Department of Journalism, Media and Communication (JMK)Stockholm UniversitySupervisor: Michael Westerlund

Th e „Virtual Coff eehouses”?Social Networking Sites and the Public Sphere – An Empirical Analysis

Th esis for the Degree of a Master in Media and Communication Studies (M.A.)

Submitted on 30th of May 2011

By:

Jan Michael GerwinKörsbärsvägen 4C lgh. 151111423 Stockholmjage1354@student.su.se

2

I.AbstractThis paper deals with online political discussion on social networking sites. Drawing

fromHabermas’conceptof thepublicsphereand formeradaptationsofpublicsphere

theory to Internet research, the studyexamines towhat extentpoliticaldiscussionon

social networking sites displays public issue focus aswell as deliberative, liberal and

communitariancharacteristics.

The empirical analysis is a case study that scrutinizes two opposing Facebook pages

created inthecontextof thetopic ‘Stuttgart21’–aconstructionprojectthatevokeda

localcivicprotestmovement inthecityofStuttgart inthesouthofGermany.Usingan

ethnographic approach, the study takes into account the architecture, culture and

discussion style on the two pages and aims at describing the pages in terms of their

degree of reciprocity, contestation, ideological homogeneity, rationality and

contextualisationwiththeofflineprotestmovement.

The results show twopolarizedpages that lackdeliberationanddialogue, but feature

ideologicalhomophilyand identification.Theresultsback the fragmentation theoryof

Internet audiences, while not maintaining the fear of losing the common ground in

society. On the contrary, the study suggests that civic political engagement on social

networkingsitesshouldbediscussedinthecontextofradicaldemocraticprocesses. It

concludesthattheutilizationofsocialnetworksinordertopoliticallyinform,stimulate

andmobilisescalablepublicsisdesirable.

3

II.Contents1.Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 4

2.LiteratureReview ..................................................................................................................................... 52.1ThePublicSphere .............................................................................................................................. 52.2TheDigitalPublicSphere................................................................................................................ 82.3OnlinePoliticalDiscussion ...........................................................................................................112.4SocialNetworkingSites..................................................................................................................122.5TerminologyandSummary..........................................................................................................14

3.CaseStudy ..................................................................................................................................................153.1NetworkagainstStuttgart21.......................................................................................................173.2NetworkinsupportofStuttgart21............................................................................................19

4.ResearchAimandQuestions...............................................................................................................20

5.Methods ......................................................................................................................................................215.1Methodology ......................................................................................................................................225.1.1VirtualEthnography.................................................................................................................................. 22QualitativeContentAnalysis ....................................................................................................................... 22QuantitativeContentAnalysis .................................................................................................................... 23Interviews............................................................................................................................................................ 23

5.2Sampling..............................................................................................................................................245.3Operationalisation...........................................................................................................................255.4Implementation................................................................................................................................27

6.Results.........................................................................................................................................................286.1User­andUsage­Statistics.............................................................................................................286.2ThematicAnalysis............................................................................................................................326.2.1TopicsonthePages ................................................................................................................................... 336.2.2TheDiscussionofStuttgart21.............................................................................................................. 356.2.3Likes,Comments,Links............................................................................................................................ 37

6.3ReciprocityandContestation.......................................................................................................386.3.1Architecture .................................................................................................................................................. 386.3.2Arguments ..................................................................................................................................................... 386.3.3Discussion...................................................................................................................................................... 39

6.4Ideology...............................................................................................................................................406.4.1KEINStuttgart21 ....................................................................................................................................... 406.4.2FürStuttgart21........................................................................................................................................... 416.4.3Rhetoric .......................................................................................................................................................... 42

6.5RationalityandDiscussionStyle.................................................................................................436.5.1Flaming&Trolling ..................................................................................................................................... 44

6.6ContextualisationwiththeWholeMovement ........................................................................45

7.Discussion..................................................................................................................................................457.1PublicIssueFocus............................................................................................................................457.2IdeologicalHomophily ...................................................................................................................467.3DeliberativeIndicators ..................................................................................................................477.4CommunitarianIndicators ...........................................................................................................497.5LiberalIndicators ............................................................................................................................507.6TheDigitalPublicSphereinaRadicalDemocracy...............................................................51

8.Conclusion&Limitations......................................................................................................................55

References......................................................................................................................................................57

Appendix.........................................................................................................................................................64CodebookQuantitativeAnalysis ........................................................................................................64

4

1.IntroductionThe Iranian opposition movement uses Twitter to mobilise, organise and report the

revoltsafterthe2009election.17year‐oldFeliciaMargineanusgathersmorethan5000

people in Stockholm todemonstrate against the right‐wingSverigedemokraterna after

the Swedish elections2010byposting an event onFacebook. Egyptian activistWhael

Ghonimusessocialmediatoorganisetheproteston25thofJanuary2011againstHosni

Mubarak. These are the stories that e‐democracy enthusiasts refer to, when writing

abouttheboundlesspossibilitiesofpoliticaldeliberation,participationandmobilisation

on the Internet. The rise of personal media that is located in a semi‐public space

between phatic, personal communication and mass media broadcasting, allows

individualstogettheirvoiceheardoverspace,timeandissueboundaries(Reeseet.al,

2007;Lüders,2008).

This development has been covered by a fair amount of research in media,

communication and political studies. The interdisciplinary field of online democracy

scholars can be categorised into three major lines of research: Firstly, those authors

concerned with the Internet as a space for political discussion and deliberation (e.g.

Connery, 1997; Dahlberg, 2001; Papacharissi, 2002 & 2004; Davies & Gangadharan,

2009;Freelon,2010),secondly,theInternetaspoliticalinstrumentformobilisationand

political participation (e.g. Bennett, 2003; Chadwick, 2006;Aeron, 2010; Papacharissi,

2010)and thirdly, citizenshipand civic culture in theonline realm (e.g. Sassen,2006;

Chadwick, 2006; Tremayne, 2007; Coleman & Blumler, 2009). Independently of the

research emphasis, there is no consensus whether the Internet plays a democracy‐

enhancing role or not and works range from optimistic (Benkler, 2006) to very

pessimisticscenarios(Sunstein,2001).

Inmy thesis, Iwant to follow the line ofworks ononlinepolitical discussion and the

digital public sphere. Empirical studies in this field dealmainlywithnewsgroups and

onlineforums,however,inthisproject,myresearchinterestwilllieonsocalled‘Social

NetworkingSites’suchasFacebookorTwitter–acommunicationtechnologythathas,in

thiscontext,notbeenempiricallyanalysedyet.Inmystudy,Iamgoingtoexaminethe

politicaldiscussionontwoFacebookpagesdealingwithalocalcivicprotestmovement

inGermany.

Theaimofthiscasestudyistoprovideempiricaldataonpoliticaldiscussiononsocial

networkingsites.Usingvirtualethnographyas themethodology, thestudy’sgoal is to

5

explorehowusersactuallyinteractonsocialnetworkingsitesinpoliticalcontextsandif

and howpolitical deliberation takes place. The analysed case is a recent civic protest

againstparliamentarypolitics inGermanythat isknownunderthekeyword“Stuttgart

21”. In this local conflict, the inhabitantsof the cityStuttgart in the southofGermany

havebeenprotestingagainsttheconstructionofanewcentraltrainstationthatistobe

locatedcompletelyunderground–along‐termprojectthatcostsapprox.5billioneuro

andthatwouldreshapethecitylastingly.

2.LiteratureReview

2.1ThePublicSphere

In his book from1962Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, JürgenHabermas presents a

historical analysis of the rise and fall of the public sphere over the past 400 years.

Having its roots in the nomore solely feudal, but still elitist salons, coffeehouses and

high societies of the 18th and 19th century, the function of the public sphere is to

legitimiseinstitutionalpoliticsthroughreasonandcriticalargument.Beingthespacefor

publicdiscourse, thepublicsphere issupposedtodecideonpublic issues, formpublic

opinionsandthustoinfluencepolitics.Habermasdescribesthepublicspheretobeone

condition ofmodern democracies, a sphere that “operates as an intermediary system

betweenstateandsociety”(Habermas,2006,412).

According to Habermas (1990, 71ff), there are three major factors that allowed the

public sphere toemerge.Firstly, thepublic spheredrew fromImmanuelKantand the

Enlightenment idea of reason and rationality that requested a sovereignty that was

boundtorationalargumentation.Secondly,capitalismandtheresultingaccumulationof

privatecapitalthroughtradeledtoacravingforprivateautonomyandliberalism.The

third factor is the advent of the newspaper press, which itself was a product of the

informationneedsofearlycapitalism(ibid.).Beingindependentfromthesovereign,the

bourgeoispublicsphereconsistedofwealthyprivatepeoplewhoheldintereststowards

thesovereigninordertoprotecttheirprivatecapital.Thefunctionofthepublicsphere

was,thus,fromthebeginningtocontrolpoliticsandnottogovernitself(ibid.,87).The

instrumentsofthebourgeoisiewererational‐criticalargumenttoformapublicopinion

and publicity either in the form of the press or in public institutions such as the

parliamentinordertostressthatopinion(ibid.,175f).

6

AccordingtoHabermas,institutionalisation,however,isoneofthecrucialfactorsforthe

declineofthepublicspherestartingattheendofthe19thcenturyandthisiswherehis

historicalanalysisturnsintoacriticalanalysisofcontemporarymass(political)culture

(cf. Kramer, 1992, 253). The negotiation of power has been increasingly taking place

between private institutions, parties and public administration. The public as

represented by private people has been increasingly excluded from this process, and

deliberation of politics, which Mendelberg (2002, 153) describes as “egalitarian,

reciprocal, reasonable and open‐minded exchange of language”, has been in decline

amongcitizens.

Theother factor for thedeclineof thepublic sphere is the transformationofpublicity

from an opinion‐distributing to an opinion‐making industry. Themassmedia and the

cultural industry have, by means of economical, technological and organisational

concentration, itselfbecomean instrumentofpower(ibid.,284).With thisconclusion,

HabermasputshimselfintothecontextoftheFrankfurtSchoolandotherauthorsfrom

criticaltheoryarguingthattheculturalindustryhastransformedthecriticalpublicinto

adullcommodifiedmassculture.

ConsideringthatHabermashimselfwasmorethandoubtfulaboutthefunctioningofthe

public sphere and even almost denied its existence in themodernwelfare state1, the

question evolves, how the concept can be utilized after all. Is it solely a normative

categoryorisitactuallyananalyticalconceptthathasempiricalrelevance?Thepublic

sphereliteratureisambivalentonthispoint(e.g.Dahlgren,2001&Sparks,2001inthe

samevolume).ReferringtoHabermashimself,GeoffEley(1992,289)pointsoutthatthe

public sphere remains historically unattained or has only been realised in “distorted”

ways.

Habermas mentions in the preface of his 1990 edition of Strukturwandel der

Öffentlichkeitthatthe‘politicalpublicsphere’isatermthatservesasamainnormative

categoryindemocracytheoryandgainsitsempiricalrelevancethroughthedefinitionof

prerequisites for equal communication2 (1990, 41). He later specifies how normative

democracy theory can contribute to empirical research and which topics can be

addressed with the concept (Habermas, 1996). Stressing this practical usage of

1Thisisapointthathepartlytakesbackinhislaterwork(Habermas,1990).2Heparticularlyreferstohisowndiscoursive‐ethicalapproachdevelopedwithK.O.ApelinDiskursundVerantwortung,1988.

7

normative theory, the question whether or not there actually exists a public sphere

seems to be of less importance and many authors agree that the public sphere still

serves as an integrative concept for empirical analyses (e.g. Schudson, 1992; Sparks,

2001).Publicspheretheorymustbeunderstoodasameltingpotofapproaches–“not

only the public sphere, but also related themes such as communicative rationality,

deliberativedemocracyandcivilsociety”(Dahlgren,2009,5).

Independentlyofthequestionwhetherornotapublicsphereexistsorhasexistedatall,

there is a huge body of criticism of Habermas’ concept. Most prominently in this

discussion is the accusation that Habermas idealizes the accessibility and the

universality of a singular public sphere3. Obviously, the public sphere that Habermas

describeswasinitiallyanelitistspherethatwasinherentlyexclusivealongthelinesof

class,genderandstatus(e.g.Landes,1988;Eley,1992;Fraser,1990;Garnham,1992).

Asaresult,GeoffEley(1992)aswellasNancyFraser(1990)argueforamulti‐sphere

scenario: “It is important to acknowledge the existence of competing publics not just

later in the nineteenth century,whenHabermas sees a fragmentation of the classical

liberalmodelofÖffentlichkeit,butateverystageinthehistoryofthepublicsphereand,

indeed,fromtheverybeginning”(Eley,1992,306).

Fraser (1990, 67) suggests the term ‘counterpublics’ to describe “subordinated social

groups”suchas“women,workers,peoplesofcolorandgaysandlesbians”.Inopposition

toNicholasGarnham(1992)andColinSparks(2001),whoemphasizetheimportanceof

a singular public sphere as common ground for public opinion, Fraser (1990, 66)

welcomes the multi‐sphere society stating that “arrangements that accommodate

contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of

participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public.” In recent

contributions to the public sphere theory, there is a tendency to speak of public

‘spheres’,i.e.intheplural4.

Fraser’s positive evaluation of contestation between different publics is reflected in

anothercriticalapproachof thepublicspheremodelandofdeliberativedemocracy in

general.DrawingfromcriticaldiscourseanalysisandPost‐Marxisttheory,someauthors3Moreover,thereiscriticismbyhistorians,whichisdirectedagainstthefirstpartofhisbookandassumeshistoricalflawsinhisanalysis(seeBaker,1992;Zaret,1992).4Actually,sodoesHabermas.Intheprefaceofthe1962edition,heclarifiesthathewillfocusonthebourgeoispublicsphereandneglecttheplebeianpublicsphere.Criticismfromthemulti‐sphereadvocatesisthusratherdirectedtowardstheneglectofotherpublicspheresthanthebourgeoisone(Fraser,1990,78).

8

point out that Habermas’ claim of rationality in political discussion restricts in fact

democratization processes and neglects the democratic power of contestation and

disagreement on the one hand (Mouffe, 1992; Papacharissi, 2004; Dahlberg, 2005 &

2007)andinformaltalkbetweencitizensontheother(Dahlgren,2006).Theadvocates

ofradicaldemocracyclaimthatpluralismanddifference insocietyarenotsufficiently

acknowledged in discourses whosemain goal it is to strive for consensus (Dahlberg,

2007,836).

Habermas is strongly criticized, but the main challenge of the public sphere as an

empirical category results from a media critique that Habermas himself encouraged:

The lack of face‐to‐face interaction, high degrees of mediatisation, commercialisation

andconcentrationofmassmedia,politicalinterventionandindeedthelackoffeedback

loopsareproblemsthatcommunicationinsocietyhasbeenfacedwithinthesecondhalf

of the 20th century (Habermas, 2006). At the same time, authors have bemoaned a

decreasing civic engagement and a decline of social capital in late‐modern societies.

“Without at first noticing,we have been pulled apart fromone another and fromour

communities over the last third of the century” (Putnam, 2000, 27). Social capital, a

social resource that establishes through relations in a community and leads to social

action, is,according toPutnam(2000,28), crucial for theeconomy,democracy,health

andhappinessofasociety.Itisthusnowonder,thattheInternetwashighlywelcomed

as a technology to reverse the commercialised logic of mass media and as a social

institution to re‐connect citizenswith eachother andwith thepolitical. Public sphere

researchers,ontheonehand,wereexcitedabouttheInternetasanewunauthoritative

and informal space for political discourse and welcomed online forums as the new

“virtualcoffeehouses”(Connery,1997).Ontheotherhand,scholarsfromsociologyand

political studies recognised the Internet’s potential for virtual communities and civic

engagement(Castells,1996;Sassi,2000;Delanty,2003;Sassen,2006).

2.2TheDigitalPublicSphere

Scholarsfromallfieldshavehighlightedthesemi‐publicandpersonalcommunicationof

Internettechnologythatwasconsideredtoproducealessmanipulatedandmoreactive

political public. “Current technological developments in communication (…) are

legitimated in terms of a desireablemove away frommass communication and back

forward toward forms of interpersonal communication” (Garnham, 1992, 367).

However, not only de‐mediatisation was accounted for the “new media” in terms of

9

democraticpotential.AlsootherinherentcharacteristicsoftheInternettechnologysuch

as the flat network structure, interactive potential, spatial boundlessness and open

accesswere in the centreof optimistic technological deterministic perspectives as for

instance presented from Rheingold (2000). However, in recent works, the positive

attitudetowardsthetechnologyastherescueofunhealthydemocracyhaveturnedinto

morecircumspectviews(Dahlgren,2009,159),inwhichespeciallyquestionsofaccess

andequalityintheInternethavebeenamatterofcriticalconsideration(i.e.Brundidge,

2010).

Andrew Chadwick (2009, 11f) summarizes the wide academic discussion of e‐

democracy as follows: “Scholarship has proceeded through severalwaves, from early

enthusiasmtopessimisticreaction,andtorecent,morebalancedandempiricallydriven

approachesof thepost‐dotcom‐era.”Besides abodyof empirical researchon Internet

activism(seeHills&Hughes,1999;Bennett,2003;vandeDonket.al.,2004),therehas

been some recent empirical work on the digital public sphere that stresses the

democratic potential of online political discussion (e.g. Dahlberg, 2001; Downey &

Fenton,2003;Papacharissi,2004;Dahlgren,2005;Pickard,2008;Price,2009;Davies&

Gangadharan,2009;Gerhards&Schäfer,2010;Davis,2010;Brundidge,2010).However,

even thoughsomeempiricalevidencehasbackedup thehighly theoreticaldiscussion,

therearestillsomeproblemsremainingwiththeconceptofadigitalpublicsphereand

twoofthemarediscussedinthefollowing.

(1)ItmightbenocoincidencethatCassSunstein(2001)releasedhisbookRepublic.com

justinthecrashoftheneweconomy.Afterthedeconstructionoftheeconomichopesof

thenewmedia,hedeconstructedthepoliticalhopesthatwereconnectedtotheInternet.

His claim is that the personalisation of media experience leads to enclaves of like‐

mindedgroupsthateventually losethecommongroundthat isneededfordemocratic

processes.Fragmentationprocessesarealsodiscussed intelevisionstudies,wherethe

TVaudienceasan(imagined)communityisconsideredtobedissolvingintofragments

of “individualised forms of asynchronous consumption” (Buonanno, 2007, 70).

AccordingtoSunstein(2001,199),thisdevelopmentcanleadtogrouppolarizationand

extremepositions,“amorebalkanizedsociety”.AziLev‐OnandBernhardManin(2009,

107) stress that these enclaves have “enhanced abilities to (…) filter out opposing

views”. Besides Sunstein’s scenario of active Internet users and their craving for

cognitiveconsonance,filteralgorithmshaverecentlybeeninthefocusoffragmentation

10

scholars (i.e. Sack et al., 2009; Lev‐On & Manin, 2009) and social filters such as for

instance Facebook’s “Edge‐Rank”5 cater for a revitalisation of the discussion. A

prominent example of algorithmic polarisation is Valdis Krebs’6 network analysis of

buyingpatterns frombook retailer customers thatmanifests for instance inAmazon’s

recommendation system. Empirical studies, however, point to ambivalent evidence

(Dahlberg,2007,830f). InastudyonpoliticalUSENETgroups, JohnKellyetal. (2005,

23)foundoutthat“regardlessofhowbalancedorunbalancedthepopulationofauthors

inapoliticalnewsgroup,thestrongestconversationallinksareacrosspoliticaldivides”.

Inopposition toSunstein, the studystates thatnewsgroupsaugment cross‐ideological

debate. But besides empirical studies, theoretical approaches from radical democracy

argue against a dramatisation of fragmentation processes and in fact celebrate the

developmenttowardsparticipatoryplurality(Dahlberg,2007;Dahlgren,2007).

(2)InherbookAprivatesphere,ZiziPapacharissi(2010)deconstructsthedichotomyof

private and public that serves as the core principle in public sphere theory. Drawing

from former public sphere criticism as well as post‐modern notions of citizenship,

Papacharissipointsout thatprivate andpublicmust implodeas categories.While the

privatesphereisincreasinglycommodifiedinthefaceofcommercialandpublicuseof

personal information (a recent example is the rise of ‘Social Commerce’7), political

activitiesthatwereinitiallysubscribedtothepublicareperformedprivately.Sherefers

inthiscontexttotheconceptof‘identitypolitics’,whichJohnCorner&DickPells(2003,

7) describe as followed: “Political style increasingly operates as a focus for post‐

ideological lifestyle choice, (…), which favour more eclectic, fluid, issue‐specific and

personality‐boundformsofpoliticalrecognitionandengagement”,aphenomenonthat

Lance Bennett (1998) also refers to as ‘lifestyle politics’. According to Papacharissi,

citizensusetheInternetandmobiletechnologytopresenttheiridentitiespubliclyina

“show, not tell”‐mode. That means that the expression of political opinion is more

important than the discussion of public issues. In this scenario, deliberation plays a

minorrole, since thepolitical isnotnegotiated throughcollectivity,but throughsocial5The„Edge‐Rank“measurestherelevanceofastatusupdateforeveryFacebookuserandtakesintoconsiderationformerinteractionwiththeitem’screator.(Kincaid,2010,Techcrunchhttp://techcrunch.com/2010/04/22/facebook‐edgerank/[22/04/2011])6http://www.orgnet.com/divided2.html[20/04/2011]7SeeRowan,David&Cheshire,Tom(2011).Commercegetssocial:Howsocialnetworksaredrivingwhatyoubuy.WiredMagazine,February2011http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2011/02/features/social‐networks‐drive‐commerce[23/02/2011]

11

contacts(ibid.,141).Personalmediahelpcitizenstogaintheautonomytomakeprivate

issues topublic issues. Considering this shift towards egocentricpolitical expressions,

Papacharissi poses the question, if the public sphere concept is still appropriate as a

model after all. Papacharissi’s analysis fits into a techno‐cultural move away from

communities centred on issues to more identity‐driven social networks (Boyd, 2009,

27).However,byputtingalltheemphasisonthequestion,WHATapublicissueis,the

analysisneglectsHOWtheseissuesarediscussed.EventhoughPapacharissi(2010,154)

makesclearthatavirtual“thumbs‐up‐or‐down”doesnotaccountfordeliberation,she

neglects, for instance, the commentary sections of blog entries, YouTube videos or

Facebookposts.

2.3OnlinePoliticalDiscussion

I argue that even in social networks, online political discussion is a relevant field of

research,buttheliteratureanalysismakesalsoclearthatdeliberationshouldnotbethe

singlecategory,whenanalysingonlinediscussions.According toDeenFreelon(2010),

deliberation is themost prominent research interest in this field, however, empirical

researchpointstoverydifferentkindsofpoliticalexpression.

Lincoln Dahlberg (2001) identifies three “camps” of research: the (1) communitarian

that “stresses the possibility of the internet enhancing communal spirit and values”

(ibid.,616),the(2)liberal,mainlyconcernedwiththeexpressionofindividualpolitical

performance and close to Papacharissi’s scenario of identity politics, and the (3)

deliberative. In a recent article, Freelon (2010) elaborates on these three models.

Conductingameta‐analysisofworksinthefield,heidentifieskeycharacteristicsofeach

model such as intra‐ideological (communitarian) vs. inter‐ideological reciprocity

(deliberative)orpersonal revelation (liberal)vs.public issues focus (deliberative).He

presents thus not only a theoretical framework of research schools, but also an

analytical instrument that should encourage scholars not to “unilaterally declare[…] a

forum more or less ‘deliberative’”, but develop “more concise conclusions such as

‘communitarianwithsomedeliberativeaspects’”(Freelon,2010,1177).Bothauthorsdo

notincludeacategorythataccountsforradicaldemocracyintheirmodels(eventhough

for instance Pickard (2008) serves as an empirical reference labelling the Internet

serviceIndymedia8as‘radicaldemocratic’).

8Indymediaisapublishingplatformforalternativeandcitizenmedia.

12

Figure1:ThethreemodelsofonlinedemocraticcommunicationandtheirindicativemetricsaccordingtoFreelon(2010,1178).

The challenge for scholars in this interdisciplinary field is not only the fast

transformationofempiricalandtheoreticalknowledge,butalsothefasttransformation

ofthematterofexaminationitself.WithinthelastfifteenyearsofresearchonInternet

politics, the Internet has evolved dramatically as a technological and cultural

phenomenon. While the early analyses from, for instance, Rheingold (2000), Hill &

Hughes (1998) and van Dijk (1997) focused on staticwebsites, later research had to

takeintoaccountdynamic,platform‐independentWeb2.09environmentsaswellasthe

SocialWeb.While some of the research questionsmight be the same, the social and

culturalcontextchangesandsodotheanalysedentities.Whileresearchhasfocusedon

USENETgroups,E‐Maillists,onlineforumsandMUDs10,theworkonsocialnetworking

sitesissofarrathersmall.

2.4SocialNetworkingSites

DanahBoyd&NicoleEllison(2007)definesocialnetworkingsites(SNS)asweb‐based

services“thatallowindividualsto(1)constructapublicorsemi‐publicprofilewithina

boundedsystem,(2)articulatelistsofotheruserswithwhomtheyshareaconnection,

and(3)viewandtraversetheirlistofconnectionsandthosemadebyotherswithinthe

system”(ibid.,211).Unlike forumsandcommunities,SNSarenotbuiltaroundcertain

topics, nor do the participants necessarily get in contact with strangers. The main

9seeO’Reilly(2005)10MUDstandsforMulti‐UserDungeonanddescribesacategoryoftext‐basedOnlinerole‐playinggames.

1178 new media & society 12(7)

an attempt to classify the metrics used in a diverse array of online political forum studies

(and a few studies of offline political behavior) according to the three-model framework’s

categories. These studies span the disciplines of mass communication, information sci-

ence, political science, critical-feminist studies, education and developmental psychology,

among others. An interdisciplinary purview is nigh obligatory in research into internet

communication, as the literature on any given subtopic thereof more often than not com-

prises a multitude of perspectives (Hunsinger, 2005). Even so, this list does not claim

exhaustiveness; though it attempts to construct an empirically grounded core of measures

within each model, more could doubtless be added. The particular behaviors described in

the following were included for two reasons: (1) each has been successfully operational-

ized in previous research and (2) a compelling argument can be made that each fits con-

ceptually within one of the three models. Table 1 summarizes the three-model framework

along with its constituent characteristics.

The liberal individualist modelLiberal individualism encompasses all characteristics of online conversation involving

personal expression and the pursuit of self-interest. From various literatures, four fea-

tures can be placed into this category: monologue, personal revelation, personal show-

case and flaming.

Monologue. In a study of the deliberative potential of several political Usenet news-

groups, Wilhelm (1999: 98) found that users’ contributions generally lacked ‘the listen-

ing, responsiveness, and dialogue that would promote communicative actions’. Similarly,

Jensen (2003: 357) holds that ‘one of the common complaints about net debates is that

Table 1. The three models of online democratic communication and their indicative metrics

Model of democratic Indicative metric communication

Liberal individualist Monologue Personal revelation Personal showcase FlamingCommunitarian Ideological fragmentation Mobilization Community language Intra-ideological questioning Intra-ideological reciprocityDeliberative Rational-critical argument Public issue focus Equality Discussion topic focus Inter-ideological questioning Inter-ideological reciprocity

at Stockholms Universitet on November 24, 2010nms.sagepub.comDownloaded from

13

category is inclusion into or exclusion out of one’s network. However, the borders

between online communities and SNS are blurry and there are many online

communities that featureSNScharacteristics (for instanceprofilepages fordiscussion

boardmembers)aswellasSNSthatfeaturecommunitycharacteristics(forexamplethe

Facebookpagesfunction).

AccordingtoBoyd&Ellison(2007,214),SixDegrees.comwasthefirstSNStolaunchin

1997 and soon SNS emerged all around the world, most prominently the networks

Friendster (Launch 2002), LinkedIn (Launch 2003) and MySpace (Launch 2003)11.

Interestingly,SNSemergedasnationalorregionalphenomenaand inthebeginningof

social networks, many countries had their own prevalent SNS, so for instance

LunarStrominSweden,StudiVZinGermany,HyvesintheDutchspeakingcountries,Gono

inPortugal,Mixi inJapan,Orkut inBrasilandIndia,QQ inChina(Boyd&Ellison,2007,

218).Inrecentyears,therehasbeenadevelopmenttowardsnicheSNSontheonehand

andconsolidationandconcentrationof theSNS‐marketon theother.Today,Facebook

(Launch2004)is,withits585millionusers12,worldwidethelargestSNS.187,7million

usersareintheagegroupof18–24years.However,allagegroupsgrowrapidlywith

between59%to124%(agegroupover65years)growthrateinthelastyear.

According to Boyd & Ellison (2007, 219), research on SNS can be comprised in the

followingthemes:ImpressionManagementandFriendshipPerformance,Networksand

Network Structure, Bridging Online and Offline Social Networks, and Privacy. The

dichotomyofprivateandpublicisamajorcategorytodescribedifferentSNS.Twitterin

comparisontoFacebookhas for instanceamuchhigherdegreeofpublicness,which is

indicatedbyahigherpublicinterestorientationofthestatusesandweakertiesbetween

theusers.

ThereareonlyfewstudiesontherelationofSNSandpolitics,butsincethecampaigning

for the presidential election in theUS in 2008, scholars recognised the importance of

SNSeveninpoliticalcontexts.“KeyfeaturesprovidedonFacebook,suchaslinking,Wall‐

posting,or resources timelyupdatedonvideo‐sharingwebsitessuchasYouTubehave

created previously unimagined opportunities for young people to exchange their

politicalviewsandbecomemorepoliticallyactive”(Wu,2010,6).AccordingtoWeiwu11SeeBoyd&Ellison(2007)forathoroughhistoryofSNS.12Socialbakers(2011).Facebookin2010:7,9newaccountregistrationspersecond.http://www.socialbakers.com/blog/109‐facebook‐in‐2010‐7‐9‐new‐account‐registrations‐per‐second/[2011‐02‐25]

14

Zhang et al. (2010, 80), 40% of all SNS users have used their network for political

information during the presidential campaigning 2008.However, the study concludes

that reliance on SNS encourages rather civic participation – that is non‐governmental

andnon‐electoral– thanpoliticalparticipationorconfidence in thegovernment(ibid.,

87). Empirical studies on thequestion, if theuseof SNS affectspolitical attitudes and

behavioursornot,pointinbothdirections(Johnsonetal.,2011).

AccordingtoZhanget.al.(2010,76),civicandpoliticalengagementarebothpositively

influencedbysocialcapital.Thereareseveralstudiesthatexaminethisparticularaspect

ofsocialnetworks(Ellisonetal.,2007;Steinfieldetal.,2008)withtheresultthatthere

is a positive correlation between the use of SNS and the deepening of social ties

(bonding social capital) as well as creating new social connections (bridging social

capital).ThesocialityofSNSandquestionswhetherornotSNSmakepeoplemoresocial

orhow theyaffect social relationsand socialbehaviour ingeneral aremajor research

trends in the field (Papacharissi, 2011, 309). Johnson et al. (2011, 203) also suggest

examininglocalcivicengagementinrelationtoSNSandthesocialuseoftheWeb.

2.5TerminologyandSummary

In this literature review, I have mentioned the terms “digital public sphere”, “e‐

democracy”,“digitalcitizenship”,“onlinedeliberation”and“onlinepoliticaldiscussion”.

All of them refer to the studyof onlinepolitics. Even though it is hard todrawa line

betweentheseresearch fieldsandsomeof the termsareusedsynonymously, the first

three terms rather apply as theoretical frameworks, whereas the latter two describe

empirical categories. Following Freelon (2010), I want to stick to the term “online

politicaldiscussion”inthefollowinganalysis,whenreferringtotheempiricalinterestof

thestudy,andIusetheterm“digitalpublicsphere”asthetheoreticalframework.This

categorisation has a bias from radical democracy theory implying that not only

deliberation, but also contestation and informal talk are relevant categories for the

digitalpublicsphere.

Theliteraturereviewshowsthatresearchononlinepoliticaldiscussioninthecontextof

public sphere theory has a fairly distinct tradition. However, it also shows that the

transformationofthemediumandthewayitisadaptedsocially,changethe(empirical)

focusoftheacademicdiscussion.Consideringalltheiterationsinpublicspheretheory

anddiscussionsofthedigitalpublicsphere,thereviewmakesclearthatitisnotenough

toask“WhatwouldHabermassay?”,buttolookatthemattersofinquiryintheirsocial

15

and cultural contexts. In the following, I want to introduce the case study before

clarifying,whattheresearchquestionsare.

3.CaseStudyThe analysed case is a recent civic protest against parliamentary politics in Germany

that is known under the keyword “Stuttgart 21” or “S21”. In this local conflict,many

inhabitants of the city Stuttgart have been protesting against the building of a new

centraltrainstationthatistobelocatedcompletelyunderground.Thecalculatedcosts

forthe long‐termprojectrangebetween4,113billionto9billionEuro14.Theproject is

supposedtoreshapethecitylastingly.

TheprojectStuttgart21wasfirstpresentedinApril1994bytheFederalStateMinister

ErwinTeufel(CDU)andenactedinNovember1995.Atthesametime,thefirstinitiative

against the project “Leben in Stuttgart – Kein Stuttgart 21” (Life in Stuttgart – No

Stuttgart 21) was founded with the aim to conduct a public referendum about the

project (Lösch et al., 2011, 187). The municipal council denied the referendum in

September 1996 due to insufficient signatures collected. After negotiation about the

funding of the project, a financing agreement was made in July 2002 and building

permission was given in 200515. Two years later, an alliance against Stuttgart 21

gathered67000signaturesforareferendum,whichthemunicipalcouncildeniedagain.

Afterseveralvaryingcalculationsoftheproject’soverallcosts,theconstructionofficially

beganinFebruary201016.

During the year 2010, the critical press coverage and the rising costs of the project,

createdatremendousgrowthoftheprotestmovement,whichcontinueddemonstrating

against the project every Monday in Stuttgart. The main arguments of the protest

movementare:1.Criticismtowardsamiscalculationofthecostsandexpectedcostsof

morethan5billionEurowithatthesametimehighpublicdebts.2.Anactually lower

capacityofthenewcentralstationduetofewertrainplatforms.3.Lesscomfortfortrain

13OfficialnumberfromDeutscheBahn.http://content.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de/stz/page/2314733_0_9223_‐grube‐wir‐bauen‐tunnels‐und‐keine‐bunker.html[27/05/2011]14InastatementoftheGermanFederalEnvironmentalAgency15StuttgarterZeitung(2009).Chronik:DasGroßprojektS‐21.http://www.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de/stz/page/2063244_0_9223_‐chronik‐das‐grossprojekt‐s‐21.html[27/05/2011]16FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung(2010).DieChronikvonStuttgart21:NabelschauinSchwaben.http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0F6C1ACA6E6643119477C00AAEDD6BD6/Doc~EFB4EC7E416DC4E33BDA214AAE06927A1~ATpl~Ecommon~Sspezial.html[27/05/2011]

16

travellers. 4.Anundemocratic procedure andpolitics against thewill of thepublic. 5.

TheremovalofpublicparkssurroundingStuttgartcastleaswellasotherenvironmental

riskssuchasanegativeaffectionofthecity’sclimateandwaterresources17(Wolf,2010,

10ff).Theprotestmovementsuggestsinsteadanalternativemodelcalled“Kopfbahnhof

21”,whichadvocatesbasicallyamodernisationoftheexistingcentralstation.

The protest against Stuttgart 21 is mainly directed against political and economic

institutionssuchasthefederalstategovernmentconsistingofacoalitionbetweenCDU

(ChristlichDemokratischeUnion18) and FDP (FreieDemokratischePartei19),Deutsche

Bahn AG20 and the supporting parties. However, as a reaction to the increasing civic

opposition against the project, a civic movement in support of the project has also

emerged.ItalignedinSeptember2010underthename“WirsindStuttgart21”(Weare

Stuttgart21).Theargumentsof theprojectsupporters,whichmainlycorrespondwith

theofficialstatements,are:1.Theundergroundstationcreatesnewurbanspacedirectly

inthecitythatisgoingtobedesignedindialoguewiththecitizens.2.Ahigherqualityof

train travelling not only due to a higher capacity of the station, but also due to new

connections to the airport and to destinations in the region. 3. The futuristic project

addstotheprestigeofthecityandtheregionasanengineeringmetropolis21.

Theconflictescalatedon30thofSeptember2010,whenamassivepoliceoperationused

water cannons and tear gas to disperse the protesters that had blocked parts of the

station and the near palace garden22. After this incident, inwhich around400people

hadbeeninjured,thefederalgovernmentstoppedthedeconstructionofthestationand

called for an arbitration between the authorities (the federal state government and

Deutsche Bahn) and the project opponents (the alliance against Stuttgart 21) led by

HeinerGeißler23.OnNovember the 30th, Geißler releasedhis arbitration statement. It

said thatStuttgart21shouldbepursued,however,withsomechangesandnotbefore

17BUNDe.V.Regionalgeschäftsstelle(2011).DiezehnwichtigstenArgumente.http://www.kopfbahnhof‐21.de/index.php?id=501[20/05/2011]18ChristianDemocraticUnion19FreeDemocraticParty20Germannationalrailwaycompany.21ArbeitsgruppeStuttgart21‐ja‐bitte(2011).GewichtigeGründefürStuttgart21.http://www.stuttgart21‐ja‐bitte.de/gewichtige‐gruende‐fuer‐stuttgart‐21[27/05/2011]22SpiegelOnline.Josef‐OttoFreudenreich:BürgerkriegimSchlossgarten.http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,720581,00.html[27/05/2011]23HeinerGeißlerisapartymemberoftheCDUthatrulestogetherwiththeliberalpartyFDPinBaden‐Württemberg.Atthesametime,heisamemberofATTAC,whichgrantshimcredibilityintheleft‐wingscene.

17

DeutscheBahnhasconducteda‘stresstest’inordertoensurethesufficientcapacityof

thenewstation.Thestatementhasbeenregardedasadefeatfortheprojectcritics24.

Theconflictaroundthecentralstationhasalsobeenperceivedasanideologicalconflict

inthefederalstateparliament(“Landtag”)betweentheconservativeandindustrial‐near

camp representedby thegoverning coalitionandDeutscheBahnversus the left‐wing,

environmentalist camp represented by ‘Die Grünen’ (the environmentalist party) and

civicorganisations25.Theconflicthasthusbecomeoneofthemostimportanttopicsin

theelectioncampaignforthenewLandtag.InSeptember2010,AngelaMerkeldenieda

referendum about the building of the central station with the argument that the

electionsin2011willdecideabouttheprojectanyway26.

The ongoing dispute about the central station has split the city into two opposed

fractions.However,thereisaninterestingdynamicofthepublicopinioninfluencedby

thearbitration.AccordingtoarepresentativestudybytheGermanopinionresearcher

Infratestdimap inSeptember2010,54%ofpeople living inBaden‐Württembergwere

againsttheproject.Inthesamestudyonedayafterthearbitrationstatementonthe1st

ofDecemberonly38%wereagainsttheproject,while54%supportedit.

Figure2:TheacceptanceofStuttgart21overtime.Source:InfratestdimaponbehalfofSWRandStuttgarterZeitung:LänderTRENDBaden‐Württemberg27.

3.1NetworkagainstStuttgart21

The protestmovement against Stuttgart 21 is driven and organised by an alliance of

political, civic and cultural organisations calling themselves ‘Aktionsbündnis gegen

24SpiegelOnline(2010).EndederSchlichtung:Stuttgart21bekommtdasGeißler‐Gütesiegel.http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,732135,00.html[27/05/2011]25However,thebiggestoppositionpartySPD(SocialDemocrats)supportsthestation.26AngelaMerkel(15/09/2010):„DieLandtagswahlimnächstenJahr,diewirdgenaudieBefragungderBürgerüberdieZukunftBaden‐Württembergs,über,Stuttgart21‘undvieleandereProjektesein“.27http://www.infratest‐dimap.de/umfragen‐analysen/bundeslaender/baden‐wuerttemberg/laendertrend/2010/dezember/[13/04/2011]

18

Stuttgart21’.Eventhoughtheallianceconsistsofindependentinstitutions,theyhavea

commonspokespersonandawebpresence.Themainactorsinthisallianceare‘Aktive

Parkschützer’(‘activeparkguards’‐acivicorganisationofactivistsagainstS21andthe

rather radical core of the protest movement), ‘Initiative Leben in Stuttgart – Kein

Stuttgart21’(acivicorganisationthatwasfoundedalreadyin1995inoppositiontothe

project), the localpartyorganisationsof the twopoliticalpartiesDieGrünenand ‘Die

Linke’ (leftist party), of whom Die Grünen are also represented in the federal state

parliament,andtheregionalgroupoftheenvironmentalorganisation‘BUNDe.V.’.

The alliance is supported by many professional groups28 such as for instance

“Architekten gegen Stuttgart 21” (architects against Stuttgart 21), “Demokratie‐

Initiative21”(initiativefordemocracy21)or“Initiative‐Barriere‐Frei‐GegenStuttgart

21”(initiativeforhandicappedpeopleagainstStuttgart21).Moreover,inconnectionto

the alliance, there are more than 20 regional protest groups in all parts of Baden‐

Württemberg and even in other parts of Germany. Independent observers have

underlinedtheprotest’scivicandnonviolentcharacter.

Theonlineprotestnetworkisjustasdiverseastheofflinenetwork.However,thereare

threemajorwebsitesof thealliancewhicharewww.kopfbahnhof‐21.de (whichserves

as informationportalabout theprotestmovementaswellasacollectionof important

documentsandnews),www.parkschuetzer.de(whichservesasanactivistnetworkand

allows activists to register and get in contact with each other as well as to organise

events – so far there are 32 719 activists registered) and the Facebook page “KEIN

Stuttgart21” (whichservesasboth informationanddiscussionplatform). Inaddition,

the alliance launched the website www.infooffensive.de, a platform that distributes

information and arguments to the press and the public outside of Stuttgart. Besides

thesemajorplatforms, the sitewww.parkschuetzer.de links tomore than50websites

that are associatedwith the protestmovement and cover all sorts of topics including

documentationoftheartscenethathasdevelopedaroundtheprotest.

Thevisualnetworkbelowshowsthelinkstructureoftheonlinenetwork.Thewebsite

www.kopfbahnhof‐21.de is the biggest node and receives 2215 links, followed by

www.parkschuetzer.deandwww.facebook.com.Interestingly,thesecondmostpopular

pages are www.unternehmer‐gegen‐s21.de (entrepreneurs against s21) and

28TheWebsitewww.parkschuetzer.delists24ofsuchgroups.

19

www.gewerkschaften‐gegen‐s21.de(workerunionsagainsts21).Thefollowingdiagram

indicatesthewideanddiverseprotestmovementthatismirroredonline.

Figure3:TheonlinenetworkagainstStuttgart21.Thebiggerthenodes,themorelinkstheyreceivefromothernodesinthenetwork.DiagramcreatedwithIssueCrawler(http://www.issuecrawler.net).

3.2NetworkinsupportofStuttgart21

Theallianceagainsttheprotestmovementiscalled“WirsindStuttgart21”andconsists

of five civic organisations. Since summer 2010, the alliance has conducted many

activities to support the project that range from information stands over

demonstrations to collectively removing stickers of the opposition movement from

publicplaces.

Thealliance runs thewebsiteswww.fuerstuttgart21.de,www.wirsindstuttgart21.deas

wellastheFacebookpage“FürStuttgart21”.Allofthesewebsitesserveasinformation

portals. www.wirsindstuttgart21.de has, in addition, an online forum, in which both

projectsupportersaswellascriticsleaddiscussions.

20

Figure4:ThecivicnetworkinsupportofStuttgart21.Thebiggerthenodes,themorelinkstheyreceivefromothernodesinthenetwork.GraphcreatedwithIssueCrawler(http://www.issuecrawler.net).

4.ResearchAimandQuestionsInthefollowingstudy,Iwanttoanalysetheonlinepoliticaldiscussionaboutthislocal

protestmovement on the twoFacebook pages “KEIN Stuttgart 21” and “Für Stuttgart

21”.TheoverarchingaimistoexamineifandhowtheFacebookpagesfulfilcriteriaof

thepublicsphereandifandhowpublicopinioniscreated.Followingthelineofresearch

on online political discussion, this project contains three aspects that seem to be

promisingtoaddtotheacademicdiscussion.Firstly,theprojectexaminesalocalprotest

movement that features polarized positions, secondly, it focuses on the social

networkingsiteFacebook,thirdly,itusesanethnographicapproach.

Researchquestions:

1. Whichpossibilitiesanddrawbacksdosocialnetworkingsitesconstituteinterms

ofpoliticalcitizendiscourse?

21

2. To what extent can the pages be described as communitarian, liberal or

deliberative?

a. Towhatextentdothediscoursesonthepagesexpresspublicissuefocus?

b. Doesinter‐andintra‐reciprocitytakeplaceonthepages?

c. Towhatextentarethegroupsideologicallyhomogeneous?

d. Is the style of discussion rational and towhat extent does flaming take

place?

5.MethodsAsmentionedinthe literaturereview,onlinecommunitiesare increasinglycentredon

networks rather than topics. “Rather than relying on interests or structure‐based

boundaries,currentsocialgroupsaredefinedthroughrelationships”(Boyd,2009,27).

FacebookandTwitteraresocialnetworkingsitesthatcertainlysharethischaracteristic.

However, in thisparticular case, the emphasis of the study liesonpeoplewhogather

around the topic Stuttgart 21 by joining the Stuttgart 21 pages29 on Facebook. This

implies that the conducted research is not a network analysis (that means not an

analysis of ‘who speaks/listens towho’), but rather the analysis of a cross‐section of

conversations.

In the particular technological and cultural setting of a social networking site with

communitycharacteristics,thequestionofadequatemethodologyisalsooftheoretical

relevance.Withinthe last tenyears, ithasbecomemoreandmorepopular to thinkof

the Internet not only as a technology, but also as a culture that can be studied with

ethnographicprinciples.Thismethodologythatauthorsrefertoas‘virtualethnography’

hasbeenusedintheanalysisofonlinecommunities(Sundén,2002;Kanayama,2003)as

well as social networking sites andonline issuenetworks (Boyd, 2007;Dirksen et al.,

2010;Farnsworth&Austrin,2010).“YoucanstudytheInternetasaformofmilieuor

cultureinwhichpeopledevelopspecificformsofcommunicationor,sometimes,specific

identities.BothsuggestatransferofethnographicmethodstoInternetresearch”(Flick,

2009,272).

29Iusetheterm‘pages’asFacebookcallsthem,eventhoughtheterms‘group’or‘community’wouldbemorefittingconsideringthatthesepagesareusedtogroupandinteractwithpeoplethatareinterestedinacommontopic.

22

5.1Methodology

5.1.1VirtualEthnography

Virtualethnographyusesprinciplesofconventionalethnographyliketheuseofarange

of methods, aiming at a holistic picture of the culture, understanding daily routines,

values and practices of the studied group (cf. Fetterman, 1998, 16ff). According to

Christine Hine (2000, 7f), who rendered outstanding service to the adaptation of

ethnographyinonlineresearch,theInternetfeaturesmeaningfulrelationshipsand“true

sociality” that allow ethnographic approaches to online cultures and groups. If we

perceiveofaFacebookpageasanethnographicfield,weareinbettershapetonotonly

analyse the textual content, but also to understand the social relations between the

groupmembers,theorganisationofthegroupaswellascharacteristicsofgroupculture,

ritualsandsymbols.“Lookingatwhatpeopledoandtalkaboutwithothersisanideal

unit for examining social behaviors, (…), and reveals aspects of groups that are not

evidentfromaggregationsofindividualbehaviors”(Haithornthwaite,2005,127).

ThestudypresentedhereisanethnographyontwoFacebookpages,whichIcallthetwo

virtual fields. I spent one week on the two pages using several methods such as

discourse analysis, interviews with group members, as well as a small‐sampled

quantitative content analysis in order to analyse the discussion style, interaction

dynamics, interconnectionbetween the twopages,prevalentdiscoursesaswellas the

offline‐online relation of the protest movement. The study is both exploratory and

analytic and no hypotheses were formulated beforehand. Even though ethnography

aimsataholisticpictureofaculture, thestudy focusesoncertainaspects thatwillbe

discussedbelow.

QualitativeContentAnalysis

The two Facebook pages feature solely textual information, so what is the difference

between virtual ethnography and content analysis? I argue that the difference is the

theoreticalassumptionofFacebookbeingaplaceandacultureinitselfandnotsolelya

cultural product. Moreover, virtual ethnography can combine a range of methods as

presentedinthisstudy.Certainly,contentanalysisplaysamajorrole(seeFine,2000).In

thisstudy,Iconductbothaqualitativeandquantitativecontentanalysis.

The qualitative analysis is a discourse analysis that follows the discourse concept of

Norman Fairclough & Ruth Wodak (1997), who advocate a critical consciousness of

languagepracticeanddefinecriticaldiscourseanalysisas“theanalysisoflinguisticand

23

semiotic aspects of social processes and problems” (ibid., 271). Papacharissi (2009)

usedcriticaldiscourseanalysisinthestudyofSNStofindout,whatlanguageindividuals

develop, when they “introduce, present and connect themselves” (ibid., 204). In the

contextofthisstudy,criticaldiscourseanalysisisespeciallyusefultoanalyseideological

inclusion and exclusion, reciprocity, thediscussion style aswell as theuse of rational

argumentation and flaming. All of these concepts will be looked at more closely in

chapter5.3.

QuantitativeContentAnalysis

The quantitative analysis in this studymust be understood as complementary to the

qualitativepart.Itwasconductedinordertoclarifythepublicissuefocusofthepages

and to classify thewall posts according to the topics addressed. The categorieswere

developed inductively that means during the analysing process. This method is also

described as empirical categorization (Merten, 1999, 247) and requires rather strong

interpretationby thecoder inorder toeliminate textualambiguitiesanddecideabout

thecontextualmeaningofawallpost.ItfollowsadesignthatPhilippMayring(2003,19)

describes as an ‘integrative approach’ to quantitative content analysis: while the

researchquestions,categoriesandinstrumenthavebeendeducedqualitatively,thedata

canbeanalysedquantitatively.

Interviews

DavidFetterman(2007,40)describesinterviewsasthe“ethnographer’smostimportant

data gathering technique”. He distinguishes informal interviews from structured or

semi‐structured30 interviews. Whereas the former are the most common in the

fieldworkandespeciallywhenenteringafield,thelatteraremoreusefulinthemiddle

orendstagesofastudy.

In this study, it was possible to establish a trustful contact with one of the

administrators of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”. I was able to conduct a structured

interviewviaE‐Mailwiththisadministratoraswellastoshareseveralinformalphone

calls,oneofthemintheweekbeforetheobservation,whichturnedouttobeveryuseful

fortheactualfieldwork,andoneofthemrightafterthefieldwork.Unfortunately,itwas

moredifficultto‘getthrough’totheadministratorsofthepage“FürStuttgart21”.Inthe

end,Iwasabletoconductastructuredinterviewwithananonymousadministratorof

30Structuredinterviewsfollowaquestionnairewithspecificresearchgoals(Fetterman,2007,38).

24

thepageviaFacebookwithveryshortanswers.Duringthefieldwork,Itriedtocontact

somepagemembersoverFacebookandreceivedseveralanswers.

5.2Sampling

Thechallengeinvirtualethnographyistoretracethenetworkstructureofthefieldand

multi‐sited ethnography is a commonmethodology to accomplish that (Farnsworth&

Austrin, 2010).Kirsten Foot (2006) also speaks of a ‘Web SphereAnalysis’,amethod

that puts the highest emphasis on links and linking structure in an actor or issue

network. This study, however, is not an actor network analysis, but an analysis of

discussionsinaparticularvirtualenvironment.Thevirtualfieldisthusrestrictedtothe

twoFacebookpages,wheretheethnographytookplace.ThereasonwhyIlimitthefield

tothepagesisdeterminedbytheresearchinterestratherthanbytheoreticaldefinition.

“Decidingwheretostartandwhentostopcanbeanintrinsicpartoftheethnographer’s

attemptstoensurethathisorherresearchquestionsarebothcoherentlyaddressedand

adapted to the cultural landscape that emerges” (Hine, 2009, 2). Even though these

fieldsarerestricted(onehastoactively‘like’thepagesinordertocontribute),theyare

not independent islandson theweb.They link toa lotofotherwebsitesaswell as to

eachotherandtheoutgoinglinkshavealsobeenanalysedinthestudy.Inthatregard,

thefieldshadsomewebspherecharacteristics.

Theexaminationtookplaceintheweekfromthe20thtothe27thofMarch2011,which

wastheweekbeforethefederalstateelectionsonthe27th.Thetimeperiodwaschosen

becausetheconflictwassupposedtoplayamajorroleinthefinalelectioncampaigning

aswell as the voting decision. Oneweek proved to be a time frame that allowed the

investigationofsocialrelationsonthepagesaswellastheunderstandingofdiscussion

patterns,whileatthesametimekeepingthedatatoaconsiderableamount.

The main matters of examination were the two ‘walls’ of the pages, where the page

administratorsaswellaspagememberscanpostshort singularmessages.Thesewall

postsreceivecommentsand‘likes’sothatasinglewallpostincludingcommentscanbe

describedas a conversation. In addition, everypagehasadiscussionboardand some

additionalstaticinformationsuchasforinstancelinkstoevents,activistgroupsetc.The

additionalinformation(onthepagetheyareorganisedastabsintheheadsectionofthe

page)wasalsotakenintoaccountintheresearch.However,mainattentionwaspaidto

the wall posts, the discourses they covered, the links they contained as well as the

responsestheygot.

25

Forthequantitativeanalysis,250wallpostsoneachpagewerechronologicallyanalysed

beginningMonday, 20th ofMarch, 9 a.m.On thepage “Für Stuttgart 21”, the 250wall

posts coveredalmost threewholedaysuntilWednesday.On thepage “KEINStuttgart

21”,the250wallpostscoveredoneandahalfdaysuntilTuesdaymorning.

5.3Operationalisation

Thegathereddatainethnographicresearchisusuallyunstructured.Theaimistogeta

holistic picture of a culture and especially to see things that were not asked for

beforehand. That is why the applied methods such as, for instance, participant

observationor interviewsareusuallyconductedanddocumented inastructuredway,

but not coded according to a structured scheme. However, considering the particular

researchinterestandtherestrictedtimespan,Iwentinthefieldwithaninstrumentthat

Iwanttocallthe‘researchemphases’.

Overall, I focused on (1) the page structure and architecture, (2) the topics of the

conversationsand(3)thelanguageusedintheconversations.Themaingoalwasatfirst

to describe these three levels, so the organisation of the group, the topics covered as

wellasoverallrhetoric.Inaddition,IappliedFreelon’sindicativemetrics(seefigure1)

tothestudy.Onallofthesethreelevels,Ianalysedthedegreeofreciprocitybetweenthe

groups,contestationbetweenopposingopinions,ideologicalinclusionorexclusion,the

use of rational arguments, the use of accusations and flaming, personal revelation, as

wellascontextualisationwiththewholecivicmovements.Alloftheseoperatorscould

bemoreorlessretracedonthethreelevels.

Pagestructure Topics Language/Rhetoric

Description

Reciprocity

Contestation

Ideology

Rationalityvs.

flaming

Personalrevelation

26

Contextualisation

withprotest

movement

Figure5:Theresearchemphases.Thisformwasusedforcodingandstructuringofthedataduringtheethnography.

Reciprocity: Reciprocity is analysed on two levels: Firstly, how the groups dealwith

arguments from the opposing side and secondly, how each page dealswith the other

pageandifthereisaninteractionbetweenthepagesornot.

Contestation:Contestationfocusesonthedirectcontactofopposingarguments.Iwant

to analyse if andhowmembersof eachpositionengagedirectly indiscussionson the

pages.

Ideology:Asmentionedbefore, the conflict arosealong the linesofpolitical ideology.

Thequestionhereis,howstronglythepagesareideologicallyshapedandtowhatextent

acertainpoliticalorientationispresupposedforanactiveparticipationintherespective

group.

Rationality vs. flaming: Papacharissi (2004, 269) describes flaming as an affront

against the online etiquette that is an “offensive, nonsensical, albeit passionate online

response”.Ontheotherhand, Iwanttoanalysetowhatextentrationalargumentsare

usedintheconversationsandhowtheseargumentsarecriticallyquestioned.

Personal revelation: Freelon (2010, 1179) describes personal revelation as “simply

disclosureofinformationaboutoneselfinapublicforum”.Thisfactorisofimportance

especially on the thematic level, when analysing to what extent the pages feature a

publicissuefocus.

Contextualisation:HereIwanttoanalysehowtheprotestmovementonthetwopages

putsitselfincontextwiththewholeonlineprotestnetworkaswellasthelocalactivities.

Thequantitativeanalysiswasconductedafterthequalitativediscourseanalysis,which

helpedtounderstandthecontextandcharacteristicsof thewallposts.Afteranalysing

and interpreting the wall posts according to their topics addressed, the data were

grouped into more and more abstract categories until they could be quantified and

coded. I codedeverywallpostwithonlyone topic. First, I checked, if thepostsname

Stuttgart21oriftheyarerelatedtotheissue.Ifnot,IformedcategoriesthatIconflated

lateron.Wallpoststhataddressedseveraltopicswerereducedtothemaintopic,which

27

wassometimesthetopicthatreceivedthemostfeedbackinthecommentariesandcould

sometimesbedeterminedby thecontext31.Thecategoriesaresometimesnotdisjunct

andIwillpointtotheseambiguitiesintheresultssection.Besidesthisthematicanalysis,

quantitativeanalysiswasapplied inorder todescribe thewallposts formally. Insum,

fivevariableswerecoded.Theyare:topic,links,pictures,numberofcommentariesand

numberoflikes32.

5.4Implementation

Istartedtheinvestigationwithaninterviewwithoneofthepageadministratorsinthe

weekbeforetheactualdatacollection,whenIalsoreceiveduserandusagestatisticsof

thepage “KEINStuttgart21”. I entered the fieldonMonday, 20th ofMarch, and spent

mostofthedayonbothofthepages,whichallowedmetocaptureapproximately75%

ofallactivitiesonthepages.Themaintaskwastoanalysetheconversationsusingmy

researchemphasesasorientationaswellasthedocumentationform.Itookscreenshots

of wall discussions that seemed to be relevant for my research emphases and I

numbered the screenshots and referenced my field notes accordingly. During this

process, I also sent messages to two page members and asked them about their

intentionsandtheirusageofthepages.

Having identified major discussion patterns and relations between the members, I

startedthequantitativepartoftheanalysisonThursdayinthesameweekanalysingall

wallposts(themajorityofwhichIhadalreadyanalysedorat leastread)accordingto

theirtopicsaddressedanddevelopedacategorysystem.Thewholeethnographycanbe

picturedasfollowed.Thearrowssymbolisetheprocesstimewise.Istartedthefieldwork

with an informal interview with one of the administrators. Then the pages were

observedandthediscoursesanalysed,whileatthesametimegettingintocontactwith

pagemembers.Afterthediscourseanalysis,thequantitativeanalysisof500wallposts

wasconducted.

31Forexample:Thewallpost:„Sundayaretheelections.Youknowwhatthatmeans.PutanendtoStuttgart21andnuclearpower.“Technically,thepostcombinesthreetopics:Thefederalstateelections,Stuttgart21andnuclearpower.However,itdoesnotdealwiththeissuesStuttgart21orenergypoliticsinparticular,butcanratherbeunderstoodasanelectionendorsement.ThatiswhyIwouldcodethetopictoberelatedtothefederalstateelections.32TheCodebookispartofthispaperintheappendix.

28

Figure6:Theschemeoftheethnography.

6.ResultsThischaptershowstheresultsoftheethnography.Theresultswillbeanalysedandput

into theoretical context in the next chapter. Here, I want to gather and structure the

resultsaccordingtotheresearchquestions.

6.1User‐andUsage‐Statistics

Theusage‐statisticsweregatheredbyFacebookInsights,anintegratedtrackingtoolfor

pageadministratorsprovidedbyFacebook.Thefirstdiagramsshowthetotalnumberof

Facebookusers,wholikethepage,andtheiractivityonthepageovertime.Bothpages

were launched on the 1st of September 2010 and extended their member base

exponentiallyaftertheescalationoftheconflictonthe30thofSeptember2010.Thepage

“KEIN Stuttgart 21” raised itsmembers from 27 666 to 89 546memberswithin one

month.Afterthat,thepagegrewsloweruntilitreachedasaturationaroundthe100000

member mark. The same applies for the page “Für Stuttgart 21” although the page

gatheredalotofmembersintheweekbeforethefederalstateelections,whentherate

ofnewmembersjumpedupto1000newmembersperdayforalmostaweek.Thepage

crossed the 100 000membersmark already inOctober 2010 andwas able to gather

morethan140000membersinthesum.

The activity of the page members is heavily dependent on the status posts by the

administrators.Thisisespeciallystrikingonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”.Theactivityof

thepagemembershasbeenincreasinglyunsteadyaftertheendofthelastyear.Thiscan

mainly be explained with a change of wall post strategy of the page administrators.

FacebookInsightsdefinesactivityofmembersnotonlybypagevisits,butalsobytheir

responsestowallposts.Wallpoststhatarewrittenbypageadministratorsdonotonly

29

appear on thewall of the particular page, but also in the news stream of every page

member.AndreasBühler,oneof theadministratorsof thepage, speaksofaconscious

changeofstrategy.Inthebeginning,theadministratorsposteduptothreewallpostsa

dayinordertospreadinformationabouttheprotest.Afterthe30thofSeptember,they

restricted themselves to a maximum of two posts a day and decided to only share

certain information. Then they reduced the number of wall posts again. “Around the

turnof theyear,moreandmoreusers jumpedoffafterposts.That iswhywetried to

reduce the frequency of the posts to every two or three days. If there were really

relevantnews,westillposteddaily.”(AndreasBühler,Administratorofthepage“KEIN

Stuttgart21”).

The sameups anddowns inpage activity canbe seenon thepage “Für Stuttgart21”.

Here,thedifferenceinactivityisevenmoredependentontheadministrator’sposts.The

standard deviation of active members on this page is about 6000 members higher

comparedtothepage“KEINStuttgart21”.

The diagrams show how similar the respective developments of daily comments and

‘likes’ are over time on the two pages. The numbers can also be explained with the

postingstrategies.However,theyevenmorecorrelatewiththeeventsandthegeneral

media discourse about the conflict. The first peaks can be explained with the media

attentionthatwascausedbytheeventsaroundthe30thofSeptember.Thenextpeaks

can be put into context with the arbitration ending with the call of the arbitration

statement onNovember, 30th. The last peak occurred on the date of the federal state

electionsonthe27thofMarch.

Unfortunately, Facebook Insights does not allow a correct measuring of the overall

numberofwallpostspostedonapageperday,becausetheprogramdoesnotidentify

wall posts that contain links or pictures. Therefore, it is not possible to provide

comparativediagramsasfortheotherparameters.

30

Figure7:Thedevelopmentofpagemembers,dailyactivemembers,dailycommentsanddaily“Likes”onthepages“KEINStuttgart21”and“FürStuttgart21”fromthe1stofSeptember2010tothebeginningofApril2011.

31

The presented diagrams resemble each other strongly, but there are yet some

remarkabledifferencesconcerningthepageusage.Eventhoughthepage“FürStuttgart

21”was continually up in pagemembers, the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” has a slightly

higheraverageofactivemembers(KEINStuttgart21:28077;FürStuttgart21:27717).

Theaveragenumbersofdailycommentsand“likes”areremarkablyhigheronthepage

“KEINStuttgart21”33.

Asignificantdifferenceisalsoobviousinthedemographicconstitutionofthepages.The

page“FürStuttgart21”hasmoremalemembersandisgenerallyyoungercomparedto

theother group.On thepage “KEINStuttgart 21”,womenandmenare almost evenly

represented.Theagestructureof thegroup isslightlyolderthantheoverallFacebook

averageinGermany.Theusersover34yearsareslightlyoverrepresented.30.6%ofthe

pagemembersareolderthan34years,whereasthisagegroupmakesuponly24%34of

GermanFacebookusers(stateApril2011).Eventhoughageplaysnoroleinthegroup

andamongthegroupmembers, theprofilepicturessuggest thatmanypeopleover34

yearsofagetakepartinthepageactivities.

33Averagedaily“Likes”“FürStuttgart21”:1871;Averagedaily“Likes”“KEINStuttgart21”:2341;Averagedailycomments“FürStuttgart21”:1779;Averagedailycomments“KEINStuttgart21”:1952inthetimeframeSeptember2010toApril201134http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook‐statistics/germany[27/05/2011]

32

Figure8:Theagestructureofthegroupsdividedbymaleandfemale.Unknownusersarenotincluded.State:18thofMarch2011,n=136002;n=97783.

6.2ThematicAnalysis

Tounderstandthediscoursesonthewallsofthepages,theweekofthedatacollection

hastobeputintothecontextoftheeventsthathappenedduringandbeforethatdate.

Therewereseveraleventsthatinfluencedthediscussionsoftheweekstrikingly.Firstof

all, the federal electionswere approaching, forwhich the Stuttgart 21‐opponents had

highhopes.Secondly,thecatastrophearoundthenuclearpowerplant‘Fukushima’that

occurredaftertheearthquakeandtsunamiinJapanonMarch11thwasheavilydiscussed

during that week. Thirdly, on the weekend before the data collection, the federal

electionsinthestate‘Saxony‐Anhalt’hadtakenplace.

The events around Fukushima influenced the German energy policy strongly. After

extending the life‐span of nuclear energy in Germany in autumn, the government

announced amoratoriumof the extension and shut down sevenof the oldest nuclear

powerplants immediatelyafter the incident in Japan, twoof them in thestateBaden‐

Württemberg.Thiswasrelevant for the federalstateelections inBaden‐Württemberg.

Not only has the biggest opposition party Die Grünen always been against the use of

nuclearpower,StefanMappus,headofthefederalstategovernment(“Ministerpräsident

of Baden‐Württemberg”), has always greatly supported nuclear energy and played an

important role in theextensionof theuseofnuclearpower.Theevents inFukushima

and the u‐turn in energy politics by Chancellor Angela Merkel and the federal

governmenthithimrightduringtheelectioncampaign35.Politicalcommentatorsagreed

after the elections that the energy policy was the main topic that had cost him the

electionsandleadtothefirst“green”MinisterpräsidentinGermany.Thisisbackedbya

study of Infratest dimap and ARD, which states that 45% of the voters declared

environmental‐andenergypolicyasthemostimportanttopicintheelections36.Inthe

electionsonthe27thofMarch,DieGrünenreceived24,2%ofthevotesandcamesecond

afterMappus’ CDU (39%) followed by SPD (23,1%) and FDP (5,3%). Grüne and SPD

were thus able to forma coalition so that, now for the first time in thehistoryof the

state,theCDUisnotinpower.

35http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/baden‐wuerttemberg‐stefan‐mappus‐im‐interview‐diese‐bilder‐waren‐ganz‐schrecklich‐1.1076956[27/05/2011]36http://stat.tagesschau.de/wahlen/2011‐03‐27‐LT‐DE‐BW/umfrage‐aktuellethemen.shtml[27/05/2011]

33

The federal state elections in Saxony‐Anhalt played a subordinated role on the pages

duringthatweekeventhoughtheyhadtakenplaceontheweekendrightbeforethedata

collection.Only6of500wallpostsdealtwiththistopic.

Concerningtheactualconflictaboutthestation,ademonstrationwithbetween18000

(official number by the police) and 60 000 (number published by the organisers)

participants tookplaceon theSaturdaybefore thedata collection.Thedemonstration

was also officially directed against nuclear power. On Monday, the 20th, the alliance

againstStuttgart21gaveacollectionof35000signaturesforareferendumtothecity

mayor.Asimilarpetitionhadbeendeniedbefore.

6.2.1TopicsonthePages

ThemostimportanttopicsthatwereaddressedinthewallpostswereStuttgart21,the

upcoming federalstateelectionsaswellas thedebateabout theuseofnuclearpower

andenergypolicy ingeneral.BothStuttgart21andenergypolicywerecrucial for the

federal state elections, however, according to the coding, a wall post addressed the

electionsonlyincaseitdealtexplicitlywiththeeventsuchasforinstanceendorsinga

party,pointing toelectioncampaignevents, commentingon theelectioncampaigning,

commenting on opinion polls for the election or postingmedia commentaries on the

upcomingelections.

Comparingthetwopages,itisstrikingthatthepage“FürStuttgart21”wasmoreissue‐

centred,whereasthepage“KEINStuttgart21”showedabiggervarietyoftopics.Inthe

descriptionof thepage “FürStuttgart21”, theadministrators state thatposts thatare

notrelatedtoS21mightbedeleted.Thepage“KEINStuttgart21”doesnothavesucha

restriction.Energypolicywashighlydiscussedonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”witha

clearbiasagainsttheuseofnuclearpower,whereasthetopicplayedaminorroleonthe

otherpage.33of250wallpostsonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”addressedthenuclear

power debate,while for instance pointing to protest events against nuclear power (7

posts)ordiscussingtheenergypolicyofthefederalstategovernment(12posts).

Bothpagesaddressedthecurrentfederalstategovernment(whichwasatthattimestill

a coalition of CDUandFDP) in severalwall posts bymeans of criticismon the “KEIN

Stuttgart21”‐pageandgeneralstatementsto“keepupthegoodwork”onthepage“Für

Stuttgart21”.Facebookwasaddressedsurprisinglyofteneitherinself‐referencetothe

group for example by commenting on the number of pagemembers or links to other

Facebookpages.

34

Both pages had some posts that featured general political positions and were not

explicitly linkedtoStuttgart21oranyotherpolitical issue.Onthepage“FürStuttgart

21”, 10 posts discredited the party Die Grünen on a general level, whereas the other

group featured criticism of party politics in general (4 posts) as well as of elites (2

posts).

Figure9:Thetopicsaddressedonthepage“FürStuttgart21”in%.n=250.

DebateaboutNuclearPower

1%

FederalGovernment

2%Facebook8%

FederalElectionsBW25%

FederalElectionsSA1%

Stuttgart2153%

GeneralPoliticalPositions5%

CityStuttgart2%

Other3%

Topics"FürStuttgart21"in%

DebateaboutNuclearPower

13% FederalStateGovernment

4%Facebook5%

FederalStateElections/BW

28%

FederalElections/SA

1%

Stuttgart2141%

GeneralPoliticalPositions4%

CityStuttgart1%

Other3%

Topics"KEINStuttgart21"in%

35

Figure10:Thetopicsaddressedonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”in%.n=250.

6.2.2TheDiscussionofStuttgart21

The actual issue Stuttgart 21 was of course the main topic on both pages. While

analysingthepoststhatdealtwiththeconflictaroundthecentralstation,thefocuswas

particularly on whether or not people used concrete arguments that advocated the

buildingofthestationorthatdismissedit.Stuttgart21andtheprotestaroundthetopic

werediscussedverydifferentlyonthetwopagesthis iswhydifferentcategorieswere

chosen.Thefollowingfigures11and12canthusnotbecomparedtoeachother.

Onbothpages,38%of theposts thataddressedStuttgart21containedargumentation

fororagainstthestationordiscusseddetailedquestionsabouttheprojectsuchas,for

instance,theinclinationofrailwaytracks,legalaspectsofareferendumorquestionsof

project funding.Theprotestmovementwasalsoamatterofdiscussiononbothpages.

Onethirdofallpostsonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”informedabout,commentedonor

mobilisedforprotestactivitiesthattookplaceduringthattime.Ontheotherpage,the

protestactivitieswerealsoheavilydiscussed.However,thepagemembersdidnotonly

debate about the activities of the protest movement, but also about the protest

movement as such, themanners of itsmembers and how the protest presented itself

publicly.Thosepostswerebiasedanddiscreditedtheprotestmovement,forinstance,as

undemocratic,subversiveandterrifying.

Sevenofthe250postsonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”andtwoofthepostsonthepage

“Für Stuttgart 21” quoted posts from the other page. Those posts received a lot of

feedbackonbothpages. The9posts received in average14,1 commentswhereas the

overallaverageofcommentstoawallpostwas3,9onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”and

6,9onthepage“FürStuttgart21”.

Interestingly, 8% of the 250 posts on the page “Für Stuttgart 21” featured criticism

towards the media coverage of the conflict especially directed against the largest

regional newspaper Stuttgarter Zeitung. Most of these posts claimed that Stuttgarter

Zeitunghadabias towardstheprojectcritics.However, thenewspaperwassubject to

criticismevenonthepage“KEINStuttgart21”.

36

Figure11:ThediscussionoftheissueStuttgart21onthepage“FürStuttgart21”dividedbytopicin%.n=133.

Figure12:ThediscussionoftheissueStuttgart21onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”dividedbytopicin%.n=102.

ProtestActivities9%

BehaviourProtest

Movement16%

Solidarity7%

EventNote4%

DiscreditingActors5%

MediaCriticism8%

Other12% Argumentsfor/

InformationtoS213%

QuestionsofDetail17%

ArgumentsagainstS21/Confrontation

11%

OfzicialStatements8%

Arguments38%

TopicsStuttgart21in%­Für

ProtestActivities33%

Confrontation8%

MediaCommentary

3%

Other8%

EventNote6%

30.09.3%

ArgumentsagainstS2110%

QuestionsofDetail18%RequestofInformation

3%OfzicialStatements

8%

Arguments38%

TopicsStuttgart21in%­KEIN

37

6.2.3Likes,Comments,Links

During the time of the data collection, more posts were written on the page “KEIN

Stuttgart 21”. However, the posts on the page “Für Stuttgart 21” received more

commentariesonaverage.78postsofthe250onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”received

nocommentsatall,whereasontheotherpagethisappliedonlyto38posts.Intermsof

‘likes’therewasnodifferencebetweenthepages.Allpostsreceivedaround6,5likeson

average. It is hard to identify any correlation between the comments and the topics

addressed, only that wall posts which were self‐referential to the Facebook page

receivedlesscommentsonaverage.

Therewasahugedifferencebetweenthepages in termsof including links in thewall

posts.Almost two thirdsofallwallpostson thepage “KEINStuttgart21”containeda

linktoanexternalwebsite.Often,thesamelinkswerepostedatdifferenttimesjustto

keep the stream updated. The page can thus almost be described as a publishing

platform.Themostcommondomainthatreceived links fromthepage“KEINStuttgart

21” was www.facebook.com followed by www.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de,

www.youtube.com and www.stuttgarter‐nachrichten.de. Other popular media outlets

suchaswww.stern.deorwww.spiegel.dereceivedseverallinksaswell.Theremainder

of the links split up on minor news websites as well as websites from the protest

network (among those most prominently the website www.bei‐abriss‐aufstand.de,

whichreceivedsixlinks).Incomparison,only67postsofthe250analysedwallpostson

thepage“FürStuttgart21”containedalink.

Figure13:Theuseoflinkinginwallpostsonthetwopagesin%.n=250each.

Tosummarizethispart,threeinterestingpointshavetobestated:Firstly,thewallposts

featured awide variety of topics, especially in the group against Stuttgart 21. This is

partlyamirroroftheprotestmovementingeneral,whichcanratherbedescribedasa

politicalmovement thanan issuenetwork.On the topicStuttgart21, it isstriking that

38

thepage“KEINStuttgart21”isratherself‐referential,whereasthegroup“FürStuttgart

21”refersverymuchtotheprotestmovementanditsactivities,butconsideringthatthe

allianceinsupportofStuttgart21wasfoundedinreactiontotheprotestmovement,this

maynotcomeasasurprise.Inotherwords:Thepagewouldprobablynotexist,ifthere

wasnotacountermovement.

Secondly, it is interestingthatthepage“KEINStuttgart21”receivedmoreposts inthe

timeof thedatacollection,however thepostson thepage “FürStuttgart21” received

morecommentsonaverage.Finally,thehighnumberoflinkspostedonthepage“KEIN

Stuttgart21”isremarkable,whencomparingthetwopages.

6.3ReciprocityandContestation

Oneof the researchaimswas to findout towhatextent contradictoryargumentsand

opinionswerediscussedonthetwopagesandhowthepagesdealtwitheachother.

6.3.1Architecture

The “Info”‐Tabs of the two pages both link only to biased websites such as

www.kopfbahnhof‐21.de,www.parkschuetzer.de,www.stuttgarterappell.deonthepage

“KEIN Stuttgart 21” or www.fuerstuttgart21.de, www.prostuttgart‐21.de and

www.stuttgart21‐kommt.deonthepage“FürStuttgart21”.Therearenolinkstoneutral

orcontradictorywebsites.Contradictoryopinionscanthusonlybeexpressedeitherasa

wallpost,acommentarytoawallpostoradiscussionpostonthediscussionboard.

Thepage“KEINStuttgart21”statesinthesection‘CompanyOverview37’thatthepageis

ameetingplace foreveryonewho is against Stuttgart21.Thepage “FürStuttgart21”

statesthatthepageshouldprovideaconstructiveatmosphereofdialogueonthebasis

ofsupportingStuttgart21.Thedesignofthepagesisthustocaterforacommunityof

like‐minded people rather than discussing the issue from different perspectives.

However, both administrators stated in their e‐mails that there is still a dialogue

betweensupportersandcriticsoneachpage.

6.3.2Arguments

Thediscussed issues on the twopageswere very similar and often links to the same

newspaper articles were posted. However, the discussion and commentaries to the

issueswereofcoursecompletelyopposing.Thecollectionofsignaturesthatwashanded

37ThesectionisnamedbyFacebook.Obviously,thepagesdonotbelongtoanycompany.

39

tothecitymayorofStuttgartonMonday, the21stofMarch,waspostedanddiscussed

severaltimesonbothwalls.Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,thiswasseenasasymbolic

event that showed the broad criticism against the project among the citizens of

Stuttgart, whereas on the other page, the event was mainly discussed under legal

aspects accusing the alliance against Stuttgart 21 to raise expectations with the

referendum,whichcouldneverbefulfilled.

On the same day, Die Grünen released their own stress test of the new station plans

stating that the capacity of the new station would be insufficient. The study was

discussed on both pages from completely different points of view. On the page “Für

Stuttgart 21”, the commentaries pointed to a lack of competence on the side of Die

Grünen and discredited the study as an obviousmanoeuvre in the election campaign

(“DurchsichtigesWahlkampfmanöver”).Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,thestudywas

seenasanewargumentagainsttheconstructionofthestation.

Thisshowsthatbothpageswereindeedwell‐informedabouttheargumentsoftheother

partyandeven talkedabout it.However, thediscussionwasone‐sidedandadvocated

mostlyoneopiniononly.Especiallythepage“FürStuttgart21”wasverymuchoriented

towards the activists and in particular their behaviour and the supposedly aggressive

appearanceoftheprotestmovementingeneral.Somemembersofbothpagesseemedto

followtheotherpageaspassivereadersandreferredtotheotherpagewith“overthere”

(“drüben”). Among the sample of the quantitative analysis, 6 wall posts on the page

“KEIN Stuttgart 21” aswell as 2wall posts on the page “Für Stuttgart 21” picked up

discussions from the other page and sometimes even featured screenshots of the

particularposts.Thecommentariestothesepostswereharshandinonecase,members

of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” even thought of legal steps against amember of the

otherpage.

6.3.3Discussion

Discussionsthatfeaturedopposingargumentswererare,however,theyoccurredfrom

time to time. It seemed that theywouldrather takeplaceon thepage “KEINStuttgart

21”,thatmeansthatmembersoftheotherpagewould‘comeover’toleaveacomment.

OneofthesupportersofStuttgart21wasalreadywell‐knowntothecommunityonthe

page “KEINStuttgart 21” andhis commentsweredealtwith sceptically or sometimes

ironically.Inaprivatemessage,herevealedthatheconsciouslychosetogetincontact

withtheprojectcriticsandthatheunderstoodhisrolenottobeprovoking,butinstead

40

tode‐escalate.Accordingtothepageadministratorsof“KEINStuttgart21”,discussions

betweensupportersandcriticshaveoftenescalatedandendedinverbalbashing.Asa

result, the administrators had developed a netiquette and started banning members

from the page, who behaved inappropriately. According to the administrators, they

enforcedthesenewrulesverystrictlyagainstsupportersofS21.Regardlessofhowpage

membersdealtwithopposingarguments, itwasobviousonbothpages thatmembers

with contradicting opinions were considered not to ‘belong to the group’, but to be

strangers,who‘cameover’fromtheotherpage.

During theobservation, somediscussions couldbe found,whichdid featureopposing

arguments. However, theywere not about the issue Stuttgart 21. In one case, a page

member argued for the energy policy of his favoured party FDP on the page “KEIN

Stuttgart21”andreceivedalotofcriticism.

AnexplanationforthelackofrationaldiscussionabouttheissueS21couldbethetime

ofthestudy.Aftersuchalongdebateaboutthestation,everybodyhadprobablyalready

formedher/hisopinion.Inonewallpost,amemberofthepage“KEINStuttgart21”even

encouragedthepagememberstoignorethesupportersoftheprojectandtoratherturn

tothose,whoarestillundecided.Unliketheexperiencesofthepageadministrators,the

discussions that featured opposing arguments were less insulting towards the

counterpartsthansomeoftheotherwallpostsatleastduringthatweek.

Itcanbesummarizedthatbothgroupstalkedabouteachother,butnotreallywitheach

other. There seemed to be many members, who followed both pages, thus, a

controversial discussion seemed to be theoretically possible. However, instead of

commenting on the posts on the page, they took the input to their own page and

discusseditthere,butnotalwaysinarationalorpersuasiveway.

6.4Ideology

6.4.1KEINStuttgart21

Out of the four administrators of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”, one is active for Die

Grünen,onestandsclosetothelocalpoliticalgroupSÖS(ecologicalandsocialStuttgart)

andone ispartof theprotestgroup ‘AktiveParkschützer’,who formsa rather radical

part of the protest movement. Yet, the page was created independently and under a

private initiativeanduntilnowtherehasneverbeenanofficial commissioningby the

alliance against Stuttgart 21 regarding the page. Even though the alliance against

41

Stuttgart 21 consists of political parties andother organisationswith agendas that go

beyond the issue Stuttgart 21, the protest movement has attracted people from all

politicalcampsandoppositiontotheprojecthasbeenfoundinallpoliticalparties,but

mostlyamongmembersofDieGrünenandDieLinke.Accordingtotheadministrators,

left‐liberalandenvironmentalistideasareprevalentonthepage,whichwasprovedfor

instanceby thestrongpositionagainstnuclearpower thatwasexpressedevenbefore

thecatastropheinFukushimaandthebroadsupportofDieGrünen,whendiscussingthe

upcoming federal state elections. In addition, the pagemembers criticised the former

MinisterpräsidentStefanMappusandthefederalstategovernmentstronglyhopingfora

changeofgovernments.4ofthe250analysedwallpostsdiscreditedMappuspersonally.

The ideological consensus along the lines of energy and federal state politics was

evident.

However, therewerewall posts that showed ideological heterogeneity. Especially the

military intervention in Libya was discussed controversially on the page and even

createdanalliancebetweenonesupporterofS21andsomeopponents.Alsointeresting

wasthefactthatthesocialdemocrats(SPD)werecompletelymissinginthediscussions

on the wall. Among the parties who support Stuttgart 21, themembers of the social

democratswerethemostcritical.EveninDecember2010,whentheprojectreachedits

highest acceptance in the opinion polls, still almost 40% of the SPD partisans were

against the project38. However, the only sign of the SPD on the pagewere two other

pagesthatthepagelikes(“SPDlergegenS21”&“SPD‐WählergegenS21”).Eventhough

itcanbeassumedthatvotersoftheSPDweremembersofthepage,theydidnotreveal

theirpartypreference.

6.4.2FürStuttgart21

Accordingtothepageadministrators,thepageisdesignedasaforumabovepartylines

andsupportersofS21canbefoundineverypoliticalparty.Infact,thepageappearedto

be far less ideologically shaped compared to the other one. Thiswas showcased by a

wallpostagainstDieGrünen,whichreceivedmorethan70commentswithinonehour.

Thewallpost featured theheadline “DieGrünen,no thanks!”anddescribed indrastic

rhetoric,why theparty isnotable tobring thecountry forward.The first reply to the

postcamefromthepageadministratorswhoencouragedthepagememberstodoless38InfratestDimaphttp://www.infratest‐dimap.de/umfragen‐analysen/bundeslaender/baden‐wuerttemberg/laendertrend/2010/dezember/[13/04/2011]

42

“party‐bashing” even in times of election campaigning and instead focusmore on the

issue S21. The following comments featured all kinds of positions from “green” S21‐

supporters,whocomplainedaboutthepoliticalexploitationofthepage,overageneral

discussion about environmentalist ideas to posts that agreed with the initial party

criticism. The discussion even developed into a debate about nuclear power and

revealed controversial positions there. After a while, the administrators emphasised

againthattheydonotwantanypartypoliticsonthepage.Thisisonlyoneexamplethat

showed ideological ambiguities. Other wall posts exposed discontent with

MinisterpräsidentMappusorthegoverningparties.

However,therewasstillanoverallbiasagainstDieGrünenwhichwasjustnotasstrong

asthesupportofDieGrünenontheotherpage.Astrongconsensusexistedconcerning

the image of the protest movement that was pictured as undemocratic, hostile and

dangerous, aswell as concerning the importance of the economic strength of Baden‐

Württemberg.Moreover,membersexpressedprideintheirfederalstateandshoweda

highdegreeoflocalpatriotism.Interestingly,thepagedisplayedaharshmediacritique

mainlydirectedagainstStuttgarterZeitungpresumingbiasedconflictcoverageaswell

asaninfiltrationbytheprojectcritics.

6.4.3Rhetoric

Inclusion and exclusion from the pages could be retraced by the accusations and

nicknamesthatthemembersofthepageshadfortheopposinggroups.Especiallyonthe

page“FürStuttgart21”, themembersoftheprotestmovementwerecalledveryharsh

names.Oneexpressionthatappearedtoberatherstandard,whenspeakingofmembers

of the protest movement was “Keintologen” – a blend of the words “Kein” (KEIN

Stuttgart 21) and “scientology” as an ironic reference to the naïve faith the protest

movement put into the protest. Die Grünen as well as Die Linke were called

“communists”severaltimesandwereaccusedofmaking“propaganda”(atermthathas

a strong negative connotation in German) aswell as of “agitating” (“hetzen”). On the

other hand, Die Grünen were described as romantic dreamers, who “want to trade

economicstrengthforbonfireromantic”.Inonecase,someonenamedDieGrünen“left‐

fascists”,butthepersonremainedisolated.

Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,especiallyStefanMappuswasthetargetofname‐giving

and it couldbe consideredas standardnot to call himbyhisname,butbyoneofhis

nicknames, for instance “fatso” (“Fettsack”), “beet face” (“Steckrübengesicht”) or “Don

43

Mappioso”,areferencetothecommonaccusationonthepageofhimactingonthevery

edgeofdemocraticlegitimation.Therewerenoparticularnamesforthemembersofthe

supporter page and they were most often referred to as “Pro’ler”. However, some

pointedtoa“hatecampaign”ontheotherpageandinanotherpost,usersmadefunof

anexaggeratedfearthattheotherpagedisplayedtowardstheprotestmovement.

6.5RationalityandDiscussionStyle

According to Habermas’ Communicative Rationality, the exchange of arguments and

counter‐arguments is themost promisingway of coming to a consensus and rational

decision‐making (Mouffe, 1999, 6). The discourse analysis at hand looks at how

arguments were used in the discussions on the walls and if the discussions strove

towardsaconsensus.

Arguments for or against Stuttgart 21were generally commonly used on both pages.

Amongallposts thatdealtwith the issueStuttgart21,38%of thepostsoneachpage

containedargumentsfororagainsttheprojectorexpressedfactualarguing,whichcould

alsobeinformationontheprojectingeneral.Onthepage“KEINStuttgart21”,onelink

was shared several times which led to a speech by one of the actors in the alliance

against S21, inwhichhe recites 60 lies about Stuttgart 21. The linkwas often shared

with thecomment touse it inorder toconvincepeople to join theprotestmovement.

Several times users requested information on the protest or particular questions

concerning the project. Themembers on both pages reacted quite critically to flawed

conclusions. In one case, a member of the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” stated that the

radioactivity measured in the south of Germany was slightly raised. He received the

criticismthatthiswasaninappropriatecommentandhadbynomeansanyconnection

totheFukushima‐catastrophe.

Asmentioned,discussionsthatexchangedargumentsandcounterargumentswererare.

When they did take place, these kinds of discussion often escalated according to the

administratorsofthepage,whostatedthatafactualexchangetookonlyplacein25%of

the cases.This ratewashigherduring theethnographyandmostof the contributions

stillreceivedatleastoneseriousreply.Infact,thediscussionsseemedtobemorefact‐

based,whenacounter‐positionwasinvolved.

The reaction to counter‐arguments depended verymuch on the rhetoric used. In one

case,auseraskedthegroup“KEINStuttgart21”inawallpost“whattheirproblemis?”

and stated that there were, in his opinion, far more important issues than a central

44

station insomecity.This comment triggereda stormofoutrageabouthisunqualified

commentandonlywhenheclarifiedthathewasactuallyinterestedin“theirproblem”,

he received some factual arguments against the station.One of the users on the page

“KEINStuttgart21”,whowasknownforhisopposingposition,mentionedinaprivate

message that he consciously triednot to formulate his comments in away that could

causepersonalaffront.However,hisprofileseemedtobeafakeprofilenotfeaturingany

personalinformationatall,atypicalcharacteristicof‘trolls’.

6.5.1Flaming&TrollingFlaming took place on both pages, but it was notmainly directed against other page

members, but against politicians or actors andmembers of the protestmovement in

general. In the description of the page “Für Stuttgart 21”, it says that the page is not

meant to be a place of agitation against the other group. However, the rhetoric was

oftentimesratherrough.TherewereseveralreferencestoNazi‐GermanyandtheThird

Reich between the lines of the posts,whichwould start for instancewith statements

such as “therewas another time inGermany,whenpeople just followed their leaders

without reasoning…”. Inonecase,amemberof thepage “FürStuttgart21”pointed to

thelinguisticsimilarityofthenames“Gangolf”and“Adolf”referringtoGangolfStocker,

oneoftheprotestleaders.Postslikethatalsoappearedontheotherpage.Inonecase,a

memberreferredtoMappusasabaton‐nazi(“Schlagstocknazi”).Thoseposts,however,

remained isolated and in one case, a user complained about this rhetoric. Generally,

peoplewereawareofthe languagethatshouldbeusedandifusersbroketheserules,

other users reprimanded them. Considering the extreme polarisation of the conflict,

flamingdid,overall,nothappenallthatoften.

Herringetal.(2002,372)definetrollingasacontributioninaforumthat“entailsluring

othersintopointlessandtime‐consumingdiscussions”.AccordingtoHerringetal.,trolls

aimattriggeringahighamountofresponsesbypostinganincorrect,butnotnecessarily

controversial, message. Generally trolls are more common on Internet discussion

boards,wheretheytakeadvantageoftheiranonymity.Becauseofthelackofanonymity,

trollsarenotcommononSNS.

Both pages tended to discreditwall postswith opposing opinions as trolling and the

mentioned S21‐supporter on the page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”was called a “professional

troll”byoneofthepagemembers.However,duringtheethnography,nowallpostcould

beidentifiedasobvioustrollingaccordingtothedefinitionbyHerringetal.

45

6.6ContextualisationwiththeWholeMovement

Eventhoughtherehasneverbeenanofficialcommissioning, theadministratorsof the

group“KEINStuttgart21”thinkofthepageastheofficialprotestpage.Accordingtothe

administrators, the alliance against Stuttgart 21 underestimated SNS as a marketing

instrument,sotheadministratorsfilledthisgapinaprivateinitiative.

TheFacebook page, in cooperationwith the alliance against S21, organised the “KEIN

Stuttgart21”‐dayonthe5thofMarch.Theeventfollowedtheleadofthe“No‐Berlusconi‐

Day”,aFacebook‐eventinItaly,andfeaturedmassralliesinalmostallofthe70electoral

districts of Baden‐Württemberg on the same day. For that reason, the page

administratorsworkedtogetherwiththeallianceandotherprotestgroups.

The page organised several offline‐meetings before demonstrations that attracted

between 20 to 120 page members. The page administrators stated also that page

membersgotincontactwitheachotherthroughthepageandmetoffline.Severalwall

posts on both pages during the ethnography suggested such offline‐meetings. In one

case,amemberofthepage“FürStuttgart21”proposedameetingofthepagemembers

after the federal state elections in order to “get to know the people behind the Fb‐

profiles”anditwasalsocommontoinvitepeopletopartyeventsorprotestactivities.

The relation of the page “Für Stuttgart 21”with the alliance for S21 did not become

sufficientlyclearinthisstudy.Eventhoughthepressofficeroftheallianceseemedtobe

responsible for the page, the administrators stated that it is not formally intertwined

withthealliance.

7.Discussion

Theresultsprovideabroadpictureof the twopages,whichshowgreatsimilarities in

certain aspects aswell as essential differences. In this chapter, Iwant to sharpen this

picture, while relating the pages to the theoretical dimension of the paper that is

Freelon’smodelofonlinepoliticaldiscussionaswellastheconceptofthepublicsphere.

7.1PublicIssueFocusOne of the key variables in public sphere theory is the public issue focus. Since both

pagesdealwiththepublicissueStuttgart21,bothpagesclearlyfocusontopicsofpublic

concern. The amount of links tomedia articles accounts for a general dependence on

publicdiscoursesrelatedtothetopic. Infact, theactivityonthepagescorrelatedeven

46

withthemediadiscourseaboutthetopicS21(seefigure7).80ofthe163linksposted

on thepage “KEINStuttgart21” referred tomediaservicessuchasnewspapersorTV

andradiobroadcasters.Interestingly,thevarietyofpublicissuesappearedtobemuch

broadercomparedtotheotherpage.

There is no obvious reason for discussing topics other than S21 on a page that is

dedicatedtoS21.However,suchdiscussionsseemedtobeverynormaland,unlikeon

the page “Für Stuttgart 21”, members did not complain about ‘off‐topic’ wall posts.

Remarkable, though, is the fact that themembersmainly discussed those topics that

featured a fairly strong consensus of opinion among the members of the page. Even

though themilitary intervention in Libya and thedevelopments in thenuclear power

plantFukushimasharedaboutthesameamountofattentioninthemainstreammedia,

theinterventioninLibyadidnotplayanyroleinthepagediscussions.Thatcouldpoint

toageneraltendencytoavoidprovocativewallposts.

Thesamecouldbethereasonforthesmallervarietyoftopicsonthepage“FürStuttgart

21”. If a simple wall post about Die Grünen creates a controversial discussion, it is

unlikelytofindconsensusregardinganyotherideologicallyshapedtopic.

7.2IdeologicalHomophilyThisleadstothequestiontowhatextentthetwogroupscountasideologicalentities–

or ‘enclaves’ (Sunstein, 2001) – after all. The discourses on the pages that were not

related to S21wereover all consensual. Controversial topicswere rare.However, the

ideologicalshapeofthepage“FürStuttgart21”wasblurryincomparisontotheother

group.Uptothefederalstateelections,themainconsensuswasthesupportofS21and

the disagreement with the protest movement. After the elections, it seemed that the

group became more political in terms of an overall identification with conservative

politics,industrial‐nearpoliciesandtheoppositiontothenewcoalition.

The page “KEIN Stuttgart 21” displayed a higher degree of ideological homogeneity,

whichgoesalongwiththecharacteristicoftheprotestmovementthathasalwaysalso

been a protest against the political style of the right‐wing federal state government.

Topics such as energy policies showed a high identification with “green” topics and

politics.

WhenitcomestotheissueS21,theideologicalhomophilyisremarkableonbothpages.

Thatisalreadypartlyimpliedbythenamesofthepagesincombinationwiththeactof

‘liking’apageinordertobecomeamember.However,itisstrikingthatthepageskeep

47

co‐existingwithoutactuallyinteractingwitheachother.UnlikethefindingsofKellyetal.

(2005), who found out that the strongest conversational links in USENET‐groups are

acrosspoliticaldivides,themembersoftheFacebookpagesdonottaketheopportunity

toactivelytakepartinthediscussionsontheotherpageandaccordingbehaviourwas

sometimesevendisregardedastrolling.

7.3DeliberativeIndicatorsEventhoughbothpagesdisplaypublicissuefocusandaconsiderablenumberoffactual

discussions,thelackofopposingargumentsoneachpagemakesithardtodefineanyof

thepagesasdeliberative.Itisstrikingthatthetwocampstalkonlyabouteachotherand

not with each other on their Facebook pages. The pages provide no opportunity for

opinion‐making, but request a biased opinion and identification with the

protest/supportermovementinordertotakeactivelypartinthediscussions.Itishard

tosayifthescepticismtowardsthemembersoftheotherpageisaresultoforareason

for the lack of interaction with each other. According to Mendelberg (2002, 157),

“discussion between antagonistic groups can play an important role in reducing

intergroupconflictandbias”.TheFacebookpagesdonotprovidethisfunctionandare

generallynot interested innegotiatingbetweenthetwocamps,butonly insupporting

oneofit.Itiscrucialthatthemembersofthepagesarestrivingforcognitiveconsonance

andthereisatendencyof“filteringout”(Lev‐Ov&Manin,2009,107)opposingviewsby

nottakingthemseriouslyordiscreditingthemrightaway.

However,thesimultaneityofthewallstreamsonbothpagesincreasestheprobabilityof

accessingopposingarguments.Theopposingviewsareoftenonlyoneclickaway.Unlike

researchon ideologicallyhomogenousblogclusters(Lev‐On&Manin,2009,112f), the

linksonthetwopagesprovideaheterogeneoushyperlinkedspacethataimsatkeeping

thepagemembersup todaterather thanadvocatingcertainviews.Especially links to

thesamenewspaperarticlesleadtoclosenesstoopposingviews.Mutz&Martin(2001,

95) point out “that individuals are exposed to farmore dissimilar political views via

newsmediathanthroughinterpersonalpoliticaldiscussants”.However,inthiscase,itis

ratherinterpersonaldiscussiononnewsmediawebsites,whichservethispurpose.

48

One example: An article fromStuttgarter Zeitung39 thatwas simultaneously linked on

bothpagesreceived244commentariesinthecommentarysectiononthenewspaper’s

website. The commentary section featured a highly factual discussion with opposing

views and arguments that went on for over a whole week. It is not said that the

discussantson thenewspaper’swebsite came from theFacebook pages,however, this

merepieceofonlinedeliberationwasaccessiblefrombothpageswithinonlyoneclick.

Many other newspaper articles concerning the issue received high amounts of

commentariesthatfeaturedopposingviews.

This shows that there is a general will to discuss the topic online in a controversial

setting, however, the Facebook pages are not able to provide this opportunity. The

assumed bias on the pages forbids an equal and undominated discussion that is,

according toHabermas’discourseethics,crucial forrational‐criticaldiscourses(Blaug,

1999,11).Thepages seem tobe,whatFraser calls “paralleldiscursivearenas” (1990,

67)thatcollect,gatherandcomfortcertainargumentationsandessentialviews.

Inter‐ideological reciprocity and inter‐ideological questioning is, according to Freelon

(2010),crucialfordeliberativeonlinediscussion.Concludingfromtheanalysisandthe

discussion so far, this is not prominent on the pages, especiallywhenwe (as Freelon

demands) exclude flaming and insulting posts. More interesting here is the aspect of

contestation. Fraser (1990), Papacharissi (2002) and Dahlberg (2007) emphasise the

democraticpotentialofcontestationandconflictratherthanconsensus.Thediscussions

thatactuallyincludedopposingviewscanbereadunderthisaspect.Participantswere

morelikelytopointoutdifferencesbetweentheviewsthanstrivingtoacompromiseor

even consensus. The page members created very obvious ‘we‐them dichotomies’.

Especially on the page “Für Stuttgart 21”, themembers put emphasise on distancing

themselves from the protest movement and to create a stereotypical picture of the

movement for instance by ascribing personality traits to the movement or inventing

nicknamessuchas“Keintologen”.Eventhoughflamingoccurrednotasfrequentlyasone

might expect (surely also due to a lack of interaction in general), name‐calling and

cynicismwasacommonwaytosetone’sowngroupapart fromtheother.Bothpages

showedastrongdogmatism.

39http://www.stuttgarter‐zeitung.de/inhalt.studie‐der‐gruenen‐stuttgart‐21‐bei‐stresstest‐durchgefallen.f49cbb98‐900c‐4a4a‐a5f3‐f093555b50dc.html[26/04/2011]

49

7.4CommunitarianIndicatorsIt is certainly no surprise that the pages have strong communitarian characteristics.

Simply the fact that there are two pages on Facebook suggests the hypothesis of

opposinggroupsoflike‐minded.Theideologicalhomophily,thelackofopposingviews

and aspects of group identification display very closed interest groups that have an

undeliberative self‐understanding. These results are in line with former research on

virtualcommunities for instancepresentedbySunstein(2001). Identificationwiththe

aims of the groups is the entrance ticket to participation and more important than

recruiting undecidedmembers or convincing peoplewith opposing views. The group

identitycreatesawarm,homelyatmosphereandcloserelationshipsbetweenthepage

membersthatisonlyoccasionallydisturbedby“outsiders”withopposingviews.Lev‐On

& Manin (2009, 111) consider this characteristic as typical for virtual communities,

“wheremembersareawareoftheircommongroupmembershipbutmaybeotherwise

anonymoustooneanother”.

However,therearesomedifferencesbetweenthetwopages.Thepage“KEINStuttgart

21”canbedescribedasmorecommunitarian.Ontheonehand,thepagemembersshow

ahigherideologicalhomogeneity,whichmanifestsitselfintherangeofdiscussedtopics

aswellasthepoliticalpartyorientation.Ontheotherhand,thepageisusedtomobilise

people to take part in demonstrations and other events (and even organising events

themselvessuchasthe“KEINStuttgart21”‐dayinMarch).Inrelationtotheotherpage,

italsoappearstobemuchmoreaim‐oriented,whichisnosurpriseconsideringthatthe

protestmovementaimsatgettingridoftheplannedstation,whereasthesupportersdo

notparticularlyaimatanything,butratherwanttoexpresstheirsupport.

Thisfavoursthehypothesisthateventhoughthepage“FürStuttgart21”hasabroader

memberbase,theotherpagefeaturesadensernetworkandstrongersustainability.The

hypothesis isbackedbytheusagedataof thepagethatshowsahigheractivityonthe

page “KEIN Stuttgart 21”, despite a smaller member base. According to Ronfeldt &

Arquilla(2001,324citedinPickard,2006),anetwork“issustainedbyawinningstory

and a well‐defined doctrine, and in which all this is layered atop advanced

communication systemsand restson strongpersonal and social ties at thebase”.The

denselocalofflinestructureofthemovementandthepublicmanifestationoftheprotest

through demonstrations and camps in the park around Stuttgart castle makes the

50

networkmoretangibleandpointstopublic‐privatedichotomiesinthedescriptionofthe

protest.

7.5LiberalIndicatorsEventhoughtheprotest/supportermovementwasnotpartoftheanalysisassuch,itis

necessary to put the Facebook pages into the context of the whole movement.

Consideringthatthesupportingcitizenswerefarlesspublic/visibleduringmostofthe

conflict(theofficialactorsofcoursewere),theFacebookpage“FürStuttgart21”fulfilsa

slightlydifferentfunctionthatseemstoaimmoreatlegitimatingratherthanadvocating.

In fact, theformerfederalstateministerMappusmentionedthegroupinan interview

withthenewsmagazineFocusinSeptember2010asanindicatorfortheacceptanceof

the project40. The privateness of the supporters points to Papacharissi’s (2010)

description of networked activism. Facebook offers the opportunity for supporters to

expresstheiropinioninaprivateorsemi‐publicenvironment,withouthavingtojoinan

institutionalisednetworkor toprotest in the streets.This applies evenmore to those

pagemembers,whojoinedthepage,buthavenotactivelytakenpartindiscussions.

Missingideologicalpreconditionsandaclearissuefocuslowertheentrancebarriersto

thegroup,anobservation,thatisaccordingtoBennett(2003),typicalforpost‐modern

protestmovements.Hepointsoutthatthe“sentimentof ‘anti‐ism’isstrong”,however,

“’ideology’ here functions more at the level of a shared normative perspectives on

particularissues”.BeingawareofthefactthatthetwoFacebookpagesdonotrepresent

the two movements in their sum, I argue that the page “Für Stuttgart 21” can be

attributed with rather individualistic characteristics and that the barriers to join the

page are lower considering that there are only two crucial positions necessary: the

supportofS21andprotestagainsttheprotest.Thiscouldprovideanexplanationforthe

highernumberofpagemembers.

To summarize this part, it can be stated that even though both pages are focused on

public issues, none of the pages can be described as deliberative due to the lack of

reciprocity. Both of the pages are clearly communitarian, whereas the page “KEIN

Stuttgart 21” represents a denser communitydue to thehigher amount of ideological

homogeneity and a higher degree ofmobilisation and general will to physical action.

40http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/focus‐interview‐mappus‐warnt‐vor‐gewaltbereiten‐stuttgart‐21‐demonstranten_aid_555698.html[29/04/2011]

51

Facebook and especially the pages‐function allows for identity politics (Papacharissi,

2010) or lifestyle politics (Bennett, 2003) due to the easy way of expressing one’s

politicalstatement.Thisiscertainlythecaseonbothofthepages,whereasthepage“Für

Stuttgart21”featuresahigherdegreeofindividualisminthesenseofFreelon’sliberal‐

individualistic model due to weaker ideological preconditions and a stronger issue

focus.

7.6TheDigitalPublicSphereinaRadicalDemocracyThedescriptionofthetwopagesbacksthefragmentationhypothesis.Eventhoughboth

pages dealwith public issues, they build up small interest groups that lack cohesion.

However, the question remains towhat extent this affects thepublic sphere andhow

thispicturecanbeintegratedinpublicspheretheory.

Oneofthemainfearsofthefragmentationpessimistsisthatsocietylosesthecommon

ground to decide on political topics. The analysis shows that the common ground is

prominentlygivenintheexaminedcase.Bothpagesmonitorthemediaenvironmentof

thetopicandreviewmediacommentarycarefully.UnlikethefearofSunsteinorLev‐On

&Manin, themainstreammediaserveasan importantreferenceandensurethatboth

campsknowabouttheargumentsthatexistintheelitediscourse–iftheypromotetheir

ownviewornot.

Theanalysisshowsthatthepageshaveanimportantinformatoryfunction,afactorthat

isnot includedinFreelon’smodel.Askedfortheimportanceofthepageforthewhole

protestmovement,oneoftheadministratorsofthepage“KEINStuttgart21”answered

that the page is the “news ticker of themovement”. In fact, the analysis showed that

especiallyinthisgroup,memberssharedalargenumberoflinksandmonitoredalmost

the complete German media landscape. However, it is not only about information

sharing, but also about reading media commentary together and discussing it in a

communityoflike‐minded.Itis,thus,notthecasethatthepagessealedthemselvesoff

from opposing views. While being aware of the counter‐arguments and movements,

theychoosetokeepthediscussionaboutthemclosedandone‐sided.

OnFacebook,bothpagesbuildsemi‐publicenclaves,however,thatdoesnotmeanthat

themembersofthepageswouldnotbuildacommonpubliconotheronlineoccasions

such as, for instance, the commentary section ofmajor newswebsites. The discussed

example above from Stuttgarter Zeitung shows that discourses can become

52

controversial and two‐sided, when they happen on neutral and public ground. This

interpretation leads toFraser’s (1990,68)perceptionof counterpublics,whichon the

onehandfunctionasabaseofidentificationandgroup‐buildingandontheotherhand

asa“trainingground”forthebiggerdiscourseoutsidethecomfortzone.

Fraser’sanalysisisfocusedonmarginalisedgroups,whomisstheaccessortheabilityto

takepart in themaindiscourse,acharacteristic thatdoesnotapply to theresearched

case.Neither are thegroups ‘resource‐low’, nor cananyof the sidesunequivocallybe

describedasthedominantopinioninthisverycomplexconflict.Whilethemembersof

theprotestmovementmightperceiveof themselvesas themarginalisedcitizens,who

have to fight against political and economical elites, the supportersmight perceive of

themselves as victims of biased media coverage and local campaigning. However,

Downey(2007,117)makesthepointthatcounter‐publicsdonothavetobecomposed

ofsubalterns,but“maypossesscapitalandculturalcapital”.Themainpointisthatthey

lineupforradicalchangetosociety.

What is important here is that two differing groups exist that both share the same

culturalinputanddiscursiveground.Inherworkonanagonisticpublicsphere,Chantal

Mouffe (2005) emphasises the need for confrontation of opposing political views in

order to fight political apathy and support participation. “Consensus is neededon the

institutions that are constitutive of democracy (…), but there will always be

disagreementconcerningthemeaningandmethodsofimplementingthosevalues.Ina

pluralist democracy, such disagreement should be considered legitimate and indeed

welcome” (ibid., 125). The analysed case does very much display such a radical

democratic scenario, especially if we consider the pages not as marginalised group

against a dominant political opinion, but as passionate exponents of citizen opinions.

Dahlgren for instance argues: “Her [Mouffe’s] vision of a pluralistic democracy (…)

emphasizes not only that subject positions change and evolve according to

contingencies, but also that identities in the context of democratic engagement are

rooted in antagonisms with other groups – ever‐shifting we‐they constellations”

(Dahlgren,2007,61).

Mouffe’s and Dahlgren’s positive attitude towards fragmentation evolves from their

wishtoincreasecitizenengagementwithpolitics.Accordingtothem,opposingopinions

cultivate a more emotional and passionate political environment, where people feel

53

eager to make their point and not disencouraged by the rule of the best (and most

rational)argument.Eventhoughitwasnottheaimofthisthesistocoverallthedetails

around the conflict Stuttgart 21, the reader might have got an impression of the

exceptionalityofthiscitizenmovementthatevencoinedthe‘wordoftheyear’in2010

“Wutbürger”(angrycitizen),areferencetoupper‐andmiddle‐classcitizens,whoopenly

express their anger about politics. The conflict on the whole can be described as

extremelyemotionalanditisworthwhilementioningthatthevoterparticipationinthe

federalstateelectionswas13percentagepointshigherthanintheelectionsfiveyears

before.Thedownsideoftheemotionalityoftheconflictisthehighamountofdogmatism

and inability to talk with each other that could be retraced on the Facebook pages.

Moreover,inthegroup“FürStuttgart21”,memberscomplainedaboutadividedcityand

hostileatmosphereinStuttgartthatwasevenreferredtoasa“civilwar”.Itisuptothe

new government now to de‐escalate the conflict and eventually bring together the

opposingfractionsagain.

Thequestion remains,what the role of social networking sites such asFacebook is in

this radicalisation process? The fact is: The protest movement is not dependent on

Facebook. Quite the reverse, the Facebook page was the last measure in the

communicative strategy of the movement. According to the administrators, the main

advantage is that informationonFacebook is fast, easy to consumeandeasy to share.

Especiallythelastpointisthemoststriking.Whilecounter‐publicshaveexistedbefore

theInternet,socialnetworkingsitesmakeitmucheasierforthemtodiffusethroughthe

SocialWeb.Everyonewholikesoneofthepagesautomatically 'recommends’thepage

toher/hiscontacts–ifs/hewantsornot.Socialnetworkingsitesallowthegatheringof

hugepublicswithinafewdays,whichisnotonlyconfirmedbythiscase,butbyarange

of other politically motivated initiatives on Facebook such as the “Virtual ‘March of

Millions’ in Solidarity with Egyptian Protestors” in February 2011 – an event that

gatheredalmostonemillionparticipantswithinashorttime.PoliticalactonFacebookis

evidentintwocontexts:Oneisthe(counter‐)publicoftheinterestgroup,theotherone

istheratherprivatecontextofsocialcontactswhotakenoticeofthepoliticalstatement.

It is thus not possible to explain SNS politics solely with fragmentation theory, nor

should it solely be declared a post‐modern notion of identity politics that misses

collective orientation. Depending on the individualmotivation, the publiceness of the

politicalstatementisscalableandsoisthecommitmenttopoliticalaction.

54

Figure14:ThecontextsofpoliticalstatementonSNS.

Can the pages be described as a digital public sphere in theHabermasian sense?The

answer depends on how important one considers deliberation. Even though

Papacharissi (2010,157ff) recognisespluralistic counterpublics as typical for Internet

activism,sheconcludesthatInternettechnologiesaugmentthenegotiationofpoliticsin

aprivatesphereandactuallyleadawayfromadeliberativepublicsphere.Dahlgrenon

the other hand rates citizen engagement higher than deliberation. Both views are

contestable.Politicaldiscussiononlineis–withorwithoutdeliberation–acontribution

to public negotiation of politics, but what is the point, if it does not lead to any

consensus?

In my opinion however, this case serves very well as an example of a digital public

multispherescenario.Thisisespeciallyduetothefactthattheprotestmovementisnot

an Internetmovement, but an actual physical protest. TheFacebook pages reflect the

protestandfeaturealldefiningcharacteristicsforapublicsphere:Theyarebuiltupof

private citizens, the groups are focused on public issues, they are independent of

economic or political influence and they feature discourse about political topics. Only

the deliberative function and thus the possibility to justify political decisions are not

given,butaswesaw,thisisverywellpossibleinotheronlinecontexts.Thecommentary

functionofnewsmediawebsitesplaysanimportantroleherethathastomyknowledge

been neglected in research so far. The pages do not resemble so much the neutral

coffeehouses,butrathertheclosedpartisanclubsthatHabermas(1990)mentionsinthe

remainderofhisbook.

According to the studied case, the fear of losing the common ground for political

decisionisnotgiven–eveninapolarisedcaseasthepresentedone.Thegroupshighly

relyonmainstreammediaaswellasonofficialactors,andargumentsof theopposing

groupsarewellknown.Thefearofradicalisationisgiven,ifwedecidetobeafraidofit.

If we, like Mouffe and Dahlgren, welcome radicalisation as a development towards

citizen participation and politisation, we should bring the issue to the next level and

55

discusshowpoliticaldecisioncanbeachievedinapolarisedsocietyandwhatrolethe

Internetcanplayinsuch.

8.Conclusion&LimitationsThe analysed case offered a great opportunity to discuss important issues in current

digital public sphere research. It opened the eyes for political qualities of social

networking sites besides deliberation, which should also be incorporated in public

spheretheory.

SNSpoliticsfeaturetheambiguityofbeingbothprivate,egocentricpoliticalstatements

as well as public negotiation of politics. The two analysed Facebook pages can be

described as counterpublics and discussed under radical democratic aspects. At the

sametime,joiningapagecanbedescribedasidentitypolitics.Researchshouldtakeinto

accountbothsidesandlocatepoliticalactivitiesintheirofflinecontexts.

InarecentarticleintheNewYorkTimes,MalcolmGladwellmadetheprovocativepoint

that “the revolutionwill notbe tweeted”41 and referred to the importanceofphysical

actioninaprotestmovements.ThecaseofStuttgart21alsomakescleartheimportance

ofonline‐offline integration,whenresearchingpoliticalactivism.Deliberationscholars

might be disappointed by the lack of controversial discussion, but in the context of a

physicalprotest,SNSprovidegreatopportunitieswhichwecouldalsoseenintherecent

Arab revolution, where SNSwere intensively used for information, identification and

mobilisationofthemovement.

My suggestion for further research is to analyse online politics in connection to the

offlinecontexts.ThisstudyfocusedsolelyontheFacebookpagestothetopicStuttgart

21.Additionalresearchontheofflineprotestmovementcouldhelptobetterunderstand

the online environments and clarify questions such as: “Are offline group differences

mirrored on SNS?”, “Does group polarisation take place offline or is it an online

phenomenon?”, “What impact do SNS have on the social ties between the protest

members?”. The integrationof offline andonline research could eitherbe achieved in

systemicapproachesorattheindividualleveloftheprotestmembers.VanessaDirksen

et al. (2010) present an approach of connective ethnography that could be helpful to

41http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell[16/05/2011]

56

methodologicallygrasptheonline‐offlineconnections,somethingthat ismissinginthe

presentedstudy.

This study also neglects questions of accessibility of the public sphere aswell as the

digital divide discussion. Both play an important role in public sphere research and

mightbejustasrelevantinresearchonSNS.Especiallyindevelopingcountries,theuse

ofSNSforpoliticalinitiativemightbeimportanttoanalyseunderaccessibilityaspects.

Thepresentedcase iscertainlyuncharacteristic inonlinedeliberationresearchdue to

thelocalandissue‐centredorientationoftheprotest.Thisiswhythestudycouldlookat

the theory from a different perspective and add this perspective to the established

research. It does not claim any generalisation on the SNS activities of other protest

movements,butwasmeanttoaddnewassumptionstotheexistingresearch.AsRobert

Yin (2003, 10) states: “Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical

propositionsandnottopopulationsoruniverses”.

57

ReferencesAeron,D.(2010).“NewMediaandFatDemocracy:TheParadoxofOnlineParticipation”.

In:NewMedia&Society,12(5),745–761.

Baker,K.M.(1992).DefiningthePublicSphereinEighteenth‐CenturyFrance:Variations

onaThemebyHabermas.In:Calhoun,C.(ed.).HabermasandthePublicSphere.pp.

181–211.Cambridge:MITPress.

Benkler,Y.(2006).TheWealthofNetworks:HowSocialProductionTransformsMarkets

andFreedom.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Bennett,W. L. (1998). "TheUnCivicCulture: Communication, Identity, and theRise of

Lifestyle Politics." Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture, American Political Science

Association.In:P.S.:PoliticalScienceandPolitics,Vol.31,41–61.

Bennett,W.L.(2003).“CommunicatingGlobalActivism:StrengthsandVulnerabilitiesof

NetworkedPolitics”.In:Information,Communication&Society.6(2):143‐168.

Blaug, R. (1999). Democracy Real and Ideal. Discourse Ethics and Radical Politics.

Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

Boyd, D. M. & Ellison, N. B. (2007). “Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and

Scholarship.” In: JournalofComputer‐MediatedCommunication,13(2008),210–

230.

Boyd,D.M. (2007). “WhyYouth (Heart) SocialNetworkSites:TheRoleofNetworked

Publics in Teenage Social Life.” In: MacArthur Foundation Series on Digital

Learning – Youth, Identity, and Digital Media Volume (ed. David Buckingham).

Cambridge:MITPress.

Boyd, D. (2009): A Response to Christine Hine. In: Markham, A.N. & Baym, N.K.

(2009)(eds.). Internet Inquiry. Conversations aboutMethod.pp. 26 – 32. London:

Sage.

Brundidge,J.(2010).“TowardaTheoryofCitizenInterfacewithPoliticalDiscussionand

News in the Contemporary Public Sphere.” In: International Journal of

Communication4(2010),1056–1078.

Buonanno,M.(2007).TheAgeofTelevision:ExperiencesandTheories.Bristol/Chicago:

IntellectBooks.

58

Castells,M.(1996).TheInformationAge,Vol.1:TheRiseoftheNetworkSociety.Oxford:

Blackwell.

Chadwick,A.(2009).“Web2.0:NewChallengesfortheStudyofDemocracyinanEraof

InformationalExuberance.”In:I/S:AJournalofLawandPolicyfortheInformation

Society,5(1):9‐41.

Coleman, S. & Blumler, J. G. (eds.)(2009). The Internet and Democratic Citizenship:

Theory,PracticeandPolity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Connery, B. A. (1997). “MHO: Authority and Egalitarian Rhetoric in the Virtual

Coffeehouse”. In: Porter, D. (ed.). Internet Culture. pp. 161 – 180. New York:

Routledge.

Dahlberg, L. (2001). “The Internet and Democratic Discourse. Exploring prospects of

online deliberative forums extending the public sphere.” In: Information,

Communication&Society,4(4),615–633.

Dahlberg,L.(2007).“RethinkingtheFragmentationoftheCyberpublic:FromConsensus

toContestation”.In:NewMedia&Society,9(5),827–847.

Dahlgren, P. (2001). The Public Sphere and the Net: Structure, Space, and

Communication. In: Bennett, L. W. & Entman, R. M. (eds.). Mediated Politics:

Communication in the Future of Democrazy. Pp. 33 – 55. Cambridge: Cambridge

UniversityPress.

Dahlgren,P.(2006).“Doingcitizenship:Theculturaloriginsofcivicagencyinthepublic

sphere.”In:EuropeanJournalofCulturalStudies,9(3),267–286.

Dahlgren,P.(2007).CivicIdentityandNetActivism:TheFrameofRadicalDemocrazy.

In: Dahlberg, L. & Siapera, E. (eds.). Radical Democracy and the Internet:

InterrogatingTheoryandPractice.Pp.55–72.Houndsmill:PalgraveMacMillan.

Dahlgren, P. (2009). Media & Political Engagement: Citizens, Communication and

Democrazy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Davies,T.&Gangadharan,S.P. (eds.)(2009).OnlineDeliberation:Design,Research,and

Practice.Chicago:CSLIPublications.

Delanty,G.(2003).“VirtualCommunity:BelongingasCommunication”.Community.(pp.

166–185).London:Routledge.

vanDijk,J.(1999).TheNetworkSociety.SocialAspectsofNewMedia.London:Sage.

59

Dirksen,D.;Huizing,A.&Smit,B.(2010).“’Pilingonlayersofunderstanding':theuseof

connectiveethnographyforthestudyof(online)workpractices.”In:NewMedia

&Society,12(7),1045–1063.

VanDeDonk,W.;Loader,B.D.;Nixon,P.G.&Rucht,D.(eds.)(2004).Cyberprotest:New

Media,Citizens,andSocialMovements.London:Routledge.

Downey, J.&Fenton,N. (2003). “Newmedia,counterpublicityandthepublicsphere.”

In:NewMedia&Society,5(2),185–202.

Downey, J. (2007). Participation and/or Deliberation? The Internet as a Tool for

AchievingRadicalDemocraticAims.In:Dahlberg,L.&Siapera,E.(eds.).Radical

Democracyand the Internet: InterrogatingTheoryandPractice. Pp.108–127.

Houndsmill:PalgraveMacMillan.

Eley, G. (1992). Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the

NineteenthCentury. In: Calhoun,C. (ed.).Habermasand thePublic Sphere. pp.

289–339.Cambridge:MITPress.

Ellison,N.B.;Steinfield,C.&Lampe,C.(2007).“ThebenefitsofFacebook‘friends’:Social

capital and college students' useof online social network sites.” In: Journal of

Computer‐MediatedCommunication,12(4),1143‐1168.

Fairclough,N. &Wodak, R. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis. In: Van Dijk, T. (ed.).

Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary

Introduction.Volume2.ThousandOaks:Sage.

Farnsworth,J.&Austrin,T.(2010).“Theethnographyofnewmediaworlds?Following

thecaseofglobalpoker.”In:NewMedia&Society,12(7),1120–1136.

Fetterman,D.(2009).Ethnography:Step­By­Step.London:Sage.

Flick,U.(2009).AnIntroductiontoQualitativeResearch.4thed.London:Sage.

Foot, K. (2006). Web Sphere Analysis and Cybercultural Studies. In: Silver, D. &

Massanari, A. (eds.). Critical Cyberculture Studies: Current Terrains, Future

Directions.NewYork:NewYorkUniversity.

Fraser, N. (1990). “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of

ActuallyExistingDemocracy.”In:SocialText,25(26),56–80.

Freelon, D.G. (2010). “Analyzing online political discussion using three models of

democraticcommunication.”In:NewMedia&Society,12(7),1172–1190.

60

Garnham,N.(1992).“TheMediaandthePublicSphere”.In:Calhoun,C.(ed.).Habermas

andthePublicSphere.pp.359–376.Cambridge:MITPress.

Gerhards, J.&Schäfer,M.S.(2010).“Istheinternetabetterpublicsphere?Comparing

oldandnewmediaintheUSAandGermany.”In:NewMedia&Society,12(1),143

–160.

Habermas, J. (1990 orig. 1962). Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (2nd ed.).

Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp.

Habermas, J. (2006). “Political Communication inMedia Society:DoesDemocracy Still

Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical

Research”.In:CommunicationTheory,16(2006):411–426.

Haythornthwaite, C. (2005). “Social networks and Internet connectivity effects.” In:

Information,Communication,&Society,8(2),125–147.

Hill, K. & Hughes, J. (1998). Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet.

Oxford:Rowman&Littlefield.

Hine,C.(2000).VirtualEthnography.London:Sage.

Hine, C. (2009). How Can Qualitative Internet Researchers Define the Boundaries of

Their Projects? In: Markham, A.N. & Baym, N.K. (2009)(eds.). Internet Inquiry.

ConversationsaboutMethod.pp.1–20.London:Sage.

Johnson,T.J.&Zhang,W.&Bichard,S.L.&Seltzer,T.(2011).UnitedWeStand?Online

Social Network Sites and Civic Engagement. In: Papacharissi, Zizzi (ed.). A

NetworkedSelf:Identity,Community,andCultureonSocialNetworkSites.Pp.185–

203.NewYork/London:Routledge.

Kanayama, T. (2003). “Online Ethnographic Research on the Experience of Japanese

ElderlyPeople”.In:NewMedia&Society,5(2),267–288.

Kelly,J.;Fisher,D.&Smith,M.(2005).Debate,Division,andDiversity:PoliticalDiscourse

Networks in USENET Newsgroups. Paper prepared for the "Online Deliberation

Conference2005",StanfordUniversity,May24,2005.

Kramer, L. (1992). Habermas, History, and Critical Theory. In: Calhoun, C. (ed.).

HabermasandthePublicSphere.pp.236–258.Cambridge:MITPress.

Landes, J. (1988).Woman and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution.

Ithaca,NY:ComellUniversityPress.

61

Lev‐On,A.&Manin,B. (2009).HappyAccidents:Deliberation andOnlineExposure to

Opposing Views. In: Davies, T. & Gangadharan, S. P. (eds.). Online Deliberation:

Design,Research,andPractice.Pp.105–122.Chicago:CSLIPublications.

Lösch,V.;Stocker,G;Leidig,S.;Wolf,W.(eds.)(2010).Stuttgart21­oder:Wemgehörtdie

Stadt.Köln:PapyRossa.

Lüders,M. (2008). “Conceptualizingpersonalmedia”. In:NewMedia& Society, 10(5),

683–702.

Mayring, P. (2003). Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken. (8th ed.)

Weinheim:BeltzVerlag.

Mendelberg, T. (2002). “The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence.” In: Political

DecisionMaking,DeliberationandParticipation,2002(6),151‐193.

Merten,K.(1999).SozialwissenschaftlicheMethodenderMedienanalyse. In:Leonhard,

J.‐F.; Ludwig, H.‐W.; Schwarze, D. & Straßner, E. (eds.). Ein Handbuch zur

Entwicklung der Medien und Kommunikationsformen. Pp. 245‐256. Berlin: De

Gruyter.

Mouffe,C.(1992).DimensionsofRadicalDemocracy.London/NewYork:Verso.

Mouffe,C.(2005).ForanAgonisticPublicSphere.In:Tønder,L.&Thomassen,L.(2005).

Radical Democracy: Politics between Abundance and Lack. Pp. 123 – 132.

Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress.

O’Reilly,T.(2005):WhatisWeb2.0?DesignPatternsandBusinessModelsfortheNext

Generation of Software. Essay. [Online document] URL

http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what‐is‐web‐20.html[2010‐10‐17]

Mutz,D.C.&Martin,P. S. (2001).FacilitatingCommunicationacrossLinesofPolitical

Difference.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,95(1),97–114.

Papacharissi, Z. (2002). “Thevirtual sphere:The internet as apublic sphere.” In:New

Media&Society,vol.4(1):9–27.

Papacharissi, Z. (2004). “Democracy online: civility, politeness, and the democratic

potentialofonlinepoliticaldiscussiongroups.”In:NewMedia&Society,6(2):259

–283.

62

Papacharissi, Z. (2009). “The virtual geographies of social networks: a comparative

analysis of Facebook, LinkedIn and AsmallWorld.” In: New Media & Society,

11(1&2):199–120.

Papacharissi,Z.(2010).APrivateSphere:DemocracyinaDigitalAge.Cambridge:Polity.

Papacharissi, Z. (ed.)(2011). The Networked Self: Identity, Connectivity and Culture on

SocialNetworkSites.Pp.NewYork:Routledge.

Pickard,V.W.(2006).“UnitedyetAutonomous:IndymediaandtheStruggletoSustaina

RadicalDemocraticNetwork”.In:MediaCulture&Society,28(3):315–36.

Pickard, V. W. (2008). “Cooptation and cooperation: institutional exemplars of

democraticinternettechnology.”In:NewMedia&Society,10(4):625–645.

Price,V.(2009).CitizensDeliberatingOnline:TheoryandSomeEvidence.In:Davies,T.

&Gangadharan,S.P.(eds.).OnlineDeliberation:Design,Research,andPractice.Pp.

37–58.Chicago:CSLIPublications.

Putnam,R.(2000).BowlingAlone:TheCollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity.New

York:Simon&Schuster.

Reese, S.D., Rutigliano, L., Hyun, K. & Jeong, J. (2007). “Mapping the blogosphere:

Professionalandcitizen‐basedmediaintheglobalnewsarena”.In:Journalism,vol.

8:235–261.

Rheingold,H.(2000orig.1993).TheVirtualCommunity:HomesteadingontheElectronic

Frontier(2nded.).Cambridge,London:MITPress.

Sassen,S.(2006).Territory–Authority–Rights.NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Sassi,S.(2000).ThecontroversiesoftheInternetandtherevitalizationoflocalpolitical

life.In:Hacker,K.L.&vanDijk,J.(eds.).DigitalDemocracy.Pp.90–104.London:

Sage.

Schudson,M.(1992).WasThereEveraPublicSphere?IfSo,When?Reflectionsonthe

American Case. In: Calhoun, C. (ed.).Habermas and the Public Sphere. pp. 143 –

163.Cambridge:MITPress.

Sack,W.; Kelly, J. &Dale,M. (2009). Searching theNet for Differences of Opinion. In:

Davies, T. & Gangadharan, S. P. (eds.).Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and

Practice.Pp.95–104.Chicago:CSLIPublications.

Sparks, C. (2001). The Internet and the Global Public Sphere. In: Bennett, L. W. &

63

Entman,R.M.(eds.).MediatedPolitics.CommunicationintheFutureofDemocrazy.

Pp.75–98.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Steinfield, C.; Ellison,N. B.& Lampe, C. (2008). “Social capital, self‐esteem, anduse of

online social network sites: A longitudinal analysis.” In: Journal of Applied

DevelopmentalPsychology,29(2008),434–445.

Sundén, J. (2002). Material Virtualities: Approaching Online Textual Embodiment.

Dissertation.Linköping:LinköpingUniversity.

Sunstein,C.R.(2001).Republic.com.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Tremayne,M.(2010).Blogging,CitizenshipandtheFutureofMedia.NewYork,Oxford:

Routledge.

Wolf,W.(2010).EinProjektundsiebenLügen.In:Lösch,V.;Stocker,G;Leidig,S.;Wolf,

W.(eds.).Stuttgart21­oder:WemgehörtdieStadt.Pp.10–39.Köln:PapyRossa.

Wu, J. (2010). Facebook Politics: An Exploratory Study of American Youth’s Political

EngagementDuringthe2008PresidentialElection.Paperpresentedattheannual

meetingoftheInternationalCommunicationAssociation,Chicago,IL,May2010.

Yin,R.K.(2003).CaseStudyResearch.DesignandMethods.3rded.ThousandOaks:Sage.

Zaret,D. (1992). Religion, Science, andPrinting in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth‐

CenturyEngland. In:Calhoun,C.(ed.).HabermasandthePublicSphere.pp.212–

235.Cambridge:MITPress.

Zhang, W.; Johnson, T. J.; Seltzer, T.; Bichard, S. L. (2010). „The Revolution Will Be

Networked: The Influence of Social Networking Sites on Political Attitudes and

Behavior.“In:SocialScienceComputerReview,28(1),75–92.

64

Appendix

CodebookQuantitativeAnalysisVariable ScaleLevel Value ExplanationLinks Nominal 0=nolink

1=link+text

Picture Nominal 0=nopicture1=picture

NumberofComments

Interval

NumberofLikes Interval 1=NuclearPower

Wallpoststhatdiscussenergypolicyorcommentontheongoingdebate.

2=FederalStateGovernment

WallpoststhataddressthefederalstategovernmentinothertopicsthanS21andnotrelatedtothefederalstateelections.

3=Facebook

WallpoststhatreflectontheFacebookpageorotherFacebookpages

4=FederalStateElectionsSA

WallpoststhataddressthefederalstateelectionsinthestateSaxony‐Anhalt

5=FederalStateElectionsBW

WallpoststhataddressthefederalstateelectionsinthestateBaden‐Württemberg

Topic Nominal

6=S21

WallpoststhatdealwiththetopicStuttgart21

65

7=GeneralPoliticalPosition

WallpoststhatexpresspoliticalstatementsindependentofStuttgart21oranyotherparticulartopicsuchaspartypreference,ideologyetc.

8=CityStuttgart

WallpoststhatdealwithStuttgartindependentofS21orthataddressthecitylifeduringtheconflict

9=Other

1=ProtestActivities Wallpoststhataddresstheactivitiesoftheprotestmovement

2=BehaviourProtestMovement

Wallpoststhataredirectedtowardsthebehaviourandmannersoftheprotesters

3=ArgumentsforS21

GeneralclaimswhyS21shouldbepursuitthatdonotaddressparticulardetailsoftheprojectorofficialstatements

4=InformationtoS21andQuestionsofDetails

Wallpoststhataddressparticulartechnicalpartsoftheprojectorprovideinformationtotheproject

TopicStuttgart21–FürS21

Nominal

5=ArgumentsagainstS21/Confrontation

Wallpoststhatpickuparguments

66

againstS216=OfficialStatement Wallpoststhat

addressstatementsbyofficialactorssuchasDBorpoliticians

7=Solidarity Wallpoststhatgiverespecttothesupportmovement

8=EventNote Wallpoststhatincludeeventinvitations

9=DiscreditingActors

Wallpoststhataredirectedagainstparticularactorsorparties(fromtheprotestmovement)

10=MediaCriticism

11=Other 1=ProtestActivities Wallpoststhat

addresstheactivitiesoftheprotestmovement

2=ArgumentsagainstS21

WallpoststhatfeatureargumentsagainsttheprojectS21

3=QuestionsofDetail

Wallpoststhataddressparticulartechnicalpartsoftheproject

4=Confrontation WallpoststhatdealwithargumentsforS21orthataddresstheFacebookpage“FürStuttgart21”

5=RequestofInformation

Wallpoststhataskforparticularinformation

TopicStuttgart21–KEINS21

Nominal

6=Media Wallpoststhat

67

Commentary discussthewaythemediacoversthetopic

7=OfficialStatements

Wallpoststhataddressstatementsofofficialactorssuchaspoliticians

8=Other 9=EventNote Wallpoststhat

includeeventinvitations

10=30.09. Wallpoststhataddresstheincidenton30thofSeptember2010