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The Limits of Silence:
Descartes, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on
Philosophy and Ordinary Language
Narve Strand
De quo consultus, an esset
tempora maturae visurus longa senectae,
fatidicus vates si se non noverit inquit.
(Ovid,Metamorphoses, iii, 344-46)
1 !ntroduction
To affirm the decisive impact of the linguistic turn has, it seems,
become a commonplace these days. Certainly, a broad consensus
prevails among both Analytic and Continental philosophers: the turn
initiated at the beginning of the last century by Heidegger and Wittgenstein
is simply irreversible, comparable, perhaps, to the impact the Copernican
Revolution had on modern philosophy. Individual thiners may disagree
on !hat conse"uences this !ill have for the status of philosophy and its
relationship to the everyday. There can be no doubt, ho!ever, that
traditional conceptions of rationality are greatly affected once the turn to
language is made.i
#efore the linguistic turn, philosophy usually dealt !ith language
by either maing it ancillary to philosophical analysis or by
completely ignoring it. $escartes is a pivotal representative of this line
of thought. It !as thought the matter at hand al!ays too precedence over
% &riginally published in Descartes and Cartesianism'Cambridge (cholars )ress, *++-:
//01. This version has been lightly edited, mostly for clarity and focus 'material has
been cut or rearranged-.
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considerations of language. After all, language is merely a means to an
end. It2s only a passive e3pressive medium of consciousness, thought or
mind, barred from playing a constitutive role, and not at all of decisive
importance in settling "uestions of meaning, reference or truth. If the
matter could not be pursued !holly in isolation from language, then one
could at least use language as a vehicle to e3press and communicate
one2s findings44let us call this e3pressive use of language 5communicative
intent.6 &n all interpretations it !as someho! thought possible to argue
one2s case 'settle the quaestio juris- prior to all communication. As a
result, the tradition ultimately sought a grounding of rationality outside the
public, discursive sphere. 7o !onder traditional philosophy had such a lo!
vie! of communicative pra3is8ii
With the linguistic turn, a concerted effort !as made to overcome
the traditional, and specifically Cartesian, disparagement of the ordinary.
To!ards this end both Heidegger and Wittgenstein tae their departure
from everyday language. Insofar as philosophy not only maes its
appearance !ithin our common language, but also aims to share its
findings therein, it cannot avoid getting caught up in it. Ho!, then, can it
altogether refuse to heed the strictures of communicative language9 Itmay still be possible, of course, to mount a reasoned defense of extra0
ordinary discourse. Ho!ever, merely appealing to the primacy of reason
or mind is bound to be a "uestion0begging e3ercise. We might ust as !ell
undercut this primacy altogether by denying the instrumentalist vie! of
language outright. #arring a reduction to total silence, therefore,
philosophy needs more than communicative intent.
7eedless to say, this !ill have far0reaching conse"uences for the
status of philosophy itself. If meaning and truth can no longer be gauged
prior to ordinary language, then traditional philosophy has effectively lost
its un"uestioned preeminence. The real "uestion is !hether this spells the
end of philosophy itself. If philosophy can never leave ordinary language
entirely behind, then is philosophical discourse not simply dissolved into it
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'Wittgenstein-9 &r is there a !ay, perhaps, to integrate ordinary language
into a more comprehensive account 'Heidegger-9 7ot!ithstanding the
recent disagreement over the specifics of this ne! rapprochement
bet!een philosophical discourse and ordinary language, the quaestio juris
must still be faced in the end. (pecifically, can ordinary language be
genuinely affirmed !ithout sacrificing, in the process, the ustificatory force
of one2s o!n claims9 If this cannot be done, then are Wittgenstein and
Heidegger not at bottom involved in a similar evasion9 And if so, e3actly
ho! much progress has really been made vis0;0vis Cartesian philosophy9
This paper aims to problemati
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" Silent Thin#ing
The imaginary scenario conured up for the benefit of the reader at
the beginning of the first =editation is characteri
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alone suggest this. Then again, since ordinary language so easily
misleads us, it must nevertheless be regarded as necessarily meaningless
or false, at least for theoretical purposes:
I am thining about these matters !ithin myself, silently and !ithout speaing ' apud
me tacitus et sine voce considerem-, nonetheless the actual !ords bring me up short,
and I am almost triced by ordinary !ays of taling 'decipior ab ipso usu loquendi-.
We say that !e see the !a3 itself, if it is there before us, not that !e udge it to be
there from its color or shapeB and this might lead me to conclude !ithout more ado
that no!ledge of the !a3 comes from !hat the eyes see, and not from the scrutiny
'inspectione- of the mind alone. #ut then if I loo out of the !indo! and see men
crossing the s"uare, as I ust happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men
themselves, ust as I say that I see the !a3. Fet do I see any more than hats and
coats !hich could conceal automatons9 I judge 'judico- that they are men. And so
something !hich I thought I !as seeing !ith my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the
faculty of udgment 'judicandi facultate- !hich is in my mind ' in mente-. Ho!ever, one
!ho !ants to achieve no!ledge above the ordinary level 'supra vulgus- should
feel ashamed of having taen ordinary !ays of taling as a basis for doubt
'ex formis loquendi quas vulgus invenit dubitationem quaesavisse- '=editation II:
C(= II, * > AT ?II, /0/*- iv
It !ould therefore be facetious to claim that the logical coherence orargumentative force of Cartesian discourse is !holly negated by the fact
that it is communicated in the form of !riting, as it !ould to merely point
out that $escartes uses !ith a vie! to truth !hat he regards as
necessarily false. Eor if charged !ith either taing poetic license or
committing a communicative fallacy, $escartes could al!ays fall bac on a
mentalist or essentialist defense in the strict sense. According to
$escartes, !e all have to reflect in!ardly and independently on !hat !e
read. The matter at hand may be translated into the form of
communication or !riting, but it is never reducible to it. In fact, if
confronted !ith opposing vie!s the thiner can al!ays dispense !ith
communication altogether.vIf I thereby reduce myself to silence, so much
the !orse for ordinary language8
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Whatever the relative !orth of these claims, the fact remains that
Heidegger did proect a reconte3tuali
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!hether or not !e go on to clarify the limits of language from the right
presuppositions 'SZ G/, D*0D/-.
Regardless, the problem !ith the tradition is that both human
e3istence (Dasein- and discourse 'ede- have al!ays been made co0
e3tensive !ith entities being merely present0at0hand 'Zuhandensein-.
Conse"uently, the many senses of #eing have al!ays been reduced to
one only, vi
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!hich !e go on to mae theoretical assertions about9 7o, in an everyday
setting it2s not really present at hand at all. In this mode, it simply is not
articulated as a thing consisting of properties that !e gauge in either a
symbolic or intuitive fashion. Instead of representing it, !e regard it
5practically6 as something that can be produced and>or used !ith a
specific purpose in vie!: it is discursively organi
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This line of attac seems to carry !ith it a certain necessity for
dialogue bet!een philosophy and communicative language. &nce
ordinary language is deemed indispensable to philosophical discourse, the
"uestion of ho! to negotiate the t!o becomes an issue, especially since
private 'noetic- discourse has been sho!n to be inseparable from the
public or communal. Will Heidegger2s account not have to face the burden
of discursive ustificationJon its o!n terms9
This, of course, assumes that the limits of language coincide !ith
communicative discourse, !hich !as never the case for Heidegger. When
stretched to its limits, !e find that hermeneutic discourse is suggestive of
something altogether transcending the ordinary. The realm in "uestion
comes not only before the theoretical, but the !orldly as !ell. This,
Heidegger thins, is because human e3istence is prone to an3iety. And
!hen !e2re in the throes of an3iety, communication recedes !holly into
the bacground and a solilo"uy of the human being !ith herself taes
center stage. An3iety isolates the human being from the !orld of things,
relations, other human beings. 7ot that this !orld completely drops out of
vie!, but it certainly pales in comparison. If she no! listens in silence to
the voice of her o!n conscience, she !ill reali
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connected. )lato only had to give a specific interpretation of these to effect
a lasting transformation of human e3istence as a !hole. (ome!hat
simplistically put, priority is for the first time given to the relationship
bet!een statement and thing.3 Manguage can no! only bespea
meaningfully or truthfully of things. Manguage is rooted in the human
beingB that of !hich it speas is basically made out to be an idea ' idea,
eidos- that someho! can only be seen in the privacy of the individual soul
'ps&ch*- or mind 'nous-. Manguage is turned into an e3pressive instrument
here, something possessed and used by inner minds to indicate to each
other things that are present only to them. )lato, then, is credited !ith
introducing both an anthropocentric and noetic bias into human history.
This is the basis of the subse"uent tradition2s vie!s, including those
of $escartes. This is basically !hat language becomes !ith )lato:
A human tool.
Erom this time to the end of his career, Heidegger !ill al!ays return
to earlier Nree thiners for inspiration in his attempts to overcome
language in this ordinary sense. His hope !as that going all the !ay bac
to the beginning !ould facilitate a leap to a 5second beginning,6 reversing
the decisive turn initiated by )lato. If language is to be rethought, then)armenides and Heraclitus eminently "ualify. Thining is found there in its
purest form, i.e., !ithout the constraints later introduced by )lato. ust
thin of the !ay they sharply contrasted the real or the 5deep6 !ith the
human0rooted or thing0lie !hen speaing of 5seeing6 'noein-, 5speaing6
'legein-, and 5truth0disclosing6 'al*theuein-.3i The e3tra0ordinary may not
be separable from the ordinary, to be sure, but neither are they to be co0
ordinated in a genuinely reciprocal !ay:
In the immediate circle of beings !e believe ourselves to be at home. The being is
familiar, reliable, ordinary 'gehauer-. 7onetheless,O PfQundamentally. the ordinary is
not ordinaryB it is e3tra0ordinary, uncanny 'un$gehauer- '+#!, /-
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& Silence, Sense, 'onsense
There are mared convergences bet!een Heidegger and Wittgenstein
on the issue of the limits of language. Eirst, both continued to see out a
delimitation and transposition of representational discourse from !ithin.
(econd, both of them became convinced that this could only be achieved
if ordinary discourse !as sho!n to be indispensable to, as !ell as
inseparable from, philosophical discourse itself. 'Heidegger in fact
anticipated the later Wittgenstein on this score.- Einally, they both came to
thin that a transfiguration of the traditional paradigm of philosophy is the
eventual outcome of this process. 'Wittgenstein, as !e shall see
presently, anticipated Heidegger here.- I do submit, ho!ever, they al!ays
disagreed on !hether, or to !hat e3tent, this makes sense.
In his first maor !or, /ractatus 0ogico$1hilosophicus '11-,
Wittgenstein is at pains to dra! limits to the discourse of sense 'Sinn-.
(ense is basically coe3tensive !ith the representational language of the
natural sciences. A proposition !ith sense is aJnon0mentalJthought
saying something definite about obective reality according to the basic
re"uirement of bivalence 'being possibly true or false-'TM *.B *.B *.*B
*.**B /B /./B B .*-. This all by itself sounds very traditional. Wecould be forgiven for thining Wittgenstein slips bac into a traditional cast
of mind. The ne3t t!o steps in his argument are truly revolutionary.
Mogical propositions cannot be representational. This because logical
form constitutes the universal condition of the possibility of both language
and !orld. Mogical propositions !ill as a matter of fact al!ays fall short of
saying something specific. Mogic is tautologousB logical propositionsJ
senseless 'Sinnlos- 'TM ./B *.+/B *.+//B *.B *.DB *.@*0@B
*.B .*-.
And then there2s philosophy. What2s left to say !hen symbolic logic
and natural science have had their say: is there a mean bet!een saying
something and saying nothing at all9 )hilosophical propositions are
metaphysical, nonsensical '.nsinn-44including Wittgenstein2s o!n. All
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metaphysical propositions must ultimately be overcome ')berindet- 'TM
.++/B D./0-. )hilosophical conceptuali
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Whatever the relative strengths of these three, the fact remains that
Wittgenstein turns e3plicitly to ordinary language later on. ven so, he
continued to evade the "uestion of ustification. If anything, the refusal
gre! even more star:
(ay !e !ant to delimit the term 5language6 'Sprache-. Eirst of all, it
is not self0evident that the concept is closed off by a limit. We can use
'gebrauchen- the !ord more or less rigidly, but only !ith a specific
purpose in vie!. We may e"ually deploy it more loosely as !e in fact more
often do. The concept is played out differently, all depending on the use
!e put it to. Met2s say go !ith this and define language0use as a ind of
5game6 'Spiel-. This concept is not sharply delineated either. $o all games
have one thing in common !hich maes us use the !ord in the same !ay
in all of them9 Are all games 5amusing69 Is there al!ays !inning or
losing9 =ust they every!here be limited by rules9 What does or does not
count as a game9 Can an a priori limit ever be fi3ed ')K GG D0D-9
Here !e come up against the great "uestion that lies behind all these
considerations44Eor someone might obect against me: Fou tae the easy !ay out8
Fou tal about all sorts of language0games, but have no!here said !hat the essence
of a language0game, and hence of language, is: !hat is common ' gemeinsam- to all
these activities. O And this is true.JInstead of producing something common to all
that !e call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in
common !hich maes us use the same !ord for all,44but that they are related to one
another in many different !ays. And it is because of these relationships, that !e call
them all 5language6 ')K GD-
It is interesting to see ho! Wittgenstein turns the tables on the thephilosopher here 'his earlier self included-, vi
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clarify these "uotidian uses !ithout transposing or subliming them in the
process ')K GG D0+1-. The absence of rigid limits never troubles us
!hen !e ordinarily apply !ords. (o !hy create endless "uestioning lie
)lato, $escartes 'or Heidegger- does by insisting on depth, in!ardness,
fi3idity9 If !ords are al!ays used in more !ays than one, and use is
al!ays open0ended, then the only thing gained by an essentialist
insistence on the reducibility of ordinary language to something
5e3traordinary6 is !hat he e3plicitly doesn2t !ant, vi
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misunderstanding of the !ay our common language really !ors 'GG DDB
1+01/-. That does not mean, ho!ever, that it can be ruled out by fiat. He
has reached the conviction that philosophical problems are rooted in deep
dis"uietudes rooted in ordinary language itself. His account has simply
gained too much in terms of intricacy since the /ractatus to allo! for a
comprehensive reductio ad absurdum of philosophical thining. Eor if
sense 'or meaning- is no longer uniformly conceived then ho! much,
e3actly, is gained by roundly reecting it as 5nonsense69 A mere appeal to
the formal identity of meaning !ith use is bound to be an e3ercise in futility
')K G/-. The nonsense epithet may ultimately be applicable to
philosophy or 5thining6 'cf. )K GG+, 1, /, and D-. All the same,
Wittgenstein is obliged to apply it in a much more attentive, nuanced !ay.
(o it !ould be too metaphysical merely appealing to Wittgensteinian
discourse being philosophically phrased as sho!ing it2s guilty of a
5performative contradiction6.3viiiA similar response could be made if !e
merely point out that his "uotidian vie! of the ordinary smacs of linguistic
5Rousseauism6.3i3 &r !e hold that philosophy is only an e3tension of
everyday discourse any!ay and that it may have something of its o!n to
contribute. Eor if challenged in these !ays, Wittgenstein could al!ays fallbac on the therapeutic defense in the strict sense. &n Wittgensteinian
5principles6 everyday discourse is a fait accompli. Manguage may seduce
us into thining !e can do more, of courseJbut have !e ever9 If !e in
fact accomplish less that !ay, !e !ould be better off simply dissolving
these 5delusions of grandeur6. $enying the disease only affirms the
needfulness of a cure. If the philosopher and the 5thiner6 resist, so much
the better for the physician8
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( The Limits of Silence
A response to the foregoing: perple3ity at the unresolved tension
bet!een philosophy and ordinary language and the persistent evasion on
the part of philosophy 'or 5thining6- of the "uestion of communicative
ustification.
$escartes believes in the primacy of the mind, !hich basically maes
communication into a mere afterthought.
Heidegger impugns this approach !ith being deaf to the ordinary. He
claims it2s indispensable to philosophy, being inseparable from it. If so, the
problem of discursive ustification is bound to insinuate itself even more
forcefully44as long, that is, as !e don2t aim straight a!ay for an even
deepersilence8
Wittgenstein goes even further, adopting a 5no0nonsense6 attitude. He
!ould charge both !ith blind condescension to!ard the ordinary, !ith a
5narcissistic6 un!illingness to face anything but their o!n e3traordinary
reflection.33Then again, if evasion is a telltale sign of implication, !ho2s to
heal the physician9
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In addition to the standard edition and translations for $escartes used in this volume, I have used the
follo!ing '!ith their corresponding abbreviations-: Eor Heidegger, I have consulted the ,esamtausgabe
'Eranfurt am =ain: ?ittorio Slostermann-'NA-. I have cited the follo!ing editions and translations of
Heidegger2s !ors: NA *, Sein und Zeit '1*@-'(-B Der .rsprung des 2untserkesin NA , 3ol4ege
'1/01D-, translated as 5&rigin of the Wor of Art6 '+#!- in +ff the 'eaten /rack% eds. and trans.
ulian Foung and Senneth Haynes 'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, *++*-: 0DB 5iet4sche 6 766 in NA D.0*B 1latons 0ehre von der #arheitand 5'rief 8ber den 3umanismus9 in NA 1, #egmarken
'1101D-, translated as 5)lato2s $octrine of Truth6 '1D/- in 1athmarks, ed. William =c7eill
'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, 11-: 0*B !us einen ,esprach von der Sprache
(Zischen einen :aponer unde einen ;ragenden< , in NA *, .nteregs 4ur Sprache '1+011-B Zur
Sache des Denkens'1D*0- in NA , translated as 5nd of )hilosophy and the Tas of Thining6 'SD-
in 'asic #ritings, ed. $avid Earrell Srell '7e! For: Harper Collins, 11/-: *@01B NA /, 0ogik als die
;rage nach dem #esen der Sprache '1/-B NA D, 'eitr"ge 4ur 1hilosophie (Vom =reignis =nd of /ransformation?, eds. Senneth #aynes, ames #ohmann, and Thomas
=cCarthy 'Cambridge, =ass.: =IT )ress, 1@-. (ee also /he 0inguistic /urn> ecent =ssa&s in
1hilosophical Method, ed. Richard =. Rorty 'Chicago: Kniversity of Chicago )ress, 1D@-.
iiThis is, of course, a very broad characteri
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viii(ee 0ogik als der ;rage nach dem #esen der Sprache 'I Gc-. This !or, I submit, is the first real
step in that direction. Eor although it could be said that even Sein und Zeit is some!hat tainted by the
subsumption of 5language6 under logos, from this !or on!ard they are made co0e3tensive. 'Heidegger
himself acno!ledges this !or as a turning point in his !us einen ,esprach von der Sprache
(Zischen einen :aponer unde einen ;ragenden< '1/01-. It has often been remared ho!
underdeveloped logos is vis0;0vis the other t!o fundamental e3istentials in Sein und Zeit. Cf.Richardson, /hrough 1henomenolog& to /hought, DD0@+ and an Aler, 5Heidegger2s Conception of
Manguage in 'eing and /ime%6 in Martin 3eidegger> Critical !ssessments, III, ed. Christopher =acAnn
'Mondon: Routledge, 11*-: /0/. Although language is no! upgraded to the center of attention from a
means to an end, and is even allo!ed to hold primacy over the human being later on 'see, e.g.5 'rief
8ber den 3umanismus9 '01-, that does not mean Heidegger changed his mind on the issue of the
problematiccentrality of discourse or logos. If anything, my e3position has sho!n that there are good
indications it !as there from the beginning.
ixIn 0ogik als der ;rage'1/-, the necessity of overcoming logic is e3plicitly announced. Ho!ever, only
!ith the 'eitr"ge and 5iet4sche 6$66of 1/D0 is the appeal to the needfulness of a second beginning
e3plicitly dealt !ith. The importance for this turn, of the change from taling about reconte3tuali
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apophantic one. Einally, it has to be admitted that of all of Heidegger2s !ors Der Sache des Denken
holds the most promise in lessening the impression of Heidegger as a foundationalist thiner. Eor in this
!or he not only recognior ordinary language 'cf. SD,@-. The quaestio juris, though, is not dealt !ith here either.
xiiiIf I am right, this e3position has sho!n there2s a continuity bet!een the earlier and later Heidegger,
insofar, that is, as they both conceive the relationship bet!een silence and communication in a
hierarchical, asymmetrical, unilateral fashion. If anything, the appeal to silence became even more
emphatic !hen the turn !as made from Dasein to Manguage>Truth>#eing. There is a sense in !hich
Heidegger2s 5sigetic6 approach is fundamentally 5un0Nree.6 7either the )resocratics nor Classical
philosophy seems ever to have thought of silence as the groundof language. As sho!n by =ortley,
silence does play some role in Nree tragedyJthe figure of Tiresias is emblematic of a ind of telling
silence ';rom #ord to Silence,I, *-. 7ot until late Anti"uity, ho!ever, !ith the rise of Nnosticism did
silence become fundamental or !as the attempt made to transcend both nous and logos 'in the
communicative sense-. When Heidegger appeals to a 5place of stillness6 'SD, -, he 'lie $escartes
before him- might be seen as follo!ing in the footsteps of Nnosticism, say, rather than of either the
Classical or the Archaic age 'see also n.III over-.
xivIt is true that Wittgenstein did tal about the aesthetical, as !ell as about the ethico0religious, as
someho! sho!ing 'Zeigen- itself in the !orld rather than being sayable 'TM, D.*0D.**-. )erhaps !hat
this means is that art, ethics, and religion, lie philosophy, can no longer have a genuinely veridical or
semantic force. Wittgenstein himself seems to have preferred reading the poetry of a Rabindranath
Tagore to e3plaining the Tractatus to his logical positivist admirers8 Cf. Ray =on, /he Dut& of ,enius
'Mondon: Random House, 11-, **0/. It2s also interesting that Wittgenstein, in conversations !ith
them, acno!ledges Heidegger2s thoughts on an3iety as suggestive of the limits of language. Cf. 5&n
Heidegger on #eing and $read6, in 3eidegger and Modern 1hilosoph& '7e! Haven: Fale Kniversity
)ress, 1@-: +0/. Eor a general bacground, see Alan ani and (tephen Toulmin, #ittgenstein@s
Vienna 'Chicago: Ivan R. $ee, Inc., 1@/- and #ittgenstein and the Vienna Circle> Conversations
ecorded b& ;riedrich #aismann'&3ford: #lac!ell, 1@1-. The problem, though, is that by reducing
the sayable to science and logic, Wittgenstein maes it seem as if philosophy, religion, or art are either
altogether un!orthy of speech or sublimely ineffable. '&r are they both perhaps9 7one9-
xvThis position is urged by Cora $iamond in her boo, /he ealistic Spirit 'Cambridge, =ass.: =IT
)ress, 11-, /0, , and /.
xviCf. De Doctrina ChristianaI.D.D. (ee also =ortley, ;rom #ord to Silence, II, *@0*+.
xviiThis point has been made by Warren Noldfarb in 5Wittgenstein on Ei3idity of =eaning,6 in =arl&
!nal&tic 1hilosoph&, ed. William Tait 'Chicago: &pen Court )ublishing Company, 11@-: @01. (ee also
his 5=etaphysics and 7onsense: &n Cora $iamond2s /he ealistic Spirit6, in :ournal of 1hilosophical
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