PROCESSES of Institutional Influence Interdependent cooperation Rule-following behavior Coercion...

PROCESSES of Institutional InfluenceInterdependent cooperationRule-following behaviorCoercionManaging capacity problemsPositive incentivesUses of informationNorms and their influence

Human Rights InstitutionsAnalysis of Influence (Hathaway)“Although countries that ratify treaties usually have better

ratings than those that do not, noncompliance appears common. Indeed, those with the worst ratings sometimes have higher rates of treaty ratification than those with substantially better ratings. … [AND] Treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse, rather than better, human rights ratings than would otherwise be expected” (Hathaway, 2002, 1999).

Explanation: international law has expressive value. “In this sense, the ratification of a treaty functions much as a roll-call vote in the U.S. Congress or a speech in favor of the temperance movement, as a pleasing statement not necessarily intended to have any real effect on outcomes” (Hathaway, 2002, 2005).

Human Rights InstitutionsProcesses of Influence (Neumayer)Unlikely processes of institutional influence

Strong states enforce on weak (except they don’t)

All states enforce (but no incentives to do so)States could provide assistance (but incapacity

is rarely plausible explanation)Social conformity (but strong counter-reasons)

Likely processesDemocratic processes of domestic criticsBut also require active and allowed civil society

Human Rights InstitutionsConditions of Influence (Neumayer)Influence depends on characteristics of

countries (a la Brown Weiss and Jacobson)HR treaties make a difference for democratic

countries with a strong civil society but not for other countries. Thus, have two different kinds of member countries and influence depends on which kind of member is involved.

“For treaty ratification to work, there must be conditions for domestic groups, parties, and individuals and for civil society to persuade, convince, and perhaps pressure governments into translating the formal promise of better human rights protection into actual reality.”

Discussion: determinants of institutional influenceHow does problem structure increase or

decrease the influence of human rights institutions?

How does institutional design increase or decrease the influence of human rights institutions?

Environmental InstitutionsAnalysis of InfluenceWill look at multiple casesGoal: Seek to have MULTIPLE evidence of

what counterfactual will beCounterfactuals: you HAVE to make them upBUT you can provide evidence for them, to

make them more plausibleAND it is more convincing if you have multiple

sources of evidence

Fisheries – notional exampleMembers before/after

Fisheries – notional exampleMembers before/after

Counterfactual of Memberbehavior if it hadn’t been a memberbased on Members prior behavior

Fisheries – notional exampleMembers / Non-members

Fisheries – notional exampleMembers / Non-members

Counterfactual of Memberbehavior if it hadn’t been a memberbased on Non-members post behavior

Phaseout by ~1995

Phaseout by ~2005

Montreal ProtocolAnalysis of InfluenceDeveloped countries

Rapid change that is hard to explain otherwiseEconomics weren’t supportive initially

Developing countriesChange at different point in time

ProcessNot compliance due to enforcement concerns

but due to political pressures leading to scientific research which produced economically beneficial products

Aral Sea AgreementAnalysis of Influence

Actual Performance – Counterfactual Performance

Performance = ---------------------------------------------------------- Optimal Performance – Counterfactual

Performance

Counterfactual: under what conditions should we expect problems in water delivery?

Upstream/downstream problem with expected barter (energy for water)

High compliance but low effectivenessWhat’s optimal performance? (natural, Soviet,

sustainability): “Performance over time … has been very low and highly variable.”

Aral Sea Analysis

Aral Sea Analysis

Look at compliance; compare actual releases to rules. Compliance is high but may not be due to institution

Use post-Soviet/pre-treaty behavior (1991-1997) as counterfactual baseline for period after 1998.

Dispose of one counterfactual by expert opinions that it’s unlikely – need PLAUSIBLE counterfactuals.

Optimal performance has problems of measurement

Discussion: determinants of institutional influenceHow does problem structure increase or

decrease the influence of environmental institutions?

How does institutional design increase or decrease the influence of environmental institutions?

ConclusionsHow do we evaluate institutional influence on

behavior?How does problem structure increase or

decrease institutional influence?How does institutional design increase or

decrease institutional influence?