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SECRET middot~~ middot-bullmiddot middotmiddot lheDirectormiddotofGentrlllitell igeicemiddotmiddotmiddot _~ middotmiddotmiddotmiddotshy
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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL EO 13526 SECTION 53(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO 2015-071 document no 15 DECLASSIFICATION DATE December 02 2016
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT
22 November 1979
The President The Vi =e President Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Longer-term Outlook for Iran
1 Attached are two think pieces on the longer-term outlook for Iran
2 The first by Richard Lehman a senior CIA analyst comparessix possible governmental outcomes with our key national interests in I ran middot
3 The second by John Waller a senior CIA operations officer experienced in Iran dissects the power structure of Iran and what that means for possible US actions middot
4 These mightmiddotbe useful background for any discussion of the longer-term outlook
STANSF ELD TURNER
Attachments as stated
This memorandum is unclassified when separated from attachments
SECRET middotmiddot ~middot
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (5 USC section 3507)
I
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J- lgtEGRET
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THE Us STAKE IN IRAN
bull bull
middot- J Introduction
middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotbull ~-- middott
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ymiddot
The purpose ofthis paper is toanalyzethe UmiddotS middotstakemiddotin Iran
from a broader perspective ~h~~ that -~fmiddotour present cancer~ ~ith th~
hostages I~ effect i at~em~tsto le~~ across~~em~~asf~fn~g~tia~~~ ting tacticsancf turbulent Tehran p~litiis to thesituatio~a yearlt gtmiddotmiddot~ he~ce ~owe~~r t~~ middothci~t~ge situatiori isre~~l~~d-~ middotIts ~~ich ismiddot i ~middot
~irs~ middott~middot middotdefine middot~ri~i-calmiddot us~middotmiddot~ati ~ri~1 -~ nterestmiddot in I~n amiddotk i~middotey nowmiddot L - middot ~ -~- middot - middot
~ppeal secondmiddott~ identify the range of possible Ir~nsof~ ~ay l981 middotmiddot middot
arid third to middota~a)yz~middot each o~ th~~e middot1n t~~m~ ofus in~e~st~- ~ ~middot bull ~middot)middotgtmiddot middot middot middot Hmiddot IImiddot Assmiddotu~~~-~~o~ lt middot middot-_ gt~ -~~ middotmiddot lt)Emiddot
middot - middot- --_~middot-__middotmiddot- - ~middot-middot-_~-middot~middot-~p ~middot-~ -~middotmiddot~ bull O bull I bull bull middot l ~-~ middot-~~ ~-lt ~~middot~~j
middot middotA Kholleinis middotattempt tomiddotnilemiddota serii-developed state of thelatelt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot ~w~ntiet~ c~nt~ by t~~ ~tanda~~s of a ~enthc~ntury ttie~~racymiddotmiddot~i~ bullOi~ac bull middot- bull bull bull middot-middot bull bull bullbull bull bullbull bull middot bull bull bull- bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull middot middotmiddot 0middot middot
middotmiddotul timately faiLmiddotmiddot middot middot middot bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot ~- middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot- bull __middot~--~-~-- middot
8middot middotIf there were ever middotany middotpoisibil ity of the US domiddoting business_--middot--
middotwith the present regime it has bee~middotmiddot destroy~d in ~h~ ~ast f~~ ~e~k~ middotmiddotmiddot)_- middot_ middot middot middot middot ~ middot - middot middot -middot--middot~middot
- -
-
middot I I
Cmiddot The middotSoviet Unions primary_ national goals middotaremiddot tomiddot middotstrengthe~middotmiddot middot gtmiddotmiddot -middot middot middot middot bull middot middotmiddot-middot middot-middot-~_itself and to weaken the US It will exploit any opportunity open tomiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middotit in the pursuit of thes~ goals restramiddotined only by- its calculations _ =- middot
middotmiddot gtmiddot
middotmiddot ~~- middot
middot of risk It is not in the interest of the United States_to-b~come or
~ to be perceived as becoming weaker than the USSR
middot-~ middot III US National Interestsmiddot
middotmiddot middot - middot
middot middot middot ~
1 US nation11 interests in Iran are many and comple)( middotbutmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot __ middot middotmiddot middotgt
_middot j
A SECRET
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I
events of the past two years have served to clarifyin the-middot starkest
way which of these can middotbe termed middotvital He have four cri-tical national1
interests two of them vitalmiddot Th~~e four ar~ listedbelOI~_ in_ priority
bull bull middot middot middot middotmiddot shy
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-middot middot
middot middot middotA It ismiddotvitamiddotlto pr~v-~nt the ttirbulence in _ran middot_ - - bull
middotmiddot
1
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bullbull
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
bull
middot
middot
bull middotterms middot middot -middot middot
middot middot_ middot
middot-middot middot middotmiddot_ ~ lt -middot middot
middotmiddotAmiddot Th~ tlw trrim he Gulfmiddot - lt middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot_ bullmiddot middot-lt- i middotmiddot
middotmiddot
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lbull
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- 2 The quarantine of Irari -is r~n~~~ ~irst beca~s~ thei-j~t~bullgt~~gt bull ___ -middotgtmiddot middot
_middotmiddot-middot middotthe West of the oil of the_ Arab1an middotPeninsula and Iraq ~0-uld thr~at~n middoti lt middot
its collapse middotThe I~anian deb~c1~ can middotimpact on middotth~ middotGulf statesmiddot iat middotmiddotgt middotmiddot -
bull middotmiddot least thre_emiddot ways middot middotmiddotmiddot _middot
middot middot middot middot _ middot Export of middotradicalism either leftist or r1uslim middotmiddot
)middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotleading to polit1cal instability Production fad li iies middot
middot middotmiddot gt
~ middot middot
middotbull bull middotmiddot middotlt-middotlt
would besubjeit to physical damagea~d-ex~ort flows t~ -bull
middotmiddot -political uncertairity
-- middot A reinforcement of the growing tendency ar1ong middot
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Far East havemiddotmiddotbull ~
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exporting states to see a reduction of production as the
most desirable cour~e in )I period of short supply ~nd middotmiddotun- middot
middot ~pendabl e national revenues
-- middotMilitary interruption of oil flow frcimthe Gulf
middot by a power contromiddotHing the Straits of Hormuz Such middota power middot middot bullgt ~~_(
middotmiddot might be a resurgent Iran the USSR or ionceivabl I~aq middotmiddot bull middotmiddot
- _ -middot bull if I ran became everl weaker - middot- bull bull bullmiddot bull bull _ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
middot middot middot
middot3bull So farmiddot the industrial economies of the west ltind ~-
proved remarkably resiiieiit they successfully weathered the cists ofmiddot
1973-74 bullb~th iri energy supp~y andbullmoney_fl ows and are ll)im~ging -reasonahy
wellmiddot with the uri certainties rif Iranian supply they have come to under
middotmiddot stand their vulnerabi1ity and taken some te~tative ~teps t~ reduce it~gt middotmiddot bull
middot
t Imiddotmiddot-[
middot middotl
-middotmiddot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
Imiddot
middot
- middot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot-middotmiddotlt-middotshyThe non~oil LDCs hiwe done less welland their abilitY to absorb anmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot--middot
middot middot bull evenmiddotgreatermiddot shoCk middotis questionable - -middotmiddot -
4 CessatiCin of severe reduction of the oil flow from the Gul~ middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull middot middot middot
however coupled inevitably 1~ith price rises on a scale hithertoun- middotmiddot -
middot
imaginable ~1oilld test and perlaps even tireakthe resilience of the
middotw~st It would pro9uce atmiddot the leastsev~re depression and inflationmiddot middot Turmoil in the Locmiddotbulls wouldcontribute by jnterrupting the supply of
middot other commodities -middotIn such a si-tuation middotthe stabi1ity and middotorientatiorr middot(middot_
~f r~ajor us ~llies and of the usmiddot itself couldno longer be as- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
~ullled )heUSSR and its allies with a basically autarchic economy
middot-middot would be shielded from these effects middot In simplest terms the present
middot world power equati6nmiddotinwhich the military strengthmiddotof the USSR is middot
roughly balanced by middotthe economic and technological strength middotof the West _
middotwaul d b~ middotfundamentally middotand perhaps i rretri evably changed to the detri- middot middotmiddot -middotmiddot
~- v middotmiddot middot__ ment middotof the West middot
~ lt-gtmiddotmiddotmiddot _middotmiddott middot middot middot bull middot ~
__ middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~middotJmiddot middot middot~ ---~- middotmiddot-~middot~-middot~~middot ~- middot middot_ _middot ~-middot~middot __ middot middot
-~middot bull
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1 SEeiltET
Denial to the USSR
1 middot
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middot middot
~-middot ~ ~
_ _ middot _-_ I middotmiddot _-c_ middot
middot ~ middot~ middot middotmiddot
5 Eveo ~lithout Iran the powerbala~ce will be exceptionally
cate in _the early to mid-1980s In this period Soviet military
gth 1middot1ill grow--substantially_relatjve to that of the-Usan _
1an~e t~at ~~i 11 only be redres~~d- when ~ilit~middotry -p~oirar~~ n~~ u~~ bull middot middot bull bull
y or under consideration come to fruition in ihe later yearsmiddot omiddotthe
e On the other-side of ~he scaie-theussR~m b~ subjectin middot - middot bull bull ~middot bull middotmiddotmiddot l bull middot middot middot middot _
hiy the same time-frame to increasing economic difficulty mostmiddot middot middot gt bull
bly in the energy field_ Petroleummiddot prbpuction middothas peaked and wtn _ - -en~1Y begin tci ~ec~ ~ n~ shmiddota~pl~ bull Th~ middotSoviet -~~o~~~~ la~kingmiddot-t~e- middotgtmiddot
~ middot middotbull middotmiddot~bull middot flts cushfon of unnece-ssary consumption that canmiddot bemiddot conservedmiddot canmiddot middot middotmiddot_
only maintain its--p~esent posi~i~~ by a -c~~bin~tion-~drast~dal~Y middot middot~___ middot_middot middot - - ~-~ middot reduced exports and ~urchas~~ in the Hestern makmiddotemiddott r f~~t the _ middot middot-~ 5 -shy
middotmiddot middot Sovi_et 1eadership mampy be able middotto maintain its militctrY power -~dvcintage - middot middot middot middot I middotmiddot ~ -middot-middot middot middotmiddot middot middot-- bull ~- ~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--~ middotmiddot
I only tiyacepting even greater ecorioriic and ideological disadvan~ages -~ ~ middot middot ~middot middot
__ P~-~~etm~~hl too~ middot~efsn~~~u i _middot _~ ho~~middot ~11 a~ding to a demo~stra~ion tha~ th~middotSovi~t m~-dei ~a~-~ ~~~ern --~~_middot state is a fail~_re middot bullmiddot - _- ----_-- _-~~
middot 6 middotMoreover the Soviet le~dership itself isi_~- a st~te of ~ter-( -lt~ regnum middot The introverted clustermiddotof old men surroundinmiddotg the fading_ c _
middotmiddot middot-_middot _ Brezhnev re jockeying among themselves- to succeed him but appearmiddot middot_-middot
-
united in resistancemiddotto the admittarrce of younger middotand more vigorous menmiddotmiddot_ middot middot to their circle middotTheir behavior as a groupmiddot ~Jit~ or_ ~1ithout B~~zhnev middot
jI middot _is likely to middotbecome -increasingly erraticJDL-u~~ untfi pow~r ~middot i middot -middot middotmiddot middot - middot --
i pa~sesmiddotto the next generati_on-although it could lapse irito paralysismiddotmiddot -cmiddotmiddot - middot middot -middotmiddot
Webull-knm~ li-ttle of the policy vie~Js of the younger menmiddot-aHhough samemiddotmiddotmiddot_-ltmiddot middot
- ~4~- - __ _middot gt__ middot--~~ _ middotmiddot~- _~lt tmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddot bull bull rbull -~
middotmiddot ~FFIln _-middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot - middotmiddot middot_middot _- -~- middot
l SECRET
Ibull F middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot analysts have suggested that theymiddot are impatient 1middot1ith middotthemiddot cauti-on qf middot middot
i
middot middot their elders the Soviet state has too l_ong toleratedmiddot the pretentions middotbullmiddotmiddot bull
A~ middotof a declining West it should take middotadvantage ltif the po~er it has shy
achievedbulland Jress more aggressively toward its national goais ~ _middot-_bullltmiddot
middot middot ltmiddot1
7 We are not st~re ho_w fullymiddot the Politburo yetmiddotmiddotunderstands its lt middotmiddot bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull r
middot predicament If the po~JerbaJq~ce isdeiicatemiddot ~lithout han howe~ermiddotitmiddotmiddot-
wi i i become even ~or~ so w~en the ~ovi ~~- ~eaders rec~~ri~ze their f~~ middot~ _ middot3middot atf~n ~~-d themiddotpo-~sible roe that Ira~-~i~ht pi~middotmiddotin middoth middotTci a~ld_middot ~_bull_~~
S~viet middot1 ~~dership ~ha~middot s~es its a~bi evemerits middot~f deca~es ~ast gra~~llt gtXgt middot middotmiddot middot -middot bull -middot _
middot threatened by a 1Cck of petroleum middotar to a younger middotone that middotsees its ltgt middot opportu~itiesbull~r ~he middotmiddotfut~r~ ~~uaily thr~atened~ t~~ ~~spe~~ o a middot middot middot -middotgt ~ chao~imiddotc ~r~n ~ts armed fo~es shatter~d an~ its~] ie~ a-lmiddoti e~-~te~=middotmiddot~a emiddot ~-
~ middot _middot middot- ~ middot middot - shybull become tempting in the early 80s Not only ~ould Sovie~ ~rlergy-~h~rt~ middot i
bull bull bull bull bull bull I bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot _-middot~_
middotages be alleviated but thesupply offore1gri exchltmge iouid be -assured middot
More~~e in geo~political t~rms tli~ somiddotvi~ts would__ be inmiddotamiddotposii~onmiddotfr~m bullmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot- -middot -- - - middot _~ middot--~=gt---_middot
~ran-_to dominate the Hiddle East and South ASia and middotultimately to deriy lt bullmiddot-- - -~- -middot - - middotmiddot -middot- middot------middot--~middot~~-
bull Gulf oil to middotthe West middotmiddot middot middot middot - middot middot middotmiddot middot 8 Either leamiddotdership would of course ~aiculate the risk~ They middot~ltlt~~ middot
middotmiddot middot bull middot- bull - i_--~-_ -middotmiddot
would lie re)atively smqll if a Marxist_ preferably controlled COftllistbullmiddot middot middotmiddot regim~ ~o~ld b~ b~otight t~ power middotin Teht~n without ~-v~middotrt S~vi eti~ter~ L
middot middot -- middot Vention-but ~OUld appear muchg~eater if militarymiddotintervention W~~emiddot -
requireq How much middotgreater would in tvrn depend onmiddot roscows ass~s~~~nt middot middotgt) ~-
middot - ~-middotof the correlation of forcesmiddot -~ bull -middot-___ ---
middot- middotshy -
9 Inmiddot that the Politburomiddot members would see g~ography as middoton tliefr middot middotlt -middot -middot
side Not only are their genera-l purpose -forcesmiddot stronger thall those ofmiddot --
~
middotmiddot
1shy
I
-middot
middot middotmiddot -6- - bull middotmiddot
--- - middotlt_ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotL
middot middotmiddot middot-middot - middot middot ~
~_middotmiddot---middot middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot
~
middot
SE6RET
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Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
1 -middot bull i
middot middot middot the pertefvedw~akness middotmiddotOf u~s middot1 eader~hip middotand the geographic advant~ge~ middotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot~ middot middot
of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
middot
i middot
I -gt
J
bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
middot -
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middotSECRET
be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
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I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
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i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
I
i
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
middot bull middotshy
middot middotmiddot
I I middot-
r
middot
middot
bull bull
- _ ~
middotf middot-- ~middotmiddot
middot_bull__gtmiddotmiddotmiddot__middot --
--middot -middot
bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
-- lt- middot
middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
bull middot middotmiddot
middot ~
_ shy middot middot middot -~ middot bullbull middotmiddot - middot
shy - middot _ bull ~- middot _- -
bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
0 bullbull bull bull
middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
middot middot
-
lt ~ middot ~-~
-middot middot-gtmiddotmiddot middot-middotmiddot
-_-
E-imiddot bull middotlt middotmiddot middot middotgt
SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
middotmiddot middot_ middot middotmiddot_ middotbull middot - middot middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
shyshy
Jmiddot-
j
I I i r
I
I
middot
John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
Lmiddotmiddot
bull
i II
II i bull
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot_
middot middot l middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-bull_ 1
11 middot lt middot middotmiddot ~
middot middot middotmiddotbull I
middot
i middot_- middot i
middot middot middotmiddot
l
I
Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
1middot mayprove to be impossible bull
_ middot j middotI - middotmiddot I
l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
I middot middotmiddotmiddot
I
i I
middot
middot middot -_
- ]1 - middot middotmiddot
bullImiddot bull
--- middot 1
~-)gtmiddot-gt middot middot middot1 - middotmiddot middot _ -- middotmiddot imiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
-- middot -_ middoti middotmiddot middot middot middot -middot middotmiddot middot i
middot=
middoti
I Imiddot
I I
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middotI
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middotmiddot- _ middotmiddotmiddot~~middot - middot
l middot middot middot i
_middot_middotbullmiddotmiddot middot__middotmiddot__middot__middotmiddot_middot ____middot-___middotmiddotmiddot_middot_1middot_middot_
-- middot -- middot - middot I middot-_ middot- middot
middotmiddot- middot__ middot middot middot-4
middot middotmiddot middot middot_ ~ middot middotmiddot-middot__middot middot_middot lt __) middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot
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bull l
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bull middot middot ~
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-~- - ~
friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
f middotJ bull
middotmiddotmiddot
middot ll
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~ middot_~__middotmiddotbull____i_shymiddotmiddot 1shy
middot_ ~~ ~-middot ~-middot ~- _J-middot middot middotmiddot ~
-
middot i middot I
I i
middot middot
middot middot middot -
bullbull Ibull
bullmiddot middotmiddotmiddot _
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middot
J- lgtEGRET
middot
THE Us STAKE IN IRAN
bull bull
middot- J Introduction
middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotbull ~-- middott
middot middot ~
ymiddot
The purpose ofthis paper is toanalyzethe UmiddotS middotstakemiddotin Iran
from a broader perspective ~h~~ that -~fmiddotour present cancer~ ~ith th~
hostages I~ effect i at~em~tsto le~~ across~~em~~asf~fn~g~tia~~~ ting tacticsancf turbulent Tehran p~litiis to thesituatio~a yearlt gtmiddotmiddot~ he~ce ~owe~~r t~~ middothci~t~ge situatiori isre~~l~~d-~ middotIts ~~ich ismiddot i ~middot
~irs~ middott~middot middotdefine middot~ri~i-calmiddot us~middotmiddot~ati ~ri~1 -~ nterestmiddot in I~n amiddotk i~middotey nowmiddot L - middot ~ -~- middot - middot
~ppeal secondmiddott~ identify the range of possible Ir~nsof~ ~ay l981 middotmiddot middot
arid third to middota~a)yz~middot each o~ th~~e middot1n t~~m~ ofus in~e~st~- ~ ~middot bull ~middot)middotgtmiddot middot middot middot Hmiddot IImiddot Assmiddotu~~~-~~o~ lt middot middot-_ gt~ -~~ middotmiddot lt)Emiddot
middot - middot- --_~middot-__middotmiddot- - ~middot-middot-_~-middot~middot-~p ~middot-~ -~middotmiddot~ bull O bull I bull bull middot l ~-~ middot-~~ ~-lt ~~middot~~j
middot middotA Kholleinis middotattempt tomiddotnilemiddota serii-developed state of thelatelt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot ~w~ntiet~ c~nt~ by t~~ ~tanda~~s of a ~enthc~ntury ttie~~racymiddotmiddot~i~ bullOi~ac bull middot- bull bull bull middot-middot bull bull bullbull bull bullbull bull middot bull bull bull- bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull middot middotmiddot 0middot middot
middotmiddotul timately faiLmiddotmiddot middot middot middot bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot ~- middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot- bull __middot~--~-~-- middot
8middot middotIf there were ever middotany middotpoisibil ity of the US domiddoting business_--middot--
middotwith the present regime it has bee~middotmiddot destroy~d in ~h~ ~ast f~~ ~e~k~ middotmiddotmiddot)_- middot_ middot middot middot middot ~ middot - middot middot -middot--middot~middot
- -
-
middot I I
Cmiddot The middotSoviet Unions primary_ national goals middotaremiddot tomiddot middotstrengthe~middotmiddot middot gtmiddotmiddot -middot middot middot middot bull middot middotmiddot-middot middot-middot-~_itself and to weaken the US It will exploit any opportunity open tomiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middotit in the pursuit of thes~ goals restramiddotined only by- its calculations _ =- middot
middotmiddot gtmiddot
middotmiddot ~~- middot
middot of risk It is not in the interest of the United States_to-b~come or
~ to be perceived as becoming weaker than the USSR
middot-~ middot III US National Interestsmiddot
middotmiddot middot - middot
middot middot middot ~
1 US nation11 interests in Iran are many and comple)( middotbutmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot __ middot middotmiddot middotgt
_middot j
A SECRET
bull I
I
events of the past two years have served to clarifyin the-middot starkest
way which of these can middotbe termed middotvital He have four cri-tical national1
interests two of them vitalmiddot Th~~e four ar~ listedbelOI~_ in_ priority
bull bull middot middot middot middotmiddot shy
bull middotbull
_
-middot middot
middot middot middotA It ismiddotvitamiddotlto pr~v-~nt the ttirbulence in _ran middot_ - - bull
middotmiddot
1
I 1
bullbull
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
bull
middot
middot
bull middotterms middot middot -middot middot
middot middot_ middot
middot-middot middot middotmiddot_ ~ lt -middot middot
middotmiddotAmiddot Th~ tlw trrim he Gulfmiddot - lt middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot_ bullmiddot middot-lt- i middotmiddot
middotmiddot
middotmiddot i I
lbull
lshy
I middot
- 2 The quarantine of Irari -is r~n~~~ ~irst beca~s~ thei-j~t~bullgt~~gt bull ___ -middotgtmiddot middot
_middotmiddot-middot middotthe West of the oil of the_ Arab1an middotPeninsula and Iraq ~0-uld thr~at~n middoti lt middot
its collapse middotThe I~anian deb~c1~ can middotimpact on middotth~ middotGulf statesmiddot iat middotmiddotgt middotmiddot -
bull middotmiddot least thre_emiddot ways middot middotmiddotmiddot _middot
middot middot middot middot _ middot Export of middotradicalism either leftist or r1uslim middotmiddot
)middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotleading to polit1cal instability Production fad li iies middot
middot middotmiddot gt
~ middot middot
middotbull bull middotmiddot middotlt-middotlt
would besubjeit to physical damagea~d-ex~ort flows t~ -bull
middotmiddot -political uncertairity
-- middot A reinforcement of the growing tendency ar1ong middot
middotmiddot
(r
~
I 1
bull bull _middotmiddot
middot bullbull --~- middot
Far East havemiddotmiddotbull ~
middot-~
-middotmiddot
bullmiddot i -~ middot
I -~---middot
middot
bull
middot-- i middotbull
middot
middot middotI I
middot bull
S~GRET middot
exporting states to see a reduction of production as the
most desirable cour~e in )I period of short supply ~nd middotmiddotun- middot
middot ~pendabl e national revenues
-- middotMilitary interruption of oil flow frcimthe Gulf
middot by a power contromiddotHing the Straits of Hormuz Such middota power middot middot bullgt ~~_(
middotmiddot might be a resurgent Iran the USSR or ionceivabl I~aq middotmiddot bull middotmiddot
- _ -middot bull if I ran became everl weaker - middot- bull bull bullmiddot bull bull _ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
middot middot middot
middot3bull So farmiddot the industrial economies of the west ltind ~-
proved remarkably resiiieiit they successfully weathered the cists ofmiddot
1973-74 bullb~th iri energy supp~y andbullmoney_fl ows and are ll)im~ging -reasonahy
wellmiddot with the uri certainties rif Iranian supply they have come to under
middotmiddot stand their vulnerabi1ity and taken some te~tative ~teps t~ reduce it~gt middotmiddot bull
middot
t Imiddotmiddot-[
middot middotl
-middotmiddot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
Imiddot
middot
- middot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot-middotmiddotlt-middotshyThe non~oil LDCs hiwe done less welland their abilitY to absorb anmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot--middot
middot middot bull evenmiddotgreatermiddot shoCk middotis questionable - -middotmiddot -
4 CessatiCin of severe reduction of the oil flow from the Gul~ middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull middot middot middot
however coupled inevitably 1~ith price rises on a scale hithertoun- middotmiddot -
middot
imaginable ~1oilld test and perlaps even tireakthe resilience of the
middotw~st It would pro9uce atmiddot the leastsev~re depression and inflationmiddot middot Turmoil in the Locmiddotbulls wouldcontribute by jnterrupting the supply of
middot other commodities -middotIn such a si-tuation middotthe stabi1ity and middotorientatiorr middot(middot_
~f r~ajor us ~llies and of the usmiddot itself couldno longer be as- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
~ullled )heUSSR and its allies with a basically autarchic economy
middot-middot would be shielded from these effects middot In simplest terms the present
middot world power equati6nmiddotinwhich the military strengthmiddotof the USSR is middot
roughly balanced by middotthe economic and technological strength middotof the West _
middotwaul d b~ middotfundamentally middotand perhaps i rretri evably changed to the detri- middot middotmiddot -middotmiddot
~- v middotmiddot middot__ ment middotof the West middot
~ lt-gtmiddotmiddotmiddot _middotmiddott middot middot middot bull middot ~
__ middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~middotJmiddot middot middot~ ---~- middotmiddot-~middot~-middot~~middot ~- middot middot_ _middot ~-middot~middot __ middot middot
-~middot bull
B
yf __ _ middot middotl deli
stren
imba
derwa middot
decad
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middotmiddot ) nota
a~p~ri
~ wemiddotst
1 SEeiltET
Denial to the USSR
1 middot
~- 1
~ i
middot middot
~-middot ~ ~
_ _ middot _-_ I middotmiddot _-c_ middot
middot ~ middot~ middot middotmiddot
5 Eveo ~lithout Iran the powerbala~ce will be exceptionally
cate in _the early to mid-1980s In this period Soviet military
gth 1middot1ill grow--substantially_relatjve to that of the-Usan _
1an~e t~at ~~i 11 only be redres~~d- when ~ilit~middotry -p~oirar~~ n~~ u~~ bull middot middot bull bull
y or under consideration come to fruition in ihe later yearsmiddot omiddotthe
e On the other-side of ~he scaie-theussR~m b~ subjectin middot - middot bull bull ~middot bull middotmiddotmiddot l bull middot middot middot middot _
hiy the same time-frame to increasing economic difficulty mostmiddot middot middot gt bull
bly in the energy field_ Petroleummiddot prbpuction middothas peaked and wtn _ - -en~1Y begin tci ~ec~ ~ n~ shmiddota~pl~ bull Th~ middotSoviet -~~o~~~~ la~kingmiddot-t~e- middotgtmiddot
~ middot middotbull middotmiddot~bull middot flts cushfon of unnece-ssary consumption that canmiddot bemiddot conservedmiddot canmiddot middot middotmiddot_
only maintain its--p~esent posi~i~~ by a -c~~bin~tion-~drast~dal~Y middot middot~___ middot_middot middot - - ~-~ middot reduced exports and ~urchas~~ in the Hestern makmiddotemiddott r f~~t the _ middot middot-~ 5 -shy
middotmiddot middot Sovi_et 1eadership mampy be able middotto maintain its militctrY power -~dvcintage - middot middot middot middot I middotmiddot ~ -middot-middot middot middotmiddot middot middot-- bull ~- ~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--~ middotmiddot
I only tiyacepting even greater ecorioriic and ideological disadvan~ages -~ ~ middot middot ~middot middot
__ P~-~~etm~~hl too~ middot~efsn~~~u i _middot _~ ho~~middot ~11 a~ding to a demo~stra~ion tha~ th~middotSovi~t m~-dei ~a~-~ ~~~ern --~~_middot state is a fail~_re middot bullmiddot - _- ----_-- _-~~
middot 6 middotMoreover the Soviet le~dership itself isi_~- a st~te of ~ter-( -lt~ regnum middot The introverted clustermiddotof old men surroundinmiddotg the fading_ c _
middotmiddot middot-_middot _ Brezhnev re jockeying among themselves- to succeed him but appearmiddot middot_-middot
-
united in resistancemiddotto the admittarrce of younger middotand more vigorous menmiddotmiddot_ middot middot to their circle middotTheir behavior as a groupmiddot ~Jit~ or_ ~1ithout B~~zhnev middot
jI middot _is likely to middotbecome -increasingly erraticJDL-u~~ untfi pow~r ~middot i middot -middot middotmiddot middot - middot --
i pa~sesmiddotto the next generati_on-although it could lapse irito paralysismiddotmiddot -cmiddotmiddot - middot middot -middotmiddot
Webull-knm~ li-ttle of the policy vie~Js of the younger menmiddot-aHhough samemiddotmiddotmiddot_-ltmiddot middot
- ~4~- - __ _middot gt__ middot--~~ _ middotmiddot~- _~lt tmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddot bull bull rbull -~
middotmiddot ~FFIln _-middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot - middotmiddot middot_middot _- -~- middot
l SECRET
Ibull F middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot analysts have suggested that theymiddot are impatient 1middot1ith middotthemiddot cauti-on qf middot middot
i
middot middot their elders the Soviet state has too l_ong toleratedmiddot the pretentions middotbullmiddotmiddot bull
A~ middotof a declining West it should take middotadvantage ltif the po~er it has shy
achievedbulland Jress more aggressively toward its national goais ~ _middot-_bullltmiddot
middot middot ltmiddot1
7 We are not st~re ho_w fullymiddot the Politburo yetmiddotmiddotunderstands its lt middotmiddot bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull r
middot predicament If the po~JerbaJq~ce isdeiicatemiddot ~lithout han howe~ermiddotitmiddotmiddot-
wi i i become even ~or~ so w~en the ~ovi ~~- ~eaders rec~~ri~ze their f~~ middot~ _ middot3middot atf~n ~~-d themiddotpo-~sible roe that Ira~-~i~ht pi~middotmiddotin middoth middotTci a~ld_middot ~_bull_~~
S~viet middot1 ~~dership ~ha~middot s~es its a~bi evemerits middot~f deca~es ~ast gra~~llt gtXgt middot middotmiddot middot -middot bull -middot _
middot threatened by a 1Cck of petroleum middotar to a younger middotone that middotsees its ltgt middot opportu~itiesbull~r ~he middotmiddotfut~r~ ~~uaily thr~atened~ t~~ ~~spe~~ o a middot middot middot -middotgt ~ chao~imiddotc ~r~n ~ts armed fo~es shatter~d an~ its~] ie~ a-lmiddoti e~-~te~=middotmiddot~a emiddot ~-
~ middot _middot middot- ~ middot middot - shybull become tempting in the early 80s Not only ~ould Sovie~ ~rlergy-~h~rt~ middot i
bull bull bull bull bull bull I bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot _-middot~_
middotages be alleviated but thesupply offore1gri exchltmge iouid be -assured middot
More~~e in geo~political t~rms tli~ somiddotvi~ts would__ be inmiddotamiddotposii~onmiddotfr~m bullmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot- -middot -- - - middot _~ middot--~=gt---_middot
~ran-_to dominate the Hiddle East and South ASia and middotultimately to deriy lt bullmiddot-- - -~- -middot - - middotmiddot -middot- middot------middot--~middot~~-
bull Gulf oil to middotthe West middotmiddot middot middot middot - middot middot middotmiddot middot 8 Either leamiddotdership would of course ~aiculate the risk~ They middot~ltlt~~ middot
middotmiddot middot bull middot- bull - i_--~-_ -middotmiddot
would lie re)atively smqll if a Marxist_ preferably controlled COftllistbullmiddot middot middotmiddot regim~ ~o~ld b~ b~otight t~ power middotin Teht~n without ~-v~middotrt S~vi eti~ter~ L
middot middot -- middot Vention-but ~OUld appear muchg~eater if militarymiddotintervention W~~emiddot -
requireq How much middotgreater would in tvrn depend onmiddot roscows ass~s~~~nt middot middotgt) ~-
middot - ~-middotof the correlation of forcesmiddot -~ bull -middot-___ ---
middot- middotshy -
9 Inmiddot that the Politburomiddot members would see g~ography as middoton tliefr middot middotlt -middot -middot
side Not only are their genera-l purpose -forcesmiddot stronger thall those ofmiddot --
~
middotmiddot
1shy
I
-middot
middot middotmiddot -6- - bull middotmiddot
--- - middotlt_ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotL
middot middotmiddot middot-middot - middot middot ~
~_middotmiddot---middot middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot
~
middot
SE6RET
I
) - middot middotmiddot
Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
1 -middot bull i
middot middot middot the pertefvedw~akness middotmiddotOf u~s middot1 eader~hip middotand the geographic advant~ge~ middotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot~ middot middot
of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
middot
i middot
I -gt
J
bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
middot -
)
middotSECRET
be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
I l I
r
I middotbullmiddot middot-imiddot
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
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middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
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bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
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middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
middotmiddot middot_ middot middotmiddot_ middotbull middot - middot middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
shyshy
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middot
John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotmiddota_ Ho~ middotwidspread middotand middothow stronmiddotg is Khomeinis middot middotmiddotinfluence how canmiddot it be exploited by him to middot middotget his wi11 done This should be anC~lyzed
onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
middot middot-- amiddotdass middotbasis middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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-middot middotmiddot __ 1
middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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T middotr bullmiddot l middot r
middot
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t I middot
I _ middot I
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
oshy middot
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middot
bull
middotmiddot -~- middot middotmiddot
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middotmiddot- middot -middot
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
middot
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bull middot~
_ -middot _ _ middotmiddot middot middot
~
middot-middot middot
middot ~ middot ~ ~ middot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
middot bull 1 - I
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i
middot
imiddot I
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imiddot
loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
middoti middot middot
bull middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
middot
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middot middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot
middot__ middot middot -
---- middot middot_
middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
middot middot 1
middotmiddot_middot--
bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
middot1
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
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middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
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Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
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I25Xl E013526
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bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
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A SECRET
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exporting states to see a reduction of production as the
most desirable cour~e in )I period of short supply ~nd middotmiddotun- middot
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~f r~ajor us ~llies and of the usmiddot itself couldno longer be as- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
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middot-middot would be shielded from these effects middot In simplest terms the present
middot world power equati6nmiddotinwhich the military strengthmiddotof the USSR is middot
roughly balanced by middotthe economic and technological strength middotof the West _
middotwaul d b~ middotfundamentally middotand perhaps i rretri evably changed to the detri- middot middotmiddot -middotmiddot
~- v middotmiddot middot__ ment middotof the West middot
~ lt-gtmiddotmiddotmiddot _middotmiddott middot middot middot bull middot ~
__ middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~middotJmiddot middot middot~ ---~- middotmiddot-~middot~-middot~~middot ~- middot middot_ _middot ~-middot~middot __ middot middot
-~middot bull
B
yf __ _ middot middotl deli
stren
imba
derwa middot
decad
roug
middotmiddot ) nota
a~p~ri
~ wemiddotst
1 SEeiltET
Denial to the USSR
1 middot
~- 1
~ i
middot middot
~-middot ~ ~
_ _ middot _-_ I middotmiddot _-c_ middot
middot ~ middot~ middot middotmiddot
5 Eveo ~lithout Iran the powerbala~ce will be exceptionally
cate in _the early to mid-1980s In this period Soviet military
gth 1middot1ill grow--substantially_relatjve to that of the-Usan _
1an~e t~at ~~i 11 only be redres~~d- when ~ilit~middotry -p~oirar~~ n~~ u~~ bull middot middot bull bull
y or under consideration come to fruition in ihe later yearsmiddot omiddotthe
e On the other-side of ~he scaie-theussR~m b~ subjectin middot - middot bull bull ~middot bull middotmiddotmiddot l bull middot middot middot middot _
hiy the same time-frame to increasing economic difficulty mostmiddot middot middot gt bull
bly in the energy field_ Petroleummiddot prbpuction middothas peaked and wtn _ - -en~1Y begin tci ~ec~ ~ n~ shmiddota~pl~ bull Th~ middotSoviet -~~o~~~~ la~kingmiddot-t~e- middotgtmiddot
~ middot middotbull middotmiddot~bull middot flts cushfon of unnece-ssary consumption that canmiddot bemiddot conservedmiddot canmiddot middot middotmiddot_
only maintain its--p~esent posi~i~~ by a -c~~bin~tion-~drast~dal~Y middot middot~___ middot_middot middot - - ~-~ middot reduced exports and ~urchas~~ in the Hestern makmiddotemiddott r f~~t the _ middot middot-~ 5 -shy
middotmiddot middot Sovi_et 1eadership mampy be able middotto maintain its militctrY power -~dvcintage - middot middot middot middot I middotmiddot ~ -middot-middot middot middotmiddot middot middot-- bull ~- ~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--~ middotmiddot
I only tiyacepting even greater ecorioriic and ideological disadvan~ages -~ ~ middot middot ~middot middot
__ P~-~~etm~~hl too~ middot~efsn~~~u i _middot _~ ho~~middot ~11 a~ding to a demo~stra~ion tha~ th~middotSovi~t m~-dei ~a~-~ ~~~ern --~~_middot state is a fail~_re middot bullmiddot - _- ----_-- _-~~
middot 6 middotMoreover the Soviet le~dership itself isi_~- a st~te of ~ter-( -lt~ regnum middot The introverted clustermiddotof old men surroundinmiddotg the fading_ c _
middotmiddot middot-_middot _ Brezhnev re jockeying among themselves- to succeed him but appearmiddot middot_-middot
-
united in resistancemiddotto the admittarrce of younger middotand more vigorous menmiddotmiddot_ middot middot to their circle middotTheir behavior as a groupmiddot ~Jit~ or_ ~1ithout B~~zhnev middot
jI middot _is likely to middotbecome -increasingly erraticJDL-u~~ untfi pow~r ~middot i middot -middot middotmiddot middot - middot --
i pa~sesmiddotto the next generati_on-although it could lapse irito paralysismiddotmiddot -cmiddotmiddot - middot middot -middotmiddot
Webull-knm~ li-ttle of the policy vie~Js of the younger menmiddot-aHhough samemiddotmiddotmiddot_-ltmiddot middot
- ~4~- - __ _middot gt__ middot--~~ _ middotmiddot~- _~lt tmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddot bull bull rbull -~
middotmiddot ~FFIln _-middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot - middotmiddot middot_middot _- -~- middot
l SECRET
Ibull F middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot analysts have suggested that theymiddot are impatient 1middot1ith middotthemiddot cauti-on qf middot middot
i
middot middot their elders the Soviet state has too l_ong toleratedmiddot the pretentions middotbullmiddotmiddot bull
A~ middotof a declining West it should take middotadvantage ltif the po~er it has shy
achievedbulland Jress more aggressively toward its national goais ~ _middot-_bullltmiddot
middot middot ltmiddot1
7 We are not st~re ho_w fullymiddot the Politburo yetmiddotmiddotunderstands its lt middotmiddot bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull r
middot predicament If the po~JerbaJq~ce isdeiicatemiddot ~lithout han howe~ermiddotitmiddotmiddot-
wi i i become even ~or~ so w~en the ~ovi ~~- ~eaders rec~~ri~ze their f~~ middot~ _ middot3middot atf~n ~~-d themiddotpo-~sible roe that Ira~-~i~ht pi~middotmiddotin middoth middotTci a~ld_middot ~_bull_~~
S~viet middot1 ~~dership ~ha~middot s~es its a~bi evemerits middot~f deca~es ~ast gra~~llt gtXgt middot middotmiddot middot -middot bull -middot _
middot threatened by a 1Cck of petroleum middotar to a younger middotone that middotsees its ltgt middot opportu~itiesbull~r ~he middotmiddotfut~r~ ~~uaily thr~atened~ t~~ ~~spe~~ o a middot middot middot -middotgt ~ chao~imiddotc ~r~n ~ts armed fo~es shatter~d an~ its~] ie~ a-lmiddoti e~-~te~=middotmiddot~a emiddot ~-
~ middot _middot middot- ~ middot middot - shybull become tempting in the early 80s Not only ~ould Sovie~ ~rlergy-~h~rt~ middot i
bull bull bull bull bull bull I bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot _-middot~_
middotages be alleviated but thesupply offore1gri exchltmge iouid be -assured middot
More~~e in geo~political t~rms tli~ somiddotvi~ts would__ be inmiddotamiddotposii~onmiddotfr~m bullmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot- -middot -- - - middot _~ middot--~=gt---_middot
~ran-_to dominate the Hiddle East and South ASia and middotultimately to deriy lt bullmiddot-- - -~- -middot - - middotmiddot -middot- middot------middot--~middot~~-
bull Gulf oil to middotthe West middotmiddot middot middot middot - middot middot middotmiddot middot 8 Either leamiddotdership would of course ~aiculate the risk~ They middot~ltlt~~ middot
middotmiddot middot bull middot- bull - i_--~-_ -middotmiddot
would lie re)atively smqll if a Marxist_ preferably controlled COftllistbullmiddot middot middotmiddot regim~ ~o~ld b~ b~otight t~ power middotin Teht~n without ~-v~middotrt S~vi eti~ter~ L
middot middot -- middot Vention-but ~OUld appear muchg~eater if militarymiddotintervention W~~emiddot -
requireq How much middotgreater would in tvrn depend onmiddot roscows ass~s~~~nt middot middotgt) ~-
middot - ~-middotof the correlation of forcesmiddot -~ bull -middot-___ ---
middot- middotshy -
9 Inmiddot that the Politburomiddot members would see g~ography as middoton tliefr middot middotlt -middot -middot
side Not only are their genera-l purpose -forcesmiddot stronger thall those ofmiddot --
~
middotmiddot
1shy
I
-middot
middot middotmiddot -6- - bull middotmiddot
--- - middotlt_ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotL
middot middotmiddot middot-middot - middot middot ~
~_middotmiddot---middot middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot
~
middot
SE6RET
I
) - middot middotmiddot
Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
1 -middot bull i
middot middot middot the pertefvedw~akness middotmiddotOf u~s middot1 eader~hip middotand the geographic advant~ge~ middotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot~ middot middot
of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
middot
i middot
I -gt
J
bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
middot -
)
middotSECRET
be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
I l I
r
I middotbullmiddot middot-imiddot
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
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of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
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bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
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middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
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middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
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middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
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middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
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middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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_ -middot _ _ middotmiddot middot middot
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middot-middot middot
middot ~ middot ~ ~ middot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
middot bull 1 - I
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middot
imiddot I
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
middoti middot middot
bull middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
middot
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middot middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot
middot__ middot middot -
---- middot middot_
middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
middot middot 1
middotmiddot_middot--
bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
middot1
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bullmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot middot
a
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b
Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot middot -
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middot middotbull middot _middot-(middot middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddot )lt middotgt
middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
-
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middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot I bull
bull middot middot
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middot
middotmiddot 6~ o
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~ middot ~ (middot_middot
middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot middot-~middotmiddotall rbull
middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
bull ~
middot-
middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
8 bull
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
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cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
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bull --~- bullbull 7
middot
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middot
middotmiddot
middot-- 11
middot-
bull bullbull _- middotmiddot___
bull
middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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bull
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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exporting states to see a reduction of production as the
most desirable cour~e in )I period of short supply ~nd middotmiddotun- middot
middot ~pendabl e national revenues
-- middotMilitary interruption of oil flow frcimthe Gulf
middot by a power contromiddotHing the Straits of Hormuz Such middota power middot middot bullgt ~~_(
middotmiddot might be a resurgent Iran the USSR or ionceivabl I~aq middotmiddot bull middotmiddot
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middot3bull So farmiddot the industrial economies of the west ltind ~-
proved remarkably resiiieiit they successfully weathered the cists ofmiddot
1973-74 bullb~th iri energy supp~y andbullmoney_fl ows and are ll)im~ging -reasonahy
wellmiddot with the uri certainties rif Iranian supply they have come to under
middotmiddot stand their vulnerabi1ity and taken some te~tative ~teps t~ reduce it~gt middotmiddot bull
middot
t Imiddotmiddot-[
middot middotl
-middotmiddot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
Imiddot
middot
- middot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot-middotmiddotlt-middotshyThe non~oil LDCs hiwe done less welland their abilitY to absorb anmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot--middot
middot middot bull evenmiddotgreatermiddot shoCk middotis questionable - -middotmiddot -
4 CessatiCin of severe reduction of the oil flow from the Gul~ middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull middot middot middot
however coupled inevitably 1~ith price rises on a scale hithertoun- middotmiddot -
middot
imaginable ~1oilld test and perlaps even tireakthe resilience of the
middotw~st It would pro9uce atmiddot the leastsev~re depression and inflationmiddot middot Turmoil in the Locmiddotbulls wouldcontribute by jnterrupting the supply of
middot other commodities -middotIn such a si-tuation middotthe stabi1ity and middotorientatiorr middot(middot_
~f r~ajor us ~llies and of the usmiddot itself couldno longer be as- middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
~ullled )heUSSR and its allies with a basically autarchic economy
middot-middot would be shielded from these effects middot In simplest terms the present
middot world power equati6nmiddotinwhich the military strengthmiddotof the USSR is middot
roughly balanced by middotthe economic and technological strength middotof the West _
middotwaul d b~ middotfundamentally middotand perhaps i rretri evably changed to the detri- middot middotmiddot -middotmiddot
~- v middotmiddot middot__ ment middotof the West middot
~ lt-gtmiddotmiddotmiddot _middotmiddott middot middot middot bull middot ~
__ middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~middotJmiddot middot middot~ ---~- middotmiddot-~middot~-middot~~middot ~- middot middot_ _middot ~-middot~middot __ middot middot
-~middot bull
B
yf __ _ middot middotl deli
stren
imba
derwa middot
decad
roug
middotmiddot ) nota
a~p~ri
~ wemiddotst
1 SEeiltET
Denial to the USSR
1 middot
~- 1
~ i
middot middot
~-middot ~ ~
_ _ middot _-_ I middotmiddot _-c_ middot
middot ~ middot~ middot middotmiddot
5 Eveo ~lithout Iran the powerbala~ce will be exceptionally
cate in _the early to mid-1980s In this period Soviet military
gth 1middot1ill grow--substantially_relatjve to that of the-Usan _
1an~e t~at ~~i 11 only be redres~~d- when ~ilit~middotry -p~oirar~~ n~~ u~~ bull middot middot bull bull
y or under consideration come to fruition in ihe later yearsmiddot omiddotthe
e On the other-side of ~he scaie-theussR~m b~ subjectin middot - middot bull bull ~middot bull middotmiddotmiddot l bull middot middot middot middot _
hiy the same time-frame to increasing economic difficulty mostmiddot middot middot gt bull
bly in the energy field_ Petroleummiddot prbpuction middothas peaked and wtn _ - -en~1Y begin tci ~ec~ ~ n~ shmiddota~pl~ bull Th~ middotSoviet -~~o~~~~ la~kingmiddot-t~e- middotgtmiddot
~ middot middotbull middotmiddot~bull middot flts cushfon of unnece-ssary consumption that canmiddot bemiddot conservedmiddot canmiddot middot middotmiddot_
only maintain its--p~esent posi~i~~ by a -c~~bin~tion-~drast~dal~Y middot middot~___ middot_middot middot - - ~-~ middot reduced exports and ~urchas~~ in the Hestern makmiddotemiddott r f~~t the _ middot middot-~ 5 -shy
middotmiddot middot Sovi_et 1eadership mampy be able middotto maintain its militctrY power -~dvcintage - middot middot middot middot I middotmiddot ~ -middot-middot middot middotmiddot middot middot-- bull ~- ~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--~ middotmiddot
I only tiyacepting even greater ecorioriic and ideological disadvan~ages -~ ~ middot middot ~middot middot
__ P~-~~etm~~hl too~ middot~efsn~~~u i _middot _~ ho~~middot ~11 a~ding to a demo~stra~ion tha~ th~middotSovi~t m~-dei ~a~-~ ~~~ern --~~_middot state is a fail~_re middot bullmiddot - _- ----_-- _-~~
middot 6 middotMoreover the Soviet le~dership itself isi_~- a st~te of ~ter-( -lt~ regnum middot The introverted clustermiddotof old men surroundinmiddotg the fading_ c _
middotmiddot middot-_middot _ Brezhnev re jockeying among themselves- to succeed him but appearmiddot middot_-middot
-
united in resistancemiddotto the admittarrce of younger middotand more vigorous menmiddotmiddot_ middot middot to their circle middotTheir behavior as a groupmiddot ~Jit~ or_ ~1ithout B~~zhnev middot
jI middot _is likely to middotbecome -increasingly erraticJDL-u~~ untfi pow~r ~middot i middot -middot middotmiddot middot - middot --
i pa~sesmiddotto the next generati_on-although it could lapse irito paralysismiddotmiddot -cmiddotmiddot - middot middot -middotmiddot
Webull-knm~ li-ttle of the policy vie~Js of the younger menmiddot-aHhough samemiddotmiddotmiddot_-ltmiddot middot
- ~4~- - __ _middot gt__ middot--~~ _ middotmiddot~- _~lt tmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddot bull bull rbull -~
middotmiddot ~FFIln _-middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot - middotmiddot middot_middot _- -~- middot
l SECRET
Ibull F middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot analysts have suggested that theymiddot are impatient 1middot1ith middotthemiddot cauti-on qf middot middot
i
middot middot their elders the Soviet state has too l_ong toleratedmiddot the pretentions middotbullmiddotmiddot bull
A~ middotof a declining West it should take middotadvantage ltif the po~er it has shy
achievedbulland Jress more aggressively toward its national goais ~ _middot-_bullltmiddot
middot middot ltmiddot1
7 We are not st~re ho_w fullymiddot the Politburo yetmiddotmiddotunderstands its lt middotmiddot bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull r
middot predicament If the po~JerbaJq~ce isdeiicatemiddot ~lithout han howe~ermiddotitmiddotmiddot-
wi i i become even ~or~ so w~en the ~ovi ~~- ~eaders rec~~ri~ze their f~~ middot~ _ middot3middot atf~n ~~-d themiddotpo-~sible roe that Ira~-~i~ht pi~middotmiddotin middoth middotTci a~ld_middot ~_bull_~~
S~viet middot1 ~~dership ~ha~middot s~es its a~bi evemerits middot~f deca~es ~ast gra~~llt gtXgt middot middotmiddot middot -middot bull -middot _
middot threatened by a 1Cck of petroleum middotar to a younger middotone that middotsees its ltgt middot opportu~itiesbull~r ~he middotmiddotfut~r~ ~~uaily thr~atened~ t~~ ~~spe~~ o a middot middot middot -middotgt ~ chao~imiddotc ~r~n ~ts armed fo~es shatter~d an~ its~] ie~ a-lmiddoti e~-~te~=middotmiddot~a emiddot ~-
~ middot _middot middot- ~ middot middot - shybull become tempting in the early 80s Not only ~ould Sovie~ ~rlergy-~h~rt~ middot i
bull bull bull bull bull bull I bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot _-middot~_
middotages be alleviated but thesupply offore1gri exchltmge iouid be -assured middot
More~~e in geo~political t~rms tli~ somiddotvi~ts would__ be inmiddotamiddotposii~onmiddotfr~m bullmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot- -middot -- - - middot _~ middot--~=gt---_middot
~ran-_to dominate the Hiddle East and South ASia and middotultimately to deriy lt bullmiddot-- - -~- -middot - - middotmiddot -middot- middot------middot--~middot~~-
bull Gulf oil to middotthe West middotmiddot middot middot middot - middot middot middotmiddot middot 8 Either leamiddotdership would of course ~aiculate the risk~ They middot~ltlt~~ middot
middotmiddot middot bull middot- bull - i_--~-_ -middotmiddot
would lie re)atively smqll if a Marxist_ preferably controlled COftllistbullmiddot middot middotmiddot regim~ ~o~ld b~ b~otight t~ power middotin Teht~n without ~-v~middotrt S~vi eti~ter~ L
middot middot -- middot Vention-but ~OUld appear muchg~eater if militarymiddotintervention W~~emiddot -
requireq How much middotgreater would in tvrn depend onmiddot roscows ass~s~~~nt middot middotgt) ~-
middot - ~-middotof the correlation of forcesmiddot -~ bull -middot-___ ---
middot- middotshy -
9 Inmiddot that the Politburomiddot members would see g~ography as middoton tliefr middot middotlt -middot -middot
side Not only are their genera-l purpose -forcesmiddot stronger thall those ofmiddot --
~
middotmiddot
1shy
I
-middot
middot middotmiddot -6- - bull middotmiddot
--- - middotlt_ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotL
middot middotmiddot middot-middot - middot middot ~
~_middotmiddot---middot middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot
~
middot
SE6RET
I
) - middot middotmiddot
Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
1 -middot bull i
middot middot middot the pertefvedw~akness middotmiddotOf u~s middot1 eader~hip middotand the geographic advant~ge~ middotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot~ middot middot
of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
middot
i middot
I -gt
J
bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
middot -
)
middotSECRET
be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
I l I
r
I middotbullmiddot middot-imiddot
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
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bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
I
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bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
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middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
bull middot middotmiddot
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shy - middot _ bull ~- middot _- -
bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
0 bullbull bull bull
middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
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shyshy
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middot
John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
lt
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middotmiddota_ Ho~ middotwidspread middotand middothow stronmiddotg is Khomeinis middot middotmiddotinfluence how canmiddot it be exploited by him to middot middotget his wi11 done This should be anC~lyzed
onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
middot middot-- amiddotdass middotbasis middot middot
tmiddot
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middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot middotmiddot bull
-middot middotmiddot __ 1
middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
_ -
T middotr bullmiddot l middot r
middot
i middotmiddot -shy
t I middot
I _ middot I
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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4
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
f middotJ bull
middotmiddotmiddot
middot ll
I
j I
i bull middotl
I l
middot+ bull -middot
i
11 - - II i j
~ middot_~__middotmiddotbull____i_shymiddotmiddot 1shy
middot_ ~~ ~-middot ~-middot ~- _J-middot middot middotmiddot ~
-
B
yf __ _ middot middotl deli
stren
imba
derwa middot
decad
roug
middotmiddot ) nota
a~p~ri
~ wemiddotst
1 SEeiltET
Denial to the USSR
1 middot
~- 1
~ i
middot middot
~-middot ~ ~
_ _ middot _-_ I middotmiddot _-c_ middot
middot ~ middot~ middot middotmiddot
5 Eveo ~lithout Iran the powerbala~ce will be exceptionally
cate in _the early to mid-1980s In this period Soviet military
gth 1middot1ill grow--substantially_relatjve to that of the-Usan _
1an~e t~at ~~i 11 only be redres~~d- when ~ilit~middotry -p~oirar~~ n~~ u~~ bull middot middot bull bull
y or under consideration come to fruition in ihe later yearsmiddot omiddotthe
e On the other-side of ~he scaie-theussR~m b~ subjectin middot - middot bull bull ~middot bull middotmiddotmiddot l bull middot middot middot middot _
hiy the same time-frame to increasing economic difficulty mostmiddot middot middot gt bull
bly in the energy field_ Petroleummiddot prbpuction middothas peaked and wtn _ - -en~1Y begin tci ~ec~ ~ n~ shmiddota~pl~ bull Th~ middotSoviet -~~o~~~~ la~kingmiddot-t~e- middotgtmiddot
~ middot middotbull middotmiddot~bull middot flts cushfon of unnece-ssary consumption that canmiddot bemiddot conservedmiddot canmiddot middot middotmiddot_
only maintain its--p~esent posi~i~~ by a -c~~bin~tion-~drast~dal~Y middot middot~___ middot_middot middot - - ~-~ middot reduced exports and ~urchas~~ in the Hestern makmiddotemiddott r f~~t the _ middot middot-~ 5 -shy
middotmiddot middot Sovi_et 1eadership mampy be able middotto maintain its militctrY power -~dvcintage - middot middot middot middot I middotmiddot ~ -middot-middot middot middotmiddot middot middot-- bull ~- ~middotmiddotmiddotmiddot--~ middotmiddot
I only tiyacepting even greater ecorioriic and ideological disadvan~ages -~ ~ middot middot ~middot middot
__ P~-~~etm~~hl too~ middot~efsn~~~u i _middot _~ ho~~middot ~11 a~ding to a demo~stra~ion tha~ th~middotSovi~t m~-dei ~a~-~ ~~~ern --~~_middot state is a fail~_re middot bullmiddot - _- ----_-- _-~~
middot 6 middotMoreover the Soviet le~dership itself isi_~- a st~te of ~ter-( -lt~ regnum middot The introverted clustermiddotof old men surroundinmiddotg the fading_ c _
middotmiddot middot-_middot _ Brezhnev re jockeying among themselves- to succeed him but appearmiddot middot_-middot
-
united in resistancemiddotto the admittarrce of younger middotand more vigorous menmiddotmiddot_ middot middot to their circle middotTheir behavior as a groupmiddot ~Jit~ or_ ~1ithout B~~zhnev middot
jI middot _is likely to middotbecome -increasingly erraticJDL-u~~ untfi pow~r ~middot i middot -middot middotmiddot middot - middot --
i pa~sesmiddotto the next generati_on-although it could lapse irito paralysismiddotmiddot -cmiddotmiddot - middot middot -middotmiddot
Webull-knm~ li-ttle of the policy vie~Js of the younger menmiddot-aHhough samemiddotmiddotmiddot_-ltmiddot middot
- ~4~- - __ _middot gt__ middot--~~ _ middotmiddot~- _~lt tmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddot bull bull rbull -~
middotmiddot ~FFIln _-middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot - middotmiddot middot_middot _- -~- middot
l SECRET
Ibull F middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot analysts have suggested that theymiddot are impatient 1middot1ith middotthemiddot cauti-on qf middot middot
i
middot middot their elders the Soviet state has too l_ong toleratedmiddot the pretentions middotbullmiddotmiddot bull
A~ middotof a declining West it should take middotadvantage ltif the po~er it has shy
achievedbulland Jress more aggressively toward its national goais ~ _middot-_bullltmiddot
middot middot ltmiddot1
7 We are not st~re ho_w fullymiddot the Politburo yetmiddotmiddotunderstands its lt middotmiddot bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull r
middot predicament If the po~JerbaJq~ce isdeiicatemiddot ~lithout han howe~ermiddotitmiddotmiddot-
wi i i become even ~or~ so w~en the ~ovi ~~- ~eaders rec~~ri~ze their f~~ middot~ _ middot3middot atf~n ~~-d themiddotpo-~sible roe that Ira~-~i~ht pi~middotmiddotin middoth middotTci a~ld_middot ~_bull_~~
S~viet middot1 ~~dership ~ha~middot s~es its a~bi evemerits middot~f deca~es ~ast gra~~llt gtXgt middot middotmiddot middot -middot bull -middot _
middot threatened by a 1Cck of petroleum middotar to a younger middotone that middotsees its ltgt middot opportu~itiesbull~r ~he middotmiddotfut~r~ ~~uaily thr~atened~ t~~ ~~spe~~ o a middot middot middot -middotgt ~ chao~imiddotc ~r~n ~ts armed fo~es shatter~d an~ its~] ie~ a-lmiddoti e~-~te~=middotmiddot~a emiddot ~-
~ middot _middot middot- ~ middot middot - shybull become tempting in the early 80s Not only ~ould Sovie~ ~rlergy-~h~rt~ middot i
bull bull bull bull bull bull I bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot _-middot~_
middotages be alleviated but thesupply offore1gri exchltmge iouid be -assured middot
More~~e in geo~political t~rms tli~ somiddotvi~ts would__ be inmiddotamiddotposii~onmiddotfr~m bullmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot- -middot -- - - middot _~ middot--~=gt---_middot
~ran-_to dominate the Hiddle East and South ASia and middotultimately to deriy lt bullmiddot-- - -~- -middot - - middotmiddot -middot- middot------middot--~middot~~-
bull Gulf oil to middotthe West middotmiddot middot middot middot - middot middot middotmiddot middot 8 Either leamiddotdership would of course ~aiculate the risk~ They middot~ltlt~~ middot
middotmiddot middot bull middot- bull - i_--~-_ -middotmiddot
would lie re)atively smqll if a Marxist_ preferably controlled COftllistbullmiddot middot middotmiddot regim~ ~o~ld b~ b~otight t~ power middotin Teht~n without ~-v~middotrt S~vi eti~ter~ L
middot middot -- middot Vention-but ~OUld appear muchg~eater if militarymiddotintervention W~~emiddot -
requireq How much middotgreater would in tvrn depend onmiddot roscows ass~s~~~nt middot middotgt) ~-
middot - ~-middotof the correlation of forcesmiddot -~ bull -middot-___ ---
middot- middotshy -
9 Inmiddot that the Politburomiddot members would see g~ography as middoton tliefr middot middotlt -middot -middot
side Not only are their genera-l purpose -forcesmiddot stronger thall those ofmiddot --
~
middotmiddot
1shy
I
-middot
middot middotmiddot -6- - bull middotmiddot
--- - middotlt_ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotL
middot middotmiddot middot-middot - middot middot ~
~_middotmiddot---middot middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot
~
middot
SE6RET
I
) - middot middotmiddot
Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
1 -middot bull i
middot middot middot the pertefvedw~akness middotmiddotOf u~s middot1 eader~hip middotand the geographic advant~ge~ middotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot~ middot middot
of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
middot
i middot
I -gt
J
bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
middot -
)
middotSECRET
be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
I l I
r
I middotbullmiddot middot-imiddot
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
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fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
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middot I
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middot shy
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-~
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middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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middot__ middot middot -
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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bull ~
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
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cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
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middot
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middotmiddot
middot-- 11
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
f middotJ bull
middotmiddotmiddot
middot ll
I
j I
i bull middotl
I l
middot+ bull -middot
i
11 - - II i j
~ middot_~__middotmiddotbull____i_shymiddotmiddot 1shy
middot_ ~~ ~-middot ~-middot ~- _J-middot middot middotmiddot ~
-
l SECRET
Ibull F middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot analysts have suggested that theymiddot are impatient 1middot1ith middotthemiddot cauti-on qf middot middot
i
middot middot their elders the Soviet state has too l_ong toleratedmiddot the pretentions middotbullmiddotmiddot bull
A~ middotof a declining West it should take middotadvantage ltif the po~er it has shy
achievedbulland Jress more aggressively toward its national goais ~ _middot-_bullltmiddot
middot middot ltmiddot1
7 We are not st~re ho_w fullymiddot the Politburo yetmiddotmiddotunderstands its lt middotmiddot bull bull ~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull r
middot predicament If the po~JerbaJq~ce isdeiicatemiddot ~lithout han howe~ermiddotitmiddotmiddot-
wi i i become even ~or~ so w~en the ~ovi ~~- ~eaders rec~~ri~ze their f~~ middot~ _ middot3middot atf~n ~~-d themiddotpo-~sible roe that Ira~-~i~ht pi~middotmiddotin middoth middotTci a~ld_middot ~_bull_~~
S~viet middot1 ~~dership ~ha~middot s~es its a~bi evemerits middot~f deca~es ~ast gra~~llt gtXgt middot middotmiddot middot -middot bull -middot _
middot threatened by a 1Cck of petroleum middotar to a younger middotone that middotsees its ltgt middot opportu~itiesbull~r ~he middotmiddotfut~r~ ~~uaily thr~atened~ t~~ ~~spe~~ o a middot middot middot -middotgt ~ chao~imiddotc ~r~n ~ts armed fo~es shatter~d an~ its~] ie~ a-lmiddoti e~-~te~=middotmiddot~a emiddot ~-
~ middot _middot middot- ~ middot middot - shybull become tempting in the early 80s Not only ~ould Sovie~ ~rlergy-~h~rt~ middot i
bull bull bull bull bull bull I bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull - bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot _-middot~_
middotages be alleviated but thesupply offore1gri exchltmge iouid be -assured middot
More~~e in geo~political t~rms tli~ somiddotvi~ts would__ be inmiddotamiddotposii~onmiddotfr~m bullmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot- -middot -- - - middot _~ middot--~=gt---_middot
~ran-_to dominate the Hiddle East and South ASia and middotultimately to deriy lt bullmiddot-- - -~- -middot - - middotmiddot -middot- middot------middot--~middot~~-
bull Gulf oil to middotthe West middotmiddot middot middot middot - middot middot middotmiddot middot 8 Either leamiddotdership would of course ~aiculate the risk~ They middot~ltlt~~ middot
middotmiddot middot bull middot- bull - i_--~-_ -middotmiddot
would lie re)atively smqll if a Marxist_ preferably controlled COftllistbullmiddot middot middotmiddot regim~ ~o~ld b~ b~otight t~ power middotin Teht~n without ~-v~middotrt S~vi eti~ter~ L
middot middot -- middot Vention-but ~OUld appear muchg~eater if militarymiddotintervention W~~emiddot -
requireq How much middotgreater would in tvrn depend onmiddot roscows ass~s~~~nt middot middotgt) ~-
middot - ~-middotof the correlation of forcesmiddot -~ bull -middot-___ ---
middot- middotshy -
9 Inmiddot that the Politburomiddot members would see g~ography as middoton tliefr middot middotlt -middot -middot
side Not only are their genera-l purpose -forcesmiddot stronger thall those ofmiddot --
~
middotmiddot
1shy
I
-middot
middot middotmiddot -6- - bull middotmiddot
--- - middotlt_ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotL
middot middotmiddot middot-middot - middot middot ~
~_middotmiddot---middot middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot
~
middot
SE6RET
I
) - middot middotmiddot
Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
1 -middot bull i
middot middot middot the pertefvedw~akness middotmiddotOf u~s middot1 eader~hip middotand the geographic advant~ge~ middotmiddot bullmiddotmiddotmiddot~ middot middot
of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
middot
i middot
I -gt
J
bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
middot -
)
middotSECRET
be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
I l I
r
I middotbullmiddot middot-imiddot
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
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the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
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elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
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middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
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middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
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to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
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measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
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middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
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2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
bull ~
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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Against this they would weigh middotthe dangermiddot that a venture in iran could
not be confined to Iran and its neighbors but might escalate to nuclea~
middot~middot bull middot confrorJtation Th~critical-factor for ttiem wo~ldbe t)eus lead~r-
ship They ileamiddotrly see the present one as weak and indecisive but they
do n~t fully und~rstand th~ us politi_cal proce~s To them _the USgt is lt-~r gt unp~edictablemiddot and especially dangerous in adversity 1~hen itmiddot may react middot middot
i middotmiddotmiddot middot 1ike awounded anima1 Both these tonsd1 era~ioris will be ~trongl middot middot middotmiddot(
I I operative _in middotthe election year 1980 11or~over theym~y cal~~late that middot middot middot
toe administration th~t taltes office in l9Slwiil nave~+all~a~gtomiddot middot
restore u~s military strength although~ any actionsit could talte ~au]d
) notsubstltmtia)ly effect the power balance for seyeral y~~rs middot middot middotmiddot _ bull middot gt bull - ~
10middot This is not iuiestimate that the Soviets will seize the Iranlan -~ --
middot oil fjelds It is rather that the combination of the Soviet need for --middot bull --- -middot middot I
-~- middotmiddot oil the p~wervacuum in Iran the strategic i-lindow of the early 80smiddot lt middotmiddot middot -bull-middot
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of the USSR make such an action a thinkable col)rse either fol ~n ~~middot gtDmiddot I middot I
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bulldecisively as a long-term disruption of that middotsupply~ middot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddot
_middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot
middot middot
cmiddot Avoid Confrontation with the USSR -
gt11 Controlling risks by avoid-ing confrontation is otwiously a middot ~- _ middot - -- middot middot _--middotmiddot- middot
desirab1 e goal for the Us but it ranks bel 01~ those of protecting the middot middot
other middotGlilf states and denying Iran to the Soviets Thesemiddotare vital to middot
the US national interests in the long term Indeed they mayonly ___ middot shy
bull _ bullmiddot =middot _ - -~ middotmiddot- bull ~ middotmiddotshy-- middot
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be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
I
I I
middot
I middot I middotmiddot
middot 1 middot
D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
I middot middotmiddot I middotmiddotmiddot shy
1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
I l I
r
I middotbullmiddot middot-imiddot
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
I
i
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
middot bull middotshy
middot middotmiddot
I I middot-
r
middot
middot
bull bull
- _ ~
middotf middot-- ~middotmiddot
middot_bull__gtmiddotmiddotmiddot__middot --
--middot -middot
bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
-- lt- middot
middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
bull middot middotmiddot
middot ~
_ shy middot middot middot -~ middot bullbull middotmiddot - middot
shy - middot _ bull ~- middot _- -
bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
0 bullbull bull bull
middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
middot middot
-
lt ~ middot ~-~
-middot middot-gtmiddotmiddot middot-middotmiddot
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ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
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middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
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John Waller
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~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
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middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
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middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
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-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
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Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
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2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
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middot middot-~middotmiddotall rbull
middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
bull ~
middot-
middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
bull
REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
8 bull
middot bull middot
middotmiddot
1
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middot middot
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Imiddotmiddotmiddot
Imiddot
) middot~ middot Imiddot _ middot
j
imiddot i
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j
close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
1
r I
I
middot i
c
SECREt middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot middot
t - I middot bull
i bull middot
cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
middot
i i
I
i
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I
middotmiddotmiddot
-
middotmiddot
bull --~- bullbull 7
middot
middot middot~ middot
middot middotbull middot middot
middot
middotmiddot
middot-- 11
middot-
bull bullbull _- middotmiddot___
bull
middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
Lmiddotmiddot
bull
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middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot_
middot middot l middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-bull_ 1
11 middot lt middot middotmiddot ~
middot middot middotmiddotbull I
middot
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
1middot mayprove to be impossible bull
_ middot j middotI - middotmiddot I
l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
I middot middotmiddotmiddot
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middot middot -_
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bullImiddot bull
--- middot 1
~-)gtmiddot-gt middot middot middot1 - middotmiddot middot _ -- middotmiddot imiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
-- middot -_ middoti middotmiddot middot middot middot -middot middotmiddot middot i
middot=
middoti
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middotmiddot- _ middotmiddotmiddot~~middot - middot
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-- middot -- middot - middot I middot-_ middot- middot
middotmiddot- middot__ middot middot middot-4
middot middotmiddot middot middot_ ~ middot middotmiddot-middot__middot middot_middot lt __) middot middot middot
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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be achievable by risking confrontation That said the arguments thatmiddot
middot
- ~
make mil tar ation appearmiddot less risky for the uss~ in the early 80smiddot middot
windo~1 are equally applicable to risk-taking by th~ US Short of a middot middot middotmiddotI middotdirect threat to our vitalmiddot interests the risk of mi)itary confrontation ~
with the USSR should be limited~ particularly so on ground scidisadv~n- ltltt bull
middot tageous as Irarimiddot middot middot middot middot ~ middot
_ middotlt-~_gtmiddot~-middot1middot middotmiddot middot
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D middot ~lainteriance of Iranian Oil Flo~1 to theWest middot middot - - middot middot middot middot ~lt middotmiddotmiddot
12 bull middotObviously a substantial and dependable flow ofmiddot Iranian oilmiddotmiddot middotmiddot lt__ middot - middot -~ middot
waul d at 1east in the shortmiddot run relieve pressure on ttleoil middotmarket and middot middot middot middot middot ~
limit eco(lomicdifficulHes in the West flie market ho~ever~ has middotab~ middot
~ ~-middotmiddot sorbed ~ considerable decrease in Iranian production and continuing- un-bull middotmiddotmiddot I
middot crtainti es as to its future middotmiddot A complete cut-offof expo~ts 1~oulddri~e middotbullmiddot(middot 1
prices higher slow ~~estern growth and ~~v~r~iy handicap the non~oil
I middotmiddot LDCs but wo~ld be far less traumatic than the loss of oil f~om across
~ bull middot -I themiddot Gult Jts ]ass has already to a certain extentbeen discounted inmiddot middot
bull ~middot
I the West supply will in the i anger run decrase in any casegtmiddot ~ middotmiddot~--middot ~
f middot middot middot lt
middotmiddotbull ~
middot middot middot middot-middot
middot
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1middot IV middotInterests of cithermiddot Powers middotmiddot
13 middot It is as critical or the West Europeans andJapan~se as it is middot ~
J forthe U~S tha~the flow of non-Iranian Gulf oil be sustaine~ andtltat)imiddot-~middot 1 bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot
the world power balance not be seriously disturbed in favor of themiddot middot middotmiddot middot
Soviet Union There Js no question that these states recognize the middot
middot ( middot I importance of the flow but somemiddot wil 1 be1i eve that theymiddot can better [
protect themselves by bilateral than by multilateral action Some will middotmiddotmiddot __ riotsee the balance as so seri~usly threatened short of Soviet military middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
j operations in Iran The greater 11eight theymiddot give middotto avoidance of US- middot
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SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
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middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
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bullmiddot -8-
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SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
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middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
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middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
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middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
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Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
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fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
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middot I
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middot shy
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-~
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middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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middot__ middot middot -
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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bull ~
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
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cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
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middot
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middotmiddot
middot-- 11
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
f middotJ bull
middotmiddotmiddot
middot ll
I
j I
i bull middotl
I l
middot+ bull -middot
i
11 - - II i j
~ middot_~__middotmiddotbull____i_shymiddotmiddot 1shy
middot_ ~~ ~-middot ~-middot ~- _J-middot middot middotmiddot ~
-
I middot
middot
middot middot middot
middot middot - - ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot
- middot
middot_middot1
- Y ~middot gtltmiddotmiddotmiddot
~
~- - _ middot r middotmiddot
i -middotltmiddot middot- middot
middot
cbull middot
-middotmiddot middotltmiddot-
middotgtSgt ~ middot-lt middot
_-middot ~- middot
bull
~
-gtlt - ~
middot ~
lt
middot
I
middot middot i- middotmiddotmiddotj
I
i
middot middot
middot
SECRET bull middotmiddot
middotr~~litYmiddot qf themiddotsoviet threat_ middotAs to Iranianmiddot oil flow they_ are likely
to vfew this and to seek ways to mairitairi 1t in bilateral nationalistic
middotwaysmiddot regardless of the position of middotthe US middotmiddot
middotmiddot 14 middotThe Middle Eastern States andmiddot particularly those of the Gulf bull
are of course less concerned with the economiC ~ell-being oigtthel-lest
than -of their own but their interest in avoidingmiddotmiddot infection from middotrranmiddot is
as g~eat as ours in protecting them frommiddot it middotsame ~r~ con~erned (lV~r - middot middot -
the g~neral us~ussR power balance(SaudiArabia) but most (Iriqlwouldmiddot
be ~0~ concerned-~ver the cl~arflndpres~nt dangerof~middotmiddota s~~iei~~riented Irim middotThey would fear aUS-soviet confrontatibn if only because it middot
middotgt -middot middot- middot middot _ -
middot rni ght bullforce them to chose sides betweein USSR that ~as militarily_ middot middotmiddot middot
stronger in the area _and a west o~ which their economtc well~being deshy - bull middot ~
middot middot pendsmiddotmiddot Their attitude toward Iranian oil_as opposed to Iranian politics
will rangemiddot f~om indi~erence to pl easur~ at the effect of T~~ leis~ on ~-bullmiddotselle~sm~Yk~t_middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot-15~ China desperatemiddotly needs a strong West to divide soviet at~ middot middotmiddot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot
middot
te11tion but it sees the West as losing its will in the faceof Soviet
pow~r China may w~U believe it ~ees the dangers to We~tern interests middot middot
iri th~ Iranian sjtuation more clearly tbari the West itselfmiddot It cer~ middot bulltainly ~ill be morestri9ent in pointing outthose dangers bull For Peking
middot some degree of US-Soviet confrontation would be desirable because itmiddot
would havemiddot the effect of strengthenin-g U~S will and accelerating Westernmiddot
arms programs In Chinas view GuLf oil from Iran or else~here- is
i
i I
l-
middot
middotimportant only in that if it flows south it strengthens middotthe West but
middotmiddotthat if it bullfl mis north it both weakens the W~st andstrengthens the -
USSR middot - _
middot --middot_-
middot middot middot - ~
middot - middot middot -middot middot
bullmiddot -8-
shy
-middot middot
middot ~ amiddotmiddot- -middot
____ _ _--_ L
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
i
bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
i l
_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
-11shy
l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
I
i
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
middot bull middotshy
middot middotmiddot
I I middot-
r
middot
middot
bull bull
- _ ~
middotf middot-- ~middotmiddot
middot_bull__gtmiddotmiddotmiddot__middot --
--middot -middot
bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
-- lt- middot
middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
bull middot middotmiddot
middot ~
_ shy middot middot middot -~ middot bullbull middotmiddot - middot
shy - middot _ bull ~- middot _- -
bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
0 bullbull bull bull
middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
middot middot
-
lt ~ middot ~-~
-middot middot-gtmiddotmiddot middot-middotmiddot
-_-
E-imiddot bull middotlt middotmiddot middot middotgt
SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
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John Waller
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~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
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middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
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middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
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-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
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Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
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2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
bull ~
middot-
middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
bull
REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
8 bull
middot bull middot
middotmiddot
1
I
I
middot middot
~~- middot ~- middot
Imiddotmiddotmiddot
Imiddot
) middot~ middot Imiddot _ middot
j
imiddot i
I 1middot
j
close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
1
r I
I
middot i
c
SECREt middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot middot
t - I middot bull
i bull middot
cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
middot
i i
I
i
I
I
middotmiddotmiddot
-
middotmiddot
bull --~- bullbull 7
middot
middot middot~ middot
middot middotbull middot middot
middot
middotmiddot
middot-- 11
middot-
bull bullbull _- middotmiddot___
bull
middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
Lmiddotmiddot
bull
i II
II i bull
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot_
middot middot l middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-bull_ 1
11 middot lt middot middotmiddot ~
middot middot middotmiddotbull I
middot
i middot_- middot i
middot middot middotmiddot
l
I
Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
1middot mayprove to be impossible bull
_ middot j middotI - middotmiddot I
l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
I middot middotmiddotmiddot
I
i I
middot
middot middot -_
- ]1 - middot middotmiddot
bullImiddot bull
--- middot 1
~-)gtmiddot-gt middot middot middot1 - middotmiddot middot _ -- middotmiddot imiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
-- middot -_ middoti middotmiddot middot middot middot -middot middotmiddot middot i
middot=
middoti
I Imiddot
I I
- I
middotI
l
l i
i
middotmiddot- _ middotmiddotmiddot~~middot - middot
l middot middot middot i
_middot_middotbullmiddotmiddot middot__middotmiddot__middot__middotmiddot_middot ____middot-___middotmiddotmiddot_middot_1middot_middot_
-- middot -- middot - middot I middot-_ middot- middot
middotmiddot- middot__ middot middot middot-4
middot middotmiddot middot middot_ ~ middot middotmiddot-middot__middot middot_middot lt __) middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot
-middot ~
t
]
i middot middot 1 ~middotmiddot middot middot middot middot~
bull l
middot bull -middot middot _
bull middot middot ~
bull bull 1 middot- J
I
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-~- - ~
friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
f middotJ bull
middotmiddotmiddot
middot ll
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i
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~ middot_~__middotmiddotbull____i_shymiddotmiddot 1shy
middot_ ~~ ~-middot ~-middot ~- _J-middot middot middotmiddot ~
-
16
middot
-- ff middotmiddotCt middot
middot I
bull
middot 1 middotmiddotmiddot
I middotmiddot middotmiddot
I
bull
SEGRET
The non-oil LDCs outside the ~iddlemiddotEast wi11 be forcedmiddotby -middot-
middot middot-~
their dependencemiddot onJoreign sources of energy and thegeneral middotweakness
middot of their economies to vie~ Iran in essentially opportunistic termsmiddot
Jhey l~ill want a maximum flowto keep middotprices do~mand their economies middot
turning over and they l1ill_dea1 with whoever can provide such a flow~ middot-- middot shy ~ if anyone can This means they would prefer the stat~s qu() in the Gulf middotc i
If the status quo were disturbed they wpuld 1~ant tosee stabili(y middot middotl middot bull middot middot middot - middot bull middotmiddot 1 restored by whatever power had the strength to do itmiddot and if that powerf middot bull bull bull j ~ere soviet tliflY would not be oyer)y concerned rn any case they would bull
middotmiddotmiddot~~emiddot t~e~s~lves middot ac~urately as having-little influence ~verthe cours~ middot bull middot - - _- middot middotmiddot bull
of events middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot j
middotmiddot- middotmiddotmiddot - -middot middot middot( -~ middot _ lt_middotmiddotmiddotbull~middotgt=-t_- i- middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotvmiddot middot middotPo smiddotsmiddotlblemiddotmiddot middotIramiddotns omiddot f 1981middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot middot
middot middot middot _ middot middotmiddot ~- i middot middot middotmiddotmiddot ~~-middot L
1 gt here middotare~t ~east six Possible 6ut~~~~s e~h wi~h infiriit~ V~ri~tio~s ~ fOr the pres~n(m~s~ inmiddot Iian~ I~ gereral it~~s ~these arebull bull bull
middot middot imiddot L _middotmiddotmiddot -- middot bull Survival o~Khom~inibulls prim~tive ~loslem the~ middot ~- ))Ji I
I I
I I
middot middot ocraty middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot ~bull middot--- middotmiddot Rep1 acemen( of Khomei ~ i et a 1 by a radical middotmiddot ~ middotmiddot _middot middot middot middot nationalist regime middot middot middot middot middot _ middotmiddot bull middot middot
-
Communist or -strongly Communist_influemceci regimemiddot middot
middot ethnically-based entities with or without p~rtition or middot
middot
middot
middot -~
gt
middot - middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
~ middotmiddot middot_middott211
-
middot imiddot -9-
I middot middot
--~
middotbull middot middot- middot lt bull- middot middot middot middot SEEfiET middot middot
L
occupation by neighboring nationsmiddot
middot- middot middot _ middot Civil ~r invoiving any of a number of combishy
middotncltionsof antagonists ethnic political and religious
middot
bull ~~lt- middot
middot middotbullbull -~
middot
middot
middotmiddot rmiddotmiddotmiddot middot l
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bull
middot
i middot J Imiddot I I middot r ~-
i
(
middott
_-
-
Et~ergence of a right or center-right regirne middot bull middotbacked by the military
middot middot bull middot 18 Any of these outcomesmiddot could middotlead to anypther In fact~ by middot middot middotmiddot
middot
198lIra~middotcquld ha~e ~een middotan ofmiddotthernmiddot -middotThe presentstate and the an~ middot middotmiddot middot
archy into which itseems togtbe collapsingmiddotis clear)y aransitionalmiddot middotmiddot middotr
phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
middotmiddot s~ middotgeat that ~li~~e s~e~s 1ittl e putp~~~- in middots~ec~i~tin~ ~~ th~middot li~lYmiddotmiddot middot bull-~middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotto seehoweach migh~ amiddotf~ect the usmiddot~a~i~naT middotinte~est~middotde~i~~d ~b~~~~middot-middot_middot1) middot middot middot -middot --
middot middot middot middot-middot middot~~- gt
middot--~ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot-middot~~--~gt - middot -imiddot--
A SurvJvalmiddotof the Khomei ni Regmiddotime middot middotmiddot middot _ middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~ ~bullmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot
~ - the Khorneini government whileh~rdmiddotly in control i~middot-middotmiddotltlt
keep ~il fowi ng a~d tci m~i~ta~~middot ~middot~m~ ~embl~n~e middoto~ middotmiddotlt ~(~
bull -
seqUenCe of~verits al thpUghmiddot _i-1 c~nmiddot -be sii-d middot tbat --~- middotlef~i-~tmiddot dUt~ome middot_gt gtmiddot~- -~_~t- middot app~ars middot~he mostmiddot probable and a rightist on~ th~ imiddotest For ~h~ middotp~rP~middot~e~ bullf~ ~f t~i S paper hbw~~ermiddot the impc)tanf thing iS notto dete~i~~ middot~hatmiddot~ middot middot middot~~
middot mightmiddotp~~duce a pa~~i~~middot~armiddot outc~~e ormiddot~~~e~~it~~inmiddotobabili~yb~middotta~he~middotmiddot~ I
middot effe~tiv~ middotenough to bull middot ~ bull j
i
middot
imiddot r
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_ a military force butmiddot toci ~ieak to restore economic activity or contain -~middot
ethnic separatl-sm The fal i of the Shah middoth~~ worried the ~~middot~anarchiesmiddot-middotgt middot middot middot-_ ~ ~ middotmiddot __ _- -- middotmiddotmiddott_middot~- the triumph of the Shia has excited their brethren across the Gulf ancj middotmiddot middot~middotmiddot~ middot
the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
CJO~ i ~ l
1
middot
-_ middot -- bull
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l middot
middotmiddot bull middot middot middotllf middot
I
I I I I
I inflt~ence~ I I middot
middot-middotmiddot
( middotmiddot imiddot
I bull 1middot bull middotbull
-middotmiddotymiddot bull1 middot
I middot middot
middot
middot
bull
Imiddot
I bull
bull middot bull middot middot bullmiddot
middot bull
i middot I
~ = I f t middot I middot j
-middot _-~
Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
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middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
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bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
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middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
middotmiddot middot_ middot middotmiddot_ middotbull middot - middot middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
shyshy
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middot
John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotmiddota_ Ho~ middotwidspread middotand middothow stronmiddotg is Khomeinis middot middotmiddotinfluence how canmiddot it be exploited by him to middot middotget his wi11 done This should be anC~lyzed
onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
middot middot-- amiddotdass middotbasis middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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-middot middotmiddot __ 1
middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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T middotr bullmiddot l middot r
middot
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t I middot
I _ middot I
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
oshy middot
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middot
bull
middotmiddot -~- middot middotmiddot
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middotmiddot- middot -middot
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
middot
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bull middot~
_ -middot _ _ middotmiddot middot middot
~
middot-middot middot
middot ~ middot ~ ~ middot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
middot bull 1 - I
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i
middot
imiddot I
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imiddot
loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
middoti middot middot
bull middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
middot
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middot middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot
middot__ middot middot -
---- middot middot_
middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
middot middot 1
middotmiddot_middot--
bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
middot1
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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bull ~
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
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cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
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-
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-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
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phase A Civil war could 1 ead to themiddot ~mergence of a ~trong state of themiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot~ l~ft or ~ight to pa~t~tionmiddot ~middotr middotb~ck middott~ a~aifdgt Thmiddot~ uric~rtai~ties middot~r
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the short-lived succe~~of the left in reaching for pow~r thro~gh~a middot~middotgt
middotShia alliance has sent ripples through the susceptible educated classes - middotmiddot
middot middot
of the Gulfstates but the regimel)as middotsci far bemiddoten too weakmiddot to middotexport middot -
its revolution especially when theleft-Muslim alliance has brokenmiddot middotmiddot middot middot middot
down and the example it has set is harilly an attraCtive one for other bull middot
Khomeini s foreign poliiy is ~lmmiddotci~t middotas anti-Soviet as it
smiddotanti -US there is vi~tually no prospect of middotthe riyatolhhs acquiescillmiddotmiddot~middotcmiddotbull
middot bullmiddot bull bull middotbullbull middotmiddot bull middot
bull middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot - c~bull eJT middotmiddot middot -- _ middot =ltmiddotmiddotmiddot middot ~middot _middotmiddotlt-~lt-~~--~~middotmiddot
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Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
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middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
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37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
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middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
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~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
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middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
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to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
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ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
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middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
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Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotSavemiddot middot middot~
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middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
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middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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middot middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot__ middot middot -
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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Thus -1he two vital Us int~rests middot _-middotbull
ltmiddotmiddot middot are not now- Clirectly threatened by the Khomeinmiddoti regime Moreover there- middot I
middot bull is no US-Soviet confrontatmiddotion 011 th~ horizon and Iranian oil comiddotn-middottj1lu~s middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot bullmiddot__ ~~ to flow -south middot middot
middotbullmiddotmiddot middotmiddot Ji middot 20 The situation is not static however It is most u~~~Y th~t _
themiddot Islamic government can remain in its prese11t state_ It must either middot -~ - __
grow stronger restoring its militari strength ani renewing jts control - shy middot- middot middot - middot middot_ -middot -~ bull middot __~middot_=middot-_ - bull ~ middotmiddot middot__ middot ~
over regional dissid~n~~middotmiddotormiddot gro~ weake~ invitin~ an~~h~ ~nd-~ivil_ -~ __ jwar In the first iaseltsrevolutionary fervor will be allthemiddot middot_~-I
~reater bulland it~ infl uence wm be felt alq~g ~he ~ul~ th~o~gh~ubv~~- ~~~)-lt-~- 1
sian and ~ilitarymiddot threat Its interest in the expci)tof _pil wi11 be _bull- ~ II
-s~condary to its interest in t~e export ~f ~evoi~t~on~ )nihesmiddote~~~d-~ bull~~I gtand mcirelikely case its ceil lapse will creatE chaos thatwill seem-middot gt middot
middot middot bull bull - middot -~middot ) I middot middotthreatening middotto an its neighbors a(ld -an opportunityto bullspme Tempta- -middotmiddotmiddot
middot ~ middot _
tionsto intervene arid to annemiddotx will be great In particular the Soviets il _q mightmiddot see middotanmiddot intervention to restore order e~s-middotattractive they would middot_middotltlt 1
middotmiddot middot~ middotI bull bull bull middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot~ I
middothave lowered the riskmiddotby providing both a reasonable pretext and a way middot middotmiddot middot middot middot_ bull - middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot il
outbull It might therefore be argued that a strong Islamic government middot middot _middot_ middotmiddot bull
~~o~ld b~middot l_~ss threatening to us it~rests than a weak one Levenmiddot a middotmiddotmiddot middot ltmiddot strong one might be unsu~cessful in destabilizing the Gulf states -- b~t bull __ middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot bull bull -~--- ~- middotmiddot middot middot-~middot~
neither outcome middotcould be viewed as favorable for the -usmiddotmiddot middot -middotmiddotmiddot
21 The illTolediate successor government_tomiddot KHomeinimiddot ff Iran remairrs middot
middot
in)act and ~ivil war does not middotbreakmiddot out is most likely to be one rep-middotmiddot_ _-bull middot
~esenti~g a co~lition of the home-gown radic~l nationalis-ts ~o~ho ~~~~-middot middot middot ---
tci prominance in the R~volution and th~ ~ore dtsmiddot~ipline~-~nd less cmiddot~n~ middot ~- gt middot middot
~lbttc 1 middot ~
-middot
__
bull middot bull
middotmiddot
middot~-middotlt
middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot
middot middot middot I middot middot middot middotmiddot
middot bull middot middot
imiddot r middot middotmiddot
I
-_-
- middot middot
middot middot
_ middot_I middotmiddot
middot middot
middot-- middot
middotspi_cuous Cor1111unist organization that has presumably beenmiddotmiddotmiddoterected on a middot Tudeh foundation A struggle for middotpowe-rmiddot~li n then middotensue betleeri the
_ ~ bull bull I bull ~-
two factions Its outcome will middotbe difficult to preltict for themiddot ~middot bull -middot ~
middotemotiomiHsm andnumbersmiddot of the former will be pitted against the dis-middot_- _middot
ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull middot--~ middotmiddot bull I I
the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
It imiddot~ 1 i kely to b~middotstorig and grow stro~g~~ be~ middot middotltmiddotlt~middot middotgt cause it will ~ave cometo ~Ow~~-b_de~eating_ K_h~~e~~i_middotmiddotxi~ ~ffr~~_
and the Commumsts middotamiddotnd because 1 tmiddot ~nll probably have middot lt __ middotmiddotmiddot middot middot- bull _cshy - middot- _middotmiddot_middot ~middot-__ -
middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
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the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
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middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
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middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
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middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
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2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
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middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
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middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
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ciplin~ and Soviet supp~-r~ ~f t~e ~tte~middot middotIf th~ nationa-iismiddott~middot ~1~ middotmiddotmiddot i middot middot middot-middot
their victory 1~ill be obvious tf the to~unists win their dorii~afiari middot~ _ middot - middotmiddotmiddot_middot-
maymiddot be hidde~~ atieas~ -initiali~ behi~da screenmiddotof~a~iortalismandltmiddotmiddotmiddotj --~-- middot-middot middot- __ middot bull
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the movement of Iran into the Soviet sphere wilL~f discreet anpoundl~ely middot-~lt(~
middot perc~pti~lemiddot middot middot middot middot middotbullmiddot-middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot~~middotmiddotmiddot middot~~middot _)~jmiddot~~j s_ A-RadicalNationalist Reginie _ - middot - middotmiddotbull -lt()middot middot middot 22 such a regimemiddot would prol)ablyhave three importcin(cha~acterfstibsmiddotmiddot~ bull bull bull bull bull bull bullbull bull middotmiddot bull middot bull middotmiddot- bull t
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middotrallied tlie middotsupport oftheurban elit~~ middot middotmiddot middot middot middot middot middot middotmiddot -middot
Its orfentat~onlt~ill ~~middot modern middot Its 1e~d~r middotmiddot ltlt)bull - middot bull middotmiddot gtmiddotmiddot lt middot~i
will see themiddot Islamic republic as the anachronism that middot middotbullmiddot middot ___ gtgt middotmiddot--) _middot middot bull middot -middot _middotmiddot- -~middot--~ middot middot_middot-~---=~middotmiddotmiddot
-it is ~-Th~Y middotand the edut~ted--cl~sses that supP~rt ihe_mmiddot~ middotmiddot~ -middot_~~--~~- _- -_ _ltlt~ middot- _ middot- middot_ middot --- middot middotmiddot middotmiddot --- middot_-middot-middot~_ ~-- middot- __ ~-- )--_
will wantmiddot to restore the economy and 1~i1l- see the need middot middot middot middot middot_-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotfor ~odern armed f~rce~ middot Thes~ g~ah_ in_ middottum -~~11 ~~~ui_rt-rmiddot Vltplusmn~~y~~ foreignmiddotexchange and a dependable export of oil middotmiddot middot middot middot ~ middot middot - middot middot middot__ middotmiddotJ
middot It wiJ1 be xenophobic No home-grown Irailian gtmiddot _ middot ltmiddotmiddot----_ middotgovernment emerging from the preserit hysteria can bemiddot-any- _middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-~middotgt- _ middot -~ _ middotmiddot middot-middot--middot ~ thing else Its hostility will be str~~ger toward the - _ middot__ middotmiddot(
- middot) middot-middot - -
middotus middotthan toward the West it will- b~middot ~i11ing to do middotbus- - middot middot middotmiddot _ middot middot - middot - _ middotr middot iness ~lith the Westmiddot butmiddot probabiy not initia1ly 1~ith themiddotmiddotmiddot - middot _ -middot-middot
middotmiddot middot - -middot --- shy middot middotmiddot
middot_middotmiddot -12shy
middot middot bull
i - middot
middot ____-- - ---=----middot7-_____
middot middot- middot bullbull tmiddot ~ middot
middot middot middot middot ~
gt middot-~middot middot --i
bull bullbull -~ _O
gtmiddotmiddot
~middotmiddotymiddot I gtgt21
) middot-gt
ii I
ir
~i~- middot~)-gt~-~--middot
middot middot
_ middot
middot middot middot
middot
-
bull
middot
middot-
middot
I j middot middot middot -1middot middot middot
middot bullbullmiddot bull middotmiddot bull middotmiddot middot r-middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot
-middotshy
middot
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbull
lt
middot
-
SECRET middot
middot bullmiddot us It willmiddotal~o-middotbe willing todo business 11ith middotthe middot
middot _middotmiddot SomiddotAets _but will b~ deeply distrusffulof t)jem - middot middot
23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
rmiddot~ goo m bull iti bull middot
C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
middotmiddotmiddot
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
middot middot-- amiddotdass middotbasis middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
middot bull 1 - I
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imiddot I
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
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-
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-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
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~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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23 Such an Iran might resemble an Iraq that was not dependent on middot
middotthe USSR for ~rms aith~ughthis resemblance ~~o~ld not imply middota sympa- middot middot middotmiddot middot - middot_middot middot ~ bull - thetic relationship between the two states It ~10uld be 1i_kely to com- middotmiddot
bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bull bull
pete with Iraq for influence across the Gulf Competition -might create middot
i~stabi i ty in the Gulf ~~-d thmtenth~ o_il_ f_~-~1 ormiddot~~e tw~s+t~~ _middot_ middot_
mi_sht effectivel~ cancel __ eac~- ~t~er outmiddot ~eog_~a8hY ~side ~u~h ~n Ira-~)
wouldnotbemiddota te~pt~n~ ~pport~m ~y-middot ~r __ the Soviet~ any ~o~e -~ha~ ~ratmiddotmiddot~has beetJ-Altho~gh middot1 t _(lll9hLtie- w1l) Jng to _export some o1l north)lard bull- middot-middot - middot
middot~~~~ ~ - ~ i middot -~ tSJtfmiddotmiddot_24middot_-A ~pdic~lriationalistlr~ w~uld ~resen~~ni a 1-i~~t~~middotthre~tbulllt ~o ol-1-suppJy-fro~~he_-Gulf Eimiddotk~I-r~q if ~~d~lmiddotdmiddotb~middot~eri~usiy 6d~~~~~if itS o~m exports ilere interrupted Military a~tio~ againstanessen4middotbull middot middotmiddot~middot- middotmiddot middot middot --~ middot middot - ~ - middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot-middot middot -~middot- middot __ __ _~~middot
tlally ]eftistmiddot though anti-Soviet Iran with a strOng and popularly- middot__
middot--~-~~ported ~over~m~nt would b~ ~~ un~ttractive option f~r th~middot Politbur()~ middot_middotmiddot _-middot1 middot middot middot~ - middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot --~---- _(t )
and the risk of US-Soviet confrontationmiddot wciuld be relatively small middot- -Thusmiddotgtmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middot middot _middot middot middot middot - middot_ -----~---~ bull middot t -middotmiddotmiddotgt_middot
_this outcome middot11hil~ _far less favorablemiddot than t_he situation that prevailed jxmiddotmiddot
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C~middot A floscow-OrieritedRegime middotmiddot _ - middot -~ middotmiddot middotmiddot bullshybull ~ middot middot - ~
-middot 25 Should the Corirmnist-nationalistmiddot stbullggleb~e overt and erid middot~_lt_ middot middot middot - -middot
lt in open defeat middotfor the national]sts the r-~gime that emerged woulcLbe _ middot -bullbull bull bull bullbullbullbull 1 bullbull bull bull bull bullbull bull bull bullbull bullbull bull _
ci~~rly identified with Moscow It would differ froma nationalist middotleftmiddotmiddot middot middotcmiddot- _ middot -middot -middot---middot
middot - ~ middot - bull middot- -middot middot-middotmiddot middotmiddot middot ~- shy -middotmiddot -l~- middot _ middot middot middot-middotmiddotmiddot middot~ bull middot ~13 middot- ~ middotbull middot- ~-~-~ middot ~
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smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
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27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
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middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
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middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
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bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
I
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middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
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middotf middot-- ~middotmiddot
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bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
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middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
bull middot middotmiddot
middot ~
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shy - middot _ bull ~- middot _- -
bull -middot middot ~-- bull -- _ middot middot middotmiddot
middotshymiddot middot
0 bullbull bull bull
middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
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E-imiddot bull middotlt middotmiddot middot middotgt
SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
middotmiddot middot_ middot middotmiddot_ middotbull middot - middot middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
shyshy
Jmiddot-
j
I I i r
I
I
middot
John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
lt
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middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddota_ Ho~ middotwidspread middotand middothow stronmiddotg is Khomeinis middot middotmiddotinfluence how canmiddot it be exploited by him to middot middotget his wi11 done This should be anC~lyzed
onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
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middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
1middot mayprove to be impossible bull
_ middot j middotI - middotmiddot I
l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
I middot middotmiddotmiddot
I
i I
middot
middot middot -_
- ]1 - middot middotmiddot
bullImiddot bull
--- middot 1
~-)gtmiddot-gt middot middot middot1 - middotmiddot middot _ -- middotmiddot imiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
-- middot -_ middoti middotmiddot middot middot middot -middot middotmiddot middot i
middot=
middoti
I Imiddot
I I
- I
middotI
l
l i
i
middotmiddot- _ middotmiddotmiddot~~middot - middot
l middot middot middot i
_middot_middotbullmiddotmiddot middot__middotmiddot__middot__middotmiddot_middot ____middot-___middotmiddotmiddot_middot_1middot_middot_
-- middot -- middot - middot I middot-_ middot- middot
middotmiddot- middot__ middot middot middot-4
middot middotmiddot middot middot_ ~ middot middotmiddot-middot__middot middot_middot lt __) middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot
-middot ~
t
]
i middot middot 1 ~middotmiddot middot middot middot middot~
bull l
middot bull -middot middot _
bull middot middot ~
bull bull 1 middot- J
I
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot-~- - ~
friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
f middotJ bull
middotmiddotmiddot
middot ll
I
j I
i bull middotl
I l
middot+ bull -middot
i
11 - - II i j
~ middot_~__middotmiddotbull____i_shymiddotmiddot 1shy
middot_ ~~ ~-middot ~-middot ~- _J-middot middot middotmiddot ~
-
_~~-
middot- middotA~middot
rmiddot middot
middot
f middot middotmiddot
bull I
middotmiddot1-middot ( middot_
-~
I
j middot I
t
middot middot
middot
middot I I
i I
i
( bullbullmiddot
bull
I-~ middot
ij middot bull bull middot- I
middotmiddot- -- _-
- middot
middot
middot
smiddotJoVernment primad ]y in being narr01middot1ly based and therefore weaker a bull
middot condition the Soviets wollld seek to rectify as rapid1y as possiblemiddot
middotThey 1~ould be Hmited however as v1olild their Iranian friends by the
(xenophobia the revolution has unleasheil middot middot Indeed this Iran might be as
much a prisoner of the revolution as the present onemiddot middot middotmiddot middot middot
26 As th~ second Iran might be modeled onmiddotmiddot Iraq tlie middotthird mightmiddot
(r~~emble Afghanistan The Soviets might welifind the~s~~~~~middot-~~~ middot
up an unpopular regillje and seeking to control middotv1ith weak Iranian armed
middotmiddotforces a variety ofethnic lpillitical and religious dissidents bull onlY
imiddotf they s~cce~d~d c~l d the ass~re th~~selves a su~piy of oi ~middotmiddot and thfs
_ middotmiddot
-middot middot shy shy
would probably require middotassistance on a scale equilialerii-to military ~
middot bull middot middotgt ~---middot ----shy _middot interventiongt _- _ - middot _middot_ middot___ middotmiddot ~-middot_---~ middot ~-
27 Successful establishment of a Soviet-oriented Iran 1~ould provide-~-
middot a liase fpr ~xtensiori of Soviet influence iriand ultimately denial atmiddot middotWestern access to the Gulf states It would provide the USSR with th~
oil ~nd f9reign ~xchange it needs middotmiddotmiddot As such a s(llution would directly
middotattack vital us interests~ centoAfloltatiOOwould pe uriavoidable~-Whiie middot
the flow of Iranian oil to the Hest would in the short run be in the middot
middotinterest of the regime iri the longer run it would be integrated intogt middotgt~middot-- middot
the petroleum economy of Eastern Europe middot Subject to the middotdemandsmiddot of middotmiddot - middot -_ middotmiddotmiddotmiddot --middot
middotSoviet policymiddot however a net but sma-ller flo~ to the Hest might con middot middot middotmiddot
I-middot
middot
middottinue middot middot middotmiddotlt middotmiddot
middotmiddot 28 If such anmiddot Iran were to fail that is not to achieve a -
measure ofmiddot popular support and reconstitute Iranmiddot as a middotunitary middotstate it middot -
- could neithermiddot project its influence abroad nor reorient its petroleum -~ middot
middot _
economy northward middotHm~ever the exi sjence Of strong popular resistancemiddot middot ~---- middot - middot
middot~
~ __ middot middotmiddot_ middotmiddot_middotmiddotmiddot-shy middot -14- bull _ ~ ~ shymiddot middot- middot - middotmiddot
middotmiddot bull
I
i i
i f middot
middot
~middotmiddot1middot
I I
f bullbull ~ middot
i
I middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot bull
middotltmiddot SEERET
middot
middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
Undermiddot~uch circumstancesus initiatlv~s~ould middotb~middot hobbled byhemiddot~~ middotmiddotmiddot bi guity ofmiddot th~ politicai middot situati~ri and th~ ntern~ti6~almiddot~~middotpapilafi~y middotmiddot ~middot
middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
~-middot middot
bull middotmiddot
middot_middot
middot
_ -middot~ middot middot ~ bull middot middot--middot middot
poundI
middot middot c bullmiddot -15shy middot middotbull ~
middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddot middot middot bull
bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
shy
bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
-Irans neighborsor frommiddot the Hest tmiddotioscm~ 11i11 be guick-to middotadvance _its middotmiddot_bull bull bull bull bull I bull
interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
middotmiddotmiddot bull bull l
__middot middotmiddot _middotmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot I middotbull lt middotmiddot middot gt
I middotmiddot
bull
I 1middot
middot
I middot _middotmiddot- I
I I
middotL -- middot middot
II
middotj
I
middot
i
bullbullbull t
fa~~ te~p~ing apet~ol~um~t_h~_rs~JLM=~~les_~middot Khu~is~~~- we~~- int~~_gt~cmiddotrh~nds of a~overnment clearly guaranteed by 11_17 Wess(a~~tor_Iraq~) ~~ middotlt middotmiddot On _this avoid~~ce of ~onfrontamiddottion would_ essentialiy depmiddotend bull Afu~c- -~~ middot 0 0 o 0 0 0 oO 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 -~-~ Mbull 0 ~---~ bullbull -
tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
i middot i
Imiddot _
middot
I middot middot I middot
middot I
bull
middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
middot
i
_middot middotmiddotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddot
-~
-17-
middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
I
i
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
middot bull middotshy
middot middotmiddot
I I middot-
r
middot
middot
bull bull
- _ ~
middotf middot-- ~middotmiddot
middot_bull__gtmiddotmiddotmiddot__middot --
--middot -middot
bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
middot middot-- amiddotdass middotbasis middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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_middot middotmiddot
with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
I
I
I ~
middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot - middotmiddot
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middot =middot -~~ -middot~
middot
middotmiddot middotmiddot
middotI
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middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot -~
middot
middot middot-~middotmiddotall rbull
middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
bull ~
middot-
middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
bull
REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
8 bull
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middotmiddot
1
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Imiddotmiddotmiddot
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
1
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I
middot i
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SECREt middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
I
middot middot
middot middot middot
t - I middot bull
i bull middot
cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
middot
i i
I
i
I
I
middotmiddotmiddot
-
middotmiddot
bull --~- bullbull 7
middot
middot middot~ middot
middot middotbull middot middot
middot
middotmiddot
middot-- 11
middot-
bull bullbull _- middotmiddot___
bull
middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
Lmiddotmiddot
bull
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middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
middot middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot_
middot middot l middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot-bull_ 1
11 middot lt middot middotmiddot ~
middot middot middotmiddotbull I
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
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-- middot -_ middoti middotmiddot middot middot middot -middot middotmiddot middot i
middot=
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-- middot -- middot - middot I middot-_ middot- middot
middotmiddot- middot__ middot middot middot-4
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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middothasmiddot~ vital middotinterestgt could wen leadtomiddotconfrol]tatian rhe~ecould be- bull
middotno ~anfidencethat Iranian oil ~oul d flawmiddot to the ~lest
middot29middot A most difficult situation for themiddot US ~~auld arJJ_~bow~gtterbullmiddot
iT an ostensibly leftist-nationalist legi~e-~ere coopted from ~ithin bymiddot
middot-
middot middotmiddot I middot~
middotCommunist cadres That this had ti~ppened might hat bemiddotall obv1ciusmiddotfor (middot middot middot-
cmany months and the movement of Iranmiddot intomiddot thi Soviet sphere of~inf1uenc~ bull bull bull bull bull bull ~ bullbull bull d bullbull
middotmight be very graduaLmiddot No clear break-pOimiddotnt woUld ever be presented middot middot middot
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middot - middot middot middot middot -middot~middot middot middot bull middot_ o~-~osti~i~Y towaril a seeminglriationalist govern~eft ltmiddot middot middotmiddot lt) middot This government would initiauy partake pfthe sam~ strengthsbull
middot and weak~e-~~es as a t~uemiddotnatio~ali~~ ~ne ana itsmiddot~~licie~inmiddoti~ially middotmiddot ~middot
30 middot ~-- middot-middot middot_-~middot- middot
iould middotqe much middotthe middotSame exceptltin its greater wiJHhgnesmiddots -tomiddot acc~pt middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot _ - ~
assistance middotfrcmi the USSR lnternally Jt would gradujilly be~om~ mo_re I
authoritarian arid more orthodox in its ~~r~is~ middotitwauid r~pidlr~can~ middotmiddotmiddot 1
middotbull stitute ttie ar~ed force~ a~~ supp~~ss sepa~ati~mmiddot middot~niile trll~achieve-middot ~ltlt~middot5middot I
middot ment o~ Soviet goalswould ~eslower-it woul~bes~rer~ _middotmiddotmiddot ~~middotrl middot middot middot-gt- ~
D Disintegration bull middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ -middot middot _
bull bull _ l bull --
middot middot31 middotqeakriess in Tehramiddotri has already encouraged amiddot re~tirgence of sep- ~ gt -middot middot middot_ middot middot -- _
aratism notably among the Kurds and middotArabsmiddot Similar tendencies un- middotmiddot bull
~ bull middot _middot
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bull middot middotmiddot middot middot middot bull _ ltmiddotmiddot ~ middot~ middot middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middot EFFRFT bull
~ bull I bull bull
middot doubtedY exist among the Azerbaijani middotBal uchi 1mct perhaps others middotwe
middotare unclear how far these movements-middothave coalesced middotIt i-smiddot virtually middotmiddot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot middotmiddotand will 1n Tehramiddotngt bull _ middot
middot
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bull --~middotmiddot-middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot_ middotmiddot~middotmiddot -middot middot SEpoundRET
middot 32 middotAfter amiddot certain Pqint th~se tiovememts middotwill bec~me independent middot middot bull
~~ther than autonomousmiddot Thewill seek and wriJ find assistanc~ f~omlt-
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interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
Kurds will accept arms from anyone an(_Moscow -is -fullY__(ltwable of_sus-middot -
1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
high espedally controlling
middot~~~-~ltL(z(_fgtthreat to its Gulf neighbors It would howevermiddot remain lioth vulnerab1emiddot-middot middot
to_
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tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
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el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
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middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
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of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
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is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
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sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
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middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
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middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
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middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
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middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
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middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
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-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
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interests The Azerbaijani _-H(particulaibull will look tomiddotthe uss~-middot Tbe middot_
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1a~riing a -~iable Kurdish indepe~nce movement nIr~middotOthebull~S-~omiddotuld middotgt-1~~k t~ Iraq Saudi Arabia Pak~stantlie U~ ~n~ th~middot ~~)middot T~~riikok- ci~il_ war ~f ~th~se lehmiddotr~~ ~~~--middot _~
middot~ would be
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tioriing government i h Khuzist~ngt wheth-~r orientedmiddot toward the Westmiddot orO middot middot middotmiddot
I~aq 1~ould pres~~ablyneed-~o ~ai~t~in_the oiT ~~gt_middot_ middotmiddotimiddot~ middotmiddot_middot__ middotJ middotmiddot middot34 middots~ div1deci iramiddotnwau~d middotn~t thr~~t~n ii inter~~-t~ ~~~ii~ii~-lt_middot inte~rmiddotati~n -~ight advance-them middotb~t nly middotifmiddot support to ~an-co~mu~i~t middot imiddot_-~0~~middot
el~ments middotw~re _a~gressively p~ovid~d ~uch -~n middotI~~n--wo~middotldmiddot ~-~~eith~l~~~- middot~~--~ltL middotracked by instability and guerrilla 11a~ In would be ~ost diffi~ult tcr ~_middot
maintain ~ stable Partition middot and in the longer runmiddot centripetal forcesmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
~
-~middot-gtmiddot middotmiddotbull = ~ bull =middot middotmiddot middot~=middotmiddot middot- -~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot middotmight weJlovercome centrifugal middotones middot bull middot~ bullmiddot~ bull _-middotI
--~ ~ middot middot middotmiddot gt middotmiddot E middot Civil War middot middot- middotmiddot middot
35 Civil 1ar might in itself be desirable middotfor the Usmiddotmiddot if it middot middotmiddotmiddot middot_ middot ----- bull middot middotmiddot middot ~ ~ middot bull
could be cmiddotontinud middotindefinitely whatever the qgtmbination of forces middot middot bull ~ middot -middot-~ middotmiddot middot middot middotmiddot~
_middotmiddotmiddot j bullbullbull middot -~- -~ middot middot- i middot middot
II -16shy
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot middotmiddot middot - middotbull SEGRET
middot middotmiddot
middot middot II bull
~middotmiddot
]t ~--middot-~~middot_middotc middot
~r(j J bull i middotmiddotmiddot bull middot 1 -
middot middotmiddotmiddot middot middot
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middot I
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middot I middotbullmiddot middot1
middot shy
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-~
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middot bull SEERET middot
of revolution would be improbable H_hlle exportmiddotof ojl stiuthwamiddotrd ~-middotbullbullmiddot bull bull bull
middot_would be-impaired or halted _export north1ard ~Ould be-impomiddotssible
Civil war c~uld not besustai~d indefintely hoimiddotJever and middotthe survvor middotmiddot
is likely tooe the most ruthless pa~~ andmiddot the one most effectivelY lt- middot -~ middot ~lipported from outside G~ogra~hygt predi~position and th~ appa~ent ab7 - i(
se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
factionalism and_general bloody-mindedriess favor no one middotbull middot middotmiddot middot - -
middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
all sides -- tci interve~e t~ c~nttol to ~void-~h~middotm~~~ ~rlple~s~nt 2~nltC i - ~ middot _
~sequen~es willbec~me overwhel~inggt Itmiddotl~iiJlead to escalati~n~ndtol bull middot
confrontation in situation~-~hereneither us nor USSR hav~ fun ~on- middott- gt trol of their surrogates middot Viitory for a middotsoviet--backed-movementunder middotmiddotgt
middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot
sucli circumstances waul d be ~s c~n9ero~s as in bullthe tnird case abo~e ~ ~ middotmiddot
T~e new government would be strong imd fi~~ly b~~ed inmiddot at least pa~t oflt ~lt~~ middot middot _ _ _
the population~ and it WOUld have the wiil ai1d the meinS to intimidatelt bullmiddot
the rest middot Civil war appears to provi~e both -agreate ~pportunity to middot~middoti middot
middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
middot ---~-middot---middotmiddot-~----~--
elite andmiddot what was left of the ~rmy It wo)lldmiddot however be anathema tomiddot middot bull1
large segments ofthe oody politic ahd would even more thanmiddot a Corrnnunistmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot _
equivalent be a prisoner of the revolution It wDuld have to be holier middot middot Jj ~
middot middotmiddot middotmiddot middot middot
-l8- middot middot
bull middotgtmiddot- l- middot -middotshy middot middot _L L j middot c~~-~~-CRsect~o~-~ middot-~~~2~~-~middot~~~- _~~~y ~ ~
middot middot
middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
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middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
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middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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t I middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
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middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
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I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
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se1ceofan~ ef7ctivepro~~esterp eleme~t~_favorthe ~~Viets r~~ ~up- ~u middotport of moderate Arabs and middotPakistan favormiddot the ~Jest Iranian xenophobia middot l middot middot -middot middot __ ltmiddot1
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middotmiddot middot 36 H civil war cannDt be maintilined indefini1iely ft w)H lead tomiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot bull gtgt-middotgt
middot u_npreaictabl e andtlleretormiddote -dangerous outtomesmiddot middotrhmiddote requiretnehtmiddot~middotoir _- middot
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middot__middotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotc_-__bullmiddotd ood_ thot thy -__bullmiddot __ _l F middot Amiddot Rightist Regime middot middot middot ~
37 bull A right or center~right government inmiddot the remote chance that bull -
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middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
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~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
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middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
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to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
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middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
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any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotSavemiddot middot middot~
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middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
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middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
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bull middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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middot middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot
middot__ middot middot -
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middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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middot Pop~ in its antius stance to h~ve a chance for surviva~tis middot
u~~H from its mast essentia1 source of supportmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddot middotgtmiddot 38 This Iran would want a stable Gulf and a constantmiddot flo~ of oil
middot _-_middottmiddot6 ~he west and woul (j of course n~t be recerittve_lQ_Sovi~L[lloaches middot-~I
lt i ~~uh~middot~~~middot ) bull achieve~ent of a measure of prosperity --an iJn1ikeiy accomplishmelt --middot
middotit is likelyto beuiistabl~a~dmiddot short-lived In ~ff~~~~middotimiddot~ middott~~ou~d middot ~) middot middot ~ middot ~-middot - middot middot
middotrepresent a transition phase to something elsemiddot It is d~fficult tci seemiddotmiddot=middot~
1middot how middotu s p~rpose~ could b~ ser~edmiddot by such~~ interlud~middot Indeed USmiddot ltmiddotmiddotmiddotmiddotgt gt_ id~ntificati~nwith or support fo a weak rightiSt gov~~n~~nt imiddot~ it middotgt
middot ~t
were accepted would surei ilani~ge any chance of restorimiddot~~Xmiddotmea~umiddotr~ ofgtmiddot
influence i~ amiddotnymiddots~bseqllent Irantha~ might e~~rg~ middot middotmiddot middot middotJ ~middotmiddotmiddot gt~) ~- middotmiddot -~ middot middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot middot middot VL conclusions middot middot middot middotmiddot ~ middot
middotbull middot middot - middot
~- 39 As -l~ng as Ira~ emains in ~haas _it mi be a middots~~ceo~ middotmiddot _emiddot middot middotpolitical instability in the NiddleEast ariduncontrollable economic middot -ltgt
middotmiddot middot middot middot bull - ~ middot middot i middot
middotmiddot fluctuation throughout the non-Coriumini st l~orld middot As long as it remain~ lt)~
wea~middot and Hestern attitudes ar~ not defined itwill middotpr~s~~ t~~ptatiomiddot~ middot middot
to~middot ~SSR that~ay wellbecome desperatemiddotfor energymiddot Jhe~emiddotst~t~~entsmiddot _shy ~ middotmiddotbull middot~~ -lt
and the fomiddotur US national int~rests discussed above suggest a pol icy_middotmiddot
middot fo the u s d~c~ the hostage issue i~ behind ~s Firs~ define We~terrr )
attitudes lest the Soviet Union miscalculate middotSecond take conc~ete middotmiddot ~ _middot
steps with ourmiddot allies to make this positiohcrediblemiddotmiddot Tliird middottakemiddotmiddot
measures withmiddot them to shieid middotthe Gulf States fi-ommiddot-subversion and militarymiddot ---~--~--__
- action~middot Fourth workmiddot-toward a degree of strenJitmiddotand stability at least
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middotf middot-- ~middotmiddot
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bull middot -middot middot middotmiddot- -- middotgt- middot- middot middotmiddot ~ ( ~-~middot=middot_middot__ middot middot- _ __ ~ middot middotmiddot - middot - middot middot-~middot middot-~middot - middot bull middot
middot middot middot bull ___ middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotbullmiddot ~ middot --~ middot middot ~
middot middot -- middot bull middotmiddotlt _ -middot middot middotmiddot bull middot ~ middot - -~ middot -middot middotmiddot middot- middot middot -
middot middot middot middot middotmiddot- _ middotmiddot- middot middotmiddot bull _
middotmiddot middot ~middot~middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddotlt~ middot middot -middot middot - middot~middot middot bull ~ middot bull bull Ibull bull I bull bull ---~ bull bull t middot -middot middot middot- - middot -(bull bull middotmiddot-~middot middotmiddot - middotmiddot - middotmiddot- middot
middot ~ bull _ ~
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middot-- -middot middotmiddot _ middot __ middotmiddot middot middot middot middot-middot middotmiddotmiddot~ middot
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middotshymiddot middot
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middot bullbull
middotmiddotmiddot bull middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot
- middotmiddot ~19- middotmiddot middot
middot- - - middot middot middotmiddotmiddot _ middot middotmiddot middot
middot - - - middot middot middot SEGRET middot bull--middot--middot-~ -_middotmiddotmiddot_middot bull=middotmiddot_middot__middot_middot_middotmiddotmiddot_middotmiddot_middot~middotcmiddot_middot_____middotmiddot_ middotmiddotbullmiddotmiddotmiddot __ bullbull middot~-middotmiddotc_middot_middot_ __ bull bull ____middot__~ bullbullmiddot_middot- _ __ _ Mgtmiddotmiddot bullbull ~--middotmiddotmiddot-~~~~-~~7~~~~~~k_~_-~--c7---~middot---~r-middot-Z_~ _ --- - - -o middot-middot - ---7 --- 3
middotltmiddot middot _ middot __ _ middot middot middot middot middot ~ middotmiddot middot bull
middot
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SEGRET -middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
ic areasmiddot of Iran Fifth -prevent the extemsio~ of Soviet
power and in_fl ~ence jn thesemiddot areas -~
middot40 The dis~ussion above suggests that _among possible linesmiddot of middot -
d-evelopment in l~an one the extensionmiddot of Soviet middotinf~uence behind a
shield of ~ationalism offers a greater threat to us middotinterests thanmiddotmiddot middot _ middot_ middot
any middotother middot T~~ however offer greater_ promise ofmiddot protection for majormiddot middotmiddot ~- bull(
Usmiddotmiddot interests than middotthe ottiers~--These aremiddot 1) emergence of a strQJ19 middot_ middot
middot-l~~t-nationa1ist regi~~ 2) disint~cj~~ti6n bf Ira~ middot~eavi~~-middot~ rel~ti~e1y s~~bie Khuzistan_pr~t~~ted fr~~~_iet_j_tifl uen~~~ middotAmiddotchoice~~--~~ ~hich middot
of thesego~ l$ to pursue and~i th~ m~~n~ t~~-~~i~~~ u- i~b~~o~d ~IT~ middotmiddot~_scope of ttlisanalysiLmiddot middot middot middot middot lt~bull__gtmiddot
middotmiddot middot_ middot middotmiddot_ middotbull middot - middot middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
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John Waller
middot
~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
f middotmiddot middot I l
middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
bull bull bull I bull bull bull
Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotmiddota_ Ho~ middotwidspread middotand middothow stronmiddotg is Khomeinis middot middotmiddotinfluence how canmiddot it be exploited by him to middot middotget his wi11 done This should be anC~lyzed
onmiddot middot middot middot middot ~ -~middot-
middot middot-- amiddotdass middotbasis middot middot
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middot im_etliriitreligious middotbasis middotmiddot middot
middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
middot
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middot-middot middot
middot ~ middot ~ ~ middot
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
middot bull 1 - I
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imiddot I
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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middot__ middot middot -
---- middot middot_
middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
middot middot 1
middotmiddot_middot--
bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
middot1
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
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tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
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WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
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the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
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John Waller
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~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
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middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
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middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
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-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
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middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
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to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
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John Waller
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~ middot middotAPPROACH TO THE IRAN PROBLEM ANANNOT)lTEDGUIDEmiddotTOANALYSIS
middot
middot middot~middot middotmiddot middotmiddotINTRODUCTION I
bull
middot middotrhis paper attempts middotto pose certain key questions aboui Iran whichmiddot should as far asmiddot possible -be systematically examined and middot-answered asmiddot a guide to middotmaking policy decisions and taking diploshy
matic economic military or covert middotaction middotin support of suchmiddot
middot middot
middot -t middot 7~
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middot middot decisions These questions -shy a cheltk list in effect-- should middotmiddotmiddotbe examinedby CIA analysts but also by State Depamiddotrtment Defense_middotmiddot middot and NSC analysts as wellmiddot I would moreover suggest that some ifmiddot middot middot middotmiddot middot not all of these key questions be simultaneously addressed by middot middot middot ~~ middotmiddotcertainmiddot allies such -as the British tlie Israelis the Saudis middotand middot middotmiddot middot middot
middot the french and by middotcertain I rani an exiles in whcentse judgement we middot I middotmiddotlt-have coofidence middotKnowledgeable-Americans in the piivate-sector middotmiddot middot middot middot
_should also be queriect -We shall find I beliemiddotve that we knowmiddotmiddotmiddot middotmore about Iran than we think we do and iansee a basis on which middot middot middot middotI middotto test policy objectives and middottake various concretemiddot acti9ns overt 1-middotand covet to achievemiddot them~ Thisanalysis-shouldalso help dis-middot middot middot middotmiddot middot cover what -~ntelligence gaps remainmiddotand needmiddotfilliljgmiddot middot middot middot middot
middot Thispaper s~gge~t~ fo~r -~atego~i~sof p~$Sfble a~tionmiddotmiddot~~ middot middot middot1 middotmiddotdiplomatic economic military and-covert-- which shoulmiddotdbe ex-- middot-middot middot ami ned in detail by the middotappropriate department or agencyin coordi- middot middot middot middot
nation with middotone nother and with the benefi~ middotof whateve~ answers middot middot middotmiddotmiddot to the key ques t1 ons we have been ab1e to f1 nd middot middot middot middot middot
middot middot KEY QUESTIONS middot bullmiddot
]middot WHAT AND HOW STRONG rsmiddot KHOfbull1EINlS CONTROL
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Prevailing assumptions tend to portraymiddot Khomeinimiddot as a ilem1 -God middot~those wi 11 middotis ibsol ute bull middotBut anyoracle on a middotmiddotpedestal of mass popularity cannot always translate his charisma into ltoncrete or
middotspecific action The machinery of power thus becomes as irriportant ifno1 more important than middotaura Horeover Gods who fail are soon
middotforgotten while Godsmiddot who are martyred may reshy middot main in -force long after theyhave left their
worldly garb While Khomeinis inchoate power and prestige may prevent others from coming to
power can it become a positiveinstrumentof middot government_
ALL PORTIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT middot CLASS FI ED SECRET
Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)
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middotb What actual ~~chiney for exercising p(ll~er and gt middot middot what specHic levers of powermiddot does Khomeinimiddot middot middot middot
middotSavemiddot middot middot~
middot Street Organfiatibns iri the caphal -al)d provi IJCi a 1 cities middot bull middotbull
middot middot ~middot bull ~ middotTheUlema ie howmiddotm~ch clerical middot
_ -_middot bullpackil)g does he basically enjoy doesmiddot ~middothe have rivals are there hierarchial
middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
middottrucking middot middot bull
-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
middotward healing political machinery to sup-pomiddotrt him Does he want -an organized politica
structure Does hmiddote want ariy semblance of a democratic middotsystem
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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c middot Where geographicaily does Khomeini have control and middot tomiddot what degree
middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
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2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
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middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
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ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
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-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
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I25Xl E013526
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but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
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middotmiddot orparish schisms jealousies-etc middot_ middot lt= middot Economicmiddot InstitutionsmiddotDoes Khomeirii control oil production and refining in
middotmiddot Khuzistan in the face of strong leftistmiddot middotmiddotmiddot unions Arab dmiddoti ssidenc~ etc Does he middot control nationamiddotl transport-- rail andmiddot
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-- Food Production middotCan Khomeini testore middot middot middotagricultural productionmiddot in iran by middotmiddot creating procedures to finance seed middotand ferti 1izer and pro vi de transport middotmiddot
Military_ Organization Can or does Khomeini want to reconstitute a strong military loyal to him This question also applies to the
middotGendarmerie and policemiddot
Political Iristitutions middotmiddotcan or does Khomeinwant to create political ie grass roots
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddot
middotmiddot~
bull middotI bull bull
middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
middot
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_ -middot _ _ middotmiddot middot middot
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middot ~ middot ~ ~ middot
middot
middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
middoti middot middot
bull middot
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5 L -middot middot = tmiddot middot middot r- bull middotmiddot ~
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middot middot middotmiddot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot
middot__ middot middot -
---- middot middot_
middot _middotmiddot _ middot middot- bullmiddotmiddot_ middot middot middotmiddot
middot middot 1
middotmiddot_middot--
bull _ _ 1 middot middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
middot middot middot -
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
-
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~ middot ~ (middot_middot
middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot middot-~middotmiddotall rbull
middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
middot middot
Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
middot- middot middotmiddotmiddotmiddot lraq middotmiddot middot middot middot
bull ~
middot-
middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
shy
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t - I middot bull
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cmiddot-middotmiddot - middot
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bull --~- bullbull 7
middot
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middot
middotmiddot
middot-- 11
middot-
bull bullbull _- middotmiddot___
bull
middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
I J
J middot middotmiddotImiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot middot -middot
middot - middot middot middot middotmiddot i -middotmiddot middot
middot middot middoti middot middot middot middot middot middot bull
middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
middot
-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
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middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
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middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
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middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
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middot- middot -~-middot CiassG-roupings middot While Khomeihi is presumed to be held in aweby the lower middotmiddotclasses which are highly religi_ous is
middot he respected by educated I rani amiddotns non middotsha s~cts middotless intensemiddotlymiddot religious -tribal groups etc- middot middot
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middot This is an eJ(tremelyimporta~t s~bj~c and should be analyzedprovince tiy pro_middotmiddot vince One can probably concludemiddot that middotmiddot I~an cannot be unified or controlled Wl thout a strqng a rillY middot middot middot
Tehra~- middotWhite th~ c~pitai is~ obviously middot middot
illJp()rtant it is not Iranmiddot Iran is a conglomerate which historically nas main- -middot tained cohesion only to the extent there middot middot has been a strong central arillY This
middot does not exist fa day - bull middotmiddot
Amiddotzerbaijan Turkish of origin --once- in middot
middot fact a --proyinc~ ofmiddotthe Ottomans Azerbai- middot middot middot middot jan fs traditionailY unsympmiddotathetic to Tehran middot controlmiddot With Soviet assistance it middotdeclared middotmiddot itself independeritin 1946 and ereCtedmiddot all middot the trappings of autonomy incl4ding a stir-middot ring -nationamiddotl anthem to the tune ofmiddot ~The Beer middotBarrel Po1ka It has been recently the scenemiddot of anti-government outbursts It
is susceptible to Soviet covertmiddotaction middot But who are the indigenous 1 eaders 9f Tabri z imd middot middot Azerbaijan Who middotholds the key to Tabriz middot How does Tabriz feel about the USmiddot middot
Gil an - Maiandaran Historically themiddot Caspianmiddot littoral has also been susceptible to-Russian
middotintrigues andmiddot blandishments Is it still r middotDo these mountamiddotin people have the same devo-
tion to Khomeini as the poor peoplemiddotof south Tehran middot middot middot
Northern and Soutbern Kurdestanmiddot Recent Kurdish middot activity particularly in the more-rugged northshyern Kurdestan speaks for itse1f middotThe Kurds nave
a long-standing urge for independence whichmiddot goes
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
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2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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middot middot middot I middotmiddot middot
middot middotmiddot middot middot middot
-
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-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
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middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
op_tions~ the subject of a separate analysis~ bull
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middot -back asmiddotfar as history (They are prob- ably i denti cal with the ancient ~1edes) It is predictable that the Kurdswill
middotmiddoterupt middotagainst any mast~r wheri they have guns and feel strong enough to fight Theircombat record againstmiddotTurks
Iraqis and Iranians middotproves they cannotmiddot be repressed without major military acshy
middottion now beyond Irans capabi 1 ity
Khuzistan bull lvithout an operating 6ii indtist~y in Khuzistafl Iran would soon be bankrup~_ There have to date been various indicationsmiddot
thatKhomeini s control is tenuous among the leftist unionized oil workers and certainly the Sunni-Arab -lowermiddot class is hostile to himmiddot Ski 11 ed 1 alior ani petty managefllenta 1 so con- middottain signifiCSI~t numbmiddoters df Turkish~speaking middot Qashqai tribesmen whose first allegiance middotis middot to thiir tribe (although for tlie inoment they are supporting Khomeini) middot Ira_q s capacitymiddot middot tq intrigue with themiddot Khuzistans Arabs fs middot -of course considerab1e and a long-festering bonier disPutegt as well as the inevitable -allure of oil provides motive enot~gh for middotmiddot Iraqt-mischief _ ~ _
Fars middotmiddotThe m1gratory Qashqa tribe who~e middotmiddot middot winter quarters are in Farsmiddot asmiddotmiddotwell middotas middotmiddot middot Khuzistan have a longmiddotmiddot record cif fjghtingmiddot the central government to retamiddotin -tribal autonomy middotWhile Qashqai tribal leade_rship middot now supports Khomei ni as an expediency itsmiddot future actions will be determined by self interest As a hedge against themiddot future the Qashqai have bEen actively colletting_ rms makirig friends with the provincia) bull endarmer-ie and seekingmiddottribil1-a11lances
throughout south-~entra1 -Iran
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Kerman (Zahedan-Bal uchistan) Southeast Iran is Irans most middotremote province~ But ofmiddot greatest significance is its inherently disshysident Baluchi tribes which_periodically reshysist central control and alwaysmiddotdreammiddotof -a greater BaluchiStan embracing their brethern -in PakiStan ana Afghanistan Natural warriors the Baluchis aredifficul-t to control inthe
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_ -middot _ _ middotmiddot middot middot
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middot ~ middot ~ ~ middot
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middotmiddotmiddotmiddot
middot middot I
middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
middot
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
a i middotmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot
middot~ middot-
middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
a -~ ~ middotmiddot middot ~
0 middot bullbull middot man middotmiddot~ middot middotmiddot middot
- middot
Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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bull ~
middot-
middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
middotmiddot Turkeymiddotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
Does activist-inclined Isra~lharbormiddotany pmiddotlans Recall its middotmiddotmiddotmiddot dynamic involvementmiddotin themiddotKurdish revaltmiddot inIraq bull Recall its middot middot
middotstrong sumiddotpport -of the Shahmiddot middotHow cou-ld Iran affect a Middle -East settTeinent- middot
_middot W~~re do ~he Pa~0estmiddoti~i~nsid~r~~ -~h~y hamiddot~~ middotkmiddot~-o~h middotmiddotleftimiddot~~middot middotmiddot co~nectfons but they -alsQ have good ties with Khomeini -~ In a middotshowdown which side middotwouldmiddot benefit from their valuable street
shyand guerrillaexperiencebullmiddot middot middot -_ middot middot middot middotltmiddot middot middot bull bull middotlt bull middotmiddot middotbull lt middot bull
Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
-middot middotmiddot
ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
9
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Assuming we middotare able iomiddot digest andrationaiize ~s many as middotmiddot possible of the variables middotin the Iranmiddotianmiddot problein with an analytshy
ical process as suggested abovemiddotthe questionremamiddotins what-can we do and whatmiddotshould we do Action middotshould be determined asshysigned and coordinated closely in four main categories middot
middotDiplolliatic
-shy
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-
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-- Econmiddotami c middot middot middot middot middot middot middot
Militarymiddot middotmiddot middot
-- Covert Acti~~ middot
middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
secret is still another challengemiddot middot middot middot middot
middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
tincjion is important since there are various thins we middotCan do imniediatel middoton a contin ency basis
I25Xl E013526
~~--------~-------=--~-----~ a _ DIPLOMATIC ACTION middot middot middot middot
middot middotmiddotbull
middot~- middot middot-middot middotmiddot By the timemiddot our middothostages are released we middot middotshould have mademiddotthe- decision wliether or notmiddot
to continue relations with Iran Relations middot middot middotat this time may be as undesirable as they l
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l II25Xl E013526 j
Anotherpririciple which the US should strive middotfor as much as possible is to enlist I
as much diplomatic supportmiddot as possible from middotmiddot I 10
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
These are the questionsmiddot which must be middot middot - middot addressed in the context of covertmiddot actionmiddot
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middot best middotoi times With virtually no arrzy n
middotmiddot the Zaliedanmiddotregionmiddot the Baludiis like the middotlt middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot- Qashqai to thmiddote west are now running their
middot middot-own affairs without interference frommilishy middot middot tary police or tax collectors bull
Khorassan M~shed as-~ major seat middotof Shiamiddotmiddot orthodoxY should perhaps be assumed to be
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loyal and supportivemiddot to Khomeini But tp th( extent there may be rivalclerics at themiddot Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed who Secretly
resent Khomeini s preeminencemiddot or who tradi middottiqnijlly look down on Qum as an inferiormiddot Shrine (which it is) -is worth exploring middot This subj_ect_gets atthe-more basicissue of bullthe extent to _which there -are real or latent middot middot
middotmiddotmiddotschisms in thmiddotShia clergy which could sap middotmiddot -middotmiddot middotKhomeinis strengthmiddotmiddot Khorassan also plays middot
middothost to the Turkish-11ongol Turkmans whomiddot earlierthismiddot year rose in revolt aga1nst Tehrari middot There are also middottwo different Kurdish tribes along themiddot
Soviet tiorder who have i10 love for the cente~-
although they are not as militant as their western brothers middot middot
middot middotbull middot middotmiddot
2 ~IHAT AND HOW STRONG IS KHOf1EINIS OPPOSITIONmiddot middot middot
Ari inventory of the actual or paten ti l oppos ~ tion to Khomeini-would include various types of urban leftists residual or latentbull military opshy middotmiddot
position middotactual or potentfal tribal opposition opposition from the Tehran Bazaar (important as middotmiddotpolitical funders middotand as links with lower-class middotmiddot street people) disgruntled landowners stushydents unemployed workers under-capitamiddotl ized f9-rmers ethnicreligious minorities regional
nationalists rival clergy and assorted moderate middot middotpol-i-ticiansmiddot who are offended by medieval feudalshy isni Khomeini s strength may to some emiddotxtent middot middotrest on the inability of these disparate forces to ever get together But in the main his strength lies in the hesitancy of any group to contest with a Saint whmiddotose capacity for govetnshy middotment may be nil but whose capacity to overawe his opposition 1s tremendous At the risk of rushing to judgement before adequate intelligence is available but because we must begin-somewhere with working hypothesesmiddot I believe first priority should be given to studying the various shades of the Iranian left middot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
middot middot middotmiddot middot
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middot middot middotmiddotmiddot -_ - middot middot _ _ middotmiddotmiddot middot_middot---middot -_-middot- middot lt -~i~
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middotKhomeini ismiddot hemiddot a matchmiddotfor middotthe-left in the aftermathshy
c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
middotleftist union middotstrength is strong and could turn against middot middot middot Khomeiniif provoked to do so middot middot middot middot middotmiddotmiddot middot
if le~ti~t -~~~u]arst~~~t-middotpower represe~ta signifi-middot bullmiddot middotcant rival to Khomejnimiddotn the capital J~md probably middot middot middot middot_
Isfahan and Ahwaz as well)middot it may probably pe said middotmiddotmiddot middotmiddot that traditi anal middotregionaltribal separatist tenaencies middot middot middot threaten him in the provinces But the middotquestipn is where middot
middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
7
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middot -- NEIGHBORS middotmiddotmiddot middot
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Saudi middot middotmiddot~middot middot Arabi
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Gulf Sheikhdomsmiddot- middot middot ~-
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bull ~
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middot Pakistan middot middot
Afghanfstan middotmiddot
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REGIONAL middot middot
middot middot -Moderatemiddot Arabs middot J~rdan Egypt Sudan M~rocc~ middot Northmiddot rfilmen middot
middot middotAntagonistic-Arabsmiddot Syria Libya PLO South middot -Yemen
- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
France bull
Japan
Chinamiddot
Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
cern but the roles of certain third~world countriesmiddot are also important Themiddot Iran situation and our response toit thereshyfore should be studied in connection with theviews intentions and consequences to severalother countries categorized for convenience as fo 11 qws middot middot
I bull
TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middotmiddot
middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
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Would Iraqmiddotbe temjgtted to satiSfy Hs territod111 claims middotinmiddotKIlUzistan or foment-Arab autonolllY middotin thatmiddotprovince middotmiddot _ middot
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ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
options would be numerous But prudence reduces- them dramati- middot cally middot middot middot middot
As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
and what will affect lasting attitudes ofthe Iranian people on the other Thelatter is a more precious commodity Itmiddotmust be accepted that popular Iranian attitudes toward the -US have al shy
ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
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middotmiddotmiddot middotEa~hmiddotc~~~g~ry bullofafction should ~omplementthe citllel )omiddot determinemiddot whilt kind bullo middot bureauclciti t machinemiddotry -- inter-lt~gency task torceNSC workin~r group~middotmiddot middotftc -- middotcan middotl)e~t middotaccpmpl ishmiddot thjs is amiddotchallimgein itself And how toprot~ct whatmiddotmust be kept
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middot middotunder ttie ~ateg~~ies ~i mi lit~ry andcovert acti cin middottwci middot parts contingency and actual should be designedmiddot Thisdis-middot
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I25Xl E013526
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friends allies or those who otherwise -findmiddot common interest with us Our pre- sentations-and representations should havemiddot as middotbroad a base as -possible middot
bbullmiddotmiddot ECONOMIC
middot It would not be useful to grapple withmiddotmiddot middotlt economic a~tion in this bdef outl1n- middotmiddot
but it may be worth noting that Iran middot _ ~ middot _ middot-middot proved curiously immune to eco11omic pres- - middot sures induced or self generated during middot_ middot the Mossadegh crisis in 192 middotBut- a middot _ _ middot -d~pdvation of oi1 revenues for a sus~ _ middot middot middot-tainedperiodoftimewou)dcer-tainly-
-weakenKhomeini-middotgt- middot ~middotmiddotmiddot
middotcmiddot--MILITARY ~ION~~ _ __ middotmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotOvert US milit~ry action in the- oi1 )__ -- shy
middotmiddot-middotmiddotfields becomes temptingmiddotas amiddot situation__ - middot- middotmiddotmiddotmiddotgrows hopeless But the consequences _-_ middot- middot
_middotmiddot could-be smiddoterious bull Itmiddotcould-provokemiddot - middot middot middot _ middotanother Soviet occupation of Azerbaijanmiddotmiddot- middot middot
middot --middot -Amiddotbulldivision of Iran intomiddot a Russianoccupied _middotmiddot northmiddot and a US-occupied south might have middot appealed to middotLord Curzan middotin another age middot middot middot middot
middot- middotmiddotcari we risk it todaymiddot Are there middotalterha- middot-- middot middot tives middotAre there surrogates which can be middot--used Are-there covert action possibl1i- middot middot ties in lieu of-naked military actionmiddot
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Left That there has middotmiddotbeen a leftist smiddotecular genershyally youthful body of expatriate Iranians who havemiddot showri remarkable cohesiveness organizational strength
_consistency of aim and modus operandi political- sophisshyticatfon and affluence for over 25 middotyears is a matter of
_record middotwho- they are how factionally splintered theY are wh~t if anymiddot forei-gn -harid has been behind them
what role they played in the middotrise and return of Khomeini are all-interesting historical questions
I 25Xl E013526_ I 1 On the assumpt1on that these 1eftist groups are - now m Iran and show themselves as strongmiddot street middotmiddotandmiddot middot middot middot middot student leaders we niust be interested in thembull If one middot middotmiddotor more-fattionmiddots of these zealots enjoy Soviet PLO middot Libyan ormiddot othermiddotmiddotforeigl as~istance theymiddot probably middotre presentmiddot the greatest threat fadrig Khomemiddotinf today_ We middotshould strive to discover whatmiddotfaction is gaining -left- middot
middot ist leadership wha~ arms they hold _and what their strat middot _ -ehgj its Wtill the left perioical~Yffl ex its_ mhusc~e-~ on middot-middot
middotmiddot t e s ree resort to ter-ron sm 1 n 1 1 trate t emiddot m1 1 1tary middotmiddot middotmiddotinfiltrate Khomeini s street gro-ups but bfdemiddot its timemiddot middot middot = middot middotuntil somemiddotbourgeois pl9tters- draw fire and ire by an middot middot middot
ill-conceived contest -for power Has the 1 eft been ac- middot middot tive in -stimulatinganti-ilmerican sentimentaremiddot theymiddotmiddot middot middot middot _intentmiddoton_provoking the usmiddot to take-actmiddotionsmiddotwhichwill more permanently alienate it-frombull Iranmiddot -Is the successor-to Khomeini in Tehran destined to be_ leftist if so w-ill he be a middotnatiomiddotnalisticmiddot leftist or a pro-Soviet leftistmiddotmiddot bull
What will be the determih1ng factors middot middot bull
Centermiddot Centri~t bourgeois plotters will stir restlessly in exile from time to time presumably stimulated by ex- middot-middotpatriate Iranian -money Bakhtiar is the most prominent middotmiddot middot at the moment Aside from keeping track of such move- middot--ments should we take them seriously What or who is fundshy
ing Bakhtiar Who are his alliesmiddot Even imiddotf he topples middot bull bull bullbullbull bull t
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c- Right middotrs there any chance that the military with or without a Pahlaili figurehead could-muster and lead anmiddotmiddotmiddot effective revolt against Khomeini If so Who would be the mostmiddot likely leaders and who would be their allies
_d middotProvincialRegional Asmiddot sketched middotabove the provir)cesmiddotmiddot middot middotmiddotof Irari are traditionally the least loyamiddotl to ttie center _- and middottoday -indeed harbor various aggressive ahti--Khomeini _- middot factions- With middotnationalist or autonomy-minded people
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with a non-governing central government with themiddotmiddot atrophying of the army with widespread trafficking
middotmiddotof arms and with possible foreign assistance middotlt ismiddot inevitablemiddot that Iran willmiddotlapse into feudal fiefdoms At worst it may beplunged into civil war A system ofmiddotuncontrolled feudal fiefdoms in factalready middot exists Th~ Kurds are in open rebellion middotmost of the other tribes pay no taxes and tolerate no law beyondmiddot
that of the tribe the central government provides them no protectionbull Azerbaijan Khuzjstan and middot middot Baluchistan have deepseated separatlst instinctswhich can be middoteasily aroused middot Inmiddot themiddot oil refineries of Khuzismiddotshytan andmiddot the factories of Isfahan it may bemiddotassumed thatmiddot
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middotand how much and with what external assistance -- currentmiddotmiddotor potential Perhaps the most important challengemiddot for
tne United States faced lith a -disintegrating Iran ismiddot middot middotmiddotto analyze accurately the anatomy of Irarismiddot componentmiddot middotmiddot middotmiddotmiddot parts To continue to view Iran as_one middotnation is middotsim-
_plestic and can lead us surely iritomiddoterrorsof analysis middot Recognition of Tehran as an erratic_~ chaotic city statemiddotmiddot
middotmiddotand the provinces asa collectionof medieval fiefdomsmiddot middot (except for industrial Khuzistan which represents a middot separate and unique problem) is important This mustmiddot middot
middotfigure prominel]tlY iri our-poHcy calculations and middotin anymiddot contingency pans which _we develop
WHAT ARE FOREIGN ATTijUDES ANO -INTENTIONS
middot middot
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middotCentral to the problem of Iran is the attitudes imd inten- middot middot tions of various countries bes-Ides ourse1f For middotanalysis purposes middot middot they can perhaps usefully be broken upmiddot into four categories (1) middot
the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
middotpared to assist usattack us or othe~ise take advantage of us over this issue and what if any action -- overt or covert~- can
they be emiddotxpected tci take Dominatimiddotng the scene of course is oilmiddot not only Irans butmiddotthat of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula A middot
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- INTERNATIONAL
Close NATO a11 ies England and Germany
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Israel
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close runner-up in -importance is the strategic balanmiddotcemiddotof middotpowermiddot middot-in which the position ofmiddotthe Soviet Union is our greatest conshy
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TRADITIONAL NORTHERNmiddot ANTAGONISTmiddot
middot middot so~iet Union (including EastmiddotE~~~~ean middotmiddot middot middotand possibly Cuban surrogates) - middot middotbullmiddot
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middot in terms of priority the middotem~rging attitude of the middotsoviet Union as devined by its diplomacy public broadcasts covert actions is of course very important Also important ob- middot
viously is theattitude of Saudi Arabia middot _
middotmiddotPerhaps potentially_ important is China middotwhich has earliermiddot signalled its interest in Iran as a Soviet border state whenmiddot it established close relations middotwith the Shah middotmiddotHow does China feei now Asmiddot a revolutionary does middotit see opportunities in Iran are any of the leftist groups ideolagi_caily proPekingmiddot middot middot
Could China aspire to split the left Could China-promote middot middotrural tribal guerrillas middot middotmiddot middot middot ~ ~
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ACTION middotmiddot middot middot --middot middot-middotmiddotPOSSIBLE US lEVERAGE VIS-Avrs KHOMEINI- middot -middot
An a~alysis ofwhat the US _canmiddot do 15 an integral part ofmiddot
the equation omiddotur options may be categorized as diplOmatic _ -middot ecanami c milita ry and cover-t aCtion middot middot middot
shy If the bari~rs -of imagination were middotour aniy ionstramiddotint our
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As a general principle in -examining our options we shouid di ffereiiti ate between what will i)llpact onmiddot Khomei ni on one harid
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ready suffered amiddot serious blow one from which we shall not re- cover for some time But we should nat middotgratuitously aggravatemiddot our image As one example the cutting off of u~s foodstuffs tomiddot Iran would accomplish little useful but it wolild gratuitousshyly enr~ge innocent people whose good will we may beab1e- to regainmiddot
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the USSR as our prime antagonist and Irans traditional neigh- middotborhodd bully 2) other neighboring countries which have an imshyportant stake in Irans future 3) regional countries with only middot slightly less stake in Iran and (4) international powers-qr groupsmiddot of powers Haido these countries feel today how far are -they pre-
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