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8/3/2019 The Sealing of the MC252
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The sealing of the MC252
Project management Success through
Project Management Failure
Thomas Garry
University of Salford
December 9, 2010
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Abstract:
This paper researches the role that crucial project management played within the
capping of the MC252 well in The Gulf of Mexico, its perceived successes and failures,
the events leading up to the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon Drilling Rig. The new
barriers that project managers then faced with regards to the sealing of the well against
aggressive timelines costing BP (British Petroleum) billions of pounds and the increased
risk factors surrounding the sealing of the well. This paper analyses the direct impact to
the stakeholders not only of BP but also the environment surrounding the leak and those
involved. Most importantly I aim to scrutinize the managing of a project that was already
deemed an utter failure before it had even begun and the circumstances surrounding the
failure.
(http://www.nowpublic.com/environment/what-caused-bp-oil-spill-2010-halliburton-
cementing-issue-2612965.html)
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On 20th April 2010 the Transocean Deepwater Horizon drilling rig leased to British
Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico sustained an enormous explosion on board, killing 11
people and injuring 17 others (ref.8) causing wide spread pollution across the coast.
2 days later the Deepwater Horizon sank to the bottom of the sea bed and in its wake a
600 mile wide area of crude oil equivalent to 4.1 million barrels.
An increase of pressure and gasses within the well is thought to have led to the accident.
This until proven can only be assumed to be educated speculation, however, the
devastation that ensued was a very BP (British Problem)
BP which was recognized as the number 2 oil company in the world behind ExxonMobil,
acquired the lease to the MC252 (Mississippi Canyon Block 252)(See map below.
Ref.11).
The lease was purchased at the Minerals management Service lease sale 206. (Page 15,
Section 2. The Mocando Well. Lease and Permits). This was a ten year joint exploration
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lease made by BP(65%), Anadarko Petroleum(25%), and MOEX Offshore(10%) all with
shared ownership, with BP acting as the principal lease operator.
Despite this shared ownership and the crucial fact that the rig was leased from
Transocean and all crew members on board at the time of the explosion were Transocean,
the blame was focused on BP.
The worlds media, but in particular US media, homed in on the fact that the fault lay with
BP, now referred to in all media relations as British Petroleum. A tag line that has not
been attached to the company for many years. Ironic as 39% of BP is owned by US
shareholders.
As John Collins Rudolph (Ref.9) identifies, Six Americans- half the total, sit on its
board of directors and in addition, the companys single largest shareholder is the
sprawling asset management firm BlackRock, based in New York City.
This media thrashing in turn had a direct impact on the companies market share with an
estimated 55bn being wiped from the companies value since the spill began. (Ref.10)
http://chart.finance.yahoo.com/c/1y/b//bp.l
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(This image shows the plummeting of BPs market share as investors sell there stocks
and the companies value plummets as news of the spill and the devastation take effect.)
Along with rising clean up costs and compensation to be paid to stakeholders affected,
this estimate is more than certain to rise further.
This incident was now not only a British problem but also came to have huge political
significance with the US-UK relations being tested to breaking point. To some this
seemed all to convenient at a critical time in Barack Obamas time in office, the President
was due to increase the funding for independent US oil company exploration in an effort
to reduce the dependency of foreign imports of fossil fuels. At the same time the US
Senate published a bill setting out new safeguards on deepwater drilling, in the mean time
suspending all offshore drilling off the Gulf of Mexico for 6 months. Meanwhile in
England, the economy is going through its toughest recovery to date and the newly
elected David Cameron and his joint cabinet are making drastic budget cuts in an effort to
pay off the countrys deficit.
However both the US and UK came to understand the dynamics of the oil industry given
the potentially competing pressures in other various sectors of the economy. Given this,
these allied countries had a vast difference in perspective on the situation but both had the
same common goal.
An independent investigation by BP has found that there was no single factor that
attributed to the well tragedy, but rather a sequence of events and negligence involving
several different parties
The project management failure is apparent from the very first instance when sub-
contractor Haliburton were hired to cement the walls of the well, concerns were raised
about the integrity of the cementing oil rigs by the US Minerals Management Service
(MMS).
(Ref.12)
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A 2007 MMS study found that although blowouts with offshore drilling operation were
becoming less frequent, less deadly, and less polluting, cementing-associated troubles
persisted.
Cementing Problems were associated with 18 of 39 blowouts between 1992 and 2006,
and 18 of 70 from 1971 to 1991.
If the wells are not completely secured then that allows for a build up of high pressure
hydrocarbons and i=oil beneath the well surface, which if not identified can enter the well
and cause an explosion similar to the Montara oil spill, August 21, 2009. (See Ref.13 for
more detailed notes)
In these circumstances a Blow Out Preventer (BOP) is usually used to cut the flow of
oil. These are large valves fitted to the top of the well to shut off oil flow in the event of
high-pressure build up
BP/Transocean were drilling in extreme conditions. In waters 2 miles deep and drilling
6.5 miles below the seabed surface, drilling this deep was relatively new territory for oil
companies and BP were seen as a pioneer in deepwater drilling.
BOP failure is highly un-common but is a main contributor to the overall failure of
shutting off the well.(Ref.14) Page 48 of the DeepwaterHorizon Accident Investigation
Report shows that the BOP maintenance records were not accurately reported in the
maintenance management system and indentified a lack of a robust Transocean
maintenance management system for Deepwater Horizon.
(Ref.5) The US Oil Industry regulator the Minerals Management Service had also
failed to require the installation of a back up shutdown system, hardly surprising
given that BP has a track record of cutting corners on risk to save money. (See Ref.7
for more detail)
Up until this incident there was no certified and tested containment strategy in place
for capping a well in such dangerous circumstances. Although surprising that
engineers have not already worked on solutions to such eventualities, this now gave
an aggressive timeline for everyone to meet. Engineers were collating there ideas
and presenting solutions that have worked on previous situations, but given the
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complexity, this gave a whole new scope to the containment as there were no
guarantees, it was simple a case of try it and hope it works.
Engineers tried several different tactics to control the well, some of which included
lowering a containment dome onto the well know as a cofferdam (Ref.15,
Explanation) A junkshot which is a combination of human hair, shredded rubber
tires and golf balls which are then blasted into the well to block it (Similar to how
hair can block a bath plug)
These methods failed, so BP launched its Static Kill Operation (Ref.6), remote
control vessels were directed to the seabed surface to cap it manually. An
experimental procedure, BP commented it to be a significant milestone successfully
plugging the leaking well.
This was achieved by pumping heavy mud into the opening for 8 hours to prevent
the flow of oil and gas, allowing for work to be carried out for the permanent sealing
of the well which is still pending.
In conclusion the scope of this project was adapted and broadened to such an extent
it resulted in the original project taking on whole new characteristics.
With the original drilling project failing, the actual capping/sealing of the well despite
other factors was a success. It is imperative that BP and other oil exploration/drilling
companies learn from this incident and implement correct system maintenance and
safety standards. (Ref.16) Robert Frese says that Good Project Management is a
process of continuous improvement The incident should be critically analyzed by
project managers in this field to help eliminate future risk factors otherwise next
time the world may be even less forgiving.
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The devastation of this tragedy was recognized all around the world and to identify
each of the stakeholders affected by this incident would be as big a task as the clean
up itself. I am now going to analyze the major stakeholders (Primary and Secondary)
of the MC252 well. It is perceived that a projects success and failures can be
measured and assessed by the stakeholder benefits or lack of in this case.
However despite compensation contingencies being put in place to those affected,
peoples attitudes and beliefs change over the life cycle of a projects development,
through various influences such as media ( identified earlier), and increased
concentration on the negativities surrounding the project.
Primary Stakeholders:
Directors, Management and Employees of BP, Transocean, Haliburton
Shareholders
Pension Fund Managers
Suppliers
Contractors
The surrounding communities and immediate family of those involved.
Secondary Stakeholders:
Government Sectors
Watchdogs/Regulators
Seafood Industry
Environmentally Campaigners
Media
Tourism Industry
Wildlife/Activists
Beaches/ Coastal Management
BP as a public company had and still has a moral and ethical responsibility to fulfill
before, during, and after the spill.
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Primarily BP should have monitored its risk calculation and safety measures and
procedures stringently, especially with the company identified as cost cutting driven.
This lack of efficiency proves that BP is already paying absolute disregard to both
stakeholder sectors by putting lives at risk as well as many other factors with the
aim to increase profits.
The question we should be asking is Would the stakeholders still be in support of BP
had the drill been successful and dividends were paid, but the element of risk factors
were identified? Would the stakeholders morally object to the way in which BP
conducts its practice or is it the media that have influenced that standpoint and
opinion?
BP neglected its stakeholders importance and relevance from the onset, this was
much more apparent in BPs Lack of transparency in public relations and the
information they were releasing to the stakeholders. This was seen as a bid to
protect the company image and reduce the perception of the severity of the
accident, in a bundled last ditch attempt for BP to ensure stakeholders that they
had everything under control.
This could not have been further from the truth, however due to other
internal/external mitigating factors, the company had to not only co-ordinate a clean
up operation, they had to develop a resolution strategy to ensure the long term
satisfaction of the stakeholders involved.
BP realized the importance of honesty and transparency with the stakeholders and
has put several initiatives in place; there response efforts have rocketed from 2,000
people at the beginning of the spill to over 45,000 at its peak in July according to BP.
BP assure they have coordinated strategic deployment of people and resources
from command centers at 17 staging areas across 4 states, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida.
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BP is fully dedicated to correcting its mistakes and shoreline clean up. BP has launched a
major program to rehabilitate the wildlife affected, and also dedicated vast sums into
environmental restoration and economic investment to understand the full impact of the
spill. (Current Figures below courtesy of BP)(Ref.17)
Mobilization and Deployment
5,991 people
445 vessels
11 aircrafts
3,256,547 feet of cumulative boom deployed
Payments 1
$20 billion claims escrow fund
$100 million unemployed rig workers' fund
$500 million establishing Gulf Coast Research Initiative
1Claims information
Containment
827,046 barrels of oily liquid skimmed
265,450 barrels in controlled surface burns
Only time will tell if BP have learnt from there negligence, it would be a shame and a
profound display of disrespect to those who lost their lives if safety measures do notchange within the BP working environment.
It has been an expensive project, which will take some time to realize its success and to
recover from, but the importance and project success ultimately lies within the recovery
of the environment, and the company recovery to regain stakeholder confidence and trust.
The scope of this project increased so much BP have to rethink there image and
perception and realize that without the consumer confidence backing them then it is no
matter how much money is spent a project waiting to fail.
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References:
1) BP rushes to contain Deepwater oil-spill
Ellie Zolfagharifard, 28 April 2010
http://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/bp-rushes-to-contain-deepwater-oil-spill/1001989.article
2) Gulf oil leak from rig explosion puts more than 400 species in potential harm's way
Bob Marshall, April 28, 2010
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2010/04/more_than_400_species_in_poten.html
3) Simon Boxall from the National Oceanography Centre at Southampton University believes that acrisis such as this was inevitable. BP are in the unfortunate position of having to pioneer ways of
dealing with it that are new and untested, and this will take weeks, if not months, he said.
http://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/spill-exposes-unprepared-industry/1002143.article#ixzz17MyCujVj
4) BP pledges Gulf of Mexico oil fields to spill fund
Sarah Young, Oct 1, 2010http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6901OZ20101001
Deepwater disaster demands slick thinking
Jon Excell, May 12, 2010http://www.theengineer.co.uk/opinion/comment/deepwater-disaster-demands-slick-thinking/1002336.article#ixzz17Qxx1RCy
5) The aim of these procedures is to assist with the strategy to kill and isolate the well, and will
complement the upcoming relief well operation, which will continue as per plan.A relief wellremains the ultimate solution to kill and permanently cement the well.
Coastguard admiral Thad Allen, leader of the governments response team, said: The static killwill increase the probability that the relief well will work. But the whole thing will not be doneuntil the relief well is completed.
The static kill is not the end all be all. It is a diagnostic test that will tell us a lot about theintegrity of the casing and the wellbore.
The Engineer, August 4, 2010http://www.theengineer.co.uk/bp-hails-static-kill-operation/1004134.article#ixzz17R0mgioO
6) Within a few months in 2005, BP suffered an explosion at its Texas City refinery that killed 15,resulting in identification of over 300 safety violations and $21 million in fines, and a BP mega-rig, the Thunder Horse, almost toppled over in a Gulf of Mexico storm.
Jeremy Kinsman, Barack Obama, Too big to failhttp://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct10/kinsman.pdf
BP sells Pan American Energy stake for $7bn
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http://www.theengineer.co.uk/ellie-zolfagharifard/143.biohttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/bp-rushes-to-contain-deepwater-oil-spill/1001989.articlehttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/bp-rushes-to-contain-deepwater-oil-spill/1001989.articlehttp://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2010/04/more_than_400_species_in_poten.htmlhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/spill-exposes-unprepared-industry/1002143.article#ixzz17MyCujVjhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/spill-exposes-unprepared-industry/1002143.article#ixzz17MyCujVjhttp://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6901OZ20101001http://www.theengineer.co.uk/jon-excell/130.biohttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/opinion/comment/deepwater-disaster-demands-slick-thinking/1002336.article#ixzz17Qxx1RCyhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/opinion/comment/deepwater-disaster-demands-slick-thinking/1002336.article#ixzz17Qxx1RCyhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/bp-hails-static-kill-operation/1004134.article#ixzz17R0mgioOhttp://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct10/kinsman.pdfhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/ellie-zolfagharifard/143.biohttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/bp-rushes-to-contain-deepwater-oil-spill/1001989.articlehttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/bp-rushes-to-contain-deepwater-oil-spill/1001989.articlehttp://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2010/04/more_than_400_species_in_poten.htmlhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/spill-exposes-unprepared-industry/1002143.article#ixzz17MyCujVjhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/news/news-analysis/spill-exposes-unprepared-industry/1002143.article#ixzz17MyCujVjhttp://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6901OZ20101001http://www.theengineer.co.uk/jon-excell/130.biohttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/opinion/comment/deepwater-disaster-demands-slick-thinking/1002336.article#ixzz17Qxx1RCyhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/opinion/comment/deepwater-disaster-demands-slick-thinking/1002336.article#ixzz17Qxx1RCyhttp://www.theengineer.co.uk/bp-hails-static-kill-operation/1004134.article#ixzz17R0mgioOhttp://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct10/kinsman.pdf8/3/2019 The Sealing of the MC252
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November 29, 2010
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11862948
7) How British Is BP?
HEATHER HORN | June 18, 2010http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/How-British-Is-BP-4042
Oil spill: BP shares slide as crisis continues
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10281079
8) Bathmetry Map MC252
http://www.neurosoftware.ro/finance/tag/mississippi-canyon/
Cementing' of rig's well eyed as possible culprit in blowout
ERIC NALDER
HOUSTON CHRONICLEApril 29, 2010
Montara Oil Spill: "A failure of sensible oilfield practice"
The Blowout was not a reflection of one unfortunate incident, or of bad luck. What happened withthe H1 Well was an accident waiting to happen; the companys systems and processes were sodeficient and its key personnel so lacking in basic competence, that the Blowout can properly besaid to have been an event waiting to occur. Indeed, during the course of its public hearing, theInquiry discovered that not one of the five Montara wells currently complies with the companysWell Construction Standards. Indeed, so poor has PTTEPAAs performance been on the MontaraOilfield, the Inquiry considers it is imperative that remedial action be instituted.
Phil HartDecember 8, 2010http://www.theoildrum.com/node/7193
9) Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (Page 48) BOP Maintenance and Testing
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf
10) A cofferdam is a type of watertight construction designed to facilitate construction projects inareas which are normally submerged, such as bridges and piers. A cofferdam is installed in thework area and water is pumped out to expose the bed of the body of water so that workers canconstruct structural supports, enact repairs, or perform other types of work in a dry environment
S.E. SmithEdited by Bronwyn HarrisSeptember 8, 2010
11)Project Success and FailureRobert Frese,December 16,2003
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12) Mobilization and Deployment5,991 people445 vessels11 aircrafts
3,256,547 feet of cumulative boom deployedPayments 1
$20 billionclaims escrow fund
$100 million unemployed rig workers' fund$500 million establishing Gulf Coast Research Initiative1Claims informationContainment827,046 barrels of oily liquid skimmed
265,450 barrels in controlled surface burns
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