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Public International Public International Aviation LawAviation Law
The Chicago ConventionThe Chicago Convention
Bilateral Air Transport AgreementBilateral Air Transport Agreement
Bermuda I, Bermuda IIBermuda I, Bermuda II
The Freedoms of the AirThe Freedoms of the Air
Open Skies AgreementOpen Skies Agreement
The Chicago ConventionThe Chicago Convention
THE CHICAGO CONVENTIONTHE CHICAGO CONVENTION
It is the foundation for our current system of international
transportation by air.
The Chicago Convention states that each “state has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory”.
Care was taken during the drafting of the Chicago Convention
to specifically exclude all military, police, customs, and other
state operated aircraft from the operation of the convention.
Convention on International Civil Aviation Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)(Chicago Convention)
• The Convention on International Civil Aviation, also
known as the Chicago Convention, established the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a
specialized agency of the United Nations charged with
coordinating and regulating international air travel. The
Convention establishes rules of airspace, aircraft registration
and safety, and details the rights of the signatories in relation
to air travel. The Convention also exempts air fuels from tax.
The document was signed on December 7, 1944 in Chicago, Illinois,
by 52 signatory states. It received the requisite 26th ratification on
March 5, 1947 and went into effect on April 4, 1947, the same date
that ICAO came into being.
In October of the same year, ICAO became a specialized agency of
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
The Convention has since been revised eight times (in 1959, 1963,
1969, 1975, 1980, 1997, 2000 and 2006). Links to all versions of the
document can be found in the external links section.
The original signed document resides in the
National Archives of the United States.
Annexes
The Convention is supported by eighteen annexes containing
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The Annexes
are amended regularly by ICAO and are as follows:
Annex 1 - Personnel Licensing
Annex 2 - Rules of the Air
Annex 3 - Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation
Vol. I - Core SARPs
Vol. II - Appendices and Attachments
Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts
Annex 5 - Units of Measurement to be used in Air and Ground
Operations
Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft
Part I - International Commercial Air Transport – Aero-
planes
Part II - International General Aviation – Aero-planes
Part III - International Operations - Helicopters
Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9 - Facilitation
Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications
Vol. I - Radio Navigation Aids
Vol. II - Communication Procedures including those with PANS
status
Vol. III - Communication Systems
Part I - Digital Data Communication Systems
Part II - Voice Communication Systems
Vol. IV - Surveillance Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems
Vol. V - Aeronautical Radio Frequency Spectrum Utilization
Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services - Air Traffic Control Service,
Flight Information Service and Alerting Service
Annex 12 - Search and Rescue
Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 14 - Aerodromes
Vol. I - Aerodrome Design and Operations
Vol. II - Heliports
Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16 - Environmental Protection
Vol. I - Aircraft Noise
Vol. II - Aircraft Engine Emissions
Annex 17 - Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference
Annex 18 - The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
Key provisions for civil aircraft permit aircraft that
are not engaged in scheduled air service to:-
Make flights into or in transit nonstop across its
territory;
Make stops for non-traffic purposes (fuel and
maintenance) without the necessity of obtaining
prior permission.
Cont’dCont’d
However, the convention clearly states that
aircraft operating in scheduled international air
service are prohibited from operating “over or
into the territory of a contracting State, except
with the special permission or other
authorization of that State.”
Other noteworthy provisions of the Chicago Convention
include:-
• The right of each state to establish restricted and
prohibited areas as long as the restrictions and
prohibitions apply equally to domestic and international
aircraft.
• Establishment of responsibility for each contracting state
to maintain radio and air navigation services and
facilities.
• The adoption of a standard system of communication
procedures.
Some commentators have noted that the Chicago Convention did
establish the two fundamental freedoms of over-flight and stops for
fuel and maintenance, it failed to establish three additional
freedoms sought in an amendment or annex to the Chicago
Convention. The three freedoms sought in the unsuccessful annex
were:
1) The right of a country’s airlines to freely transport passengers
and/or cargo from its home nation to a second nation without
special authorization
2) The right of a country’s airlines to freely transport cargo and
passengers from a second nation back to its home nation
3) The right of a country’s airlines to freely transport passengers and
cargo between a second and third nation
.
Cont’dCont’d• In the end, the Chicago convention left these
issues up to the individual nations involved to negotiate directly. If all these freedoms were codified in the Chicago Convention, the result would have been a sort of “open skies” agreement among the more developed nations of the world
Open SkiesOpen Skies Although the multilateral Chicago Convention failed to create an
open skies environment for international air transportation, it did
spawn several bilateral agreements that have effectively created a
more open skies type of approach over time. The first of these
bilateral agreements was known as the Bermuda I agreement,
entered into in 1946 by the United States and Great Britain.
It permitted the airlines of the 2 countries to operate to and from
each country- but only to designated “gateway” airports. Each airline
would be allowed as many flights as it desired.
Similar agreements were also entered into by various nations
throughout the world.
Cont’dCont’d
• Bermuda I agreement was superseded in 1967 by Bermuda II.
• The first “open skies” initiative that would allow for a more liberal
framework for air route selection, capacity determinations, fare
setting, and frequency of flights was entered into in October 1992
between the United States and the Netherlands. Subsequently, the
USA entered into open skies agreements with 13 EU nations and
later on with Canada, South America, Peru, Malaysia, Taiwan, New
Zealand, and Singapore, among others.
Bilateral Air Transport Agreement Bilateral Air Transport Agreement
• A bilateral Air Transport Agreement (also
sometimes called a bilateral Air Service
Agreement) is an agreement which two nations
sign to allow civil aviation between their territories.
• In 1913, in what was probably the earliest such
agreement, a bilateral Exchange of Notes was
signed between Germany and France to provide
for airship services.
• One of the first post-Second World War ATAs was the
Bermuda Agreement, which was signed in 1946 by the
United Kingdom and the United States. Features of
this agreement became models for the thousands of
such agreements that were to follow.
• A current model for ATAs is the US-introduced
Open skies treaty.
• In principle all ATAs should be registered by the
International Civil Aviation Organization in DAGMAR.
Bermuda I AgreementBermuda I Agreement
• The Bermuda Agreement, reached in 1946
by American and British negotiators in
Bermuda, was an early
Bilateral Air Transport Agreement regulating
civil air transport. It established a precedent
for the signing of approximately 3,000 other
such agreements between countries.
• The Agreement was expanded in 1977.
Bermuda I: Agreement between the government of the
United Kingdom and the government of the United
States relating to Air Services between their respective
Territories, Bermuda, 11 February 1946
Bermuda II : Agreement between the government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the government of the United States
concerning Air Services, Bermuda, 23 July 1977.
Bermuda II AgreementBermuda II Agreement Bermuda II was a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement between
the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States
signed on July 23, 1977 as a renegotiation of the original 1946
Bermuda Agreement.
A new "open skies" agreement was signed by the United
States and the European Union (of which the United Kingdom
is part) on 30 April 2007, and came into effect on 30 March
2008, thus replacing Bermuda II.[1]
• The original 1946 Bermuda agreement took its name from
the island where UK and US transport officials met to
negotiate a new, inter-governmental air services agreement
between Britain and the United States. That agreement,
which was highly restrictive at the insistence of the British
negotiators who feared that "giving in" to US demands for a
"free-for-all" would lead to the then financially and
operationally superior US airlines' total domination of the
global air transport industry, was the world's first bilateral air
services agreement. It became a blueprint for all subsequent
air services agreements.
• Bermuda II has been revised several times since its signing, most recently in 1995. Although Bermuda II was much less restrictive than the original Bermuda agreement it replaced, it is widely regarded as a highly restrictive agreement that contrasts with the principle of "open skies" against the background of continuing liberalization of the legal framework governing the air transport industry in various parts of the world.
Description of the AgreementDescription of the Agreement• Broadly speaking, only a combined four airlines from the UK and
US are allowed to operate flights between London Heathrow and
the US. The two British carriers are currently British Airways and
Virgin Atlantic. The American carriers are American Airlines and
United Airlines. The US has also approved Continental to fly to
London Heathrow but the British do not recognize this route
authority and, consequently, this service is not in operation.
However, the British have not obstructed Continental's code-share
agreement with Virgin Atlantic, which places Continental flight
numbers in addition to its own on some Heathrow flights.
Cont’dCont’d• Air India, El Al, Iran Air and Kuwait Airways were
permitted to continue exercising their so-called "fifth freedom" traffic rights from Heathrow to JFK, which they had already enjoyed under the original Bermuda agreement. (Both El Al and Iran Air no longer exercise these rights. The former has decided that it makes better economic sense for it to fly non-stop between Tel Aviv and New York. The latter's US traffic rights were withdrawn in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.) Similarly, Air New Zealand was allowed to continue using its fifth freedom rights between London and Los Angeles.
• Bermuda II has continued and expanded the principle of "dual designation",
i.e. the right to designate two UK airlines as well as two US carriers as "flag
carriers" on the same routes, which already existed on the London-New
York and London-Los Angeles routes under the original Bermuda treaty.
• The extensive fifth freedom rights US carriers used to enjoy from the UK to
other European countries were restricted to a few routes from London
Heathrow to what used to be West Germany, including West Berlin, in the
days prior to German reunification. In the early '90s, United Airlines used to
fly between Heathrow, Berlin, Hamburg and Munich (United had acquired
these traffic rights along with Pan Am's transatlantic traffic rights to/from
Heathrow for US$1bn in 1990). A few years earlier, TWA flew between
London and Brussels but, unlike United, did not have rights to carry local
traffic between the two cities.
American and British regulatory authorities must approve every airline's
capacity and pricing ahead of each operating season.
Each country can refuse traffic rights to a carrier it is not satisfied with,
particularly with regard to ownership and/or control.
Only a specified number of US "gateway cities" can be served by both UK
and US carriers from London Heathrow as well as London Gatwick.
Only the following US gateway cities may be served non-stop from
Heathrow: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago O'Hare, Denver, Detroit,
Los Angeles, Miami, New York-JFK, Newark, Philadelphia, Phoenix,
San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington-Dulles.
All non-stop flights between London and Atlanta, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Pittsburgh, Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Las Vegas,
Orlando, Tampa, Raleigh/Durham, St. Louis, and Charlotte must use
Gatwick as their UK departure/entry point rather than Heathrow.
• In a 1995 annex to Bermuda II capacity, fare and route restrictions governing all
scheduled air services serving airports other than London Heathrow or London Gatwick
were lifted. (This partial liberalization came about as a UK concession to the US to help
British Airways gain approval for its code-share alliance with US Air. As a result, access
restrictions that originally covered all London airports were lifted at Luton and Stansted.
This, in turn, has enabled "new generation", all-business class carriers such as Eos,
Maxjet and Silverjet to enter the lucrative London-New York business travel market by
choosing Stansted and Luton rather than Heathrow or Gatwick as their UK
departure/arrival airports).
• Continental Airlines has also taken advantage of this liberalization by starting service to a
number of important regional UK airports, including Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester,
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Belfast International Airport. Continental also introduced direct
flights from Stansted to Newark in 2001, but these were withdrawn in the industry
downturn after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Historical backgroundHistorical background• In July 1976, Edmund Dell, the then new UK Secretary of State for Trade, renounced the
original Bermuda air services agreement of 1946 and initiated bilateral negotiations with
his US counterparts on a new air services agreement, which resulted in the Bermuda II
treaty of 1977.
• The reason for this was that there was no provision in the original 1946 Bermuda
agreement that would have allowed British Caledonian (B. Cal), then the UK's foremost
wholly privately owned, independent international scheduled airline, to use the licences the
CAA had awarded it in 1972 to begin daily scheduled services from its London Gatwick
base to Houston and Atlanta. (These cities were not nominated as "gateway cities" in the
original Bermuda agreement.) In addition, there was no provision in the original Bermuda
agreement that would have allowed Laker Airways to use the licence the UK's Air
Transport Licensing Board (ATLB), the CAA's predecessor, had awarded it the same year
to commence a daily "Skytrain" operation between London Stansted and New York JFK.
• Under the new agreement, B. Cal had its licenses to
commence scheduled services from its Gatwick base to both
Houston and Atlanta confirmed and was designated as the
UK's exclusive flag carrier on both routes. It also obtained a
license and sole UK flag carrier status to commence
scheduled services from Gatwick to Dallas/Fort Worth. In
addition, B. Cal obtained a license and sole UK flag carrier
status to commence scheduled all cargo flights between
Gatwick and Houston - including an optional stop-over at
Manchester or Prestwick in either direction.
• The UK Government chose to designate Laker Airways rather
than B. Cal as the second UK flag carrier to New York to enable
that airline to inaugurate its long-planned "Skytrain" operation
on that route.
• Moreover, both sides agreed to continue dual designation, i.e.
designating two UK flag carriers as well as two US flag carriers,
on the London-New York and London-Los Angeles routes. The
principle of dual designation was extended to another two high-
volume routes. The UK side chose to designate a second
carrier on London-Miami, while the US side chose London-
Boston for the same purpose.
Cont’dCont’d
• This meant that a second British airline was permitted to commence
scheduled services on the former route while another American
carrier could do the same on the latter route. The UK Government
chose to designate Laker Airways as the second UK flag carrier on
the L.A. and Miami routes while the US Government decided to
designate Northwest as the second US flag carrier on London-
Boston. (Pan Am and TWA continued in their role as the two
designated US flag carriers between London and New York as well
as London and L.A. respectively.)
• During the Bermuda II negotiations the UK side succeeded in
having a clause stating that Gatwick - rather than Heathrow -
was to be nominated as the designated US flag carrier's
London gateway airport whenever B. Cal was going to be the
sole designated UK flag carrier on the same route inserted
into the new air services agreement. This clause was meant
to support the growth of B. Cal's scheduled operation at
Gatwick as well as to redress the competitive imbalance
between it and its much bigger, more powerful rivals.
• The UK side furthermore succeeded in negotiating a three-
year "exclusivity" period for the incumbent operator on any
new route with their US counterparts.
For Gatwick-based B. Cal this meant that it did not have to face any competitor that was
using Heathrow, a more accessible airport with a bigger catchment area and a far greater
number of passengers connecting between flights, on any of the new routes it was
planning to launch to the US. It also meant that it had any new route to the US completely
to itself for the first three years of operation, which most airline industry analysts reckon is
sufficiently long for a brand-new scheduled air service to become profitable.
At British insistence Bermuda II furthermore contained clauses that made it illegal for any
airline operating scheduled flights between the UK and the US to resort to
predatory pricing or capacity dumping. Air fares were only approved if they reflected the
actual cost of providing these services. Similarly, capacity increases were sanctioned on
a reciprocal basis only. The reason for insisting on the inclusion of these provisions in the
Bermuda II agreement was to prevent the much bigger, better financed and commercially
far more aggressive US carriers from undercutting B. Cal with "loss-leading" fares cross-
subsidised with profits those carriers' vast domestic networks generated as well as to stop
them from "marginalizing" the UK carrier by adding capacity far in excess of what the
market could sustain.
In 1981, in an annex to Bermuda II, both sides agreed to
automatically nominate Gatwick as the gateway airport for
London for any London-US route that did not already exist
under the original 1946 Bermuda agreement.
As all available routes between London Heathrow/Gatwick
and the US are currently taken, any carrier wishing to start
a new route to a US gateway city currently not served
from either of London's two main airports must drop
another route. Further, both nations must agree to the
change. This rule has prevented non-stop flights between
London and Honolulu, Portland (OR), Salt Lake City, etc.
• Bermuda II's access restrictions to Heathrow are still in force almost 30
years after the agreement took effect. BA's access rights to Heathrow
under Bermuda II derive from the fact that it is BOAC's legal heir on all
routes that airline used to operate between Heathrow and various points in
the US under the original Bermuda agreement. American's and United's
access rights to Heathrow under Bermuda II derive from the fact that they
are TWA's and Pan Am's respective legal heirs on all routes these airlines
used to operate between various points in the US and Heathrow under the
original Bermuda agreement. However, Bermuda II contained terms that
US negotiators overlooked. The agreement specifically mentioned Pan Am
and TWA. When Pan Am sold Heathrow rights to United Airlines, British
negotiators initially stated that they would not allow United to receive the
transferred route authority citing the treaty's specific designation of Pan
Am. They furthermore stated that United was not a successor airline
because it was not assuming ownership of Pan Am.
Con’tdCon’td• This may have been a negotiating ploy as the British later did allow transfer of route
authority to United. Virgin Atlantic's access rights to Heathrow under Bermuda II derive from
the fact that the UK was not using its entitlement to nominate a second carrier to match the
two US carriers' presence at London's premier airport. The UK Government therefore took
advantage of the abolition of the London Air Traffic Distribution Rules, which had confined
Virgin's London operations to Gatwick, as well as of the US Government's intention to have
American and United replace TWA and Pan Am as the designated US flag carriers at
Heathrow to help Virgin establish a presence at that airport as well. These access
restrictions are also the reason BA (as B. Cal's legal heir between London and Houston,
London and Dallas as well as London and Atlanta) and American (as Braniff's legal heir
between Dallas and London) are obliged to continue using Gatwick as their UK gateway for
all non-stop scheduled operations between London and Houston, London and Dallas as
well as London and Atlanta as long as Bermuda II remains
Future
• Liberalisation of the Bermuda II agreement has been the declared intention of both
countries since 1995. However, bilateral negotiations between the UK and the US were
unsuccessful.
• Meanwhile, matters have been complicated by the European Court of Justice's judgement
to declare all bilateral agreements between individual EU member states and the US
illegal. Such agreements are deemed to violate the EU's Common Aviation Market.
• The main sticking point that has until now prevented the conclusion of a new, transatlantic
"Common Aviation Area" agreement between the EU and the US is that the UK and most
other European countries view the US version of "open skies" as too restrictive. The US
"open skies" template denies foreign airlines "cabotage" rights, i.e. the right to operate
wholly within the US domestic market without entering into a code-share agreement with
a US carrier. It also denies foreign airlines the right to acquire stakes in their US
counterparts with the intention of exercising boardroom control.
Another bone of contention preventing the conclusion of a "Common Aviation Area" agreement between
the EU and the US was the US government's continuing insistence on its so-called "Fly America" policy
for all employees and contractors of the Federal Government. This policy compels US government
employees/contractors to make all their work-related, overseas air travel arrangements with US-based
airlines only. (This also includes a requirement for Federal employees to use international services
operated by foreign airlines only if they are code-shared with a US carrier, in which case these services
must be booked under the US carrier's flight number.)
On (March 2, 2007) a draft agreement[2] was reached by negotiators from the European Commission
and the US that will in effect to drop Bermuda II restrictions preventing US flag carriers, other than
American and United, from flying to Heathrow. [1] This new Air Transport Agreement between the EU and
the US was approved unanimously by the EU Transport Council on 22 March 2007[3] and will replace
Bermuda II with effect from 30 March 2008. This also effectively paves the way for either country to allow
foreign airlines to enter the market. On 3 October 2007, Britain concluded its first fully liberal
Open Skies Agreement with Singapore, allowing Singapore Airlines to fly completely unrestricted from
any point in the United Kingdom, including Heathrow, to any other destination, including the United
States and domestic destinations, effective 30 March 2008[2].
Beyond rightsBeyond rights Some of the newer bilateral open skies
agreements have even opened up what are
referred to as beyond rights.
These beyond rights permit air carriers to fly
cargo to a partner country and then fly directly
from the partner country to a third nation with no
requirement that the flights first return to the
original country.
Freedoms of the airFreedoms of the air The Freedoms of the air are a set of commercial aviation rights
granting a country's airline(s) the privilege to enter and land in another
country's airspace.
Formulated as a result of disagreements over the extent of aviation
liberalization in the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944,
(known as the Chicago Convention) the United States had called for a
standardized set of separate air rights which may be negotiated
between states but most of the other countries involved were
concerned that the size of the US airlines would dominate all world air
travel if there were not strict rules.
• The convention was successful in drawing up a multilateral
agreement in which the first two freedoms, known as the
International Air Services Transit Agreement, or "Two Freedoms
agreement" were open to all signatories. As of the summer of
2007, the treaty is accepted by 129 countries.
• While it was agreed that the third to fifth freedoms shall be
negotiated between states, the International Air Transport
Agreement (or the "Five Freedoms agreement") was also
opened for signatures, encompassing the first five freedoms.
• Several other "freedoms" have since been added,
although most are not officially recognized under
international bilateral treaties they have been
agreed by a number of countries e.g Aer Lingus
had fifth freedom rights through Manchester to
various European destinations prior to EU
liberalization and Pan Am had rights through
London for many years.
First freedomFirst freedom• IASTA participants (and some of their colonies)
• It was also known as technical freedom. The right to overfly a
country without landing. It grants the privilege to fly over the
territory of a treaty country without landing. Member states of
the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA) are
granting this freedom (as well as the Second Freedom) to
other member states,[2] subject to the transiting aircraft using
designated air routes.[3] As of the summer of 2007, 129
countries were parties to this treaty, including such large ones
as the United States of America, India, and Australia.
• However, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and China never joined, and Canada left the treaty in 1988.[4] These large and strategically located non-IASTA-member states prefer to maintain tighter control over foreign airlines' over flight of their airspace, and negotiate transit agreements with other countries on a case-by-case basis.[5]
• Since the end of the Cold War, first freedom rights are almost completely universal, although most countries require prior notification before an over flight, and charge substantial fees for the privilege.
• IASTA allows each member country to charge foreign airlines "reasonable" fees for using
its airports (which is applicable, presumably, only to the Second Freedom) and "facilities"; [6]
according to IASTA, such fees should not be higher than those charged to domestic airlines
engaged in similar international services. [6] Such fees indeed are commonly charged merely
for the privilege of the over-flight of a country's national territory, when no airport usage is
involved,[7] For example, the Federal Aviation Administration of the USA, an IASTA
signatory, currently (2009) charges the so-called en-route fees, of US$33.72 per 100
nautical miles, of great circle distance from point of entry of an aircraft into the U.S.-
controlled airspace to the point of its exit from this airspace. [8] In addition, a lower fee (a so-
called oceanic fee) of $15.94 per 100 nautical miles is charged for flying over the
international waters where air traffic is controlled by the US, which includes sections of
Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans.[8] Countries that are not signatories of the IASTA
charge over-flight fees as well; among them, Russia is known for charging high fees,
especially on the Trans-Arctic routes between North America and Asia, which cross Siberia.[7]
Second freedomSecond freedom• It was also a technical freedom. The right to stop in a country for refueling or
maintenance on the way to another, without transferring passengers or cargo.
• The most famous example of the second freedom is Shannon Airport, which was used as
a stopping point for most North Atlantic flights until the 1960s. Anchorage was similarly
used for flights between Western Europe and East Asia, bypassing Soviet airspace, until
the 1980s. Anchorage is still used by some Chinese and Taiwanese airlines for flights to
the U.S. and Toronto from China and Taiwan. Also, flights between Europe and South
Africa often stopped at Ilha do Sal (Sal Island), off the coast of Senegal, due to many
African nations refusing to allow South African flights to overfly their territory during the
Apartheid regime. Gander, Newfoundland was also a frequent stopping point for airlines
from the U.S.S.R. and East Germany on the way to the Caribbean, Central America,
Mexico and South America.
• Because of longer range of modern airliners, second-freedom rights are comparatively
rarely exercised by passenger carriers today, but they are widely used by air cargo
carriers, and are more or less universal between countries. [7]
Third freedom
• It was the First Commercial Freedom. The right to carry passengers or cargo from one's
own country to another.
Fourth freedom
• The right to carry passengers or cargo from another country to one's own.
• Third and fourth freedom rights are almost always granted simultaneously in bilateral
agreements between countries.
Fifth freedom
• It is also called a connecting flight. The right to carry passengers from one's own country
to a second country, and from that country to a third country. An example of this could be
Emirates Airlines flights originating in Dubai, then going on to Bangkok, and then from
Bangkok to Sydney, where tickets can be sold on any or all sectors.
• Two sub-categories exist. Beyond Fifth Freedom allows the right to carry passengers from
the second country to the third country. Intermediate Fifth Freedom allows the right to
carry passengers from the third to the second country.
Sixth freedom
• The right to carry passengers or cargo from a second country to a third country by stopping in one's own
country.
• Cathay Pacific Airways, Thai Airways, Malaysia Airlines ,Singapore Airlines and other airlines in Asia use
sixth-freedom rights extensively to fly passengers between Europe and Australasia. Likewise,
American Airlines connects passengers from Europe and Asia to other countries in the Americas via U.S.
ports, and British Airways commonly tickets passengers from America to Asia via London. Icelandair sells
tickets between Europe and North America via Iceland, Finnair sells tickets from North America to Asia via
Helsinki.
Seventh freedom
• The right to carry passengers or cargo between two foreign countries without continuing service to one's
own country.
• The seventh freedom is rare because it is usually not in the commercial interest of airlines, except in Europe
where an EU open sky has seen many carriers, particularly low cost carriers, operate flights between two
points, with neither of them being in their home country. On 2 October 2007, the United Kingdom and
Singapore initialed an agreement that will allow unlimited seventh freedom rights from 30 March 2008
(along with a full exchange of other freedoms of the air).
Eighth freedom (true Cabotage)Eighth freedom (true Cabotage)• The right to carry passengers or cargo between two or more points in one foreign country. The eighth
freedom is also known as Cabotage, and is extremely rare outside of Europe. The main real life example
of eighth-freedom rights is the European Union, which has granted such rights between all of its member
states. Other examples of an exchange of this right include the Single Aviation Market (SAM) established
between Australia and New Zealand in 1996 and the 2001 Protocol to the Multilateral Agreement on the
Liberalization of International Air Transportation (MALIAT) between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and
Singapore. Otherwise, such rights have usually only been granted in isolated instances where the
domestic air network is very underdeveloped. A notable instance was Pan Am's authority to fly between
Frankfurt and West Berlin from the 1950s to 1980s. In 2005, the United Kingdom and New Zealand
concluded an agreement granting unlimited Cabotage rights.[1] Given the distance between the two
countries, the agreement can be seen as a reflecting political principle rather than an expectation that
these rights will be taken up in the near future. New Zealand had previously exchanged eighth-freedom
rights with Ireland in 1999.
• In the 1950s through the early 1970s, B.O.A.C. flights from London to New
York to Los Angeles to Honolulu permitted London origination passengers
to make stopovers inside the U.S. In the 1980s and 1990s, El Al Israeli
airlines had similar rights for passengers to/from Tel Aviv to Los Angeles,
which stopped in New York. JAT Yugoslav Airlines had similar rights in the
1980s from Zagreb to Chicago to Los Angeles.
• Currently, Eva Air of Taiwan flies from Taipei to Seattle to Newark, with the
right for Taipei/Newark passengers to make a stopover in Seattle, if
continuing later on to Newark, and vice versa. Likewise, Qantas Airways of
Australia flies from Sydney to Los Angeles with continuing service to New
York-JFK. Qantas is not permitted to sell standalone tickets on the Los
Angeles-New York part of this trip, but it does sell tickets that start in New
York and connect in Los Angeles to other Qantas flights on to Brisbane or
Melbourne.
Ninth freedom (stand alone Ninth freedom (stand alone Cabotage)Cabotage)
• The right to carry passengers or cargo within a foreign
country without continuing service to or from one's own
country.
• Sometimes also known as stand alone Cabotage. It
differs from the aviation definition of true Cabotage, in that
it does not directly relate to one's own country.
• The EU agreements mentioned above also fall under this
category.
Assignment to be submitted by Assignment to be submitted by 44thth April 2009. April 2009.
• Discuss the Chicago Convention of 1944 under the
following subtopics. (10marks)
i. The main statement and the key provisions
ii. Freedoms sought in an unsuccessful annex
• Explain “Open skies” and “beyond rights”. (5marks)
• True/False: A presidential jet is included in the
operation of the Chicago Convention. (1mark)
• Summarize the 9 freedoms of the air (18 marks)
Take Home MessageTake Home Message
‘Anyone who stops learning is old, whether
at 20 or 80. Anyone who keeps learning
stays young.’
Henry Ford.
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