The Limits of Silence

8/13/2019 The Limits of Silence

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The Limits of Silence:

Descartes, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein on

Philosophy and Ordinary Language

Narve Strand

De quo consultus, an esset

tempora maturae visurus longa senectae,

fatidicus vates si se non noverit inquit.

(Ovid,Metamorphoses, iii, 344-46)

1 !ntroduction

To affirm the decisive impact of the linguistic turn has, it seems,

become a commonplace these days. Certainly, a broad consensus

prevails among both Analytic and Continental philosophers: the turn

initiated at the beginning of the last century by Heidegger and Wittgenstein

is simply irreversible, comparable, perhaps, to the impact the Copernican

Revolution had on modern philosophy. Individual thiners may disagree

on !hat conse"uences this !ill have for the status of philosophy and its

relationship to the everyday. There can be no doubt, ho!ever, that

traditional conceptions of rationality are greatly affected once the turn to

language is made.i

#efore the linguistic turn, philosophy usually dealt !ith language

by either maing it ancillary to philosophical analysis or by

completely ignoring it. $escartes is a pivotal representative of this line

of thought. It !as thought the matter at hand al!ays too precedence over

% &riginally published in Descartes and Cartesianism'Cambridge (cholars )ress, *++-:

//01. This version has been lightly edited, mostly for clarity and focus 'material has

been cut or rearranged-.


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considerations of language. After all, language is merely a means to an

end. It2s only a passive e3pressive medium of consciousness, thought or

mind, barred from playing a constitutive role, and not at all of decisive

importance in settling "uestions of meaning, reference or truth. If the

matter could not be pursued !holly in isolation from language, then one

could at least use language as a vehicle to e3press and communicate

one2s findings44let us call this e3pressive use of language 5communicative

intent.6 &n all interpretations it !as someho! thought possible to argue

one2s case 'settle the quaestio juris- prior to all communication. As a

result, the tradition ultimately sought a grounding of rationality outside the

public, discursive sphere. 7o !onder traditional philosophy had such a lo!

vie! of communicative pra3is8ii

With the linguistic turn, a concerted effort !as made to overcome

the traditional, and specifically Cartesian, disparagement of the ordinary.

To!ards this end both Heidegger and Wittgenstein tae their departure

from everyday language. Insofar as philosophy not only maes its

appearance !ithin our common language, but also aims to share its

findings therein, it cannot avoid getting caught up in it. Ho!, then, can it

altogether refuse to heed the strictures of communicative language9 Itmay still be possible, of course, to mount a reasoned defense of extra0

ordinary discourse. Ho!ever, merely appealing to the primacy of reason

or mind is bound to be a "uestion0begging e3ercise. We might ust as !ell

undercut this primacy altogether by denying the instrumentalist vie! of

language outright. #arring a reduction to total silence, therefore,

philosophy needs more than communicative intent.

7eedless to say, this !ill have far0reaching conse"uences for the

status of philosophy itself. If meaning and truth can no longer be gauged

prior to ordinary language, then traditional philosophy has effectively lost

its un"uestioned preeminence. The real "uestion is !hether this spells the

end of philosophy itself. If philosophy can never leave ordinary language

entirely behind, then is philosophical discourse not simply dissolved into it


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'Wittgenstein-9 &r is there a !ay, perhaps, to integrate ordinary language

into a more comprehensive account 'Heidegger-9 7ot!ithstanding the

recent disagreement over the specifics of this ne! rapprochement

bet!een philosophical discourse and ordinary language, the quaestio juris

must still be faced in the end. (pecifically, can ordinary language be

genuinely affirmed !ithout sacrificing, in the process, the ustificatory force

of one2s o!n claims9 If this cannot be done, then are Wittgenstein and

Heidegger not at bottom involved in a similar evasion9 And if so, e3actly

ho! much progress has really been made vis0;0vis Cartesian philosophy9

This paper aims to problemati


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" Silent Thin#ing

The imaginary scenario conured up for the benefit of the reader at

the beginning of the first =editation is characteri


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alone suggest this. Then again, since ordinary language so easily

misleads us, it must nevertheless be regarded as necessarily meaningless

or false, at least for theoretical purposes:

I am thining about these matters !ithin myself, silently and !ithout speaing ' apud

me tacitus et sine voce considerem-, nonetheless the actual !ords bring me up short,

and I am almost triced by ordinary !ays of taling 'decipior ab ipso usu loquendi-.

We say that !e see the !a3 itself, if it is there before us, not that !e udge it to be

there from its color or shapeB and this might lead me to conclude !ithout more ado

that no!ledge of the !a3 comes from !hat the eyes see, and not from the scrutiny

'inspectione- of the mind alone. #ut then if I loo out of the !indo! and see men

crossing the s"uare, as I ust happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men

themselves, ust as I say that I see the !a3. Fet do I see any more than hats and

coats !hich could conceal automatons9 I judge 'judico- that they are men. And so

something !hich I thought I !as seeing !ith my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the

faculty of udgment 'judicandi facultate- !hich is in my mind ' in mente-. Ho!ever, one

!ho !ants to achieve no!ledge above the ordinary level 'supra vulgus- should

feel ashamed of having taen ordinary !ays of taling as a basis for doubt

'ex formis loquendi quas vulgus invenit dubitationem quaesavisse- '=editation II:

C(= II, * > AT ?II, /0/*- iv

It !ould therefore be facetious to claim that the logical coherence orargumentative force of Cartesian discourse is !holly negated by the fact

that it is communicated in the form of !riting, as it !ould to merely point

out that $escartes uses !ith a vie! to truth !hat he regards as

necessarily false. Eor if charged !ith either taing poetic license or

committing a communicative fallacy, $escartes could al!ays fall bac on a

mentalist or essentialist defense in the strict sense. According to

$escartes, !e all have to reflect in!ardly and independently on !hat !e

read. The matter at hand may be translated into the form of

communication or !riting, but it is never reducible to it. In fact, if

confronted !ith opposing vie!s the thiner can al!ays dispense !ith

communication altogether.vIf I thereby reduce myself to silence, so much

the !orse for ordinary language8


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Whatever the relative !orth of these claims, the fact remains that

Heidegger did proect a reconte3tuali


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!hether or not !e go on to clarify the limits of language from the right

presuppositions 'SZ G/, D*0D/-.

Regardless, the problem !ith the tradition is that both human

e3istence (Dasein- and discourse 'ede- have al!ays been made co0

e3tensive !ith entities being merely present0at0hand 'Zuhandensein-.

Conse"uently, the many senses of #eing have al!ays been reduced to

one only, vi


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!hich !e go on to mae theoretical assertions about9 7o, in an everyday

setting it2s not really present at hand at all. In this mode, it simply is not

articulated as a thing consisting of properties that !e gauge in either a

symbolic or intuitive fashion. Instead of representing it, !e regard it

5practically6 as something that can be produced and>or used !ith a

specific purpose in vie!: it is discursively organi


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This line of attac seems to carry !ith it a certain necessity for

dialogue bet!een philosophy and communicative language. &nce

ordinary language is deemed indispensable to philosophical discourse, the

"uestion of ho! to negotiate the t!o becomes an issue, especially since

private 'noetic- discourse has been sho!n to be inseparable from the

public or communal. Will Heidegger2s account not have to face the burden

of discursive ustificationJon its o!n terms9

This, of course, assumes that the limits of language coincide !ith

communicative discourse, !hich !as never the case for Heidegger. When

stretched to its limits, !e find that hermeneutic discourse is suggestive of

something altogether transcending the ordinary. The realm in "uestion

comes not only before the theoretical, but the !orldly as !ell. This,

Heidegger thins, is because human e3istence is prone to an3iety. And

!hen !e2re in the throes of an3iety, communication recedes !holly into

the bacground and a solilo"uy of the human being !ith herself taes

center stage. An3iety isolates the human being from the !orld of things,

relations, other human beings. 7ot that this !orld completely drops out of

vie!, but it certainly pales in comparison. If she no! listens in silence to

the voice of her o!n conscience, she !ill reali


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connected. )lato only had to give a specific interpretation of these to effect

a lasting transformation of human e3istence as a !hole. (ome!hat

simplistically put, priority is for the first time given to the relationship

bet!een statement and thing.3 Manguage can no! only bespea

meaningfully or truthfully of things. Manguage is rooted in the human

beingB that of !hich it speas is basically made out to be an idea ' idea,

eidos- that someho! can only be seen in the privacy of the individual soul

'ps&ch*- or mind 'nous-. Manguage is turned into an e3pressive instrument

here, something possessed and used by inner minds to indicate to each

other things that are present only to them. )lato, then, is credited !ith

introducing both an anthropocentric and noetic bias into human history.

This is the basis of the subse"uent tradition2s vie!s, including those

of $escartes. This is basically !hat language becomes !ith )lato:

A human tool.

Erom this time to the end of his career, Heidegger !ill al!ays return

to earlier Nree thiners for inspiration in his attempts to overcome

language in this ordinary sense. His hope !as that going all the !ay bac

to the beginning !ould facilitate a leap to a 5second beginning,6 reversing

the decisive turn initiated by )lato. If language is to be rethought, then)armenides and Heraclitus eminently "ualify. Thining is found there in its

purest form, i.e., !ithout the constraints later introduced by )lato. ust

thin of the !ay they sharply contrasted the real or the 5deep6 !ith the

human0rooted or thing0lie !hen speaing of 5seeing6 'noein-, 5speaing6

'legein-, and 5truth0disclosing6 'al*theuein-.3i The e3tra0ordinary may not

be separable from the ordinary, to be sure, but neither are they to be co0

ordinated in a genuinely reciprocal !ay:

In the immediate circle of beings !e believe ourselves to be at home. The being is

familiar, reliable, ordinary 'gehauer-. 7onetheless,O PfQundamentally. the ordinary is

not ordinaryB it is e3tra0ordinary, uncanny 'un$gehauer- '+#!, /-


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& Silence, Sense, 'onsense

There are mared convergences bet!een Heidegger and Wittgenstein

on the issue of the limits of language. Eirst, both continued to see out a

delimitation and transposition of representational discourse from !ithin.

(econd, both of them became convinced that this could only be achieved

if ordinary discourse !as sho!n to be indispensable to, as !ell as

inseparable from, philosophical discourse itself. 'Heidegger in fact

anticipated the later Wittgenstein on this score.- Einally, they both came to

thin that a transfiguration of the traditional paradigm of philosophy is the

eventual outcome of this process. 'Wittgenstein, as !e shall see

presently, anticipated Heidegger here.- I do submit, ho!ever, they al!ays

disagreed on !hether, or to !hat e3tent, this makes sense.

In his first maor !or, /ractatus 0ogico$1hilosophicus '11-,

Wittgenstein is at pains to dra! limits to the discourse of sense 'Sinn-.

(ense is basically coe3tensive !ith the representational language of the

natural sciences. A proposition !ith sense is aJnon0mentalJthought

saying something definite about obective reality according to the basic

re"uirement of bivalence 'being possibly true or false-'TM *.B *.B *.*B

*.**B /B /./B B .*-. This all by itself sounds very traditional. Wecould be forgiven for thining Wittgenstein slips bac into a traditional cast

of mind. The ne3t t!o steps in his argument are truly revolutionary.

Mogical propositions cannot be representational. This because logical

form constitutes the universal condition of the possibility of both language

and !orld. Mogical propositions !ill as a matter of fact al!ays fall short of

saying something specific. Mogic is tautologousB logical propositionsJ

senseless 'Sinnlos- 'TM ./B *.+/B *.+//B *.B *.DB *.@*0@B

*.B .*-.

And then there2s philosophy. What2s left to say !hen symbolic logic

and natural science have had their say: is there a mean bet!een saying

something and saying nothing at all9 )hilosophical propositions are

metaphysical, nonsensical '.nsinn-44including Wittgenstein2s o!n. All


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metaphysical propositions must ultimately be overcome ')berindet- 'TM

.++/B D./0-. )hilosophical conceptuali


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Whatever the relative strengths of these three, the fact remains that

Wittgenstein turns e3plicitly to ordinary language later on. ven so, he

continued to evade the "uestion of ustification. If anything, the refusal

gre! even more star:

(ay !e !ant to delimit the term 5language6 'Sprache-. Eirst of all, it

is not self0evident that the concept is closed off by a limit. We can use

'gebrauchen- the !ord more or less rigidly, but only !ith a specific

purpose in vie!. We may e"ually deploy it more loosely as !e in fact more

often do. The concept is played out differently, all depending on the use

!e put it to. Met2s say go !ith this and define language0use as a ind of

5game6 'Spiel-. This concept is not sharply delineated either. $o all games

have one thing in common !hich maes us use the !ord in the same !ay

in all of them9 Are all games 5amusing69 Is there al!ays !inning or

losing9 =ust they every!here be limited by rules9 What does or does not

count as a game9 Can an a priori limit ever be fi3ed ')K GG D0D-9

Here !e come up against the great "uestion that lies behind all these

considerations44Eor someone might obect against me: Fou tae the easy !ay out8

Fou tal about all sorts of language0games, but have no!here said !hat the essence

of a language0game, and hence of language, is: !hat is common ' gemeinsam- to all

these activities. O And this is true.JInstead of producing something common to all

that !e call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in

common !hich maes us use the same !ord for all,44but that they are related to one

another in many different !ays. And it is because of these relationships, that !e call

them all 5language6 ')K GD-

It is interesting to see ho! Wittgenstein turns the tables on the thephilosopher here 'his earlier self included-, vi


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clarify these "uotidian uses !ithout transposing or subliming them in the

process ')K GG D0+1-. The absence of rigid limits never troubles us

!hen !e ordinarily apply !ords. (o !hy create endless "uestioning lie

)lato, $escartes 'or Heidegger- does by insisting on depth, in!ardness,

fi3idity9 If !ords are al!ays used in more !ays than one, and use is

al!ays open0ended, then the only thing gained by an essentialist

insistence on the reducibility of ordinary language to something

5e3traordinary6 is !hat he e3plicitly doesn2t !ant, vi


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misunderstanding of the !ay our common language really !ors 'GG DDB

1+01/-. That does not mean, ho!ever, that it can be ruled out by fiat. He

has reached the conviction that philosophical problems are rooted in deep

dis"uietudes rooted in ordinary language itself. His account has simply

gained too much in terms of intricacy since the /ractatus to allo! for a

comprehensive reductio ad absurdum of philosophical thining. Eor if

sense 'or meaning- is no longer uniformly conceived then ho! much,

e3actly, is gained by roundly reecting it as 5nonsense69 A mere appeal to

the formal identity of meaning !ith use is bound to be an e3ercise in futility

')K G/-. The nonsense epithet may ultimately be applicable to

philosophy or 5thining6 'cf. )K GG+, 1, /, and D-. All the same,

Wittgenstein is obliged to apply it in a much more attentive, nuanced !ay.

(o it !ould be too metaphysical merely appealing to Wittgensteinian

discourse being philosophically phrased as sho!ing it2s guilty of a

5performative contradiction6.3viiiA similar response could be made if !e

merely point out that his "uotidian vie! of the ordinary smacs of linguistic

5Rousseauism6.3i3 &r !e hold that philosophy is only an e3tension of

everyday discourse any!ay and that it may have something of its o!n to

contribute. Eor if challenged in these !ays, Wittgenstein could al!ays fallbac on the therapeutic defense in the strict sense. &n Wittgensteinian

5principles6 everyday discourse is a fait accompli. Manguage may seduce

us into thining !e can do more, of courseJbut have !e ever9 If !e in

fact accomplish less that !ay, !e !ould be better off simply dissolving

these 5delusions of grandeur6. $enying the disease only affirms the

needfulness of a cure. If the philosopher and the 5thiner6 resist, so much

the better for the physician8


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( The Limits of Silence

A response to the foregoing: perple3ity at the unresolved tension

bet!een philosophy and ordinary language and the persistent evasion on

the part of philosophy 'or 5thining6- of the "uestion of communicative

ustification.

$escartes believes in the primacy of the mind, !hich basically maes

communication into a mere afterthought.

Heidegger impugns this approach !ith being deaf to the ordinary. He

claims it2s indispensable to philosophy, being inseparable from it. If so, the

problem of discursive ustification is bound to insinuate itself even more

forcefully44as long, that is, as !e don2t aim straight a!ay for an even

deepersilence8

Wittgenstein goes even further, adopting a 5no0nonsense6 attitude. He

!ould charge both !ith blind condescension to!ard the ordinary, !ith a

5narcissistic6 un!illingness to face anything but their o!n e3traordinary

reflection.33Then again, if evasion is a telltale sign of implication, !ho2s to

heal the physician9


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In addition to the standard edition and translations for $escartes used in this volume, I have used the

follo!ing '!ith their corresponding abbreviations-: Eor Heidegger, I have consulted the ,esamtausgabe

'Eranfurt am =ain: ?ittorio Slostermann-'NA-. I have cited the follo!ing editions and translations of

Heidegger2s !ors: NA *, Sein und Zeit '1*@-'(-B Der .rsprung des 2untserkesin NA , 3ol4ege

'1/01D-, translated as 5&rigin of the Wor of Art6 '+#!- in +ff the 'eaten /rack% eds. and trans.

ulian Foung and Senneth Haynes 'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, *++*-: 0DB 5iet4sche 6 766 in NA D.0*B 1latons 0ehre von der #arheitand 5'rief 8ber den 3umanismus9 in NA 1, #egmarken

'1101D-, translated as 5)lato2s $octrine of Truth6 '1D/- in 1athmarks, ed. William =c7eill

'Cambridge: Cambridge Kniversity )ress, 11-: 0*B !us einen ,esprach von der Sprache

(Zischen einen :aponer unde einen ;ragenden< , in NA *, .nteregs 4ur Sprache '1+011-B Zur

Sache des Denkens'1D*0- in NA , translated as 5nd of )hilosophy and the Tas of Thining6 'SD-

in 'asic #ritings, ed. $avid Earrell Srell '7e! For: Harper Collins, 11/-: *@01B NA /, 0ogik als die

;rage nach dem #esen der Sprache '1/-B NA D, 'eitr"ge 4ur 1hilosophie (Vom =reignis =nd of /ransformation?, eds. Senneth #aynes, ames #ohmann, and Thomas

=cCarthy 'Cambridge, =ass.: =IT )ress, 1@-. (ee also /he 0inguistic /urn> ecent =ssa&s in

1hilosophical Method, ed. Richard =. Rorty 'Chicago: Kniversity of Chicago )ress, 1D@-.

iiThis is, of course, a very broad characteri


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viii(ee 0ogik als der ;rage nach dem #esen der Sprache 'I Gc-. This !or, I submit, is the first real

step in that direction. Eor although it could be said that even Sein und Zeit is some!hat tainted by the

subsumption of 5language6 under logos, from this !or on!ard they are made co0e3tensive. 'Heidegger

himself acno!ledges this !or as a turning point in his !us einen ,esprach von der Sprache

(Zischen einen :aponer unde einen ;ragenden< '1/01-. It has often been remared ho!

underdeveloped logos is vis0;0vis the other t!o fundamental e3istentials in Sein und Zeit. Cf.Richardson, /hrough 1henomenolog& to /hought, DD0@+ and an Aler, 5Heidegger2s Conception of

Manguage in 'eing and /ime%6 in Martin 3eidegger> Critical !ssessments, III, ed. Christopher =acAnn

'Mondon: Routledge, 11*-: /0/. Although language is no! upgraded to the center of attention from a

means to an end, and is even allo!ed to hold primacy over the human being later on 'see, e.g.5 'rief

8ber den 3umanismus9 '01-, that does not mean Heidegger changed his mind on the issue of the

problematiccentrality of discourse or logos. If anything, my e3position has sho!n that there are good

indications it !as there from the beginning.

ixIn 0ogik als der ;rage'1/-, the necessity of overcoming logic is e3plicitly announced. Ho!ever, only

!ith the 'eitr"ge and 5iet4sche 6$66of 1/D0 is the appeal to the needfulness of a second beginning

e3plicitly dealt !ith. The importance for this turn, of the change from taling about reconte3tuali


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apophantic one. Einally, it has to be admitted that of all of Heidegger2s !ors Der Sache des Denken

holds the most promise in lessening the impression of Heidegger as a foundationalist thiner. Eor in this

!or he not only recognior ordinary language 'cf. SD,@-. The quaestio juris, though, is not dealt !ith here either.

xiiiIf I am right, this e3position has sho!n there2s a continuity bet!een the earlier and later Heidegger,

insofar, that is, as they both conceive the relationship bet!een silence and communication in a

hierarchical, asymmetrical, unilateral fashion. If anything, the appeal to silence became even more

emphatic !hen the turn !as made from Dasein to Manguage>Truth>#eing. There is a sense in !hich

Heidegger2s 5sigetic6 approach is fundamentally 5un0Nree.6 7either the )resocratics nor Classical

philosophy seems ever to have thought of silence as the groundof language. As sho!n by =ortley,

silence does play some role in Nree tragedyJthe figure of Tiresias is emblematic of a ind of telling

silence ';rom #ord to Silence,I, *-. 7ot until late Anti"uity, ho!ever, !ith the rise of Nnosticism did

silence become fundamental or !as the attempt made to transcend both nous and logos 'in the

communicative sense-. When Heidegger appeals to a 5place of stillness6 'SD, -, he 'lie $escartes

before him- might be seen as follo!ing in the footsteps of Nnosticism, say, rather than of either the

Classical or the Archaic age 'see also n.III over-.

xivIt is true that Wittgenstein did tal about the aesthetical, as !ell as about the ethico0religious, as

someho! sho!ing 'Zeigen- itself in the !orld rather than being sayable 'TM, D.*0D.**-. )erhaps !hat

this means is that art, ethics, and religion, lie philosophy, can no longer have a genuinely veridical or

semantic force. Wittgenstein himself seems to have preferred reading the poetry of a Rabindranath

Tagore to e3plaining the Tractatus to his logical positivist admirers8 Cf. Ray =on, /he Dut& of ,enius

'Mondon: Random House, 11-, **0/. It2s also interesting that Wittgenstein, in conversations !ith

them, acno!ledges Heidegger2s thoughts on an3iety as suggestive of the limits of language. Cf. 5&n

Heidegger on #eing and $read6, in 3eidegger and Modern 1hilosoph& '7e! Haven: Fale Kniversity

)ress, 1@-: +0/. Eor a general bacground, see Alan ani and (tephen Toulmin, #ittgenstein@s

Vienna 'Chicago: Ivan R. $ee, Inc., 1@/- and #ittgenstein and the Vienna Circle> Conversations

ecorded b& ;riedrich #aismann'&3ford: #lac!ell, 1@1-. The problem, though, is that by reducing

the sayable to science and logic, Wittgenstein maes it seem as if philosophy, religion, or art are either

altogether un!orthy of speech or sublimely ineffable. '&r are they both perhaps9 7one9-

xvThis position is urged by Cora $iamond in her boo, /he ealistic Spirit 'Cambridge, =ass.: =IT

)ress, 11-, /0, , and /.

xviCf. De Doctrina ChristianaI.D.D. (ee also =ortley, ;rom #ord to Silence, II, *@0*+.

xviiThis point has been made by Warren Noldfarb in 5Wittgenstein on Ei3idity of =eaning,6 in =arl&

!nal&tic 1hilosoph&, ed. William Tait 'Chicago: &pen Court )ublishing Company, 11@-: @01. (ee also

his 5=etaphysics and 7onsense: &n Cora $iamond2s /he ealistic Spirit6, in :ournal of 1hilosophical


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The Limits of Silence