Risky Business: Does Corporate Political Giving Affect...

RiskyBusiness:DoesCorporatePoliticalGivingAffectConsumerBehavior?

CostasPanagopoulos1

DonaldP.Green2

JonathanKrasno3

MichaelSchwam-Baird2

EricMoore3

KyleEndres1

1FordhamUniversity2ColumbiaUniversity 3BinghamtonUniversity

October26,2016Abstract:Towhatextentdoconsumers’preferenceschangewhentheylearnaboutfirms’partisanallegiances?WeaddressthisquestionbyconductingaseriesofexperimentsinwhichAmericanrespondentswerepresentedwithfactualinformationaboutcorporatepoliticaldonations.InStudies1and2,thisinformationwasconveyedsubtlyviaatriviaquizinwhichjustonequestionwasrandomlyvariedtoconveypoliticalornon-politicalinformation.Respondentsweretoldthecorrectanswertoeachquestion.Outcomesweremeasuredthroughfutureshoppingintentionsaswellasarevealedconsumerpreference:respondentswereinvitedtoparticipateinarafflefora$10giftcardandaskedwhichstore’sgiftcardtheywouldliketoreceiveiftheyweretowintheraffle.RespondentswhoidentifywithapoliticalpartyweresignificantlymorelikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhosePACssupporttheirpartyandlesslikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhosePACssupporttheopposingparty.InStudy3,afieldexperimentrandomlyassignedmailingsdisclosingthepartisancampaigncontributionsbytwolargechains.Whenrecipientsrespondedtoaseeminglyunrelatedsurveyseveraldayslater,theirfutureshoppingintentionsweresignificantlyaffectedbywhethertheexperimentalinformationindicatedthatthechain’spoliticaldonationsaidedoropposedtherespondent’spreferredparty.Theresultsshowthatpartyattachmentsexpressthemselvesinconsumerchoicewheninformationenablesvoterstoidentifyretailers’partisaninclinations.Weconsiderthepolicyimplicationsofthisfindinginlightofrecentcampaignfinancerulings.Acknowledgements:PaperpreparedforpresentationattheannualmeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Philadelphia,September1-4,2016.TheauthorsaregratefultoDemocracyFundandtheOpenSocietyFoundation,whichfundedthisprojectthroughFordhamUniversitybutbearnoresponsibilityforthecontentofthisreport.WethankWinstonLinforhishelpandguidanceregardingdataanalysis.ThisresearchwasapprovedbyinstitutionalreviewboardsatBinghamtonUniversity(#3611-15),ColumbiaUniversity(#AAAP9508),andFordhamUniversity(#265).Commentsarewelcomeandmaybedirectedto:costas@post.harvard.edu,jkrasno@binghamton.edu,ordpg2110@columbia.edu.

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Citizensinpublicopinionstudiesroutinelydecrytheinfluenceofspecial,and

especiallycorporate,interestsinpolitics(ShawandRagland2000;Panagopoulosand

Weinschenk2016).Reformersworrythatcorporatepoliticalspendingexertsacorrosive

effectonthepoliticalprocessandunderminespublictrust(Klumppetal.2015;Stateofthe

Union2010).TheseconcernshaveonlyintensifiedintheaftermathoftheU.S.Supreme

Court’slandmarkCitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommissionruling,whichopenedthe

doortounlimitedcorporatespendinginelections,providedthatitisindependentand

uncoordinatedwithcampaigns.

Corporatespendinghasfeaturedprominentlyinelectionsfordecades,eversince

thenewlyformedFederalElectionCommission(FEC)issuedanadvisoryopiniontothe

SunOilCompanyin1975thatapprovedtheformationofitscorporatePACandallowed

corporatetreasuriestofundoverheadandindirectcosts(RozellandWilcox1999).Once

theFECgavethebusinesscommunitythegreenlight,thenumberofcorporatePACsgrew

rapidly.By1984,thetotalnumberofPACstopped4,000(RozellandWilcox1999:77);as

ofJuly2015,atotalof5,891federalPACswereregistered,1,677ofwhichwerecorporate

PACs.Between1990and2014,politicalactioncommittees(PACs)contributedmorethan

$4billiontocandidatesrunningforofficeintheUnitedStates,accordingtotheCenterfor

ResponsivePolitics2015).CorporatePACspendingtypicallyaccountsforabout40percent

oftotalPACspendingduringanelectioncycle.Scholarsestimatethataboutone-thirdofall

U.S.Housecandidates’campaignreceiptsandone-fifthofallU.S.Senatecandidates’funds

comefromPACs(Ainsworth2002).Federalcampaignfinancelawslimithowmuch

corporatePACscanraisefromindividualsanddirecttospecificcandidates’campaigns,but

Citizenspermitsunlimitedindependentspendingbycorporations.

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Scholarshavearguedthatcorporatecampaigncontributionshelptosecure

favorableelectionoutcomesoraccesstothewinningcandidates’offices(Snyder1993).In

additiontolobbyingefforts,campaigncontributionscanhelpcorporationstoextract

specialfavorsfromlawmakers,includinggovernmentcontracts,regulatorywaivers,and

governmentsubsidies(GodwinandSeldon2002).Empiricalevidencelinkingcontributions

tolegislators’rollcallvotesismixed(Wawro2001;Stratmann1998,1991;Wright1990,

1985),butthereisreasontobelievethatcontributionsfacilitateaccesstoelectedofficials

(KallaandBroockman2015;Austen-Smith1995;Langbein1986).

Whilescholarshavelongstudiedcorporatecontributionstocandidatesandtheir

effectsonlegislativebehavior,theinfluenceofcorporateinvolvementinelectionson

votersandconsumershaslargelyescapedscholarlyattention.Manymodelsofcorporate

givinginelectionscharacterizetheirpoliticalbehaviorashighlystrategicbutoverlookthe

prospectofpublicorconsumerbacklash(e.g.,MastersandKeim1985).Forexample,itis

oftennotedthatcorporationsgenerallysupportincumbentsmoreoftenthanchallengersin

congressionalelections(Brunell2005;Milyoetal.2000)andgivedisproportionallyto

committeechairsandcandidatesofthepoliticalpartyinpowerinCongress(Rudolph

1999;RomerandSnyder1994;GrierandMunger1986).Inaddition,somecorporations

regularlyfavoroneparty’scandidatesforreasonsthatmayreflecttheideological

preferencesofcorporateleadersortheregulatoryenvironmentinwhichthecorporation

operates.Gimpel,Lee,andParrott(2014,p.1037)reportthat36%ofindustrysectors

donatedisproportionatelytoRepublicans,2%toDemocrats,andtherestdonatewith“no

discerniblepartisanpreference.”Whetherornotcorporatepartisansupporthasthe

potentialtoaffectconsumerbehaviorremainsanopenquestion.

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Weaddressthisquestionthroughapairofsurveyexperimentsandafieldexperiment

inwhichrandomlyassignedgroupsofrespondentsareexposedtofactualinformation

aboutwhichlargenationalchainsdonatedmoneytomajor-partycandidatesthroughtheir

PACs.InStudies1and2,thisinformationwasconveyedsubtlyviaatriviaquizinwhich

justonequestionwasrandomlyvariedtoconveyinformationaboutpoliticalcontributions.

Respondents,whosepartyattachmentsweremeasuredbyasurveyconductedaweek

earlier,weretoldthecorrectanswertoeachquestion.Respondentsprovedquite

knowledgeableaboutmostchainstoretriviabuttendedtoknowlittleaboutthesechains’

campaigncontributions.Outcomesweremeasuredthougharevealedconsumer

preference:inadditiontodescribingtheirfutureshoppingplans,respondentswereinvited

toparticipateinarafflefora$10giftcardandaskedwhichchainstore’sgiftcardthey

wouldliketoreceiveiftheyweretowintheraffle.Wefindstrongstatisticalevidencethat

respondentswhoidentifywithapartyaremorelikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhose

PACssupporttheirparty’scandidatesandlesslikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhose

PACssupporttheopposingparty’scandidates.Thispatternisaffirmedbyafield

experimentinwhichanewpoolofsubjectsdrawnfromanationalpanelsurveywassent

oneoftworandomlyassignedmailingsthatprovidedsimilarinformationaboutfirms’

contributions.Interviewsconductedaweeklatersuggestthatrespondentsrewarded

chainsfortheirpoliticallylike-mindedcontributionsandpunishedchainsthatsupported

theopposingparty.Evidently,partyattachmentsexpressthemselvesinconsumerchoice

whenvotersareinformedaboutaretailer’spartisansympathies.Thisisaformofpolitical

expressionthatismutedbythepublic’slackofawarenessofcorporatepolitical

contributions.Weconcludebyconsideringtheimplicationsofthesefindingsfortheories

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ofexpressivepartisanshipandforpoliciesconcerningthedisclosureofcampaign

contributions.

PoliticalConsumerism

Overtime,thestudyofpoliticalparticipationhasgraduallybroadenedfromthe

studyofvotingtoincludeawidearrayofotherwaysinwhichcitizensmayconveytheir

politicalviews,suchasparticipationinlocalaffairs(NieandVerba1972),volunteerwork

(Verba,Schlozman,andBrady1995),andprotestactivities(BarnesandKaase1979).The

intellectualtrendhasincreasinglycalledattentiontothemarketplaceasalocusofpolitical

expression.Thepoliticalconsumerismhypothesis(Stolle,Hooghe,andMicheletti2005;

AndersonandCunningham1972;Keumetal2004)contendsthatindividualsselectamong

productsandproducersbasedonsocial,politicalandethicalconsiderations,suchas“fair

trade”practices(Hainmueller,Hiscox,andSequeira2015),ethicallaborstandards

(HainmuellerandHiscox2015),andcorporatepoliticalactivity(Shahetal.2007:219).

PoliticalexpressionviaconsumerchoicehasalongtraditionintheUnitedStatesdatingto

thecolonialera,whenboycottswerethecenterpieceofAmericanresistancetowardBritish

rule(Breen2004).

Manyscholarscontendthatpoliticalpreferencesshapeconsumerdecisionstoa

politicalandeconomicallyimportantextent.Shahetal(2007:232)arguethat,“Consumer-

citizens,whoexercisetheirpoliticalvaluesandconcernsthroughtheirconsumption

patterns,viewtheeconomicrealmasameaningfulsphereinwhichtoadvancetheirmoral

andsocialconcerns.”Responsestocorporateactivitymaytaketheformofboycotts

(punishingbusinessforunfavorablebehaviorbywithholdingdemand)orbuycotts

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(rewardingbusinessforfavorablebehaviorbyincreasingdemand).Formany,political

consumerismprovidesanalternativemodetoengagewithpublicissuesoutsideof

conventionalpoliticalchannels(Nielson2010;Shahetal.2007;BennettandEntman

2001).LargesegmentsoftheAmericanpublicreportthattheyengageinboycottsand

buycotts(PanagopoulosandEndres2016;NewmanandBartels2011),andthis

phenomenoniscommoninWesternEurope(Ferrer-FonsandFraile.2014),theMiddle

East(BensteadandReif2015;FarahandNewman2010),andinLatinAmerica(Echegaray

2015).Byusingthemarkettoexpresspoliticalandmoralconcerns,politicalconsumerism

isamanifestationofwhatBennett(1998)terms“lifestylepolitics”andreflectsthebroader

tendencytofindpoliticalmeaninginrecreationalexperiences,entertainmentchoices,

fashiondecisionsandotherpersonalchoices(Shahetal.2007:219).1

Ispoliticalconsumerismaforcethatcorporationsmustheed?Consumerdemand

increaseswhenproductsareadvertisedwithreferencetowidely-sharedvaluessuchas

supportforhumanrights(Hainmuelleretal.2015;HainmuellerandHiscox2015a)or

environmentalprotection(HainmuellerandHiscox2015b),andthesevaluesveryoften

appearinthe“missionstatements”thatcorporationsfeatureontheirwebsites.

1Politicalconsumerismhasbeenobservedinmanycountriesandcontexts(Stolle,HoogheandMicheletti2005;StolleandMicheletti2015).Individualsconcernedabouttheenvironment,forexample,aremorelikelytoseekandpurchaseenvironmentallyfriendlyproducts(MintonandRose1997).Researchhasfoundthatwomen,youngpeopleandmoreeducatedindividualsareparticularlylikelytomakeconsumptiondecisionsbasedonpoliticalconsiderations.Mediause,andespeciallynewsconsumption,seemstopredictpoliticallymotivatedconsumption,presumablybecauseitprovidessignalstoconsumersaboutpolitically-relevantcorporateactivity(Holt2000;Keumetal.2004).Althoughwerestrictourattentionheretopoliticalpartisanship,ourempiricalstrategyreadilyextendstotheseotherpoliticaldomains.

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Aswemovefromconsensusvaluestomorecontentiousissues,overtsupport

becomesrarer.Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatcorporationsarewisetoavoidentangling

themselvesindivisivepoliticalissues.AtellingcaseinpointaroseinJuneof2012,when

theAmericanfast-foodchainChick-fil-Abecamethecenterofcontroversy.DanT.Cathy,

thecompany’schiefoperatingofficermadecommentsopposingsame-sexmarriage,and

reportssurfacedthatthecompany’scharitablearm,theWinShapeFoundation,had

donatedmillionstoorganizationshostiletosame-sexmarriagerights.Opponentscalledfor

protestsandboycottsnationwide,whilesupportersralliedtoeatattherestaurants

(Severson2012).Afewweekslater,thechainissuedastatementstatingthat,“[g]oing

forward,ourintentistoleavethepolicydebateoversame-sexmarriagetothegovernment

andpoliticalarena.”

OneimplicationoftheChick-fil-Aexampleisthatcorporationswadeintopartisan

politicsattheirperil.Partyaffiliationhaslongbeenrecognizedasanespeciallyimportant

politicalorientation(Campbelletal.1960),andrecentworkhasunderscoredtherangeof

waysinwhichpartisanattachmentsexpressthemselves.Buildingonsocialidentitytheory

(Tajfel&Turner1979),experimentsbyHuddyetal.(2015)showthatpartisans’political

actions,suchascampaigninvolvement,expressadeep-seatedgroupidentity,whichinturn

leadspartisanstorisetothedefenseofthepartyin-group.AlthoughHuddyetal.(2015)

didnotanalyzeconsumerbehavior,theirhypothesisabouttheexpressionofpartisan

socialidentitypredictsthatconsumerswillreacttoinformationaboutcorporatecampaign

activityinwaysthatreflecttheirpartisanpredispositions.Corporationsthatsupportthe

opposingpartywillbeperceivedasathreattothepartisanin-group,whilethosethat

supportone’sownpartywillbeseenasmeritingin-grouployalty.Inthenextsection,we

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deviseatestofthishypothesisbyassessingtheextenttowhichpartisanschangetheir

consumerbehaviorbasedoninformationaboutwhichpoliticalpartiescorporations

supportthroughtheirPACs.

ExperimentalDesign:Studies1and2

Duringthesummerof2015,weconductedtwosurveyexperiments,bothusingthe

samebasicexperimentaldesignbutwithdifferentsubjects.Inthefirststudy,werandomly

assignedinformationabouttwotypesoffranchises,hamburgerrestaurantsandlargeretail

chains.Inthesecondstudy,weexpandedthelistofcategoriesfromtwotofourby

includingpizzarestaurantsanddrugstores.

Inordertoensurethatourexperimentalinterventionwasrelevanttothe

participants,eachsurveyexperimentwasconductedovertwowavesofinterviews.Inthe

firstwave,AmazonMechanicalTurkworkerswerepaidasmallfeeof$1tocompletea

brieffiveminutesurveythatassessed(1)thefrequencywithwhichtheypatronizedeachof

thestoresthatwouldlaterappearinourquiz,(2)theirratingsofthesestores,(3)their

partyidentification,and(4)demographiccharacteristics.Respondentswerealsoasked

whethertheywouldbewillingtoparticipateinafollow-upsurvey.Atotalof3,809

respondentscompletedthebaselinesurveyinStudy1;another3,739completedthe

baselinesurveyinStudy2.Approximatelyaweeklater,weinvitedasubsetofthebaseline

respondentstocompleteafollow-upsurvey.Invitationswereextendedtothosewho

indicatedawillingnesstocompleteafollow-upsurvey,maintainedanactiveMechanical

Turkaccount,providedananswertothebaselinesurvey’spartyidentificationquestion,

anddidnotindicatethatthey“never”patronizeanyofthestoresinoneormoreofour

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storecategories.Invitationswereextendedto3,457participantsinStudy1and3,413in

Study2.

Inordertomotivatesubjectstoattendcloselytothecontentofthequiz,thesecond

wavesurveywasprefacedwiththefollowinginstructions:“Wewillbeaskingyoufactual

questionsaboutsomeoftheplaceswhereyoumayeatandshop.Attheendofeachsection,

youwillbegiventheopportunitytoenterarandomdrawingtowinoneofonehundred

$10giftcards.Foreachquestionyouanswercorrectly,wewilladdanadditionalentryfor

youinordertoincreaseyourchancesofwinning.”Theoverwhelmingmajorityof

respondents(96%)indicatedtheirwillingnesstoparticipateineachlottery,whichisnot

surprisinggiventhattheprizewaslargeinrelationtotheflatwagepaidtothosewho

participatedinthesurvey.

Ineachstudy,werandomlyassignedsubjectstooneoffiveexperimentalgroups.2

Thefirstquizfocusedonthreehamburgerchains(BurgerKing,McDonald’s,andWendy’s).

Thefirstthreequestionsofthequizfocusedonnon-politicalcontent(e.g.,Whichofthe

threechainswasthefirsttointroducea“dollarmenu”?).Allrespondentssawthesame

threeinitialquestionsandanswers.Thefourthquestionwasmanipulatedrandomly.In

theRepublicanPercentagecondition,subjectswereasked“Whichofthesecompaniesgave

thelargestpercentageoftheirpoliticalcontributionstoRepublicancandidatesin2014?”

and,afteranswering,toldthatthecorrectanswerisWendy’s:“Throughtheirpolitical

actioncommittee,Wendy’sgave93%oftheirtotalpoliticalcontributionstoRepublican

candidatesin2014.”IntheDemocraticPercentagecondition,subjectswereasked“Which2InStudy1,weincludedasixthconditionthataskedsubjectsaboutwhichchaincontributedthemosttobothparties.WeexcludedthisconditionfromStudy2becausewehadnocleartheoreticalpredictionabouthowsubjectswouldrespondtothisinformation,and,indeed,itproducednoapparenttreatmenteffect.

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ofthesecompaniesgavethelargestpercentageoftheirpoliticalcontributionsto

Democraticcandidatesin2014?”and,afteranswering,toldthatthecorrectansweris

BurgerKing.IntheRepublicanAmountcondition,subjectswereasked“Whichofthese

companiesgavethemostdollarstoRepublicancandidatesin2014?”and,afteranswering,

toldthatthecorrectanswerisMcDonald’s.TheDemocraticAmountquestionwasworded

similarly,andagaintheanswerisMcDonald’s.Finally,acontrolconditionaskedsubjectsa

non-politicalquestion:“In2010,whichrestaurantaddedseasalttotheirfries?”Itshould

benotedthatalloftheinformationprovidedtorespondentswasfactuallyaccurate;by

framingthequestionsindifferentways,wewereabletocallattentiontothepartisan

colorationofaparticularchain.Noneoftheotherquestionsinthesecondwavesurvey

askedaboutpoliticsuntilafteroutcomemeasuresweregathered.3

Aftereachquiz,subjectswereaskedwhethertheywouldliketoparticipateina

lotteryforoneoftheonehundred$10giftcardprizes.Therewerenoapparenteffectsof

thetreatmentonwillingnesstoparticipateinthelotteryforanyofthequizzesineither

Study1orStudy2.4Thosewhoagreedwerethenasked,“Whichofthefollowing

companieswouldyouliketoreceiveagiftcardtoifyouwintheraffle?”andpresentedwith

thelistofstoresthatappearedinthequiz.Afterselectingagiftcard,respondentswere

askedtheirfutureshoppingintentions.Thissequenceofrandomlyassignedquizcontent,

giftcardpreference,andanticipatedpatronageofeachstorewasrepeatedforretailstores,

3Attheveryendofthesurvey,afterallrelevantconsumeroutcomeshadbeenmeasured,weaskedaboutwhichparty’scandidatetherespondentintendedtovoteforinthe2016congressionalelections.4InStudy1,96.2%ofrespondentsassignedtoatreatmentand96.0%ofrespondentsassignedtothecontrolagreedtoparticipateinthelottery.InStudy2,96.0%ofrespondentsassignedtoatreatmentand95.1%ofrespondentsassignedtothecontrolagreedtoparticipate.

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pizzarestaurants,anddrugstores.5Table1summarizesthenumberofrespondents

assignedtoeachexperimentalconditionandindicatesthecorrectanswertoeach

experimentallymanipulatedquestion.Asexpected,randomassignmenttotreatment

conditionisstatisticallyunrelatedtorespondents’backgroundcovariatesasmeasuredin

thebaselinesurveywave:age,gender,approvalofObama,andthefrequencywithwhich

theypatronizethelargestchainstoreineachofthestorecategories.Multinomial

regressionoftheassignedexperimentalconditiononthesecovariatesproduces

insignificantlikelihoodratiostatistics.Thep-valuesfortheeightrandomassignments

rangefrom0.11to0.63.

Thedistributionofquizanswersstronglysuggeststhatthepoliticalinformationwas

noveltorespondents.Table2summarizesanswerstoeachofthequizquestions.

Whereas,forexample,alargeproportionofsubjectsknewthatbaconisnotastandard

ingredientinBurgerKing’s“whopper”hamburger,answerstothefactualquestionsabout

politicaldonationswerescarcelymoreaccuratethanwouldbeexpectedbyrandom

guessing.Thefactthatthepoliticalinformationisnewtorespondentshasimportant

implicationsfortheinterpretationofourresultsbecauseitsuggeststhatalargemajorityof

eachtreatmentgrouphadanopportunitytoupdatetheirevaluationsofthechainstores

basedontheinformationprovided.

Howsubjectsrespondtoinformationaboutpoliticalcontributionspresumably

dependsontheirownpartyattachments.RepublicansshouldevaluateWendy’smore

favorablyuponlearningthatWendy’sisthehamburgerchainthatgivesthelargest

5Thesequenceinwhichthechainstoreswerepresentedwasrandomlyassigned,andafreshrandomassignmentofexperimentalconditionwasperformedforeachstorecategory.

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proportionofitsdonationstoRepublicans;thesamenewsshouldproducealessfavorable

assessmentamongDemocrats.Forthisreason,weassesstreatmenteffectsseparately

accordingtowhethersubjectsidentifiedasRepublicansorDemocratsinthebaseline

surveyofeachstudy.Thisclassificationusedtheinitialquestiontothetraditionalparty

identificationmeasureusedbytheAmericanNationalElectionStudiessincethe1950s:

“Generallyspeaking,doyouusuallythinkofyourselfasaRepublican,aDemocrat,an

Independent,orsomethingelse?”6Althoughthedistributionofpartisansinourtwo

studiesismoreDemocraticthanwouldbetypicalofarepresentativenationalsurvey,we

neverthelesshaveamplenumbersofDemocratsandRepublicansforpurposesofassessing

treatmenteffectsforeachpartisangroup.Inthefirststudy,weobtainedresponsesfrom

972Democratsand363Republicans;inthesecondstudy,1,029Democratsand466

Republicans.7Takentogether,wehaveatotalof48experimentalcomparisons:sixsetsof

experimentaltests(hamburgerchainsandretailstoresinStudy1;hamburger,retail,pizza,

anddrugstoresinStudy2),eachfeaturingfourtreatmentgroupcomparisonstoacontrol

condition,whichareinturnconsideredseparatelyforself-describedDemocratsand

Republicans.Thiswealthofcomparisonsprovidesapreciseassessmentofwhetherandto

whatextentpoliticalinformationaffectssubjects’giftcardpreferences.

6Similarresultsareobtainedwhenoneexpandsthedefinitionofeachpartisangrouptoinclude“leaningindependents”basedonthestandardAmericanNationalElectionStudyfollow-upquestionthatasksindependentswhethertheyfeelclosertoonepartyortheother.7WhenconductingStudy2,weinadvertentlyallowed835subjectswhoparticipatedinthefirststudytoparticipateinthesecondstudy.Forallcalculations,weexcluderepeatsubjectsfromStudy2onthegroundsthatparticipationinthefirststudymayhaveaffectedthesesubjects’behaviorinthesecondstudy(whetherthroughlearningorperceivingadesiredresponsefromtheresearchers).Asitturnsout,weobtainsimilarresultswithandwithouttheserepeatsubjects.

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Results.Table3presentsdetailedresultsforeachstudy,treatmentcondition,and

partisangroup.Ourstatisticalanalysissummarizestherelationshipbetweenpolitical

informationandgiftcardpreference.Foreachofthe48comparisonsofatreatmentgroup

withacontrolgroup,weassesswhethertheapparenttreatmenteffectisinthepredicted

direction.ForDemocraticrespondents,thepredictionisthatdemandforgiftcardsfrom

firmjdiminishes(increases)whenthatfirmisshowntosupportRepublicans(Democrats).

ForRepublicans,thesepredictionsarereversed.Wefindthat36ofthe48comparisons

pointinthepredicteddirection.Randomizationinferenceshowsthatasetofpredictions

thislopsidedwouldoccurbychancewithp=0.0004.8

Next,wecalculatetheaverageeffectofnegativeandpositivepoliticalinformation

ongiftcarddemand.Acrossall48comparisons,giftcarddemandchangedbyanaverageof

3.89percentagepointsinthepredicteddirection.Inordertocalculatetheconfidence

intervalsurroundingthisestimate,weuserandomizationinferenceandassumethatthe

effectoftreatmentinthepredicteddirectionisthesameforeverysubject(Gerberand

Green2012,pp.67-71).Weobtaina95percentconfidenceintervalrangingfrom2.0to5.1

percentagepointsinthepredicteddirection.Overall,wefindarobustchangeingiftcard

demandwhenafirmisrevealedtosupportoropposerespondents’preferredparty.

Theaverageshiftinpreferenceacrossalloftheassignedinformationconditions

arguablyunderstatesthetruemagnitudeoftheinformationeffect.Insomeinstances,the

informationrevealedtorespondentsconveysatmostaweaksignalofpartysupport.(See8Thereferencedistributionwasgeneratedbysimulation,permutingtheassignmentoftreatmentconditions10,000timesandassessingtheresultingdistributionofcomparisonsthatcameoutinthepredicteddirection.Thismethodaccountsfordependenciesthatariseduetothefactthatmultipletreatmentarmsarecomparedtothesamecontrolgroup.

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TableA1forasummaryofchainstores’contributions.)Amongpizzachains,forexample,

thelargestpercentagedonortoDemocratsisDomino’s,butthatfirmgivesDemocratsa

meager22%.ItshouldnotbesurprisingtofindinTable3thatthisinformationfailsto

makeDomino’sappreciablymoreattractiveintheeyesofDemocratsorlessattractivein

theeyesofRepublicans.Becauseweprovidedonlytruthfulinformationtorespondents

(andthereforedidnotrandomlyvarythereporteddonationsmadebyeachcorporate

chain),ourexperimentdoesnotallowforadirecttestofthehypothesisthatpartysupport

mattersmostwhencorporationsdisplaysubstantialsupport,butthedatacertainlyhint

thatthisisthecase.

Oneinterestingfeatureofourexperimentaldesignisthatitenablesustoassess

whetherestimatedtreatmenteffectsamongDemocratsareequalinmagnitudebut

oppositeinsigntothecorrespondingeffectsamongRepublicanswhenbothgroupsreceive

thesameinformation.Figure1demonstratesthatthisinfactthecase.Thehorizontalaxis

gaugeseffectsizeamongDemocrats,andtheverticalaxisgaugeseffectsizeamong

Republicans.Thehypothesisofequalandoppositeeffectsimpliesadownwardsloping

regressionlinepassingthroughtheoriginata45-degreeangle,andtheobservedeffectson

averagefollowthispredictedpattern.Apparently,thesamenewsthatraisesafirm’s

statureintheeyesofonepartylowersitcorrespondinglyintheeyesoftheopposingparty.

RobustnessChecksandPlaceboTests.Thissectionreportstheresultsofaseriesof

furtherteststoestablishthattheeffectonconsumerpreferencesshowsupwherewe

expectitanddoesnotshowupwherewedonotexpectit.First,wetestwhethertheeffect

isapparentwhenconsumerpreferenceismeasuredbyanoutcomeotherthanchoiceofgift

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card.Respondentswereaskeddirectlyabouttheirfutureshoppinganddiningintentions.

Forexample,respondentswereasked,“Thinkingahead,andusingthefollowingscale,how

oftendoyouplantoeatatthefollowinghamburgerrestaurants?”Anorderedseriesoffive

responseoptionsrangedfrom“severaltimesaweek”to“never.”Inordertocompare

treatmentandcontrolresponsedistributions,weusedorderedlogittoregressfrequency

ofanticipateddiningorshoppingonadummyvariablefortreatment.Consistentwiththe

findingsregardingthegiftcard,wefound39of48estimatedtreatmenteffectstobeinthe

predicteddirection(p<0.0001).SeetheAppendixforfullresultswithandwithout

controlsforpre-treatmentcovariates.

Second,wenotethatRepublicansandDemocratsdonotrespondstronglyor

systematicallytoinformationthatcarriesnopartisanvalence.Whenlearningthata

restaurantorchainstoreisthelargestoverallcampaigndonor,partisansneitherreward

norpunishthefirmwithenhancedordiminisheddemandforgiftcardsorexpectedfuture

purchases.9Bythesametoken,thepartisaninformationdescribedaboveseemstohave

nosystematiceffectonself-describedindependents.Itappearsthattwoconditionsmust

holdbeforeconsumersrewardorpunishfirmsfortheirpoliticalcontributions:the

consumersthemselvesmustharborapartyattachment,andtheinformationtheyreceive

aboutcontributionsmustspecifywhichpartythefirmsupports.

ExperimentalDesign:Study3

Studies1and2demonstratethatpartisansrespondtoinformationaboutrestaurant

9Inthefirstroundofdatacollection,“totalcontributions”wasoneoftherandomlyassignedquizquestions.BothDemocratsandRepublicansshowedsmallbutinsignificantincreasesingiftcarddemandforboththebiggestdonors(McDonald’sandWalmart).

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andretailchains’recordofpartisansupport.Theresultsarerobustacrosspartiesand

outcomemeasures,yettwoquestionsremainaboutthegeneralizabilityoftheresults.The

firstiswhethertheeffectcanbeinducedinsomewayotherthanviaaquizthat

incentivizesrespondentstopaycloseattention.Thesecondiswhetherthetreatmenteffect

persistsovertime–Studies1and2askedrespondentsabouttheirpreferencesand

intendedbehaviorshortlyaftertheyencounteredtheexperimentalinformation.Inorder

toaddressthesequestions,Study3teststheeffectofapostcardmailedtothehome

addressofpanelsurveyrespondents,whoansweredanend-linesurveyaweeklater.

WepartneredwithYouGov/Polimetrix,whichrecruitedasampleofrespondents

fromitsnationwideonlinepanel.Subjectswererestrictedtoself-identifiedDemocratsor

RepublicansbasedonthestemquestionoftheconventionalAmericanNationalElection

Studypartyidentificationmeasure.10InkeepingwithStudies1and2,respondents

completedapreliminarysurveythatprobedthemaboutbasicpoliticalattitudesand

consumerpreferencesandbehaviors(seeAppendixforsurveyinstrument).These

responsesfurnishpre-treatment,baselinemeasuresofsocial,political,andconsumer

attitudesandbehaviors.Atotalof1,658respondentscompletedtheinitialwaveofour

survey,fieldedJune15-24,2016.

Ourexperimentaltreatmentconsistedofapostcardmailingdesignedtoprovide

informationaboutthepoliticalcontributionsoffirmsinthe2014federalelections.To

maximizeattentiontothetreatments,aprofessionalgraphicsdesignerproducedcolor

postcardsthatwerevisuallyengaging.Thecontentofthepostcardswasdesignedto

parallelascloselyaspossiblethekeytreatmentelementsinStudies1and2.(SeeAppendix

10Thus,independentsandleaningpartisansareexcluded.

16

forreproductionsofthepostcards.)Toenhancepower,wefocusedonjusttwochainstores

withsharplycontrastingpatternsofpartysupport.OnepostcardhighlightedPAC

contributionsbyBedBath&Beyond,achainthatcontributed71%ofitsPACcontributions

toDemocraticcandidatesinthe2014cycle;theotherprovidedparallelinformationabout

Wendy’s,achainthatdirected93%ofitscontributionstoGOPcandidatesin2014.11The

postcardsalsonotedthatthesepercentageswerehigherthantwocompetingfirmsineach

commercialcategory(McDonaldsandBurgerKingforhamburgerchains;Targetand

Walmartforbig-boxchains).

YouGov/Polimetrixrandomlydividedthesubjectpoolinhalfanddesignatedhalfof

therespondentstoreceivetheBedBath&Beyondpostcardandtheotherhalftoreceive

theWendy’spostcard.Postcardsweremailedusingfirst-classpostageonJune30,2016

andwereexpectedtoarrivebetweenJuly5thand6th.

Approximatelyoneweekfollowingexpecteddeliveryofthepostcards,duringthe

periodJuly13-20,YouGov/Polimetrixfieldedafollow-uponlinesurveyamongsubjects

whohadcompletedthebaselinesurveyandweremailedapostcard.Thesecondwaveof

thesurveyfeaturedquestionitemsaboutrespondents’socialandpoliticalviews,and,

crucially,aboutfutureconsumerintentions.Atotalof1,446subjectscompletedthefollow-

upwaveofthesurvey,forareinterviewrateof87%.Reinterviewratesdiffered

insignificantlyacrossexperimentalconditions:86.6%amongthosereceivingtheWendy’s

11Thepostcardsinformedrespondentsthatthepercentagesreportedwerebasedonnumberscompiledbyopensecrets.org.ThetextofthepostcardscharacterizethecontributionsasPACcontributions,buttheopensecrets.orgstatisticswecitedcombinePACcontributionswithcontributionsfromcorporateexecutives.StatisticsreportedinthetwoMTurkstudieswerecharacterizedinasimilarway,duetoourmisreadingoftheopensecrets.orgreport.Wedonotexpectthatourmistakencharacterizationaffectedthewayinwhichsubjectperceivedtheinformation.

17

postcardand87.9%amongthosereceivingtheBedBath&Beyondpostcard.Thosewho

completedtheend-linesurveywere72%white,58%female,and58%self-identified

Democrats.Fully67%reportedthattheyeatatWendy’satleast“afewtimesayear”inthe

baselinesurvey;58%reportedthattheyshopatBedBath&Beyondatleast“afewtimesa

year.”

Ouroutcomemeasureisdrawnfromaseriesofsurveyitemsprobingsubjectsabout

theirconsumerintentions.UsingthewordingandformatasinStudies1and2,onesetof

questionsaskedrespondentsabouttheirconsumerintentionswithrespecttothree,fast-

foodhamburgerchains(inrandomorder:Wendy’s,McDonaldsandBurgerKing),while

anothersetinquiredaboutbig-boxshoppingintentionsatTarget,Walmart,andBedBath&

Beyond,randomlyordered.Foreachfirm,subjectsindicatedwhethertheyexpectedtoeat

orshopateachfirmrespectivelyeither“severaltimesaweek,”“aboutonceaweek,”“once

ortwiceamonth,”“afewtimesayear,”or“never.”Becausethisoutcomemeasureisa

seriesoforderedcategories,weuseorderedlogisticregressiontoestimatethelatent

treatmenteffect.

Asamanipulationcheck,thesecondwavesurveyconcludedwithtwoknowledge

questionsthattestedparticipants’abilitytorecallthecontentofthepostcards.One

questionasked“Whichofthefollowinghamburgerrestaurantsgavethehighestpercentage

ofitspoliticalcontributionstoRepublicansin2014?”Theotherasked“Whichofthe

followingbigboxstoresgavethehighestpercentageofitspoliticalcontributionsto

Democratsin2014?”Theresultsleavenodoubtthatthemailingmadethetreatment

groupsignificantlymoreknowledgeable.Just5.7%ofthecontrolgroupcorrectly

answeredthefirstquestion,ascomparedto23.6%ofthetreatmentgroup.Thesecond

18

questionwascorrectlyansweredby3.3%ofthecontrolgroupand12.7%ofthetreatment

group.Thep-valuesofthesecontrastsarewellbelow0.0001inbothcases.

Results.Table4estimatestheaveragetreatmenteffectforeachoffourexperimental

contrasts.AmongDemocrats,newsthatWendy’scontributesoverwhelminglyto

Republicansshoulddiminishtheirwillingnesstodinethereinthefuture;forRepublicans,

thisinformationshouldincreasetheirwillingnesstodoso.TheBedBath&Beyond

postcardshouldincreaseshoppingintentionsamongDemocratsbutdecreasethemamong

Republicans.Resultsfromtherawcomparisonbetweentreatmentandcontrolgroupsare

ambiguous,butcontrollingfordiningandshoppingpatternsmeasuredinthebaseline

surveysharpenstheresultsconsiderably.Aftercontrollingforbaselineconsumption,all

fourestimatesareinthepredicteddirection.Incolumns2and5ofTable4,thefour

estimatedt-ratiosforthetreatmenteffectsare-1.73,1.02,0.63,and-1.29.Tocalculatethe

one-sidedjointsignificanceoftheseestimates,wecodethemallinthepositivedirectionto

obtainanaveraget-ratio;thep-valueofobtaininganaveragestatisticatleastthislargein

fourtestsislessthan0.01.Addingfurthercovariatesforbaselineconsumptionat

competingchainstores(columns3and6)producessimilarresults,againwithp<0.01.

Howlargeistheeffectinsubstantiveterms?Usingmeta-analysistopoolthefour

orderedlogisticregressioncoefficientsfromthefullsetofcovariatesindicatesthatthe

postcardsonaveragechangedlatentdemandby0.215logits.Thismovementonthe

logisticscaleisequivalenttoshiftingtheproportionsayingthattheyplanto“never”

patronizeachainstorefrom26.9%(inthecontrolcondition)upto31.3%(inthenegative

informationcondition)ordownto22.9%(inthepositiveinformationcondition).Thisshift

19

indemandissimilarinmagnitudetowhatwefoundinStudies1and2andsimilaralsoto

theresultsofotherfieldexperimentsthattesttheeffectsofinformationaboutfairtrade

(Hainmuelleretal.2015),sweatshoplabor(HainmuellerandHiscox2015a),or

environmentalpollution(HainmuellerandHiscox2015b).Whereaspreviousexperiments

havedemonstratedtheeffectofinformationondemandforspecificproducts,oursshow

thatinformationalsoaffectsdemandforonechainstoreoveranother.

Discussion

Althoughtheliteratureonpartyidentificationisvast,politicalscientistsseldom

studytheeffectsofpartisanshiponconsumerbehavior(foranexception,seeGerberand

Huber2009),presumablybecausebehaviorssuchasshoppinganddiningareconsidered

outsidethescopeofpolitics.Ourexperimentssuggestthatconsumerpreferencescanbe

shapedbypartyattachments.Consumerswhoidentifywithamajorpartyrespondto

informationaboutthepartisancolorationoffirmssuchasWendy’sorWalmart.Itappears

thatfewpeoplehavemuchbackgroundknowledgeaboutthepoliticalsympathiesof

leadingnationalchains,butwhentoldwhichcorporationsarethelargestormostlopsided

contributorstoapoliticalparty,respondentsexpresstheirpartisanshipthroughtheir

consumptionchoices.DemocratsandRepublicansrewardfirmsthatprovidefinancial

backingtotheirpartyandpunishfirmsthatcontributemoneytotheopposingparty.This

effectwasdemonstrateddecisivelyinStudies1and2,whichwerecarriedoutinthe

contextofanon-linesurveyexperiment.Study3waslessfar-reachingintermsofchain

storesandlesspowerfulthanthetwostudiesthatprecededit,butitsdesignassessesthe

narrowbutimportantquestionofwhetherthiseffectcanbeproducedoutsidethesurvey

20

contextandsustainedoverseveraldays.Theoverallpatternofresultsconfirmedthat

partisansrewardorpunishfirmsuponlearningthattheircampaigncontributions

lopsidedlyfavoroneparty.

Themagnitudeofthiseffectislargeenoughtobeeconomicallymeaningful.In

Studies1and2,informingrespondentsaboutwhichfirmisthemostardentcontributorto

theirpartyincreasestheiraverageprobabilityofselectingthatfirm’sgiftcardby3.89

percentagepoints.Sincetheaveragefirminourstudycommandsapproximately31.5%of

thegiftcardmarketinitsrestaurantorretailcategory,thiseffectimpliesasizeableshiftin

theshareofgiftcardsthatasinglefirmcommands.Study3produceseffectsthatare

similarinmagnitudeonanunderlyinglogisticscale.

Althoughthismanifestationofpartisanattachmentsisimportanttothosewho

studypoliticalexpression,themarketimplicationsofthisphenomenonareambiguous.If

equivalentnumbersofDemocratsandRepublicansmoveinoppositedirectionsinresponse

tothisinformation,theneteffectonconsumerpreferencesiszero.However,inregions

wherethepartisanbalancestronglyfavorsoneparty(e.g.,NewYorkCity),thistypeof

informationcouldchangeafirm’smarketshare.Interestingly,apartisanreputationmight

beriskyeveninareaswherethefirm’spreferredpartypredominates.Ifpeopleshopor

dineinpoliticallyheterogeneousgroups,puttingoffonememberofsuchagroupmay

redirectitsbusinesselsewhere.

Fromapolicystandpoint,onepotentiallydisturbingramificationofthesefindingsis

thepossibilitythattheymightpersuadesomecorporationstodisbandordeemphasize

theirPACsinfavorofmoreopaquecategoriesofpoliticalfinancing.Theseopaquemethods

offunding–knowncolloquiallyas“darkmoney”–includegivingtoorganizationslikethe

21

ChamberofCommerceorCrossroadsGPS,whichhaverefusedtodisclosetheirdonorson

thegroundsthattheiractivitiesarenotelectioneering.Ironically,JusticeKennedy,writing

forthemajorityinCitizensUnited,repeatedlyassertsthatdisclaimeranddisclosure

requirementsareconstitutionalandposenochillingeffectonspeakerswithoutseemingto

noticethattheCourt’sdecisioninCitizensUnitedandearliercasescreateloopholesthat

allowdonorstoavoiddisclosure.

Wethinkofourfindingsasdemonstratingthepotentialimportanceofdisclosure.

Thefactthatasizablesubsetofrespondentsrewardedorpunishedcompaniesfortheir

politicalgivingbychoosing,atleastintheshortrun,totaketheirpatronageelsewhere

confirmsbusinessandpoliticsmightnotalwaysmix.That,inturn,providesrealimpetus

behindinformationproductssuchasthe“BuyPartisan”app,whichmakesacorporation’s

politicalgivingeasierforshopperstosee.Althoughourresultsfocussolelyonparty-

relatedinformation,futureresearchmaydemonstratecomparableeffectswhenfirmsare

associatedwithpoliticalcauses,suchasenvironmentalconservation,genderequality,or

supportforhumanrights.

Finally,ourfindingsgivecredencetolegislativeproposalsdesignedtoenhance

disclosuresothatthepublicisinformedaboutthefinancialbackerswhenever

communicationsmentioncandidates.Giventheuncertainprospectsofsuchlegislationin

thecurrentpoliticalenvironment,thefactthatmanymajordonorsofdarkmoneyare

publiclytradedcorporationscreatesotheroptionstoshinelightontheiractivitiessuchas

shareholdersuitsorSEC-requireddisclosure.Ourstudysuggeststhat,ifsuccessful,these

disclosurechannelswouldprovideinformationthatconsumersfindrelevant.

22

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