Public International Public International Aviation LawAviation Law

The Chicago ConventionThe Chicago Convention

Bilateral Air Transport AgreementBilateral Air Transport Agreement

Bermuda I, Bermuda IIBermuda I, Bermuda II

The Freedoms of the AirThe Freedoms of the Air

Open Skies AgreementOpen Skies Agreement

The Chicago ConventionThe Chicago Convention

THE CHICAGO CONVENTIONTHE CHICAGO CONVENTION

It is the foundation for our current system of international

transportation by air.

The Chicago Convention states that each “state has complete

and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its

territory”.

Care was taken during the drafting of the Chicago Convention

to specifically exclude all military, police, customs, and other

state operated aircraft from the operation of the convention.

Convention on International Civil Aviation Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)(Chicago Convention)

• The Convention on International Civil Aviation, also

known as the Chicago Convention, established the

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a

specialized agency of the United Nations charged with

coordinating and regulating international air travel. The

Convention establishes rules of airspace, aircraft registration

and safety, and details the rights of the signatories in relation

to air travel. The Convention also exempts air fuels from tax.

The document was signed on December 7, 1944 in Chicago, Illinois,

by 52 signatory states. It received the requisite 26th ratification on

March 5, 1947 and went into effect on April 4, 1947, the same date

that ICAO came into being.

In October of the same year, ICAO became a specialized agency of

the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The Convention has since been revised eight times (in 1959, 1963,

1969, 1975, 1980, 1997, 2000 and 2006). Links to all versions of the

document can be found in the external links section.

The original signed document resides in the

National Archives of the United States.

Annexes

The Convention is supported by eighteen annexes containing

Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The Annexes

are amended regularly by ICAO and are as follows:

Annex 1 - Personnel Licensing

Annex 2 - Rules of the Air

Annex 3 - Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation

Vol. I - Core SARPs

Vol. II - Appendices and Attachments

Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts

Annex 5 - Units of Measurement to be used in Air and Ground

Operations

Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft

Part I - International Commercial Air Transport – Aero-

planes

Part II - International General Aviation – Aero-planes

Part III - International Operations - Helicopters

Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks

Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft

Annex 9 - Facilitation

Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications

Vol. I - Radio Navigation Aids

Vol. II - Communication Procedures including those with PANS

status

Vol. III - Communication Systems

Part I - Digital Data Communication Systems

Part II - Voice Communication Systems

Vol. IV - Surveillance Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems

Vol. V - Aeronautical Radio Frequency Spectrum Utilization

Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services - Air Traffic Control Service,

Flight Information Service and Alerting Service

Annex 12 - Search and Rescue

Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation

Annex 14 - Aerodromes

Vol. I - Aerodrome Design and Operations

Vol. II - Heliports

Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services

Annex 16 - Environmental Protection

Vol. I - Aircraft Noise

Vol. II - Aircraft Engine Emissions

Annex 17 - Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation

Against Acts of Unlawful Interference

Annex 18 - The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air

Key provisions for civil aircraft permit aircraft that

are not engaged in scheduled air service to:-

Make flights into or in transit nonstop across its

territory;

Make stops for non-traffic purposes (fuel and

maintenance) without the necessity of obtaining

prior permission.

Cont’dCont’d

However, the convention clearly states that

aircraft operating in scheduled international air

service are prohibited from operating “over or

into the territory of a contracting State, except

with the special permission or other

authorization of that State.”

Other noteworthy provisions of the Chicago Convention

include:-

• The right of each state to establish restricted and

prohibited areas as long as the restrictions and

prohibitions apply equally to domestic and international

aircraft.

• Establishment of responsibility for each contracting state

to maintain radio and air navigation services and

facilities.

• The adoption of a standard system of communication

procedures.

Some commentators have noted that the Chicago Convention did

establish the two fundamental freedoms of over-flight and stops for

fuel and maintenance, it failed to establish three additional

freedoms sought in an amendment or annex to the Chicago

Convention. The three freedoms sought in the unsuccessful annex

were:

1) The right of a country’s airlines to freely transport passengers

and/or cargo from its home nation to a second nation without

special authorization

2) The right of a country’s airlines to freely transport cargo and

passengers from a second nation back to its home nation

3) The right of a country’s airlines to freely transport passengers and

cargo between a second and third nation

.

Cont’dCont’d• In the end, the Chicago convention left these

issues up to the individual nations involved to negotiate directly. If all these freedoms were codified in the Chicago Convention, the result would have been a sort of “open skies” agreement among the more developed nations of the world

Open SkiesOpen Skies Although the multilateral Chicago Convention failed to create an

open skies environment for international air transportation, it did

spawn several bilateral agreements that have effectively created a

more open skies type of approach over time. The first of these

bilateral agreements was known as the Bermuda I agreement,

entered into in 1946 by the United States and Great Britain.

It permitted the airlines of the 2 countries to operate to and from

each country- but only to designated “gateway” airports. Each airline

would be allowed as many flights as it desired.

Similar agreements were also entered into by various nations

throughout the world.

Cont’dCont’d

• Bermuda I agreement was superseded in 1967 by Bermuda II.

• The first “open skies” initiative that would allow for a more liberal

framework for air route selection, capacity determinations, fare

setting, and frequency of flights was entered into in October 1992

between the United States and the Netherlands. Subsequently, the

USA entered into open skies agreements with 13 EU nations and

later on with Canada, South America, Peru, Malaysia, Taiwan, New

Zealand, and Singapore, among others.

Bilateral Air Transport Agreement Bilateral Air Transport Agreement

• A bilateral Air Transport Agreement (also

sometimes called a bilateral Air Service

Agreement) is an agreement which two nations

sign to allow civil aviation between their territories.

• In 1913, in what was probably the earliest such

agreement, a bilateral Exchange of Notes was

signed between Germany and France to provide

for airship services.

• One of the first post-Second World War ATAs was the

Bermuda Agreement, which was signed in 1946 by the

United Kingdom and the United States. Features of

this agreement became models for the thousands of

such agreements that were to follow.

• A current model for ATAs is the US-introduced

Open skies treaty.

• In principle all ATAs should be registered by the

International Civil Aviation Organization in DAGMAR.

Bermuda I AgreementBermuda I Agreement

• The Bermuda Agreement, reached in 1946

by American and British negotiators in

Bermuda, was an early

Bilateral Air Transport Agreement regulating

civil air transport. It established a precedent

for the signing of approximately 3,000 other

such agreements between countries.

• The Agreement was expanded in 1977.

Bermuda I: Agreement between the government of the

United Kingdom and the government of the United

States relating to Air Services between their respective

Territories, Bermuda, 11 February 1946

Bermuda II : Agreement between the government of

the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and the government of the United States

concerning Air Services, Bermuda, 23 July 1977.

Bermuda II AgreementBermuda II Agreement Bermuda II was a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement between

the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States

signed on July 23, 1977 as a renegotiation of the original 1946

Bermuda Agreement.

A new "open skies" agreement was signed by the United

States and the European Union (of which the United Kingdom

is part) on 30 April 2007, and came into effect on 30 March

2008, thus replacing Bermuda II.[1]

• The original 1946 Bermuda agreement took its name from

the island where UK and US transport officials met to

negotiate a new, inter-governmental air services agreement

between Britain and the United States. That agreement,

which was highly restrictive at the insistence of the British

negotiators who feared that "giving in" to US demands for a

"free-for-all" would lead to the then financially and

operationally superior US airlines' total domination of the

global air transport industry, was the world's first bilateral air

services agreement. It became a blueprint for all subsequent

air services agreements.

• Bermuda II has been revised several times since its signing, most recently in 1995. Although Bermuda II was much less restrictive than the original Bermuda agreement it replaced, it is widely regarded as a highly restrictive agreement that contrasts with the principle of "open skies" against the background of continuing liberalization of the legal framework governing the air transport industry in various parts of the world.

Description of the AgreementDescription of the Agreement• Broadly speaking, only a combined four airlines from the UK and

US are allowed to operate flights between London Heathrow and

the US. The two British carriers are currently British Airways and

Virgin Atlantic. The American carriers are American Airlines and

United Airlines. The US has also approved Continental to fly to

London Heathrow but the British do not recognize this route

authority and, consequently, this service is not in operation.

However, the British have not obstructed Continental's code-share

agreement with Virgin Atlantic, which places Continental flight

numbers in addition to its own on some Heathrow flights.

Cont’dCont’d• Air India, El Al, Iran Air and Kuwait Airways were

permitted to continue exercising their so-called "fifth freedom" traffic rights from Heathrow to JFK, which they had already enjoyed under the original Bermuda agreement. (Both El Al and Iran Air no longer exercise these rights. The former has decided that it makes better economic sense for it to fly non-stop between Tel Aviv and New York. The latter's US traffic rights were withdrawn in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.) Similarly, Air New Zealand was allowed to continue using its fifth freedom rights between London and Los Angeles.

• Bermuda II has continued and expanded the principle of "dual designation",

i.e. the right to designate two UK airlines as well as two US carriers as "flag

carriers" on the same routes, which already existed on the London-New

York and London-Los Angeles routes under the original Bermuda treaty.

• The extensive fifth freedom rights US carriers used to enjoy from the UK to

other European countries were restricted to a few routes from London

Heathrow to what used to be West Germany, including West Berlin, in the

days prior to German reunification. In the early '90s, United Airlines used to

fly between Heathrow, Berlin, Hamburg and Munich (United had acquired

these traffic rights along with Pan Am's transatlantic traffic rights to/from

Heathrow for US$1bn in 1990). A few years earlier, TWA flew between

London and Brussels but, unlike United, did not have rights to carry local

traffic between the two cities.

American and British regulatory authorities must approve every airline's

capacity and pricing ahead of each operating season.

Each country can refuse traffic rights to a carrier it is not satisfied with,

particularly with regard to ownership and/or control.

Only a specified number of US "gateway cities" can be served by both UK

and US carriers from London Heathrow as well as London Gatwick.

Only the following US gateway cities may be served non-stop from

Heathrow: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago O'Hare, Denver, Detroit,

Los Angeles, Miami, New York-JFK, Newark, Philadelphia, Phoenix,

San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington-Dulles.

All non-stop flights between London and Atlanta, Cincinnati, Cleveland,

Pittsburgh, Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Las Vegas,

Orlando, Tampa, Raleigh/Durham, St. Louis, and Charlotte must use

Gatwick as their UK departure/entry point rather than Heathrow.

• In a 1995 annex to Bermuda II capacity, fare and route restrictions governing all

scheduled air services serving airports other than London Heathrow or London Gatwick

were lifted. (This partial liberalization came about as a UK concession to the US to help

British Airways gain approval for its code-share alliance with US Air. As a result, access

restrictions that originally covered all London airports were lifted at Luton and Stansted.

This, in turn, has enabled "new generation", all-business class carriers such as Eos,

Maxjet and Silverjet to enter the lucrative London-New York business travel market by

choosing Stansted and Luton rather than Heathrow or Gatwick as their UK

departure/arrival airports).

• Continental Airlines has also taken advantage of this liberalization by starting service to a

number of important regional UK airports, including Bristol, Birmingham, Manchester,

Edinburgh, Glasgow and Belfast International Airport. Continental also introduced direct

flights from Stansted to Newark in 2001, but these were withdrawn in the industry

downturn after the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Historical backgroundHistorical background• In July 1976, Edmund Dell, the then new UK Secretary of State for Trade, renounced the

original Bermuda air services agreement of 1946 and initiated bilateral negotiations with

his US counterparts on a new air services agreement, which resulted in the Bermuda II

treaty of 1977.

• The reason for this was that there was no provision in the original 1946 Bermuda

agreement that would have allowed British Caledonian (B. Cal), then the UK's foremost

wholly privately owned, independent international scheduled airline, to use the licences the

CAA had awarded it in 1972 to begin daily scheduled services from its London Gatwick

base to Houston and Atlanta. (These cities were not nominated as "gateway cities" in the

original Bermuda agreement.) In addition, there was no provision in the original Bermuda

agreement that would have allowed Laker Airways to use the licence the UK's Air

Transport Licensing Board (ATLB), the CAA's predecessor, had awarded it the same year

to commence a daily "Skytrain" operation between London Stansted and New York JFK.

• Under the new agreement, B. Cal had its licenses to

commence scheduled services from its Gatwick base to both

Houston and Atlanta confirmed and was designated as the

UK's exclusive flag carrier on both routes. It also obtained a

license and sole UK flag carrier status to commence

scheduled services from Gatwick to Dallas/Fort Worth. In

addition, B. Cal obtained a license and sole UK flag carrier

status to commence scheduled all cargo flights between

Gatwick and Houston - including an optional stop-over at

Manchester or Prestwick in either direction.

• The UK Government chose to designate Laker Airways rather

than B. Cal as the second UK flag carrier to New York to enable

that airline to inaugurate its long-planned "Skytrain" operation

on that route.

• Moreover, both sides agreed to continue dual designation, i.e.

designating two UK flag carriers as well as two US flag carriers,

on the London-New York and London-Los Angeles routes. The

principle of dual designation was extended to another two high-

volume routes. The UK side chose to designate a second

carrier on London-Miami, while the US side chose London-

Boston for the same purpose.

Cont’dCont’d

• This meant that a second British airline was permitted to commence

scheduled services on the former route while another American

carrier could do the same on the latter route. The UK Government

chose to designate Laker Airways as the second UK flag carrier on

the L.A. and Miami routes while the US Government decided to

designate Northwest as the second US flag carrier on London-

Boston. (Pan Am and TWA continued in their role as the two

designated US flag carriers between London and New York as well

as London and L.A. respectively.)

• During the Bermuda II negotiations the UK side succeeded in

having a clause stating that Gatwick - rather than Heathrow -

was to be nominated as the designated US flag carrier's

London gateway airport whenever B. Cal was going to be the

sole designated UK flag carrier on the same route inserted

into the new air services agreement. This clause was meant

to support the growth of B. Cal's scheduled operation at

Gatwick as well as to redress the competitive imbalance

between it and its much bigger, more powerful rivals.

• The UK side furthermore succeeded in negotiating a three-

year "exclusivity" period for the incumbent operator on any

new route with their US counterparts.

For Gatwick-based B. Cal this meant that it did not have to face any competitor that was

using Heathrow, a more accessible airport with a bigger catchment area and a far greater

number of passengers connecting between flights, on any of the new routes it was

planning to launch to the US. It also meant that it had any new route to the US completely

to itself for the first three years of operation, which most airline industry analysts reckon is

sufficiently long for a brand-new scheduled air service to become profitable.

At British insistence Bermuda II furthermore contained clauses that made it illegal for any

airline operating scheduled flights between the UK and the US to resort to

predatory pricing or capacity dumping. Air fares were only approved if they reflected the

actual cost of providing these services. Similarly, capacity increases were sanctioned on

a reciprocal basis only. The reason for insisting on the inclusion of these provisions in the

Bermuda II agreement was to prevent the much bigger, better financed and commercially

far more aggressive US carriers from undercutting B. Cal with "loss-leading" fares cross-

subsidised with profits those carriers' vast domestic networks generated as well as to stop

them from "marginalizing" the UK carrier by adding capacity far in excess of what the

market could sustain.

In 1981, in an annex to Bermuda II, both sides agreed to

automatically nominate Gatwick as the gateway airport for

London for any London-US route that did not already exist

under the original 1946 Bermuda agreement.

As all available routes between London Heathrow/Gatwick

and the US are currently taken, any carrier wishing to start

a new route to a US gateway city currently not served

from either of London's two main airports must drop

another route. Further, both nations must agree to the

change. This rule has prevented non-stop flights between

London and Honolulu, Portland (OR), Salt Lake City, etc.

• Bermuda II's access restrictions to Heathrow are still in force almost 30

years after the agreement took effect. BA's access rights to Heathrow

under Bermuda II derive from the fact that it is BOAC's legal heir on all

routes that airline used to operate between Heathrow and various points in

the US under the original Bermuda agreement. American's and United's

access rights to Heathrow under Bermuda II derive from the fact that they

are TWA's and Pan Am's respective legal heirs on all routes these airlines

used to operate between various points in the US and Heathrow under the

original Bermuda agreement. However, Bermuda II contained terms that

US negotiators overlooked. The agreement specifically mentioned Pan Am

and TWA. When Pan Am sold Heathrow rights to United Airlines, British

negotiators initially stated that they would not allow United to receive the

transferred route authority citing the treaty's specific designation of Pan

Am. They furthermore stated that United was not a successor airline

because it was not assuming ownership of Pan Am.

Con’tdCon’td• This may have been a negotiating ploy as the British later did allow transfer of route

authority to United. Virgin Atlantic's access rights to Heathrow under Bermuda II derive from

the fact that the UK was not using its entitlement to nominate a second carrier to match the

two US carriers' presence at London's premier airport. The UK Government therefore took

advantage of the abolition of the London Air Traffic Distribution Rules, which had confined

Virgin's London operations to Gatwick, as well as of the US Government's intention to have

American and United replace TWA and Pan Am as the designated US flag carriers at

Heathrow to help Virgin establish a presence at that airport as well. These access

restrictions are also the reason BA (as B. Cal's legal heir between London and Houston,

London and Dallas as well as London and Atlanta) and American (as Braniff's legal heir

between Dallas and London) are obliged to continue using Gatwick as their UK gateway for

all non-stop scheduled operations between London and Houston, London and Dallas as

well as London and Atlanta as long as Bermuda II remains

Future

• Liberalisation of the Bermuda II agreement has been the declared intention of both

countries since 1995. However, bilateral negotiations between the UK and the US were

unsuccessful.

• Meanwhile, matters have been complicated by the European Court of Justice's judgement

to declare all bilateral agreements between individual EU member states and the US

illegal. Such agreements are deemed to violate the EU's Common Aviation Market.

• The main sticking point that has until now prevented the conclusion of a new, transatlantic

"Common Aviation Area" agreement between the EU and the US is that the UK and most

other European countries view the US version of "open skies" as too restrictive. The US

"open skies" template denies foreign airlines "cabotage" rights, i.e. the right to operate

wholly within the US domestic market without entering into a code-share agreement with

a US carrier. It also denies foreign airlines the right to acquire stakes in their US

counterparts with the intention of exercising boardroom control.

Another bone of contention preventing the conclusion of a "Common Aviation Area" agreement between

the EU and the US was the US government's continuing insistence on its so-called "Fly America" policy

for all employees and contractors of the Federal Government. This policy compels US government

employees/contractors to make all their work-related, overseas air travel arrangements with US-based

airlines only. (This also includes a requirement for Federal employees to use international services

operated by foreign airlines only if they are code-shared with a US carrier, in which case these services

must be booked under the US carrier's flight number.)

On (March 2, 2007) a draft agreement[2] was reached by negotiators from the European Commission

and the US that will in effect to drop Bermuda II restrictions preventing US flag carriers, other than

American and United, from flying to Heathrow. [1] This new Air Transport Agreement between the EU and

the US was approved unanimously by the EU Transport Council on 22 March 2007[3] and will replace

Bermuda II with effect from 30 March 2008. This also effectively paves the way for either country to allow

foreign airlines to enter the market. On 3 October 2007, Britain concluded its first fully liberal

Open Skies Agreement with Singapore, allowing Singapore Airlines to fly completely unrestricted from

any point in the United Kingdom, including Heathrow, to any other destination, including the United

States and domestic destinations, effective 30 March 2008[2].

Beyond rightsBeyond rights Some of the newer bilateral open skies

agreements have even opened up what are

referred to as beyond rights.

These beyond rights permit air carriers to fly

cargo to a partner country and then fly directly

from the partner country to a third nation with no

requirement that the flights first return to the

original country.

Freedoms of the airFreedoms of the air The Freedoms of the air are a set of commercial aviation rights

granting a country's airline(s) the privilege to enter and land in another

country's airspace.

Formulated as a result of disagreements over the extent of aviation

liberalization in the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944,

(known as the Chicago Convention) the United States had called for a

standardized set of separate air rights which may be negotiated

between states but most of the other countries involved were

concerned that the size of the US airlines would dominate all world air

travel if there were not strict rules.

• The convention was successful in drawing up a multilateral

agreement in which the first two freedoms, known as the

International Air Services Transit Agreement, or "Two Freedoms

agreement" were open to all signatories. As of the summer of

2007, the treaty is accepted by 129 countries.

• While it was agreed that the third to fifth freedoms shall be

negotiated between states, the International Air Transport

Agreement (or the "Five Freedoms agreement") was also

opened for signatures, encompassing the first five freedoms.

• Several other "freedoms" have since been added,

although most are not officially recognized under

international bilateral treaties they have been

agreed by a number of countries e.g Aer Lingus

had fifth freedom rights through Manchester to

various European destinations prior to EU

liberalization and Pan Am had rights through

London for many years.

First freedomFirst freedom• IASTA participants (and some of their colonies)

• It was also known as technical freedom. The right to overfly a

country without landing. It grants the privilege to fly over the

territory of a treaty country without landing. Member states of

the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA) are

granting this freedom (as well as the Second Freedom) to

other member states,[2] subject to the transiting aircraft using

designated air routes.[3] As of the summer of 2007, 129

countries were parties to this treaty, including such large ones

as the United States of America, India, and Australia.

• However, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and China never joined, and Canada left the treaty in 1988.[4] These large and strategically located non-IASTA-member states prefer to maintain tighter control over foreign airlines' over flight of their airspace, and negotiate transit agreements with other countries on a case-by-case basis.[5]

• Since the end of the Cold War, first freedom rights are almost completely universal, although most countries require prior notification before an over flight, and charge substantial fees for the privilege.

• IASTA allows each member country to charge foreign airlines "reasonable" fees for using

its airports (which is applicable, presumably, only to the Second Freedom) and "facilities"; [6]

according to IASTA, such fees should not be higher than those charged to domestic airlines

engaged in similar international services. [6] Such fees indeed are commonly charged merely

for the privilege of the over-flight of a country's national territory, when no airport usage is

involved,[7] For example, the Federal Aviation Administration of the USA, an IASTA

signatory, currently (2009) charges the so-called en-route fees, of US$33.72 per 100

nautical miles, of great circle distance from point of entry of an aircraft into the U.S.-

controlled airspace to the point of its exit from this airspace. [8] In addition, a lower fee (a so-

called oceanic fee) of $15.94 per 100 nautical miles is charged for flying over the

international waters where air traffic is controlled by the US, which includes sections of

Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic Oceans.[8] Countries that are not signatories of the IASTA

charge over-flight fees as well; among them, Russia is known for charging high fees,

especially on the Trans-Arctic routes between North America and Asia, which cross Siberia.[7]

Second freedomSecond freedom• It was also a technical freedom. The right to stop in a country for refueling or

maintenance on the way to another, without transferring passengers or cargo.

• The most famous example of the second freedom is Shannon Airport, which was used as

a stopping point for most North Atlantic flights until the 1960s. Anchorage was similarly

used for flights between Western Europe and East Asia, bypassing Soviet airspace, until

the 1980s. Anchorage is still used by some Chinese and Taiwanese airlines for flights to

the U.S. and Toronto from China and Taiwan. Also, flights between Europe and South

Africa often stopped at Ilha do Sal (Sal Island), off the coast of Senegal, due to many

African nations refusing to allow South African flights to overfly their territory during the

Apartheid regime. Gander, Newfoundland was also a frequent stopping point for airlines

from the U.S.S.R. and East Germany on the way to the Caribbean, Central America,

Mexico and South America.

• Because of longer range of modern airliners, second-freedom rights are comparatively

rarely exercised by passenger carriers today, but they are widely used by air cargo

carriers, and are more or less universal between countries. [7]

Third freedom

• It was the First Commercial Freedom. The right to carry passengers or cargo from one's

own country to another.

Fourth freedom

• The right to carry passengers or cargo from another country to one's own.

• Third and fourth freedom rights are almost always granted simultaneously in bilateral

agreements between countries.

Fifth freedom

• It is also called a connecting flight. The right to carry passengers from one's own country

to a second country, and from that country to a third country. An example of this could be

Emirates Airlines flights originating in Dubai, then going on to Bangkok, and then from

Bangkok to Sydney, where tickets can be sold on any or all sectors.

• Two sub-categories exist. Beyond Fifth Freedom allows the right to carry passengers from

the second country to the third country. Intermediate Fifth Freedom allows the right to

carry passengers from the third to the second country.

Sixth freedom

• The right to carry passengers or cargo from a second country to a third country by stopping in one's own

country.

• Cathay Pacific Airways, Thai Airways, Malaysia Airlines ,Singapore Airlines and other airlines in Asia use

sixth-freedom rights extensively to fly passengers between Europe and Australasia. Likewise,

American Airlines connects passengers from Europe and Asia to other countries in the Americas via U.S.

ports, and British Airways commonly tickets passengers from America to Asia via London. Icelandair sells

tickets between Europe and North America via Iceland, Finnair sells tickets from North America to Asia via

Helsinki.

Seventh freedom

• The right to carry passengers or cargo between two foreign countries without continuing service to one's

own country.

• The seventh freedom is rare because it is usually not in the commercial interest of airlines, except in Europe

where an EU open sky has seen many carriers, particularly low cost carriers, operate flights between two

points, with neither of them being in their home country. On 2 October 2007, the United Kingdom and

Singapore initialed an agreement that will allow unlimited seventh freedom rights from 30 March 2008

(along with a full exchange of other freedoms of the air).

Eighth freedom (true Cabotage)Eighth freedom (true Cabotage)• The right to carry passengers or cargo between two or more points in one foreign country. The eighth

freedom is also known as Cabotage, and is extremely rare outside of Europe. The main real life example

of eighth-freedom rights is the European Union, which has granted such rights between all of its member

states. Other examples of an exchange of this right include the Single Aviation Market (SAM) established

between Australia and New Zealand in 1996 and the 2001 Protocol to the Multilateral Agreement on the

Liberalization of International Air Transportation (MALIAT) between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and

Singapore. Otherwise, such rights have usually only been granted in isolated instances where the

domestic air network is very underdeveloped. A notable instance was Pan Am's authority to fly between

Frankfurt and West Berlin from the 1950s to 1980s. In 2005, the United Kingdom and New Zealand

concluded an agreement granting unlimited Cabotage rights.[1] Given the distance between the two

countries, the agreement can be seen as a reflecting political principle rather than an expectation that

these rights will be taken up in the near future. New Zealand had previously exchanged eighth-freedom

rights with Ireland in 1999.

• In the 1950s through the early 1970s, B.O.A.C. flights from London to New

York to Los Angeles to Honolulu permitted London origination passengers

to make stopovers inside the U.S. In the 1980s and 1990s, El Al Israeli

airlines had similar rights for passengers to/from Tel Aviv to Los Angeles,

which stopped in New York. JAT Yugoslav Airlines had similar rights in the

1980s from Zagreb to Chicago to Los Angeles.

• Currently, Eva Air of Taiwan flies from Taipei to Seattle to Newark, with the

right for Taipei/Newark passengers to make a stopover in Seattle, if

continuing later on to Newark, and vice versa. Likewise, Qantas Airways of

Australia flies from Sydney to Los Angeles with continuing service to New

York-JFK. Qantas is not permitted to sell standalone tickets on the Los

Angeles-New York part of this trip, but it does sell tickets that start in New

York and connect in Los Angeles to other Qantas flights on to Brisbane or

Melbourne.

Ninth freedom (stand alone Ninth freedom (stand alone Cabotage)Cabotage)

• The right to carry passengers or cargo within a foreign

country without continuing service to or from one's own

country.

• Sometimes also known as stand alone Cabotage. It

differs from the aviation definition of true Cabotage, in that

it does not directly relate to one's own country.

• The EU agreements mentioned above also fall under this

category.

Assignment to be submitted by Assignment to be submitted by 44thth April 2009. April 2009.

• Discuss the Chicago Convention of 1944 under the

following subtopics. (10marks)

i. The main statement and the key provisions

ii. Freedoms sought in an unsuccessful annex

• Explain “Open skies” and “beyond rights”. (5marks)

• True/False: A presidential jet is included in the

operation of the Chicago Convention. (1mark)

• Summarize the 9 freedoms of the air (18 marks)

Take Home MessageTake Home Message

‘Anyone who stops learning is old, whether

at 20 or 80. Anyone who keeps learning

stays young.’

Henry Ford.