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Tokwe Mukosi Flood Disaster
Lessons Learned Workshop Report
Flamboyent Hotel Masvingo
17-21 November 2014
Compiled By MacDonald Kadzatsa: Workshop Facilitator
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Acronyms
CCCM Camp Coordination and Camp Management CMED Central Mechanical Engineering Department CRS Catholic Relief Services DDF District Development Fund DRM Disaster Risk Management FAO Food and Agricultural Organization IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee IOM International Organization on Migration LL Lessons Learned NFIs Non Food Items OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children UNDP United Nation Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Zim Asset Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation ZINWA Zimbabwe National Water Authority
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Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 5
Summary of findings ..................................................................................................................................... 8
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 12
1.1 Participating Organizations ................................................................................................................... 13
1.2 Purpose of the Lessons Learned Workshop .......................................................................................... 13
1.3 Workshop Programme .......................................................................................................................... 14
1.4 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 14
Findings ....................................................................................................................................................... 15
Day II: Field Visit ................................................................................................................................. 15
Day III .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
Workshop proceedings ............................................................................................................................... 16
Session I: Opening of workshop .......................................................................................................... 16
Session I: Approaches and Best Practices for Lessons Learned .......................................................... 17
Session II: ................................................................................................................................................ 18
(i) DRM Key concepts and Civil Protection Policy in Zimbabwe. ..................................................... 18
(ii) Civil protection policy in Zimbabwe ........................................................................................ 18
(iii) Humanitarian Principles .............................................................................................................. 19
Session III .................................................................................................................................................... 19
(i): ZINWA: Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe ................................ 19
(ii): Climate Change Office: Climate and Flood Risk in Zimbabwe. ................................................... 21
Session V ..................................................................................................................................................... 22
(i): Policy, regulations and procedures on the construction of dams ............................................. 22
(ii) ............................................................................................................................................................ 23
Session VI: ................................................................................................................................................... 24
Response of Zimbabwe to Flooding emergencies using Geo-information Science and Near real-time
Geo-data ................................................................................................................................................. 24
Session VII: Manifestation and Management of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Disaster ..................................... 25
(i) The Social Cost of Tokwe Mukosi Dam. .......................................................................................... 25
(ii) National Coordination of the Disaster ....................................................................................... 26
(iii): Community Representative ............................................................................................................ 27
Day IV .......................................................................................................................................................... 28
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Group Work ............................................................................................................................................ 28
Annexures ................................................................................................................................................... 29
Annex I: Presentations ...................................................................................................................... 29
Annex II: Group work Tasks .................................................................................................................... 64
1. Group Work Guide ............................................................................................................................. 64
Annex III: Group work presentation ........................................................................................................... 67
Annex IV: List of Participants ............................................................................................................... 80
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Executive Summary
The Lessons Learned Report provides a strategic level overview of lessons learned by the Government
of Zimbabwe, disaster risk management stakeholders and its partners from rescue and relief activities in
the immediate aftermath of the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster of 2014. The report focuses on the
complexity of responding to a disaster of the magnitude that Zimbabwe experienced, and what disaster
risk management community has learned from the achievements and challenges from an organizational
perspective, and institutional relationships. It comprises input from the experiences of some of the
many government agencies, military, UN, civil society organizations and individuals who came to the
assistance of the affected communities. Most importantly, it makes key recommendations on critical
areas to be addressed to improve disaster management and response.
The generous contribution of all partners to the relief effort and to this review, epitomizes the best of
humanitarian response to assist the people of Zimbabwe in times of great need. The combined
experiences are a valuable resource to enhance preparation, response and management of future
disasters.
The information on Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster lessons learned was gathered through a guided field
tour, presentations by key stakeholders involved in emergency response and those involved and had
hands on in the design and construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam as well as the participants’ group
work organized around the 4 thematic areas defined below.
The key issues that emerged from the process can be grouped around 4 main themes – search and
rescue; Camp Coordination and Camp Management; relocation to permanent residence and early
recovery measures and; regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and related
flood disaster risk mitigation and preparedness.
The rapid nature and evolution of the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster demonstrated the need to review
disaster risk management in Zimbabwe especially so in the face of changing climate.
The disaster management capacity of the civil protection organization at national, provincial and district
levels emerged as an element requiring immediate focus as it was found to have some limitations. At
the national level, the Department of Civil Protection suffered from a significant scarcity of resources in
comparison to the monumental caseload. Inadequate non-food items (NFIs) such as tents, tarpaulins,
water bowsers, mobile water treatment plants among others curtailed provision of comprehensive
emergency response. The lean budget that the department has meant that the provincial and district
civil protection organization were inherently under-funded thus lacked the resources to mount an
effective initial disaster response before external support has been marshaled. Equally lacking was the
national guidelines and policy framework to guide emergency management operations particularly
where there was need for total relocation, resettlement and compensation of the people displaced by a
disaster generated by a development project.
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At the provincial and district levels, there was a distinct lack of capacity for provision of relief due partly
to lack of funding, inadequate emergency resources, lack of appropriate all-terrain vehicles and
inadequately trained personnel. Although capacity was strengthened over the course of time through
on the job training in Camp Coordination and Camp Management, and warehouse management
following the disaster, the crisis had by then largely passed.
The search and rescue operation were effective and the teams tasked (Zimbabwe Air Force and
Zimbabwe Republic Police sub-aqua), the District Development Fund (DDF), Central Mechanical and
Engineering Department (CMED) were diligent and dedicated and as a result no lives were lost. The
rapidness at which the flood situation evolved negated the orderly relocation of a significant population
(2,713 families, more than 18,000 livestock and household property) that was planned and called for
swift marshaling of resources over a very short time space. The search and rescue operations thus
experienced problems of inadequate appropriate vehicles to transport people, livestock and household
properties. The operation also experienced shortages of A1 jet fuel and containers. Operations were
also hampered by lack of baseline information such as population distribution maps and guidance on the
low lying and high lands as well as inaccessibility of some of the areas due to the torrential rainfall that
washed away roads and bridges.
Camp Coordination and Camp Management of the Chingwizi relocation camp was preceded with
commendable coordination mechanisms established by the provincial civil protection organization and
well complemented by the national level and UN cluster coordination mechanism for civil society
organizations through United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).
Although challenges were experienced at the beginning of the emergency operations, significant
support both in cash and in kind were mobilized to meet the humanitarian gaps. The lack of
disaggregated list of displaced people, infiltration of beneficiary registers by ineligible beneficiaries, poor
accountability, leakages of emergency supplies through pilfering and theft and corruption among those
entrusted with safe keeping of emergency supplies were key challenges. Inadequate water supplies and
sanitation and general hygiene upkeep of the relocation camp were also key challenges given the high
population density of camp settlement.
Relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures was an area that experiences serious
challenges. As identified above, the rapid nature of the flood disaster prevented the orderly and planned
resettlement of the people displaced by the dam project. In order to decongest the Chingwizi camp in
the face of increasing threats of disease outbreaks and to facilitate early settlement that would allow
people to retain their livelihoods, allocation of 1 hectare plots was a method of choice. This move
agitated the expectant communities causing serious conflict that instigated forcible resettlement. The
relocation exercise by its nature disrupted people’s livelihoods particularly their food security.
Inadequate grazing areas for livestock forced some families to move their livestock to other areas. The
uncoordinated livestock movement resulted in the spread of lumpy skin disease to the host community.
Efforts were however made to scale up livestock vaccination and dipping services which the relocated
communities did not use.
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Although a significant number of organizations were physically present in Chingwizi during the acute
phase of the flood emergency, these quickly thinned off leaving less than a handful to support early
recovery.
On the regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and integration of disaster
risk mitigation and preparedness, there is ample policy and regulatory frameworks to ensure dam flood
safety in Zimbabwe. There however are major gaps to ensure compliance and enforcement of statutes
particularly related to rural settlements. Settlements in the Tokwe Mukosi basin were not regulated
despite existing plans for the dam construction. Lack of integration of disaster risk reduction on new
development and adequate consultations of all key sectors including the communities, local government
structures and the civil protection organization resulted in default planning and budgeting for the Tokwe
Mukosi dam project. This lack of broad consultations may have contributed to failure to integrate social
costs for the dam construction and to the unplanned settlements that exposed communities to flood
risk. Furthermore, the lack of explicit policy framework and time bound activities for relocation and
compensation mechanisms including a resettlement model for people displaced by development
projects raised pertinent administrative gaps that caused disharmony between government and
displaced communities. Government is however mobilizing resources to pay compensation for the
remaining 1,908 families and for valuating an additional 3,054 homes in the Tokwe Mukosi dam buffer
zone.
3 new schools, a clinic and clinic staff housing are at various stages of construction. Water supplies to
these new facilities are however inadequate due to the low yielding boreholes. Plans are however
underway to relocate the mobile water treatment equipment that was being used at the relocation
camp and to install a six kilometer water pipeline to service the clinic and the schools.
It is also worth noting that there is assurance from ZINWA that there is no longer the risk of flooding of
the Tokwe Mukosi dam as the a concrete facing over the dam wall rock fill has been completed and the
civil works to raise the dam wall are nearly complete.
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Summary of findings
Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
Search and rescue
Coordinated search and rescue operations
No loss of life reported
Well motivated and dedicated search and rescue teams;
Verbal reports, meetings within the communities, information through local structures, police and army foot patrols, cellphone communication to the district administrators’ offices, print and electronic media played a pivotal role to inform the nation.
People self- evacuated to high
2,713 families, more than 18,000 livestock and household properties needed to be moved immediately
Shortages of A1 Jet fuel and containers
Lack of baseline information on population settlements
Rainfall damage roads and bridges
Soggy ground making road evacuation difficult
Lack of all- terrain vehicles
Control of emergency assets e.g. vehicles from outside emergency operation area;
Loss of livestock due to overloading and inappropriate transport
Relocation of people displaced by development project should take place well before development project commence
Availability of real time flood monitoring and information dissemination can facilitate search and rescue operations.
Need to devolve command and control of assets used for emergency operations to field level.
The complementarities of civil and military stakeholders in an emergency are integral to a successful response.
Development projects should integrate social costs in their budget to take into account the costs for relocation of displaced people.
Tertiary institutions such as the University of Zimbabwe and development partners to be approached to support science based real-time flood monitoring, flood mapping and technology based information dissemination;
Command and control of emergency management operational assets should be field based.
Camp Coordination and Camp Management
Provincial structures established before and during the emergency to
Lack of disaggregated list of displaced people,
Infiltration of beneficiary registers by ineligible beneficiaries,
Poor accountability, leakages of
Timely provision of disaggregated data of beneficiaries assists in focused and targeted humanitarian assistance;
Beneficiary registration should be disaggregate by age, sex, status of head of household e.g. child/OVC or female headed, elderly
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Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
coordinate activities
Dedicated staff willing to work extended hours
Coordinated support from partners and the national levels;
Targeted resource mobilization;
Health and hygiene promotion contributed to reduced risk of disease outbreaks.
emergency supplies through pilfering and theft and corruption. Inadequate water supplies and sanitation;
General hygiene upkeep of the relocation camp;
Inadequate security and lighting for people;
Lack dumpsite and cemetery;
Inadequate familiarity of humanitarian principles among responders.
High prevalence of STIs at the Camp related to low health promotion activities and lack of recreational activities
Need for beneficiary registration to be strictly monitored to avoid infiltration
Planning for CCCM and warehouse management is important to ensure the safety and security of emergency supplies;
Procurement and pre-positioning of emergency NFIs is critical to effective disaster response;
Although water and sanitation and hygiene were compromised, health and hygiene can help reduce risk of disease outbreaks;
Inadequate shelter undermined privacy;
Awareness of humanitarian principles can facilitate effective disaster response
and disabled.
Verification of beneficiaries should be regularly conducted with the involvement of the traditional leaders and the police.
Training in CCCM and warehouse management should be mandatory for the civil protection organization staff and stakeholders;
DCP should procure and preposition NFIs;
Humanitarian principles should be customized to the Zimbabwean situation
Relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures
Families relocated before the flood disaster were adequately catered for;
Flood emergency disrupted the planned phased relocation exercise;
Lack of policy and guidelines on resettlement model and compensation mechanisms for people displaced by development projects;
The available land was under Development Trust of Zimbabwe and the present land user frustrated the program despite the land being state land
Permanent relocation did not adequately provide for livelihood recovery and compromised food security;
Delayed relocation of people in the basin resulted in the compromised planned resettlement;
Need for policy framework and guidelines for resettlement models and compensation mechanisms for people displaced by development projects;
Early recovery needs to be integrated with humanitarian assistance;
Relocation of people displaced by development projects to proceed project commencement;
Resettlement and compensation guidelines for people displaced by development projects should be developed;
Early recovery framework should be developed to ensure resilience of disaster affected
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Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
Boreholes provided in the resettlement areas did not yield adequate water;
Planning of permanent settlement did not make provision for grazing areas;
Relocated families did not use livestock vaccination and dipping services risking the spread of livestock diseases;
An early recovery framework for the flood affected communities was not developed
Incidents of robberies reported after compensation payments
Geological and hydrological surveys must proceed relocation and resettlement of people.
Livestock welfare needs to integral to human relocation and settlement;
Announcements of compensation payments can result in robberies;
communities;
Availability of water and suitability of land for human activities should be considered before relocation and resettlement of displaced people.
Training on livestock emergency guidelines and standards must be conducted for civil protection organizations;
Appropriate and user friendly cash transfers need to be investigated to facilitate compensation payments.
Food assistance should continue until harvesting in April 2015.
On the regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and integration of disaster risk mitigation and preparedness
Elaborate legislative and policy framework for dam construction and safety standards exist.
International best practices relating to procedures and practices for relocating people in during dam construction;
Regular dam
Inadequate compliance and enforcement of dam safety statutes;
Disaster risk reduction not adequately integrated into dam project design process.
Current river water level monitoring system does not facilitate real time relaying of river water levels to warn of possible flooding;
Relation between rainfall intensity and flooding has not been established.
There is limited capacity for flood modeling and mapping;
Best practices for dam construction and relocation of at risk population were not
Need for ensuring compliance and enforcement of dam safety measures and best practices;
Civil Protection Act needs to be reviewed
Need for mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction into development planning;
The province did not anticipate a flood disaster and thus had no appropriate response plan;
Real time monitoring and dissemination of early warning critical for flood risk
Enforcement and compliance with dam safety legislation need to be enhanced;
The Civil Protection Act, should be replaced with a proactive Act.
Disaster risk reduction should be mainstreamed into development planning;
Flood monitoring including real time monitoring and dissemination facilities for
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Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation
inspection are conducted on all dams;
Disaster management legislation and policy exist;
followed;
Funding for relocation of people in the basin was not integrated in the project budget
management;
Flood mapping and modeling can assist in emergency preparedness and response;
Consultation and communication with affected communities can?
flood early warning information and flood modeling and mapping should be prioritized;
Communities should be consulted and be well informed of the need for relocation and on preferred models of resettlement;
Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical, expertise and equipment, financial) for mitigation, preparedness, and response to manage the flood risk within the context of climate change
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1. Introduction
In early February 2014, communities living in the Tokwe Mukosi basin were inundated by the rising
water levels at the Tokwe-Mukosi Dam which was still under construction. The water levels rapidly rose
to 671 meters above sea level on the 3rd of February 2014 threatening communities within its basin. The
communities within the basin were to be relocated under a phased relocation plan. The phased
relocation plan had intended to relocate a total of 6393 families or about 32 000 people and their
18,764 livestock to make way for the dam.
Given the magnitude of the threat to extensive flooding, His Excellency, the President declared a State
of Disaster on 9th February 2014 in regard to the confluence of the southern parts of Chivi and Masvingo
Districts, the northern parts of Mwenezi as well as western parts of Chiredzi Districts.
The Government made an appeal from both local and international humanitarian communities to meet
urgent humanitarian needs for affected communities in the Tokwe-Mukosi Dam Basin. The priority was
the evacuation and relocation of affected communities as well as the provision of food, shelter, safe
water and other basic needs
The Country’s Civil Protection Organisation comprising the Cabinet Committee on Emergency
Preparedness and Disaster Management, the National Civil Protection Committee, the Masvingo
Provincial Civil Protection Committee and District Civil Protection Committees of affected districts were
tasked with coordination and management of the disaster.
Concerted efforts were made to safeguard life and property of the affected communities. As a result, 2
713 families were successfully relocated from Tokwe Mukosi basin to the designated Masangula,
Chisase and Chingwizi resettlement areas.
The relocation exercise was burdened by a number of challenges ranging from lack of funds, resistance
by some of the families in question to be relocated to the Nuanetsi Ranch in Mwenezi, lack of funding
for compensation of affected households and other cultural and socio-economic dimensions yet to be
deliberated on. It also took a long time for communities to take up their designated relocation plots due
to challenges that also require an open discussion. There is also need to scrutinise the assumptions for
Tokwe Mukosi dam construction project. For instance, the initial strategic plan for the dam was
premised on recurrent droughts affecting most parts of Masvingo Province. Engineers thought that the
dam would start filling up at a later stage when the communities within the Tokwe Mukosi basin would
have been trans-located to their designated relocation sites. There is also need to assess the level of
community involvement in the project design and implementation.
Furthermore, there was media hype that raised critical issues surrounding the Tokwe Mukosi flood
disaster with the bulk pointing at some weaknesses of the civil protection organization at central
government, the provincial and district structures.
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There however were positive lessons and key achievements that were made upon which the civil
protection organization can document and build on to strengthen future performance.
It is against this background that a national workshop is being organised to draw lessons from the Tokwe
Mukosi flood disaster. The Department of Civil Protection has therefore enlisted the services of a
national consultant to facilitate at the workshop. Below are the terms of reference for the consultancy.
1.1 Participating Organizations National Protection, Provincial and District organizations, the UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, FAO),
International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Non-governmental organizations: Save the
Children, Plan Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Oxfam, International Refugee Council, Christian
Care, CRS and Care International.
1.2 Purpose of the Lessons Learned Workshop
The 2014 Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster has reinforced the important need to go beyond disaster
response but to also strengthen and institutionalize flood disaster risk management in Zimbabwe.
The purpose of documenting lessons learned is to share and use knowledge derived from experience to:
Promote the recurrence of desirable outcomes
Preclude the recurrence of undesirable outcomes.
The ultimate purpose of documented lessons learned is to provide information that can increase
effectiveness and efficiency and to build on the experience that has been earned for future flood risk
management. If documented and disseminated properly, lessons learned provide a powerful method of
sharing ideas for improving work processes, operation, quality, safety and cost effectiveness among
other advantages. It will also help improve management decision making and performance throughout
the tiers of government as well as contributing to building resilience of communities impacted by
disasters.
The Lessons Learned workshop brought together the various government departments, civil protection
organizations in the country, the United Nations agencies in Zimbabwe and representatives from the
affected communities to facilitate a national knowledge sharing platform aimed to:
identify lessons learned through serious scrutiny of the flood hazard, its impacts and societal
responses to them;
identify effective approaches to integrate and institutionalize emergency management Lessons
Learned/Best Practices;
ensure a common understanding of national, provincial, district and community level priorities
and objectives, as well as opportunities and challenges to feed into inter-agency preparedness
for future flood disasters and
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make recommendations that will contribute to continuous improvements and enhance future
emergency planning, preparedness, response and recovery /development through existing
training programs.
1.3 Workshop Programme
Day I: Traveling
Day II: Field trip to Chingwizi and the Tokwe Mukosi Dam.
Day III:
Official opening
Presentations
o Lessons Learned Approaches and Best Practices
o DRM Key concepts and Civil Protection Policy in Zimbabwe
o Humanitarian Principles
o Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe
o Climate Change and Flood Risk in Zimbabwe
o Dam construction policy and regulations
o Possible improved future response to flood emergencies based on Geo Remote Sensing
and Real Time Data
o Manifestation and Management of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Disaster
o National Coordination of the Flood Disaster
o Introduction to Groupwork
Day IV: Group presentations and plenary
Day V: Summary of Challenges, Lessons Learned and Proposed Activities
Recommendations and Way Forward
1.4 Methodology
The lessons learned workshop is an event where stakeholders come together to share their insights and
experiences of flood disaster risk management. Specifically they will be asked to share their responses
to three key questions:
1. What worked well in the flood disaster risk management?
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2. What could have been improved?
3. What should be done differently next time?
To ensure that participants to the workshop conceptualize the nature of the Tokwe Mukosi flood
disaster and its impact, a field trip was undertaken to the now disbanded Chingwizi relocation camp,
Chingwizi resettlement area and to the Tokwe Mukosi dam. The camp site was now evacuated but some
of the infrastructure such as water points and a mobile communication booster were still intact. The
camp was home to 2,713 families comprising of people moved from the area down-stream of the dam,
the areas where dam water flooded or threatened to flood homesteads as well as the buffer zone area
that would contribute to environmental degradation and subsequent siltation of the dam.
Presentations by the Provincial Administrator for Masvingo Province, sector ministries and departments
and the representative from the relocated communities assisted to inform the workshop participants on
the situation that prevailed during the emergency operations up to the resettlement of the people
evacuated from the Tokwe Mukosi basin. Follow up group work and plenary allowed for detailed
discussions of thematic areas and to the identification of challenges, lessons learned and actions to be
followed up after the workshop.
Findings Day II: Field Visit To ensure that participants to the workshop conceptualize the nature of the Tokwe Mukosi flood
disaster and its impact, a field trip was undertaken to the now disbanded Chingwizi relocation camp,
Chingwizi resettlement area and to the Tokwe Mukosi dam. The camp site was now evacuated but some
of the infrastructure such as water points and a mobile communication booster were still intact. The
camp was home to 2,713 families comprising of people moved from the area down-stream of the dam,
the areas where dam water flooded or threatened to flood homesteads as well as the buffer zone area
that would contribute to environmental degradation and subsequent siltation of the dam.
Presentations by the Provincial Administrator for Masvingo Province, sector ministries and departments
and the representative from the relocated communities assisted to inform the workshop participants on
the situation that prevailed during the emergency operations up to the resettlement of the people
evacuated from the Tokwe Mukosi basin.
A visit was made to site where a permanent clinic and clinic staff housing were under construction. A
briefing on the progress being made on the construction of the clinic and staff housing as well as the
health service delivery was given by the Community based Nurse for Mwenezi District. Currently a
temporary clinic donated by CESVI an Italian organization was being used while the permanent clinic
under construction was being funded by the National Aids Council and the Zimbabwe Defence Force was
constructing the clinic. The staff housing was being funded and constructed by the Family of God
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Church. Progress in the completion of the clinic was temporarily hampered by delays in the delivery of
building materials.
The clinic was experiencing water shortages as the borehole provided had low yield. Problems of patient
referral were also being experienced as the ambulance provided for the clinic was not permanently
allocated. Scorpion bites were a major problem and the clinic lacked appropriate medicines to manage
the scorpion bites. Reports of youth pregnancy and the attendant problem of referrals were also
highlighted.
A visit was made to the Tokwe Mukosi dam where the resident engineers briefed participants on the
progress being made on the dam construction. The technique of the dam construction was unique in
that it involved a rock fill dam wall that utilized the abundant rocks that Chivi district was endowed. 7.5
million tonnes of rock over which a concrete face was overlayed made the costs of the dam construction
lower. However because of the rapid inflows of water into the dam, water started sipping through the
rock fill and there was risk of flooding downstream as there was need to release over 6 million cubic
metres of water. The construction of the face slab was completed by 11 November 2014 making the
dam safe from damage of the dam wall.
Day III
Workshop proceedings
Session I: Opening of workshop
The workshop was officially opened by the Minister of Local Government Public Works and National
Housing (MLGPWNH) whose speech was read by the Permanent Secretary Engineer G.S. Mulilo. The
Minister pointed out that the flood disaster was due high precipitation that resulted in the
unanticipated rapid filling up of the Tokwe Mukosi dam that was still under construction. Also
contributing to the disaster was the inadequate early warning systems along the river systems as well as
the delays in relocating the communities vulnerable to flooding before the dam project got underway.
The President His Excellency Robert Mugabe declared a state of national disaster for the areas impacted
by the flood. Following the declaration, an appeal of Z$20 million was made to assist the people
affected by the flood. Individuals, charitable organizations, the private sector, civil society organizations,
churches and foreign governments contributed both in cash and in kind to support government’s efforts
to assist the affected communities.
The emergency relocation and resettlement programme and its associated costs such as compensation
for relocated households were a social burden requiring government to embark on phased
compensation. Government has paid compensation to a section of the relocated families and mobilizing
resources to compensate families whose properties have been valuated following the relocation and
resettlement exercise.
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The process of providing emergency assistance for the people relocated to Chingwizi camp was not
without problems. The Minister noted the problems encountered in beneficiary registration,
management and distribution of emergency assistance both non-food and food items and the
disharmony between the communities and the camp managers when people were forced to leave the
camp for resettlement. The Minister stressed the importance of coordinated camp management.
The contributions made by stakeholders and partners including government departments, individuals,
international organizations and foreign governments, church related organizations, civil society
organizations and the private sector in the coordinated flood disaster response were acknowledged by
the Minister. He also commended the efforts made by the different arms of government and its partners
in the provision of uninterrupted health care delivery, education facilities, water and sanitation and
emergency shelter and other critical services.
The coordination of the emergency response to the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster was generally good
and the Minister expressed gratitude that no loss lives were lost. Furthermore there was a lot of
dedication and sacrifice among the responders and credit should be given to government partners
among them development partners and civil society organizations who came forward to close the gaps
identified in the emergency response.
The Minister encouraged participants to have an interactive and fruitful discussion.
Session I: Approaches and Best Practices for Lessons Learned
Presented by: Mr. MacDonald Kadzatsa
The facilitator outlined workshop objectives, expected outcomes and the general approach to the
workshop. He further highlighted the best practices when conducting lessons learned workshop. A set of
guiding questions to guide the workshop discussions were presented and these included;
What was learned about the flood disaster in general?
What worked well?
What could have been improved?
What should be done differently next time?
What was learned about what did not go well?
What was learned about budgeting/financing?
What was learned about working with partners?
What was learned about working with the affected communities?
How will this be incorporated into future disaster management?
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Session II:
(i) DRM Key concepts and Civil Protection Policy in Zimbabwe. Presented by: Ms. Sibusiso Ndlovu The purpose of the presentation was to provide participants with an opportunity to grasp the common
terminology in disaster risk management. The terminologies discussed were those that the workshop
was to continually use thus the importance of participants to understand them. The terminologies
included:- what constituted a disaster, what was risk, management, hazard, vulnerability, disaster
preparedness, early warning, emergency, disaster prevention, the conceptual framework of disaster risk
management with reference to the Hyogo Framework for Action, the key elements of disaster in the
pre-and post-disaster phases, rehabilitation and recovery, resilience as well as the relationship between
disaster and development.
(ii) Civil protection policy in Zimbabwe Presented by: Ms. Sibusiso Ndlovu The presentation was intended to familiarize participants with policy guiding civil protection in Zimbabwe. The topic covered the definition of civil protection, the policy statement, a description of the Civil Protection Act No 5 of 1989, the structural model of the Civil Protection System in Zimbabwe and the Civil Protection Organization in Zimbabwe. The legislative and resource gaps in the current civil protection system were also presented. The meeting was also informed of the existence of the draft Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Bill that was waiting promulgation by Parliament and the proposed structures of DRM organization and sub-committees in the bill. Discussion Concern was raised on the continued use of archaic policy and legislative frameworks that were not
reflective of the global initiatives to elevating disaster risk management as development issue and
Hyogo Framework for Action that Zimbabwe was signatory. A draft Disaster Risk Management Bill was
developed in 2012 and is yet to be promulgated.
Recommendation
The workshop recommended advocacy of the review of the Civil Protection Act and Policy and the need for Parliament to promulgate the Disaster Risk Management Bill.
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(iii) Humanitarian Principles Presentation by: Ms. Melly Sibanda The session covered the humanitarian principles that are guided by the code of conduct for the
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Non-Governmental
Organizations, the Humanitarian Charter, the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) 6 core principles
on the code of conduct on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Guiding Principles for
Internally Displaced. The humanitarian principles were however not legally binding. The principles are
intended to provide guidance on procedures, practices, ethics, standards and the rights of people
visited by calamities when providing humanitarian assistance vis a vis the Tokwe Mukosi Flood Disaster.
The presentation also covered the definition of humanitarianism, the role of governments in disasters,
the origin of the humanitarian principles. The presentation covered the Constitution of Zimbabwe
Chapter 4 that made provision for the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms that were also
applicable to people impacted by disasters. Additional principles applicable to disaster situations
included the 4 Core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and the Sphere
Standards also provided guidance in emergency operations.
To complement the presentation Ms Sibanda showed a video on Humanitarian Principles.
Discussions
Concern was raised on the provision of food assistance where instances were sited where foodstuffs
provided had no regard to people’s culture and norms and people’s religious beliefs. Furthermore some
humanitarian workers failed to provide tips on how to prepare food stuffs that were foreign to the
benefiting communities.
Recommendations
It was recommended that staple food be distributed and where foreign food stuffs are
introduced, instructions on how to prepare such food be given to the beneficiaries.
There is need to customize the humanitarian principles and the code of conduct to the
Zimbabwean context.
Session III (i): ZINWA: Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in
Zimbabwe Presentation by ZINWA: Mr Viriri
The session provided some information on flooding, its nature, causes and outline of the flood risk areas
in Zimbabwe, early warning mechanisms and their implications for planning. The session was intended
to orient participants on the challenges and issues confounding flood risk management in Zimbabwe.
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Flooding in Zimbabwe was mainly due to the river networks failing to take the excess water from either
torrential rains or water released from dams. The factors compounding flooding were, intense rainfall
(+50 mm in 24 hours), cyclones, topography, river networks converging at confluences, river siltation,
operations of dams and the unfolding impacts of climate change. The traditional flood risk areas in
Zimbabwe include Muzarabani, Middle Save, Tsholotsho, Kamativi - Confluence of Gwayi and Shangani,
Gokwe, Chikwalakwala, Malipati, Tuli-Shashe, and areas along Zambezi, Save, Limpopo river basins.
ZINWA is charged with the responsibility to collect, process and disseminate information pertaining to
river flow statistics and dam levels. Currently 342 of the 700 river water level monitoring stations are
operational with the majority automated. The traditional rain gauge network is however not suited for
flood monitoring as data from the stations are obtained at weekly intervals. Furthermore Zimbabwe has
7 real time water level monitoring stations with only 4 being operational. Plans to increase the number
of real time monitoring stations were being hampered by poor local network coverage and financial
constraints. Vandalism of monitoring stations has also contributed to poor coverage of real-time
monitoring systems. There currently is no capacity for flood forecasting and modeling. Rainfall
forecasting and outlook are the only means available to warn of possible flooding.
In the case of Tokwe Mukosi river basin, 4 monitoring stations both up and down stream were used.
Analysis of the data from the stations indicated that 902,115 million litres of water (50% capacity of the
dam) had flowed into the dam. As the dam was incomplete, the water had to be released.
Discussions
Issues were raised on the low coverage of water level monitoring stations in dams and rivers and
inadequate real time flood monitoring stations and lack of capacity for flood forecasting and modeling
that meant the country was at risk of flooding.
Another issue raised was the inability of the early warning systems to estimate the extent of flooding in
the event of a dam breach to facilitate informed evacuation of people at risk of flooding.
Financial constraints to procure monitoring equipment and for civil works, lack of network coverage,
inadequate trained personnel and vandalism of monitoring equipment were the major challenges.
Furthermore most of the monitoring stations were ill equipped and not suitable for flood monitoring.
Recommendations
Capacity for flood monitoring should be enhanced through;
o ZINWA approaching partners for support in strengthening capacity for flood
monitoring particularly for the procurement of equipment and construction of real
time flood monitoring stations as well as relevant training of personnel;
o Approaching Potraz to facilitate local GSM coverage for monitoring equipment;
o Monitoring equipment damaged by siltation, flooding and vandalism should be
replaced;
o Enhancing capacity for flood forecasting, mapping and modeling
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o Creating ownership and community self-policing to prevent vandalism of monitoring
equipment.
o Providing an inundation map to guide evacuation exercise though for example
satellite maps and flood modeling;
(ii): Climate Change Office: Climate and Flood Risk in Zimbabwe. Presentation by Climate Change Office: Mr. A. Moyo The session provided an insight into the contribution of climate change and variability to flooding in
Zimbabwe. The presentation discussed the recent climate and weather extremes, some projections,
climate change concept, lessons learnt from past seasons, recommendations including for Tokwe-
Mukosi and existing opportunities.
Climate change in Zimbabwe was expected to contribute to changes in the rainfall patterns. Extreme
events were set to increase with some models suggesting a 10 – 20 % decline in Zimbabwe rainfall by
2050. Changing rainfall distribution with lower rainfall or fewer but heavier storms was the projected
scenario. Furthermore, less predictable tropical cyclones were expected to increase in intensity. Chances
for increasing variability, especially in areas where rainfall is already quite variable were expected to
increase and in addition, strong winds and hailstorms were being projected. There is increasing evidence
of infrastructure damage such as blowing away of roofs, damage of buildings by strong winds and
injuries and damages due to hailstorms.
For the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster there is need for strengthening of climate related early warning
system through provision of radars and related capacity issues, provision of adequate automatic
stations, ensuring monitoring equipment maintenance, need for more improved Radiosondes (upper
air), partnership building to improve data collection. There is also need to review the early-warning
system from the observing network, climate component, and institute studies to enhance the climate
observation. Climate change adaptation including alternative livelihoods, poverty reduction and
community empowerment, need to be accelerated through an integrated approach.
Discussions
Concerns on early warning systems with reference to collection, analysis and dissemination of real time
information were raised.
Recommendations
Opportunities for mainstreaming climate change in all sectors existing through Zim Asset;
Reviewing of existing policy frameworks including the civil protection policy and draft
disaster risk management bill to integrate climate change adaptation;
Strengthening of national capacities to reduce climate change risk and build resilience for
any climate change shocks
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Session V
(i): Policy, regulations and procedures on the construction of dams
Presentation By ZINWA: Engineer Mutazu
The session was intended to provide participants with insight into the policy and regulatory framework for dam construction. This was in order to facilitate informed discussions for the group work that was to follow. The presentation covered the following: provisions of the water act, construction of dams, periodic inspections of large dams, registration of dams, procedure in emergencies, appointment of board of consultants, procedure in emergencies arising during execution of dam works. The Water Act Chapter 20:24 regulates dam safety and construction in Zimbabwe. There are 8,000 dams 245 of which are classified as large and the remainder small. Dams are subject to inspection during and after construction to ensure structural soundness and safety. It is mandatory for owners of dams to inform the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate of possible or existing threat of flooding and taking appropriate measures to prevent and control flooding from such dam. As in the case of the Tokwe Mukosi dam, if, during construction of a dam, any sudden danger is posed to
any works or structure connected therewith, and such danger renders it necessary to carry out
immediate dam works different from original submitted design drawings or specifications; the owner of
the dam is required to immediately commence with the recommended remedial works. The swift action
to drain the Tokwe Mukosi dam and the subsequent acceleration of the completion of the concrete
facing ensured dam safety.
Discussions
The inflows into the Tokwe Mukosi dam were not predictable and much of what took place in terms of
the emergency evacuation was not planned for. The relaying of information on the river water levels
draining into the Tokwe Mukosi dam was deficient to alert the onsite engineers to take appropriate
flood prevention. Other factors such as the delays experienced in dam construction and relocation and
subsequent resettlement of people in the basin and the buffer zone were also at play.
Concerns were raised on the capacity of ZINWA to demarcate the extent of inundation downstream in
the event of release of dam water. Furthermore the need for information on the level of rainfall
intensity and the extent inundation of river basins was critical to facilitate informed evacuation
exercises.
The workshop was informed that ZINWA had no capacity for flood forecasting and modeling and would
need to investigate the integration of these in its systems.
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Recommendations
Timely relocation of people at risk of flooding;
Real time river water level monitoring and information dissemination should be enhanced;
Flood mapping and modeling should be seriously considered to avert flood disasters.
ZINWA should approach partners for support in procurement and installation of real time flood
monitoring and for flood modeling;
(ii) Procedures for Dam Construction- the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project
overview
Presented by: Eng. T. Maurikira
The session covered the provisions of the Water Act, dam design in Zimbabwe, design peak floods,
Tokwe-Mukosi dam design flood control during construction, safety of dams in Zimbabwe, international
best practice for communities displaced by dam projects. The purpose of the session was to provide
additional background information on dam safety with focus on the Tokwe Mukosi dam construction. In
addition to the presentation made by Engineer Mutazu, Engineer Maurikira outlined the critical hazard
analysis conducted for dam construction. In ZINWA, for purposes of design and construction, dams are
categorized into four classes i.e. class 1 – 4. These classes are related to the hazard potential which is
based on the risk to life and the economic consequences which can arise if the dam fails. Class 1 dams
are those that give the worst scenario and are designed to the highest standards. The hazard potential
or class is used to determine the design flood for the dams. Tokwe Mukosi Dam whose dam wall height
is 89.2 metres, and a capacity of 1,802, 600,000 cubic metres is on completion and is categorized in class
1. The Tokwe Mukosi dam has been adequately designed to prevent flooding before and after
construction. There however was a high water inflow into the dam that surpassed the water level that
had been estimated leading to the flood scenario and population displacements that was experienced.
Dam construction like any development programme, is subject to international best practices and
United Nations and World Commission on Dams guidelines that consider the issues surrounding
population displacement. No dam project should be allowed to proceed on indigenous and communal
lands without obtaining their free, prior and informed consent. Best practice dictates that compensation
policies for dam projects should ensure a prompt and measureable improvement of the lives of the
affected people and communities.
Discussions
In the face of ongoing dam construction country wide, concern was raised on the failure to relocate
people in the Tokwe Mukosi basin and the resultant adhoc movement of people that resulted in
disruption of people’s lives and livelihoods.
Funding for all activities for the dam construction was under the Ministry of Environment, Water and
Climate. However funding for other related activities such as relocation, resettlement and compensation
for relocated families were not included in the dam construction budget.
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Recommendations
From the lessons learnt from Tokwe-Mukosi, there is an urgent need to ensure that the
resettlement of the affected communities is done early in the programme before similar events
to the Tokwe Mukosi flooding recur.
There was need to build in related costs for the dam construction and that line ministries were expected to contribute components of the budget for their sectors for inclusion in the dam construction budget.
Session VI:
Response of Zimbabwe to Flooding emergencies using Geo-information
Science and Near real-time Geo-data Professor. dr. Amon Murwira The session covered the following: Flood Monitoring using GIScience technology Caprivi in 2004; Flood
hazard mapping using GIScience technology Chikwarakwara and Muzarabani; Unpacking Tokwe-Mukosi
2014 disaster using GIScience and the Future response using Near Realtime Geodata collection and
Aggregation. The motivation for the session was the introduction of science based real time monitoring
and dissemination of early warning information as well as for possible support for search and rescue
operations. The presentation covered use of historical data to determine flood risk based on the Caprivi
flood scenario in Namibia as well as the experiences of the University of Zimbabwe in Chikwakwala and
Muzarabani areas. A flood simulation exercise used was able to show areas that were likely to be
inundated and those that would not in the event of flooding. Such information apart from guiding
settlement patterns would also assist the search and rescue operations teams to identify areas to focus
their operations. Science based flood early warning was also important to support flood mapping
including levels of inundation. A pictorial presentation of the flooding scenario of the Tokwe Mukosi
basin using satellite information demonstrated the capacity of the science based real-time flood
monitoring that Zimbabwe could adopt. The relying of real time flood early warning information can be
done through use of mobile telephones whose coverage is quite wide in Zimbabwe
Discussions
There has been limited use of science based/technology to facilitate real time flood monitoring and to
rope in the tertiary institutions to play a leading role applied research on disaster risk management.
Recommendations
There is need to rope in the tertiary institutions to support in capacity building and technology
transfer in use of science based real time monitoring and dissemination of early warning
information.
The tertiary institutions should assist in developing flood models and in introduction of real time
early warning systems.
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Session VII: Manifestation and Management of Tokwe Mukosi Dam
Disaster
(i) The Social Cost of Tokwe Mukosi Dam. Presentation by: Mr. F. Chikovo The session covered the Tokwe Mukosi disaster management from the provincial, national and
community perspective. Mr. Chikovo the Provincial Administrator for Masvingo Province presented
provincial perspective covering the following topics: Socio Economic Importance of Tokwe Mukosi Dam,
Social Cost of the Dam, Progress Before Disaster, Actual Disaster and Camp Establishment, Identification
of Permanent Resettlement Sites, Camp Decongestion and Lessons Learnt. He outlined the benefits of
the Tokwe Mukosi and its contribution to food security at national and provincial levels including the
downstream benefits accruing from tourism and electricity generation and related investments. The
dam however entailed relocation of 6393 families, more than 18 764 livestock and household property.
In anticipation of the relocation exercise, a committee was established to draw a plan for the relocation
exercise and the accompanying budget. A 3 phased relocation plan to commence in October 2013 was
developed and submitted to the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate as well as the key
ministries. Funds for the relocation begun to be allocated in July 2013 to support head counting,
property valuation, planning, pegging resettlement areas, borehole drilling and for paying
compensation. The relocation process begun albeit laboriously and 611 people, 994 livestock and
household property were relocated to the Chisase, Masangula and Chingwizi. Additional land for
resettlement had to be identified as the area pegged had been exhausted. The heavy rains that fell in
the basin between in January 2014 resulted in the rapid water inflows into the Tokwe Mukosi dam that
was still under construction. Flooding in the basin and the risk of a dam breach required swift
evacuation of 2,713 families, their livestock and household property. Heavy rains however impeded
speedy evacuations requiring that people move themselves and their property to high ground.
Emergency needs mounted and plans for relocation had to change to transit centres and later to the
emergency relocation camp at Chingwizi. A state of national disaster was declared on 9 February giving
way to external emergency support for relocated people in Chingwizi relocation camp. The initial stages
of the emergency relocation exercise was beset with challenges of inadequate emergency shelter,
water and sanitation facilities, leakages of emergency supplies due to pilfering and theft as well
infiltration by bogus beneficiaries. The situation however improved with the provision of additional staff
and receipt of additional emergency supplies from well-wishers. Training on Camp Coordination and
Camp Management as well as warehouse management also facilitated improved service delivery and
accounting for emergency supplies. Despite the improvements noted, conditions in the camp there was
need to decongest the camp and allocate permanent settlements.
In order to decongest the camp, 3,020 1 hectare plots were pegged for allocation to the people
relocated. This plan agitated the relocated people creating disharmony as the promised 4 hectares and
accompanying compensation payment was no longer the priority. People had to be forcibly resettled on
the 1 hectare plots.
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Currently, 2,555 families have been allocated 1 hectare residential plots and another 146 families are
yet to be resettled. 1,431 families have now been compensated and 1,908 families are still to be
compensated. 3 primary schools (Tokwe Mukosi, Nyuni and Chingwizi) and 1 secondary school (Nyuni
Secondary) are now established and are at various stages of construction. A total of 36 boreholes (6
institutional and 30 community) were drilled and a new clinic and staff housing are under construction
with support from the National Aids Council, the Family of God Church and the Zimbabwe Defence.
Discussions
The participants noted with concern the lack of standards, and guidelines for the resettlement and
compensation of people displaced by development projects. Futhermore the delayed relocation exercise
contributed to the adhoc and chaotic relocation and resettlement of people leading to the disruption of
lives and livelihoods. Although the emergency response needs stabilized after some 3 weeks, the initial
stages of the emergency response was fraught with problems ranging from pilfering and leakages of
emergency supplies, infiltration of leadership and bogus beneficiaries. Some people lost property
including livestock and they are still to be compensated.
Due to disruption of livelihoods caused by the relocation exercise, the people resettled at Chingwizi
were experiencing food shortages and would thus need food assistance.
Recommendations
Funding for huge projects such as Tokwe Mukosi Dam construction should include both the
actual cost of construction and social cost.
Integrated and coordinated response to disasters requires commitment and sacrifice by all
The Department of Civil Protection should have basic emergency supplies (non-food items tents,
bowsers, water tablets, blankets, food hampers mosquito nets and some vehicles) to mitigate
against disaster.
Funds to compensate service providers and take care of the welfare of those managing the
disaster should be an integral component of the budget for the Department of Civil Protection.
There is need to provide regular training in camp coordination and camp management for civil
protection organization at national, provincial and district levels.
(ii) National Coordination of the Disaster Presented by Mr. S. M. Pawadyira Mr Pawadyira presented the procedures followed for the declaration of national state disaster and on
the processes that were activated during the emergency operations. He commended all the role players
who contributed in cash and in kind and for the diligent search and rescue operations marshaled by the
Zimbabwe Air force and complemented by the Air force of Namibia and that conducted by the
Zimbabwe Police Sub-Aqua. The rescue operations however experienced fuel shortages particularly A1
Jet Fuel requiring urgent appeal to Treasury for urgent release of funds to procure adequate fuel and
fuel containers. Mr Pawadyira underlined the importance of effective communication during emergency
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operations particularly as it pertains to affected people’s entitlements including the importance of
community consultations on relocation and resettlement exercises.
Due to the uncertainties on the resettlement exercise, a follow up presentation by the representative
from the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement was made. A modified resettlement programme was
implemented in the Chisase, Masangula and Chingwizi Masangula areas. All the resettled people were
however earmarked to benefit from a communal irrigation scheme in order for them to benefit from the
Tokwe Mukosi dam whose construction had displaced them.
Discussions
There were still uncertainties on the resettlement model for the people resettled in Chingwizi. The plans
and time frames for the people resettled in Chingwizi to benefit from the Tokwe Mukosi water for
irrigation is still unclear. There is also the debate on the ownership of the land on which the people were
settled between the government and the Development Trust of Zimbabwe that has potential to derail
the resettlement exercise.
Recommendations
There is need to establish clear lines of communication between government officials and
communities in order to gain trust and allow communities to contribute to plans that affect their
welfare
(iii): Community Representative
Presentation by Mr. N. Mangwengwe
The community perspective was given by Mr. Mangwengwe who narrated the relocation exercise up
until the final permanent resettlement. People were moved by helicopter and by road when they
suddenly found themselves surrounded by flood water. The people did not know where they were being
taken to. On arrival at Chingwizi there was no ready shelter and people slept on the open. Shelter, food
supplies, kitchen utensils were provided on the next day. There however was no water and sanitation
and health facilities but these facilities were later provided. When people were advised to move to
newly pegged resettlement area, there was disharmony because of the mistrust that the promised 4
hectares of farming land and 0.5 hectares for irrigation as well as compensation were not going to be
honoured.
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Day IV
Group Work The group work was introduced with 4 thematic areas as follows:
Group I: Operational challenges, lessons /suggested solutions on search and rescue (aerial,
water, land) with regards to (subtopics)
Group II: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to Camp
management
Group III: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to relocation to
permanent residence and early recovery measures
Group IV: a) Identify any gaps and propose solutions with regards to the extent to which current
regulatory processes and procedures related to dams under construction integrate
disaster risk mitigation and preparedness (use the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project as a case
in point)
b) Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical expertise
and equipment, financial) for mitigation, preparedness and response to manage the
flood risk within the context of climate change.
Details of the members to each group and related details are provided in Annex I below.
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Annexures
Annex I: Presentations Session I: Lessons Learned Best Practices
Introduction
• Hydro-climatic disasters (Floods, droughts, tropical cyclones) are responsible for the
serious disruption of the functioning of a society and widespread human, material or
environmental losses.
• These disasters and the communities exposed to them are expected to rise with increased
climate variability as a result of climate change.
• Zimbabwe continues to experience flood disasters and for each of these new lessons are
learned.
• Tragically, the span of attention given to flood disasters is often short, probably because
the disaster events continue only for a short while, and as the memory of disaster events
fades, so does the urgency for disaster risk reduction strategies.
• The Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster has however raised a scenario that has a unique
perspective to which new lessons were learned.
Workshop objectives
• To provide an opportunity for parties to engage with experts and stakeholders
• To discuss the scope of the flood disaster response
• To use the lessons learned/identified to scope the way forward.
Expected outcomes
• Lessons learned identified
• Effective approaches to integrate and institutionalize emergency management Lessons
Learned/Best Practices identified;
• Recommendations that will contribute to continuous improvements and enhance future
emergency planning, preparedness, response and recovery /development made
What are Lessons Learned
• The process of organizational learning and improvements by identifying significant
successes achieved and how to replicate them
And
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• The process concerned with how issues, problems, and other setbacks were encountered,
how they were overcome, and how they can be avoided in future projects.
• Involve:
– Review sessions conducted to gather feedback from team members and
stakeholders on what went well and what didn’t go well on a scenario.
– Identifying lessons learned through serious scrutiny of scenarios, their
impacts and societal responses;
– Identifying effective approaches to integrate and institutionalize
emergency management Lessons Learned/Best Practices;
– Ensuring a common understanding of national, provincial, district and
community level priorities and objectives, as well as opportunities and
challenges to feed into inter-agency preparedness for future flood
disasters and
– Making recommendations that will contribute to continuous improvements
and enhance future emergency planning, preparedness, response and
recovery /development through existing training programs.
Guiding Questions
• Key questions:
– What was learned about the flood disaster in general?
– What worked well?
– What could have been improved?
– What should be done differently next time?
– What was learned about what did not go well?
– What was learned about budgeting/financing?
– What was learned about working with partners?
– What was learned about working with the affected communities?
– How will this be incorporated into future disaster management?
Practice Overview
• Lessons Learned sessions tend to bring out the negatives, be sure to ask "What Went
Right“;
• LL include the processes necessary for identification, documentation, validation, and
dissemination of lessons learned;
• Distribution of LL to appropriate organizations and personnel,
• Identification of actions that will be taken as a result of the lesson learned
• Follow-up to ensure that appropriate actions were taken.
• Take steps to ensure that the LL sessions will be comfortable and non-confrontational;
• Encourage creative thinking - make it a relaxed environment for having the discussion
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During Discussions
• There is effective participation.
• Participants achieve a mutual understanding.
• All contributions are considered and included in the ideas, solutions or decisions that
emerge.
• Participants take shared responsibility for the outcome.
• Focusing the discussion around actions/solutions.
• Identify top items to be worked on
• Ensure that outcomes, actions and questions are properly recorded and actioned, and
appropriately dealt with afterwards.
Lets not forget issues of gender (women, men, girls and boys) were impacted
Closing
• Identify clear actions and owners/responsible agencies where appropriate;
• Focus on identifying solutions for the most important issues
In summary
• Lessons learned are
• Not a complaining session or finger pointing
• A process to identify what was learned
• Used to analyze data and prioritize actions
• Basis for development of action points by identified institutions
• LL documented, archived and disseminated to relevant organizations for their action
• LL are about “how to get it right the next time there is a similar disaster?”
Disaster lessons we have been calling ‘lessons learned” are really not learned but only identified. When
they are addressed they can legitimately be called lessons learned. Otherwise, they should be called
“lessons identified”.
Ultimately there is no such thing as failure. They are lessons learned in different ways.
Twyla Tharp
Session II (i) Civil protection policy in Zimbabwe
Definition of Civil Protection
All humanitarian measures aimed at protecting:
~Populations,
~ Their environment and their
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~ Natural inheritance against accidents and disasters of every kind
Broad Policy Statement
National Policy for Civil Protection states that “ Every Citizen of Zimbabwe should assist where possible to avert or limit the effects of a disaster”.
Central Government initiates disaster preparedness programmes through the relevant sector ministries with local administration taking the responsibilities for implementing and maintaining its effectiveness.
Sector Specific Policies
Overall coordination.
The Minister of Local Government Public Works and National Housing is charged with the coordinative role as empowered by the Civil Protection Act No. 5 of 1989. The Act provides for:-
Special powers designed to establish, coordinate and direct the activities of both the public and private emergency services
Guidelines for action and maximum use of resources since disaster mitigation requires a multi sectoral and interdisciplinary approach;
The establishment of a National Civil Protection Fund which receives money from both Government and the public. The fund is applied to the development and promotion of Civil Protection activities throughout the country.
Commandeering of resources for the purpose of mitigating a disaster, Declaration of a State of Disaster by the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe
The Structural Model of the Civil Protection System in Zimbabwe
President (Head of State)
Parliament (Legislative)
Cabinet (Policy formulation)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
MLGPWNH, Sister Ministries/Departments/ NGO, UN
Parastatals
NB: Other members are co opted as and when necessary.
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Civil Protection Organisation in Zimbabwe
CO-ORDINATOR PLANNING COMMITTEE
N Minister – LGPWNH National Civil Protection Coordinating
A + Committee (NCPCC)
T Civil Protection Directorate with a Multi sectoral Representation
I Secretariat
P Provincial Administrator Provincial Civil Protection
R MLGPWNH Planning Committee (NCPPC)
O
D District Administrator District Civil Protection
I (DISTRICT MLGPWNH
S Planning Committee (DCPPC)
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LEGISLATIVE GAPS & RESOURCE
Structural/ organisational gaps,
Centralisation of capacity for rescue
Communication,
Decision making and information flow
Public awareness and education
Proposed Policy Act / Bill on Disaster Risk Management
Provisions
~ organisation
~ financing
Subcommittees of the National Platform and Functions
Emergency Services Subcommittee
Food, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Subcommittee
Epidemics and Zoonotics Subcommittee
Concluding remarks
Evident government commitment to manage disasters as demonstrated by the existence of policy and
the legal enabling statutes, and efforts to improve on existing mechanisms in order to create a
conducive environment for disaster risk management.
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Session II (II): Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Concepts
• Disaster ~ a serious disruption of the functioning of a community / society, causing major human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources ~ Better understood as consequences of everyday actions and decisions which cumulatively lead to disaster (Hewitt 1997) Risk: probability of harmful consequences or expected losses
Management: Follet’s, art of getting things done through other people; Malik’s
transformation of resources into utility; and generally referred to as planning, organising,
controlling and leading
Key Terms
• Disaster terminology
~Hazard, vulnerability, disaster risk, emergency
• Disaster management terminology
~ capacity, mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation
resilience
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Hazard and Vulnerability
• Hazard– potentially damaging event, phenomenon, human activity, that may cause loss
of life, injury, property damage, social and economic disruption and or environmental
degradation
• Vulnerability – The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, environmental
factors which increase susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards
Disaster Risk
• Disaster Risk - Function of the risk process, result of combination of hazard,
vulnerability and insufficient capacity to reduce the potential negative
impacts (ISDR 2006)
Hazard x vulnerability = disaster risk
Capacity
Emergency
• A state in which normal operating procedures are suspended and extra ordinary measures are
taken.
- Compound emergency - Complex emergency
Disaster Preparedness
• Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards
• Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of disasters
include public awareness, forecasting, early warning, alert mechanisms and preparation of
response plans
Early Warning
• Chain of events namely;
- understanding the hazard and the vulnerable
- monitoring and forecasting impending hazard events
- processing and dissemination of timely, accurate and understandable warnings to populations at risk
and political authorities
- Facilitate appropriate response measures
- ultimately seek to minimize loss and damage
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Session II (ii) Humanitarian Principles
Presentation by Ms. M. Sibanda
Purpose
To conduct an introspection on individual and or organizational/sectoral performance on quality of
assistance/services rendered to the then displaced population in Chingwizi holding camp.
Objective
To promote awareness on ethical issues in disaster risk management (DRM) rights of people
affected by disaster.
Definitions
Humanitarianism: To promote awareness on: ethical issues in disaster risk management (DRM)
rights of people affected by disaster.
Origins of humanitarianisms
The principles are derived from the core principles which have guided the work of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. The Humanitarian Charter (Sphere Project,
2011).
References
Code of Conduct for International Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster
Relief
Humanitarian Charter
Inter-agency’s Standing Committee (IASC) Six Core Principles of the Code of Conduct on
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
** Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
Humanitarian Charter
Principles are reflected in:
International humanitarian law
International human rights law
Refugee law
NB: Zimbabwe - a signatory to conventions
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The right to life with dignity
All human beings have a right to life, an adequate standard of living, freedom from cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. State and non-state actors must not frustrate
or withhold life-saving assistance from deserving civilian populations during disasters or
conflicts. Any assistance rendered to deserving populations must be impartial.
Legal instruments - Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); International Convention of
Civil and Political Rights (1966); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
The right to receive humanitarian assistance
Adequate food, water, clothing, shelter and basic health care. State and non-state actors should
observe the principles of non-discrimination and impartiality.
Legal instruments - Customary International Humanitarian Law; The Four Geneva Conventions
of 1949; Additional Protocols of 1977
The Right to Protection and Security
Identify and protect people who are vulnerable to abuse due to their age, gender, religion, race,
ethnicity etc. The principle of non-refoulement is to be observed, that is, no refugee shall be
sent back to a country where his life or freedom would be in danger due to their race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Legal instruments: International Humanitarian Law; Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional
Protocols of 1977; Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951; Convention on the Rights
of the Child (1989)
Constitution of Zimbabwe (Chapter 4 Part 2 (Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms)
The right to:
• Life
• Human dignity
• Personal security
• Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
• Equality and non-discrimination
• Environmental rights
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Core principles & Additional principles
All humanitarian activities are guided by 4 humanitarian principles:
• humanity
• neutrality
• impartiality
• independence
Principle 1 : Humanity
• Human suffering MUST be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action
is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.
Principle 2: Neutrality
• To act without preference for one group or another
• Humanitarian actors MUST not take sides in
• hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
Principle 3 : Impartiality
• To act on the basis of need without discrimination
• Humanitarian action MUST be carried out on the
• basis of need alone, giving priority to the most
• urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions
• on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious
• belief, class or political opinions.
Principle 3 : Independence
• Humanitarian action MUST be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other
objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being
implemented.
Additional Principles
• Respect culture and custom
• Humanitarian response to use local resources and capacities as much as possible
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• Participation of the beneficiaries to be encouraged
• Emergency response to strive to reduce future vulnerabilities
• Accountability - to both donors and beneficiaries
• Humanitarian agencies to portray affected people as dignified human beings, not hopeless
objects
• Do No Harm
• Humanitarian actors should as far as possible avoid exposing people to further harm
References
• Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) ACT 2013
• IASC
• Sphere Project Handbook, 2011
• UN OCHA website
Role of Government
Primary responsibility to protect and take the lead in offering citizens assistance in the event of natural
and human induced disasters.
Session III (i): Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe
Presented by : Mr. M.F Viriri
Definition of floods
The temporary inundation of normally dry land area from the overflowing of natural or artificial confines
of a river or other water bodies (J Burton 2003).
Causes of floods
• Intense rainfall
• Tropical Cyclones
• River network – dense network at confluences of rivers
• Topography – steep slopes followed low laying areas
• Operation of Dams
• Siltation of Rivers –leading to loss of channel capacity
• Climate change-increase in the frequency of cyclone occurrences and floods overtime.
•
Tropical Cyclones & Intense rainfall
Two types of floods mainly affect the country.
The most frequent is the seasonal flood, occurring normally in JFM, at the peak of the rainfall
season.
The second and not so frequent one is the cyclone-induced flood, having become more frequent
than before.
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River Network
• Dense river networks occurs on confluences of rivers.
• This result in one river (normally the smaller) failing to drain into the bigger river leading
to the river bursting its banks.
Dam Operation
• Dam releases may lead to flooding especially in downstream areas if not managed well.
• If more water is released into the main river it may also lead to flooding (flush) at the
confluences with minor tributaries.
• Normally releases from the dams are made during the peak of the rainfall season.
Traditional Flood Prone Areas in Zimbabwe
Muzarabani
Middle Save
Tsholotsho
Kamativi- Confluence of Gwayi and Shangani
Gokwe
Chikwalakwala
Malipati
Tuli-Shashe
Areas along Zambezi, Save, Limpopo etc.
Flood Early Warning Systems
• ZINWA has got a number of measures in place for monitoring the floods.
• The organisation collect, process and disseminate information pertaining to river flow statistics
and dam levels.
• The organization has in place a stream flow measuring network for monitoring river flows and
dams which also act as temporary storage of flood water during peak event.
• The river flow monitoring system consists of automatic water level recorders located on various
points on the rivers of the country.
• In the event of floods the observers who maintains the stations are required to send water
levels by telephone on daily basis to the Head Office.
Flow monitoring system
• The hydrological network consists of 342 stations which are currently operational.
• Most of the stations collect river levels through automatic recorders
• While providing useful data, the traditional river gauge networks are often not suited directly to
flood monitoring.
• The main reason being data from the stations is obtained at weekly intervals when the chart is
changed
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Real time stations
• The country has 7 real time stations currently working.
• 4 stations (C68,C59,B59&E74) installed under SADC HYCOS Phase II project are working.
The other 3 (F23,F22 and F24) were installed under the joint Pungwe Project.
• For HYCOS a total of 13 stations (5 Phase I and 8 for Phase II) were earmarked in the
country.
• All the stations under Phase I (B62,C57,B37,D75&E43) were installed but none is currently
working mainly due to vandalism.
• Installations of the other stations(4)-A38,B27,B85,E130 are hampered by finances to
construct the necessary civil works.
• In addition there are recommendations to relocate E43,C57 and B37 due to accessibility
and GSM network coverage limitations
• Estimated cost to complete the installations $200,000
Dam level monitoring
• 148 major dams are monitored across the country.
• Dam levels are collected twice a week;
• The dam levels are processed to get dam capacities (volumes) and a State of Major Dams
Report is produced and disseminated.
Data Transmission
• The SADC HYCOS real time stations transmit data through the satellite to a server in SA &
data can be accessed through website with a 1-hour delay. This method is vital for flood
monitoring.
• The Pungwe stations transmit levels through the local GSM network. The stations are
programmed in such a way that if the river levels reach a certain threshold level an alarm
in the form of SMS would be sent to our cellphones.
• Telephones are used to collect levels from other key stations on daily basis.
• The same means of communication is used for dam level collections.
• The bulk of stations which collect levels through charts are not ideal for flood monitoring
since charts are submitted after the hydrological season for processing.
Flood Forecasting Capabilities
• The main objective of forecasting is to predict accurately the exceedence of critical
flows/flood heights or thresholds in order to issue warnings to the public to take the
necessary evasive action.
• Currently no flood forecasting model of repute is available.
• However hydrological forecasts/outlook based on the rainfall forecast are produced for
the country and for specific catchments e.g Tokwe Mukosi.
• The forecast are disseminated to stakeholder nationally and internationally.
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• Hydrological Update Report for Flood Monitoring are produced every week and
disseminated nationally and internationally.
Tokwe Murkosi Dam Flood Assessment for 2013/14 Season
• The assessment was based on processed 2013/2014 flow data from the hydrological
stations feeding into the Tokwe Murkosi Dam system.
• The key questions answered through the analysis were a) if the dam was complete prior
to the 2013/14 rain season would it have filled or spilled or to what storage level would
the dam have reached? b) What was the magnitude & frequency of the peak flow which
occurred at the dam site during the season
Methodology
Selection of stations
• Key stations upstream and downstream of Tokwe Mukosi Dam system were selected for
analysis. E112 in Tokwe River, E117 in Ngezi River, E107 Musokwesi River and E176 in
Tokwe River downstream of the Tokwe Mukosi Dam site.
• The flow data for the stations was processed and used for the analysis.
Peak flow for the season
• The peak flow at the dam site was estimated from E112 (Tokwe) by transposing the peak
at the station to the Tokwe Murkosi Dam site. This was done by factoring in the
catchment area at the dam site.
Determining the storage level the dam would have reached
• This was estimated using the stations feeding into the dam system (E117 Ngezi, E112 in
Tokwe River and E107 in Musokwesi River). The flows from the three systems were
transposed to the dam site by factoring in the catchment area.
• The mean daily flows were then estimated by averaging the resultant inflows from the
three stations.
• The total inflow of the season at the dam was determined by adding the mean daily flows.
• The total inflow was equated to the volume of water which would have accumulated in
the dam if the dam was complete.
• The water balance for the dam was also determined and plotted.
Results: Determining the storage volume of the dam
• An estimated total flow of 902,115ML passed through the Tokwe Mukosi Dam site
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• If the dam was complete prior to the 2014 hydrological season, this volume would have
been captured by the dam as storage & when the volume is equated to the storage of the
Tokwe Mukosi Dam it translates to a percentage full of 50%.
• This means by the end of May the dam would have been reached 50% full.
Results: Water balance at the Tokwe Mukosi Dam
• The graph shows the r/ship between the inflows & outflows & storage trends at the dam
site.
• The inflows increased sharply since the beginning of Feb resulting in the sharp increase in
the storage levels at the Tokwe Mukosi Dam from the 6th February to mid-February.
• Subsequent releases (Approx 873,207ML) were made from the dam to lower the water
levels.
Results: Determination of the peak flow for the season
• The peak flow at E112 occurred on the 7th of Feb 2014 at approximately 1400hrs & measured
272m3/s. The time to peak was approx 10hrs 30 minutes.
• This peak was recorded at the Dam site on the 8th of Feb, 2014 when the level reached 675.28m
above msl.
Summary Conclusions from the Tokwe Mukosi Flow Assessment
• If Tokwe Mukosi Dam was complete prior to the 2014 rainfall it would have reached a
storage level of 50% full.
• The total inflows into the Tokwe Mukosi Dam for the 2014 season were approximately
902,115ML.
• The estimated peak flow for the 2014 season at the dam site measured 1614m3
/s with a
return period of 26 years.
• It takes approximately a day for flows at Tokwe Bhanya (E112) to reach the Damsite while
flows released from the Tokwe Mukosi Dam reaches the downstream station within a day.
Recommendations
The need for closer gauging stations to effectively monitor inflows and outflows from the Tokwe Mukosi
Dam should be re-emphasised.
Challenges
• Very few Real Time Stations for effective flood monitoring.
• Vandalism-hydrological station susceptible to vandalism leading to decrease in the
hydrological network.
• The network used to have over 700 stations
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• Some of the stations were washed away /damaged by floods, submerged by dams
,siltation leading to closure
• Information gaps on ungauged major rivers like Angwa River. Approximately 15/151
subzones completely ungauged.
• Lack of flood forecasting models & skills.
• Communication problem-most of the flood prone areas & hydrological station sites do not
have GSM network coverage.
• Financial challenges to construct the necessary civil works for installations.
Implications for Planning
• Expansion of Real time DCP systems on the hydrological network.
• Rehabilitation of vandalised hydrometric stations.
• Acquire flood forecasting software like Mike 11 and training of users.
• People should be resettled to areas where flooding does not occur.
• Schools, clinics and other public utilities should also be located at areas where flooding
does not occur.
• More resources should be channeled towards capacitating communities on risk reduction
issues.
POLICY, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF DAMS
Presentation by ; Engineer Mutazu
• There are over 8,000 constructed dams in the country. Of these 245 are large according to the
Water Act.
• The policy regulating the design and construction of dams in Zimbabwe is covered under the
Water Act [Chapter 20:24] Part IX – Dam Safety.
• According to section 96 of the Act dams fall under:
o Small dams which are classified as those dams with a vertical height of more than 8
metres but less than 15 metres and are capable of storing more than 500 000 m3
but
less than 1 000 000 m3
of water.
o Large dams are defined as those with a vertical height of 15 metres or more and are
capable of storing more than 1 000 000 m3
of water.
Dam Design and Construction
The designs, drawings and specifications for
• a small dam are required to be prepared by an approved civil engineer or civil
engineering technician
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• A large dam are required to be prepared by an approved civil engineer, assisted by such
qualified engineers, geologists and other specialists as the Secretary in consultation
with the National Water Authority
• The designer certifies the adequacy and safety of the proposed dam works and the
documents shall be submitted to the secretory for approval.
Periodic inspections of large dams
• The owner of a large dam is required to engage an approved civil engineer to carry out
inspection of a completed large dam:-
o before the end of the month of June or the month immediately following.
o the first season during which water was diverted or stored by the dam; and
o the first season during which water spilled from the large dam; and
o each successive period of five years reckoned from the date of completion of
construction of the large dam; and
• The owner of the large dam shall be required to carry out the remedial measures as
contained in the detailed inspection report.
• If the owner of a large dam fails to carryout maintenance or remedial works as specified
by the approved engineer where a dam is considered to be unsafe and is a potential
hazard the Ministry may proceed with the required remedial works and take all
necessary measures to recover the cost from the owner of the dam.
Dam Registration
• The owner of dam is required to obtain a registration certificate upon production of certified
completion drawing and completion report.
• The completion certificate is required to indicate adequacy in the structural safety of the dam.
• The owner of a dam who contravenes provisions of these requirements shall be guilty of an
offence and is liable to being fined or to be imprisoned or both.
Procedure on Emergencies
• If the owner of a small dam or large dam learns of any sudden or unprecedented flood or
alarming or unusual circumstance or occurrence, whether anticipated or existing, which may
adversely affect the small dam or large dam, he shall, in addition to discharging any duty,
liability or obligation imposed on him by or under any other law—
• Forthwith take all such steps as may be reasonable and practicable for dealing with the flood,
circumstance or occurrence, as the case may be; and
• As soon as practicable and by registered letter notify the Secretary and the National Water
Authority, as fully as possible, of the flood, circumstance or occurrence, as the case may be, and
of the action he has taken or proposes to take in terms of paragraph (a).
• The owner shall be required to:
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o notify the Secretary by registered letter, immediately after commencing to take any
action; or
o report to the Secretary within a period of forty-eight hours after commencing to take
the action on the progress and results of the action; and
o comply with such other instructions as the Secretary may from time to time give to him.
• Failure to comply with the above is an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both.
Appointment of Board of Consultants
• If in the opinion of the Secretary , the safety considerations relating to a small dam or large dam
are compromised,
• may appoint a board of consultants to report to him on any action to be taken in relation to the
small dam or large dam concerned or to any design, drawings, records, reports or specifications
relating to the dam.
• A board of consultants shall consist of two or more engineers who have—
o had wide experience of the design and construction of small dams and large dams; and
not previously been associated with any dam works in respect of the small dam or large
dam concerned.
Procedures in emergencies arising during execution of dam works
• If, during construction of a dam, any sudden danger is posed to any works or structure
connected therewith, and such danger renders it necessary to carry out immediate dam works
different from original submitted design drawings or specifications;
o the owner of the dam is required to immediately commence with the recommended
remedial works, and
o proceed with procedures as stated under the emergency procedures above.
Session III (ii): Tokwe Mukosi dam project: The design, safety and the flood
Presentation by : Eng. T. Maurikira
Provisions of the Water Act
• There are over 8,000 constructed dams in the country. Of these 245 are large according to the
Water Act.
• The policy regulating the design and construction of dams in Zimbabwe is covered under the
Water Act [Chapter 20:24] Part IX – Dam Safety.
• According to section 96 of the Act dams fall under:
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o Small dams which are classified as those dams with a vertical height of more than 8
metres but less than 15 metres and are capable of storing more than 500 000 m3
but
less than 1 000 000 m3
of water.
o Large dams are defined as those with a vertical height of 15 metres or more and are
capable of storing more than 1 000 000 m3
of water.
• According to Section 102 of the Act, there shall be thorough investigations and a detailed design
and a construction programme before commencement of construction works.
• The supervising engineer, as defined in section 103 of the Act has a duty to ensure construction
works conform to the designs and programme of works.
Dam Design in Zimbabwe
• In ZINWA, for purposes of design and construction, dams are categorized into four classes i.e.
class 1 – 4.
• These classes are related to the hazard potential which is based on the risk to life and the
economic consequences which can arise if the dam fails. Class 1 dams are those that give the
worst scenario and are designed to the highest standards (i.e. 1: 2 000 year
• return period with a dry freeboard and checked against overtopping for a 1: 10 000 year flood)
• The hazard potential or class is used to determine the design flood for the dams. Tokwe Mukosi
Dam is categorized in class 1.
Hazard Potential
HAZARD POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE ECONOMIC LOSS
Very low Impossible Minimal
Low Impossible Marginal
Moderate Possible Appreciable
High Probable Excessive
Dam Classification
HAZARD / SIZE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE MAJOR
Very low 4 3 2 1
Low 3 2 1 1
Moderate 2 1 1 1
High 1 1 1 1
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Design peak floods
• Class 4: 100 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 250 year return period with no
dry freeboard.
• Class 3: 250 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 750 year return period with
o no dry freeboard.
• Class 2: 750 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 2000 year return period with
o no dry freeboard.
• Class 1: 2000 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 10 000 year return period
with no dry freeboard.
Tokwe-Mukosi dam design
• Tokwe-Mukosi Dam is classified as a large dam with a height of 89.2 m and on completion will
be capable of storing 1 802 600 000 m3.
• Construction works commenced in April 1998. Due to financial challenges, the project went
through a series of partial and full suspensions before works commenced in earnest in April
2011.
• The project was targeted to be complete in April 2013 but due to financial challenges the project
is now anticipated to be finished in June 2015.
• For, Tokwe- Mukosi Dam, as also applies to all large dams in Zimbabwe, the standard design
flood requirement is that the flood of 2 000 year return period must be passed with adequate
dry freeboard allowance, and that the 10 000 year flood must be passed without overtopping of
the dam wall or embankments.
• Application of the standard stated above, the design flood data for Tokwe-Mukosi Dam was
assessed to be as follows;
• Maximum Probable Flood (M. P. F.) with a return period of 10 000 years: 10 290 m3
/sec.
• Flood with a return period of 2 000 year : 7 630 m3
/sec
• An emergency/auxiliary spillway is allowed for on saddle dam number 5, with a spillway cill at
level 706.44m. The spillway length is 150m. This will discharge the flood waters above
• 8 000 m3
/sec and prevent overtopping of the dam.
• In addition to the emergency spillway a parapet wall will be built to level 708.3m as an
additional safety measure against overtopping of the embankment.
• Major features of the dam flood design are;
• Two drop inlet spillways of capacity 1090 m3
/sec at the full supply level 701.00m
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• A 150 metre long auxiliary spillway at level 706.44m
• And a parapet wall on the dam crest built to level 708.3m
• Thus the design flood is adequately catered for.
Flood Control during construction
• Provision is generally made for the care and diversion of floods during construction and this is
usually achieved, at the early stages of construction, through the outlet works.
• The outlet works are put in place at an early stage of construction and works on the main
embankment particularly on the river bed area are timed to be done and be substantially
completed during the dry season. Floods may also be allowed to pass over an uncompleted
embankment. When provided for an upstream cofferdam will help as a temporary storage for
floods and divert the flood flows through the outlet works.
• As for Tokwe-Mukosi, the diversion of water was through the outlet works where water was
being discharged through twin 2m diameter pipes.
• The diversion works were designed to pass 80m3/s which translates to 6.912 x 106m3 per day.
The Engineer’s estimate for river diversion was based on a mean annual inflow of 300 x 106 m3,
which translates to 9.64m3/s.
• The diversion works were designed to pass a 1: 2 year flood with a reservoir surcharge up to
level 660m.
• The Engineer estimated that the reservoir could impound water up to level 660m and the
outlets would cope with the diversion requirements without overtopping the dam.
• However, the flood water that reached the project site was estimated to be of the magnitude of
1: 10 year flood, hence the diversion works could not cope.
SAFETY OF DAMS IN ZIMBABWE
• During the Elnino induced floods of the year 2000 the spillway capacities of our dams were able
to pass the floods without any problem. However there is need to review our hydrological data
in view of the climate change phenomena.
CHALLENGES
• The safety of any dam is as good as its maintenance. Maintenance of dams remains a
challenge due to the nonpayment of bills. It is desirable that part of the money collected
from each dam goes towards the routine maintenance of that dam.
• For sustainability of operations in the water sector one of the principles adopted is user
pays principle.
• Through this principle it is envisaged that the people who use the stored water pay for it
in order to ensure that the dam is maintained in a safe and operational condition.
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• The Dam Safety budget has not received any fiscal support over the years making it
difficult for ZINWA to comply with the requirements under the Water Act.
• For the safety of Tokwe Mukosi dam it is imperative that beneficiaries of the Tokwe
Mukosi water pay for the use of the stored water.
DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF COMMUNITIES
• It is expected that the relocation and resettlement of affected communities will be
done and completed before the commencement of the programme for dam
construction activities.
• On Tokwe-Mukosi Dam the desired timing of relocation and resettlement of affected
communities was not possible.
Due to these financial challenges, the Government through the Ministry of Local Government had
planned to resettle affected communities in three phases;
Phase 1
• This was made up of families under level 660m and families affected by the construction
of saddle dams.
• The total number of families under this zone was 1247.
Phase 2
• This involved the families living under high flood level and above level 660m
• The total number of families under this zone was 1878.
• Due to the flooding event of February 2014 all families in this zone had to be evacuated
and relocated to a safe holding camp at Chingwizi.
Phase 3
• This involved the resettlement of families in the buffer zone. The Buffer Zone
is the area above the high flood level which is designated for conservation
around the dam so as to minimise siltation of the dam.
• The total number of families in the Buffer Zone is 3268
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE FOR DISPLACED PROJECT COMMUNITIES.
• It is now recognised that development-induced displaced persons can be classified as a distinct
group of persons requiring protection under international human rights law. In 1994, forced
eviction was recognised as a human-rights violation by the UN Secretary General and in 1997,
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) formulated guidelines on
displacement. These principles identify rights and guarantees that apply to the protection and
assistance to be rendered to displaced people during their displacement and eventual
resettlement.
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• The World Commission on Dams (WCD, 2000) and the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP, 2007) also recommends that no dam project should be allowed to proceed
on indigenous and communal peoples` lands without obtaining their free, prior and informed
consent. Best practice dictates that compensation policies for dam projects should ensure a
prompt and measureable improvement of the lives of the affected people and communities by;
o Ensuring the improved livelihoods of affected people
o Implementation of developmental approaches.
o In-kind compensation instead of cash compensation.
o Compensation of affected people without formal entitlement to the land.
o Enhancing participatory approaches.
o Ensuring compliance with resettlement agreements
• Currently ZINWA is supervising the construction of the following dams; Gwayi-Tshangani,
Marovanyati, Semwa and Mutange. From the lessons learnt from Tokwe-Mukosi, there is an
urgent need to ensure that the resettlement of the affected communities is done early in the
programme before similar events to the Tokwe Mukosi flooding recur.
Design Flood Data
• M. P. F. (10 000 year) : 10 290 m3/sec.
• 2 000 year flood : 7 630 m3/sec
• Time to peak (2 000 year) : 21 hours
• Flood volume (2 000 year) : 760 000 Ml
• Discharge capacity of 2x drop inlet spillways : 1 090 m3/sec
• Flood rise : 5.44 m
• Dry freeboard : 1.16 m
• Full Supply Level (F.S.L.) of dam : 701.00
• High Flood Level (HFL) : 706.44
• Crest level of dam : 707.60
• Reservoir area at F.S.L. : 9 640 ha
CONCLUSION
• Our dams are structurally safe but need yearly maintenance works to prevent continuous
deterioration which might lead to the loss of these valuable investment structures, loss of water
security and worse still the loss of lives.
• It is recommended that budgetary support be channeled towards the mandatory inspections
and follow up rehabilitation measures on a yearly basis and beneficiaries of the stored water
pay for the water to ensure adequate maintenance of the developed dams.
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Session III (iii): Climate Change and Flood Risk
Presentation by : Mr E.N Moyo
Climate at the Centre of ZimASSET
• Food Security and Nutrition; - > 70% of Zim’s livelihood depends on rain-fed agriculture and
downstream sectors related to it.
1. Social Services and Poverty Eradication;
2. Infrastructure and Utilities such as Tokwe-Mukosi;
– Climate extremes causing serious homelessness and infrastructural damage
– Energy and power generation
– Health and DRR
Climate Projections and Recent Trends
• Climate projections can be assessed from physical understanding of the processes
governing regional responses; and recent historical climate change’- use of Physical
Mechanisms (IPCC, 2007)
• First step is to look at present day variability than 2080 Climatology in Zimbabwe (
Washington et al, 2006)
• Use of Proxy- such as maize harvest
• precipitation change rely models along with physical insights with agreement
encouraging stronger statements as to the likelihood of c. change.
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IPCC-AR5 on Climate Change & Precipitation
• Extreme precipitation is expected to increase with warming.
• Observations and model projected future changes both indicate increase in extreme
precipitation associated with warming.
• Analysis of observed annual maximum 1-day precipitation (RX1day) indicates a significant
increase in extreme 24hrs precipitation with a median increase about 7% per °C rise
• The global atmospheric water content is constrained by the Clausius–Clapeyron equation to
increase at around 7% K–1;
• Heavy rainfalls associated with T cyclones likely to increase with continued warming induced by
enhanced GHG concerns.
• For a range of emission scenarios (SRES A2, A1B, and B1), a 1-in-20 year annual max 24-hour
precipitation rate is likely to become a 1-in-5 to 1-in-15 year event by 2100
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Projected Rainfall Change
• Tradoss et al, 2005 also found out that the
– decrease in the OND rainfall is more of a consistently late onset
– Increase in JFM is more of few intense storms
– CWD Project, EMA-UNDP-GoZ says:
– Rainfall patterns are likely to change & extreme events set to increase with
some models suggesting a 10 – 20 % decline in Zimbabwe rainfall by 2050.
– Changing rainfall distribution
– Tending to be Lower Rainfall / Fewer but heavier storms
• Tropical Cyclones to increase in intensity, less predictable
• Increasing variability, especially in areas where rainfall is already quite variable
• Strengthening of winds, Hailstorms
Microburst & Macroburst
• A microburst is a very localized column of sinking air, producing damaging divergent
and straight-line winds at the surface that are similar to, but distinguishable from,
tornadoes, which generally have convergent damage.
• The air moves in a downward motion until it hits ground level. It then spreads outward in
all directions.
• A microburst often has high winds that can knock over fully grown trees.
• Usually last for a duration of a couple of seconds to several minutes.
• Examples:
– Wet Macroburst (Bindura Feb 4 2014/ Rutenga-Chilonga April ‘13) or
WestNich-Mberengwa 2 April 2013
– Dry Microburst (Chivi 29 Dec, 2012; Dotito 19 Nov 2012)
• A changing climate leads to changes in frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing
of extreme weather and climate events, unprecedented extreme weather and climate events.
• However, mean precipitation is expected to increase less than extreme precipitation because of
energy constraints (e.g., Allen and Ingram, 2002)
• Some climate extremes (e.g. floods or drought) may be the result of an accumulation of weather
or climate events that are not extreme when considered independently.
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Tokwe-Mukosi & National Early Warning System
• Radars & related capacity issues
• More automatic stations (AWS)
– Maintenance plan and Sustainability issues
• Need for more improved Radiosondes (upper air)
• Need for partnership to improve data collection
– Leadership & Security agents help us to secure the equipment
• Need to review the early-warning system from the observing network, climate
component, and institute studies to enhance the observation.
• Do disaster scenario analysis
Need for C. Change EAT & Behavioural Change
• Engineers, Designers, City Planners, Leaders, Chiefs etc
• ZINWA, Agritex, Constructors and Disaster planners
• Economic development and financing
• Improved adaptive capacity which is an issue of poverty, lack of education and livelihood
options.
– Lets empower our people further
– Lets embrace Technology to disseminate info
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Opportunities
1. ZIMASSET identified development of a Climate Policy as one of the key outputs under
the Food Security and Nutrition Cluster.
– presents a good opportunity for us all to mainstream climate change into
key development sectors
– through strengthening of national capacities to reduce climate change risk
and build resilience for any climate change shocks.
– Policy presents an opportunity to decouple climate variations and DRR
/other sensitive sectors
2. Finalisation of the NCCRS w strategies to deal with climate change issues including
flooding
Creation of Climate Change Management Department within MEWC
Session V: Socio economic importance of Tokwe Mukosi dam
Presented by: Mr Chikovo-Provincial Administrator Masvingo Province
Tokwe Mukosi Dam project is part of the Provincial Irrigation Master Plan which is a strategic objective
of this province after realizing that 90% of our people depend on agricultural production and yet our
region does not support rain fed agriculture and that therefore irrigated cropping is the way to go.
On completion the Tokwe Mukosi dam will have full supply level capacity of 1802 600 mega litres of
water whose 010% yield of 423 000 mega litres of water can irrigate 25 000 hectares downstream
This hectarage can be translated to 150 000 tonnes of cereals per season and definitely the dam is
envisaged to become the development hub of the province opening as it does vast and diverse
investment opportunities in agriculture, downstream value additions and vast tourism related
enterprises.
ACTIVITY TIME FRAME AMOUNT REQ
Enumeration/Head Count 1st Sept 2012 36,040.00
Valuation 11 Sept 2012 415,502.00
Compensation for 500 families Aug to Oct 2012 2,330,770.00
Compensation for 2 500 families Nov to June 2013 11,653,850.00
Relocation of 1st 500 families Sept to Oct 2012 71,377.00
Relocation of 2nd 2 500 families (PSIP) Mar to June 2013 356,886.00
Demarcation of Buffer Zone - Physical marking
1st Sept 2012 23,550.00
Land Use Planning 1st Sept 2012 93,077.00
Identification of Irrigation Land 15 Nov 2012 14,750.00
Development of Irrigation for 500 families
PSIP 2013 1,200,000.00
Development of Irrigation for PSIP 2013 6,000,000.00
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2 500 families
Drilling of 5 boreholes 15 Sept 2012 38,900.00
Drilling of 95 Boreholes PSIP April 2013 712,500.00
Construction of first 2 primary schools 1st Sept 2012 4,183,250.00
Construction of 3 schools (2 primary & 1 secondary)
PSIP - Jan 2013 1,405,460.00
Construction of clinic 1st Oct 2012 2 500 000,00
construction of 3 dip tanks 1st Sept 2012 42,000.00
construction of 9 dip tanks PSIP 2013 126,000.00
TOTAL 31,435 992.00
This was communicated to the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate responsible for the dam
funding and also copied to the Ministry of Local Government and all other Provincial Heads were
directed to communicate this Activity Calendar to their Ministries for budgetary considerations.
PROGRESS BEFORE DISASTER
The Ministry of Local Government was allocated $50, 000 for Head Count and Coordination in July 2013
and the assignment established the following.
That 6,393 families and their 18, 764 cattle including 8167 primary school going and 2,295 secondary
school going children would need to be relocated from the basin. These would however, be relocated in
three phases viz:
Phase 1 – relocate 1, 247 families who were deemed to be at Level 660m above sea level and would be
in danger of flooding by October 2013.
Phase II – relocate 1, 878 families who would be affected when dam was expected to fill up by October
2014.
Phase III – relocate 3, 268 families in the Buffer Zone, who would be moved to protect the dam by
October 2015.
In the same month of July, Ministry of Public Works received $140, 000.00 and valuated 1, 950 families
in the basin.
Ministry of Lands received $40, 000.00 to plan and peg Masangula Resettlement Scheme and produced
800 A1 plots.
DDF and ZINWA received each $57, 500.00 and drilled 11 boreholes at Chisase and Masangula.
The Ministry of Local Government again received $3,832 490,00 as compensation funds and
compensated 896 families under Level 1.
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Ministry of Local Government then relocated 611 families and 757 cattle and 137 donkeys to Chisase,
Masangula and Chingwizi at a cost of $142, 754,00.
Before the disaster the process of relocation was laborious, commencing with compensation, then
driving the families to see their allocated land, allowing for 2 weeks to clear land, then finally
transporting the families to their new resettlement. The process consumed a lot of time.
By December 2013 Chisase and Masangula were full and in January the province decided to go back to
5,020 planned plots in Chingwizi because there was no other planned land available for resettling people
affected by Tokwe Mukosi.
This meant that all 1,247 families less 611 that we had moved in Level 1 plus 1,878 in Level II and some
199 families in Level III totalling 2,713 families, their livestock and movable property needed to be
evacuated at once to avoid imminent flooding.
The Provincial Administrator immediately reactivated the Provincial Civil Protection Committee and
District Civil Protection Committees for Chivi, Masvingo, Chiredzi and Mwenezi to plan and evacuate
people from the flood basin and warn people downstream of the dam in the event that the dam wall
collapsed.
We also realised that several families in Level 1 were inaccessible by trucks as the area was now bogging
heavy trucks, so we immediately established pick–up points at higher grounds at Gororo, Zunga,
Kushinga, Zifunzi, Rarangwe, Gunikuni and mobilised tractors to assist scotch carts to pick people to
these pick up points.
We immediately realised that we needed +50 trucks, +20 tractors, thousands of tents, food, water,
water tablets, drugs, blankets and sanitation facilities to cope with the disaster so we applied for a
declaration of State of Disaster.
The province realised that they could not continue to pick people from the basin and allocate them the 4
hectare arable land as before but that we needed to establish an evacuation Transit Holding Camp at
Chingwizi. This would quicken the process so that families would be picked from the basin and dropped
at camp and allocated tents, food and blankets.
Meanwhile we agreed to assign the following duties to our working teams.
Search and Rescue Team under Propol – to use uniformed forces to identify families in danger, move
them to pick-up points by scotch carts, tractors and helicopters.
The Transport Team under CMED - to deploy the 10 CMED vehicle we had to pick people from pick-up
points to Chingwizi holding camp some 120km away at the rate of 1 or two families per day per truck.
This meant that we were evacuating people at a rate of 15 to 20 families per day.
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The Logistics Team under District Administrators – to mobilise people to go to higher ground, to
organise those that would look after livestock and maintain records of movements of people and
livestock.
His Excellency declared our situation a Disaster on 9th February 2014 and the National Civil Protection
Committee descended on the Province and collected all our logistical requirements to mitigate against
disaster and immediately called for a Press Conference to appeal for well-wishers to assist.
We started receiving tents, food, drugs, clothes, blankets and trucks from ordinary Zimbabweans, the
corporate world, churches, NGOs and members of the UN Family and Zimbabwean and Namibian Air
Force. We improved our evacuation rate to +100 families a day and to +200 families at the peak.
All donations were accounted for at Provincial Administrator’s office and sent to the District
Administrator Mwenezi for safe keeping and allocation to beneficiaries.
The Provincial Civil Protection Committee would meet twice daily at 6AM and 6PM together with
cooperating partners to assess the situation and relocate and feed people and cater for their welfare
both at pick-up points and holding camp.
CAMP ESTABLISHMENT
Owing to non-availability of planned land to resettle people we established a temporary transit camp at
Chingwizi as indicated earlier in my report.
We set up a Camp Management Team at Chingwizi headed by District Administrator Mwenezi,
supported by Civil Protection Unit and assisted by I.O.M and UN Agencies and NGOs.
On arrival at camp a family would be allocated a tent, 50kg mealie-meal, 2 litres cooking oil, 1kg salt, 4kg
sugar, 10kg sugar beans, 5kg Kapenta.
We also had to provide water to the families. At first we were carting the water from Triangle until we
drilled some 3 boreholes and established a piped water scheme for the transit camp.
We equally put up a clinic to offer essential health services which was ably supervised by PMD.
By 19 February 2014 a primary and secondary school had been established to cater for all school going
children.
With the support of NGOs we built up around 700 temporary toilets which we would decommission and
build new ones when full.
IDENTIFICATION OF PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT SITES AND CAMP DECONGESTION
Following completion of the evacuation process the Province resolved to relocate all the families from
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the camp by offering them 1 hectare residential plots first and then demarcate arable land for their use
later.
The Ministry of Lands mobilised a team of planners who pegged 3,020 one hectare residential plots and
provided for schools, clinics, business centres, Police Station and community centres.
The Province then directed people to move to 1 hectare plots and build permanent houses while
government planned arable land for irrigation.
The people complained that they need compensation first and wanted 4 hectare arable land like the
other 611 families that had been resettled before the disaster.
Government advised that they feared continued stay in camp would expose the people to disease
outbreak and would reduce their time to build before the next rainy season and appealed to people to
leave camp for residential stands.
The first 800 families moved voluntarily to the new stands although some rogue elements attacked
them for leaving before compensation.
The rest only left camp when they had burnt Police vehicles which led to some running skirmishes with
the police.
To date a total of 2,555 families have been allocated 1 hectare residential plots and another 146 families
are yet to be resettled. We equally need to regularize 250 illegally settled families in Chingwizi to the 1
hectare stands.
1,431 families have now been compensated at a cost of $5, 389, 840.00, we still have to pay 1,908
families in Level 1 and II at a cost of $7, 357, 978.00.
3 primary schools (Tokwe Mukosi, Nyuni and Chingwizi) and 1 secondary school (Nyuni Secondary) are
now established.
A total of 36 boreholes (6 institutional and 30 community) were drilled.
58 institutional and 780 household toilets donated by IOM (230), Catholic Relief Services (250) and BH
ASO (300) have been built.
IOM , one of the UN Agencies that remained has funded the production of Ward 13 Community Based
Plan, the draft plan is now in place and will be sent to council for consideration by the Full Council
before marketing it for funding.
The government top priorities for Chingwizi are:
• Payment of compensation to the tune of $7, 357, 978.00 for 1,908 families in Level 1 and II.
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• Need to valuate 3,054 families in the Buffer Zone and pay subsequent compensation.
• Allocation of arable land and grazing land to all the people in Chingwizi.
• Feeding these people monthly until they harvest
Completion of permanent social infrastructure like the 3 primary schools, 1 secondary school, 1 or 2
clinics, additional boreholes, Police Camp, Community Centre, Dip tanks etc.
The disaster was declared for a period of 3 moths from 9 February to 9 May 2014.
LESSONS LEARNT
Funding for huge projects such as Tokwe Mukosi Dam construction should include both the actual cost
of construction and social cost.
Period between application of disaster and declaration should be made shorter to allow
easy sourcing of resources.
Virtually all NGOs and UN Agencies that were partnering government have now left
Chingwizi;
Funding for huge projects such as Tokwe Mukosi Dam construction should include both the
actual cost of construction and social cost.
Period between application of disaster and declaration should be made shorter to allow
easy sourcing of resources.
Provincial and District Civil Protection Committees should do a thorough environmental scan
and ranking of possible disasters that may occur taking into consideration climate change.
Mobilisation of resources by government requires a lot of time and hence requests for
funding should be done in time.
The disaster period for Tokwe Mukosi disaster was shorter than the work to be done and
should have been extended to 6 months.
Integrated and coordinated response to disasters requires commitment and sacrifice by all.
The disaster period for Tokwe Mukosi disaster was shorter than the work to be done and
should have been extended to 6 months.
Integrated and coordinated response to disasters requires commitment and sacrifice by all.
Civil Protection Unit should have basic equipment to mitigate against disaster like, tents,
bowsers, water tablets, blankets, food hampers mosquito nets and some vehicles.
It is easy to commandeer resources when disaster has been declared but Civil Protection
Unit should have a fund to compensate service providers and take care of the welfare of
those managing the disaster.
CONCLUSION
My presentation would not be complete if I did not thank His Excellency for declaring the disaster,
National Civil Protection Unit for all the disaster mitigation direction and mobilisation of partners and
resources, all partners, the corporate world, churches, ordinary Zimbabweans, our Traditional Chiefs,
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local authorities and parastatals, the academia for being there when we needed them most, the
Provincial and District Civil Protection Committee members who worked day and night to ensure no life
was lost.
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Annex II: Group work Tasks
1. Group Work Guide
For Groups 1 to 3: group work to be undertaken in 3 steps
a). Brief overview on roles and activities undertaken by identified sectors or institutions as well as
address itemised subtopics
b). Plenary on challenges, lessons/ suggested solutions
c) Preparation of report for presentation
Group 1
Topic: Operational challenges, lessons /suggested solutions on search and rescue (aerial, water, land)
with regards to (subtopics):
~ alert mechanism and information on location of vulnerable communities, identification and
accessibility of areas of refuge,
~mobilisation of communities and livestock to move to safety, movement to pick up points and
management at pick up points
~ movement of communities from pick up points and reception challenges at campsite
~manpower levels and skills, equipment and related logistics as well as general coordination of search
and rescue operations
~ other pertinent issues related to search and rescue.
Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews
~ Air Force of Zimbabwe: HQ
~ Zimbabwe National Army 4 Brigade
~ ZRP Sub Aqua: HQ
~ DA Chivi and DA Masvingo
~ Veterinary: Province
~CMED: HQ
~ NGOs: IOM
Group 2
Topic: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to Camp management:
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Subtopics
~ Siting, layout planning, security
~ Donations, warehousing and distribution of tents, food, clothing, etc
~ Provision of water and sanitation
~ Provision of health services, health promotion, psychological support
~ Education and recreational facilities
~ Environmental management
~livelihoods
~ Manpower levels and skills
~ Co ordination of camp management
Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews
DA Mwenezi
Social welfare: Mwenezi
Water: Province
Health: Mwenezi
Education: Province
Environment: Province
Veterinary: Mwenezi
NGOs: Oxfam, ? others
Group 3
Topic: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to relocation to permanent
residence and early recovery measures
Subtopics
~ valuation process and compensation
~ land identification, layout planning, consultations with communities on land use and anticipated
nature of livelihoods
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~ manpower levels and skills
~ co ordination of relocation exercise
Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews
Valuations: HQ
Lands: HQ
Agriculture/ irrigation: province
Group 4
Topic:
a) Identify any gaps and propose solutions with regards to the extent to which current regulatory
processes and procedures related to dams under construction integrate disaster risk mitigation and
preparedness (use the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project as a case in point)
b) Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical expertise and equipment,
financial) for mitigation, preparedness and response to manage the flood risk within the context of
climate change
Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews
ZINWA
Climate Change Office
Department of Water
Local Government
Universities
NGOs
Meteorological Services
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Annex III: Group work presentation
GROUP 1: OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES LESSONS LEARNT ON SEARCH AND
RESCUE
INTRODUCTION
A disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society. Disasters involve
widespread to human, material, economic or environmental impacts, which, exceed the ability of the
affected community or society to cope using its own resources. The Tokwe Mukosi disaster started on
01 Feb 2014 when the community who were in the basin were surprised by rising water as a result of
the construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam. Villagers had to report to the police verbally, used cell
phone to alert the local government district administrators. Police had to be moved in to access the
situation and identify the most vulnerable and advising the residence to move to higher grounds.
ALERT MECHANISM
Verbal reports, meetings within the communities, information through local structures, police and army
foot patrols, cellphone communication to the district administrators offices. Print and electronic media
also played a pivotal role to inform the nation.
CHALLENGES
-Communication was a serious challenge- poor network, lack of airtime allowances no facilities for re-
charging the phones. Because of the nature of terrain in the Tokwe Mukosi basin even army and police
radios relay system had problems as well. Troops had to walk long.
IDENTIFICATION OF AREAS OF REFUGE
There are factors to consider when establising a camp hence the identification of areas like Gunikuni,
Rarangwe, Zunga, Zifunzi and Gororo these are:
- accessebility by road with use of heavy trucks
- water
- shelter
- sanitary facilities
this was done with at the back of our minds and most serious that it was a high groud and away from
danger.
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CHALLENGES
-Damaged roads.
-Water logged roads.
-Inadequate vehicles (tractors)
-Breakdown of vehicles.
MOBILISATION OF COMMUNITIES AND MOVEMENT TO SAFETY
As earlier on mentioned above during the identification of the vulnerable it was concurrent that victims
were advised to move to safe places. They used their scotch carts and tractors to uplift house hold
equipment while live stock was moved on foot, cattle, donkeys and goats. The marooned had to be
airlifted and some were ferried by boats to the shore. it must be noted that the ground was heavily
soaked hence pickup points refer to identified places that could be accessed by tractors and to holding
points where they would be carried to the final destination in this case Chingwisi.
MOVEMENT FROM PICK UP POINTS AND RECEPTION CHALLENGES
Movement challenges: (as mentioned above).
The same animals which were used as draught power where the same animals required to be moved to
new destination.
- outbreak of lumpy-skin disease.
- families taking too long to prepare.
- families resisting to move.
- elderly and disabled who could not carry for themselves (these were assisted by the soldiers and
police)
- air and boats could not carry most belongings e.g. grinding mills, barbed wire and asbestors
sheets.
- inadequate shelter and ablution facilities.
- food inconsistences supply of food.
- bogus beneficiaries.
- chronically ill (those on art)
- animals stayed too long resulting in over grazing and destruction of crops.
- loss of livestock on transit (14 cattle due vehicle breakdown)
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MANPOWER LEVEL, EQUIPMENT AND RELATED LOGISTICS
The security forces had enough manpower for the task at hand with requisite skills provided by army
and airforce and the Zimbabwe republic police.
challenges we had include
(a) inadquate fuel for helicopters. we had 30 000 litres of jet a1 which was positioned at Ngundu
and this only lasted 5 days. an aditional 30 000 litres was again provided for the task. (it was be
noted here that aircrafts and boats consume a lot of fuels
(b) few trucks to ferry families and their livestock.
(c) erratic supply of fuel.
(d) some vehicles were controlled from their headquarters and not by those on the ground.
(e) backup services were not available.
(f) lack of updated maps and latest technological equipment for easy location of points of needy.
OTHER PERTINENT ISSUES RELATED TO SEARCH AND RESCUE
Upkeep support.
Recommended solutions
- air time allowances to be provided to those on the ground.
- purchase long range communication equipment.
- employment of temporal boosters.
- need for equipment to open temporal roads and crossings.
- intensification of awareness campaigns to speed preparation of families.
- inclusion of expertise in search and rescue operations.
- sufficient right type of trucks to ferry livestock.
- thorough screening of disaster victims to avoid bogus victims.
- compensation of lost livestock during transit.
- local Civil Protection organization to have standby funds readily available for such disasters.
- it is strongly recommended that allowances be paid to staff in operations.
Group II: Camp Coordination and Camp Management
Siting , layout planning , security
Operational challenges
- Siting was ok because the ground was already cleared for crop production, the place was large
enough to accommodate all the families
- No coordination on camp planning therefore the prior planning of tents there was haphazard-
affected water and sanitation infrastructure planning, people enumeration etc.
- Inadequate tents for the families..did not meet minimum standards,
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- Inadequate security and lighting for people,
- Security of domestic animals was at stake,
- Forgot to site dumpsite and cemetry
Lessons learnt
1. There had to be a settlement pattern from the onset-have a proper settlement plan prior to
moving people in place.,
2. Need to know what people need to get tents and where they have to go with them.
3. Need for more organization to provide security and deployment of police in time,
4. The DA Mwenezi was overwhelmed by work,
Suggested Solutions
Once the disaster has been declared, there was should be a focal point to do a settlement plan
The was need to have some persons delegated to do certain tasks- camp planning, security, receiving
IDPs
Donations , warehousing, distribution of tents , food , clothing etc
• Best Practices
• There was a lot of support in term of donations-from private sector, donor community
and individuals,
• Clothing donors were too many to an extent that people will
• Lessons learnt
• 1. Different organizations gave different systems for donations worked
• 2. Need for reconciliation between dispatch and receiving of IDPs (system not watertight)
Operational challenges
• Poor security of donations, there were allegations of stealing of donated clothing and
food, by those who guarded them
• Poor warehousing and inadequate space resulted in loss of over 30t food
• Allocation was not systematic; people will queuing repeatedly for different donations
• There was donation before needs assessment-people were just given all that was
there,
• No camp registration system and database to assist allocation of donations, (WFP
would not bring food unless there was a reg. system in place)
• There was no proper handover and communication from dispatch to receiving districts-
resulted in bogus IDPs
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Suggested Solutions
• There was need to develop a robust reg system to allow for planning for food and NFI
allocations-what to get and in what quantities
• Involvement of local leadership in the allocation of donations,
• Ned to have identified a focal point person whose trained in humanitarian principles to
manage food distributions. The country needs food and nutrition guidelines in the context
of emergencies to guide food ration packages and avoid violation of the code on
marketing of breast milk substitutes
Provision of water and sanitation
Best practices
• Prompt action to identify water sources-water trucking initially by UNICEF and drilling
boreholes to supplement the trucking,
• Design and installation of a robust water supply system that managed to provide
adequate water to the camp,
• The donation of the water system by Oxfam GB to CPU in order to assist the CPU to better
prepare for future emergencies
Operational challenges
• 1. Inadequate sanitation-coverage of 1:20 latrine was not met,
• 2. Initially there was no potable water for the people,
• Poor maintenance of sanitation facilities,
• Sanitation facilities were not standardized in terms of design
Lessons learnt
1. Water trucking was the best
• Suggested Solutions
• 1. Involve affected people in sanitation and water supply
• There was need to work with SPHERE standards for sanitation facilities
• Development of a National Multisectoral Disaster and Risk Management Guideline and
handbook which adapts global minimum standards to the Zimbabwean context.
• Capitation on multi-sectoral guidelines
Provision of Health Services , promotion , psychosocial support
Operational challenges
• There was no ambulance or fuel for referrals to Chiredzi clinic.
• There was no support to the relief staff, Health workers were not given allowances
• High prevalence of STIs at the Camp related to low health promotion activities and lack of
recreational activities,
• Challenge of teenage pregnancies because of exposure to the crowded conditions and
lack of psychosocial support,
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• Political influence downplay interventions that were being provided,
• Some people came without their locals, therefore they lacked support
Lessons learnt
• There was need for permanent nursing staff at the camp clinic, not the rotations,
• The uptake of health and nutrition services was good
• There is need for early psychosocial support to the affected families as they came into the
camp,
• Giving incentives was bad because it created negative impact on other state actors who
did not prove some.
• There was need to engage all affected families to understand their role in the
emergencies rather than paying them
Suggested Solutions
• Need to have a pool of health personnel trained in disaster management in preparedness
for such emergencies,
• Dispatch mobile clinics to emergencies
• Engage volunteer during initial phases of the emergency.
• There is need to separate political and disaster issues
• Psychosocial support should have been started when the people were being moved in
camp
• There was need to engage local systems to manage psychosocial support
• Engage other non-state actors to provide psychosocial support
Environmental Management
Operational challenges
• Poor solid waste management, initially there was no dumpsite.
Lessons learnt
• The best practice was provision of poles for tent erection which prevented deforestation
• However, later the dumpy site was established and at household level people were
encouraged to Environment was well protected
• MOHCC provided pre-sensitisation on malaria prevention an provision of ITN (mosquito
nets)
Suggested Solutions
• Proper planning for waste management should be put in place before people are put in
camp
Livelihoods (livestock , informal trading )
Operational challenges
Overloading of trucks during transit resulting in lose of cattle and goats,
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Overgrazing of area due to high concentration of animals at grazing site,
Camp residents were not responding to dog and cattle vaccination,
There is no dip tank at the moment/permanent site,
Shortage of livestock personnel,
Lack of stock cards-there had to change the stock cards brought from the original districts.
There was no area initially designated for cattle pens,
People generally lost livelihoods-gardens, chicken rearing etc, what they used to do in their
previous areas
Lessons learnt
Some more enterprising people established tuck shops and some were selling vegetables and
airtime
There was a vibrant sewing clubs-sewing uniforms. This indicates that the camp management
allowed people to express their skills to earn a living
Suggested Solutions
• They need inputs for production and grain support for food,
• They need training to start establishing community feedlots, poultry, production, fruit tree
production, agronomy and paravets for animal health,
• Need to establish dip tanks
Manpower levels and skills
Operational challenges
• There were no skills in terms of disaster management and coordination,
Lessons learnt
We did not take time to define role and responsibilities to ensure the necessary skills and manpower
were available at the camp
Suggested Solutions
• Need for disaster management training DCPC and avail a contingent fund plan and fund
Coordination and Camp Management
• Best Practice
• The setting up of structures with regular weekly meetings coordination chaired by the DA
Mwenezi,
• There was also an NGO Forum that discussed operational
• Operational challenges
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• Initially we were reactive as opposed to being proactive-despite the fact that districts had
disaster preparedness plans in place, these were not implemented, however, structures
had to be put in place.
• Lessons learnt
• The Chingwizi Response was a learning curve for all-government and a non-state actors,
• Suggested Solutions
• Preparedness plan and disaster response plan
Group III: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards
to relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures
Valuation Process
• Inaccessibility of some of the homesteads
• Bad weather condition – delayed the process resulting in human fatigue, hence more
usage of resources
• Resistance by the affected community –delayed the valuation process
• Lack of thorough pre-awareness campaigns
• Absentee homestead heads
• Reconstruction of abandoned homesteads
• Attempted double dipping by showing already valuated homesteads
• Misconception of the program in anticipation on land issuance
• The valuation process should be done immediately after commencement of dam
construction
Compensation
• No budget was allocated for social costs – cost of the whole project should be captured
on the onset
• Inadequate funding for the compensation
• Timing of the compensation and relocation – funds were used for other activities
• Other homesteads head came and collect compensation funds and disappeared
• Societal security after payment – thieves, conmen, sex workers took advantage of the
situation
• Head count should be done as soon as dam plans are available
• Valuation should be done before commencement of dam construction
• The budget for compensation and other social costs should be considered at the same
time with the budget of the hardcore component of the dam
• Government could have built at least a three roomed house so that people will have
somewhere to put up (empowerment)
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Land Identification
• Unavailability of the land for the affected community
• Failure to take advantage of the land reform program
• The available land was under Development Trust of Zimbabwe and the present land user
frustrated the program despite the land being state land
• The Province had to seek authority from Central Government
• No budget for land identification.
Layout Planning
• No model for the project –available land was not adequate to accommodate affected
families and their livestock as the planning were done hurriedly
• The projected number of affected families anticipated for resettlement was far below
the planned figure (phase 1 was combined with phased 2)
• Top down approach to the planning and adoption of the model resulted in resistance
from the community (they were not consulted)
• Participatory planning with communities in coming out with models and layout plans
• Look and learn tours for communities to be put in place
• Planned anticipated nature of livelihood –this should be communicated to all
stakeholders so as to get their buy-in
Consultation on land use and anticipated Nature of Livelihood
• No consultation of the stakeholders
• No anticipated nature of livelihoods after permanent settlement
• Political influence also disturbed the professional way of carrying out the whole process
• Information/communication should be two way - consultation is very important.
• Technocrats should be allowed to work independently
• Total dam commandable area = 25 000ha
• Original irrigation hectarage committed to communal irrigation schemes (before land
reform) = 8 000 ha
• Benefiting districts are Chivi; Mwenezi and Chiredzi District
• More than 90% of the irrigated hectarage will involve pumping (Use generated electricity)
Resettlement Areas-Irrigation Development
• Phase 1: 1 650 ha to be developed at rate 0.5 ha per 1 ha settlement plot ($24,75 million)
• Phase 2: 4 900 ha to be developed in a cluster model for 3256 resettled families i.e each family
receiving i.5 ha ($73,5 million)
• Phase 3: 4 720 ha to be developed in a cluster model for 3 144 households to be moved from
the buffer zone ($70.8 million)
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Challenges to Irrigation Development
Chingwizi area was originally supposed to be served by the proposed Runde Tende Dam by gravity.
Relative heights between some irrigation blocks and the source of water (Runde & Tokwe Rivers) is very
high hence use of heavy duty pipes which are expensive, and also high electricity consumption at pump
station. The settlement area between road and railway line is too long (20 km), therefore long pipeline
of usually big irrigation pipes. The 20km settlement strip will be generally rising from the deserted
Chingwizi camp to the end of the resettlement strip hence need of boosting pumps or pumping to a very
high place so that it can flow under gravity.
Manpower levels and skills
• National, Provincial and District manpower was adequate though poorly funded
• Lack of training on disaster management
• Lack of coordination on information dissemination
• Centralization of the CPU budget
• Decentralization of the CPU funds and other rescue equipment
• There was high commitment from the team members
• Committed manpower should be rewarded
• Lessons
Regular training of teams members is needed to avoid uncoordinated approach in times of disaster
Co-ordination of Relocation Exercise
• Lack of resources
• Resistance from sectors Ministries to second vehicles and other resources to operational
teams
• Livestock transportation was done in absence of owner resulting in loss of livestock
• Well coordinated and dedicated team during the disaster management
• Relocation should be developmental (attractive) and not standstill
• A relocation should timely planned
• Lessons
Good leadership as shown by the PA enabled smooth coordination of the whole exercise
Lessons Learnt
• If valuation is done late there is tendency of excluding it from the project budget
• People are bound to demonstrate to express their resistance to being moved
• They think that once moved the Gvt will forget about them
• Timely release of funds needs to be done to avoid cost overrun
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• Dam planning should be done simultaneous with resettlement programmes and this aspect
should be given precedence over other land issues
• Land should be identified first so as to avoid holding camps and resettlement should precede
construction of the dam
• Timely release of planning budgets from government
Group IV: Identify any gaps and propose solutions with regards to the extent
to which the current regulatory processes and procedures related
to dams under construction integrate disaster risk mitigation and
preparedness (use the Tokwe-Mukosi Dam Project as a case in point
Gaps Suggested Solutions
• One who is responsible for resettlement of affected households when a dam is under construction is clear.
• Currently dam construction projects do not involve DCP until the disaster occurs.
• The social cost of dam construction not included on the whole project cost.
The Water Act to provide a specific ministry which ensures the resettlement of people before dam construction.
The DCP should work with affected communities before dams are constructed (non-structural mitigation measures )
The social cost of dam construction should be included on the whole project cost by the 0wner of the dam.
Limited power to enforce compliance with plans and design specifications and procedures of dam construction (e.g. Negomo Dam; EIA for dams approved before)
There is no specific time frame for relocation of communities at risk before a dam is constructed.
Currently the strategic (long term) plans seem not to be in tandem with short term plans (people allocated pieces of land in flood basin when the basin was meant for dam construction)
The Water Act should empower the responsible Ministry to enforce compliance with plans and design specifications and procedures of dam construction.
The Water Act should provide specific time frame for relocation of communities at risk before a dam is constructed
There is need for the strategic (long term) plans of the Government to be in tandem with short term plans of local authorities
The current act governing DRR (Civil Protection Act, 1989) emphasise a response mode.
No provision for consultations with the communities to be affected by dam construction.
Currently the same ministry is performing the roles of regulator, implementer and inspector in the case of national dams
The Civil Protection Act, should be replaced by a proactive one in line with HFA. The DRM Bill before Parliament needs to be approved so the country moves into proactive DRR
The Water Act should provide for consultations with the communities to be affected before dam construction as this which would reduce confrontations when people are asked to relocate
Need for separation of roles between regulators and contractors. Independent regulator and different contractor
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No disaster fund at provincial and district level (evidenced by drought and AIDS levies)
No much involvement of local authorities in DRM
No involvement traditional leadership in prevention and mitigation of disasters
Create a disaster fund from the national fiscus
Local authorities should embed DRM and set aside funds for the same.
Traditional leadership should be involved in prevention and mitigation of disasters
Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical, expertise and equipment,
financial) for mitigation, preparedness, and response to manage the flood risk within the context of
climate change
Strengths
• Existence of a variety of institutions (MSD, DCP, ZINWA, Air Force, EMA, Acts, research institutions)
• Expertise in institutions
• Disaster management programmes in tertiary institutions
• Building codes in both rural and urban areas
• Policy instruments such as ZimASSET
Weaknesses
• Inertia in legislation (e.g. DRM Bill since 2011)
• No enforcement of building codes especially in rural areas
• No funding for research in DRM discipline
• Working in silos between research institutions and policy makers
• No insurance policy against floods in flood-prone areas
• Financial constraints leading to delayed completion of dam projects
• Radar equipment for EWS with regard to precipitation
• Limited number of hydrological and weather stations (capturing of data in small specific areas)
• Root causes and dynamic pressures leading to floods (e.g. siltation)
• No flood-plain management policy.
Opportunities
• ICT to develop appropriate technology
• Research opportunities to solve current problems
• Strengthening of PPPs
• Application of research projects from University students
• Introduction of multi-currency systems
• Pulling resources together such as installation of radar systems by mobile phones providers, local
authorities , EMA, etc.)
Threats
• Skills flight in search of better jobs
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• Economic meltdown threatening the maintenance of equipment
• Unforeseen weather extremes (hazards)
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Annex IV: Action Plan , Way Forward and Recommendations
Action Plans:
Challenges Lessons Learned Proposed Solutions/Activities
Responsible Ministry
Partners Time frame
Communication was compromised by terrain and lack of airtime for field staff.
There is need for long range communication equipment to facilitate communication; Need for reserve funds for immediate use before normal budgetary cycle.
-Purchase long range radio (VHF), communication equipment including Satellite phones; Avail airtime .
ZNA, AFZ and Defence and ZRP DCP MLGPWNH (DCP)
Potraz, NGOs and UN agencies
Immediate to end of June 2015
Inadequate Jet A1 fuel
Need for reserve funds for immediate use before normal budgetary cycle
Lobbying MoF for adequate funding for emergency operations.
MLGPWNH (DCP), AFZ
Immediate and continuous
Inadequate rescue equipment and in supplies
Need for adequate safety equipment for water rescue.
Procure life-jackets jackets, raincoats and umbrellas and gumboots
ZRP sub-aqua DCP and UNDP
Immediate
Provision of shelter, food , water, sanitation and health services at transit points resulting in people being stranded and exposed to the weather elements as well as disruption of education at schools used as transit centres.
Need adequate temporary shelter, food, water, sanitation and health services during evacuation process.
Adequate arrangements for shelter food , water, sanitation and health services taking into account the complexity of the emergency.
DCP NGOs Immediate and continuous
Inadequate information to guide search and rescue operations with regards to location of victims and walking long distances for rescuers.
Need for GIS and other related IT.
Application of GIS, procurement mapping equipment and relevant training.
DCP , ZINWA, UN agencies, universities and partners
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Challenges and Recommendations
Challenge Recommendation
The social cost of dam construction not included on the whole project for dam construction
Social cost should an integral component of dam construction budget
There is no specific time frame for relocation of communities at risk before a dam is constructed
There is need for a composite policy framework to address the issues of development that displaces communities inclusive of time frames and minimum standards to cover such issues as resettlement patterns, provision and other amenities (Compensation, traditional rites, inclusion of host community in ongoing development programmes.
The current act governing DRR (Civil Protection Act, 1989) emphasis a response mode.
There is need for lobbying and advocacy for the promulgation of the DRM Bill that is before Parliament. The Civil Protection Act, should be replaced by a proactive one in line with HFA.
The DCP has inadequate funding for its activities resulting in inadequate funding of the provincial and district civil protection organization funding.
Lobbying and advocacy to increase funding for the Civil Protection Fund to enable the DCP to disburse to provinces and districts in advance as well as to support research initiatives. Local Authorities be encouraged to budget for disaster risk management.
No flood plain management framework.
There is need to develop a flood plain management framework.
Lack of information on extent of inundation in case of dam wall damage and failure.
There is need for GIS based mapping for downstream inundation.
Non activation of existing emergency preparedness plans.
There is need to review, update and conduct simulations for existing plans.
Food supplies of people in Chingwizi until the next harvest
DCP to follow up with Social Welfare to provide food assistance.
Increased exposure to disaster risk of rural settlements
Physical Planning and Rural District Councils to investigate introduction of simplified spatial planning and related simplified building bylaws to guide rural human settlements taking into account prevailing disaster risks and the anticipated negative impacts of climate change and variability.
Lack of data on intensity of rainfall due to climate change for inclusion in dam design and generally in flooding models
Climate Change Office and ZINWA to collaborate on research on intensity of rainfall due to climate change.
Urban flooding Urban Local Authorities to maintain/upgrade drainage systems and other related civil works in order to better cope with the impact of Climate Change.
Way Forward
Activity By whom By when
Compilation of workshop report Facilitator 28 November 2014
Presentation of report to the National Civil Protection Committee
DCP 4 December 2014
Submit the report to Cabinet Committee on EPR
PS MLGPWNH 11 December 2014
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Report on progress on plan of action and feedback on Cabinet EPDM
CPO In routine CPO meetings at district province and national
Integrate action plan and recommendations into existing sector strategic plans and work plans
CPO Immediate and ongoing
Continuous monitoring of situation at Chingwizi resettlement and follow up on outstanding issues like traditional rites, compensation and insurance payment of lost livestock
Provincial and District Civil Protection Organizations
Ongoing
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Annex V: List of Participants
TOKWE MUKORSI LESSONS LEARNT WORKSHOP REGISTER 18 -21 NOV 2014
FULL NAME ORGANISATION DESIGNATION SEX CONTACT
Begede Mathias Redcross Field Officer M 773217888
Betera Lameck DCP PAO M 773420090
Bote R Local Gvt Snr Assistant Ex F 773305446
Charumbira V Policy and Research PRO F 772852038
Chauke Elisa Loca Gvt- Mwnezi PAO F 773569238
Chibwe- Badza Olivia DCP PAO F 772323457
Chihombori John Agritex Land use specialist M 773552068
Chikara C ZINWA Asst Resident Eng M
Chikwanda William MOEWC Engineer M 773424381
Chikwata Innocent Airforce of Zim Medical Directorate M 712702000
Chimboza Denford FAO Economist M 773260086
Chimanya Kuda UNICEF Nutritionist Specialist F 775473172
Chimbishi F Lands Chief Lands Officer M 772302134
Chipika G Local Gvt PAO M 773904409
Chishaka S Christian Care Prog Mgr M 772781727
Chishangu M Local Gvt Valuations Officer M 772323457
Chitesa A Agritex Agric Specialist F 779976069
Chiware Christina Social Welfare Programme Officer F 773004019
Dingana M ZINWA Surveyor M 772606668
Dzvene Wellington CRS Programme Mgr M 776117397
Dlamini Latiso Local Gvt PA F 712212824
Gwata A AFZ DOPS M 712236692
Goza William Irrigation Dpt Prov. Irrig Engineer M 714900706
Gutukunuhwa M. H DDF Prov Coordinator M 773897352
Gwitima Robert MOCHCC Prov Env Health Officer M 772937147
Hadzirambwi Bernard Local Gvt D.A M 775686465
Hondongwa Local Gvt Admin Officer M 775934871
Juma Jonathan ZINWA Operations Manager M 773904294
Kadzatsa Macdonald DCP Facilitator M 772765875
Khumalo Melissa DCP Attachee F 773735104
Kwenda M Rockshade Driver M 775014150
Made Ambrose Programme Specialist UNDP M 04 338836-41
Magomana Tariro Vet Animal Health insp M 772595072
Maheya Sarious Local Gvt Headman M
Mangwengwe N Chingwizi Beneficiary F 77917004
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Manyumbu A IOM Governance M 772952806
Marekwa Nicholas ZRP Sub Aqua BYO Assistant Inspector M 772917326
Mariga M Local Gvt Provincial Admin M 773265055
Maronge Abiot Local gvt Director RLA M 772785377
Mashambe P SMECD Prinicipal Officer M 776903431
Masvosva Charles ZNA Major Snr M 773365910
Maurukira T ZINWA Manager M 779407109
Mavhura Emmanuel Bindura University Lecturer DRR Research M 773487211
Mazai M Local gvt A/PA M 773519417
Mazvidza James Local gvt D.A M 775143175
Mbetsa Fungai Loca Gvt PA M 772730655
Mgcini Ncube Local Gvt Driver M 773732518
Mhara L SAVE THE CHILDREN Field Coordinator M 772904852
Moyo Elisha N Climate Change Mgmt Principal C.C Research M 775219592
Moyo James D ZDF Hq S01 POL M 712236587
Mtetwa R ZINWA Engineer M 774710835
Mubau P MOPSE Deputy Director M 772259368
Muchechetere Verenica Agritex DAEO F 775091599
Mucheni C DPP - Local Gvt Town Planner F 773702105
Muchongwe Stanford Ministry of Finance Snr Accountant M 772837384
Mudereri Johnson Public Works Provincial Director M 771653214
Mujaji R PLAN/UNICEF Field Coordinator F 772778259
Mukunguta Patrick Met office Meteorologist M 772429036
Munsaka E DR NUST Researcher M 778626447
Munyari Hope Redcross Dis Mgmt Officer M 773813585
Musakanda Martin Local Gvt HNS officer M 773004343
Mutazu T MEWC Director M 712235636
Musarurwa J OXFAM EFSV- Coordinator M 782794631
Muzenda Vincent Plan Zimbabwe Child Rights Coordinator F 775684035
Ncube Charles OXFAM WASH Coordinator M 773100457
Ndlovu Somandla EMA A/Prov. Env Mgr M 39262776
Nyika Phoebe DPP - Local Gvt PPO F 7751343033
Nyoni Godfrey DCP P.A.O M 772424545
Pawadyira Madzudzo DCP Director M 712804880
Rubaya Munyaradzi Min of SMEs Provincial Head M 775162571
Sachirarwe Pamella DCP Ex Assistant F 772773466
Shumba C Local Gvt PA M 772964204
Sibanda B Social Welfare Social Service Officer M 775472796
Sibanda Meliqiniso DCP PAO F 773722925
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Sithole Silas Education E.O Buildings M 774049119
Siyafa I IRC EH Coordinator M 773247097
Svosvai C Parks and WildLife Area Manager M 772554731
Tizora R UNICEF WASH Officer Intern F 773237958
Tumba Temba Vet Animal Health insp M 773158933
Uriga Zvokuona DCP Accountant M 777052885
Vhiriri Nyashadzashe ZINWA Mgr- Hydrology M 773578689
Vina Alice Local Gvt Accountant F 775176864
Zindi B UNICEF WASH Officer M 772383828
Zizhou G Local gvt A/PA F 772784862
Gutsi J DCP Driver M 773723243
Manika T Local Gvt I.T M 772923996
Eng. G.S Mlilo Local Gvt Secretary M
Tenga D Local Gvt Driver M
Ndlovu Sibusisiwe DCP Deputy Director F
Whande Abel CARE Head sub office M 772634768
Thomas Paul UN-OCHA HO M 772125303
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