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RiskyBusiness:DoesCorporatePoliticalGivingAffectConsumerBehavior?
CostasPanagopoulos1
DonaldP.Green2
JonathanKrasno3
MichaelSchwam-Baird2
EricMoore3
KyleEndres1
1FordhamUniversity2ColumbiaUniversity 3BinghamtonUniversity
October26,2016Abstract:Towhatextentdoconsumers’preferenceschangewhentheylearnaboutfirms’partisanallegiances?WeaddressthisquestionbyconductingaseriesofexperimentsinwhichAmericanrespondentswerepresentedwithfactualinformationaboutcorporatepoliticaldonations.InStudies1and2,thisinformationwasconveyedsubtlyviaatriviaquizinwhichjustonequestionwasrandomlyvariedtoconveypoliticalornon-politicalinformation.Respondentsweretoldthecorrectanswertoeachquestion.Outcomesweremeasuredthroughfutureshoppingintentionsaswellasarevealedconsumerpreference:respondentswereinvitedtoparticipateinarafflefora$10giftcardandaskedwhichstore’sgiftcardtheywouldliketoreceiveiftheyweretowintheraffle.RespondentswhoidentifywithapoliticalpartyweresignificantlymorelikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhosePACssupporttheirpartyandlesslikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhosePACssupporttheopposingparty.InStudy3,afieldexperimentrandomlyassignedmailingsdisclosingthepartisancampaigncontributionsbytwolargechains.Whenrecipientsrespondedtoaseeminglyunrelatedsurveyseveraldayslater,theirfutureshoppingintentionsweresignificantlyaffectedbywhethertheexperimentalinformationindicatedthatthechain’spoliticaldonationsaidedoropposedtherespondent’spreferredparty.Theresultsshowthatpartyattachmentsexpressthemselvesinconsumerchoicewheninformationenablesvoterstoidentifyretailers’partisaninclinations.Weconsiderthepolicyimplicationsofthisfindinginlightofrecentcampaignfinancerulings.Acknowledgements:PaperpreparedforpresentationattheannualmeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Philadelphia,September1-4,2016.TheauthorsaregratefultoDemocracyFundandtheOpenSocietyFoundation,whichfundedthisprojectthroughFordhamUniversitybutbearnoresponsibilityforthecontentofthisreport.WethankWinstonLinforhishelpandguidanceregardingdataanalysis.ThisresearchwasapprovedbyinstitutionalreviewboardsatBinghamtonUniversity(#3611-15),ColumbiaUniversity(#AAAP9508),andFordhamUniversity(#265).Commentsarewelcomeandmaybedirectedto:[email protected],[email protected],[email protected].
1
Citizensinpublicopinionstudiesroutinelydecrytheinfluenceofspecial,and
especiallycorporate,interestsinpolitics(ShawandRagland2000;Panagopoulosand
Weinschenk2016).Reformersworrythatcorporatepoliticalspendingexertsacorrosive
effectonthepoliticalprocessandunderminespublictrust(Klumppetal.2015;Stateofthe
Union2010).TheseconcernshaveonlyintensifiedintheaftermathoftheU.S.Supreme
Court’slandmarkCitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommissionruling,whichopenedthe
doortounlimitedcorporatespendinginelections,providedthatitisindependentand
uncoordinatedwithcampaigns.
Corporatespendinghasfeaturedprominentlyinelectionsfordecades,eversince
thenewlyformedFederalElectionCommission(FEC)issuedanadvisoryopiniontothe
SunOilCompanyin1975thatapprovedtheformationofitscorporatePACandallowed
corporatetreasuriestofundoverheadandindirectcosts(RozellandWilcox1999).Once
theFECgavethebusinesscommunitythegreenlight,thenumberofcorporatePACsgrew
rapidly.By1984,thetotalnumberofPACstopped4,000(RozellandWilcox1999:77);as
ofJuly2015,atotalof5,891federalPACswereregistered,1,677ofwhichwerecorporate
PACs.Between1990and2014,politicalactioncommittees(PACs)contributedmorethan
$4billiontocandidatesrunningforofficeintheUnitedStates,accordingtotheCenterfor
ResponsivePolitics2015).CorporatePACspendingtypicallyaccountsforabout40percent
oftotalPACspendingduringanelectioncycle.Scholarsestimatethataboutone-thirdofall
U.S.Housecandidates’campaignreceiptsandone-fifthofallU.S.Senatecandidates’funds
comefromPACs(Ainsworth2002).Federalcampaignfinancelawslimithowmuch
corporatePACscanraisefromindividualsanddirecttospecificcandidates’campaigns,but
Citizenspermitsunlimitedindependentspendingbycorporations.
2
Scholarshavearguedthatcorporatecampaigncontributionshelptosecure
favorableelectionoutcomesoraccesstothewinningcandidates’offices(Snyder1993).In
additiontolobbyingefforts,campaigncontributionscanhelpcorporationstoextract
specialfavorsfromlawmakers,includinggovernmentcontracts,regulatorywaivers,and
governmentsubsidies(GodwinandSeldon2002).Empiricalevidencelinkingcontributions
tolegislators’rollcallvotesismixed(Wawro2001;Stratmann1998,1991;Wright1990,
1985),butthereisreasontobelievethatcontributionsfacilitateaccesstoelectedofficials
(KallaandBroockman2015;Austen-Smith1995;Langbein1986).
Whilescholarshavelongstudiedcorporatecontributionstocandidatesandtheir
effectsonlegislativebehavior,theinfluenceofcorporateinvolvementinelectionson
votersandconsumershaslargelyescapedscholarlyattention.Manymodelsofcorporate
givinginelectionscharacterizetheirpoliticalbehaviorashighlystrategicbutoverlookthe
prospectofpublicorconsumerbacklash(e.g.,MastersandKeim1985).Forexample,itis
oftennotedthatcorporationsgenerallysupportincumbentsmoreoftenthanchallengersin
congressionalelections(Brunell2005;Milyoetal.2000)andgivedisproportionallyto
committeechairsandcandidatesofthepoliticalpartyinpowerinCongress(Rudolph
1999;RomerandSnyder1994;GrierandMunger1986).Inaddition,somecorporations
regularlyfavoroneparty’scandidatesforreasonsthatmayreflecttheideological
preferencesofcorporateleadersortheregulatoryenvironmentinwhichthecorporation
operates.Gimpel,Lee,andParrott(2014,p.1037)reportthat36%ofindustrysectors
donatedisproportionatelytoRepublicans,2%toDemocrats,andtherestdonatewith“no
discerniblepartisanpreference.”Whetherornotcorporatepartisansupporthasthe
potentialtoaffectconsumerbehaviorremainsanopenquestion.
3
Weaddressthisquestionthroughapairofsurveyexperimentsandafieldexperiment
inwhichrandomlyassignedgroupsofrespondentsareexposedtofactualinformation
aboutwhichlargenationalchainsdonatedmoneytomajor-partycandidatesthroughtheir
PACs.InStudies1and2,thisinformationwasconveyedsubtlyviaatriviaquizinwhich
justonequestionwasrandomlyvariedtoconveyinformationaboutpoliticalcontributions.
Respondents,whosepartyattachmentsweremeasuredbyasurveyconductedaweek
earlier,weretoldthecorrectanswertoeachquestion.Respondentsprovedquite
knowledgeableaboutmostchainstoretriviabuttendedtoknowlittleaboutthesechains’
campaigncontributions.Outcomesweremeasuredthougharevealedconsumer
preference:inadditiontodescribingtheirfutureshoppingplans,respondentswereinvited
toparticipateinarafflefora$10giftcardandaskedwhichchainstore’sgiftcardthey
wouldliketoreceiveiftheyweretowintheraffle.Wefindstrongstatisticalevidencethat
respondentswhoidentifywithapartyaremorelikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhose
PACssupporttheirparty’scandidatesandlesslikelytoselectgiftcardsforchainswhose
PACssupporttheopposingparty’scandidates.Thispatternisaffirmedbyafield
experimentinwhichanewpoolofsubjectsdrawnfromanationalpanelsurveywassent
oneoftworandomlyassignedmailingsthatprovidedsimilarinformationaboutfirms’
contributions.Interviewsconductedaweeklatersuggestthatrespondentsrewarded
chainsfortheirpoliticallylike-mindedcontributionsandpunishedchainsthatsupported
theopposingparty.Evidently,partyattachmentsexpressthemselvesinconsumerchoice
whenvotersareinformedaboutaretailer’spartisansympathies.Thisisaformofpolitical
expressionthatismutedbythepublic’slackofawarenessofcorporatepolitical
contributions.Weconcludebyconsideringtheimplicationsofthesefindingsfortheories
4
ofexpressivepartisanshipandforpoliciesconcerningthedisclosureofcampaign
contributions.
PoliticalConsumerism
Overtime,thestudyofpoliticalparticipationhasgraduallybroadenedfromthe
studyofvotingtoincludeawidearrayofotherwaysinwhichcitizensmayconveytheir
politicalviews,suchasparticipationinlocalaffairs(NieandVerba1972),volunteerwork
(Verba,Schlozman,andBrady1995),andprotestactivities(BarnesandKaase1979).The
intellectualtrendhasincreasinglycalledattentiontothemarketplaceasalocusofpolitical
expression.Thepoliticalconsumerismhypothesis(Stolle,Hooghe,andMicheletti2005;
AndersonandCunningham1972;Keumetal2004)contendsthatindividualsselectamong
productsandproducersbasedonsocial,politicalandethicalconsiderations,suchas“fair
trade”practices(Hainmueller,Hiscox,andSequeira2015),ethicallaborstandards
(HainmuellerandHiscox2015),andcorporatepoliticalactivity(Shahetal.2007:219).
PoliticalexpressionviaconsumerchoicehasalongtraditionintheUnitedStatesdatingto
thecolonialera,whenboycottswerethecenterpieceofAmericanresistancetowardBritish
rule(Breen2004).
Manyscholarscontendthatpoliticalpreferencesshapeconsumerdecisionstoa
politicalandeconomicallyimportantextent.Shahetal(2007:232)arguethat,“Consumer-
citizens,whoexercisetheirpoliticalvaluesandconcernsthroughtheirconsumption
patterns,viewtheeconomicrealmasameaningfulsphereinwhichtoadvancetheirmoral
andsocialconcerns.”Responsestocorporateactivitymaytaketheformofboycotts
(punishingbusinessforunfavorablebehaviorbywithholdingdemand)orbuycotts
5
(rewardingbusinessforfavorablebehaviorbyincreasingdemand).Formany,political
consumerismprovidesanalternativemodetoengagewithpublicissuesoutsideof
conventionalpoliticalchannels(Nielson2010;Shahetal.2007;BennettandEntman
2001).LargesegmentsoftheAmericanpublicreportthattheyengageinboycottsand
buycotts(PanagopoulosandEndres2016;NewmanandBartels2011),andthis
phenomenoniscommoninWesternEurope(Ferrer-FonsandFraile.2014),theMiddle
East(BensteadandReif2015;FarahandNewman2010),andinLatinAmerica(Echegaray
2015).Byusingthemarkettoexpresspoliticalandmoralconcerns,politicalconsumerism
isamanifestationofwhatBennett(1998)terms“lifestylepolitics”andreflectsthebroader
tendencytofindpoliticalmeaninginrecreationalexperiences,entertainmentchoices,
fashiondecisionsandotherpersonalchoices(Shahetal.2007:219).1
Ispoliticalconsumerismaforcethatcorporationsmustheed?Consumerdemand
increaseswhenproductsareadvertisedwithreferencetowidely-sharedvaluessuchas
supportforhumanrights(Hainmuelleretal.2015;HainmuellerandHiscox2015a)or
environmentalprotection(HainmuellerandHiscox2015b),andthesevaluesveryoften
appearinthe“missionstatements”thatcorporationsfeatureontheirwebsites.
1Politicalconsumerismhasbeenobservedinmanycountriesandcontexts(Stolle,HoogheandMicheletti2005;StolleandMicheletti2015).Individualsconcernedabouttheenvironment,forexample,aremorelikelytoseekandpurchaseenvironmentallyfriendlyproducts(MintonandRose1997).Researchhasfoundthatwomen,youngpeopleandmoreeducatedindividualsareparticularlylikelytomakeconsumptiondecisionsbasedonpoliticalconsiderations.Mediause,andespeciallynewsconsumption,seemstopredictpoliticallymotivatedconsumption,presumablybecauseitprovidessignalstoconsumersaboutpolitically-relevantcorporateactivity(Holt2000;Keumetal.2004).Althoughwerestrictourattentionheretopoliticalpartisanship,ourempiricalstrategyreadilyextendstotheseotherpoliticaldomains.
6
Aswemovefromconsensusvaluestomorecontentiousissues,overtsupport
becomesrarer.Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatcorporationsarewisetoavoidentangling
themselvesindivisivepoliticalissues.AtellingcaseinpointaroseinJuneof2012,when
theAmericanfast-foodchainChick-fil-Abecamethecenterofcontroversy.DanT.Cathy,
thecompany’schiefoperatingofficermadecommentsopposingsame-sexmarriage,and
reportssurfacedthatthecompany’scharitablearm,theWinShapeFoundation,had
donatedmillionstoorganizationshostiletosame-sexmarriagerights.Opponentscalledfor
protestsandboycottsnationwide,whilesupportersralliedtoeatattherestaurants
(Severson2012).Afewweekslater,thechainissuedastatementstatingthat,“[g]oing
forward,ourintentistoleavethepolicydebateoversame-sexmarriagetothegovernment
andpoliticalarena.”
OneimplicationoftheChick-fil-Aexampleisthatcorporationswadeintopartisan
politicsattheirperil.Partyaffiliationhaslongbeenrecognizedasanespeciallyimportant
politicalorientation(Campbelletal.1960),andrecentworkhasunderscoredtherangeof
waysinwhichpartisanattachmentsexpressthemselves.Buildingonsocialidentitytheory
(Tajfel&Turner1979),experimentsbyHuddyetal.(2015)showthatpartisans’political
actions,suchascampaigninvolvement,expressadeep-seatedgroupidentity,whichinturn
leadspartisanstorisetothedefenseofthepartyin-group.AlthoughHuddyetal.(2015)
didnotanalyzeconsumerbehavior,theirhypothesisabouttheexpressionofpartisan
socialidentitypredictsthatconsumerswillreacttoinformationaboutcorporatecampaign
activityinwaysthatreflecttheirpartisanpredispositions.Corporationsthatsupportthe
opposingpartywillbeperceivedasathreattothepartisanin-group,whilethosethat
supportone’sownpartywillbeseenasmeritingin-grouployalty.Inthenextsection,we
7
deviseatestofthishypothesisbyassessingtheextenttowhichpartisanschangetheir
consumerbehaviorbasedoninformationaboutwhichpoliticalpartiescorporations
supportthroughtheirPACs.
ExperimentalDesign:Studies1and2
Duringthesummerof2015,weconductedtwosurveyexperiments,bothusingthe
samebasicexperimentaldesignbutwithdifferentsubjects.Inthefirststudy,werandomly
assignedinformationabouttwotypesoffranchises,hamburgerrestaurantsandlargeretail
chains.Inthesecondstudy,weexpandedthelistofcategoriesfromtwotofourby
includingpizzarestaurantsanddrugstores.
Inordertoensurethatourexperimentalinterventionwasrelevanttothe
participants,eachsurveyexperimentwasconductedovertwowavesofinterviews.Inthe
firstwave,AmazonMechanicalTurkworkerswerepaidasmallfeeof$1tocompletea
brieffiveminutesurveythatassessed(1)thefrequencywithwhichtheypatronizedeachof
thestoresthatwouldlaterappearinourquiz,(2)theirratingsofthesestores,(3)their
partyidentification,and(4)demographiccharacteristics.Respondentswerealsoasked
whethertheywouldbewillingtoparticipateinafollow-upsurvey.Atotalof3,809
respondentscompletedthebaselinesurveyinStudy1;another3,739completedthe
baselinesurveyinStudy2.Approximatelyaweeklater,weinvitedasubsetofthebaseline
respondentstocompleteafollow-upsurvey.Invitationswereextendedtothosewho
indicatedawillingnesstocompleteafollow-upsurvey,maintainedanactiveMechanical
Turkaccount,providedananswertothebaselinesurvey’spartyidentificationquestion,
anddidnotindicatethatthey“never”patronizeanyofthestoresinoneormoreofour
8
storecategories.Invitationswereextendedto3,457participantsinStudy1and3,413in
Study2.
Inordertomotivatesubjectstoattendcloselytothecontentofthequiz,thesecond
wavesurveywasprefacedwiththefollowinginstructions:“Wewillbeaskingyoufactual
questionsaboutsomeoftheplaceswhereyoumayeatandshop.Attheendofeachsection,
youwillbegiventheopportunitytoenterarandomdrawingtowinoneofonehundred
$10giftcards.Foreachquestionyouanswercorrectly,wewilladdanadditionalentryfor
youinordertoincreaseyourchancesofwinning.”Theoverwhelmingmajorityof
respondents(96%)indicatedtheirwillingnesstoparticipateineachlottery,whichisnot
surprisinggiventhattheprizewaslargeinrelationtotheflatwagepaidtothosewho
participatedinthesurvey.
Ineachstudy,werandomlyassignedsubjectstooneoffiveexperimentalgroups.2
Thefirstquizfocusedonthreehamburgerchains(BurgerKing,McDonald’s,andWendy’s).
Thefirstthreequestionsofthequizfocusedonnon-politicalcontent(e.g.,Whichofthe
threechainswasthefirsttointroducea“dollarmenu”?).Allrespondentssawthesame
threeinitialquestionsandanswers.Thefourthquestionwasmanipulatedrandomly.In
theRepublicanPercentagecondition,subjectswereasked“Whichofthesecompaniesgave
thelargestpercentageoftheirpoliticalcontributionstoRepublicancandidatesin2014?”
and,afteranswering,toldthatthecorrectanswerisWendy’s:“Throughtheirpolitical
actioncommittee,Wendy’sgave93%oftheirtotalpoliticalcontributionstoRepublican
candidatesin2014.”IntheDemocraticPercentagecondition,subjectswereasked“Which2InStudy1,weincludedasixthconditionthataskedsubjectsaboutwhichchaincontributedthemosttobothparties.WeexcludedthisconditionfromStudy2becausewehadnocleartheoreticalpredictionabouthowsubjectswouldrespondtothisinformation,and,indeed,itproducednoapparenttreatmenteffect.
9
ofthesecompaniesgavethelargestpercentageoftheirpoliticalcontributionsto
Democraticcandidatesin2014?”and,afteranswering,toldthatthecorrectansweris
BurgerKing.IntheRepublicanAmountcondition,subjectswereasked“Whichofthese
companiesgavethemostdollarstoRepublicancandidatesin2014?”and,afteranswering,
toldthatthecorrectanswerisMcDonald’s.TheDemocraticAmountquestionwasworded
similarly,andagaintheanswerisMcDonald’s.Finally,acontrolconditionaskedsubjectsa
non-politicalquestion:“In2010,whichrestaurantaddedseasalttotheirfries?”Itshould
benotedthatalloftheinformationprovidedtorespondentswasfactuallyaccurate;by
framingthequestionsindifferentways,wewereabletocallattentiontothepartisan
colorationofaparticularchain.Noneoftheotherquestionsinthesecondwavesurvey
askedaboutpoliticsuntilafteroutcomemeasuresweregathered.3
Aftereachquiz,subjectswereaskedwhethertheywouldliketoparticipateina
lotteryforoneoftheonehundred$10giftcardprizes.Therewerenoapparenteffectsof
thetreatmentonwillingnesstoparticipateinthelotteryforanyofthequizzesineither
Study1orStudy2.4Thosewhoagreedwerethenasked,“Whichofthefollowing
companieswouldyouliketoreceiveagiftcardtoifyouwintheraffle?”andpresentedwith
thelistofstoresthatappearedinthequiz.Afterselectingagiftcard,respondentswere
askedtheirfutureshoppingintentions.Thissequenceofrandomlyassignedquizcontent,
giftcardpreference,andanticipatedpatronageofeachstorewasrepeatedforretailstores,
3Attheveryendofthesurvey,afterallrelevantconsumeroutcomeshadbeenmeasured,weaskedaboutwhichparty’scandidatetherespondentintendedtovoteforinthe2016congressionalelections.4InStudy1,96.2%ofrespondentsassignedtoatreatmentand96.0%ofrespondentsassignedtothecontrolagreedtoparticipateinthelottery.InStudy2,96.0%ofrespondentsassignedtoatreatmentand95.1%ofrespondentsassignedtothecontrolagreedtoparticipate.
10
pizzarestaurants,anddrugstores.5Table1summarizesthenumberofrespondents
assignedtoeachexperimentalconditionandindicatesthecorrectanswertoeach
experimentallymanipulatedquestion.Asexpected,randomassignmenttotreatment
conditionisstatisticallyunrelatedtorespondents’backgroundcovariatesasmeasuredin
thebaselinesurveywave:age,gender,approvalofObama,andthefrequencywithwhich
theypatronizethelargestchainstoreineachofthestorecategories.Multinomial
regressionoftheassignedexperimentalconditiononthesecovariatesproduces
insignificantlikelihoodratiostatistics.Thep-valuesfortheeightrandomassignments
rangefrom0.11to0.63.
Thedistributionofquizanswersstronglysuggeststhatthepoliticalinformationwas
noveltorespondents.Table2summarizesanswerstoeachofthequizquestions.
Whereas,forexample,alargeproportionofsubjectsknewthatbaconisnotastandard
ingredientinBurgerKing’s“whopper”hamburger,answerstothefactualquestionsabout
politicaldonationswerescarcelymoreaccuratethanwouldbeexpectedbyrandom
guessing.Thefactthatthepoliticalinformationisnewtorespondentshasimportant
implicationsfortheinterpretationofourresultsbecauseitsuggeststhatalargemajorityof
eachtreatmentgrouphadanopportunitytoupdatetheirevaluationsofthechainstores
basedontheinformationprovided.
Howsubjectsrespondtoinformationaboutpoliticalcontributionspresumably
dependsontheirownpartyattachments.RepublicansshouldevaluateWendy’smore
favorablyuponlearningthatWendy’sisthehamburgerchainthatgivesthelargest
5Thesequenceinwhichthechainstoreswerepresentedwasrandomlyassigned,andafreshrandomassignmentofexperimentalconditionwasperformedforeachstorecategory.
11
proportionofitsdonationstoRepublicans;thesamenewsshouldproducealessfavorable
assessmentamongDemocrats.Forthisreason,weassesstreatmenteffectsseparately
accordingtowhethersubjectsidentifiedasRepublicansorDemocratsinthebaseline
surveyofeachstudy.Thisclassificationusedtheinitialquestiontothetraditionalparty
identificationmeasureusedbytheAmericanNationalElectionStudiessincethe1950s:
“Generallyspeaking,doyouusuallythinkofyourselfasaRepublican,aDemocrat,an
Independent,orsomethingelse?”6Althoughthedistributionofpartisansinourtwo
studiesismoreDemocraticthanwouldbetypicalofarepresentativenationalsurvey,we
neverthelesshaveamplenumbersofDemocratsandRepublicansforpurposesofassessing
treatmenteffectsforeachpartisangroup.Inthefirststudy,weobtainedresponsesfrom
972Democratsand363Republicans;inthesecondstudy,1,029Democratsand466
Republicans.7Takentogether,wehaveatotalof48experimentalcomparisons:sixsetsof
experimentaltests(hamburgerchainsandretailstoresinStudy1;hamburger,retail,pizza,
anddrugstoresinStudy2),eachfeaturingfourtreatmentgroupcomparisonstoacontrol
condition,whichareinturnconsideredseparatelyforself-describedDemocratsand
Republicans.Thiswealthofcomparisonsprovidesapreciseassessmentofwhetherandto
whatextentpoliticalinformationaffectssubjects’giftcardpreferences.
6Similarresultsareobtainedwhenoneexpandsthedefinitionofeachpartisangrouptoinclude“leaningindependents”basedonthestandardAmericanNationalElectionStudyfollow-upquestionthatasksindependentswhethertheyfeelclosertoonepartyortheother.7WhenconductingStudy2,weinadvertentlyallowed835subjectswhoparticipatedinthefirststudytoparticipateinthesecondstudy.Forallcalculations,weexcluderepeatsubjectsfromStudy2onthegroundsthatparticipationinthefirststudymayhaveaffectedthesesubjects’behaviorinthesecondstudy(whetherthroughlearningorperceivingadesiredresponsefromtheresearchers).Asitturnsout,weobtainsimilarresultswithandwithouttheserepeatsubjects.
12
Results.Table3presentsdetailedresultsforeachstudy,treatmentcondition,and
partisangroup.Ourstatisticalanalysissummarizestherelationshipbetweenpolitical
informationandgiftcardpreference.Foreachofthe48comparisonsofatreatmentgroup
withacontrolgroup,weassesswhethertheapparenttreatmenteffectisinthepredicted
direction.ForDemocraticrespondents,thepredictionisthatdemandforgiftcardsfrom
firmjdiminishes(increases)whenthatfirmisshowntosupportRepublicans(Democrats).
ForRepublicans,thesepredictionsarereversed.Wefindthat36ofthe48comparisons
pointinthepredicteddirection.Randomizationinferenceshowsthatasetofpredictions
thislopsidedwouldoccurbychancewithp=0.0004.8
Next,wecalculatetheaverageeffectofnegativeandpositivepoliticalinformation
ongiftcarddemand.Acrossall48comparisons,giftcarddemandchangedbyanaverageof
3.89percentagepointsinthepredicteddirection.Inordertocalculatetheconfidence
intervalsurroundingthisestimate,weuserandomizationinferenceandassumethatthe
effectoftreatmentinthepredicteddirectionisthesameforeverysubject(Gerberand
Green2012,pp.67-71).Weobtaina95percentconfidenceintervalrangingfrom2.0to5.1
percentagepointsinthepredicteddirection.Overall,wefindarobustchangeingiftcard
demandwhenafirmisrevealedtosupportoropposerespondents’preferredparty.
Theaverageshiftinpreferenceacrossalloftheassignedinformationconditions
arguablyunderstatesthetruemagnitudeoftheinformationeffect.Insomeinstances,the
informationrevealedtorespondentsconveysatmostaweaksignalofpartysupport.(See8Thereferencedistributionwasgeneratedbysimulation,permutingtheassignmentoftreatmentconditions10,000timesandassessingtheresultingdistributionofcomparisonsthatcameoutinthepredicteddirection.Thismethodaccountsfordependenciesthatariseduetothefactthatmultipletreatmentarmsarecomparedtothesamecontrolgroup.
13
TableA1forasummaryofchainstores’contributions.)Amongpizzachains,forexample,
thelargestpercentagedonortoDemocratsisDomino’s,butthatfirmgivesDemocratsa
meager22%.ItshouldnotbesurprisingtofindinTable3thatthisinformationfailsto
makeDomino’sappreciablymoreattractiveintheeyesofDemocratsorlessattractivein
theeyesofRepublicans.Becauseweprovidedonlytruthfulinformationtorespondents
(andthereforedidnotrandomlyvarythereporteddonationsmadebyeachcorporate
chain),ourexperimentdoesnotallowforadirecttestofthehypothesisthatpartysupport
mattersmostwhencorporationsdisplaysubstantialsupport,butthedatacertainlyhint
thatthisisthecase.
Oneinterestingfeatureofourexperimentaldesignisthatitenablesustoassess
whetherestimatedtreatmenteffectsamongDemocratsareequalinmagnitudebut
oppositeinsigntothecorrespondingeffectsamongRepublicanswhenbothgroupsreceive
thesameinformation.Figure1demonstratesthatthisinfactthecase.Thehorizontalaxis
gaugeseffectsizeamongDemocrats,andtheverticalaxisgaugeseffectsizeamong
Republicans.Thehypothesisofequalandoppositeeffectsimpliesadownwardsloping
regressionlinepassingthroughtheoriginata45-degreeangle,andtheobservedeffectson
averagefollowthispredictedpattern.Apparently,thesamenewsthatraisesafirm’s
statureintheeyesofonepartylowersitcorrespondinglyintheeyesoftheopposingparty.
RobustnessChecksandPlaceboTests.Thissectionreportstheresultsofaseriesof
furtherteststoestablishthattheeffectonconsumerpreferencesshowsupwherewe
expectitanddoesnotshowupwherewedonotexpectit.First,wetestwhethertheeffect
isapparentwhenconsumerpreferenceismeasuredbyanoutcomeotherthanchoiceofgift
14
card.Respondentswereaskeddirectlyabouttheirfutureshoppinganddiningintentions.
Forexample,respondentswereasked,“Thinkingahead,andusingthefollowingscale,how
oftendoyouplantoeatatthefollowinghamburgerrestaurants?”Anorderedseriesoffive
responseoptionsrangedfrom“severaltimesaweek”to“never.”Inordertocompare
treatmentandcontrolresponsedistributions,weusedorderedlogittoregressfrequency
ofanticipateddiningorshoppingonadummyvariablefortreatment.Consistentwiththe
findingsregardingthegiftcard,wefound39of48estimatedtreatmenteffectstobeinthe
predicteddirection(p<0.0001).SeetheAppendixforfullresultswithandwithout
controlsforpre-treatmentcovariates.
Second,wenotethatRepublicansandDemocratsdonotrespondstronglyor
systematicallytoinformationthatcarriesnopartisanvalence.Whenlearningthata
restaurantorchainstoreisthelargestoverallcampaigndonor,partisansneitherreward
norpunishthefirmwithenhancedordiminisheddemandforgiftcardsorexpectedfuture
purchases.9Bythesametoken,thepartisaninformationdescribedaboveseemstohave
nosystematiceffectonself-describedindependents.Itappearsthattwoconditionsmust
holdbeforeconsumersrewardorpunishfirmsfortheirpoliticalcontributions:the
consumersthemselvesmustharborapartyattachment,andtheinformationtheyreceive
aboutcontributionsmustspecifywhichpartythefirmsupports.
ExperimentalDesign:Study3
Studies1and2demonstratethatpartisansrespondtoinformationaboutrestaurant
9Inthefirstroundofdatacollection,“totalcontributions”wasoneoftherandomlyassignedquizquestions.BothDemocratsandRepublicansshowedsmallbutinsignificantincreasesingiftcarddemandforboththebiggestdonors(McDonald’sandWalmart).
15
andretailchains’recordofpartisansupport.Theresultsarerobustacrosspartiesand
outcomemeasures,yettwoquestionsremainaboutthegeneralizabilityoftheresults.The
firstiswhethertheeffectcanbeinducedinsomewayotherthanviaaquizthat
incentivizesrespondentstopaycloseattention.Thesecondiswhetherthetreatmenteffect
persistsovertime–Studies1and2askedrespondentsabouttheirpreferencesand
intendedbehaviorshortlyaftertheyencounteredtheexperimentalinformation.Inorder
toaddressthesequestions,Study3teststheeffectofapostcardmailedtothehome
addressofpanelsurveyrespondents,whoansweredanend-linesurveyaweeklater.
WepartneredwithYouGov/Polimetrix,whichrecruitedasampleofrespondents
fromitsnationwideonlinepanel.Subjectswererestrictedtoself-identifiedDemocratsor
RepublicansbasedonthestemquestionoftheconventionalAmericanNationalElection
Studypartyidentificationmeasure.10InkeepingwithStudies1and2,respondents
completedapreliminarysurveythatprobedthemaboutbasicpoliticalattitudesand
consumerpreferencesandbehaviors(seeAppendixforsurveyinstrument).These
responsesfurnishpre-treatment,baselinemeasuresofsocial,political,andconsumer
attitudesandbehaviors.Atotalof1,658respondentscompletedtheinitialwaveofour
survey,fieldedJune15-24,2016.
Ourexperimentaltreatmentconsistedofapostcardmailingdesignedtoprovide
informationaboutthepoliticalcontributionsoffirmsinthe2014federalelections.To
maximizeattentiontothetreatments,aprofessionalgraphicsdesignerproducedcolor
postcardsthatwerevisuallyengaging.Thecontentofthepostcardswasdesignedto
parallelascloselyaspossiblethekeytreatmentelementsinStudies1and2.(SeeAppendix
10Thus,independentsandleaningpartisansareexcluded.
16
forreproductionsofthepostcards.)Toenhancepower,wefocusedonjusttwochainstores
withsharplycontrastingpatternsofpartysupport.OnepostcardhighlightedPAC
contributionsbyBedBath&Beyond,achainthatcontributed71%ofitsPACcontributions
toDemocraticcandidatesinthe2014cycle;theotherprovidedparallelinformationabout
Wendy’s,achainthatdirected93%ofitscontributionstoGOPcandidatesin2014.11The
postcardsalsonotedthatthesepercentageswerehigherthantwocompetingfirmsineach
commercialcategory(McDonaldsandBurgerKingforhamburgerchains;Targetand
Walmartforbig-boxchains).
YouGov/Polimetrixrandomlydividedthesubjectpoolinhalfanddesignatedhalfof
therespondentstoreceivetheBedBath&Beyondpostcardandtheotherhalftoreceive
theWendy’spostcard.Postcardsweremailedusingfirst-classpostageonJune30,2016
andwereexpectedtoarrivebetweenJuly5thand6th.
Approximatelyoneweekfollowingexpecteddeliveryofthepostcards,duringthe
periodJuly13-20,YouGov/Polimetrixfieldedafollow-uponlinesurveyamongsubjects
whohadcompletedthebaselinesurveyandweremailedapostcard.Thesecondwaveof
thesurveyfeaturedquestionitemsaboutrespondents’socialandpoliticalviews,and,
crucially,aboutfutureconsumerintentions.Atotalof1,446subjectscompletedthefollow-
upwaveofthesurvey,forareinterviewrateof87%.Reinterviewratesdiffered
insignificantlyacrossexperimentalconditions:86.6%amongthosereceivingtheWendy’s
11Thepostcardsinformedrespondentsthatthepercentagesreportedwerebasedonnumberscompiledbyopensecrets.org.ThetextofthepostcardscharacterizethecontributionsasPACcontributions,buttheopensecrets.orgstatisticswecitedcombinePACcontributionswithcontributionsfromcorporateexecutives.StatisticsreportedinthetwoMTurkstudieswerecharacterizedinasimilarway,duetoourmisreadingoftheopensecrets.orgreport.Wedonotexpectthatourmistakencharacterizationaffectedthewayinwhichsubjectperceivedtheinformation.
17
postcardand87.9%amongthosereceivingtheBedBath&Beyondpostcard.Thosewho
completedtheend-linesurveywere72%white,58%female,and58%self-identified
Democrats.Fully67%reportedthattheyeatatWendy’satleast“afewtimesayear”inthe
baselinesurvey;58%reportedthattheyshopatBedBath&Beyondatleast“afewtimesa
year.”
Ouroutcomemeasureisdrawnfromaseriesofsurveyitemsprobingsubjectsabout
theirconsumerintentions.UsingthewordingandformatasinStudies1and2,onesetof
questionsaskedrespondentsabouttheirconsumerintentionswithrespecttothree,fast-
foodhamburgerchains(inrandomorder:Wendy’s,McDonaldsandBurgerKing),while
anothersetinquiredaboutbig-boxshoppingintentionsatTarget,Walmart,andBedBath&
Beyond,randomlyordered.Foreachfirm,subjectsindicatedwhethertheyexpectedtoeat
orshopateachfirmrespectivelyeither“severaltimesaweek,”“aboutonceaweek,”“once
ortwiceamonth,”“afewtimesayear,”or“never.”Becausethisoutcomemeasureisa
seriesoforderedcategories,weuseorderedlogisticregressiontoestimatethelatent
treatmenteffect.
Asamanipulationcheck,thesecondwavesurveyconcludedwithtwoknowledge
questionsthattestedparticipants’abilitytorecallthecontentofthepostcards.One
questionasked“Whichofthefollowinghamburgerrestaurantsgavethehighestpercentage
ofitspoliticalcontributionstoRepublicansin2014?”Theotherasked“Whichofthe
followingbigboxstoresgavethehighestpercentageofitspoliticalcontributionsto
Democratsin2014?”Theresultsleavenodoubtthatthemailingmadethetreatment
groupsignificantlymoreknowledgeable.Just5.7%ofthecontrolgroupcorrectly
answeredthefirstquestion,ascomparedto23.6%ofthetreatmentgroup.Thesecond
18
questionwascorrectlyansweredby3.3%ofthecontrolgroupand12.7%ofthetreatment
group.Thep-valuesofthesecontrastsarewellbelow0.0001inbothcases.
Results.Table4estimatestheaveragetreatmenteffectforeachoffourexperimental
contrasts.AmongDemocrats,newsthatWendy’scontributesoverwhelminglyto
Republicansshoulddiminishtheirwillingnesstodinethereinthefuture;forRepublicans,
thisinformationshouldincreasetheirwillingnesstodoso.TheBedBath&Beyond
postcardshouldincreaseshoppingintentionsamongDemocratsbutdecreasethemamong
Republicans.Resultsfromtherawcomparisonbetweentreatmentandcontrolgroupsare
ambiguous,butcontrollingfordiningandshoppingpatternsmeasuredinthebaseline
surveysharpenstheresultsconsiderably.Aftercontrollingforbaselineconsumption,all
fourestimatesareinthepredicteddirection.Incolumns2and5ofTable4,thefour
estimatedt-ratiosforthetreatmenteffectsare-1.73,1.02,0.63,and-1.29.Tocalculatethe
one-sidedjointsignificanceoftheseestimates,wecodethemallinthepositivedirectionto
obtainanaveraget-ratio;thep-valueofobtaininganaveragestatisticatleastthislargein
fourtestsislessthan0.01.Addingfurthercovariatesforbaselineconsumptionat
competingchainstores(columns3and6)producessimilarresults,againwithp<0.01.
Howlargeistheeffectinsubstantiveterms?Usingmeta-analysistopoolthefour
orderedlogisticregressioncoefficientsfromthefullsetofcovariatesindicatesthatthe
postcardsonaveragechangedlatentdemandby0.215logits.Thismovementonthe
logisticscaleisequivalenttoshiftingtheproportionsayingthattheyplanto“never”
patronizeachainstorefrom26.9%(inthecontrolcondition)upto31.3%(inthenegative
informationcondition)ordownto22.9%(inthepositiveinformationcondition).Thisshift
19
indemandissimilarinmagnitudetowhatwefoundinStudies1and2andsimilaralsoto
theresultsofotherfieldexperimentsthattesttheeffectsofinformationaboutfairtrade
(Hainmuelleretal.2015),sweatshoplabor(HainmuellerandHiscox2015a),or
environmentalpollution(HainmuellerandHiscox2015b).Whereaspreviousexperiments
havedemonstratedtheeffectofinformationondemandforspecificproducts,oursshow
thatinformationalsoaffectsdemandforonechainstoreoveranother.
Discussion
Althoughtheliteratureonpartyidentificationisvast,politicalscientistsseldom
studytheeffectsofpartisanshiponconsumerbehavior(foranexception,seeGerberand
Huber2009),presumablybecausebehaviorssuchasshoppinganddiningareconsidered
outsidethescopeofpolitics.Ourexperimentssuggestthatconsumerpreferencescanbe
shapedbypartyattachments.Consumerswhoidentifywithamajorpartyrespondto
informationaboutthepartisancolorationoffirmssuchasWendy’sorWalmart.Itappears
thatfewpeoplehavemuchbackgroundknowledgeaboutthepoliticalsympathiesof
leadingnationalchains,butwhentoldwhichcorporationsarethelargestormostlopsided
contributorstoapoliticalparty,respondentsexpresstheirpartisanshipthroughtheir
consumptionchoices.DemocratsandRepublicansrewardfirmsthatprovidefinancial
backingtotheirpartyandpunishfirmsthatcontributemoneytotheopposingparty.This
effectwasdemonstrateddecisivelyinStudies1and2,whichwerecarriedoutinthe
contextofanon-linesurveyexperiment.Study3waslessfar-reachingintermsofchain
storesandlesspowerfulthanthetwostudiesthatprecededit,butitsdesignassessesthe
narrowbutimportantquestionofwhetherthiseffectcanbeproducedoutsidethesurvey
20
contextandsustainedoverseveraldays.Theoverallpatternofresultsconfirmedthat
partisansrewardorpunishfirmsuponlearningthattheircampaigncontributions
lopsidedlyfavoroneparty.
Themagnitudeofthiseffectislargeenoughtobeeconomicallymeaningful.In
Studies1and2,informingrespondentsaboutwhichfirmisthemostardentcontributorto
theirpartyincreasestheiraverageprobabilityofselectingthatfirm’sgiftcardby3.89
percentagepoints.Sincetheaveragefirminourstudycommandsapproximately31.5%of
thegiftcardmarketinitsrestaurantorretailcategory,thiseffectimpliesasizeableshiftin
theshareofgiftcardsthatasinglefirmcommands.Study3produceseffectsthatare
similarinmagnitudeonanunderlyinglogisticscale.
Althoughthismanifestationofpartisanattachmentsisimportanttothosewho
studypoliticalexpression,themarketimplicationsofthisphenomenonareambiguous.If
equivalentnumbersofDemocratsandRepublicansmoveinoppositedirectionsinresponse
tothisinformation,theneteffectonconsumerpreferencesiszero.However,inregions
wherethepartisanbalancestronglyfavorsoneparty(e.g.,NewYorkCity),thistypeof
informationcouldchangeafirm’smarketshare.Interestingly,apartisanreputationmight
beriskyeveninareaswherethefirm’spreferredpartypredominates.Ifpeopleshopor
dineinpoliticallyheterogeneousgroups,puttingoffonememberofsuchagroupmay
redirectitsbusinesselsewhere.
Fromapolicystandpoint,onepotentiallydisturbingramificationofthesefindingsis
thepossibilitythattheymightpersuadesomecorporationstodisbandordeemphasize
theirPACsinfavorofmoreopaquecategoriesofpoliticalfinancing.Theseopaquemethods
offunding–knowncolloquiallyas“darkmoney”–includegivingtoorganizationslikethe
21
ChamberofCommerceorCrossroadsGPS,whichhaverefusedtodisclosetheirdonorson
thegroundsthattheiractivitiesarenotelectioneering.Ironically,JusticeKennedy,writing
forthemajorityinCitizensUnited,repeatedlyassertsthatdisclaimeranddisclosure
requirementsareconstitutionalandposenochillingeffectonspeakerswithoutseemingto
noticethattheCourt’sdecisioninCitizensUnitedandearliercasescreateloopholesthat
allowdonorstoavoiddisclosure.
Wethinkofourfindingsasdemonstratingthepotentialimportanceofdisclosure.
Thefactthatasizablesubsetofrespondentsrewardedorpunishedcompaniesfortheir
politicalgivingbychoosing,atleastintheshortrun,totaketheirpatronageelsewhere
confirmsbusinessandpoliticsmightnotalwaysmix.That,inturn,providesrealimpetus
behindinformationproductssuchasthe“BuyPartisan”app,whichmakesacorporation’s
politicalgivingeasierforshopperstosee.Althoughourresultsfocussolelyonparty-
relatedinformation,futureresearchmaydemonstratecomparableeffectswhenfirmsare
associatedwithpoliticalcauses,suchasenvironmentalconservation,genderequality,or
supportforhumanrights.
Finally,ourfindingsgivecredencetolegislativeproposalsdesignedtoenhance
disclosuresothatthepublicisinformedaboutthefinancialbackerswhenever
communicationsmentioncandidates.Giventheuncertainprospectsofsuchlegislationin
thecurrentpoliticalenvironment,thefactthatmanymajordonorsofdarkmoneyare
publiclytradedcorporationscreatesotheroptionstoshinelightontheiractivitiessuchas
shareholdersuitsorSEC-requireddisclosure.Ourstudysuggeststhat,ifsuccessful,these
disclosurechannelswouldprovideinformationthatconsumersfindrelevant.
22
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