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Department of Journalism, Media and Communication (JMK)Stockholm UniversitySupervisor: Michael Westerlund
Th e „Virtual Coff eehouses”?Social Networking Sites and the Public Sphere – An Empirical Analysis
Th esis for the Degree of a Master in Media and Communication Studies (M.A.)
Submitted on 30th of May 2011
By:
Jan Michael GerwinKörsbärsvägen 4C lgh. 151111423 Stockholmjage1354@student.su.se
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I.AbstractThis paper deals with online political discussion on social networking sites. Drawing
fromHabermas’conceptof thepublicsphereand formeradaptationsofpublicsphere
theory to Internet research, the studyexamines towhat extentpoliticaldiscussionon
social networking sites displays public issue focus aswell as deliberative, liberal and
communitariancharacteristics.
The empirical analysis is a case study that scrutinizes two opposing Facebook pages
created inthecontextof thetopic ‘Stuttgart21’–aconstructionprojectthatevokeda
localcivicprotestmovement inthecityofStuttgart inthesouthofGermany.Usingan
ethnographic approach, the study takes into account the architecture, culture and
discussion style on the two pages and aims at describing the pages in terms of their
degree of reciprocity, contestation, ideological homogeneity, rationality and
contextualisationwiththeofflineprotestmovement.
The results show twopolarizedpages that lackdeliberationanddialogue, but feature
ideologicalhomophilyand identification.Theresultsback the fragmentation theoryof
Internet audiences, while not maintaining the fear of losing the common ground in
society. On the contrary, the study suggests that civic political engagement on social
networkingsitesshouldbediscussedinthecontextofradicaldemocraticprocesses. It
concludesthattheutilizationofsocialnetworksinordertopoliticallyinform,stimulate
andmobilisescalablepublicsisdesirable.
3
II.Contents1.Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 4
2.LiteratureReview ..................................................................................................................................... 52.1ThePublicSphere .............................................................................................................................. 52.2TheDigitalPublicSphere................................................................................................................ 82.3OnlinePoliticalDiscussion ...........................................................................................................112.4SocialNetworkingSites..................................................................................................................122.5TerminologyandSummary..........................................................................................................14
3.CaseStudy ..................................................................................................................................................153.1NetworkagainstStuttgart21.......................................................................................................173.2NetworkinsupportofStuttgart21............................................................................................19
4.ResearchAimandQuestions...............................................................................................................20
5.Methods ......................................................................................................................................................215.1Methodology ......................................................................................................................................225.1.1VirtualEthnography.................................................................................................................................. 22QualitativeContentAnalysis ....................................................................................................................... 22QuantitativeContentAnalysis .................................................................................................................... 23Interviews............................................................................................................................................................ 23
5.2Sampling..............................................................................................................................................245.3Operationalisation...........................................................................................................................255.4Implementation................................................................................................................................27
6.Results.........................................................................................................................................................286.1UserandUsageStatistics.............................................................................................................286.2ThematicAnalysis............................................................................................................................326.2.1TopicsonthePages ................................................................................................................................... 336.2.2TheDiscussionofStuttgart21.............................................................................................................. 356.2.3Likes,Comments,Links............................................................................................................................ 37
6.3ReciprocityandContestation.......................................................................................................386.3.1Architecture .................................................................................................................................................. 386.3.2Arguments ..................................................................................................................................................... 386.3.3Discussion...................................................................................................................................................... 39
6.4Ideology...............................................................................................................................................406.4.1KEINStuttgart21 ....................................................................................................................................... 406.4.2FürStuttgart21........................................................................................................................................... 416.4.3Rhetoric .......................................................................................................................................................... 42
6.5RationalityandDiscussionStyle.................................................................................................436.5.1Flaming&Trolling ..................................................................................................................................... 44
6.6ContextualisationwiththeWholeMovement ........................................................................45
7.Discussion..................................................................................................................................................457.1PublicIssueFocus............................................................................................................................457.2IdeologicalHomophily ...................................................................................................................467.3DeliberativeIndicators ..................................................................................................................477.4CommunitarianIndicators ...........................................................................................................497.5LiberalIndicators ............................................................................................................................507.6TheDigitalPublicSphereinaRadicalDemocracy...............................................................51
8.Conclusion&Limitations......................................................................................................................55
References......................................................................................................................................................57
Appendix.........................................................................................................................................................64CodebookQuantitativeAnalysis ........................................................................................................64
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1.IntroductionThe Iranian opposition movement uses Twitter to mobilise, organise and report the
revoltsafterthe2009election.17year‐oldFeliciaMargineanusgathersmorethan5000
people in Stockholm todemonstrate against the right‐wingSverigedemokraterna after
the Swedish elections2010byposting an event onFacebook. Egyptian activistWhael
Ghonimusessocialmediatoorganisetheproteston25thofJanuary2011againstHosni
Mubarak. These are the stories that e‐democracy enthusiasts refer to, when writing
abouttheboundlesspossibilitiesofpoliticaldeliberation,participationandmobilisation
on the Internet. The rise of personal media that is located in a semi‐public space
between phatic, personal communication and mass media broadcasting, allows
individualstogettheirvoiceheardoverspace,timeandissueboundaries(Reeseet.al,
2007;Lüders,2008).
This development has been covered by a fair amount of research in media,
communication and political studies. The interdisciplinary field of online democracy
scholars can be categorised into three major lines of research: Firstly, those authors
concerned with the Internet as a space for political discussion and deliberation (e.g.
Connery, 1997; Dahlberg, 2001; Papacharissi, 2002 & 2004; Davies & Gangadharan,
2009;Freelon,2010),secondly,theInternetaspoliticalinstrumentformobilisationand
political participation (e.g. Bennett, 2003; Chadwick, 2006;Aeron, 2010; Papacharissi,
2010)and thirdly, citizenshipand civic culture in theonline realm (e.g. Sassen,2006;
Chadwick, 2006; Tremayne, 2007; Coleman & Blumler, 2009). Independently of the
research emphasis, there is no consensus whether the Internet plays a democracy‐
enhancing role or not and works range from optimistic (Benkler, 2006) to very
pessimisticscenarios(Sunstein,2001).
Inmy thesis, Iwant to follow the line ofworks ononlinepolitical discussion and the
digital public sphere. Empirical studies in this field dealmainlywithnewsgroups and
onlineforums,however,inthisproject,myresearchinterestwilllieonsocalled‘Social
NetworkingSites’suchasFacebookorTwitter–acommunicationtechnologythathas,in
thiscontext,notbeenempiricallyanalysedyet.Inmystudy,Iamgoingtoexaminethe
politicaldiscussionontwoFacebookpagesdealingwithalocalcivicprotestmovement
inGermany.
Theaimofthiscasestudyistoprovideempiricaldataonpoliticaldiscussiononsocial
networkingsites.Usingvirtualethnographyas themethodology, thestudy’sgoal is to
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explorehowusersactuallyinteractonsocialnetworkingsitesinpoliticalcontextsandif
and howpolitical deliberation takes place. The analysed case is a recent civic protest
againstparliamentarypolitics inGermanythat isknownunderthekeyword“Stuttgart
21”. In this local conflict, the inhabitantsof the cityStuttgart in the southofGermany
havebeenprotestingagainsttheconstructionofanewcentraltrainstationthatistobe
locatedcompletelyunderground–along‐termprojectthatcostsapprox.5billioneuro
andthatwouldreshapethecitylastingly.
2.LiteratureReview
2.1ThePublicSphere
In his book from1962Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, JürgenHabermas presents a
historical analysis of the rise and fall of the public sphere over the past 400 years.
Having its roots in the nomore solely feudal, but still elitist salons, coffeehouses and
high societies of the 18th and 19th century, the function of the public sphere is to
legitimiseinstitutionalpoliticsthroughreasonandcriticalargument.Beingthespacefor
publicdiscourse, thepublicsphere issupposedtodecideonpublic issues, formpublic
opinionsandthustoinfluencepolitics.Habermasdescribesthepublicspheretobeone
condition ofmodern democracies, a sphere that “operates as an intermediary system
betweenstateandsociety”(Habermas,2006,412).
According to Habermas (1990, 71ff), there are three major factors that allowed the
public sphere toemerge.Firstly, thepublic spheredrew fromImmanuelKantand the
Enlightenment idea of reason and rationality that requested a sovereignty that was
boundtorationalargumentation.Secondly,capitalismandtheresultingaccumulationof
privatecapitalthroughtradeledtoacravingforprivateautonomyandliberalism.The
third factor is the advent of the newspaper press, which itself was a product of the
informationneedsofearlycapitalism(ibid.).Beingindependentfromthesovereign,the
bourgeoispublicsphereconsistedofwealthyprivatepeoplewhoheldintereststowards
thesovereigninordertoprotecttheirprivatecapital.Thefunctionofthepublicsphere
was,thus,fromthebeginningtocontrolpoliticsandnottogovernitself(ibid.,87).The
instrumentsofthebourgeoisiewererational‐criticalargumenttoformapublicopinion
and publicity either in the form of the press or in public institutions such as the
parliamentinordertostressthatopinion(ibid.,175f).
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AccordingtoHabermas,institutionalisation,however,isoneofthecrucialfactorsforthe
declineofthepublicspherestartingattheendofthe19thcenturyandthisiswherehis
historicalanalysisturnsintoacriticalanalysisofcontemporarymass(political)culture
(cf. Kramer, 1992, 253). The negotiation of power has been increasingly taking place
between private institutions, parties and public administration. The public as
represented by private people has been increasingly excluded from this process, and
deliberation of politics, which Mendelberg (2002, 153) describes as “egalitarian,
reciprocal, reasonable and open‐minded exchange of language”, has been in decline
amongcitizens.
Theother factor for thedeclineof thepublic sphere is the transformationofpublicity
from an opinion‐distributing to an opinion‐making industry. Themassmedia and the
cultural industry have, by means of economical, technological and organisational
concentration, itselfbecomean instrumentofpower(ibid.,284).With thisconclusion,
HabermasputshimselfintothecontextoftheFrankfurtSchoolandotherauthorsfrom
criticaltheoryarguingthattheculturalindustryhastransformedthecriticalpublicinto
adullcommodifiedmassculture.
ConsideringthatHabermashimselfwasmorethandoubtfulaboutthefunctioningofthe
public sphere and even almost denied its existence in themodernwelfare state1, the
question evolves, how the concept can be utilized after all. Is it solely a normative
categoryorisitactuallyananalyticalconceptthathasempiricalrelevance?Thepublic
sphereliteratureisambivalentonthispoint(e.g.Dahlgren,2001&Sparks,2001inthe
samevolume).ReferringtoHabermashimself,GeoffEley(1992,289)pointsoutthatthe
public sphere remains historically unattained or has only been realised in “distorted”
ways.
Habermas mentions in the preface of his 1990 edition of Strukturwandel der
Öffentlichkeitthatthe‘politicalpublicsphere’isatermthatservesasamainnormative
categoryindemocracytheoryandgainsitsempiricalrelevancethroughthedefinitionof
prerequisites for equal communication2 (1990, 41). He later specifies how normative
democracy theory can contribute to empirical research and which topics can be
addressed with the concept (Habermas, 1996). Stressing this practical usage of
1Thisisapointthathepartlytakesbackinhislaterwork(Habermas,1990).2Heparticularlyreferstohisowndiscoursive‐ethicalapproachdevelopedwithK.O.ApelinDiskursundVerantwortung,1988.
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normative theory, the question whether or not there actually exists a public sphere
seems to be of less importance and many authors agree that the public sphere still
serves as an integrative concept for empirical analyses (e.g. Schudson, 1992; Sparks,
2001).Publicspheretheorymustbeunderstoodasameltingpotofapproaches–“not
only the public sphere, but also related themes such as communicative rationality,
deliberativedemocracyandcivilsociety”(Dahlgren,2009,5).
Independentlyofthequestionwhetherornotapublicsphereexistsorhasexistedatall,
there is a huge body of criticism of Habermas’ concept. Most prominently in this
discussion is the accusation that Habermas idealizes the accessibility and the
universality of a singular public sphere3. Obviously, the public sphere that Habermas
describeswasinitiallyanelitistspherethatwasinherentlyexclusivealongthelinesof
class,genderandstatus(e.g.Landes,1988;Eley,1992;Fraser,1990;Garnham,1992).
Asaresult,GeoffEley(1992)aswellasNancyFraser(1990)argueforamulti‐sphere
scenario: “It is important to acknowledge the existence of competing publics not just
later in the nineteenth century,whenHabermas sees a fragmentation of the classical
liberalmodelofÖffentlichkeit,butateverystageinthehistoryofthepublicsphereand,
indeed,fromtheverybeginning”(Eley,1992,306).
Fraser (1990, 67) suggests the term ‘counterpublics’ to describe “subordinated social
groups”suchas“women,workers,peoplesofcolorandgaysandlesbians”.Inopposition
toNicholasGarnham(1992)andColinSparks(2001),whoemphasizetheimportanceof
a singular public sphere as common ground for public opinion, Fraser (1990, 66)
welcomes the multi‐sphere society stating that “arrangements that accommodate
contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of
participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public.” In recent
contributions to the public sphere theory, there is a tendency to speak of public
‘spheres’,i.e.intheplural4.
Fraser’s positive evaluation of contestation between different publics is reflected in
anothercriticalapproachof thepublicspheremodelandofdeliberativedemocracy in
general.DrawingfromcriticaldiscourseanalysisandPost‐Marxisttheory,someauthors3Moreover,thereiscriticismbyhistorians,whichisdirectedagainstthefirstpartofhisbookandassumeshistoricalflawsinhisanalysis(seeBaker,1992;Zaret,1992).4Actually,sodoesHabermas.Intheprefaceofthe1962edition,heclarifiesthathewillfocusonthebourgeoispublicsphereandneglecttheplebeianpublicsphere.Criticismfromthemulti‐sphereadvocatesisthusratherdirectedtowardstheneglectofotherpublicspheresthanthebourgeoisone(Fraser,1990,78).
8
point out that Habermas’ claim of rationality in political discussion restricts in fact
democratization processes and neglects the democratic power of contestation and
disagreement on the one hand (Mouffe, 1992; Papacharissi, 2004; Dahlberg, 2005 &
2007)andinformaltalkbetweencitizensontheother(Dahlgren,2006).Theadvocates
ofradicaldemocracyclaimthatpluralismanddifference insocietyarenotsufficiently
acknowledged in discourses whosemain goal it is to strive for consensus (Dahlberg,
2007,836).
Habermas is strongly criticized, but the main challenge of the public sphere as an
empirical category results from a media critique that Habermas himself encouraged:
The lack of face‐to‐face interaction, high degrees of mediatisation, commercialisation
andconcentrationofmassmedia,politicalinterventionandindeedthelackoffeedback
loopsareproblemsthatcommunicationinsocietyhasbeenfacedwithinthesecondhalf
of the 20th century (Habermas, 2006). At the same time, authors have bemoaned a
decreasing civic engagement and a decline of social capital in late‐modern societies.
“Without at first noticing,we have been pulled apart fromone another and fromour
communities over the last third of the century” (Putnam, 2000, 27). Social capital, a
social resource that establishes through relations in a community and leads to social
action, is,according toPutnam(2000,28), crucial for theeconomy,democracy,health
andhappinessofasociety.Itisthusnowonder,thattheInternetwashighlywelcomed
as a technology to reverse the commercialised logic of mass media and as a social
institution to re‐connect citizenswith eachother andwith thepolitical. Public sphere
researchers,ontheonehand,wereexcitedabouttheInternetasanewunauthoritative
and informal space for political discourse and welcomed online forums as the new
“virtualcoffeehouses”(Connery,1997).Ontheotherhand,scholarsfromsociologyand
political studies recognised the Internet’s potential for virtual communities and civic
engagement(Castells,1996;Sassi,2000;Delanty,2003;Sassen,2006).
2.2TheDigitalPublicSphere
Scholarsfromallfieldshavehighlightedthesemi‐publicandpersonalcommunicationof
Internettechnologythatwasconsideredtoproducealessmanipulatedandmoreactive
political public. “Current technological developments in communication (…) are
legitimated in terms of a desireablemove away frommass communication and back
forward toward forms of interpersonal communication” (Garnham, 1992, 367).
However, not only de‐mediatisation was accounted for the “new media” in terms of
9
democraticpotential.AlsootherinherentcharacteristicsoftheInternettechnologysuch
as the flat network structure, interactive potential, spatial boundlessness and open
accesswere in the centreof optimistic technological deterministic perspectives as for
instance presented from Rheingold (2000). However, in recent works, the positive
attitudetowardsthetechnologyastherescueofunhealthydemocracyhaveturnedinto
morecircumspectviews(Dahlgren,2009,159),inwhichespeciallyquestionsofaccess
andequalityintheInternethavebeenamatterofcriticalconsideration(i.e.Brundidge,
2010).
Andrew Chadwick (2009, 11f) summarizes the wide academic discussion of e‐
democracy as follows: “Scholarship has proceeded through severalwaves, from early
enthusiasmtopessimisticreaction,andtorecent,morebalancedandempiricallydriven
approachesof thepost‐dotcom‐era.”Besides abodyof empirical researchon Internet
activism(seeHills&Hughes,1999;Bennett,2003;vandeDonket.al.,2004),therehas
been some recent empirical work on the digital public sphere that stresses the
democratic potential of online political discussion (e.g. Dahlberg, 2001; Downey &
Fenton,2003;Papacharissi,2004;Dahlgren,2005;Pickard,2008;Price,2009;Davies&
Gangadharan,2009;Gerhards&Schäfer,2010;Davis,2010;Brundidge,2010).However,
even thoughsomeempiricalevidencehasbackedup thehighly theoreticaldiscussion,
therearestillsomeproblemsremainingwiththeconceptofadigitalpublicsphereand
twoofthemarediscussedinthefollowing.
(1)ItmightbenocoincidencethatCassSunstein(2001)releasedhisbookRepublic.com
justinthecrashoftheneweconomy.Afterthedeconstructionoftheeconomichopesof
thenewmedia,hedeconstructedthepoliticalhopesthatwereconnectedtotheInternet.
His claim is that the personalisation of media experience leads to enclaves of like‐
mindedgroupsthateventually losethecommongroundthat isneededfordemocratic
processes.Fragmentationprocessesarealsodiscussed intelevisionstudies,wherethe
TVaudienceasan(imagined)communityisconsideredtobedissolvingintofragments
of “individualised forms of asynchronous consumption” (Buonanno, 2007, 70).
AccordingtoSunstein(2001,199),thisdevelopmentcanleadtogrouppolarizationand
extremepositions,“amorebalkanizedsociety”.AziLev‐OnandBernhardManin(2009,
107) stress that these enclaves have “enhanced abilities to (…) filter out opposing
views”. Besides Sunstein’s scenario of active Internet users and their craving for
cognitiveconsonance,filteralgorithmshaverecentlybeeninthefocusoffragmentation
10
scholars (i.e. Sack et al., 2009; Lev‐On & Manin, 2009) and social filters such as for
instance Facebook’s “Edge‐Rank”5 cater for a revitalisation of the discussion. A
prominent example of algorithmic polarisation is Valdis Krebs’6 network analysis of
buyingpatterns frombook retailer customers thatmanifests for instance inAmazon’s
recommendation system. Empirical studies, however, point to ambivalent evidence
(Dahlberg,2007,830f). InastudyonpoliticalUSENETgroups, JohnKellyetal. (2005,
23)foundoutthat“regardlessofhowbalancedorunbalancedthepopulationofauthors
inapoliticalnewsgroup,thestrongestconversationallinksareacrosspoliticaldivides”.
Inopposition toSunstein, the studystates thatnewsgroupsaugment cross‐ideological
debate. But besides empirical studies, theoretical approaches from radical democracy
argue against a dramatisation of fragmentation processes and in fact celebrate the
developmenttowardsparticipatoryplurality(Dahlberg,2007;Dahlgren,2007).
(2)InherbookAprivatesphere,ZiziPapacharissi(2010)deconstructsthedichotomyof
private and public that serves as the core principle in public sphere theory. Drawing
from former public sphere criticism as well as post‐modern notions of citizenship,
Papacharissipointsout thatprivate andpublicmust implodeas categories.While the
privatesphereisincreasinglycommodifiedinthefaceofcommercialandpublicuseof
personal information (a recent example is the rise of ‘Social Commerce’7), political
activitiesthatwereinitiallysubscribedtothepublicareperformedprivately.Sherefers
inthiscontexttotheconceptof‘identitypolitics’,whichJohnCorner&DickPells(2003,
7) describe as followed: “Political style increasingly operates as a focus for post‐
ideological lifestyle choice, (…), which favour more eclectic, fluid, issue‐specific and
personality‐boundformsofpoliticalrecognitionandengagement”,aphenomenonthat
Lance Bennett (1998) also refers to as ‘lifestyle politics’. According to Papacharissi,
citizensusetheInternetandmobiletechnologytopresenttheiridentitiespubliclyina
“show, not tell”‐mode. That means that the expression of political opinion is more
important than the discussion of public issues. In this scenario, deliberation plays a
minorrole, since thepolitical isnotnegotiated throughcollectivity,but throughsocial5The„Edge‐Rank“measurestherelevanceofastatusupdateforeveryFacebookuserandtakesintoconsiderationformerinteractionwiththeitem’screator.(Kincaid,2010,Techcrunchhttp://techcrunch.com/2010/04/22/facebook‐edgerank/[22/04/2011])6http://www.orgnet.com/divided2.html[20/04/2011]7SeeRowan,David&Cheshire,Tom(2011).Commercegetssocial:Howsocialnetworksaredrivingwhatyoubuy.WiredMagazine,February2011http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2011/02/features/social‐networks‐drive‐commerce[23/02/2011]
11
contacts(ibid.,141).Personalmediahelpcitizenstogaintheautonomytomakeprivate
issues topublic issues. Considering this shift towards egocentricpolitical expressions,
Papacharissi poses the question, if the public sphere concept is still appropriate as a
model after all. Papacharissi’s analysis fits into a techno‐cultural move away from
communities centred on issues to more identity‐driven social networks (Boyd, 2009,
27).However,byputtingalltheemphasisonthequestion,WHATapublicissueis,the
analysisneglectsHOWtheseissuesarediscussed.EventhoughPapacharissi(2010,154)
makesclearthatavirtual“thumbs‐up‐or‐down”doesnotaccountfordeliberation,she
neglects, for instance, the commentary sections of blog entries, YouTube videos or
Facebookposts.
2.3OnlinePoliticalDiscussion
I argue that even in social networks, online political discussion is a relevant field of
research,buttheliteratureanalysismakesalsoclearthatdeliberationshouldnotbethe
singlecategory,whenanalysingonlinediscussions.According toDeenFreelon(2010),
deliberation is themost prominent research interest in this field, however, empirical
researchpointstoverydifferentkindsofpoliticalexpression.
Lincoln Dahlberg (2001) identifies three “camps” of research: the (1) communitarian
that “stresses the possibility of the internet enhancing communal spirit and values”
(ibid.,616),the(2)liberal,mainlyconcernedwiththeexpressionofindividualpolitical
performance and close to Papacharissi’s scenario of identity politics, and the (3)
deliberative. In a recent article, Freelon (2010) elaborates on these three models.
Conductingameta‐analysisofworksinthefield,heidentifieskeycharacteristicsofeach
model such as intra‐ideological (communitarian) vs. inter‐ideological reciprocity
(deliberative)orpersonal revelation (liberal)vs.public issues focus (deliberative).He
presents thus not only a theoretical framework of research schools, but also an
analytical instrument that should encourage scholars not to “unilaterally declare[…] a
forum more or less ‘deliberative’”, but develop “more concise conclusions such as
‘communitarianwithsomedeliberativeaspects’”(Freelon,2010,1177).Bothauthorsdo
notincludeacategorythataccountsforradicaldemocracyintheirmodels(eventhough
for instance Pickard (2008) serves as an empirical reference labelling the Internet
serviceIndymedia8as‘radicaldemocratic’).
8Indymediaisapublishingplatformforalternativeandcitizenmedia.
12
Figure1:ThethreemodelsofonlinedemocraticcommunicationandtheirindicativemetricsaccordingtoFreelon(2010,1178).
The challenge for scholars in this interdisciplinary field is not only the fast
transformationofempiricalandtheoreticalknowledge,butalsothefasttransformation
ofthematterofexaminationitself.WithinthelastfifteenyearsofresearchonInternet
politics, the Internet has evolved dramatically as a technological and cultural
phenomenon. While the early analyses from, for instance, Rheingold (2000), Hill &
Hughes (1998) and van Dijk (1997) focused on staticwebsites, later research had to
takeintoaccountdynamic,platform‐independentWeb2.09environmentsaswellasthe
SocialWeb.While some of the research questionsmight be the same, the social and
culturalcontextchangesandsodotheanalysedentities.Whileresearchhasfocusedon
USENETgroups,E‐Maillists,onlineforumsandMUDs10,theworkonsocialnetworking
sitesissofarrathersmall.
2.4SocialNetworkingSites
DanahBoyd&NicoleEllison(2007)definesocialnetworkingsites(SNS)asweb‐based
services“thatallowindividualsto(1)constructapublicorsemi‐publicprofilewithina
boundedsystem,(2)articulatelistsofotheruserswithwhomtheyshareaconnection,
and(3)viewandtraversetheirlistofconnectionsandthosemadebyotherswithinthe
system”(ibid.,211).Unlike forumsandcommunities,SNSarenotbuiltaroundcertain
topics, nor do the participants necessarily get in contact with strangers. The main
9seeO’Reilly(2005)10MUDstandsforMulti‐UserDungeonanddescribesacategoryoftext‐basedOnlinerole‐playinggames.
1178 new media & society 12(7)
an attempt to classify the metrics used in a diverse array of online political forum studies
(and a few studies of offline political behavior) according to the three-model framework’s
categories. These studies span the disciplines of mass communication, information sci-
ence, political science, critical-feminist studies, education and developmental psychology,
among others. An interdisciplinary purview is nigh obligatory in research into internet
communication, as the literature on any given subtopic thereof more often than not com-
prises a multitude of perspectives (Hunsinger, 2005). Even so, this list does not claim
exhaustiveness; though it attempts to construct an empirically grounded core of measures
within each model, more could doubtless be added. The particular behaviors described in
the following were included for two reasons: (1) each has been successfully operational-
ized in previous research and (2) a compelling argument can be made that each fits con-
ceptually within one of the three models. Table 1 summarizes the three-model framework
along with its constituent characteristics.
The liberal individualist modelLiberal individualism encompasses all characteristics of online conversation involving
personal expression and the pursuit of self-interest. From various literatures, four fea-
tures can be placed into this category: monologue, personal revelation, personal show-
case and flaming.
Monologue. In a study of the deliberative potential of several political Usenet news-
groups, Wilhelm (1999: 98) found that users’ contributions generally lacked ‘the listen-
ing, responsiveness, and dialogue that would promote communicative actions’. Similarly,
Jensen (2003: 357) holds that ‘one of the common complaints about net debates is that
Table 1. The three models of online democratic communication and their indicative metrics
Model of democratic Indicative metric communication
Liberal individualist Monologue Personal revelation Personal showcase FlamingCommunitarian Ideological fragmentation Mobilization Community language Intra-ideological questioning Intra-ideological reciprocityDeliberative Rational-critical argument Public issue focus Equality Discussion topic focus Inter-ideological questioning Inter-ideological reciprocity
at Stockholms Universitet on November 24, 2010nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from
13
category is inclusion into or exclusion out of one’s network. However, the borders
between online communities and SNS are blurry and there are many online
communities that featureSNScharacteristics (for instanceprofilepages fordiscussion
boardmembers)aswellasSNSthatfeaturecommunitycharacteristics(forexamplethe
Facebookpagesfunction).
AccordingtoBoyd&Ellison(2007,214),SixDegrees.comwasthefirstSNStolaunchin
1997 and soon SNS emerged all around the world, most prominently the networks
Friendster (Launch 2002), LinkedIn (Launch 2003) and MySpace (Launch 2003)11.
Interestingly,SNSemergedasnationalorregionalphenomenaand inthebeginningof
social networks, many countries had their own prevalent SNS, so for instance
LunarStrominSweden,StudiVZinGermany,HyvesintheDutchspeakingcountries,Gono
inPortugal,Mixi inJapan,Orkut inBrasilandIndia,QQ inChina(Boyd&Ellison,2007,
218).Inrecentyears,therehasbeenadevelopmenttowardsnicheSNSontheonehand
andconsolidationandconcentrationof theSNS‐marketon theother.Today,Facebook
(Launch2004)is,withits585millionusers12,worldwidethelargestSNS.187,7million
usersareintheagegroupof18–24years.However,allagegroupsgrowrapidlywith
between59%to124%(agegroupover65years)growthrateinthelastyear.
According to Boyd & Ellison (2007, 219), research on SNS can be comprised in the
followingthemes:ImpressionManagementandFriendshipPerformance,Networksand
Network Structure, Bridging Online and Offline Social Networks, and Privacy. The
dichotomyofprivateandpublicisamajorcategorytodescribedifferentSNS.Twitterin
comparisontoFacebookhas for instanceamuchhigherdegreeofpublicness,which is
indicatedbyahigherpublicinterestorientationofthestatusesandweakertiesbetween
theusers.
ThereareonlyfewstudiesontherelationofSNSandpolitics,butsincethecampaigning
for the presidential election in theUS in 2008, scholars recognised the importance of
SNSeveninpoliticalcontexts.“KeyfeaturesprovidedonFacebook,suchaslinking,Wall‐
posting,or resources timelyupdatedonvideo‐sharingwebsitessuchasYouTubehave
created previously unimagined opportunities for young people to exchange their
politicalviewsandbecomemorepoliticallyactive”(Wu,2010,6).AccordingtoWeiwu11SeeBoyd&Ellison(2007)forathoroughhistoryofSNS.12Socialbakers(2011).Facebookin2010:7,9newaccountregistrationspersecond.http://www.socialbakers.com/blog/109‐facebook‐in‐2010‐7‐9‐new‐account‐registrations‐per‐second/[2011‐02‐25]
14
Zhang et al. (2010, 80), 40% of all SNS users have used their network for political
information during the presidential campaigning 2008.However, the study concludes
that reliance on SNS encourages rather civic participation – that is non‐governmental
andnon‐electoral– thanpoliticalparticipationorconfidence in thegovernment(ibid.,
87). Empirical studies on thequestion, if theuseof SNS affectspolitical attitudes and
behavioursornot,pointinbothdirections(Johnsonetal.,2011).
AccordingtoZhanget.al.(2010,76),civicandpoliticalengagementarebothpositively
influencedbysocialcapital.Thereareseveralstudiesthatexaminethisparticularaspect
ofsocialnetworks(Ellisonetal.,2007;Steinfieldetal.,2008)withtheresultthatthere
is a positive correlation between the use of SNS and the deepening of social ties
(bonding social capital) as well as creating new social connections (bridging social
capital).ThesocialityofSNSandquestionswhetherornotSNSmakepeoplemoresocial
orhow theyaffect social relationsand socialbehaviour ingeneral aremajor research
trends in the field (Papacharissi, 2011, 309). Johnson et al. (2011, 203) also suggest
examininglocalcivicengagementinrelationtoSNSandthesocialuseoftheWeb.
2.5TerminologyandSummary
In this literature review, I have mentioned the terms “digital public sphere”, “e‐
democracy”,“digitalcitizenship”,“onlinedeliberation”and“onlinepoliticaldiscussion”.
All of them refer to the studyof onlinepolitics. Even though it is hard todrawa line
betweentheseresearch fieldsandsomeof the termsareusedsynonymously, the first
three terms rather apply as theoretical frameworks, whereas the latter two describe
empirical categories. Following Freelon (2010), I want to stick to the term “online
politicaldiscussion”inthefollowinganalysis,whenreferringtotheempiricalinterestof
thestudy,andIusetheterm“digitalpublicsphere”asthetheoreticalframework.This
categorisation has a bias from radical democracy theory implying that not only
deliberation, but also contestation and informal talk are relevant categories for the
digitalpublicsphere.
Theliteraturereviewshowsthatresearchononlinepoliticaldiscussioninthecontextof
public sphere theory has a fairly distinct tradition. However, it also shows that the
transformationofthemediumandthewayitisadaptedsocially,changethe(empirical)
focusoftheacademicdiscussion.Consideringalltheiterationsinpublicspheretheory
anddiscussionsofthedigitalpublicsphere,thereviewmakesclearthatitisnotenough
toask“WhatwouldHabermassay?”,buttolookatthemattersofinquiryintheirsocial
15
and cultural contexts. In the following, I want to introduce the case study before
clarifying,whattheresearchquestionsare.
3.CaseStudyThe analysed case is a recent civic protest against parliamentary politics in Germany
that is known under the keyword “Stuttgart 21” or “S21”. In this local conflict,many
inhabitants of the city Stuttgart have been protesting against the building of a new
centraltrainstationthatistobelocatedcompletelyunderground.Thecalculatedcosts
forthe long‐termprojectrangebetween4,113billionto9billionEuro14.Theproject is
supposedtoreshapethecitylastingly.
TheprojectStuttgart21wasfirstpresentedinApril1994bytheFederalStateMinister
ErwinTeufel(CDU)andenactedinNovember1995.Atthesametime,thefirstinitiative
against the project “Leben in Stuttgart – Kein Stuttgart 21” (Life in Stuttgart – No
Stuttgart 21) was founded with the aim to conduct a public referendum about the
project (Lösch et al., 2011, 187). The municipal council denied the referendum in
September 1996 due to insufficient signatures collected. After negotiation about the
funding of the project, a financing agreement was made in July 2002 and building
permission was given in 200515. Two years later, an alliance against Stuttgart 21
gathered67000signaturesforareferendum,whichthemunicipalcouncildeniedagain.
Afterseveralvaryingcalculationsoftheproject’soverallcosts,theconstructionofficially
beganinFebruary201016.
During the year 2010, the critical press coverage and the rising costs of the project,
createdatremendousgrowthoftheprotestmovement,whichcontinueddemonstrating
against the project every Monday in Stuttgart. The main arguments of the protest
movementare:1.Criticismtowardsamiscalculationofthecostsandexpectedcostsof
morethan5billionEurowithatthesametimehighpublicdebts.2.Anactually lower
capacityofthenewcentralstationduetofewertrainplatforms.3.Lesscomfortfortrain
13OfficialnumberfromDeutscheBahn.http://content.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de/stz/page/2314733_0_9223_‐grube‐wir‐bauen‐tunnels‐und‐keine‐bunker.html[27/05/2011]14InastatementoftheGermanFederalEnvironmentalAgency15StuttgarterZeitung(2009).Chronik:DasGroßprojektS‐21.http://www.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de/stz/page/2063244_0_9223_‐chronik‐das‐grossprojekt‐s‐21.html[27/05/2011]16FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung(2010).DieChronikvonStuttgart21:NabelschauinSchwaben.http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0F6C1ACA6E6643119477C00AAEDD6BD6/Doc~EFB4EC7E416DC4E33BDA214AAE06927A1~ATpl~Ecommon~Sspezial.html[27/05/2011]
16
travellers. 4.Anundemocratic procedure andpolitics against thewill of thepublic. 5.
TheremovalofpublicparkssurroundingStuttgartcastleaswellasotherenvironmental
riskssuchasanegativeaffectionofthecity’sclimateandwaterresources17(Wolf,2010,
10ff).Theprotestmovementsuggestsinsteadanalternativemodelcalled“Kopfbahnhof
21”,whichadvocatesbasicallyamodernisationoftheexistingcentralstation.
The protest against Stuttgart 21 is mainly directed against political and economic
institutionssuchasthefederalstategovernmentconsistingofacoalitionbetweenCDU
(ChristlichDemokratischeUnion18) and FDP (FreieDemokratischePartei19),Deutsche
Bahn AG20 and the supporting parties. However, as a reaction to the increasing civic
opposition against the project, a civic movement in support of the project has also
emerged.ItalignedinSeptember2010underthename“WirsindStuttgart21”(Weare
Stuttgart21).Theargumentsof theprojectsupporters,whichmainlycorrespondwith
theofficialstatements,are:1.Theundergroundstationcreatesnewurbanspacedirectly
inthecitythatisgoingtobedesignedindialoguewiththecitizens.2.Ahigherqualityof
train travelling not only due to a higher capacity of the station, but also due to new
connections to the airport and to destinations in the region. 3. The futuristic project
addstotheprestigeofthecityandtheregionasanengineeringmetropolis21.
Theconflictescalatedon30thofSeptember2010,whenamassivepoliceoperationused
water cannons and tear gas to disperse the protesters that had blocked parts of the
station and the near palace garden22. After this incident, inwhich around400people
hadbeeninjured,thefederalgovernmentstoppedthedeconstructionofthestationand
called for an arbitration between the authorities (the federal state government and
Deutsche Bahn) and the project opponents (the alliance against Stuttgart 21) led by
HeinerGeißler23.OnNovember the 30th, Geißler releasedhis arbitration statement. It
said thatStuttgart21shouldbepursued,however,withsomechangesandnotbefore
17BUNDe.V.Regionalgeschäftsstelle(2011).DiezehnwichtigstenArgumente.http://www.kopfbahnhof‐21.de/index.php?id=501[20/05/2011]18ChristianDemocraticUnion19FreeDemocraticParty20Germannationalrailwaycompany.21ArbeitsgruppeStuttgart21‐ja‐bitte(2011).GewichtigeGründefürStuttgart21.http://www.stuttgart21‐ja‐bitte.de/gewichtige‐gruende‐fuer‐stuttgart‐21[27/05/2011]22SpiegelOnline.Josef‐OttoFreudenreich:BürgerkriegimSchlossgarten.http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,720581,00.html[27/05/2011]23HeinerGeißlerisapartymemberoftheCDUthatrulestogetherwiththeliberalpartyFDPinBaden‐Württemberg.Atthesametime,heisamemberofATTAC,whichgrantshimcredibilityintheleft‐wingscene.
17
DeutscheBahnhasconducteda‘stresstest’inordertoensurethesufficientcapacityof
thenewstation.Thestatementhasbeenregardedasadefeatfortheprojectcritics24.
Theconflictaroundthecentralstationhasalsobeenperceivedasanideologicalconflict
inthefederalstateparliament(“Landtag”)betweentheconservativeandindustrial‐near
camp representedby thegoverning coalitionandDeutscheBahnversus the left‐wing,
environmentalist camp represented by ‘Die Grünen’ (the environmentalist party) and
civicorganisations25.Theconflicthasthusbecomeoneofthemostimportanttopicsin
theelectioncampaignforthenewLandtag.InSeptember2010,AngelaMerkeldenieda
referendum about the building of the central station with the argument that the
electionsin2011willdecideabouttheprojectanyway26.
The ongoing dispute about the central station has split the city into two opposed
fractions.However,thereisaninterestingdynamicofthepublicopinioninfluencedby
thearbitration.AccordingtoarepresentativestudybytheGermanopinionresearcher
Infratestdimap inSeptember2010,54%ofpeople living inBaden‐Württembergwere
againsttheproject.Inthesamestudyonedayafterthearbitrationstatementonthe1st
ofDecemberonly38%wereagainsttheproject,while54%supportedit.
Figure2:TheacceptanceofStuttgart21overtime.Source:InfratestdimaponbehalfofSWRandStuttgarterZeitung:LänderTRENDBaden‐Württemberg27.
3.1NetworkagainstStuttgart21
The protestmovement against Stuttgart 21 is driven and organised by an alliance of
political, civic and cultural organisations calling themselves ‘Aktionsbündnis gegen
24SpiegelOnline(2010).EndederSchlichtung:Stuttgart21bekommtdasGeißler‐Gütesiegel.http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,732135,00.html[27/05/2011]25However,thebiggestoppositionpartySPD(SocialDemocrats)supportsthestation.26AngelaMerkel(15/09/2010):„DieLandtagswahlimnächstenJahr,diewirdgenaudieBefragungderBürgerüberdieZukunftBaden‐Württembergs,über,Stuttgart21‘undvieleandereProjektesein“.27http://www.infratest‐dimap.de/umfragen‐analysen/bundeslaender/baden‐wuerttemberg/laendertrend/2010/dezember/[13/04/2011]
18
Stuttgart21’.Eventhoughtheallianceconsistsofindependentinstitutions,theyhavea
commonspokespersonandawebpresence.Themainactorsinthisallianceare‘Aktive
Parkschützer’(‘activeparkguards’‐acivicorganisationofactivistsagainstS21andthe
rather radical core of the protest movement), ‘Initiative Leben in Stuttgart – Kein
Stuttgart21’(acivicorganisationthatwasfoundedalreadyin1995inoppositiontothe
project), the localpartyorganisationsof the twopoliticalpartiesDieGrünenand ‘Die
Linke’ (leftist party), of whom Die Grünen are also represented in the federal state
parliament,andtheregionalgroupoftheenvironmentalorganisation‘BUNDe.V.’.
The alliance is supported by many professional groups28 such as for instance
“Architekten gegen Stuttgart 21” (architects against Stuttgart 21), “Demokratie‐
Initiative21”(initiativefordemocracy21)or“Initiative‐Barriere‐Frei‐GegenStuttgart
21”(initiativeforhandicappedpeopleagainstStuttgart21).Moreover,inconnectionto
the alliance, there are more than 20 regional protest groups in all parts of Baden‐
Württemberg and even in other parts of Germany. Independent observers have
underlinedtheprotest’scivicandnonviolentcharacter.
Theonlineprotestnetworkisjustasdiverseastheofflinenetwork.However,thereare
threemajorwebsitesof thealliancewhicharewww.kopfbahnhof‐21.de (whichserves
as informationportalabout theprotestmovementaswellasacollectionof important
documentsandnews),www.parkschuetzer.de(whichservesasanactivistnetworkand
allows activists to register and get in contact with each other as well as to organise
events – so far there are 32 719 activists registered) and the Facebook page “KEIN
Stuttgart21” (whichservesasboth informationanddiscussionplatform). Inaddition,
the alliance launched the website www.infooffensive.de, a platform that distributes
information and arguments to the press and the public outside of Stuttgart. Besides
thesemajorplatforms, the sitewww.parkschuetzer.de links tomore than50websites
that are associatedwith the protestmovement and cover all sorts of topics including
documentationoftheartscenethathasdevelopedaroundtheprotest.
Thevisualnetworkbelowshowsthelinkstructureoftheonlinenetwork.Thewebsite
www.kopfbahnhof‐21.de is the biggest node and receives 2215 links, followed by
www.parkschuetzer.deandwww.facebook.com.Interestingly,thesecondmostpopular
pages are www.unternehmer‐gegen‐s21.de (entrepreneurs against s21) and
28TheWebsitewww.parkschuetzer.delists24ofsuchgroups.
19
www.gewerkschaften‐gegen‐s21.de(workerunionsagainsts21).Thefollowingdiagram
indicatesthewideanddiverseprotestmovementthatismirroredonline.
Figure3:TheonlinenetworkagainstStuttgart21.Thebiggerthenodes,themorelinkstheyreceivefromothernodesinthenetwork.DiagramcreatedwithIssueCrawler(http://www.issuecrawler.net).
3.2NetworkinsupportofStuttgart21
Theallianceagainsttheprotestmovementiscalled“WirsindStuttgart21”andconsists
of five civic organisations. Since summer 2010, the alliance has conducted many
activities to support the project that range from information stands over
demonstrations to collectively removing stickers of the opposition movement from
publicplaces.
Thealliance runs thewebsiteswww.fuerstuttgart21.de,www.wirsindstuttgart21.deas
wellastheFacebookpage“FürStuttgart21”.Allofthesewebsitesserveasinformation
portals. www.wirsindstuttgart21.de has, in addition, an online forum, in which both
projectsupportersaswellascriticsleaddiscussions.
20
Figure4:ThecivicnetworkinsupportofStuttgart21.Thebiggerthenodes,themorelinkstheyreceivefromothernodesinthenetwork.GraphcreatedwithIssueCrawler(http://www.issuecrawler.net).
4.ResearchAimandQuestionsInthefollowingstudy,Iwanttoanalysetheonlinepoliticaldiscussionaboutthislocal
protestmovement on the twoFacebook pages “KEIN Stuttgart 21” and “Für Stuttgart
21”.TheoverarchingaimistoexamineifandhowtheFacebookpagesfulfilcriteriaof
thepublicsphereandifandhowpublicopinioniscreated.Followingthelineofresearch
on online political discussion, this project contains three aspects that seem to be
promisingtoaddtotheacademicdiscussion.Firstly,theprojectexaminesalocalprotest
movement that features polarized positions, secondly, it focuses on the social
networkingsiteFacebook,thirdly,itusesanethnographicapproach.
Researchquestions:
1. Whichpossibilitiesanddrawbacksdosocialnetworkingsitesconstituteinterms
ofpoliticalcitizendiscourse?
21
2. To what extent can the pages be described as communitarian, liberal or
deliberative?
a. Towhatextentdothediscoursesonthepagesexpresspublicissuefocus?
b. Doesinter‐andintra‐reciprocitytakeplaceonthepages?
c. Towhatextentarethegroupsideologicallyhomogeneous?
d. Is the style of discussion rational and towhat extent does flaming take
place?
5.MethodsAsmentionedinthe literaturereview,onlinecommunitiesare increasinglycentredon
networks rather than topics. “Rather than relying on interests or structure‐based
boundaries,currentsocialgroupsaredefinedthroughrelationships”(Boyd,2009,27).
FacebookandTwitteraresocialnetworkingsitesthatcertainlysharethischaracteristic.
However, in thisparticular case, the emphasis of the study liesonpeoplewhogather
around the topic Stuttgart 21 by joining the Stuttgart 21 pages29 on Facebook. This
implies that the conducted research is not a network analysis (that means not an
analysis of ‘who speaks/listens towho’), but rather the analysis of a cross‐section of
conversations.
In the particular technological and cultural setting of a social networking site with
communitycharacteristics,thequestionofadequatemethodologyisalsooftheoretical
relevance.Withinthe last tenyears, ithasbecomemoreandmorepopular to thinkof
the Internet not only as a technology, but also as a culture that can be studied with
ethnographicprinciples.Thismethodologythatauthorsrefertoas‘virtualethnography’
hasbeenusedintheanalysisofonlinecommunities(Sundén,2002;Kanayama,2003)as
well as social networking sites andonline issuenetworks (Boyd, 2007;Dirksen et al.,
2010;Farnsworth&Austrin,2010).“YoucanstudytheInternetasaformofmilieuor
cultureinwhichpeopledevelopspecificformsofcommunicationor,sometimes,specific
identities.BothsuggestatransferofethnographicmethodstoInternetresearch”(Flick,
2009,272).
29Iusetheterm‘pages’asFacebookcallsthem,eventhoughtheterms‘group’or‘community’wouldbemorefittingconsideringthatthesepagesareusedtogroupandinteractwithpeoplethatareinterestedinacommontopic.
22
5.1Methodology
5.1.1VirtualEthnography
Virtualethnographyusesprinciplesofconventionalethnographyliketheuseofarange
of methods, aiming at a holistic picture of the culture, understanding daily routines,
values and practices of the studied group (cf. Fetterman, 1998, 16ff). According to
Christine Hine (2000, 7f), who rendered outstanding service to the adaptation of
ethnographyinonlineresearch,theInternetfeaturesmeaningfulrelationshipsand“true
sociality” that allow ethnographic approaches to online cultures and groups. If we
perceiveofaFacebookpageasanethnographicfield,weareinbettershapetonotonly
analyse the textual content, but also to understand the social relations between the
groupmembers,theorganisationofthegroupaswellascharacteristicsofgroupculture,
ritualsandsymbols.“Lookingatwhatpeopledoandtalkaboutwithothersisanideal
unit for examining social behaviors, (…), and reveals aspects of groups that are not
evidentfromaggregationsofindividualbehaviors”(Haithornthwaite,2005,127).
ThestudypresentedhereisanethnographyontwoFacebookpages,whichIcallthetwo
virtual fields. I spent one week on the two pages using several methods such as
discourse analysis, interviews with group members, as well as a small‐sampled
quantitative content analysis in order to analyse the discussion style, interaction
dynamics, interconnectionbetween the twopages,prevalentdiscoursesaswellas the
offline‐online relation of the protest movement. The study is both exploratory and
analytic and no hypotheses were formulated beforehand. Even though ethnography
aimsataholisticpictureofaculture, thestudy focusesoncertainaspects thatwillbe
discussedbelow.
QualitativeContentAnalysis
The two Facebook pages feature solely textual information, so what is the difference
between virtual ethnography and content analysis? I argue that the difference is the
theoreticalassumptionofFacebookbeingaplaceandacultureinitselfandnotsolelya
cultural product. Moreover, virtual ethnography can combine a range of methods as
presentedinthisstudy.Certainly,contentanalysisplaysamajorrole(seeFine,2000).In
thisstudy,Iconductbothaqualitativeandquantitativecontentanalysis.
The qualitative analysis is a discourse analysis that follows the discourse concept of
Norman Fairclough & Ruth Wodak (1997), who advocate a critical consciousness of
languagepracticeanddefinecriticaldiscourseanalysisas“theanalysisoflinguisticand
23
semiotic aspects of social processes and problems” (ibid., 271). Papacharissi (2009)
usedcriticaldiscourseanalysisinthestudyofSNStofindout,whatlanguageindividuals
develop, when they “introduce, present and connect themselves” (ibid., 204). In the
contextofthisstudy,criticaldiscourseanalysisisespeciallyusefultoanalyseideological
inclusion and exclusion, reciprocity, thediscussion style aswell as theuse of rational
argumentation and flaming. All of these concepts will be looked at more closely in
chapter5.3.
QuantitativeContentAnalysis
The quantitative analysis in this studymust be understood as complementary to the
qualitativepart.Itwasconductedinordertoclarifythepublicissuefocusofthepages
and to classify thewall posts according to the topics addressed. The categorieswere
developed inductively that means during the analysing process. This method is also
described as empirical categorization (Merten, 1999, 247) and requires rather strong
interpretationby thecoder inorder toeliminate textualambiguitiesanddecideabout
thecontextualmeaningofawallpost.ItfollowsadesignthatPhilippMayring(2003,19)
describes as an ‘integrative approach’ to quantitative content analysis: while the
researchquestions,categoriesandinstrumenthavebeendeducedqualitatively,thedata
canbeanalysedquantitatively.
Interviews
DavidFetterman(2007,40)describesinterviewsasthe“ethnographer’smostimportant
data gathering technique”. He distinguishes informal interviews from structured or
semi‐structured30 interviews. Whereas the former are the most common in the
fieldworkandespeciallywhenenteringafield,thelatteraremoreusefulinthemiddle
orendstagesofastudy.
In this study, it was possible to establish a trustful contact with one of the
administrators of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”. I was able to conduct a structured
interviewviaE‐Mailwiththisadministratoraswellastoshareseveralinformalphone
calls,oneofthemintheweekbeforetheobservation,whichturnedouttobeveryuseful
fortheactualfieldwork,andoneofthemrightafterthefieldwork.Unfortunately,itwas
moredifficultto‘getthrough’totheadministratorsofthepage“FürStuttgart21”.Inthe
end,Iwasabletoconductastructuredinterviewwithananonymousadministratorof
30Structuredinterviewsfollowaquestionnairewithspecificresearchgoals(Fetterman,2007,38).
24
thepageviaFacebookwithveryshortanswers.Duringthefieldwork,Itriedtocontact
somepagemembersoverFacebookandreceivedseveralanswers.
5.2Sampling
Thechallengeinvirtualethnographyistoretracethenetworkstructureofthefieldand
multi‐sited ethnography is a commonmethodology to accomplish that (Farnsworth&
Austrin, 2010).Kirsten Foot (2006) also speaks of a ‘Web SphereAnalysis’,amethod
that puts the highest emphasis on links and linking structure in an actor or issue
network. This study, however, is not an actor network analysis, but an analysis of
discussionsinaparticularvirtualenvironment.Thevirtualfieldisthusrestrictedtothe
twoFacebookpages,wheretheethnographytookplace.ThereasonwhyIlimitthefield
tothepagesisdeterminedbytheresearchinterestratherthanbytheoreticaldefinition.
“Decidingwheretostartandwhentostopcanbeanintrinsicpartoftheethnographer’s
attemptstoensurethathisorherresearchquestionsarebothcoherentlyaddressedand
adapted to the cultural landscape that emerges” (Hine, 2009, 2). Even though these
fieldsarerestricted(onehastoactively‘like’thepagesinordertocontribute),theyare
not independent islandson theweb.They link toa lotofotherwebsitesaswell as to
eachotherandtheoutgoinglinkshavealsobeenanalysedinthestudy.Inthatregard,
thefieldshadsomewebspherecharacteristics.
Theexaminationtookplaceintheweekfromthe20thtothe27thofMarch2011,which
wastheweekbeforethefederalstateelectionsonthe27th.Thetimeperiodwaschosen
becausetheconflictwassupposedtoplayamajorroleinthefinalelectioncampaigning
aswell as the voting decision. Oneweek proved to be a time frame that allowed the
investigationofsocialrelationsonthepagesaswellastheunderstandingofdiscussion
patterns,whileatthesametimekeepingthedatatoaconsiderableamount.
The main matters of examination were the two ‘walls’ of the pages, where the page
administratorsaswellaspagememberscanpostshort singularmessages.Thesewall
postsreceivecommentsand‘likes’sothatasinglewallpostincludingcommentscanbe
describedas a conversation. In addition, everypagehasadiscussionboardand some
additionalstaticinformationsuchasforinstancelinkstoevents,activistgroupsetc.The
additionalinformation(onthepagetheyareorganisedastabsintheheadsectionofthe
page)wasalsotakenintoaccountintheresearch.However,mainattentionwaspaidto
the wall posts, the discourses they covered, the links they contained as well as the
responsestheygot.
25
Forthequantitativeanalysis,250wallpostsoneachpagewerechronologicallyanalysed
beginningMonday, 20th ofMarch, 9 a.m.On thepage “Für Stuttgart 21”, the 250wall
posts coveredalmost threewholedaysuntilWednesday.On thepage “KEINStuttgart
21”,the250wallpostscoveredoneandahalfdaysuntilTuesdaymorning.
5.3Operationalisation
Thegathereddatainethnographicresearchisusuallyunstructured.Theaimistogeta
holistic picture of a culture and especially to see things that were not asked for
beforehand. That is why the applied methods such as, for instance, participant
observationor interviewsareusuallyconductedanddocumented inastructuredway,
but not coded according to a structured scheme. However, considering the particular
researchinterestandtherestrictedtimespan,Iwentinthefieldwithaninstrumentthat
Iwanttocallthe‘researchemphases’.
Overall, I focused on (1) the page structure and architecture, (2) the topics of the
conversationsand(3)thelanguageusedintheconversations.Themaingoalwasatfirst
to describe these three levels, so the organisation of the group, the topics covered as
wellasoverallrhetoric.Inaddition,IappliedFreelon’sindicativemetrics(seefigure1)
tothestudy.Onallofthesethreelevels,Ianalysedthedegreeofreciprocitybetweenthe
groups,contestationbetweenopposingopinions,ideologicalinclusionorexclusion,the
use of rational arguments, the use of accusations and flaming, personal revelation, as
wellascontextualisationwiththewholecivicmovements.Alloftheseoperatorscould
bemoreorlessretracedonthethreelevels.
Pagestructure Topics Language/Rhetoric
Description
Reciprocity
Contestation
Ideology
Rationalityvs.
flaming
Personalrevelation
26
Contextualisation
withprotest
movement
Figure5:Theresearchemphases.Thisformwasusedforcodingandstructuringofthedataduringtheethnography.
Reciprocity: Reciprocity is analysed on two levels: Firstly, how the groups dealwith
arguments from the opposing side and secondly, how each page dealswith the other
pageandifthereisaninteractionbetweenthepagesornot.
Contestation:Contestationfocusesonthedirectcontactofopposingarguments.Iwant
to analyse if andhowmembersof eachpositionengagedirectly indiscussionson the
pages.
Ideology:Asmentionedbefore, the conflict arosealong the linesofpolitical ideology.
Thequestionhereis,howstronglythepagesareideologicallyshapedandtowhatextent
acertainpoliticalorientationispresupposedforanactiveparticipationintherespective
group.
Rationality vs. flaming: Papacharissi (2004, 269) describes flaming as an affront
against the online etiquette that is an “offensive, nonsensical, albeit passionate online
response”.Ontheotherhand, Iwanttoanalysetowhatextentrationalargumentsare
usedintheconversationsandhowtheseargumentsarecriticallyquestioned.
Personal revelation: Freelon (2010, 1179) describes personal revelation as “simply
disclosureofinformationaboutoneselfinapublicforum”.Thisfactorisofimportance
especially on the thematic level, when analysing to what extent the pages feature a
publicissuefocus.
Contextualisation:HereIwanttoanalysehowtheprotestmovementonthetwopages
putsitselfincontextwiththewholeonlineprotestnetworkaswellasthelocalactivities.
Thequantitativeanalysiswasconductedafterthequalitativediscourseanalysis,which
helpedtounderstandthecontextandcharacteristicsof thewallposts.Afteranalysing
and interpreting the wall posts according to their topics addressed, the data were
grouped into more and more abstract categories until they could be quantified and
coded. I codedeverywallpostwithonlyone topic. First, I checked, if thepostsname
Stuttgart21oriftheyarerelatedtotheissue.Ifnot,IformedcategoriesthatIconflated
lateron.Wallpoststhataddressedseveraltopicswerereducedtothemaintopic,which
27
wassometimesthetopicthatreceivedthemostfeedbackinthecommentariesandcould
sometimesbedeterminedby thecontext31.Thecategoriesaresometimesnotdisjunct
andIwillpointtotheseambiguitiesintheresultssection.Besidesthisthematicanalysis,
quantitativeanalysiswasapplied inorder todescribe thewallposts formally. Insum,
fivevariableswerecoded.Theyare:topic,links,pictures,numberofcommentariesand
numberoflikes32.
5.4Implementation
Istartedtheinvestigationwithaninterviewwithoneofthepageadministratorsinthe
weekbeforetheactualdatacollection,whenIalsoreceiveduserandusagestatisticsof
thepage “KEINStuttgart21”. I entered the fieldonMonday, 20th ofMarch, and spent
mostofthedayonbothofthepages,whichallowedmetocaptureapproximately75%
ofallactivitiesonthepages.Themaintaskwastoanalysetheconversationsusingmy
researchemphasesasorientationaswellasthedocumentationform.Itookscreenshots
of wall discussions that seemed to be relevant for my research emphases and I
numbered the screenshots and referenced my field notes accordingly. During this
process, I also sent messages to two page members and asked them about their
intentionsandtheirusageofthepages.
Having identified major discussion patterns and relations between the members, I
startedthequantitativepartoftheanalysisonThursdayinthesameweekanalysingall
wallposts(themajorityofwhichIhadalreadyanalysedorat leastread)accordingto
theirtopicsaddressedanddevelopedacategorysystem.Thewholeethnographycanbe
picturedasfollowed.Thearrowssymbolisetheprocesstimewise.Istartedthefieldwork
with an informal interview with one of the administrators. Then the pages were
observedandthediscoursesanalysed,whileatthesametimegettingintocontactwith
pagemembers.Afterthediscourseanalysis,thequantitativeanalysisof500wallposts
wasconducted.
31Forexample:Thewallpost:„Sundayaretheelections.Youknowwhatthatmeans.PutanendtoStuttgart21andnuclearpower.“Technically,thepostcombinesthreetopics:Thefederalstateelections,Stuttgart21andnuclearpower.However,itdoesnotdealwiththeissuesStuttgart21orenergypoliticsinparticular,butcanratherbeunderstoodasanelectionendorsement.ThatiswhyIwouldcodethetopictoberelatedtothefederalstateelections.32TheCodebookispartofthispaperintheappendix.
28
Figure6:Theschemeoftheethnography.
6.ResultsThischaptershowstheresultsoftheethnography.Theresultswillbeanalysedandput
into theoretical context in the next chapter. Here, I want to gather and structure the
resultsaccordingtotheresearchquestions.
6.1User‐andUsage‐Statistics
Theusage‐statisticsweregatheredbyFacebookInsights,anintegratedtrackingtoolfor
pageadministratorsprovidedbyFacebook.Thefirstdiagramsshowthetotalnumberof
Facebookusers,wholikethepage,andtheiractivityonthepageovertime.Bothpages
were launched on the 1st of September 2010 and extended their member base
exponentiallyaftertheescalationoftheconflictonthe30thofSeptember2010.Thepage
“KEIN Stuttgart 21” raised itsmembers from 27 666 to 89 546memberswithin one
month.Afterthat,thepagegrewsloweruntilitreachedasaturationaroundthe100000
member mark. The same applies for the page “Für Stuttgart 21” although the page
gatheredalotofmembersintheweekbeforethefederalstateelections,whentherate
ofnewmembersjumpedupto1000newmembersperdayforalmostaweek.Thepage
crossed the 100 000membersmark already inOctober 2010 andwas able to gather
morethan140000membersinthesum.
The activity of the page members is heavily dependent on the status posts by the
administrators.Thisisespeciallystrikingonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”.Theactivityof
thepagemembershasbeenincreasinglyunsteadyaftertheendofthelastyear.Thiscan
mainly be explained with a change of wall post strategy of the page administrators.
FacebookInsightsdefinesactivityofmembersnotonlybypagevisits,butalsobytheir
responsestowallposts.Wallpoststhatarewrittenbypageadministratorsdonotonly
29
appear on thewall of the particular page, but also in the news stream of every page
member.AndreasBühler,oneof theadministratorsof thepage, speaksofaconscious
changeofstrategy.Inthebeginning,theadministratorsposteduptothreewallpostsa
dayinordertospreadinformationabouttheprotest.Afterthe30thofSeptember,they
restricted themselves to a maximum of two posts a day and decided to only share
certain information. Then they reduced the number of wall posts again. “Around the
turnof theyear,moreandmoreusers jumpedoffafterposts.That iswhywetried to
reduce the frequency of the posts to every two or three days. If there were really
relevantnews,westillposteddaily.”(AndreasBühler,Administratorofthepage“KEIN
Stuttgart21”).
The sameups anddowns inpage activity canbe seenon thepage “Für Stuttgart21”.
Here,thedifferenceinactivityisevenmoredependentontheadministrator’sposts.The
standard deviation of active members on this page is about 6000 members higher
comparedtothepage“KEINStuttgart21”.
The diagrams show how similar the respective developments of daily comments and
‘likes’ are over time on the two pages. The numbers can also be explained with the
postingstrategies.However,theyevenmorecorrelatewiththeeventsandthegeneral
media discourse about the conflict. The first peaks can be explained with the media
attentionthatwascausedbytheeventsaroundthe30thofSeptember.Thenextpeaks
can be put into context with the arbitration ending with the call of the arbitration
statement onNovember, 30th. The last peak occurred on the date of the federal state
electionsonthe27thofMarch.
Unfortunately, Facebook Insights does not allow a correct measuring of the overall
numberofwallpostspostedonapageperday,becausetheprogramdoesnotidentify
wall posts that contain links or pictures. Therefore, it is not possible to provide
comparativediagramsasfortheotherparameters.
30
Figure7:Thedevelopmentofpagemembers,dailyactivemembers,dailycommentsanddaily“Likes”onthepages“KEINStuttgart21”and“FürStuttgart21”fromthe1stofSeptember2010tothebeginningofApril2011.
31
The presented diagrams resemble each other strongly, but there are yet some
remarkabledifferencesconcerningthepageusage.Eventhoughthepage“FürStuttgart
21”was continually up in pagemembers, the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” has a slightly
higheraverageofactivemembers(KEINStuttgart21:28077;FürStuttgart21:27717).
Theaveragenumbersofdailycommentsand“likes”areremarkablyhigheronthepage
“KEINStuttgart21”33.
Asignificantdifferenceisalsoobviousinthedemographicconstitutionofthepages.The
page“FürStuttgart21”hasmoremalemembersandisgenerallyyoungercomparedto
theother group.On thepage “KEINStuttgart 21”,womenandmenare almost evenly
represented.Theagestructureof thegroup isslightlyolderthantheoverallFacebook
averageinGermany.Theusersover34yearsareslightlyoverrepresented.30.6%ofthe
pagemembersareolderthan34years,whereasthisagegroupmakesuponly24%34of
GermanFacebookusers(stateApril2011).Eventhoughageplaysnoroleinthegroup
andamongthegroupmembers, theprofilepicturessuggest thatmanypeopleover34
yearsofagetakepartinthepageactivities.
33Averagedaily“Likes”“FürStuttgart21”:1871;Averagedaily“Likes”“KEINStuttgart21”:2341;Averagedailycomments“FürStuttgart21”:1779;Averagedailycomments“KEINStuttgart21”:1952inthetimeframeSeptember2010toApril201134http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook‐statistics/germany[27/05/2011]
32
Figure8:Theagestructureofthegroupsdividedbymaleandfemale.Unknownusersarenotincluded.State:18thofMarch2011,n=136002;n=97783.
6.2ThematicAnalysis
Tounderstandthediscoursesonthewallsofthepages,theweekofthedatacollection
hastobeputintothecontextoftheeventsthathappenedduringandbeforethatdate.
Therewereseveraleventsthatinfluencedthediscussionsoftheweekstrikingly.Firstof
all, the federal electionswere approaching, forwhich the Stuttgart 21‐opponents had
highhopes.Secondly,thecatastrophearoundthenuclearpowerplant‘Fukushima’that
occurredaftertheearthquakeandtsunamiinJapanonMarch11thwasheavilydiscussed
during that week. Thirdly, on the weekend before the data collection, the federal
electionsinthestate‘Saxony‐Anhalt’hadtakenplace.
The events around Fukushima influenced the German energy policy strongly. After
extending the life‐span of nuclear energy in Germany in autumn, the government
announced amoratoriumof the extension and shut down sevenof the oldest nuclear
powerplants immediatelyafter the incident in Japan, twoof them in thestateBaden‐
Württemberg.Thiswasrelevant for the federalstateelections inBaden‐Württemberg.
Not only has the biggest opposition party Die Grünen always been against the use of
nuclearpower,StefanMappus,headofthefederalstategovernment(“Ministerpräsident
of Baden‐Württemberg”), has always greatly supported nuclear energy and played an
important role in theextensionof theuseofnuclearpower.Theevents inFukushima
and the u‐turn in energy politics by Chancellor Angela Merkel and the federal
governmenthithimrightduringtheelectioncampaign35.Politicalcommentatorsagreed
after the elections that the energy policy was the main topic that had cost him the
electionsandleadtothefirst“green”MinisterpräsidentinGermany.Thisisbackedbya
study of Infratest dimap and ARD, which states that 45% of the voters declared
environmental‐andenergypolicyasthemostimportanttopicintheelections36.Inthe
electionsonthe27thofMarch,DieGrünenreceived24,2%ofthevotesandcamesecond
afterMappus’ CDU (39%) followed by SPD (23,1%) and FDP (5,3%). Grüne and SPD
were thus able to forma coalition so that, now for the first time in thehistoryof the
state,theCDUisnotinpower.
35http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/baden‐wuerttemberg‐stefan‐mappus‐im‐interview‐diese‐bilder‐waren‐ganz‐schrecklich‐1.1076956[27/05/2011]36http://stat.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2011‐03‐27‐LT‐DE‐BW/umfrage‐aktuellethemen.shtml[27/05/2011]
33
The federal state elections in Saxony‐Anhalt played a subordinated role on the pages
duringthatweekeventhoughtheyhadtakenplaceontheweekendrightbeforethedata
collection.Only6of500wallpostsdealtwiththistopic.
Concerningtheactualconflictaboutthestation,ademonstrationwithbetween18000
(official number by the police) and 60 000 (number published by the organisers)
participants tookplaceon theSaturdaybefore thedata collection.Thedemonstration
was also officially directed against nuclear power. On Monday, the 20th, the alliance
againstStuttgart21gaveacollectionof35000signaturesforareferendumtothecity
mayor.Asimilarpetitionhadbeendeniedbefore.
6.2.1TopicsonthePages
ThemostimportanttopicsthatwereaddressedinthewallpostswereStuttgart21,the
upcoming federalstateelectionsaswellas thedebateabout theuseofnuclearpower
andenergypolicy ingeneral.BothStuttgart21andenergypolicywerecrucial for the
federal state elections, however, according to the coding, a wall post addressed the
electionsonlyincaseitdealtexplicitlywiththeeventsuchasforinstanceendorsinga
party,pointing toelectioncampaignevents, commentingon theelectioncampaigning,
commenting on opinion polls for the election or postingmedia commentaries on the
upcomingelections.
Comparingthetwopages,itisstrikingthatthepage“FürStuttgart21”wasmoreissue‐
centred,whereasthepage“KEINStuttgart21”showedabiggervarietyoftopics.Inthe
descriptionof thepage “FürStuttgart21”, theadministrators state thatposts thatare
notrelatedtoS21mightbedeleted.Thepage“KEINStuttgart21”doesnothavesucha
restriction.Energypolicywashighlydiscussedonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”witha
clearbiasagainsttheuseofnuclearpower,whereasthetopicplayedaminorroleonthe
otherpage.33of250wallpostsonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”addressedthenuclear
power debate,while for instance pointing to protest events against nuclear power (7
posts)ordiscussingtheenergypolicyofthefederalstategovernment(12posts).
Bothpagesaddressedthecurrentfederalstategovernment(whichwasatthattimestill
a coalition of CDUandFDP) in severalwall posts bymeans of criticismon the “KEIN
Stuttgart21”‐pageandgeneralstatementsto“keepupthegoodwork”onthepage“Für
Stuttgart21”.Facebookwasaddressedsurprisinglyofteneitherinself‐referencetothe
group for example by commenting on the number of pagemembers or links to other
Facebookpages.
34
Both pages had some posts that featured general political positions and were not
explicitly linkedtoStuttgart21oranyotherpolitical issue.Onthepage“FürStuttgart
21”, 10 posts discredited the party Die Grünen on a general level, whereas the other
group featured criticism of party politics in general (4 posts) as well as of elites (2
posts).
Figure9:Thetopicsaddressedonthepage“FürStuttgart21”in%.n=250.
DebateaboutNuclearPower
1%
FederalGovernment
2%Facebook8%
FederalElectionsBW25%
FederalElectionsSA1%
Stuttgart2153%
GeneralPoliticalPositions5%
CityStuttgart2%
Other3%
Topics"FürStuttgart21"in%
DebateaboutNuclearPower
13% FederalStateGovernment
4%Facebook5%
FederalStateElections/BW
28%
FederalElections/SA
1%
Stuttgart2141%
GeneralPoliticalPositions4%
CityStuttgart1%
Other3%
Topics"KEINStuttgart21"in%
35
Figure10:Thetopicsaddressedonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”in%.n=250.
6.2.2TheDiscussionofStuttgart21
The actual issue Stuttgart 21 was of course the main topic on both pages. While
analysingthepoststhatdealtwiththeconflictaroundthecentralstation,thefocuswas
particularly on whether or not people used concrete arguments that advocated the
buildingofthestationorthatdismissedit.Stuttgart21andtheprotestaroundthetopic
werediscussedverydifferentlyonthetwopagesthis iswhydifferentcategorieswere
chosen.Thefollowingfigures11and12canthusnotbecomparedtoeachother.
Onbothpages,38%of theposts thataddressedStuttgart21containedargumentation
fororagainstthestationordiscusseddetailedquestionsabouttheprojectsuchas,for
instance,theinclinationofrailwaytracks,legalaspectsofareferendumorquestionsof
project funding.Theprotestmovementwasalsoamatterofdiscussiononbothpages.
Onethirdofallpostsonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”informedabout,commentedonor
mobilisedforprotestactivitiesthattookplaceduringthattime.Ontheotherpage,the
protestactivitieswerealsoheavilydiscussed.However,thepagemembersdidnotonly
debate about the activities of the protest movement, but also about the protest
movement as such, themanners of itsmembers and how the protest presented itself
publicly.Thosepostswerebiasedanddiscreditedtheprotestmovement,forinstance,as
undemocratic,subversiveandterrifying.
Sevenofthe250postsonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”andtwoofthepostsonthepage
“Für Stuttgart 21” quoted posts from the other page. Those posts received a lot of
feedbackonbothpages. The9posts received in average14,1 commentswhereas the
overallaverageofcommentstoawallpostwas3,9onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”and
6,9onthepage“FürStuttgart21”.
Interestingly, 8% of the 250 posts on the page “Für Stuttgart 21” featured criticism
towards the media coverage of the conflict especially directed against the largest
regional newspaper Stuttgarter Zeitung. Most of these posts claimed that Stuttgarter
Zeitunghadabias towardstheprojectcritics.However, thenewspaperwassubject to
criticismevenonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”.
36
Figure11:ThediscussionoftheissueStuttgart21onthepage“FürStuttgart21”dividedbytopicin%.n=133.
Figure12:ThediscussionoftheissueStuttgart21onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”dividedbytopicin%.n=102.
ProtestActivities9%
BehaviourProtest
Movement16%
Solidarity7%
EventNote4%
DiscreditingActors5%
MediaCriticism8%
Other12% Argumentsfor/
InformationtoS213%
QuestionsofDetail17%
ArgumentsagainstS21/Confrontation
11%
OfzicialStatements8%
Arguments38%
TopicsStuttgart21in%Für
ProtestActivities33%
Confrontation8%
MediaCommentary
3%
Other8%
EventNote6%
30.09.3%
ArgumentsagainstS2110%
QuestionsofDetail18%RequestofInformation
3%OfzicialStatements
8%
Arguments38%
TopicsStuttgart21in%KEIN
37
6.2.3Likes,Comments,Links
During the time of the data collection, more posts were written on the page “KEIN
Stuttgart 21”. However, the posts on the page “Für Stuttgart 21” received more
commentariesonaverage.78postsofthe250onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”received
nocommentsatall,whereasontheotherpagethisappliedonlyto38posts.Intermsof
‘likes’therewasnodifferencebetweenthepages.Allpostsreceivedaround6,5likeson
average. It is hard to identify any correlation between the comments and the topics
addressed, only that wall posts which were self‐referential to the Facebook page
receivedlesscommentsonaverage.
Therewasahugedifferencebetweenthepages in termsof including links in thewall
posts.Almost two thirdsofallwallpostson thepage “KEINStuttgart21”containeda
linktoanexternalwebsite.Often,thesamelinkswerepostedatdifferenttimesjustto
keep the stream updated. The page can thus almost be described as a publishing
platform.Themostcommondomainthatreceived links fromthepage“KEINStuttgart
21” was www.facebook.com followed by www.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de,
www.youtube.com and www.stuttgarter‐nachrichten.de. Other popular media outlets
suchaswww.stern.deorwww.spiegel.dereceivedseverallinksaswell.Theremainder
of the links split up on minor news websites as well as websites from the protest
network (among those most prominently the website www.bei‐abriss‐aufstand.de,
whichreceivedsixlinks).Incomparison,only67postsofthe250analysedwallpostson
thepage“FürStuttgart21”containedalink.
Figure13:Theuseoflinkinginwallpostsonthetwopagesin%.n=250each.
Tosummarizethispart,threeinterestingpointshavetobestated:Firstly,thewallposts
featured awide variety of topics, especially in the group against Stuttgart 21. This is
partlyamirroroftheprotestmovementingeneral,whichcanratherbedescribedasa
politicalmovement thanan issuenetwork.On the topicStuttgart21, it isstriking that
38
thepage“KEINStuttgart21”isratherself‐referential,whereasthegroup“FürStuttgart
21”refersverymuchtotheprotestmovementanditsactivities,butconsideringthatthe
allianceinsupportofStuttgart21wasfoundedinreactiontotheprotestmovement,this
maynotcomeasasurprise.Inotherwords:Thepagewouldprobablynotexist,ifthere
wasnotacountermovement.
Secondly, it is interestingthatthepage“KEINStuttgart21”receivedmoreposts inthe
timeof thedatacollection,however thepostson thepage “FürStuttgart21” received
morecommentsonaverage.Finally,thehighnumberoflinkspostedonthepage“KEIN
Stuttgart21”isremarkable,whencomparingthetwopages.
6.3ReciprocityandContestation
Oneof the researchaimswas to findout towhatextent contradictoryargumentsand
opinionswerediscussedonthetwopagesandhowthepagesdealtwitheachother.
6.3.1Architecture
The “Info”‐Tabs of the two pages both link only to biased websites such as
www.kopfbahnhof‐21.de,www.parkschuetzer.de,www.stuttgarterappell.deonthepage
“KEIN Stuttgart 21” or www.fuerstuttgart21.de, www.prostuttgart‐21.de and
www.stuttgart21‐kommt.deonthepage“FürStuttgart21”.Therearenolinkstoneutral
orcontradictorywebsites.Contradictoryopinionscanthusonlybeexpressedeitherasa
wallpost,acommentarytoawallpostoradiscussionpostonthediscussionboard.
Thepage“KEINStuttgart21”statesinthesection‘CompanyOverview37’thatthepageis
ameetingplace foreveryonewho is against Stuttgart21.Thepage “FürStuttgart21”
statesthatthepageshouldprovideaconstructiveatmosphereofdialogueonthebasis
ofsupportingStuttgart21.Thedesignofthepagesisthustocaterforacommunityof
like‐minded people rather than discussing the issue from different perspectives.
However, both administrators stated in their e‐mails that there is still a dialogue
betweensupportersandcriticsoneachpage.
6.3.2Arguments
Thediscussed issues on the twopageswere very similar and often links to the same
newspaper articles were posted. However, the discussion and commentaries to the
issueswereofcoursecompletelyopposing.Thecollectionofsignaturesthatwashanded
37ThesectionisnamedbyFacebook.Obviously,thepagesdonotbelongtoanycompany.
39
tothecitymayorofStuttgartonMonday, the21stofMarch,waspostedanddiscussed
severaltimesonbothwalls.Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,thiswasseenasasymbolic
event that showed the broad criticism against the project among the citizens of
Stuttgart, whereas on the other page, the event was mainly discussed under legal
aspects accusing the alliance against Stuttgart 21 to raise expectations with the
referendum,whichcouldneverbefulfilled.
On the same day, Die Grünen released their own stress test of the new station plans
stating that the capacity of the new station would be insufficient. The study was
discussed on both pages from completely different points of view. On the page “Für
Stuttgart 21”, the commentaries pointed to a lack of competence on the side of Die
Grünen and discredited the study as an obviousmanoeuvre in the election campaign
(“DurchsichtigesWahlkampfmanöver”).Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,thestudywas
seenasanewargumentagainsttheconstructionofthestation.
Thisshowsthatbothpageswereindeedwell‐informedabouttheargumentsoftheother
partyandeven talkedabout it.However, thediscussionwasone‐sidedandadvocated
mostlyoneopiniononly.Especiallythepage“FürStuttgart21”wasverymuchoriented
towards the activists and in particular their behaviour and the supposedly aggressive
appearanceoftheprotestmovementingeneral.Somemembersofbothpagesseemedto
followtheotherpageaspassivereadersandreferredtotheotherpagewith“overthere”
(“drüben”). Among the sample of the quantitative analysis, 6 wall posts on the page
“KEIN Stuttgart 21” aswell as 2wall posts on the page “Für Stuttgart 21” picked up
discussions from the other page and sometimes even featured screenshots of the
particularposts.Thecommentariestothesepostswereharshandinonecase,members
of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” even thought of legal steps against amember of the
otherpage.
6.3.3Discussion
Discussionsthatfeaturedopposingargumentswererare,however,theyoccurredfrom
time to time. It seemed that theywouldrather takeplaceon thepage “KEINStuttgart
21”,thatmeansthatmembersoftheotherpagewould‘comeover’toleaveacomment.
OneofthesupportersofStuttgart21wasalreadywell‐knowntothecommunityonthe
page “KEINStuttgart 21” andhis commentsweredealtwith sceptically or sometimes
ironically.Inaprivatemessage,herevealedthatheconsciouslychosetogetincontact
withtheprojectcriticsandthatheunderstoodhisrolenottobeprovoking,butinstead
40
tode‐escalate.Accordingtothepageadministratorsof“KEINStuttgart21”,discussions
betweensupportersandcriticshaveoftenescalatedandendedinverbalbashing.Asa
result, the administrators had developed a netiquette and started banning members
from the page, who behaved inappropriately. According to the administrators, they
enforcedthesenewrulesverystrictlyagainstsupportersofS21.Regardlessofhowpage
membersdealtwithopposingarguments, itwasobviousonbothpages thatmembers
with contradicting opinions were considered not to ‘belong to the group’, but to be
strangers,who‘cameover’fromtheotherpage.
During theobservation, somediscussions couldbe found,whichdid featureopposing
arguments. However, theywere not about the issue Stuttgart 21. In one case, a page
member argued for the energy policy of his favoured party FDP on the page “KEIN
Stuttgart21”andreceivedalotofcriticism.
AnexplanationforthelackofrationaldiscussionabouttheissueS21couldbethetime
ofthestudy.Aftersuchalongdebateaboutthestation,everybodyhadprobablyalready
formedher/hisopinion.Inonewallpost,amemberofthepage“KEINStuttgart21”even
encouragedthepagememberstoignorethesupportersoftheprojectandtoratherturn
tothose,whoarestillundecided.Unliketheexperiencesofthepageadministrators,the
discussions that featured opposing arguments were less insulting towards the
counterpartsthansomeoftheotherwallpostsatleastduringthatweek.
Itcanbesummarizedthatbothgroupstalkedabouteachother,butnotreallywitheach
other. There seemed to be many members, who followed both pages, thus, a
controversial discussion seemed to be theoretically possible. However, instead of
commenting on the posts on the page, they took the input to their own page and
discusseditthere,butnotalwaysinarationalorpersuasiveway.
6.4Ideology
6.4.1KEINStuttgart21
Out of the four administrators of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”, one is active for Die
Grünen,onestandsclosetothelocalpoliticalgroupSÖS(ecologicalandsocialStuttgart)
andone ispartof theprotestgroup ‘AktiveParkschützer’,who formsa rather radical
part of the protest movement. Yet, the page was created independently and under a
private initiativeanduntilnowtherehasneverbeenanofficial commissioningby the
alliance against Stuttgart 21 regarding the page. Even though the alliance against
41
Stuttgart 21 consists of political parties andother organisationswith agendas that go
beyond the issue Stuttgart 21, the protest movement has attracted people from all
politicalcampsandoppositiontotheprojecthasbeenfoundinallpoliticalparties,but
mostlyamongmembersofDieGrünenandDieLinke.Accordingtotheadministrators,
left‐liberalandenvironmentalistideasareprevalentonthepage,whichwasprovedfor
instanceby thestrongpositionagainstnuclearpower thatwasexpressedevenbefore
thecatastropheinFukushimaandthebroadsupportofDieGrünen,whendiscussingthe
upcoming federal state elections. In addition, the pagemembers criticised the former
MinisterpräsidentStefanMappusandthefederalstategovernmentstronglyhopingfora
changeofgovernments.4ofthe250analysedwallpostsdiscreditedMappuspersonally.
The ideological consensus along the lines of energy and federal state politics was
evident.
However, therewerewall posts that showed ideological heterogeneity. Especially the
military intervention in Libya was discussed controversially on the page and even
createdanalliancebetweenonesupporterofS21andsomeopponents.Alsointeresting
wasthefactthatthesocialdemocrats(SPD)werecompletelymissinginthediscussions
on the wall. Among the parties who support Stuttgart 21, themembers of the social
democratswerethemostcritical.EveninDecember2010,whentheprojectreachedits
highest acceptance in the opinion polls, still almost 40% of the SPD partisans were
against the project38. However, the only sign of the SPD on the pagewere two other
pagesthatthepagelikes(“SPDlergegenS21”&“SPD‐WählergegenS21”).Eventhough
itcanbeassumedthatvotersoftheSPDweremembersofthepage,theydidnotreveal
theirpartypreference.
6.4.2FürStuttgart21
Accordingtothepageadministrators,thepageisdesignedasaforumabovepartylines
andsupportersofS21canbefoundineverypoliticalparty.Infact,thepageappearedto
be far less ideologically shaped compared to the other one. Thiswas showcased by a
wallpostagainstDieGrünen,whichreceivedmorethan70commentswithinonehour.
Thewallpost featured theheadline “DieGrünen,no thanks!”anddescribed indrastic
rhetoric,why theparty isnotable tobring thecountry forward.The first reply to the
postcamefromthepageadministratorswhoencouragedthepagememberstodoless38InfratestDimaphttp://www.infratest‐dimap.de/umfragen‐analysen/bundeslaender/baden‐wuerttemberg/laendertrend/2010/dezember/[13/04/2011]
42
“party‐bashing” even in times of election campaigning and instead focusmore on the
issue S21. The following comments featured all kinds of positions from “green” S21‐
supporters,whocomplainedaboutthepoliticalexploitationofthepage,overageneral
discussion about environmentalist ideas to posts that agreed with the initial party
criticism. The discussion even developed into a debate about nuclear power and
revealed controversial positions there. After a while, the administrators emphasised
againthattheydonotwantanypartypoliticsonthepage.Thisisonlyoneexamplethat
showed ideological ambiguities. Other wall posts exposed discontent with
MinisterpräsidentMappusorthegoverningparties.
However,therewasstillanoverallbiasagainstDieGrünenwhichwasjustnotasstrong
asthesupportofDieGrünenontheotherpage.Astrongconsensusexistedconcerning
the image of the protest movement that was pictured as undemocratic, hostile and
dangerous, aswell as concerning the importance of the economic strength of Baden‐
Württemberg.Moreover,membersexpressedprideintheirfederalstateandshoweda
highdegreeoflocalpatriotism.Interestingly,thepagedisplayedaharshmediacritique
mainlydirectedagainstStuttgarterZeitungpresumingbiasedconflictcoverageaswell
asaninfiltrationbytheprojectcritics.
6.4.3Rhetoric
Inclusion and exclusion from the pages could be retraced by the accusations and
nicknamesthatthemembersofthepageshadfortheopposinggroups.Especiallyonthe
page“FürStuttgart21”, themembersoftheprotestmovementwerecalledveryharsh
names.Oneexpressionthatappearedtoberatherstandard,whenspeakingofmembers
of the protest movement was “Keintologen” – a blend of the words “Kein” (KEIN
Stuttgart 21) and “scientology” as an ironic reference to the naïve faith the protest
movement put into the protest. Die Grünen as well as Die Linke were called
“communists”severaltimesandwereaccusedofmaking“propaganda”(atermthathas
a strong negative connotation in German) aswell as of “agitating” (“hetzen”). On the
other hand, Die Grünen were described as romantic dreamers, who “want to trade
economicstrengthforbonfireromantic”.Inonecase,someonenamedDieGrünen“left‐
fascists”,butthepersonremainedisolated.
Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,especiallyStefanMappuswasthetargetofname‐giving
and it couldbe consideredas standardnot to call himbyhisname,butbyoneofhis
nicknames, for instance “fatso” (“Fettsack”), “beet face” (“Steckrübengesicht”) or “Don
43
Mappioso”,areferencetothecommonaccusationonthepageofhimactingonthevery
edgeofdemocraticlegitimation.Therewerenoparticularnamesforthemembersofthe
supporter page and they were most often referred to as “Pro’ler”. However, some
pointedtoa“hatecampaign”ontheotherpageandinanotherpost,usersmadefunof
anexaggeratedfearthattheotherpagedisplayedtowardstheprotestmovement.
6.5RationalityandDiscussionStyle
According to Habermas’ Communicative Rationality, the exchange of arguments and
counter‐arguments is themost promisingway of coming to a consensus and rational
decision‐making (Mouffe, 1999, 6). The discourse analysis at hand looks at how
arguments were used in the discussions on the walls and if the discussions strove
towardsaconsensus.
Arguments for or against Stuttgart 21were generally commonly used on both pages.
Amongallposts thatdealtwith the issueStuttgart21,38%of thepostsoneachpage
containedargumentsfororagainsttheprojectorexpressedfactualarguing,whichcould
alsobeinformationontheprojectingeneral.Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,onelink
was shared several times which led to a speech by one of the actors in the alliance
against S21, inwhichhe recites 60 lies about Stuttgart 21. The linkwas often shared
with thecomment touse it inorder toconvincepeople to join theprotestmovement.
Several times users requested information on the protest or particular questions
concerning the project. Themembers on both pages reacted quite critically to flawed
conclusions. In one case, a member of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” stated that the
radioactivity measured in the south of Germany was slightly raised. He received the
criticismthatthiswasaninappropriatecommentandhadbynomeansanyconnection
totheFukushima‐catastrophe.
Asmentioned,discussionsthatexchangedargumentsandcounterargumentswererare.
When they did take place, these kinds of discussion often escalated according to the
administratorsofthepage,whostatedthatafactualexchangetookonlyplacein25%of
the cases.This ratewashigherduring theethnographyandmostof the contributions
stillreceivedatleastoneseriousreply.Infact,thediscussionsseemedtobemorefact‐
based,whenacounter‐positionwasinvolved.
The reaction to counter‐arguments depended verymuch on the rhetoric used. In one
case,auseraskedthegroup“KEINStuttgart21”inawallpost“whattheirproblemis?”
and stated that there were, in his opinion, far more important issues than a central
44
station insomecity.This comment triggereda stormofoutrageabouthisunqualified
commentandonlywhenheclarifiedthathewasactuallyinterestedin“theirproblem”,
he received some factual arguments against the station.One of the users on the page
“KEINStuttgart21”,whowasknownforhisopposingposition,mentionedinaprivate
message that he consciously triednot to formulate his comments in away that could
causepersonalaffront.However,hisprofileseemedtobeafakeprofilenotfeaturingany
personalinformationatall,atypicalcharacteristicof‘trolls’.
6.5.1Flaming&TrollingFlaming took place on both pages, but it was notmainly directed against other page
members, but against politicians or actors andmembers of the protestmovement in
general. In the description of the page “Für Stuttgart 21”, it says that the page is not
meant to be a place of agitation against the other group. However, the rhetoric was
oftentimesratherrough.TherewereseveralreferencestoNazi‐GermanyandtheThird
Reich between the lines of the posts,whichwould start for instancewith statements
such as “therewas another time inGermany,whenpeople just followed their leaders
without reasoning…”. Inonecase,amemberof thepage “FürStuttgart21”pointed to
thelinguisticsimilarityofthenames“Gangolf”and“Adolf”referringtoGangolfStocker,
oneoftheprotestleaders.Postslikethatalsoappearedontheotherpage.Inonecase,a
memberreferredtoMappusasabaton‐nazi(“Schlagstocknazi”).Thoseposts,however,
remained isolated and in one case, a user complained about this rhetoric. Generally,
peoplewereawareofthe languagethatshouldbeusedandifusersbroketheserules,
other users reprimanded them. Considering the extreme polarisation of the conflict,
flamingdid,overall,nothappenallthatoften.
Herringetal.(2002,372)definetrollingasacontributioninaforumthat“entailsluring
othersintopointlessandtime‐consumingdiscussions”.AccordingtoHerringetal.,trolls
aimattriggeringahighamountofresponsesbypostinganincorrect,butnotnecessarily
controversial, message. Generally trolls are more common on Internet discussion
boards,wheretheytakeadvantageoftheiranonymity.Becauseofthelackofanonymity,
trollsarenotcommononSNS.
Both pages tended to discreditwall postswith opposing opinions as trolling and the
mentioned S21‐supporter on the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”was called a “professional
troll”byoneofthepagemembers.However,duringtheethnography,nowallpostcould
beidentifiedasobvioustrollingaccordingtothedefinitionbyHerringetal.
45
6.6ContextualisationwiththeWholeMovement
Eventhoughtherehasneverbeenanofficialcommissioning, theadministratorsof the
group“KEINStuttgart21”thinkofthepageastheofficialprotestpage.Accordingtothe
administrators, the alliance against Stuttgart 21 underestimated SNS as a marketing
instrument,sotheadministratorsfilledthisgapinaprivateinitiative.
TheFacebook page, in cooperationwith the alliance against S21, organised the “KEIN
Stuttgart21”‐dayonthe5thofMarch.Theeventfollowedtheleadofthe“No‐Berlusconi‐
Day”,aFacebook‐eventinItaly,andfeaturedmassralliesinalmostallofthe70electoral
districts of Baden‐Württemberg on the same day. For that reason, the page
administratorsworkedtogetherwiththeallianceandotherprotestgroups.
The page organised several offline‐meetings before demonstrations that attracted
between 20 to 120 page members. The page administrators stated also that page
membersgotincontactwitheachotherthroughthepageandmetoffline.Severalwall
posts on both pages during the ethnography suggested such offline‐meetings. In one
case,amemberofthepage“FürStuttgart21”proposedameetingofthepagemembers
after the federal state elections in order to “get to know the people behind the Fb‐
profiles”anditwasalsocommontoinvitepeopletopartyeventsorprotestactivities.
The relation of the page “Für Stuttgart 21”with the alliance for S21 did not become
sufficientlyclearinthisstudy.Eventhoughthepressofficeroftheallianceseemedtobe
responsible for the page, the administrators stated that it is not formally intertwined
withthealliance.
7.Discussion
Theresultsprovideabroadpictureof the twopages,whichshowgreatsimilarities in
certain aspects aswell as essential differences. In this chapter, Iwant to sharpen this
picture, while relating the pages to the theoretical dimension of the paper that is
Freelon’smodelofonlinepoliticaldiscussionaswellastheconceptofthepublicsphere.
7.1PublicIssueFocusOne of the key variables in public sphere theory is the public issue focus. Since both
pagesdealwiththepublicissueStuttgart21,bothpagesclearlyfocusontopicsofpublic
concern. The amount of links tomedia articles accounts for a general dependence on
publicdiscoursesrelatedtothetopic. Infact, theactivityonthepagescorrelatedeven
46
withthemediadiscourseaboutthetopicS21(seefigure7).80ofthe163linksposted
on thepage “KEINStuttgart21” referred tomediaservicessuchasnewspapersorTV
andradiobroadcasters.Interestingly,thevarietyofpublicissuesappearedtobemuch
broadercomparedtotheotherpage.
There is no obvious reason for discussing topics other than S21 on a page that is
dedicatedtoS21.However,suchdiscussionsseemedtobeverynormaland,unlikeon
the page “Für Stuttgart 21”, members did not complain about ‘off‐topic’ wall posts.
Remarkable, though, is the fact that themembersmainly discussed those topics that
featured a fairly strong consensus of opinion among the members of the page. Even
though themilitary intervention in Libya and thedevelopments in thenuclear power
plantFukushimasharedaboutthesameamountofattentioninthemainstreammedia,
theinterventioninLibyadidnotplayanyroleinthepagediscussions.Thatcouldpoint
toageneraltendencytoavoidprovocativewallposts.
Thesamecouldbethereasonforthesmallervarietyoftopicsonthepage“FürStuttgart
21”. If a simple wall post about Die Grünen creates a controversial discussion, it is
unlikelytofindconsensusregardinganyotherideologicallyshapedtopic.
7.2IdeologicalHomophilyThisleadstothequestiontowhatextentthetwogroupscountasideologicalentities–
or ‘enclaves’ (Sunstein, 2001) – after all. The discourses on the pages that were not
related to S21wereover all consensual. Controversial topicswere rare.However, the
ideologicalshapeofthepage“FürStuttgart21”wasblurryincomparisontotheother
group.Uptothefederalstateelections,themainconsensuswasthesupportofS21and
the disagreement with the protest movement. After the elections, it seemed that the
group became more political in terms of an overall identification with conservative
politics,industrial‐nearpoliciesandtheoppositiontothenewcoalition.
The page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” displayed a higher degree of ideological homogeneity,
whichgoesalongwiththecharacteristicoftheprotestmovementthathasalwaysalso
been a protest against the political style of the right‐wing federal state government.
Topics such as energy policies showed a high identification with “green” topics and
politics.
WhenitcomestotheissueS21,theideologicalhomophilyisremarkableonbothpages.
Thatisalreadypartlyimpliedbythenamesofthepagesincombinationwiththeactof
‘liking’apageinordertobecomeamember.However,itisstrikingthatthepageskeep
47
co‐existingwithoutactuallyinteractingwitheachother.UnlikethefindingsofKellyetal.
(2005), who found out that the strongest conversational links in USENET‐groups are
acrosspoliticaldivides,themembersoftheFacebookpagesdonottaketheopportunity
toactivelytakepartinthediscussionsontheotherpageandaccordingbehaviourwas
sometimesevendisregardedastrolling.
7.3DeliberativeIndicatorsEventhoughbothpagesdisplaypublicissuefocusandaconsiderablenumberoffactual
discussions,thelackofopposingargumentsoneachpagemakesithardtodefineanyof
thepagesasdeliberative.Itisstrikingthatthetwocampstalkonlyabouteachotherand
not with each other on their Facebook pages. The pages provide no opportunity for
opinion‐making, but request a biased opinion and identification with the
protest/supportermovementinordertotakeactivelypartinthediscussions.Itishard
tosayifthescepticismtowardsthemembersoftheotherpageisaresultoforareason
for the lack of interaction with each other. According to Mendelberg (2002, 157),
“discussion between antagonistic groups can play an important role in reducing
intergroupconflictandbias”.TheFacebookpagesdonotprovidethisfunctionandare
generallynot interested innegotiatingbetweenthetwocamps,butonly insupporting
oneofit.Itiscrucialthatthemembersofthepagesarestrivingforcognitiveconsonance
andthereisatendencyof“filteringout”(Lev‐Ov&Manin,2009,107)opposingviewsby
nottakingthemseriouslyordiscreditingthemrightaway.
However,thesimultaneityofthewallstreamsonbothpagesincreasestheprobabilityof
accessingopposingarguments.Theopposingviewsareoftenonlyoneclickaway.Unlike
researchon ideologicallyhomogenousblogclusters(Lev‐On&Manin,2009,112f), the
linksonthetwopagesprovideaheterogeneoushyperlinkedspacethataimsatkeeping
thepagemembersup todaterather thanadvocatingcertainviews.Especially links to
thesamenewspaperarticlesleadtoclosenesstoopposingviews.Mutz&Martin(2001,
95) point out “that individuals are exposed to farmore dissimilar political views via
newsmediathanthroughinterpersonalpoliticaldiscussants”.However,inthiscase,itis
ratherinterpersonaldiscussiononnewsmediawebsites,whichservethispurpose.
48
One example: An article fromStuttgarter Zeitung39 thatwas simultaneously linked on
bothpagesreceived244commentariesinthecommentarysectiononthenewspaper’s
website. The commentary section featured a highly factual discussion with opposing
views and arguments that went on for over a whole week. It is not said that the
discussantson thenewspaper’swebsite came from theFacebook pages,however, this
merepieceofonlinedeliberationwasaccessiblefrombothpageswithinonlyoneclick.
Many other newspaper articles concerning the issue received high amounts of
commentariesthatfeaturedopposingviews.
This shows that there is a general will to discuss the topic online in a controversial
setting, however, the Facebook pages are not able to provide this opportunity. The
assumed bias on the pages forbids an equal and undominated discussion that is,
according toHabermas’discourseethics,crucial forrational‐criticaldiscourses(Blaug,
1999,11).Thepages seem tobe,whatFraser calls “paralleldiscursivearenas” (1990,
67)thatcollect,gatherandcomfortcertainargumentationsandessentialviews.
Inter‐ideological reciprocity and inter‐ideological questioning is, according to Freelon
(2010),crucialfordeliberativeonlinediscussion.Concludingfromtheanalysisandthe
discussion so far, this is not prominent on the pages, especiallywhenwe (as Freelon
demands) exclude flaming and insulting posts. More interesting here is the aspect of
contestation. Fraser (1990), Papacharissi (2002) and Dahlberg (2007) emphasise the
democraticpotentialofcontestationandconflictratherthanconsensus.Thediscussions
thatactuallyincludedopposingviewscanbereadunderthisaspect.Participantswere
morelikelytopointoutdifferencesbetweentheviewsthanstrivingtoacompromiseor
even consensus. The page members created very obvious ‘we‐them dichotomies’.
Especially on the page “Für Stuttgart 21”, themembers put emphasise on distancing
themselves from the protest movement and to create a stereotypical picture of the
movement for instance by ascribing personality traits to the movement or inventing
nicknamessuchas“Keintologen”.Eventhoughflamingoccurrednotasfrequentlyasone
might expect (surely also due to a lack of interaction in general), name‐calling and
cynicismwasacommonwaytosetone’sowngroupapart fromtheother.Bothpages
showedastrongdogmatism.
39http://www.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de/inhalt.studie‐der‐gruenen‐stuttgart‐21‐bei‐stresstest‐durchgefallen.f49cbb98‐900c‐4a4a‐a5f3‐f093555b50dc.html[26/04/2011]
49
7.4CommunitarianIndicatorsIt is certainly no surprise that the pages have strong communitarian characteristics.
Simply the fact that there are two pages on Facebook suggests the hypothesis of
opposinggroupsoflike‐minded.Theideologicalhomophily,thelackofopposingviews
and aspects of group identification display very closed interest groups that have an
undeliberative self‐understanding. These results are in line with former research on
virtualcommunities for instancepresentedbySunstein(2001). Identificationwiththe
aims of the groups is the entrance ticket to participation and more important than
recruiting undecidedmembers or convincing peoplewith opposing views. The group
identitycreatesawarm,homelyatmosphereandcloserelationshipsbetweenthepage
membersthatisonlyoccasionallydisturbedby“outsiders”withopposingviews.Lev‐On
& Manin (2009, 111) consider this characteristic as typical for virtual communities,
“wheremembersareawareoftheircommongroupmembershipbutmaybeotherwise
anonymoustooneanother”.
However,therearesomedifferencesbetweenthetwopages.Thepage“KEINStuttgart
21”canbedescribedasmorecommunitarian.Ontheonehand,thepagemembersshow
ahigherideologicalhomogeneity,whichmanifestsitselfintherangeofdiscussedtopics
aswellasthepoliticalpartyorientation.Ontheotherhand,thepageisusedtomobilise
people to take part in demonstrations and other events (and even organising events
themselvessuchasthe“KEINStuttgart21”‐dayinMarch).Inrelationtotheotherpage,
italsoappearstobemuchmoreaim‐oriented,whichisnosurpriseconsideringthatthe
protestmovementaimsatgettingridoftheplannedstation,whereasthesupportersdo
notparticularlyaimatanything,butratherwanttoexpresstheirsupport.
Thisfavoursthehypothesisthateventhoughthepage“FürStuttgart21”hasabroader
memberbase,theotherpagefeaturesadensernetworkandstrongersustainability.The
hypothesis isbackedbytheusagedataof thepagethatshowsahigheractivityonthe
page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”, despite a smaller member base. According to Ronfeldt &
Arquilla(2001,324citedinPickard,2006),anetwork“issustainedbyawinningstory
and a well‐defined doctrine, and in which all this is layered atop advanced
communication systemsand restson strongpersonal and social ties at thebase”.The
denselocalofflinestructureofthemovementandthepublicmanifestationoftheprotest
through demonstrations and camps in the park around Stuttgart castle makes the
50
networkmoretangibleandpointstopublic‐privatedichotomiesinthedescriptionofthe
protest.
7.5LiberalIndicatorsEventhoughtheprotest/supportermovementwasnotpartoftheanalysisassuch,itis
necessary to put the Facebook pages into the context of the whole movement.
Consideringthatthesupportingcitizenswerefarlesspublic/visibleduringmostofthe
conflict(theofficialactorsofcoursewere),theFacebookpage“FürStuttgart21”fulfilsa
slightlydifferentfunctionthatseemstoaimmoreatlegitimatingratherthanadvocating.
In fact, theformerfederalstateministerMappusmentionedthegroupinan interview
withthenewsmagazineFocusinSeptember2010asanindicatorfortheacceptanceof
the project40. The privateness of the supporters points to Papacharissi’s (2010)
description of networked activism. Facebook offers the opportunity for supporters to
expresstheiropinioninaprivateorsemi‐publicenvironment,withouthavingtojoinan
institutionalisednetworkor toprotest in the streets.This applies evenmore to those
pagemembers,whojoinedthepage,buthavenotactivelytakenpartindiscussions.
Missingideologicalpreconditionsandaclearissuefocuslowertheentrancebarriersto
thegroup,anobservation,thatisaccordingtoBennett(2003),typicalforpost‐modern
protestmovements.Hepointsoutthatthe“sentimentof ‘anti‐ism’isstrong”,however,
“’ideology’ here functions more at the level of a shared normative perspectives on
particularissues”.BeingawareofthefactthatthetwoFacebookpagesdonotrepresent
the two movements in their sum, I argue that the page “Für Stuttgart 21” can be
attributed with rather individualistic characteristics and that the barriers to join the
page are lower considering that there are only two crucial positions necessary: the
supportofS21andprotestagainsttheprotest.Thiscouldprovideanexplanationforthe
highernumberofpagemembers.
To summarize this part, it can be stated that even though both pages are focused on
public issues, none of the pages can be described as deliberative due to the lack of
reciprocity. Both of the pages are clearly communitarian, whereas the page “KEIN
Stuttgart 21” represents a denser communitydue to thehigher amount of ideological
homogeneity and a higher degree ofmobilisation and general will to physical action.
40http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/focus‐interview‐mappus‐warnt‐vor‐gewaltbereiten‐stuttgart‐21‐demonstranten_aid_555698.html[29/04/2011]
51
Facebook and especially the pages‐function allows for identity politics (Papacharissi,
2010) or lifestyle politics (Bennett, 2003) due to the easy way of expressing one’s
politicalstatement.Thisiscertainlythecaseonbothofthepages,whereasthepage“Für
Stuttgart21”featuresahigherdegreeofindividualisminthesenseofFreelon’sliberal‐
individualistic model due to weaker ideological preconditions and a stronger issue
focus.
7.6TheDigitalPublicSphereinaRadicalDemocracyThedescriptionofthetwopagesbacksthefragmentationhypothesis.Eventhoughboth
pages dealwith public issues, they build up small interest groups that lack cohesion.
However, the question remains towhat extent this affects thepublic sphere andhow
thispicturecanbeintegratedinpublicspheretheory.
Oneofthemainfearsofthefragmentationpessimistsisthatsocietylosesthecommon
ground to decide on political topics. The analysis shows that the common ground is
prominentlygivenintheexaminedcase.Bothpagesmonitorthemediaenvironmentof
thetopicandreviewmediacommentarycarefully.UnlikethefearofSunsteinorLev‐On
&Manin, themainstreammediaserveasan importantreferenceandensurethatboth
campsknowabouttheargumentsthatexistintheelitediscourse–iftheypromotetheir
ownviewornot.
Theanalysisshowsthatthepageshaveanimportantinformatoryfunction,afactorthat
isnot includedinFreelon’smodel.Askedfortheimportanceofthepageforthewhole
protestmovement,oneoftheadministratorsofthepage“KEINStuttgart21”answered
that the page is the “news ticker of themovement”. In fact, the analysis showed that
especiallyinthisgroup,memberssharedalargenumberoflinksandmonitoredalmost
the complete German media landscape. However, it is not only about information
sharing, but also about reading media commentary together and discussing it in a
communityoflike‐minded.Itis,thus,notthecasethatthepagessealedthemselvesoff
from opposing views. While being aware of the counter‐arguments and movements,
theychoosetokeepthediscussionaboutthemclosedandone‐sided.
OnFacebook,bothpagesbuildsemi‐publicenclaves,however,thatdoesnotmeanthat
themembersofthepageswouldnotbuildacommonpubliconotheronlineoccasions
such as, for instance, the commentary section ofmajor newswebsites. The discussed
example above from Stuttgarter Zeitung shows that discourses can become
52
controversial and two‐sided, when they happen on neutral and public ground. This
interpretation leads toFraser’s (1990,68)perceptionof counterpublics,whichon the
onehandfunctionasabaseofidentificationandgroup‐buildingandontheotherhand
asa“trainingground”forthebiggerdiscourseoutsidethecomfortzone.
Fraser’sanalysisisfocusedonmarginalisedgroups,whomisstheaccessortheabilityto
takepart in themaindiscourse,acharacteristic thatdoesnotapply to theresearched
case.Neither are thegroups ‘resource‐low’, nor cananyof the sidesunequivocallybe
describedasthedominantopinioninthisverycomplexconflict.Whilethemembersof
theprotestmovementmightperceiveof themselvesas themarginalisedcitizens,who
have to fight against political and economical elites, the supportersmight perceive of
themselves as victims of biased media coverage and local campaigning. However,
Downey(2007,117)makesthepointthatcounter‐publicsdonothavetobecomposed
ofsubalterns,but“maypossesscapitalandculturalcapital”.Themainpointisthatthey
lineupforradicalchangetosociety.
What is important here is that two differing groups exist that both share the same
culturalinputanddiscursiveground.Inherworkonanagonisticpublicsphere,Chantal
Mouffe (2005) emphasises the need for confrontation of opposing political views in
order to fight political apathy and support participation. “Consensus is neededon the
institutions that are constitutive of democracy (…), but there will always be
disagreementconcerningthemeaningandmethodsofimplementingthosevalues.Ina
pluralist democracy, such disagreement should be considered legitimate and indeed
welcome” (ibid., 125). The analysed case does very much display such a radical
democratic scenario, especially if we consider the pages not as marginalised group
against a dominant political opinion, but as passionate exponents of citizen opinions.
Dahlgren for instance argues: “Her [Mouffe’s] vision of a pluralistic democracy (…)
emphasizes not only that subject positions change and evolve according to
contingencies, but also that identities in the context of democratic engagement are
rooted in antagonisms with other groups – ever‐shifting we‐they constellations”
(Dahlgren,2007,61).
Mouffe’s and Dahlgren’s positive attitude towards fragmentation evolves from their
wishtoincreasecitizenengagementwithpolitics.Accordingtothem,opposingopinions
cultivate a more emotional and passionate political environment, where people feel
53
eager to make their point and not disencouraged by the rule of the best (and most
rational)argument.Eventhoughitwasnottheaimofthisthesistocoverallthedetails
around the conflict Stuttgart 21, the reader might have got an impression of the
exceptionalityofthiscitizenmovementthatevencoinedthe‘wordoftheyear’in2010
“Wutbürger”(angrycitizen),areferencetoupper‐andmiddle‐classcitizens,whoopenly
express their anger about politics. The conflict on the whole can be described as
extremelyemotionalanditisworthwhilementioningthatthevoterparticipationinthe
federalstateelectionswas13percentagepointshigherthanintheelectionsfiveyears
before.Thedownsideoftheemotionalityoftheconflictisthehighamountofdogmatism
and inability to talk with each other that could be retraced on the Facebook pages.
Moreover,inthegroup“FürStuttgart21”,memberscomplainedaboutadividedcityand
hostileatmosphereinStuttgartthatwasevenreferredtoasa“civilwar”.Itisuptothe
new government now to de‐escalate the conflict and eventually bring together the
opposingfractionsagain.
Thequestion remains,what the role of social networking sites such asFacebook is in
this radicalisation process? The fact is: The protest movement is not dependent on
Facebook. Quite the reverse, the Facebook page was the last measure in the
communicative strategy of the movement. According to the administrators, the main
advantage is that informationonFacebook is fast, easy to consumeandeasy to share.
Especiallythelastpointisthemoststriking.Whilecounter‐publicshaveexistedbefore
theInternet,socialnetworkingsitesmakeitmucheasierforthemtodiffusethroughthe
SocialWeb.Everyonewholikesoneofthepagesautomatically 'recommends’thepage
toher/hiscontacts–ifs/hewantsornot.Socialnetworkingsitesallowthegatheringof
hugepublicswithinafewdays,whichisnotonlyconfirmedbythiscase,butbyarange
of other politically motivated initiatives on Facebook such as the “Virtual ‘March of
Millions’ in Solidarity with Egyptian Protestors” in February 2011 – an event that
gatheredalmostonemillionparticipantswithinashorttime.PoliticalactonFacebookis
evidentintwocontexts:Oneisthe(counter‐)publicoftheinterestgroup,theotherone
istheratherprivatecontextofsocialcontactswhotakenoticeofthepoliticalstatement.
It is thus not possible to explain SNS politics solely with fragmentation theory, nor
should it solely be declared a post‐modern notion of identity politics that misses
collective orientation. Depending on the individualmotivation, the publiceness of the
politicalstatementisscalableandsoisthecommitmenttopoliticalaction.
54
Figure14:ThecontextsofpoliticalstatementonSNS.
Can the pages be described as a digital public sphere in theHabermasian sense?The
answer depends on how important one considers deliberation. Even though
Papacharissi (2010,157ff) recognisespluralistic counterpublics as typical for Internet
activism,sheconcludesthatInternettechnologiesaugmentthenegotiationofpoliticsin
aprivatesphereandactuallyleadawayfromadeliberativepublicsphere.Dahlgrenon
the other hand rates citizen engagement higher than deliberation. Both views are
contestable.Politicaldiscussiononlineis–withorwithoutdeliberation–acontribution
to public negotiation of politics, but what is the point, if it does not lead to any
consensus?
In my opinion however, this case serves very well as an example of a digital public
multispherescenario.Thisisespeciallyduetothefactthattheprotestmovementisnot
an Internetmovement, but an actual physical protest. TheFacebook pages reflect the
protestandfeaturealldefiningcharacteristicsforapublicsphere:Theyarebuiltupof
private citizens, the groups are focused on public issues, they are independent of
economic or political influence and they feature discourse about political topics. Only
the deliberative function and thus the possibility to justify political decisions are not
given,butaswesaw,thisisverywellpossibleinotheronlinecontexts.Thecommentary
functionofnewsmediawebsitesplaysanimportantroleherethathastomyknowledge
been neglected in research so far. The pages do not resemble so much the neutral
coffeehouses,butrathertheclosedpartisanclubsthatHabermas(1990)mentionsinthe
remainderofhisbook.
According to the studied case, the fear of losing the common ground for political
decisionisnotgiven–eveninapolarisedcaseasthepresentedone.Thegroupshighly
relyonmainstreammediaaswellasonofficialactors,andargumentsof theopposing
groupsarewellknown.Thefearofradicalisationisgiven,ifwedecidetobeafraidofit.
If we, like Mouffe and Dahlgren, welcome radicalisation as a development towards
citizen participation and politisation, we should bring the issue to the next level and
55
discusshowpoliticaldecisioncanbeachievedinapolarisedsocietyandwhatrolethe
Internetcanplayinsuch.
8.Conclusion&LimitationsThe analysed case offered a great opportunity to discuss important issues in current
digital public sphere research. It opened the eyes for political qualities of social
networking sites besides deliberation, which should also be incorporated in public
spheretheory.
SNSpoliticsfeaturetheambiguityofbeingbothprivate,egocentricpoliticalstatements
as well as public negotiation of politics. The two analysed Facebook pages can be
described as counterpublics and discussed under radical democratic aspects. At the
sametime,joiningapagecanbedescribedasidentitypolitics.Researchshouldtakeinto
accountbothsidesandlocatepoliticalactivitiesintheirofflinecontexts.
InarecentarticleintheNewYorkTimes,MalcolmGladwellmadetheprovocativepoint
that “the revolutionwill notbe tweeted”41 and referred to the importanceofphysical
actioninaprotestmovements.ThecaseofStuttgart21alsomakescleartheimportance
ofonline‐offline integration,whenresearchingpoliticalactivism.Deliberationscholars
might be disappointed by the lack of controversial discussion, but in the context of a
physicalprotest,SNSprovidegreatopportunitieswhichwecouldalsoseenintherecent
Arab revolution, where SNSwere intensively used for information, identification and
mobilisationofthemovement.
My suggestion for further research is to analyse online politics in connection to the
offlinecontexts.ThisstudyfocusedsolelyontheFacebookpagestothetopicStuttgart
21.Additionalresearchontheofflineprotestmovementcouldhelptobetterunderstand
the online environments and clarify questions such as: “Are offline group differences
mirrored on SNS?”, “Does group polarisation take place offline or is it an online
phenomenon?”, “What impact do SNS have on the social ties between the protest
members?”. The integrationof offline andonline research could eitherbe achieved in
systemicapproachesorattheindividualleveloftheprotestmembers.VanessaDirksen
et al. (2010) present an approach of connective ethnography that could be helpful to
41http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell[16/05/2011]
56
methodologicallygrasptheonline‐offlineconnections,somethingthat ismissinginthe
presentedstudy.
This study also neglects questions of accessibility of the public sphere aswell as the
digital divide discussion. Both play an important role in public sphere research and
mightbejustasrelevantinresearchonSNS.Especiallyindevelopingcountries,theuse
ofSNSforpoliticalinitiativemightbeimportanttoanalyseunderaccessibilityaspects.
Thepresentedcase iscertainlyuncharacteristic inonlinedeliberationresearchdue to
thelocalandissue‐centredorientationoftheprotest.Thisiswhythestudycouldlookat
the theory from a different perspective and add this perspective to the established
research. It does not claim any generalisation on the SNS activities of other protest
movements,butwasmeanttoaddnewassumptionstotheexistingresearch.AsRobert
Yin (2003, 10) states: “Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical
propositionsandnottopopulationsoruniverses”.
57
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Appendix
CodebookQuantitativeAnalysisVariable ScaleLevel Value ExplanationLinks Nominal 0=nolink
1=link+text
Picture Nominal 0=nopicture1=picture
NumberofComments
Interval
NumberofLikes Interval 1=NuclearPower
Wallpoststhatdiscussenergypolicyorcommentontheongoingdebate.
2=FederalStateGovernment
WallpoststhataddressthefederalstategovernmentinothertopicsthanS21andnotrelatedtothefederalstateelections.
3=Facebook
WallpoststhatreflectontheFacebookpageorotherFacebookpages
4=FederalStateElectionsSA
WallpoststhataddressthefederalstateelectionsinthestateSaxony‐Anhalt
5=FederalStateElectionsBW
WallpoststhataddressthefederalstateelectionsinthestateBaden‐Württemberg
Topic Nominal
6=S21
WallpoststhatdealwiththetopicStuttgart21
65
7=GeneralPoliticalPosition
WallpoststhatexpresspoliticalstatementsindependentofStuttgart21oranyotherparticulartopicsuchaspartypreference,ideologyetc.
8=CityStuttgart
WallpoststhatdealwithStuttgartindependentofS21orthataddressthecitylifeduringtheconflict
9=Other
1=ProtestActivities Wallpoststhataddresstheactivitiesoftheprotestmovement
2=BehaviourProtestMovement
Wallpoststhataredirectedtowardsthebehaviourandmannersoftheprotesters
3=ArgumentsforS21
GeneralclaimswhyS21shouldbepursuitthatdonotaddressparticulardetailsoftheprojectorofficialstatements
4=InformationtoS21andQuestionsofDetails
Wallpoststhataddressparticulartechnicalpartsoftheprojectorprovideinformationtotheproject
TopicStuttgart21–FürS21
Nominal
5=ArgumentsagainstS21/Confrontation
Wallpoststhatpickuparguments
66
againstS216=OfficialStatement Wallpoststhat
addressstatementsbyofficialactorssuchasDBorpoliticians
7=Solidarity Wallpoststhatgiverespecttothesupportmovement
8=EventNote Wallpoststhatincludeeventinvitations
9=DiscreditingActors
Wallpoststhataredirectedagainstparticularactorsorparties(fromtheprotestmovement)
10=MediaCriticism
11=Other 1=ProtestActivities Wallpoststhat
addresstheactivitiesoftheprotestmovement
2=ArgumentsagainstS21
WallpoststhatfeatureargumentsagainsttheprojectS21
3=QuestionsofDetail
Wallpoststhataddressparticulartechnicalpartsoftheproject
4=Confrontation WallpoststhatdealwithargumentsforS21orthataddresstheFacebookpage“FürStuttgart21”
5=RequestofInformation
Wallpoststhataskforparticularinformation
TopicStuttgart21–KEINS21
Nominal
6=Media Wallpoststhat
67
Commentary discussthewaythemediacoversthetopic
7=OfficialStatements
Wallpoststhataddressstatementsofofficialactorssuchaspoliticians
8=Other 9=EventNote Wallpoststhat
includeeventinvitations
10=30.09. Wallpoststhataddresstheincidenton30thofSeptember2010
Recommended