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GettingtheGreenLight:
MajorityPartyRuleandTaiwan’sApproachtotheSouthChinaSea
KimberlyLWilson
May13,2017
[FirstDraft–PleaseDoNotCiteWithoutAuthor’sPermission]
Abstract:IntheleaduptoTaiwan’s2016presidentialandlegislativeelections,high-rankingmembersofTaiwan’sDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP)gaveinterviewsandissuedstatementsindicatingtheDPPwasnotcommittedtodefendingtheU-ShapedLineclaimintheSouthChinaSea.TheDPPconsistentlyaccusedChinaofignoringinternationallawintheSouthChinaSea,andtheDPPavoidedcitingtheU-ShapedLineinitsownstatementsonTaiwan’ssovereignty.Nowthatithasregainedthepresidencyandholdsalegislativemajority,howhastheDPPmanagedTaiwan’sambiguousSouthChinaSeaclaim,andwhatdoesthistellusabouttheroleofdomesticpoliticsinterritorialandmaritimedisputes?Thispaperarguesthatsinceretakingpower,theDPPhasfollowedamoderatepositionintheSouthChinaSea,apositionselectedbasedonitsappealtoboththeRepublicofChina(ROC)publicandMainlandChina.DPPconcessionsrepresentamovetowardthecenter,demonstratingthateveninthemidstofhighlyintractableterritorialandmaritimeconflicts,politicalpartieswillmakestrategiccalculationsbasedonthepreferencesoftheirbaseandthegeneralpublic.Inthiscase,theDPPbasehaspreferencesintheSouthChinaSea,butholdsthesepreferenceslessstronglythanonotherissues,makingtheSouthChinaSeaanissuewheretheDPPcanmakeconcessionstoChinawithoutsevererepercussionsfromitsbase.
I. Introduction:TheSouthChinaSea,anareastretchingfromtheKarimataandMalaccaStraitstotheStrait
ofTaiwan,issubjecttoacomplexarrayofoverlappingterritorialandmaritimeclaims.1Theareais
aglobalhubfortransportationandtelecommunications,ishighlyvaluedforitsfisheries,andis
believedtopossessconsiderablenaturalresourcesinitsseabed.Thedisputeisfrequently
portrayedininternationalmediaashighlyvolatileandasapotentialflashpointforglobalconflict,
withmuchanalysiscenteredonChina’sambiguousclaimencompassingmuchofthearea.Whilethe
ChinesepeopleareassumedtoviewChina’sclaimasquitenatural–anoft-citedfactisthatthe
SouthChinaSeaappearsinmapsonthewallsofeveryclassroominChina–theclaimisgenerally
puzzlingtothoseoutsideChina,withmanyaskinghowChinaclaimswaterandterritoryspanning
anareaover1,000milesfromitscoast.MorecynicalperspectivescharacterizeChina’sclaimas
simplyapowergrabbyarisingpowerhungryfornaturalresources,butthisrationalizationcannot
explainthesimilarclaimmaintainedbytheRepublicofChina(ROCorTaiwan).Taiwanhas
consistentlyadvocatedforitsown,separateclaimintheSouthChinaSea,drawingonacommon
basisofChinesehistory.Insum,overlappingclaimsintheSouthChinaSeaareahighlytopical
puzzle,andtheROCclaimprovidesimportantandintriguingevidence.
Scholarshiphaslongattestedtotheintractabilityandvolatilityofterritorialdisputes.2Yetit
hasbeenrelativelyquietonhowstatesformclaimssuchasthosefoundintheSouthChinaSea.In
muchanalysesofterritorialandmaritimeconflict,claimsaretakenasgiven,withlimited1TheclaimantstothedisputeareChina,thePhilippines,Vietnam,Malaysia,Brunei,Indonesia,andTaiwan.Indonesiaissometimesexcludedfromthislist,duetotheambiguousnatureofbothChina’sandTaiwan’sclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.ItisunclearwhetherornotmapsdepictingbothPRCandROCclaimsincludetheNatunaarea,anareaadministeredbyIndonesia.2JohnA.Vasquez,TheWarPuzzle(CambridgeUniversityPress,1993);JohnA.VasquezandMarieTHenehan,“TerritorialDisputesandtheProbabilityofWar,1816-1992,”JournalofPeaceResearch38,no.2(March2001):123–38;PaulK.Huth,StandingYourGround:TerritorialDisputesandInternationalConflict(UniversityofMichiganPress,1998);PaulKHuth,“WhyAreTerritorialDisputesbetweenStatesaCentralCauseofInternationalConflict?,”inWhatDoWeKnowaboutWar?,ed.JohnAVasquez(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2000),85–110.
theoreticalworkonhowstatesinitiallydeterminewhatbelongstothem.Inoneofthefewstudies
thatdirectlyaddresshowclaimsareformed,AlexanderB.Murphyfindsthathistoricaljustifications
playacentralroleinshapingclaimsanddisputes.Murphyarguesthatprinciplesofindividual
propertyrightsareroutinelyappliedtostates,resultingintheuseofhistoricallossofpropertyasa
rationaleforclaims.Nowitisuniversallyrecognizedthat“astateisnotentitledtoseizeterritory
fromanotherunlessthatterritoryitselfwasoriginallywrongfullyseized.”3Similarly,strategicvalue
andeconomicvalue,suchasnaturalresources,havebeenfoundtomotivateterritorialclaims.4
Theseinsightsprovideimportantdirectionsforresearch,butdonotprovideacomprehensive
pictureforhowstatesdeterminetheirclaims.
Tofurtherexploresuchanimportantandtimelypuzzle,thispaperincludesaqualitative
casestudyofTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaims,includingevidencedrawnfrominterviewswithROC
governmentofficialsandmaritimeexperts.WhileChina'sclaimintheSouthChinaSeaisregularly
highlightedinmediaandscholarlywork,TaiwanhasgrappledwithacommonChinesehistorical
recordwhenestablishingitsparallelclaim,andisnonethelessoftenomittedfromanalysesofthe
dispute.UndoubtedlyduetoTaiwan'sambiguousinternationalstatus,aswellasitsdecidedly
restrainedforeignpolicy,theexclusionissignificant,asTaiwan'sdemocraticpoliticalenvironment
providesanexceptionalopportunityto“lookinsidethebox”inwhichforeignpolicyisbeingmade.
ThecasestudypresentedherefocusesonTaiwan’scurrentrulingparty-theDemocratic
ProgressiveParty(DPP).Intherun-uptothe2016election,theDPPmadeanumberofstatements
indicatingtheymightchangeTaiwan’sSouthChinaSeaclaimiftheyreturnedtopower.Since
winningthepresidencyandgainingamajorityinTaiwan’sunicamerallegislature,theyhave
3AlexanderBMurphy,“HistoricalJustificationsforTerritorialClaims,”AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers80,no.4(December1990):531–48.4Huth,StandingYourGround.
insteadpursuedasomewhatsubduedalthoughdecidedlymoderateposition,insomelimitedbut
noteworthyinstancestheyhavebeenquitesimilartothepreviousKMT(NationalistParty)
administration.Thisisbecause,similartothemedianvotertheorem,wheregovernmentpolicies
convergetowardthepoliticalcenter,statementsonTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimaredesignedto
satisfyeachparty’spoliticalbasewhilesimultaneouslyappealingtotheROCpublic.Inthiscase,an
interestingandtheoreticallysignificantadditionistheeffortsbybothpartiestoconcurrently
balanceandsatisfyexternalactors,chieflytheUnitedStates,China,andJapan.AlthoughtheDPP
emphasizesTaiwaneseidentityandopenlyquestionsconnectionstoChina,strivingtoarticulateits
positionontheclaimlargelyintermsofinternationallawratherthanChinesehistory,theDPPis
stillamajorpartyinatwo-partydominantsystem,drivingittofindpoliciesthatwillsatisfyalarge
numberofconstituentsandactors.InthecaseoftheSouthChinaSea,theDPPhastendedtoview
Taiwan’sclaimasabargainingchipmorethanasaninherentrightorresponsibility,allowingthem
totakeamoremoderatepositionunlikelytoalienatetheirbase,who’sstrongestpreferencestend
tobefocusedonotherissues.Ultimately,thiscaseshowsthatalthoughterritorialandmaritime
disputesremainintractableandvolatile,domesticpoliticsdictatesforeignpolicyoutcomes,evenon
somethingasassumedlysacredasclaimstolandandwater.
ToillustratetheprocessthroughwhichtheDPPhasdevelopedandadjustedtheirposition
ontheSouthChinaSea,thispaperwillexploreDPPpoliciesontheSouthChinaSeaclaiminfour
parts.First,basicbackgroundinformationontheROCclaimisoutlined.Thesecondsection
documentstheDPPpositionontheclaimintheleaduptothe2016election.Third,thestrengthof
DPPpreferenceswithrespecttotheSouthChinaSeaareevaluated.Fourth,evidenceofaDPPshift
towardthecenterisdescribed.Finally,thearticleconcludeswithasummaryoffindingsand
implicationsforthestudyofdomesticpoliticsinthecontextofterritorialandmaritimedisputes.
II. Background:RepublicofChina(ROC)ClaimsintheSouthChinaSeaAnessentialreferencepointforunderstandingTaiwan’sclaim,aswellasthatofthePRC,is
amapcreatedbytheRepublicofChinagovernmentin1947(seeFigure1).Thedashedline
depictedinthismap,encompassingthevastmajorityoftheSouthChinaSea,isreferredtoasthe
“U-ShapedLine”orthe“11-DashLine.”Taiwanhasneveralteredthelinefoundinthemap's
originalversion,andboththePRCandROChavemaintainedsimilarlyambiguousclaimsbasedon
thismap(oralternateversionsinthecaseofthePRC).5Rivalclaimantsandobservershave
questionedwhatthenowinfamousU-ShapedLineisdesignating:historicwatersorsomeother
historicright,aterritorialclaimtolandfeatures,maritimedelimitation,orperhapsacombination
ofjurisdictionalrights.Moreover,thelegaljustificationsofthelineareunclear.NeitherthePRCnor
ROCgovernmenthaseverprovidedacomprehensiveexplanationfortheclaim.Forinstance,no
coordinateshavebeenprovidedtodesignateanexactgeographicalarea.Inthe1993SouthChina
SeaPolicies,issuedbyTaiwan’slegislature,theROCgovernmentspecificallynotedthatithad
historicwaterrightsintheSouthChinaSea.Thesehistoricwaterrightswerenotdefined,and
possibledefinitionsrangefromexclusivefishingrightsuptoaconceptionoftheSouthChinaSeaas
aChineselake,similartowatersinternaltoanation’sterritoryintermsofexclusivity.Thiswording
wassuspendedduringChenShui-bian’sDPPpresidency,andwasnotrevivedduringtheKMTMa
Ying-jeouadministration.
5Thelinewillbereferredtointhispaperasthe“U-ShapedLine.”
Figure1:AMapofthePositionsoftheSouthChinaSeaIslands(1947)
AlthoughTaiwan’sclaimisambiguous,Taiwan'sgovernmenthasdoggedlyasserted
Taiwan'srightsintheSouthChinaSea.Forinstance,Taiwan’sMinistryofForeignAffairs(MOFA)
hasremainedconsistentwhendescribingTaiwan'sclaim.Usingavariationofwordingthathas
beenpresentinROCstatementsfordecades,MOFAconsistentlyemphasizessovereigntyoverSouth
ChinaSealandfeaturesandmaritimeclaimstowaterssurroundingthosefeatures.AMOFA
statementontheSouthChinaSeain2015servesasaprimeexample:
Whetherfromtheperspectivesofhistory,geography,orinternationallaw,theNansha(Spratly)Islands,Shisha(Paracel)Islands,ChungshaIslands(MacclesfieldBank),andTungsha(Pratas)Islands,aswellastheirsurroundingwaters,areaninherentpartofROCterritoryandwaters.AstheROCenjoysallrightstotheseislandgroupsandtheirsurroundingwatersinaccordancewithinternationallaw,theROCgovernmentdoesnotrecognizeanyclaimtosovereigntyover,oroccupationof,theseareasbyothercountries,irrespectiveofthereasonsputforwardormethodsusedforsuchclaimoroccupation.6 Asillustratedbythisexcerpt,Taiwan'sMOFAappearstobefollowinganinterpretationof
Taiwan'sclaimcenteredonSouthChinaSealandfeatures.Noseparatehistoricwatersclaimis
mentioned,andtheU-ShapedLineisalsonotablyabsentfromtheirdescription.Similarly,the
recentMaadministrationoftenexpressedaconceptionoftheclaimbasedonlandfeaturesand
relatedwaterrights.7WhiletheofficialROCclaimhasseeminglymovedawayfromahistoric
watersclaimintheSouthChinaSea,MOFAstilladamantlymaintainsaclaimontherocks,shoals,
andislandswithintheU-shapedline,includingwatersrightsbasedonthesefeatures.
Itisimportanttonote,despitetherelativeconsistencyinTaiwan'srecentSouthChinaSea
statements,especiallythosecomingfromMOFA,ambiguityremainsthedefiningcharacteristicof
Taiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaims.Thisambiguityhasseveralsources.First,ambiguityonSouth
ChinaSeaclaimshasbeenandcontinuestobeaconsciouslyselectedpolicyoftheTaiwanese
6MinistryofForeignAffairs,RepublicofChina(Taiwan).“StatementontheSouthChinaSea.”(July7,2015).<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=0E7B91A8FBEC4A94&sms=220E98D761D34A9A&s=EDEBCA08C7F51C98.>(accessedJune7,2017). 7KimberlyL.Wilson,"PartyPoliticsandNationalIdentityinTaiwan’sSouthChinaSeaClaims."AsianSurvey57,no.2(2017):271-296.
government.AsoneofficialinMOFA'sDepartmentofEastAsianandPacificAffairsexplained
duringtherecentMaAdministration,disagreementwithinTaiwan'sgovernmentisasourceof
ambiguity:
Therearealotofargumentsaboutwhattheclaimshouldbe.Everyfourscholarshasfivedifferentviews.ThereissomeinternaldiscussionbetweenMOFA,theMinistryofInterior,andtheNationalSecurityCouncil,andwealsoneedtoconsidertheUnitedStatesandcross-Straitrelations.It'snoteasy.PresidentMasaysthatsofarwehaven'treachedapositionofagreementamongallpartieswithinthegovernment.8
Moreover,strategicconsiderationsfactorintoTaiwan'spolicyofambiguity.Asthesame
officialexplained,Taiwan'smaingoalrightnowregardingtheSouthChinaSeaistojointheCodeof
Conductdiscussions,andupsettinganyoftheotherpartieswoulddisadvantagetheseefforts.He
concluded,“Wehaveadelicaterole,andsofarwehaven'tfiguredoutabetterpolicythan
ambiguity.”9
Insum,Taiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimpossessesasignificantdegreeofambiguity.Such
ambiguitymakeselectoraloutcomesimportantfortheSouthChinaSeaclaim,aslegislativeand
presidentialactionscanimpacttheclaim.Inthenextsection,DPPstatementsontheclaimwhilein
theminoritypositionwillbeexamined.
III. DPPSouthChinaSeaPolicyPositionsBeforethe2016Elections TheDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP),whichrecentlyretookthepresidencyandnow
holdsalegislativemajority,hasstakedoutapositiononTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimthatis
centeredonTaiwaneseidentity.Yettheirapproachultimatelyreflectsanefforttoaccountforthe
concernsoftheirbasewhileutilizingmoderateapproaches.Asaminorityparty,theDPP
ceaselesslyadvocatedforTaiwan'ssovereigntyoverTaipingIsland,thelargestnaturallyforming
8Interview.Taipei.June2014.9Interview.Taipei.June2014.
featureintheSouthChinaSea,andtheonlyfeatureoccupiedbyTaiwanthatisdisputedbyanactor
otherthanChina.Atthesametime,theDPPavoidedanyuseoftheU-ShapedLineormore
expansiveclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.InstatingtheirpositionsonTaiwan'sclaim,DPPofficials
consistentlyemphasizearelianceoninternationallawasaguidelineinshapingTaiwan'sclaim,
particularlytheprincipleofeffectiveoccupation.
TheDPPhasbeenapersistentadvocateofTaiwan’sclaimtoTaipingIsland,butthat
advocacycomeswiththeinsistencethatTaiwan’sclaimsareseparatefromChina’s.OnFebruary2,
2008,theDPP'sChenShui-bianbecamethefirstTaiwanesepresidenttovisitTaipingIsland,his
visitcommemoratingtheopeningofanewrunwaycommissionedbyhisadministration.While
ChenwasvisitingTaiping,heannouncedhis“SpratlyInitiative,”whichtheDPPstillcitesas
foundationaltotheirpoliciesontheSouthChinaSea.10Throughouthistimeinoffice,Chenwas
quietontheU-ShapedLineaswellastheSouthChinaSealandfeaturesnotoccupiedbyTaiwan,but
asnotedabove,heplayedanimportantroleinweakeningthehistoricwatersargumentby
suspendingthe1993SouthChinaSeaPolicies.CurrentDPPPresidentTsaiIng-wenhasconsistently
maintainedthatTaiwan'spositionontheSouthChinaSeaisdifferentfromMainlandChina's.
Similarly,intheDPP'sinternallydistributedSouthChinaSeaPoliciesandPositions,theEnglish
translationstates,“TaiwanhasitsownviewpointregardingtheSpratlyIslands–onethatis
foundedonsovereigntyoriginatingfromTaiwan,andwhichisdifferentfromChina's[claimsover
theterritory]."11AsonescholarcloselyaffiliatedwiththeDPPexplainedduringaninterview,this
internalSouthChinaSeapolicydocumentintentionallymentions“SouthChinaSeaexclusive
10Duringoneinterview,aformerDPPofficialthathelpeddrafttheSpratlyInitiativeexplainedthatinwritingtheInitiative,thenDPPgovernmentofficialsdebatedthenameextensively.Reflectiveoftheirviewsonthedispute,theyjokedthattheycouldnotnametheinitiative“TheSouthChinaSeaInitiative,”becausethenthetitlewouldhavetheword“China.”Theformerofficialadded,wejokedaboutit,“butactuallyweallthoughtaboutit.”Interview.Taipei.June2014.11TheDemocraticProgressiveParty’sSouthChinaSeaPoliciesandViewpoints(internaldocumentprovidedtoauthor)
economiczone”asasignalthattheDPPdisagreeswithabroaderhistoricwatersclaimintheSouth
ChinaSea.12
Intheirpublicstatements,DPPofficialsuniformlycitedadesiretobaseTaiwan'sclaimon
internationallaw,particularlythelegalprincipleofeffectiveoccupation.Duringaninterview,
MichaelTsai,formerSecretaryofDefenseduringtheChenAdministration,statedthat,“Taiwan
shouldonlyclaimTaipingIslandandthesurroundingwaters,areaswithactualcontrol.IfTaiwan
madethisclaim,itwouldberelativelyundisputed.OnlyChinawouldchallengeROCcontrolof
Taiping.”13Inanotherexample,JosephWuhasarguedTaiwanshouldnotinvestitselfin
strengtheningrelationswith“anexpansionistpowerwhichclaimsunsubstantiatedhistorical
rights,"aclearreferencetoChinaanditsclaims.Inthesameeditorial,Wuincludedapolicypoint
specifictotheSouthChinaSea:
SouthChinaSeaissue:TaiwanshouldmakeitclearthatitfollowstheUNConventionontheLawofSea,article121specifically,indefiningitsterritorialclaimsbasedontheactualownershipofItuAba(Taipingislet)…TaiwanshouldalsomakeitveryclearthatitwillnotcooperatewithChinaonthesovereigntyissueagainstanyotherclaimants.14 Wu'sstatementarticulateswhatwasaconsistentexpressionofTaiwan'sSouthChinaSea
claimsamongtheDPPminority–internationallawsupportsTaiwan’ssovereigntyoverTaiping,
andnootherdisputedSouthChinaSealandfeatures.
12Moreover,theChinesetranslationofthesamedocumentreferstoSouthChinaSea“highseas”(theEnglishtranslationsays“internationalwaters”),whichwascarefullywordedintheoriginalChinesetoindicateaDPPskepticismregardingtheabilityofmostSouthChinaSealandfeaturestoqualifyasislandsundertheUNCLOSdefinitionofanislandasincludedinArticle121.Interview.Taipei.June2014.13Interview.Taipei.February201414AccessedonJuly29,2014at:http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.com/2014/05/dpp-us-representatives-5142015-op-ed-in.html.Alsoavailableathttp://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-future-of-u-s-taiwan-relations/
TheDPP’sdistinctpositionontheSouthChinaSeacreatesthepotentialforTaiwan’sclaim
tochangeinthefuture.FormerDeputySecretaryGeneraloftheNationalSecurityCouncilduring
theChenAdministration,ParrisChangtoldVoiceofAmericainSeptember2014thatiftheDPP
regainedthegovernmentin2016(whichitdid),theDPPwillconsiderchangingTaiwan’sSouth
ChinaSeaclaim.AccordingtoChang:
Afterthe2016changeofgovernmentinTaiwan,thereisthiskindofpossibility[changingtheclaim],becauseDPPmembers,includingmyself,havealreadysaidTaiwanshouldadjustourterritorialclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.AfterWorldWarII,theKuomingtanggovernmentin1947putforwardthe9or11dashlineposition,whichhasnorelationshipwithTaiwan'sgovernmenttoday.IfwehaveaDPPgovernment,Ibelieve,wearewillingtoreconsider.WebelievethatTaiwan,inthecapacityofanindependentcountry,isintheAsianandworlddemocraticcamps.OurpositionandourobediencetointernationallawaredifferentfromChina,whichemphasizesitshistoryandsovereignty.15InMay2015,Taiwan'sthenincomingpresidentTsaiIng-wentoldreportersthattheDPP
wouldnotabandonTaiwan'sclaimtosovereigntyoverTaipingIsland.Tsaiexpressedsurprisethat
anyonewouldquestiontheDPP'scommitmenttodefendingTaiping,butitisnotablethatTsaidid
notmakeanystatementsaboutTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimsbeyondTaipingIsland,otherthan
thatthedisputeshouldbehandledinaccordancewithinternationallaw16
IV. TheStrengthofDPPPreferences
AlthoughtheDPPhasbeenconsistentinitsargumentforaclaimbasedontheeffective
occupationofTaipingIslandalone,rootedininternationallawandavoidinganyuseoftheU-
ShapedLinethatissodirectlyconnectedtoChinesenationalidentity,therearereasonstoquestion
15BaoLi,‘‘Taiwanqiangaoguanchengyingfangqinanzhongguohaizhuzhang’’[Formerhigh-rankingTaiwaneseofficialadvocatesdroppingtheSouthChinaSeaclaim],VOA,September14,2014,<http://www.voachinese.com/content/taiwan-20140913/2449107.html>.16TsaiwasexplicitonTaiping.ShestatedthattheDPPwillnot‘‘abandonorrenounceTai-wan’sTaipingIslandsovereignty.’’AparaphrasedEnglishtranslationofherstatementisgiveninCNA,‘‘DPPHasNoPlantoGiveUpTaipingSovereignty:Tsai,’’ChinaPost,May27,2015,<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/05/27/437001/DPP-has.htm>.
howdedicatedtheDPPistothisposition.ThemainreasonfordoubtisthatboththeDPPandthe
DPPbasetendnottohaveanyfirmordeeppreferenceswithregardstotheSouthChinaSea,and
thereforetheSouthChinaSearepresentsapotentialareaforcompromise.Duringinterviews,DPP
membershavemadestatementsindicatingthistobetrue,bothbeforeandduringthecurrent
administration.Forexample,duringaninterviewin2014,aformerofficialintheChen
administrationexplainedthatforChen,theSouthChinaSeawasnotapriority.Hesaid,“Chen’s
prioritywasnottheSouthChinaSea,itwastheUnitedStatesfirst,theEastChinaSeaandTaiwan-
Japanrelationssecond,andthenlastwastheSouthChinaSea.”17Oneformerhigh-rankingofficial
fromtheChenadministration,whocontinuestoplayanadvisoryroleinthecurrentadministration,
explainedthatfortheDPP,theEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSeadisputearedifferentkindsof
disputes:
Lotsoffishermenfishedinthatarea[theEastChinaSea],anddidthatalways,sowhenJapansurrenderedafterWorldWarII,fishermen’shabitswerestillthesame,fishermenwenttothatarea,tooktheirboatsthere,thenwentbackhome…sosuddenlyafterWorldWarII,youcannotdothat?Historiansdoalotofresearch,butfromanordinaryperson’sperspective,theyareusedtodailyactivitiesinthatarea.Ofcoursethisdoesnotmeanhistoricaldocumentsarenotimportant.Ijustwanttoadd,ordinaryfishermenusedtogothere.ForTaiping,thisisquitedifferent.ChenShui-bianhadstrategicthinking…forformerpresidentChen,wewanttoplayacertainkindofrole...thisisquitedifferent,itisastrategicrole.18
TheideathattheSouthChinaSeadisputeisastrategicopportunityratherthananinherentrightor
responsibilityisconsistentthroughoutDPPinterviewsonthistopic.Moreover,theDPPdoesnot
generallybelievetheirbaseprioritizestheSouthChinaSea,makingitanarearipeforcompromise.
Inanother2014interview,aDPPstrategistspecializedinforeignpolicysaid,“Sofartherehasbeen
nodiscussiononsettinga[official]politicalstatementontheSouthChinaSea,maybeinthefuture.
Fornowitisnotpoliticallyimportant;thereareotherissueswearefocusedon.”19
17Interview,Taipei,June2014.18Interview,Taipei,May2017.19Interview,Taipei,June2014.
AlthoughtheDPPislesscommittedtoanexpansiveSouthChinaSeaclaim,viewsthearea
strategically,anddoesnotbelievethedisputeishighlysalienttotheirbase,theystillrecognizethat
ChinacaresaboutTaiwan’sclaimintheSouthChinaSea.Evenbeforereturningthepower,theDPP
indicatedduringinterviewstheymaybewillingtoshifttheirpositionontheclaimbasedon
considerationsofexternalactors,particularlycross-Straitrelations.AsoneDPPstrategistnoted,
“TheDPPisfocusingonwhatwehaveeffectivecontrolover,butifwedropotherpartsofthe
(SouthChinaSea)claim,weareworriedaboutaffectingcross-Straitrelations.Wewanttobe
helpfultotheUS,makingthesituationmorepeaceful,butcross-Straitrelationsisaprioritytoo.”20
V. DPPSouthChinaSeaPolicyAfterthe2016Election
Aftercomingtopower,theTsaiadministrationgenerallyavoidedanySouthChinaSea
claimsbeyondTaipinganditsrelatedjurisdictionalrights.21WhenthePermanentCourtof
ArbitrationinvalidatedtheU-ShapedLineinJuly2016,alsofindingthatnoSouthChinaSealand
featurequalifiesasanisland(notevenTaipingIsland),Tsairespondedbymovingupascheduled
navalpatrolofTaipingandstronglydenouncingtheruling.Heradministrationhassincesent
delegationsofvisitorstoTaiping,includingavisitbyInteriorMinisterYehJiunn-ronginAugust.In
thewakeoftheruling,scholarsinTaiwannotedtheTsaiadministration’ssingularfocusonTaiping
initsdefenseofTaiwan’sSouthChinaSearights,forexampleavoidinganymentionofScarborough
Shoaldespiteitbeingmentionedintheruling.22Itseemssafetoassumethathadthecourtleft
Taipingoutofitsruling,theDPPresponsetotherulingmayhavebeenmorepositive.
20Interview,WashingtonDC,November2014.21Admittedly,therehavebeensomeearlysignsthattheTsaiadministrationmaybemorepragmaticontheSouthChinaSeanowthatitisinoffice.Forinstance,MOFASpokespersonEleanorWanghasindicatedinpublicstatementsthatSouthChinaSealandfeaturesareROC‘‘historiclandsandmaritimeterritories.’’However,itshouldbenotedthatWangwasalsoMOFAspokespersonduringtheMaadministration,andmadesimilarstatementswhenMawasinoffice.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeRalphJennings,‘‘NewTaiwanLeadershipTakesToughStanceonDisputedSouthChinaSea,’’Forbes,May31,2016,<http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/05/31/new-taiwan-leadership-extends-tough-stance-on-disputed-south-china-sea/>22TheChinaPost,“TsaigovtshouldsetupSouthChinaSearulingcommittee:experts,”September6,2016.
AlthoughtheTsaiadministrationhasbeennotedforemphasizingTaipingIslandinits
defenseofROCrightsaftertherulingwasannounced,Tsai’sadministrationhasmadeseveral
significantdeparturesfromtheparty’sestablishedapproachbothduringtheChenadministration
andwhileintheminorityposition.Intheaftermathofthearbitrationannouncement,theTsai
administrationsentbothMinisterofForeignAffairsDavidLeeandMinisteroftheInteriorYeh
Jiunn-rongtotheLegislativeYuanwheretheyeachgavereportsreaffirmingtheTsai
administration’scommitmenttothelandfeaturesdepictedinthe1947map.Evenwhenfacedwith
criticismfromtheNewPowerParty’sFreddyLim,whosaiditwasajoketocontinueclaimingthe
SouthChinaSealandfeatures,andsimilartoclaimingouterMongolia,DavidLeesimplyrepeated
severaltimesthattheTsaiadministrationsupportsthepositionputforwardinthe1947map.23
DavidLeehassincereferredto“SouthChinaSeaIslands”inhisstatementsofROCclaimsgivento
theLegislativeYuan.However,ananonymoussourceintheTsaiadministrationmadeitclearthat
theTsaiadministrationwillneverusetheU-ShapedLineinitsclaim.24
WhenaskedaboutshiftsbetweenTsaiasacandidateandtheTsaiadministrationinterms
oftheSouthChinaSeaclaim,aDPPstrategistinvolvedwithplanningtheTsaiadministration’s
responsetothearbitrationrulingsaidthattheForeignMinisterandtheMinisterofInterior’s
statementswerepartoftheTsaiadministration’seffortstowinfavorwithBeijing,particularlywith
thehopeofpleasingBeijingenoughtogaingreaterinternationalspace.Tsaiconsideredmoves
towardJapanandtheUSonthisissue,butultimatelyhopedconcessionsaimedatBeijingandthe
statusquowouldreapthegreatestpoliticalrewards:
OurMinisterofForeignAffairs…sayswerespectNanhaiqundaoweizhitu(the1947map).SoBeijingwassurprisedwhentheyheardthis.ThiswassomecommunicationtoMainland
23CNA,“Nanhaizhuquanwaizhang:Jianchi1947niantichuzhuzhang,”July12,2016.24TaipeiTimes,“Tsaitoavoid‘U-shapedline’:source,”July15,2016.
China.Tsaiwillalwaysdothistostabilizecross-Straitrelations.Icansaythis,itisnotabigchange;wejustchangesomewords.IntheLegislativeYuan,theyaskedourcabinetmembersifwefollowthemap.Thepan-blueaskedquestions,ourministerssaytheyfollowNanhaiqundaoweizhitu(the1947map).ThisisamessagetoBeijing.25
Asthesestatementsillustrate,TsaisentherministerstotheROCLegislativeYuanwiththe
intentionofstatingsupportforaversionoftheSouthChinaSeaclaimthatcomesclosertoChinese
articulationsoftheclaimthananyDPPstatementhadcomebefore.ThiswasbecauseTsaiiseager
togaininternationalspace,andthepathtogaininternationalspaceisthroughBeijing.Becausethe
SouthChinaSeaisanissuelesssalienttoTsai’sbase,relativelyspeaking,itisanareawhereshecan
makeconcessions,incontrasttothe1992Consensus,whichishighlysalienttoTsai’s
independence-leaningbaseandwhereshiftstowardthecenterareimpossible.Eveninpublic
statementsontheSouthChinaSeadispute,theTsaiadministrationhasfollowedthisstrategy–
mirroringBeijing’swordinginanefforttogainleverage.AsthesameDPPstrategistexplained,the
DPPstartedusingBeijing’swordingfromits2009UnitedNationssubmission,suchas“relevant
waters,”despiteit’slegalambiguity:
Weusedtheterm‘relevantwaters’tomaintaincross-Straitrelations.TsaiwantstojoinInterpolandotherinternationalorganizations,soshetriedtosendgoodfeelingstoBeijing.Atthattime,wesuggestedtoTsaithatthisisimpossible,andwesuggestedcateringtoJapanandtheUnitedStatestocreateleverage.Tsaididn’tacceptthis.Shewantedtomaintainthestatusquo.26
Itisnoteworthy,however,thattheDPPdrewthelineatlisting“history”asareasonjustifyingthe
SouthChinaSeaclaim.WhentheywereaskedbyChineseofficialswhytheydidnotincludehistory
intheirpublicstatementsofjustificationsfortheclaim,theysaiditwasatrivialdifferencefromthe
Maadministration,wheninactualityitwasintentionaldecision.27
25Interview,Taipei,May2017.26Interview,Taipei,May2017.27Interview,Taipei,May2017.
Insum,TsaiadministrationstatementsontheSouthChinaSeadonotcontainreferencesto
ChineseheritageortheU-ShapedLine,andinsteademphasizeinternationallaw.However,arecent
notableshifthasbeeninstatingasimpleaffirmationofsupportforthe1947map.Thisshiftisonly
possiblebecausetheSouthChinaSeaclaimislesssalienttoTsai’sbase,andTsaiknowsitmaybe
anareatoofferconcessionstoMainlandChina.TheDPPpositiononTaiwan’srightsintheSouth
ChinaSeahadpreviouslybeenveryuniform:TaiwanhassovereigntyoverTaiping(whichisan
island),butclaimstootherlandfeaturesintheSouthChinaSeahaveaquestionablelegalbasis.
NowTsaihashadherministersmakesimplestatementssupportingthe1947mappositionandhas
issuedstatementsmirroringBeijing’slanguage,allwiththegoalofgaininginternationalspace.
VI. Conclusions&Implications
Scholarshipdoesnothaveacomprehensivetheoreticalexplanationforhowstatesestablish
territorialandmaritimeclaims.Thisisasignificantoversightbecauseunderstandingthe
backgroundforclaimshelpsusbetterunderstandtheconditionsshapingvolatiledisputes.Inthe
caseofTaiwan,theDPPhadadvocatedforalimitedsovereigntyclaimoverTaipingIsland,and
relatedjurisdictionalrights,whentheyweretheminorityparty.Sincegainingpower,theyhave
beenpushedtowardthecenterofTaiwan’spoliticalspectrum,showingawillingnessto
compromisewhentheybelieveitwillservetheirbroaderinterests,especiallyinlightofthelow
saliencyoftheSouthChinaSeatotheirpoliticalbase.Theimplicationsofthisfindingaretwofold:(a)
politicalpartypoliticaldecisionsandstrategicmaneuveringcandirectlyimpactsomethingas
seeminglyintractableasterritorialandmaritimeclaims,and(b)theclaimsputforthbyother
actors,suchasChina,requiresimilarin-depthanalyses.
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