Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates

Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science

How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates

Stephen StichDept. of Philosophy

& Center for Cognitive ScienceRutgers University

sstich@ruccs.rutgers.edu

Jean Nicod

Lectures

Lecture 2

The Persistence of Moral Disagreement

Jean Nicod

Lectures

Philosophical Background

Fundamental Moral DisagreementFundamental Moral Disagreement

No one doubts that moral views differ both withinwithin cultural groups

No one doubts that moral views differ both withinwithin cultural groups and acrossacross cultural groups

But whether that diversity of views would persist under idealizedidealized circumstance is a hotly debated question

How to characterize the relevant sort of relevant sort of idealized circumstancesidealized circumstances is a difficult and contentious question

It is widely agreed that in to be “ideally situated” people must be

rational rational impartialimpartial agree on all relevant non-moral issuesagree on all relevant non-moral issues

There is much debate on how these notions are to be understood

But I’ll assume we all have a rough understanding which is good enough for present purposes

If a moral disagreement would persist persist under idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is

FundamentalFundamental

If it would not persistnot persist under idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is

SuperficialSuperficial

There are many reasons why it’s philosoph-philosoph-ically importantically important to know whether moral disagreement is fundamental or superficial

I’ll focus on two

Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude TheoriesTheories

Moral RealismMoral Realism

Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude TheoriesIdeal Observer & Qualified Attitude Theories

(arguably) defended by Adam Smith, Hume & Hutcheson

and by Firth, Brandt, Lewis, Harman & other leading moral theorists in the 20th century

Semantic Version:

‘x is morally right (wrong)’x is morally right (wrong)’ means anyone who is ideally situated (= rational, impartial, fully informed, etc.) would have a (un)favorable attitude toward x

If ideally situated people disagree about x, then x is neither right nor wrong

Semantic version + fundamental disagreement

Moral SkepticismMoral Skepticism

Justification Version: a moral claim is justified justified iff the person making

the claim would have the appropriate attitude toward the matter at hand, after going thru an appropriate idealizing process (= a process that corrects relevant false beliefs & removes partiality, irrationality, etc).

If two ideally situated people have different attitudes about x, then

‘x is wrong’is justified for one while

‘x is not wrong’is justified for the other

This version of the Ideal Observer Theory + fundamental disagreement

Moral RelativismMoral Relativism

Moral RealismMoral Realism

defended by Boyd, Brink, Railton, Michael Smith, Sturgeon & many others

there are lots of important differences between these theorists

but for most of them, the persistence of moral moral disagreement that does not depend on non-moral disagreement that does not depend on non-moral disagreementdisagreement (or other distorting factors, like self-interest or irrationality) would pose a significant significant problem problem

Richard Boyd:

"careful philosophical exam- ination will reveal …that agreement on nonmoral issues agreement on nonmoral issues would eliminate almost all would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of disagreement about the sorts of issues which arise in ordinary issues which arise in ordinary moral practicemoral practice.” "(1988)

David Brink:

“It is incumbent on the moral realist . . . To claim that most moral disputes are resolvableresolvable at least in principle.” (1984)

The notion of objectivity “signifies the possibility of a convergenceconvergence in moral views” (1994: 6)

Michael Smith:

Many Moral Realists and many Moral Anti-Realists would agreeagree that

Fundamental moral disagreementFundamental moral disagreement (i.e. persisting diversity under idealized conditions) entails, or at least strongly suggests, that

Moral Realism is FalseMoral Realism is False*

*“Non-Convergentists” disagree

For these reasons (and others) it is clearly

philosophically importantphilosophically important

to determine whether (and to what extent) moral disagreement is

fundamentalfundamental

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Arguably the first “experimental philosopher” of the modern period was

Richard Brandt1910 - 1997

There is a large anthropological literature (going back to Westermark 1906) documenting radically divergent moral outlooksradically divergent moral outlooks in different cultures.

But traditional ethnography gives little guidance about what people’s moral attitudes would be under idealizedidealized circumstances.

In the 1950s, Brandt’s began a study of the HopisHopis aimed at providing the sort of ethno-graphy that would be useful to philosophers

Brandt found a number of examples of moral moral differencesdifferences between Hopis & white Americans that he could not trace to non-moral disagreementcould not trace to non-moral disagreement

Hopi have no moral qualms about allowing children to “play” with small animals“play” with small animals in a way which causes them great pain, breaks their bones and ultimately kills them

Brandt looked for evidence that the disagreement between the Hopis’ moral view and the view of contemporary white Americans was superficialsuperficial

But he found none

Hopi do not believe that these animals lack the capacity to feel painpain

nor do they believe (e.g.) that animals are rewarded for martyrdommartyrdom in the afterlife

nor could Brandt find any otherany other nonmoral belief or failure of imagination that could account for the disagreement

Brandt concluded that these moral disagreements are fundamental

they reflect a “basic difference of attitude”“basic difference of attitude” which would not disappear not disappear under idealized conditions under idealized conditions like those that his own “qualified attitude theory” specified

He went on to argue that the “Qualified Attitude Theory” (his own justification-based version of the Ideal Observer Theory) led to relativism

and that some semantic versions of the Ideal Observer Theory led to skepticism

Richard Nisbett’sRichard Nisbett’s studies of attitudes toward honor & violence in “Cultures of “Cultures of Honor”Honor” is a rich source of rich source of evidenceevidence suggesting that some very important examples of moral disagreement are fundamentalfundamental

“A key aspect of the culture of honor is the importance placed on the insult and the necessity to respond to it. An insult implies that the target is weak enough to be bullied. Since a reputation for strength is of the essence in the culture of honor, the individual who insults someone must be forced to retract; if the instigator refuses, he must be punished – with violence or even death.” (Nisbett and Cohen 1996: 5)

Cultures of honor tend to arise in situations where resources are liable to theftresources are liable to theft and where the state’s coercive apparatus cannot be relied on to prevent or punish theft

These conditions often occur in relatively remote areas where herdingherding is the main viable form of agriculture; the "portability" of herd animals makes them prone to theft

They also occur in many urban, inner city areasurban, inner city areas where police protection for minorities is unreliable

Cultures of honor exhibit considerable cultural inertiacultural inertia, persisting for many generations after the conditions that gave rise to them disappeared

Parts of the American SouthAmerican South were originally settled by Scotch-Irish herders with a long culture of honor tradition

Nisbett & Cohen argue that a culture of honor a culture of honor persists among white southerners in the USApersists among white southerners in the USA

They support this claim with data of various sorts, including

Demographic dataDemographic data indicating that among southern whites homicideshomicides are more

common in regions where herding once was common

white males in the South are much more likely than white males in other regions to be involved in homicideshomicides resulting from resulting from argumentsarguments they are notnot more likely to be involved in

homicides that occur in the course of a robbery or other felony

Survey dataSurvey data indicating that white southerners are more likely to believe

that violence is “extremely justified”violence is “extremely justified” in response to a variety of affronts

that if a man fails to respond violently, he is “not “not much of a man”much of a man”

Legal scholarshipLegal scholarship indicating that southern states “give citizens more freedom to use more freedom to use violenceviolence in defending themselves, their homes, and their property"

Particularly compelling were a field studyfield study of moral responses to culture of honor violence and a series of laboratory experimentsof laboratory experiments

In the field studyfield study letters were sent to hundreds of employers in the North & South.

The letters purported to be from a 27 year old Michigan man who had one blemish on his otherwise solid record.

One letter explained:

“I have been convicted of manslaughter… I got into a fight with someone who was having an affair with my fiancée…. He confronted me in front of my friends at a bar,… told everyone that he and my fiancée were sleeping together, …laughed at me to my face, and asked me to step outside if I was man enough.”

The other letter explained that the “applicant” had “stolen a couple of expensive cars” at a time when he needed money to support his family.

Southern employers were more likely to be more likely to be sympatheticsympathetic in response to the manslaughter incident than the car theft.

There was no such difference in responses from northernnorthern employers.

One southern employer wrote back:

“As for your problems of the past, anyone could probably be in the situation you were in. It was just It was just an unfortunate incident that should not be held an unfortunate incident that should not be held against youagainst you. Your honesty shows that you are sincere…. I wish you the best of luck for your future. You have a positive attitude and a willingness to work. These are qualities that businesses look for in employees.”

No northern employers were comparably No northern employers were comparably sympatheticsympathetic.

The laboratory experimentslaboratory experiments were conducted on white, male (mostly upper middle class) University of Michigan undergraduates from the North & the South

Subjects were told saliva samples would be collected to measure blood sugar as they performed various tasks

After a sample was collected, Ss walked down a narrow corridor where they were bumped by a confederate who called the S an “asshole”

A 2nd saliva sample was collected & both samples tested for cortisolcortisol (associated with stress) & testosteronetestosterone (associated with dominance behavior & aggression)

hange in Cortisol Level

0 Control Insult

hange in Testosterone Level

0Control Insult

Culture of Honor SubjectsNon-Culture of Honor Subjects

These findings suggest that moral attitudes about the appropriateness of violence in response to insults will not convergenot converge even under idealized circumstances, and thus that these disagreements are fundamentalthese disagreements are fundamental

To see why, consider the standard examples of “defusing explanations”“defusing explanations” used by Moral Realists to argue that disagreement is not fundamental

The disagreement is caused or sustained by disagreement about relevant non-moral factsdisagreement about relevant non-moral facts

It is hard to see what these non-moral facts might be

We know (for example) that there are no systematic religious religious differences between the Northern & Southern students in Nisbett’s experiment

Nor is there any reason to think that Northerners did not believe that calling someone an “asshole” is an insultinsult

Of course, it is always possible that there is an unsuspected systematic difference in beliefunsuspected systematic difference in belief

But it seems clear that the burden of argumentburden of argument falls squarely on those who deny that the moral disagreements between culture of honor subjects and non-culture of honor subjects are fundamental

The disagreement is caused by one group or the other failing to be impartialfailing to be impartial

There is no “reason to think that southerners’ economic interests are served by being quick on the draw, while northerners’ economic interests are served by turning the other cheek”. (Doris & Plakias, p. 30)

The disagreement is caused by one group or the other being significantly more irrationalirrational

On thin thin interpretations of rationality, this is singularly implausiblesingularly implausible

It is perhaps more plausible on “thick” “thick” interpretations of rationality because …

Southerners voted for Bush!

So they are OBVIOUSLY IRRATIONALOBVIOUSLY IRRATIONAL

But, of course, thick interpretations of rationality are typically normatively loadednormatively loaded, and thus question beggingquestion begging

The Geography of Morals ProjectThe Geography of Morals Project (Doris, Peng, Uskul, Nichols & Stich)

Inspired by Nisbett’s findings EAs are more collectivist; Ws are more individualist

The EA conception of the personEA conception of the person emphasizes social rolessocial roles (mother, teacher) and de-emphasizes “context independent attributescontext independent attributes”(honest, gregarious)

This suggests EAs would take a harsher view of transgressions destructive of group tiesdestructive of group ties & a more lenient view of transgressions that benefit the benefit the groupgroup

Note that if these psychological differences have a significant impact on moral judgment, it is plausible that the resulting disagreement is fundamentalfundamental

Experiment I Subjects were Asian & non–Asian undergrads at U.C.

Berkeley

All experimental material was in English

Experiment 2 Subjects were Chinese students in Beijing & non-Asian

undergrads at U.C. Santa Cruz

Experimental material was translated into Chinese for Chinese subjects

Case I: The Magistrate & the MobThe Magistrate & the Mob

An unidentified member of an ethnic group is known to be responsible for a murder that occurred in a town. This causes many of the townspeople to become extremely hostile towards the ethnic group. Because the town has a history of severe ethnic conflict and rioting, the town's Police Chief and Judge know that if they do not immediately identify and punish a culprit, the townspeople will start anti-ethnic rioting that will cause great damage to property owned by members of the ethnic group, and a considerable number of serious injuries and deaths in the ethnic population. But nobody in the community knows who the murderer is, or where to find him.

The Police Chief and Judge are faced with a dilemma. They can falsely accuse, convict, and imprison Mr. Smith, an innocent member of the ethnic group, in order to prevent the riots. Or they can continue hunting for the guilty man, thereby allowing the anti-ethnic riots to occur, and do the best they can to combat the riots until the guilty man is apprehended. After discussing and debating their options at length, the Police Chief and Judge decide to falsely accuse, convict, and imprison Mr. Smith, the innocent member of the ethnic group, in order to prevent the riots. They do so, thereby preventing the riots and preventing a considerable number of ethnic group deaths and serious injuries.

The (Western!) philosophical consensus(Western!) philosophical consensus on cases like this is clear. “Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in order to

prevent riots in the street, period.” (Bloomfield 2001)

“Someone [who] really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent [is permissible] should be quite excluded from consideration-- I do not want to argue with him;

The (Western!) philosophical consensus(Western!) philosophical consensus on cases like this is clear. “Judges ought not to find the innocent guilty in order to

prevent riots in the street, period.” (Bloomfield 2001)

“Someone [who] really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent [is permissible] should be quite excluded from consideration-- I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mindhe shows a corrupt mind.” (Anscombe 1958)

Compare (even!) Smart (1973)

However, in both Experiment I (with Asian-Americans) & Experiment II (with Chinese students) the Asians the Asians were less inclined to make these judgmentswere less inclined to make these judgments

Here are some of the moralmoral questions subjects were asked:

4. The Police Chief and Judge did the morally right thing

5. The Police Chief and Judge did the morally wrong thing

6. The Police Chief and Judge should be punished for what they did

8. The Police Chief and Judge should feel guilty for what they did

12. The Police Chief and Judge are responsible for Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted and imprisoned

13. The townspeople are responsible for Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted and imprisoned

… and here are some of the factual questions subjects were asked:

1. Being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned caused Mr. Smith to suffer

2. Mr. Smith being falsely accused, convicted, and imprisoned caused Mr. Smith’s friends, family, and loved ones to suffer

3. If the riots occurred, they would have caused members of the ethnic group to suffer

ResultsResults Chinese subjects were significantly less likelyless likely to think

that the Police Chief & the Judge did was morally wrongmorally wrong

They were significantly more likelymore likely to think that what they did was morally rightmorally right

They were significantly less likelyless likely to say that the Police Chief & the Judge should be punished punished

Chinese subjects were significantly more likelymore likely to hold the potential rioters responsiblepotential rioters responsible for the scapegoating

Suggesting that they attributed more responsibility at the level of the collective than did their more individualist counterparts

Case II: PromiscuityPromiscuity

Jack and Debbie have been happily married for 15 years. Jack’s best friend from childhood, Casey, is passing through town on business, and Jack and Debbie invite him to stay at their house for a few days. All three of them have a great time, drinking, eating, laughing, and talking over old times. On the morning before Casey is scheduled to leave, Jack is called in to work to deal with an emergency. “Casey, old friend,” Jack says, “I’m sorry I won’t be here to see you off. But I want you to enjoy our fullest hospitality.”

Looking meaningfully at Debbie, Jack says, “Debbie will be pleased to see to your every need, won’t you, Debbie?” The implication is clear: Jack is inviting Casey to have sex with his wife. After Jack leaves, Debbie and Casey have sex.

2. What Jack did was morally wrong

3. What Jack did was morally right

4. Jack should be punished for what he did

5. Jack should have been prevented from doing what he did

6. If what Jack did was not customary in his culture, it would be morally wrong

7. If what Jack did was customary in his culture, it would be morally right

8. I would be bothered by what Jack did, even if it were customary in his culture

ResultsResults

Chinese subjects were more likelymore likely to agree that this behavior is morally wrongmorally wrong

They were less likelyless likely to agree that it was morally rightmorally right

They were more likelymore likely to think that Jack should be punishedpunished for doing what he did

They were more likelymore likely to think that Jack should have been prevented from doing what he did

These results indicate that Chinese subjects were more likely to think this kind of sexual behavior is appropriately morally condemnedmorally condemned, subject to punitive punitive responsesresponses, and legitimately interfered withlegitimately interfered with

These findings are predicted by the hypothesispredicted by the hypothesis that Chinese culture is more collectivistChinese culture is more collectivist

since this kind of sexual behavior is, intuitively, a threat to the family, among the most important forms of association in a collectivist culture

Case III: HonorHonor

Jack and Debbie have been happily married for 15 years. Jack’s best friend from childhood, Casey, is passing through town on business, and Jack and Debbie invite him to stay at their house for a few days. All three of them have a great time, drinking, eating, laughing, and talking over old times. On the morning before Casey is scheduled to leave, Jack is called in to work to deal with an emergency.

When he returns a few hours later, he finds Debbie and Casey lying on the couch, naked in each other’s arms. They have obviously been having sex. Jack is enraged; his best friend and wife have betrayed him. “Bastard,” he shouts at Casey. “How can you insult a man like this, when you are a guest in his home?” Casey tries to respond, but before he can do anything, Jack pulls a knife, stabbing and killing him.

Subjects were asked many of the same questions they were asked about the promiscuity case. They were also asked some additional questions, including:

1. What Casey and Debbie did caused Jack to suffer

2. What Jack did caused Casey and Debbie to suffer

ResultsResults

Chinese subjects were less likelyless likely to think the homicide committed by Jack was morally wrongmorally wrong

They were more likelymore likely to think it was morally rightmorally right

They were less likelyless likely to think Jack should be punishedpunished

They were more likelymore likely to assent to the statement, “If what Jack did was customarycustomary in his culture, it would be morally rightmorally right.”

Again, most of these results can be explained by the hypothesis that Chinese morality is more collectivistcollectivist

The Chinese subjects are more tolerant of violence in response to an anti-collective behavioranti-collective behavior – the individual pursuit of sexual gratification at the expense of a collective – the family

If that is right, then it is plausible that the disagreement is fundamentalfundamental

None of the standard “defusing explanations”“defusing explanations” look plausible

There were no differences between Chinese & Westerners on any of the non-moral questionsnon-moral questions, like:

What Casey and Debbie did caused Jack to suffer.

What Jack did caused Casey and Debbie to suffer.

It is hard to see how either group might be considered less impartialless impartial

And it is hard to take seriously the suggestion that one group or the other suffers from irrationalityirrationality

or that 1.3 billion Chinese have …

corrupt minds!

Elizabeth Anscombe

“Yes, but…” Some Support From a Theory

We are under no illusions that this study (and others that point in the same direction) will convince convince those who think there is little or no fundamental moral disagreement

Those skeptical about fundamental moral disagreement might raise a variety of objections focusing on the detailsdetails of these studies

including possible sources of superficial sources of superficial disagreement that have not been ruled disagreement that have not been ruled outout

To address these “Yes, but …”“Yes, but …” objections and move the debate forward, I believe that we need an empirically supportedempirically supported theory of the psychological psychological mechanisms mechanisms underlying the acquisition & utilization of moral norms and of how those mechanisms might have evolvedevolved.

Chandra Sripada & I have recently published a theory aimed at doing that

Sripada & Stich, “A A Frame-work for the Frame-work for the Psychology of NormsPsychology of Norms,” in The Innate Mind: Culture & Cognition, ed. by Carruthers, Laurence & Stich, Oxford Univ. Press, 2006

Acquisition Mechanism

Execution Mechanismid

behavio

compliance motivation

punitive motivation

emotion system

Rule-related reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

post-hoc justification

norm data base r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

other emotion triggers

causal links that are well supported by empirical findings

causal links for which there is currently little evidence

behavio

punitive motivation

emotion system

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

norm data base r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

The Model Claimsthat Moral Judgments

behavio

punitive motivation

emotion system

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

are largely determined by therules in the norm data base

identi

behavio

rAcquisition Mechanism

Execution Mechanism

punitive motivation

emotion system

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

which are largely determined by theacquisition mechanism

identi

behavio

Execution Mechanism

punitive motivation

emotion system

ProximalCues in

EnvironmentEnvironment

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

which is heavily influenced by the normsthat prevail in the social environment

identi

behavio

Execution Mechanism

punitive motivation

emotion system

ProximalCues in

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

So people who grow up in social environments inwhich different norms prevail will often make different

moral judgments… even in ideal conditionsideal conditions

identi

behavio

Execution Mechanism

punitive motivation

emotion system

ProximalCues in

judgment

explicit reasoning

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

So people who grow up in social environments inwhich different norms prevail will often make different

moral judgments… even in ideal conditionsideal conditions

Sripada & I survey a substantial body of evidence which, we maintain, is consistent with this model

But rather than review that evidence, I want to close by considering a prima facie disquieting featureprima facie disquieting feature of the S&S model, viz.

it suggests that reasonreason can play only a peripheral roleperipheral role in our moral lives

In a recent paper, Leland SaundersLeland Saunders has argued that this is mistaken and that the S&S modelS&S model actually supportssupports an

influential account of the use of reason in ethics, viz, a psychologized version of Rawlsian psychologized version of Rawlsian Reflective EquilibriumReflective Equilibrium

In the 11stst step step in Saunders’ account, a deliberative moral agent generates lots of judgmentsgenerates lots of judgments about actual and hypothetical cases in a given moral domain

Execution Mechanism

identi

behavio

compliance

motivation

punitive motivati

emotion

systemRule-related

reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasonin

beliefs

post-hoc justificatio

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

other emotion triggers J2J1

J3 J4J5 J6

Next, the deliberative agent attempts to articulate a articulate a moral principlemoral principle (or set of principles) that will capture capture those cases those cases

That, as Rawls notes, will often require ignoring one ignoring one or more of the judgments or more of the judgments

The process is one that requires explicit, often explicit, often painstaking, reasoning painstaking, reasoning

Execution Mechanism

identi

behavio

compliance

motivation

punitive motivati

emotion

systemRule-related

reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasonin

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

J3 J4J5 J6

The deliberative agent then forms a commitmentcommitment to adhere to the principle – which may be thought of as a belief that one ought to do what the principle belief that one ought to do what the principle requiresrequires

Execution Mechanism

identi

behavio

compliance

motivation

punitive motivati

emotion

systemRule-related

reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasonin

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

Acting Acting on that belief will often require that the principle be explicitly rehearsedexplicitly rehearsed One says to oneself, “I ought (or ought not) to do A”

This repeated, linguistically explicit, rehearsal mimics mimics one of the principle environmental cues for norm environmental cues for norm acquisitionacquisition

And that (sometimes) will lead to the principle being internalized internalized by the norm system

Execution Mechanism

identi

behavio

compliance

motivation

punitive motivati

emotion

systemRule-related

reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasonin

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

Explicit verbalrehearsal of Pr

Subsequent spontaneous judgments & behaviors will be the product of rationally generated norms

Execution Mechanism

identi

behavio

compliance

motivation

punitive motivati

emotion

systemRule-related

reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasonin

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

As Saunders notes, this process is probably relatively rarerelatively rare, since it is both complicatedcomplicated and arduousarduous

Execution Mechanism

identi

behavio

compliance

motivation

punitive motivati

emotion

systemRule-related

reasoning capacity

ProximalCues in

Environment

judgment

explicit reasonin

beliefs

norm data base

r1---------- r2---------- r3---------- …… rn----------

J3 J4J5 J6

Explicit verbalrehearsal of Pr

Also, as Saunders does not explicitly note, deliberative agents who start with quite different, start with quite different, socially acquired normssocially acquired norms are likely to end up with end up with different judgment-capturing principlesdifferent judgment-capturing principles and thus with different rationally generated normsdifferent rationally generated norms

They will be Rawlsian Rational Agents

Fundamental Moral Fundamental Moral DisagreementsDisagreements

The End

Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates

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