeinganactualinfiniteoraninfiniteregressofcauses,butonlyinthesuppositionthatthingswhichdonotexistnecessarilybytheirownnature[,whichnoneofthemembersofthatinfinitecausalsequencedo,]arenotdetermined[determinari]toexistbyathingwhichdoesnecessarilyexistbyitsownnature.”(myemphasisEp.12)

WhatismostimportanttonoticehereisthatSpinozaspeaksofthatwhichexistsbyitsownnature,whichcanbenothingelsethanGodinhisabsolutenature,asdeterminingeachmemberoftheinfinitesequence.Godinhisab-solutenatureis, therefore,notameregroundingcause,amerenecessarycondition, for eachmember of the sequence. After all, amere groundingcause,amerenecessarycondition, forxdoesnotdeterminex.God inhisabsolutenatureis,rather,thecompletecause,thesufficientcondition,foreachmember.14

-------------------------------------------- 14CoulditbethatIamtakingtoomanylibertieswiththeterm“determinari?”Per-

haps.Afterall,“determinare”(theactiveinfiniteform)canmeantosetboundariesupon,ortoresolve.Nevertheless,Shirleyprovidesagoodexplanationwhytheterm“determinare,”inSpinoza’sthought,“isneverusedinthesenseoftodecide,resolve,andsoforth.Itisal-waysused in the sense thatgives rise to thephilosophical term ‘determinism’” (Shirley1992,25-26).

Inadditiontothesepoints,noticealsothatifnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute,thenthatrequiresthepres-enceofchanceinSpinoza’ssystem.15SuchaconsequenceisrepugnanttoathoroughgoingexplanatoryrationalistlikeSpinoza.Afterall,Spinozaholdsthateachthing,whetheritexistsornot,requiresanexplanationforwhyitexistsornot.ForSpinoza,theremustbeananswertoeverywhy-question(andthis includeswhy-notquestions)(1a2,1p7d2,1p8s2,1p11d2,1p16,1p17s2,1p18,1p29,1p33,1p33s1,1app,2p44c2d;Ep.54,Ep.75).

Foreachthingtheremustbeassignedacause,orreason,asmuchforitsexistenceasforitsnonexistence.Forexample,ifatriangleexists,theremustbeareasonorcausewhyitexists;butifitdoesnotexist,theremustalsobeareasonorcausewhichpreventsitfromexisting,orwhichtakesitsexistenceaway.(1p11d2)

Butwhyexactlyisitthecasethatifnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute,thenthatrequiresthepresenceofchanceinSpinoza’ssystem?Itmightnotseemsoobviousatfirstwhythepresenceofchance,andthustheviolationofSpinoza’sthoroughgoingex-planatory rationalism,would indeed result. After all, the sumof all finitemodesofanattributeatagiventimetnwillbeentailedbythesumofallfinitemodesattn-1.16Anythingthathappensintheinfinitechainofthesesumsoffinitemodesateachmoment(sumsthat,forthesakeofbrevity,Iwillcall“worldstates”)isguaranteedbythepasttoplayoutexactlyasitdoes.Sinceanyoneoftheworldstatesentailsallthefollowingworldstates,thereisineffectcompletedeterminism.17Inlightofthecompletedeterminismofthehorizontal-temporalorder,theremightseemtobenoviolationofexplana-toryrationalismevenonthereadingof1p28and1p28dinquestion:thead-mittedlynaturalreadingthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheab-solutenatureofitsattribute.

-------------------------------------------- 15SeeHuenemann1999,227.16Tobemoreprecise(butat theexpenseofneedlesslycomplicatingmatters)we

shouldsaythatthesumofall finitemodesofanattributeatagiventimetnwillbefullyentailed,fullyexplained,bythesumofallfinitemodesattn-1plustheabsolutenatureoftheattributeinquestion.Wehavetosaythattheabsolutenatureoftheattributemakesacon-tributionbecause,afterall,theabsolutenatureoftheattributeis,trivially,necessaryforanyfinitemode.Theabsolutenaturemakesmorespecificcontributionsthanjustthis,wecansayaswell.Fortheinfinite-eternalmodes,whichdouncontroversiallyultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattributes,makecontributions.Thecontributionsmadebyinfinite-eternalmodes,whicharewhatthescholastictraditionandsometimesSpinozaaswellcall“causaesecundae,”arefrequentlydescribedinthesecondaryliteratureasthecontributionsofuniversallawsofnature:see3prefaceII/138/12-18;TTP4.1III/57,TTP6.3III/82-83).

17CurleyandWalski1999,243.

Buthereiswhythepresenceofchance,andthustheviolationofSpi-noza’s thoroughgoing explanatory rationalism, would result if no finitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureof itsattribute.Assumethatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattrib-ute.Considernowtheentirechainofworldstatesitself,theentiresequencethatextendsintoboththeinfinitepastandtheinfinitefutureandwheretheposteriorstatesareutterlydeterminedbytheprior.Whatisthefullexpla-nationfortheinfinitechainofworldstatesasawhole,achainthatIwillcall“alpha”?Whatcompletelyexplainswhyalphaasawholeobtainsratherthansomeother infinite chain?18 Theexplanation cannotbe that alpha is self-caused.Asachainofmodes,alphaisdependentontheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.The explanationalso cannotbe that finitemodesbeyondalphamakeitnecessarythatalpha(ratherthansomeotherchain)obtains.Asthetotalchainoffinitemodesofagivenattribute,therearenofinitemodesbe-yond alpha that could play such a role. (Any finitemodes beyond alphawouldbelong to adifferent attributeand there canbeno interactionbe-tweenattributes:1p10s,2p5,2p5d.19)Theonlyotheroptionthatremainsastowhatprovidesthefullexplanationforalpha(andthusforwhyalpharatherthansomeotherinfiniteseriesobtains)isthatalphaultimatelyfol-lowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.20Now,ifalphaultimatelyfol-lowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute,theneachofthefinitemodesthatmakeitupmustultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattrib-ute.For ifx-y-zasapackageultimately follows fromtheabsolutenature,thenitistrivialthatanygivenmemberofthatpackage(say,y)ultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenature.Weareassuming,however,thatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Accordingtoourassumption,then,itcannotbethecasethatalphaultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Therefore,wearecompelledtosay

-------------------------------------------- 18Bennettasksthisquestion(1984,117-118)asLeibniznodoubtwouldaswell.As

LeibnizexplainsinhisFifthLettertoClarke,itmayverywellbetruethattheoccurrenceoffiniteindividualxisentailedbythepreviousworldstateG,suchthatwehavethehypothet-icalproposition“ifG, thenx.”But,asLeibnizasks,whatabout theentirechainofworldstates?“Wemust,”Leibnizsays,“distinguishbetweenanabsoluteandahypotheticalneces-sity.”AsLeibnizputsitinOntheUltimateOriginofThings,inordertoexplaintheultimateorigin of “the chain of states or series of things, the aggregate ofwhich constitutes theworld,”wemustmovefrom“hypotheticalnecessity,whichdeterminedtheposteriorstatesoftheworldbytheprior,tosomethingwhichisabsoluteormetaphysicalnecessity.”Thatwhichhasabsoluteormetaphysicalnecessityis,LeibnizsaysintheMonadology,“outsidethesequenceorseriesofthisdetailofcontingents,howeverinfiniteitmaybe”(37-39).

19SeeGarrett1999,121;DellaRocca2008,54-58,97-103.20Theonlyotheroption, inotherwords, is thateitheralpha immediately follows

fromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeorthatalpha,byimmediatelyfollowingfromaninfinite-eternalmode,mediatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.

thatalphaexistswithoutafullexplanation—andthusthatchanceisimpli-catedintheexistenceofalpha—ifindeednofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.21Inotherwords,andtosummarize

-------------------------------------------- 21Curley1969,105;Curley1988,49.Thatoneiscompelledtotakealphaaslacking

anadequatecauseisadmittedevenbyCurleyhimself.Curleyclingstothereadingof1p28inquestionasthekeypremisetohisdenialoftheviewthatSpinozaisastrictnecessitarian,onewhoholdsthatallthings—evenfinitemodes—havethesamedegreeofnecessityastheabsolutenatureoftheattributesthemselves.

Theissueastowhetheralphahasafullexplanation,whichcanmeanonlythatitisfullyexplainedbytheabsolutenatureoftheattributeinquestion,isofcentralconcernintheinterpretivedebateastowhetherSpinozaisastrictormoderatenecessitarianor,inotherwords,whetherheisanecessitarianorsimplyadeterminist.Onthestrictnecessitar-ian (or simply necessitarian) reading,which has as its key evidence Spinoza’s repeatedclaim that everything flows entirely from the absolute nature ofGod, everything—eveneachfinitemode—isasnecessaryasGodinhisabsolutenature:namely,absolutelyneces-sary.Onthemoderatenecessitarian(orsimplydeterminist)reading,whichhasasitskeyevidence1p28and1p28d,noteverythingisabsolutelynecessary.Onlytheattributesthem-selves,andtheinfinite-eternalmodesthatSpinozadescribesin1p21,1p22,and1p23asultimatelyemanatingentirelyfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattributes,areabsolutelynecessary.However,onthisview,finitemodesdonothaveabsolutenecessity,butsomelessernecessity(intheliteraturecalled“hypotheticalnecessity”).Now,allsidesinthede-bateagreethatthereisaninfiniteregressofcausesattheleveloffinitemodes(nocausaldead-endordead-start);eachfinitemodeisatleastpartiallyafunctionofpreviousfinitemodesadinfinitum.Asthemoderatenecessitarianordeterministreadinguniquelyholds,however,eachfinitemodeisneverfullyafunctionoftheabsolutenatureoftheirattribute.Sincethereisnobuck-stoppingarchetemporally(as,again,everyoneinthedebateagrees)butalsonosufficientbuckstoppingarcheontologically (asmoderatenecessitarian inter-pretersmusthold,lesttheybeforcedtoconcedethateverythingisabsolutelynecessary),nofinitemodeisultimatelyfullyexplainedbywhatfullyexplainsitselfandthusnofinitemodecanhavetheabsolutenecessityofthatwhichfullyexplainsitself.(Finitemodes,in-stead,enjoymerely thenecessityof theendlesslydeferredbuckstoppingarche.)Onthisview,then,alphadoesnothaveafullexplanation.

Thefollowingcommentatorsleantowardthestrictnecessitarianreading,whichinmyviewistherightposition(forreasonsthatwillbecomeevident).Carriero1991;Deleuze1988,93-94;DellaRocca1996,95-96;DellaRocca2008,69-78;D.Garrett1999,103-130;Griffin 2008, 71-93; Hampshire 1951; Huenemann 1999, 224-240; Koistinen 1998, 66;Koistinen2003,283-310;Lovejoy1964,151-157;Nadler2006,84-121;Newlands2007;Steinberg1981,35-68;Viljanen2008,412-437.

Hereisa listofthosewholeantowardthemoderatenecessitarianinterpretation.Curley1969,101-118;Curley1988,48-50;CurleyandWalski1999;Dea2008,603-628;Donagan1973,241-258;Friedman1986,371-401;Fullerton1894,254;Miller2001,779-814.

HereisalistofthosewhoseemtoholdthatSpinozaiscontradictoryonthematter,thatis,thatheendorsesstrictnecessitarianismanditsdenialandso,ineffect,thathethinksalpha isentailedby theabsolutenatureof theattribute inquestionandthat it isnotsoentailed.Bennett1984,111-124;Jarrett1978,55-56;Matson1977,76-83.

Delahunty (1985, 155-165) is the only prominent commentator, of which I amaware,thatexplicitlyendorsesthemainremainingoption:thatadefinitivedecisioncannotbemadeeitherway.

Formoreonthisissue,seethefollowing.BussotiiandTapp2009;Hart1983;Leib-niz1969;Newlands2010;Phemister2006;Schmaltz1997;Willis1870,xxi.

thediscussion,theviolationofSpinoza’sexplanatoryrationalismwouldre-sultfromtheassumptionthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheab-solute nature of its attribute. For if alpha (the entire sequence of finitemodes)hasafullcause,thentheabsolutenatureofalpha’sattributepro-videsthatcause.Butiftheabsolutenatureofalpha’sattributeprovidesthatcause,thenitisnotthecasethatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.

5.RESOLVINGTHETENSION

The evidence in favor of the interpretation that, for Spinoza, every finitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeisstrongerthantheevidenceinfavoroftheinterpretationthat, forSpinoza,nofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Whates-pecially tips the scale, inmyview, is that the interpretation according towhichnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsat-tributeresultsinaviolationoftheexplanatoryrationalism,andtherejectionofchance, that isso foundational toSpinoza’svision.As Isee it, then, theevidencefortheinterpretationthattheabsolutenatureofanattributeisin-sufficientforitsfinitemodesmustbeexplainedawayifthereistobeanyresolutionofthetension.22

Now,itmightbesaidthatIcannotputmuchweightonthefactthatalphawouldlackasufficientexplanationifnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Onwhatgrounds?Well,accordingtosomecommentators,23Spinozafailstoconsiderthefullexplanationforalphaasawhole.ThatSpinoza“overlook[s]thehardquestionabouttheen-tire series” is evident, Bennett says, by the fact that Spinoza writes “asthoughourabilitytoanswerthewhyquestionaboutanyparticular[finitemodeintheseries]isenough[toexplaintheentireseriesandthus]tomeetthedemandsofexplanatoryrationalism.”24

Itdoesnotseem,however,thatSpinozafailedtoconsiderthefullex-planationforalphaasawhole.ThereisatleastonecasewhereSpinozaun-equivocallytodiscussalphaasawholeandsays,infact,thatalphaasawhole

-------------------------------------------- 22Andofcourseweshouldtrytoresolvethetension.Afterall,Spinozaassertsthat

eachthingfollowsultimatelyfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeinclosevicinitytothosepassageswhereheissupposedtobedenyingthis.

23Bennett1984,117-119;Curley1988,151n61.24Bennett1984,117-118.

doesultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.25Iwilldis-cussthepassageinquestionbeforeImoveontomysuggestionforresolu-tion of the apparent tension. That passage itself, in fact, provides an im-portantclueastohowthetensionistoberesolved.

Thepassage that Ihave inmind isLetter64.HereSpinozasuppliesTschirnhausandSchullerwithsomeexamplesofthosemodesthat,asde-scribed in1p21-1p23,ultimately follow fromtheabsolutenatureof theirattribute.Whenhecomestothosemodesthatfollowultimatelybutnotim-mediatelyfromtheabsolutenatureoftheirattributes(thosemodesknownin the literatureasmediate infinite-eternalmodes),Spinozasuggests thattheoneunderExtension(thatis,themediateinfinite-eternalmodefollow-ingultimatelyfromtheabsolutenatureofExtension)is“thefaceoftheen-tireuniverse”.Forfurtherassistanceastowhathemeans,hedirectshiscor-respondenttothescholiumofthe7thlemmaof2p13s.Inthislemma,Spinozaexplainsthateachbodyisacompositeofsmallerbodiesandthateachbodycanpreserveitsidentityandindividualitythroughvariousinternalchangesifandonlyifitscomponentbodiesmaintaintheproperpatternofmotionandrestamongthemselves.Spinozathensaysthatwecankeepproceedingupwards, through largerand largercomposite individuals,untilwereachthe material universe itself as a composite super-individual(2p13slemma7s,II/101-102).Sothesuggestionisthatthesuper-individual,whichispresumablymadeupofall finitemodesofExtensionastheyarerelatedacrosstime,iswhatSpinozameansbythefaceoftheuniverseandthusthemediateinfinite-eternalmodeunderExtension.Themediateinfi-nite-eternalmodeunderExtensionthuswouldamounttoalphaunderEx-tension.Sinceallinfinite-eternalmodes,whetherimmediate(1p21)orme-diate(1p22),ultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofthegivenattrib-ute,Spinozaispresumablysayingthatalphaultimatelyfollowsfromtheab-solutenatureofthegivenattribute.26Herearethekeypassagesinquestion.

-------------------------------------------- 25Thereareother,althoughlessdefinitive,placesaswell.AtTTP3.3andTTP6.6

Spinozadescribestheorderofnature,alpha,aseternalandfixed.Alphacouldbeeternalandfixedonlyifitultimatelyfollowedfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.Indeed,atTTP3.3andTTP16.20weseeSpinozasaythatthecommonorderofnature,alpha,waspredeterminedandpreordainedbyGod’snature.At1p33dSpinozaalsosuggeststhatifal-phawasdifferentGod’sabsolutenaturewouldbedifferent.That impliesthatalphaulti-matelyfollowsfromGod’sabsolutenature.

26ItshouldbenotedthatCurley,notwantingtobudgeontheviewthattheabsolutenatureofanattributeisnotasufficientcauseofanyfinitemode,interpretsSpinoza’sre-markstoTschirnhaushereinawaythatwouldnotconflictwiththeviewthattheabsolutenatureofanattributeisnotasufficientcauseofanyfinitemode.Curley,Ibelieve,iswrong.Thateverythinghasasitssufficientcausetheabsolutenatureofitsattributeiscorrobo-ratedfromjusttoomanydirections.Nevertheless,IwillquoteCurleyinfull:

IshouldliketohaveexamplesofthosethingsimmediatelyproducedbyGod,andofthosethingsproducedbythemediationofsomeinfi-nitemodification.(SchullerEp.63)

[T]heexamplesyouaskforofthefirstkindare:inthecaseofthought,absolutelyinfiniteintellect;inthecaseofextension,motionandrest.An example of the second kind is the face of the whole universe,which, although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always thesame.SeeScholiumtoLemma7precedingProp.14,11.(SpinozaEp.64)

So farwehaveconceivedan individualwhich is composedof [thesimplestbodies,thatis,]bodieswhicharedistinguishedfromonean-other only bymotion and rest, speed and slowness. . . . But ifweshouldnowconceiveofanother,composedofanumberofIndividu-alsofadifferentnature,weshallfindthatitcanbeaffectedinagreatmanyotherways,andstillpreserveitsnature. . . .ButifweshouldfurtherconceiveofathirdkindofIndividual,composed[NS:ofmanyindividuals]ofthissecondkind,weshallfindthatitcanbeaffectedinmanyotherways,withoutanychangeofitsform.Andifwepro-ceedinthiswaytoinfinity,weshalleasilyconceivethatthewholeofnatureisoneIndividualwhoseparts,i.e.,allbodies,varyininfiniteways,withoutanychangeofthewholeIndividual.(2p13lemma7s)

Somemaysaythatthefaceoftheuniverseisnotallbodies,butsimplylawsofnatureorperhapsthepatternofmotionandrestofthesuperindi-vidualinquestion(seeYovel1991).Spinozaistalkingaboutallbodies,how-ever.He is talkingaboutan individual, a super-individual,whose compo-nentsincludeallbodies.OnemaysaythatSpinozaistalkingaboutallbodiesatagiventime.Spinozaneversaysthat,though.Also,Spinozatendstospeakfromtheperspectiveoftheeternal.Whenhesaysallbodies,then,thedefault--------------------------------------------

First,thephrase“thefaceofthewholeuniverse”neednotreferto[thesumofallfinitemodesofagivenattribute]but[merely]tothosefeaturesofthat[supercom-posite]individualwhichenableittoretainitsidentitythroughchange....Second,ifwedointerpret“thefaceofthewholeuniverse”asreferringtothat[supersumoffinitemodes],thenwemaketroubleforourselveselsewhere.Themediateinfi-nitemodeoftheattributeofextensionissupposedtofollowfromtheabsolutena-tureoftheattributeofextension....Ifthemediateinfinitemodeofextensionfol-lows in thatway fromtheattributeofExtension,and ifwe identify themediateinfinitemodeofextensionwiththetotalityoffinitethings,thenthetotalityoffinitethingsfollowsfromtheattributeofextension.Idonotseehowthetotalityoffinitethingscan followfromtheattributeofextensionwithout itsbeingthecasethatindividualfinitethingsalsofollowfromtheattributeofextension....Unless[one]ispreparedtoattributeagrandinconsistencytoSpinoza,[one]oughtnottoiden-tifythemediateinfinitemodewiththetotalityoffinitethings.(Curley1993,131-132)

istoregardhimassayingallbodiesever:“allbodies”is,literally,allbodies—andsoacrossalltime.Thenotionoftemporalityisindeedexplicitintheverypassageathand.Spinozadescribesthesuper-individualasbeingthesameevenasitsparts,thatis,allbodies,varyininfinitewaysacrossinfinitetime.ThustheverycontextofthepassageindicatesthatSpinozaistalkingaboutallbodiesacrossall time.Moreover, if the facewassimplyallbodiesatagiventime,thatwouldmeanthatthereareinfinitefacesoveralltime—onefaceforeachsliceoftime.ButnotonlydoesSpinozamerelytalkaboutthefaceoftheuniversesingular, theabsolutenatureofGodproduceswhatitproducesfrometernity,thatis,inaneternalinstantratherthanateachtime-slicethroughoutsempiternity.Lastly,evenifthereweretheseinfinitefaces,alphawouldbethesumofthesefaces.AndsinceeachofthesefaceswouldfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofExtension,sotoothenwouldalpha.ThisisallthatIneedhere.

SoIsayonceagain,theevidencefortheinterpretationthatnofinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattributeshouldbeexplainedawayifthetensioninquestionistobedissolved.Forstrongerev-idence is tobefoundin favorof the interpretationthateveryfinitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.1p28and1p28d,inlightof1p21-1p23,isthemainevidencefortheinterpretationthatnofi-nitemodeultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofitsattribute.ThatiswhereIwillfocusmyattention,then.

Whenwelookat1p28and1p28dinisolationfromtherestofSpinoza’swritings,thenaturalreading,andtheonethatLeibniztakes,isthatSpinozadeniesthattheabsolutenatureofanattributeistheultimatesufficientcauseforeachfinitemode.However,inlightofalltheevidencetotheeffectthateverythingultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenature(suchthattheabso-lute nature is notmerely necessary but also sufficient for everything), itseemsthat1p28mustbereadinamorerestrictedsense.Takingacueespe-ciallyfromSpinoza’sendorsementofthefactthatthewholepackageoffinitemodes(alpha)ultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenature(aswejustsawwhenlookingatEp.64andlemma7s),andtakingacueingeneralfromthefactthatSpinozaoftenstresseshowfinitemodesareinextricablyimbedded,“interconnected”(TTP3.3),within“thecommonorderofnatureasawhole”(alpha) (2p29s, 2p30d, 4p4d, 4p4c, 4p57s; Ep. 12 IV/54/10-15;TdIE40,TdIE55,TdIE65,TdIE75;CM1.3I/241/30ff,CM2.9I/266),Ifinditmostreasonabletoread1p28and1p28dasdenying,notthattheabsolutenatureultimatelyproduceseachfinitemode,butmerelythattheabsolutenatureultimatelyproduceseachfinitemodeonebyone,inpiece-by-piecefashion.Spinozamustmeansimplythattheabsolutenatureofanattributedoesnot

producefinitemodesindividually,inisolationfromeveryothermemberofthepackage—piecemeal.Hemustmeanthat,sincetheabsolutenaturepro-ducestheentirepackageoffinitemodes,anygivenfinitemodenecessarilycomestogetherwithall theothers, inwhichcase it ismisguided, insomesense,tosingleoneoutasifthatoneallonitsownfollowedfromtheabso-lutenature.SincetheabsolutenatureofGodproducesanygivenfinitemodein the sense that it produces thewholepackageof finitemodes, 1p28d’sclaimthat“whatisfinite...couldnothavebeenproducedbytheabsolutenatureofanattributeofGod”isnottobeseenatrejectingtheclaimthattheabsolutenatureofGodproducesanygivenfinitemodeinthesensethatitpro-ducesthewholepackageoffinitemodes.1p28disrejectingsomethingelse.1p28disrejectingthesortofscenariowherewhatisfiniteisproducedbytheabsolutenatureofGodandyetdoesnotnecessarilycometogetherwitheveryotherfinitemodeacrossalltime.

Accordingtomyinterpretation,eachthing—evenafinitemodesuchasme—ultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofGod,contrarytowhatissuggestedbythemorestraightforwardreadingof1p28(inlightof1p21-1p23).SincewhatultimatelyfollowsfromtheabsolutenatureofGodisasnecessaryastheabsolutenatureofGoditself,andsincetheabsolutenatureofGodisabsolutelynecessary,eachthing—evenafinitemodesuchasme—isabsolutelynecessary.AsweseeinthedebateamongSpinozascholarsastowhetherSpinozaisastrictnecessitarian(adebatenotdirectlyaddressedinthispaper),therearepassagesthatseemtoconflictwiththepositionthateachthingisabsolutelynecessary(andthusthatSpinozaisastrictnecessi-tarian).Whilesuchpassageswouldhavetobediscussedinaplacethatper-mitsmorespace,Ithinkthatthegeneralstrategyforexplainingwhy1p28doesnotconflictwithSpinoza’scommitmenttotheviewthatallthings,evenfiniteones, follow fromtheabsolutenatureofGodserves toexplainwhythesepassagesdonotconflictwithSpinoza’scommitmenttotheviewthatallthings,evenfiniteones,areabsolutelynecessary.

Take,forinstance,oneofthemostpowerfulpiecesofevidencefortheviewthatfinitethings,suchasme,arenotabsolutelynecessary:2a1.

The essence ofman does not involve necessary existence, that is,fromtheorderofNatureitcanhappenequallythatthisorthatmandoesexist,orthathedoesnotexist.

By“agivenman”hereSpinozameansagivenman,suchasme,asheisallbyhimself, isolatedfromeverythingelse. In isolationfromeverythingelse,agivenmandoesnotultimatelyfollowfromtheabsolutenatureofGodand

thusagivenmanisnotabsolutelynecessary.Indeed,sinceagivenman,incontrasttoGod,doesnothimselfinvolveexistence,agivenmanconsideredallbyhimselfissuchthathemayormaynotexist.Since2a1isnotconsid-eringagivenmaninrelationtothegrandschemeofthings(accordingtowhichthatgivenmanwouldbeabsolutelynecessary),thefactthatSpinozasaysherethatagivenmanisnotnecessaryposesnoproblemfortheinter-pretationthat,forSpinoza,eachthing,includingthegivenmaninquestion,isabsolutelynecessary.

Isaythatby“agivenman”hereat2a1Spinozameansagivenmaninisolation.Isaythisnotjustbecausedoingsoexplainsawaythetensionthatthispassageposestotheinterpretationthateverythingisabsolutelyneces-sary.Simplyconsider2a1itself.HereSpinozasaysthatevenbytheorderofnatureitisnotnecessarythatagivenmanexist.Accordingtotheusualun-derstandingof theorderofnature thatSpinozahimself tends touse (see2p29s,2p30d,4p4c),theorderofnatureistherealmofmodes,whichasIarguedabove isuncontroversially (forbothsidesof thenecessitariande-bate)deterministic.Accordingtothissenseoftheorderofnature,Iamnec-essaryinthatmyexistencehasbeenguaranteedbypreviousstatesoftheworld,adinfinitum.SinceSpinozaisdenyingherein2a1thatmyexistenceisguaranteedbypreviousstatesoftheworld,hemustbethinkingofagivenmanallbyhimself,inisolation.ThereareonlytwooptionsabouthowSpi-nozamightconstrueagivenman:(1)agivenmanasembeddedintheentirerealmofmodes(andthusasguaranteedbythepreviousstatesoftheworldandthus,sincetheentireseriesofworldstatesisguaranteedbytheabsolutenatureofGod,bytheabsolutenatureofGod);(2)agivenmanasisolatedfromeverythingelse.2a1itselfmakesitclearthatSpinozaisnottakingthefirstoption.Hemustbetakingthesecondoption,then.Andthesecondop-tionisitself,ofcourse,liveforSpinoza.Spinoza,afterall,regardsthingsaspositivities,thingsintheirownright.Andthushecantalkabouthowathingisitsintrinsicstructure(2p13s,3post1),orabouthowathingiswhatit“isandcando,notwhatitisnotandcannotdo”(3p54;seeTdIE101;1p8s2).Andthushecantalkaboutathing“insofarasitisinitself”(3p6),thatis,con-sideringthelawsofitsnaturealone(see1d7,3p2s,3p56d,4d8,4p2d,4p18s,4p19,4p24,4p35,4p37s2;CM2.4I/256).

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