GettingtheGreenLight:

MajorityPartyRuleandTaiwan’sApproachtotheSouthChinaSea

KimberlyLWilson

May13,2017

[FirstDraft–PleaseDoNotCiteWithoutAuthor’sPermission]

Abstract:IntheleaduptoTaiwan’s2016presidentialandlegislativeelections,high-rankingmembersofTaiwan’sDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP)gaveinterviewsandissuedstatementsindicatingtheDPPwasnotcommittedtodefendingtheU-ShapedLineclaimintheSouthChinaSea.TheDPPconsistentlyaccusedChinaofignoringinternationallawintheSouthChinaSea,andtheDPPavoidedcitingtheU-ShapedLineinitsownstatementsonTaiwan’ssovereignty.Nowthatithasregainedthepresidencyandholdsalegislativemajority,howhastheDPPmanagedTaiwan’sambiguousSouthChinaSeaclaim,andwhatdoesthistellusabouttheroleofdomesticpoliticsinterritorialandmaritimedisputes?Thispaperarguesthatsinceretakingpower,theDPPhasfollowedamoderatepositionintheSouthChinaSea,apositionselectedbasedonitsappealtoboththeRepublicofChina(ROC)publicandMainlandChina.DPPconcessionsrepresentamovetowardthecenter,demonstratingthateveninthemidstofhighlyintractableterritorialandmaritimeconflicts,politicalpartieswillmakestrategiccalculationsbasedonthepreferencesoftheirbaseandthegeneralpublic.Inthiscase,theDPPbasehaspreferencesintheSouthChinaSea,butholdsthesepreferenceslessstronglythanonotherissues,makingtheSouthChinaSeaanissuewheretheDPPcanmakeconcessionstoChinawithoutsevererepercussionsfromitsbase.

I. Introduction:TheSouthChinaSea,anareastretchingfromtheKarimataandMalaccaStraitstotheStrait

ofTaiwan,issubjecttoacomplexarrayofoverlappingterritorialandmaritimeclaims.1Theareais

aglobalhubfortransportationandtelecommunications,ishighlyvaluedforitsfisheries,andis

believedtopossessconsiderablenaturalresourcesinitsseabed.Thedisputeisfrequently

portrayedininternationalmediaashighlyvolatileandasapotentialflashpointforglobalconflict,

withmuchanalysiscenteredonChina’sambiguousclaimencompassingmuchofthearea.Whilethe

ChinesepeopleareassumedtoviewChina’sclaimasquitenatural–anoft-citedfactisthatthe

SouthChinaSeaappearsinmapsonthewallsofeveryclassroominChina–theclaimisgenerally

puzzlingtothoseoutsideChina,withmanyaskinghowChinaclaimswaterandterritoryspanning

anareaover1,000milesfromitscoast.MorecynicalperspectivescharacterizeChina’sclaimas

simplyapowergrabbyarisingpowerhungryfornaturalresources,butthisrationalizationcannot

explainthesimilarclaimmaintainedbytheRepublicofChina(ROCorTaiwan).Taiwanhas

consistentlyadvocatedforitsown,separateclaimintheSouthChinaSea,drawingonacommon

basisofChinesehistory.Insum,overlappingclaimsintheSouthChinaSeaareahighlytopical

puzzle,andtheROCclaimprovidesimportantandintriguingevidence.

Scholarshiphaslongattestedtotheintractabilityandvolatilityofterritorialdisputes.2Yetit

hasbeenrelativelyquietonhowstatesformclaimssuchasthosefoundintheSouthChinaSea.In

muchanalysesofterritorialandmaritimeconflict,claimsaretakenasgiven,withlimited1TheclaimantstothedisputeareChina,thePhilippines,Vietnam,Malaysia,Brunei,Indonesia,andTaiwan.Indonesiaissometimesexcludedfromthislist,duetotheambiguousnatureofbothChina’sandTaiwan’sclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.ItisunclearwhetherornotmapsdepictingbothPRCandROCclaimsincludetheNatunaarea,anareaadministeredbyIndonesia.2JohnA.Vasquez,TheWarPuzzle(CambridgeUniversityPress,1993);JohnA.VasquezandMarieTHenehan,“TerritorialDisputesandtheProbabilityofWar,1816-1992,”JournalofPeaceResearch38,no.2(March2001):123–38;PaulK.Huth,StandingYourGround:TerritorialDisputesandInternationalConflict(UniversityofMichiganPress,1998);PaulKHuth,“WhyAreTerritorialDisputesbetweenStatesaCentralCauseofInternationalConflict?,”inWhatDoWeKnowaboutWar?,ed.JohnAVasquez(Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,2000),85–110.

theoreticalworkonhowstatesinitiallydeterminewhatbelongstothem.Inoneofthefewstudies

thatdirectlyaddresshowclaimsareformed,AlexanderB.Murphyfindsthathistoricaljustifications

playacentralroleinshapingclaimsanddisputes.Murphyarguesthatprinciplesofindividual

propertyrightsareroutinelyappliedtostates,resultingintheuseofhistoricallossofpropertyasa

rationaleforclaims.Nowitisuniversallyrecognizedthat“astateisnotentitledtoseizeterritory

fromanotherunlessthatterritoryitselfwasoriginallywrongfullyseized.”3Similarly,strategicvalue

andeconomicvalue,suchasnaturalresources,havebeenfoundtomotivateterritorialclaims.4

Theseinsightsprovideimportantdirectionsforresearch,butdonotprovideacomprehensive

pictureforhowstatesdeterminetheirclaims.

Tofurtherexploresuchanimportantandtimelypuzzle,thispaperincludesaqualitative

casestudyofTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaims,includingevidencedrawnfrominterviewswithROC

governmentofficialsandmaritimeexperts.WhileChina'sclaimintheSouthChinaSeaisregularly

highlightedinmediaandscholarlywork,TaiwanhasgrappledwithacommonChinesehistorical

recordwhenestablishingitsparallelclaim,andisnonethelessoftenomittedfromanalysesofthe

dispute.UndoubtedlyduetoTaiwan'sambiguousinternationalstatus,aswellasitsdecidedly

restrainedforeignpolicy,theexclusionissignificant,asTaiwan'sdemocraticpoliticalenvironment

providesanexceptionalopportunityto“lookinsidethebox”inwhichforeignpolicyisbeingmade.

ThecasestudypresentedherefocusesonTaiwan’scurrentrulingparty-theDemocratic

ProgressiveParty(DPP).Intherun-uptothe2016election,theDPPmadeanumberofstatements

indicatingtheymightchangeTaiwan’sSouthChinaSeaclaimiftheyreturnedtopower.Since

winningthepresidencyandgainingamajorityinTaiwan’sunicamerallegislature,theyhave

3AlexanderBMurphy,“HistoricalJustificationsforTerritorialClaims,”AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers80,no.4(December1990):531–48.4Huth,StandingYourGround.

insteadpursuedasomewhatsubduedalthoughdecidedlymoderateposition,insomelimitedbut

noteworthyinstancestheyhavebeenquitesimilartothepreviousKMT(NationalistParty)

administration.Thisisbecause,similartothemedianvotertheorem,wheregovernmentpolicies

convergetowardthepoliticalcenter,statementsonTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimaredesignedto

satisfyeachparty’spoliticalbasewhilesimultaneouslyappealingtotheROCpublic.Inthiscase,an

interestingandtheoreticallysignificantadditionistheeffortsbybothpartiestoconcurrently

balanceandsatisfyexternalactors,chieflytheUnitedStates,China,andJapan.AlthoughtheDPP

emphasizesTaiwaneseidentityandopenlyquestionsconnectionstoChina,strivingtoarticulateits

positionontheclaimlargelyintermsofinternationallawratherthanChinesehistory,theDPPis

stillamajorpartyinatwo-partydominantsystem,drivingittofindpoliciesthatwillsatisfyalarge

numberofconstituentsandactors.InthecaseoftheSouthChinaSea,theDPPhastendedtoview

Taiwan’sclaimasabargainingchipmorethanasaninherentrightorresponsibility,allowingthem

totakeamoremoderatepositionunlikelytoalienatetheirbase,who’sstrongestpreferencestend

tobefocusedonotherissues.Ultimately,thiscaseshowsthatalthoughterritorialandmaritime

disputesremainintractableandvolatile,domesticpoliticsdictatesforeignpolicyoutcomes,evenon

somethingasassumedlysacredasclaimstolandandwater.

ToillustratetheprocessthroughwhichtheDPPhasdevelopedandadjustedtheirposition

ontheSouthChinaSea,thispaperwillexploreDPPpoliciesontheSouthChinaSeaclaiminfour

parts.First,basicbackgroundinformationontheROCclaimisoutlined.Thesecondsection

documentstheDPPpositionontheclaimintheleaduptothe2016election.Third,thestrengthof

DPPpreferenceswithrespecttotheSouthChinaSeaareevaluated.Fourth,evidenceofaDPPshift

towardthecenterisdescribed.Finally,thearticleconcludeswithasummaryoffindingsand

implicationsforthestudyofdomesticpoliticsinthecontextofterritorialandmaritimedisputes.

II. Background:RepublicofChina(ROC)ClaimsintheSouthChinaSeaAnessentialreferencepointforunderstandingTaiwan’sclaim,aswellasthatofthePRC,is

amapcreatedbytheRepublicofChinagovernmentin1947(seeFigure1).Thedashedline

depictedinthismap,encompassingthevastmajorityoftheSouthChinaSea,isreferredtoasthe

“U-ShapedLine”orthe“11-DashLine.”Taiwanhasneveralteredthelinefoundinthemap's

originalversion,andboththePRCandROChavemaintainedsimilarlyambiguousclaimsbasedon

thismap(oralternateversionsinthecaseofthePRC).5Rivalclaimantsandobservershave

questionedwhatthenowinfamousU-ShapedLineisdesignating:historicwatersorsomeother

historicright,aterritorialclaimtolandfeatures,maritimedelimitation,orperhapsacombination

ofjurisdictionalrights.Moreover,thelegaljustificationsofthelineareunclear.NeitherthePRCnor

ROCgovernmenthaseverprovidedacomprehensiveexplanationfortheclaim.Forinstance,no

coordinateshavebeenprovidedtodesignateanexactgeographicalarea.Inthe1993SouthChina

SeaPolicies,issuedbyTaiwan’slegislature,theROCgovernmentspecificallynotedthatithad

historicwaterrightsintheSouthChinaSea.Thesehistoricwaterrightswerenotdefined,and

possibledefinitionsrangefromexclusivefishingrightsuptoaconceptionoftheSouthChinaSeaas

aChineselake,similartowatersinternaltoanation’sterritoryintermsofexclusivity.Thiswording

wassuspendedduringChenShui-bian’sDPPpresidency,andwasnotrevivedduringtheKMTMa

Ying-jeouadministration.

5Thelinewillbereferredtointhispaperasthe“U-ShapedLine.”

Figure1:AMapofthePositionsoftheSouthChinaSeaIslands(1947)

AlthoughTaiwan’sclaimisambiguous,Taiwan'sgovernmenthasdoggedlyasserted

Taiwan'srightsintheSouthChinaSea.Forinstance,Taiwan’sMinistryofForeignAffairs(MOFA)

hasremainedconsistentwhendescribingTaiwan'sclaim.Usingavariationofwordingthathas

beenpresentinROCstatementsfordecades,MOFAconsistentlyemphasizessovereigntyoverSouth

ChinaSealandfeaturesandmaritimeclaimstowaterssurroundingthosefeatures.AMOFA

statementontheSouthChinaSeain2015servesasaprimeexample:

Whetherfromtheperspectivesofhistory,geography,orinternationallaw,theNansha(Spratly)Islands,Shisha(Paracel)Islands,ChungshaIslands(MacclesfieldBank),andTungsha(Pratas)Islands,aswellastheirsurroundingwaters,areaninherentpartofROCterritoryandwaters.AstheROCenjoysallrightstotheseislandgroupsandtheirsurroundingwatersinaccordancewithinternationallaw,theROCgovernmentdoesnotrecognizeanyclaimtosovereigntyover,oroccupationof,theseareasbyothercountries,irrespectiveofthereasonsputforwardormethodsusedforsuchclaimoroccupation.6 Asillustratedbythisexcerpt,Taiwan'sMOFAappearstobefollowinganinterpretationof

Taiwan'sclaimcenteredonSouthChinaSealandfeatures.Noseparatehistoricwatersclaimis

mentioned,andtheU-ShapedLineisalsonotablyabsentfromtheirdescription.Similarly,the

recentMaadministrationoftenexpressedaconceptionoftheclaimbasedonlandfeaturesand

relatedwaterrights.7WhiletheofficialROCclaimhasseeminglymovedawayfromahistoric

watersclaimintheSouthChinaSea,MOFAstilladamantlymaintainsaclaimontherocks,shoals,

andislandswithintheU-shapedline,includingwatersrightsbasedonthesefeatures.

Itisimportanttonote,despitetherelativeconsistencyinTaiwan'srecentSouthChinaSea

statements,especiallythosecomingfromMOFA,ambiguityremainsthedefiningcharacteristicof

Taiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaims.Thisambiguityhasseveralsources.First,ambiguityonSouth

ChinaSeaclaimshasbeenandcontinuestobeaconsciouslyselectedpolicyoftheTaiwanese

6MinistryofForeignAffairs,RepublicofChina(Taiwan).“StatementontheSouthChinaSea.”(July7,2015).<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=0E7B91A8FBEC4A94&sms=220E98D761D34A9A&s=EDEBCA08C7F51C98.>(accessedJune7,2017). 7KimberlyL.Wilson,"PartyPoliticsandNationalIdentityinTaiwan’sSouthChinaSeaClaims."AsianSurvey57,no.2(2017):271-296.

government.AsoneofficialinMOFA'sDepartmentofEastAsianandPacificAffairsexplained

duringtherecentMaAdministration,disagreementwithinTaiwan'sgovernmentisasourceof

ambiguity:

Therearealotofargumentsaboutwhattheclaimshouldbe.Everyfourscholarshasfivedifferentviews.ThereissomeinternaldiscussionbetweenMOFA,theMinistryofInterior,andtheNationalSecurityCouncil,andwealsoneedtoconsidertheUnitedStatesandcross-Straitrelations.It'snoteasy.PresidentMasaysthatsofarwehaven'treachedapositionofagreementamongallpartieswithinthegovernment.8

Moreover,strategicconsiderationsfactorintoTaiwan'spolicyofambiguity.Asthesame

officialexplained,Taiwan'smaingoalrightnowregardingtheSouthChinaSeaistojointheCodeof

Conductdiscussions,andupsettinganyoftheotherpartieswoulddisadvantagetheseefforts.He

concluded,“Wehaveadelicaterole,andsofarwehaven'tfiguredoutabetterpolicythan

ambiguity.”9

Insum,Taiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimpossessesasignificantdegreeofambiguity.Such

ambiguitymakeselectoraloutcomesimportantfortheSouthChinaSeaclaim,aslegislativeand

presidentialactionscanimpacttheclaim.Inthenextsection,DPPstatementsontheclaimwhilein

theminoritypositionwillbeexamined.

III. DPPSouthChinaSeaPolicyPositionsBeforethe2016Elections TheDemocraticProgressiveParty(DPP),whichrecentlyretookthepresidencyandnow

holdsalegislativemajority,hasstakedoutapositiononTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimthatis

centeredonTaiwaneseidentity.Yettheirapproachultimatelyreflectsanefforttoaccountforthe

concernsoftheirbasewhileutilizingmoderateapproaches.Asaminorityparty,theDPP

ceaselesslyadvocatedforTaiwan'ssovereigntyoverTaipingIsland,thelargestnaturallyforming

8Interview.Taipei.June2014.9Interview.Taipei.June2014.

featureintheSouthChinaSea,andtheonlyfeatureoccupiedbyTaiwanthatisdisputedbyanactor

otherthanChina.Atthesametime,theDPPavoidedanyuseoftheU-ShapedLineormore

expansiveclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.InstatingtheirpositionsonTaiwan'sclaim,DPPofficials

consistentlyemphasizearelianceoninternationallawasaguidelineinshapingTaiwan'sclaim,

particularlytheprincipleofeffectiveoccupation.

TheDPPhasbeenapersistentadvocateofTaiwan’sclaimtoTaipingIsland,butthat

advocacycomeswiththeinsistencethatTaiwan’sclaimsareseparatefromChina’s.OnFebruary2,

2008,theDPP'sChenShui-bianbecamethefirstTaiwanesepresidenttovisitTaipingIsland,his

visitcommemoratingtheopeningofanewrunwaycommissionedbyhisadministration.While

ChenwasvisitingTaiping,heannouncedhis“SpratlyInitiative,”whichtheDPPstillcitesas

foundationaltotheirpoliciesontheSouthChinaSea.10Throughouthistimeinoffice,Chenwas

quietontheU-ShapedLineaswellastheSouthChinaSealandfeaturesnotoccupiedbyTaiwan,but

asnotedabove,heplayedanimportantroleinweakeningthehistoricwatersargumentby

suspendingthe1993SouthChinaSeaPolicies.CurrentDPPPresidentTsaiIng-wenhasconsistently

maintainedthatTaiwan'spositionontheSouthChinaSeaisdifferentfromMainlandChina's.

Similarly,intheDPP'sinternallydistributedSouthChinaSeaPoliciesandPositions,theEnglish

translationstates,“TaiwanhasitsownviewpointregardingtheSpratlyIslands–onethatis

foundedonsovereigntyoriginatingfromTaiwan,andwhichisdifferentfromChina's[claimsover

theterritory]."11AsonescholarcloselyaffiliatedwiththeDPPexplainedduringaninterview,this

internalSouthChinaSeapolicydocumentintentionallymentions“SouthChinaSeaexclusive

10Duringoneinterview,aformerDPPofficialthathelpeddrafttheSpratlyInitiativeexplainedthatinwritingtheInitiative,thenDPPgovernmentofficialsdebatedthenameextensively.Reflectiveoftheirviewsonthedispute,theyjokedthattheycouldnotnametheinitiative“TheSouthChinaSeaInitiative,”becausethenthetitlewouldhavetheword“China.”Theformerofficialadded,wejokedaboutit,“butactuallyweallthoughtaboutit.”Interview.Taipei.June2014.11TheDemocraticProgressiveParty’sSouthChinaSeaPoliciesandViewpoints(internaldocumentprovidedtoauthor)

economiczone”asasignalthattheDPPdisagreeswithabroaderhistoricwatersclaimintheSouth

ChinaSea.12

Intheirpublicstatements,DPPofficialsuniformlycitedadesiretobaseTaiwan'sclaimon

internationallaw,particularlythelegalprincipleofeffectiveoccupation.Duringaninterview,

MichaelTsai,formerSecretaryofDefenseduringtheChenAdministration,statedthat,“Taiwan

shouldonlyclaimTaipingIslandandthesurroundingwaters,areaswithactualcontrol.IfTaiwan

madethisclaim,itwouldberelativelyundisputed.OnlyChinawouldchallengeROCcontrolof

Taiping.”13Inanotherexample,JosephWuhasarguedTaiwanshouldnotinvestitselfin

strengtheningrelationswith“anexpansionistpowerwhichclaimsunsubstantiatedhistorical

rights,"aclearreferencetoChinaanditsclaims.Inthesameeditorial,Wuincludedapolicypoint

specifictotheSouthChinaSea:

SouthChinaSeaissue:TaiwanshouldmakeitclearthatitfollowstheUNConventionontheLawofSea,article121specifically,indefiningitsterritorialclaimsbasedontheactualownershipofItuAba(Taipingislet)…TaiwanshouldalsomakeitveryclearthatitwillnotcooperatewithChinaonthesovereigntyissueagainstanyotherclaimants.14 Wu'sstatementarticulateswhatwasaconsistentexpressionofTaiwan'sSouthChinaSea

claimsamongtheDPPminority–internationallawsupportsTaiwan’ssovereigntyoverTaiping,

andnootherdisputedSouthChinaSealandfeatures.

12Moreover,theChinesetranslationofthesamedocumentreferstoSouthChinaSea“highseas”(theEnglishtranslationsays“internationalwaters”),whichwascarefullywordedintheoriginalChinesetoindicateaDPPskepticismregardingtheabilityofmostSouthChinaSealandfeaturestoqualifyasislandsundertheUNCLOSdefinitionofanislandasincludedinArticle121.Interview.Taipei.June2014.13Interview.Taipei.February201414AccessedonJuly29,2014at:http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.com/2014/05/dpp-us-representatives-5142015-op-ed-in.html.Alsoavailableathttp://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-future-of-u-s-taiwan-relations/

TheDPP’sdistinctpositionontheSouthChinaSeacreatesthepotentialforTaiwan’sclaim

tochangeinthefuture.FormerDeputySecretaryGeneraloftheNationalSecurityCouncilduring

theChenAdministration,ParrisChangtoldVoiceofAmericainSeptember2014thatiftheDPP

regainedthegovernmentin2016(whichitdid),theDPPwillconsiderchangingTaiwan’sSouth

ChinaSeaclaim.AccordingtoChang:

Afterthe2016changeofgovernmentinTaiwan,thereisthiskindofpossibility[changingtheclaim],becauseDPPmembers,includingmyself,havealreadysaidTaiwanshouldadjustourterritorialclaimsintheSouthChinaSea.AfterWorldWarII,theKuomingtanggovernmentin1947putforwardthe9or11dashlineposition,whichhasnorelationshipwithTaiwan'sgovernmenttoday.IfwehaveaDPPgovernment,Ibelieve,wearewillingtoreconsider.WebelievethatTaiwan,inthecapacityofanindependentcountry,isintheAsianandworlddemocraticcamps.OurpositionandourobediencetointernationallawaredifferentfromChina,whichemphasizesitshistoryandsovereignty.15InMay2015,Taiwan'sthenincomingpresidentTsaiIng-wentoldreportersthattheDPP

wouldnotabandonTaiwan'sclaimtosovereigntyoverTaipingIsland.Tsaiexpressedsurprisethat

anyonewouldquestiontheDPP'scommitmenttodefendingTaiping,butitisnotablethatTsaidid

notmakeanystatementsaboutTaiwan'sSouthChinaSeaclaimsbeyondTaipingIsland,otherthan

thatthedisputeshouldbehandledinaccordancewithinternationallaw16

IV. TheStrengthofDPPPreferences

AlthoughtheDPPhasbeenconsistentinitsargumentforaclaimbasedontheeffective

occupationofTaipingIslandalone,rootedininternationallawandavoidinganyuseoftheU-

ShapedLinethatissodirectlyconnectedtoChinesenationalidentity,therearereasonstoquestion

15BaoLi,‘‘Taiwanqiangaoguanchengyingfangqinanzhongguohaizhuzhang’’[Formerhigh-rankingTaiwaneseofficialadvocatesdroppingtheSouthChinaSeaclaim],VOA,September14,2014,<http://www.voachinese.com/content/taiwan-20140913/2449107.html>.16TsaiwasexplicitonTaiping.ShestatedthattheDPPwillnot‘‘abandonorrenounceTai-wan’sTaipingIslandsovereignty.’’AparaphrasedEnglishtranslationofherstatementisgiveninCNA,‘‘DPPHasNoPlantoGiveUpTaipingSovereignty:Tsai,’’ChinaPost,May27,2015,<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/05/27/437001/DPP-has.htm>.

howdedicatedtheDPPistothisposition.ThemainreasonfordoubtisthatboththeDPPandthe

DPPbasetendnottohaveanyfirmordeeppreferenceswithregardstotheSouthChinaSea,and

thereforetheSouthChinaSearepresentsapotentialareaforcompromise.Duringinterviews,DPP

membershavemadestatementsindicatingthistobetrue,bothbeforeandduringthecurrent

administration.Forexample,duringaninterviewin2014,aformerofficialintheChen

administrationexplainedthatforChen,theSouthChinaSeawasnotapriority.Hesaid,“Chen’s

prioritywasnottheSouthChinaSea,itwastheUnitedStatesfirst,theEastChinaSeaandTaiwan-

Japanrelationssecond,andthenlastwastheSouthChinaSea.”17Oneformerhigh-rankingofficial

fromtheChenadministration,whocontinuestoplayanadvisoryroleinthecurrentadministration,

explainedthatfortheDPP,theEastChinaSeaandSouthChinaSeadisputearedifferentkindsof

disputes:

Lotsoffishermenfishedinthatarea[theEastChinaSea],anddidthatalways,sowhenJapansurrenderedafterWorldWarII,fishermen’shabitswerestillthesame,fishermenwenttothatarea,tooktheirboatsthere,thenwentbackhome…sosuddenlyafterWorldWarII,youcannotdothat?Historiansdoalotofresearch,butfromanordinaryperson’sperspective,theyareusedtodailyactivitiesinthatarea.Ofcoursethisdoesnotmeanhistoricaldocumentsarenotimportant.Ijustwanttoadd,ordinaryfishermenusedtogothere.ForTaiping,thisisquitedifferent.ChenShui-bianhadstrategicthinking…forformerpresidentChen,wewanttoplayacertainkindofrole...thisisquitedifferent,itisastrategicrole.18

TheideathattheSouthChinaSeadisputeisastrategicopportunityratherthananinherentrightor

responsibilityisconsistentthroughoutDPPinterviewsonthistopic.Moreover,theDPPdoesnot

generallybelievetheirbaseprioritizestheSouthChinaSea,makingitanarearipeforcompromise.

Inanother2014interview,aDPPstrategistspecializedinforeignpolicysaid,“Sofartherehasbeen

nodiscussiononsettinga[official]politicalstatementontheSouthChinaSea,maybeinthefuture.

Fornowitisnotpoliticallyimportant;thereareotherissueswearefocusedon.”19

17Interview,Taipei,June2014.18Interview,Taipei,May2017.19Interview,Taipei,June2014.

AlthoughtheDPPislesscommittedtoanexpansiveSouthChinaSeaclaim,viewsthearea

strategically,anddoesnotbelievethedisputeishighlysalienttotheirbase,theystillrecognizethat

ChinacaresaboutTaiwan’sclaimintheSouthChinaSea.Evenbeforereturningthepower,theDPP

indicatedduringinterviewstheymaybewillingtoshifttheirpositionontheclaimbasedon

considerationsofexternalactors,particularlycross-Straitrelations.AsoneDPPstrategistnoted,

“TheDPPisfocusingonwhatwehaveeffectivecontrolover,butifwedropotherpartsofthe

(SouthChinaSea)claim,weareworriedaboutaffectingcross-Straitrelations.Wewanttobe

helpfultotheUS,makingthesituationmorepeaceful,butcross-Straitrelationsisaprioritytoo.”20

V. DPPSouthChinaSeaPolicyAfterthe2016Election

Aftercomingtopower,theTsaiadministrationgenerallyavoidedanySouthChinaSea

claimsbeyondTaipinganditsrelatedjurisdictionalrights.21WhenthePermanentCourtof

ArbitrationinvalidatedtheU-ShapedLineinJuly2016,alsofindingthatnoSouthChinaSealand

featurequalifiesasanisland(notevenTaipingIsland),Tsairespondedbymovingupascheduled

navalpatrolofTaipingandstronglydenouncingtheruling.Heradministrationhassincesent

delegationsofvisitorstoTaiping,includingavisitbyInteriorMinisterYehJiunn-ronginAugust.In

thewakeoftheruling,scholarsinTaiwannotedtheTsaiadministration’ssingularfocusonTaiping

initsdefenseofTaiwan’sSouthChinaSearights,forexampleavoidinganymentionofScarborough

Shoaldespiteitbeingmentionedintheruling.22Itseemssafetoassumethathadthecourtleft

Taipingoutofitsruling,theDPPresponsetotherulingmayhavebeenmorepositive.

20Interview,WashingtonDC,November2014.21Admittedly,therehavebeensomeearlysignsthattheTsaiadministrationmaybemorepragmaticontheSouthChinaSeanowthatitisinoffice.Forinstance,MOFASpokespersonEleanorWanghasindicatedinpublicstatementsthatSouthChinaSealandfeaturesareROC‘‘historiclandsandmaritimeterritories.’’However,itshouldbenotedthatWangwasalsoMOFAspokespersonduringtheMaadministration,andmadesimilarstatementswhenMawasinoffice.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeRalphJennings,‘‘NewTaiwanLeadershipTakesToughStanceonDisputedSouthChinaSea,’’Forbes,May31,2016,<http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/05/31/new-taiwan-leadership-extends-tough-stance-on-disputed-south-china-sea/>22TheChinaPost,“TsaigovtshouldsetupSouthChinaSearulingcommittee:experts,”September6,2016.

AlthoughtheTsaiadministrationhasbeennotedforemphasizingTaipingIslandinits

defenseofROCrightsaftertherulingwasannounced,Tsai’sadministrationhasmadeseveral

significantdeparturesfromtheparty’sestablishedapproachbothduringtheChenadministration

andwhileintheminorityposition.Intheaftermathofthearbitrationannouncement,theTsai

administrationsentbothMinisterofForeignAffairsDavidLeeandMinisteroftheInteriorYeh

Jiunn-rongtotheLegislativeYuanwheretheyeachgavereportsreaffirmingtheTsai

administration’scommitmenttothelandfeaturesdepictedinthe1947map.Evenwhenfacedwith

criticismfromtheNewPowerParty’sFreddyLim,whosaiditwasajoketocontinueclaimingthe

SouthChinaSealandfeatures,andsimilartoclaimingouterMongolia,DavidLeesimplyrepeated

severaltimesthattheTsaiadministrationsupportsthepositionputforwardinthe1947map.23

DavidLeehassincereferredto“SouthChinaSeaIslands”inhisstatementsofROCclaimsgivento

theLegislativeYuan.However,ananonymoussourceintheTsaiadministrationmadeitclearthat

theTsaiadministrationwillneverusetheU-ShapedLineinitsclaim.24

WhenaskedaboutshiftsbetweenTsaiasacandidateandtheTsaiadministrationinterms

oftheSouthChinaSeaclaim,aDPPstrategistinvolvedwithplanningtheTsaiadministration’s

responsetothearbitrationrulingsaidthattheForeignMinisterandtheMinisterofInterior’s

statementswerepartoftheTsaiadministration’seffortstowinfavorwithBeijing,particularlywith

thehopeofpleasingBeijingenoughtogaingreaterinternationalspace.Tsaiconsideredmoves

towardJapanandtheUSonthisissue,butultimatelyhopedconcessionsaimedatBeijingandthe

statusquowouldreapthegreatestpoliticalrewards:

OurMinisterofForeignAffairs…sayswerespectNanhaiqundaoweizhitu(the1947map).SoBeijingwassurprisedwhentheyheardthis.ThiswassomecommunicationtoMainland

23CNA,“Nanhaizhuquanwaizhang:Jianchi1947niantichuzhuzhang,”July12,2016.24TaipeiTimes,“Tsaitoavoid‘U-shapedline’:source,”July15,2016.

China.Tsaiwillalwaysdothistostabilizecross-Straitrelations.Icansaythis,itisnotabigchange;wejustchangesomewords.IntheLegislativeYuan,theyaskedourcabinetmembersifwefollowthemap.Thepan-blueaskedquestions,ourministerssaytheyfollowNanhaiqundaoweizhitu(the1947map).ThisisamessagetoBeijing.25

Asthesestatementsillustrate,TsaisentherministerstotheROCLegislativeYuanwiththe

intentionofstatingsupportforaversionoftheSouthChinaSeaclaimthatcomesclosertoChinese

articulationsoftheclaimthananyDPPstatementhadcomebefore.ThiswasbecauseTsaiiseager

togaininternationalspace,andthepathtogaininternationalspaceisthroughBeijing.Becausethe

SouthChinaSeaisanissuelesssalienttoTsai’sbase,relativelyspeaking,itisanareawhereshecan

makeconcessions,incontrasttothe1992Consensus,whichishighlysalienttoTsai’s

independence-leaningbaseandwhereshiftstowardthecenterareimpossible.Eveninpublic

statementsontheSouthChinaSeadispute,theTsaiadministrationhasfollowedthisstrategy–

mirroringBeijing’swordinginanefforttogainleverage.AsthesameDPPstrategistexplained,the

DPPstartedusingBeijing’swordingfromits2009UnitedNationssubmission,suchas“relevant

waters,”despiteit’slegalambiguity:

Weusedtheterm‘relevantwaters’tomaintaincross-Straitrelations.TsaiwantstojoinInterpolandotherinternationalorganizations,soshetriedtosendgoodfeelingstoBeijing.Atthattime,wesuggestedtoTsaithatthisisimpossible,andwesuggestedcateringtoJapanandtheUnitedStatestocreateleverage.Tsaididn’tacceptthis.Shewantedtomaintainthestatusquo.26

Itisnoteworthy,however,thattheDPPdrewthelineatlisting“history”asareasonjustifyingthe

SouthChinaSeaclaim.WhentheywereaskedbyChineseofficialswhytheydidnotincludehistory

intheirpublicstatementsofjustificationsfortheclaim,theysaiditwasatrivialdifferencefromthe

Maadministration,wheninactualityitwasintentionaldecision.27

25Interview,Taipei,May2017.26Interview,Taipei,May2017.27Interview,Taipei,May2017.

Insum,TsaiadministrationstatementsontheSouthChinaSeadonotcontainreferencesto

ChineseheritageortheU-ShapedLine,andinsteademphasizeinternationallaw.However,arecent

notableshifthasbeeninstatingasimpleaffirmationofsupportforthe1947map.Thisshiftisonly

possiblebecausetheSouthChinaSeaclaimislesssalienttoTsai’sbase,andTsaiknowsitmaybe

anareatoofferconcessionstoMainlandChina.TheDPPpositiononTaiwan’srightsintheSouth

ChinaSeahadpreviouslybeenveryuniform:TaiwanhassovereigntyoverTaiping(whichisan

island),butclaimstootherlandfeaturesintheSouthChinaSeahaveaquestionablelegalbasis.

NowTsaihashadherministersmakesimplestatementssupportingthe1947mappositionandhas

issuedstatementsmirroringBeijing’slanguage,allwiththegoalofgaininginternationalspace.

VI. Conclusions&Implications

Scholarshipdoesnothaveacomprehensivetheoreticalexplanationforhowstatesestablish

territorialandmaritimeclaims.Thisisasignificantoversightbecauseunderstandingthe

backgroundforclaimshelpsusbetterunderstandtheconditionsshapingvolatiledisputes.Inthe

caseofTaiwan,theDPPhadadvocatedforalimitedsovereigntyclaimoverTaipingIsland,and

relatedjurisdictionalrights,whentheyweretheminorityparty.Sincegainingpower,theyhave

beenpushedtowardthecenterofTaiwan’spoliticalspectrum,showingawillingnessto

compromisewhentheybelieveitwillservetheirbroaderinterests,especiallyinlightofthelow

saliencyoftheSouthChinaSeatotheirpoliticalbase.Theimplicationsofthisfindingaretwofold:(a)

politicalpartypoliticaldecisionsandstrategicmaneuveringcandirectlyimpactsomethingas

seeminglyintractableasterritorialandmaritimeclaims,and(b)theclaimsputforthbyother

actors,suchasChina,requiresimilarin-depthanalyses.