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— t
TheW
ashingtonStar
.,* E
dito
rials C
hissified
SE
CT
ION
D
SUN
DA
Y, A
UG
US
T 4
, 1978
jewels?'
by
In• 1975, u
nd
er the d
irectorsh
ip o
f W
illiam C
olb
y, the C
IA fo
un
d itself in
state o
f un
preced
ented
crisis. Its en
tire role h
ad u
nd
ergo
ne a d
ramatic
;lun
ge:, fro
m b
eing
a secret investi-
jative agen
cy it had
beco
me a targ
et o
f pu
blic In
vestigatio
n, w
ith no few
erl an
fou
r,go
vernm
ent bodies scrutiry:77
Wog its p
ast activities. • • -44
• -t Th
e imp
act of th
ese investig
ation
's! O
n th
e no
rmal activities o
f the C
IA'
liat"devastatin
g." A
ccord
ing
to fo
r ;p
ier executives o
f the C
IA, th
e mu
lti-: ' le
inv
estig
atio
ns
did
mu
ch
; mo
re
an
mere
ly p
ara
lyze
the C
IA te
rn-'
• r,
Con
fessor? -..,
uilt-R
idd
en?. ,
Mole? •
• p
ererily, Th
ey resulted
In co
mp
letely, d
emo
ralizing
its 'staff, disru
ptin
g Its',
relation
s with
oth
er Western
intelli-
gen
ce services on
wh
om
it dep
end
ed
for in
form
ation
, discred
iting
it with
th
e pu
blic, an
d, fo
r all practical p
ut.*
po
lies, wreckin
g it as a viab
le intern
gence service. .
The , pro
xim
ate
ca
us
e o
f the
se
, Investigations w
as 'efront-page story.. In
the N
ew Y
ork T
imes o
n D
ec. 22,- 974, b
y S
eym
ou
r Hers
h w
hic
h re
-v
ea
led
tha
t the
CIA
ha
d b
ee
n e
n-
daged for som
e 20 years'in the sort of o
mestic serves lan
ce that h
ad p
eep, ap
eelfically pro
icribed
by th
e CIA
's S
eeder.. T
he H
ersh sto
ry was based
01100,0y-held
C14 rep
ort d
on
e the
previtoof ...year b
y its
insp
ecto
r g
eneral; w
hich
was a co
mp
ilation
of
11114111LOA
'i geeitioeable acJiviliea
prio
r to 1973 an
d w
hich
was term
ed
by C
olb
y the "fam
ily jewels."
,
With
in ill h
ou
rs of p
ub
lication
of
the Times 'expose . ; C
olb
y effectively confirm
ed 7 thilt v era
city cill'. the sto
ry b
y ann
otin
elne
r; .the resig
natio
n •Ilti
ji
James ' JeN
s - An
gletq
lf;"th. : C
IA's,
Chief
Ch
ief o
f 1 ,1n
tvitite
liig7re
i, - • tio had
;?''1: •
.,z i ' ;'•'; ';':
.... I • ; . i •,, yo;:. '4.4
'.1,
11
- .A
ci46 m
ovest recent book by w
riter-'critic dw
ard Jay. Epstein
is Legepd.: The Se-cret
World
of;' L
e H
arv
ey Q
sa
■ ad
(hftGraw
11111.1,1978).-1 1 1
• R
eprinted, by perin
issibn, from
Com
. 'm
eniary sn
agazine, C
opyright _i9 JO
by g
litZtrig
illiblililiP
M (1
1i1
11
1..i
been
men
tion
ed in
Hersh
's repo
rt, all w
ell as An
gleto
n's th
ree top
; dep
uties
on the ;cpunterinteillgence staff.; and C
olby'h
and
-delivered
',It flen
ga
re"
port of hli'o
wn
tO S
e'crereitY'rd S
tate H
enry Kissinger'. Though' w
ritten In a' less sensational (O
ne than 4,0114.4 ex! p
ose, th
is,
th is, rep
ort c leg
el y,y ib
eta
nirl
ate
d.C
te1act, iIt1
I* th
.l co
un
terinteilleeke , staff iteit'w
ell 'as! o
ther elem
ents:o
f •the'cj6lu
ict been,
involved' in qUestIsinable.angY
postibly; illeg
al aCtivitlea:co
llpy 1010 K
issin-ger that he had C
leansed 11141epigt Ot
agen
ts' nam
es and
secret ePetatio
nu
so
that th
e'presid
ent co
ulO
nah
e it availab
le tO th
e 'press. co
llipilso
hp
-: p
end
ed to
; the
rep
ort .'inf
ttrmatitio
Hersh
had
no
t dIvu
lged
;',ieClu
din
g a'
list,Of alleged 'aisessinatioit ettem
ptit b
y . the. C
IA': ; C
on
fron
ted w
ith W
itt docunient, P
resid
en
t Fo
rd h
ad
little choice but;to ipi
a an Jet.).it4ingatiep
Ot th
e C
lkiih
r • L
:,;!jh
,1 ;1.A?
'
• 'NY
: .' „
'l' je
wel;
:.-.:
Ho
w h
ad th.e.;
tv in
nt,, t
he
first lea
ked
to .g
le N
el.sY
er Im
es its Te
first place/ T
his 11(44,0*. P
ositio
n p
ut
to . Colb
y; In ri 925 ' b
y,. R
ichard , 11. lielin
s, him
self a form
er directo
r of
the C
IA. A
ccording 'to Held
s's recol-
lection of th
eir con
versation
, 'Co
lby
114Rghalailtiltsaall
k
He
rsh
," A(th
e'tim
e, H
elm
s d
id n
ot
fully co
mp
rehen
d w
hat. Co
lby m
eant
by th
is adm
ission
. It seeme
d•a
lmo
st
inco
nceivab
le to h
im th
at the d
Ireq
for o
f the C
IA, w
ho
m h
e had
alwayl,
fou
nd
to b
e an in
telligen
t, discreet;
and
com
pletely resp
on
sible o
fficer, and w
ho had sworn an oath to protect
the n
ation
's secrets, cou
ld h
ave re. vealed
such
critical info
rmetio
n fo
r. P
ub
lication
:-Yet th
e next tim
e Helm
s saw
Colby, he again asked him
about th
e leak, and
Co
lby reiterated
that h
e had confirm
ed the story to Hersh and
the H
ew Y
ork T
imes.
;1 •
Th
at it was C
olb
y him
self wh
o h
ad
'eng
ineered
the leak o
leo b
ecame
clear in th
e mean
time to
mem
bers o
f th
e CIA
'e cou
nterin
telligen
ce clad
who had been forced to resign oq eci
fount or it. In his autobiography, C
olby gives a som
ewhat m
ore circumspect account
of th
e incid
ent. H
e claims th
at Hersh
telep
ho
ned
him
'excititili, saying
int w
as investig
ating
1110gal P
A actIvb
ties, an
d:req
uestin
g - on
,Ilnk
ervievi; C
olb
y explain
s that sin
ce Hersh, had
coo
perated
with
him
a few m
on
ths
earlier in suppressing the story of the C
ilum
aelpiorm
a10,141,9Esth
im
the interview he requested and could
trust h
is respo
nsib
ility. . . " ti
In th
e interview
. Co
lby asserts, h
e 'attem
pted
to "p
ut in
pro
per p
erspec.
tive" bo
th th
e CIA
's investig
ation
of
the an
ti-war m
ovem
ent in
the U
nited
S
tates and
the C
IA's su
rveillance o
f
mAma
it filtaen—citiz e ns_.
H
e a
ckn
ow
led
ges 'c
on
firmin
g to
H
ersh that the CIA
had, in the case of th
e mail in
tercepts, s
om
etim
es
vio
-la
ted
its c
harte
r (an
d th
e la
w). H
p
pro
vided
Hersh
' with
incrim
inatin
g
details ab
ou
t oth
er hig
hly classified
and illegal surveillance activities.
t' ,•••
Co
lby sayS
that h
e did
no
t realize ?the public release of this inform
atiop w
oeld
have th
e "traum
atic con
se-q
uen
ces" it did
. Th
e on
ly reason
he to
ld H
ersh ab
ou
t it, he w
rites, was to
lay to
rest rum
ors w
hich
Hersh
had
,h
eard o
f even m
ore in
crimin
ating
a divities on the part of the C
IA. ; •;-;
,Th
is explan
ation
, ho
wever, is n
ot
entirel,y .'convincing..) W
hatever th
e 'M
eal': Co
lby m
ay have h
ad • w
ith.
Hersh
' to su
pp
ress the G
lom
arrEs,
plo
rer story, it cou
ld ro
t have b
een,
gala
o. eg
t.1
j
tim new
y
ule
1113ir E
dward Jay E
pstein
deta
ils o
f a s
ecre
t and c
losely
held
',re
port --
so
se
cre
t, ind
ee
d, th
at (a
s
4.r-{C
olb
y
adm
its) h
e h
ad n
ot e
ven
brie
fed P
resid
ent N
ixon o
r Pre
sident
Ford
or H
enry
Kis
sin
ger a
bout its
existe
nce
. C
olb
y's
role
in th
e "fa
mily
jew
els
" a
ffair tu
rns o
ut to
ha
ve
invo
lve
d a
g
rea
t de
al m
ore
tha
n ta
lkin
g to
a re
-p
orte
r, or fa
iling
to ta
lk. to
the
pre
si-
dent. T
he "fa
mily
jew
els
" report w
as
no o
rdin
ary
CIA
do
cum
en
t. It wa
s
Colb
y w
ho d
rafte
d th
e d
irectiv
e
ord
erin
g a
ll CIA
pe
rso
nn
el to
rep
ort
an
y pa
st tran
sgre
ssion
s or q
ue
stion
-able
activity th
ey kn
ew
of; a
nd it w
as
Co
lby w
ho
from
sta
rt to fin
ish s
up
er-
inte
nd
ed
the
69
3-p
ag
e re
po
rt. It wa
s als
o C
olb
y w
ho b
riefe
d S
enato
rs
Stu
art S
ymin
gto
n a
nd Jo
hn S
tennis,
an
d C
on
gre
ssm
en
Ed
wa
rd H
eb
ert
an
d L
ucie
n N
ed
zi, a
bo
ut th
e re
po
rt, and w
hO cettiU
lted th
e Dep
artm e
st of
Justice
on
the
issue
of th
e le
ga
lity of
a n
um
be
r of th
e "je
we
ls. T
o h
e
su
re, a
ny o
ne
of th
ese
pa
rties m
ay
have
leake
d a
spects o
f the re
port, b
ut
the c
onfirm
atio
n, a
nd th
e d
eta
ils.
whic
h tu
rned it in
to a
front-p
age
story ca
me
from
Co
lby.
Why w
ould
a d
irecto
r of th
e C
IA
reve
al th
ese
, and o
ther, ske
leto
ns in
th
e C
IA's
clo
se
t? W
he
n I p
ose
d th
is
questio
n to
a fo
rmer c
olle
ague
of C
olb
y's in th
e CIA
, he sa
id th
at th
ere
Se
e C
OL
BY
, 1:1-4 w
ere•three eq
ually p
lausib
le theo
ries to
explain
Co
lby's b
ehavio
r. Th
eory
_one, Colby w
as a con
ge
nita
l "confes-so
r," wh
o sin
cere
ly be
lieve
d th
e C
IA
t hp
uld
no
t be a secret service an
d
here
fore
free
ly d
isc
los
ed
info
rm-
'Iron
to all co
rners. T
heo
ry two
, Co
lby
lid b
ecom
e overw
helm
ed w
ith g
uilt
du
ring
his lo
ng
and
gru
eling
tou
r of
'du
ly in V
ietnam
, and
to p
urg
e him
-'self o
f this g
uilt, h
e turn
ed ag
ainst
,the C
IA. T
he th
ird w
as the asto
nish
-M
g :th
eo
ry th
at C
olb
y m
igh
t be
a
:So
Viel "m
ole," o
r pen
etration
agen
t,, -w
ho
had
been
ord
ered to
wreck th
e ;intelligence service.
Th
e ve
ry fa
ct th
at su
ch th
eories,'
mid
' especially th
e third
, sho
uld
be
Me
n C
urs
esthe fero
city,
of -fe
elin
g In
the
Inte
llige
nce
ca
m-
munity
over C
olb
y's
goin
g p
ublic
. Y
et.n
one o
f these th
eories even
re- m
ote
ly fits
the
kn
ow
n fa
cts
ab
ou
t p
op
y's
care
er In
the C
IA. F
ar fro
m,
eing
i bo
rn "co
rifessor,' as th
e first theory suggests, it w
as because of his d
iscretion
and
dem
on
strated lo
yalty th
at he,w
as cho
sen to
be C
IA d
irec- A
cir,-,Th
e secon
d th
eory, tracin
g h
is rq
otlie
s to
his
ex
pe
rien
ce
in- V
iet-
nam
, also seem
s inad
equ
ate; Co
lby]
was p
rou
d o
f his acco
mp
lishm
entS
. O
w;
. there is no basis w
hatever fu
r the n
otio
n th
at Co
lby is a "m
ole."
If'Co
lby
we
re a
So
vie
t /ag
en
t, on
e
would have expected his career to be
7atiidded with intelligence successes
lAviticii th
e So
viets wo
uld
have p
ro-
Aided for purposes of his prom
otion). B
ut th
e fact is that u
p u
ntil V
ietnam
b
e h
ad
few
if an
y successes as an
;in
telligen
ce officer. N
or h
ad h
e de-.
eirsIppext any secret sources; instead, S
hia career w
as bu
ilt on
his co
mp
e-le
ney a
s a
n a
dm
inis
trato
r an
d a
'p
rob
lem
-so
lver. F
urth
erm
ore
, it :seem
s Inconceivable that the Soviets,
if they h
ad m
anag
ed to
brin
g o
ne o
f :,th
eir a
ge
nts
to th
e p
oin
t of b
ein
g
;Tracto
r of th
e CIA
, wo
uld
then
risk "tuthing his career by having him
leak ;S
ecrets to the press. S
inc
e th
es
e th
ree
the
orie
s a
re'
Ina
de
qu
ate
to e
xp
lain
Co
lby
's s
e-
-Slo
ps, it is n
ecessary to co
nsid
er a le
urth
po
ss
ibility
— th
at th
e le
ak
s
'were p
art of a m
aneu
ver inten
ded
to
)telidve C
olb
y of an
extremely vexin
g
bu
reaucratic p
rob
lem.
;,-,When C
olby was appointed deputy
directo
r of p
lans b
y Sch
lesing
er in
1973, and
too
k 'charg
e of th
e CIA
's clan
destin
e activities, he fo
un
d U
.S.
intellig
ence virtu
ally paralyzed
wh
en,
;it ca
me
to d
ete
rmin
ing
the
So
vie
t. U
nio
n's m
ilitary and
strategic in
ten-,
Bops, W
hile satellites and other tech.,. M
eal devices d
id p
rovid
e a con
stant
.flow of data on S
oviet economic, m
ill-. 'tarry,
and
tech
no
log
ical .ach
ievemen
ts, som
e form
of h
uin
as :in
telligen
ce — sp
ecifically. spies --1!
' was still n
eeded
in o
rder to
acqu
ire] ,ko
oveled
ge o
f ho
w th
e So
viets -te
nd
ed
to u
se
the
se
resou
rces. Fo
r:
bead
y e/ decad
ettio
wevsr, th
e CIA
;lied b
een u
nable
to re
cruit a
ny a
gent
-wills
access to
the s
ecre
ts o
f the
:krem
lin w
ho
wa
s con
side
red
relia
ble
: th
e C
IA's
counte
rinte
lligence
eva
luato
rs. T
he re
cru
itment o
f agents
insid
e
the
. So
vie
t Un
ion
ha
d a
lwa
ys
pre
sen
ted
a p
rob
lem
for U
.S. in
telli-
gence. S
ince th
e S
ovie
t Unio
n is
a
clo
sed a
nd rig
idly
com
partm
enta
l-iz
ed
society, w
ith alm
ost n
o m
ove-
ment am
ong the various sectors, the C
IA h
ad d
ecided
that it m
ade little
liaise to attem
pt to
recruit its o
wn
ag
epis am
on
g S
oviet citizen
s and
th
en m
aneu
ver them
into
po
sition
s w
here th
ey wo
uld
have access to
etate'secrets. E
ven if it succeeded in m
aking
such
recruitm
ents, an
d even
ltelie, agents escaped the detection of
1
om
nip
resen
t secu
rity fo
rces,
-there w
as no
way o
f insu
ring
that
they would ever achieve a position of
value- •
• A'-; T
he
refo
re, th
e C
IA a
ime
d a
t re-
.cruiting persons who already had ac-
Leess to Soviet s
tate
secre
ts; fo
r all
:practical p
urp
ose
s, this m
eant high-
rankin
g S
oviet in
telligen
ce officers
„dispatched to the West. O
ne program
In.th
e la
te 1
95
0s
, for e
xa
mp
le, in
-.V
olved
simp
ly teleph
on
ing
So
viet in
tellig
en
ce o
fficers
atta
ch
ed
to
emb
assies in th
e West an
d askin
g if
they h
ad an
y interest in
selling
se-crets_ T
he id
ea app
arently w
as that
even if 99 o
ut o
f 100 hu
ng
up
, a few
Contacts w
ould be made.
CIA
officers of course realized that the prospects for recruiting w
ere not g
oo
d. S
oviet o
fficers are carefully
'screened
befo
re they era allo
wed
to
attain p
ositio
ns o
f status in
the elite
Intellig
ence o
rgan
ization
s, and
be-
fore being posted to the West. M
ore-' o
ver, their fam
ilies are held
ho
stage
In th
e So
viet Un
ion
, and
any m
on
ey th
e CIA
mig
ht o
ffer for co
mm
itting
espionage w
ould be of no use to them'
ht 'h
om
e. N
evertheless, the C
IA d
id
have a
nu
mb
er o
f early
recru
iting
su
ccesses — m
ost n
otab
ly Co
lon
el P
eter Po
po
v in th
e early
1950s and C
olonel Oleg P
enkovsky in 1961. Y
et th
e re
cru
itmen
t pro
cess In
-, vO
lved conhiderable risks. Since the
- Ru
ssians kn
ow
that th
e CIA
is de
-' pendent o
n S
ovie
t inte
lligence
agents
igt .01 97flalM
tf!9/ Pan
hive ag
ents
conta
ct the C
IA a
nd fe
ed it ca
refu
lly p
rep
are
d sto
ries d
esig
ne
d to
pro
voke
.,a
nd m
isle
ad W
este
rn In
tellig
ence.
Su
ch
"dis
info
rma
tion
" op
era
tion
s, if
clea
rly orch
estra
ted
, can
wo
rk disa
s- • tro
usly w
ell to
dece
ive a
n e
ne
my
=-
lion
: •
,• •
The re
sponsib
ility for w
eedin
g o
ut
?.'d
isin
form
atio
n" a
nd
frau
du
len
t e
mits
wa
s v
es
ted
in a
sm
all C
IA
cou
nterin
telligen
ce staff head
ed b
y ',Taw
s Jesus Angleton. It w
as the job
of th
e co
unte
rinte
lligence
staff to
sus-, p
ea
•eve
ry a
ge
nt re
cru
ited
by o
the
r; cliyisio
ns o
f the
CIA
as b
ein
g possibly
a "p
lan
t" or d
ou
ble
-ag
en
t, an
d to
; th
elkng
e data fro
m su
ch so
urces as
passib
le "d
isin
form
atio
n." O
gle
- - .ten
's con
stant su
spicio
ns n
atMally
tend
ed to
frustrate th
ose case o
ffi-cers w
ho believed they had recruited ifa
hla
ble
agents
and th
ose re
ports
office
rs whose
job it w
as to
produce a ,coherent picture of S
oviet activities_ The suspicions of A
ngleton and his c
ou
nte
rinte
llige
nc
e s
taff w
ere
g
reatly heig
hten
ed in
1961 wh
en -a
KG
B o
fficer, An
atoly M
. Go
litsin, d
e-tected to the C
IA and told A
ngleton in. his d
eb
riefin
gs th
at th
e K
GB
was in
th
e p
roc
es
s o
f mo
un
ting
ix m
ajo
r: deception o
pe
ratio
n w
hic
h w
ou
ld in
-. volve "disinform
ation" agents posing eith
er as d
isside
nt S
ovie
t inte
llige
nce
offic
ers
or a
s o
utrig
ht d
efe
cto
rs.'
Go
litsin
furth
er s
ug
ge
ste
d th
at th
e
So
viets h
od
pe
ne
trate
d b
oth
the
CIA
a
nd
the
FB
I — ju
st as th
ey h
ad
pe
ne
-tra
ted B
ritish in
tellig
ence w
ith K
im
Ph
ilby a
nd
We
st Ge
rma
n in
tellig
en
ce
with
He
inz F
elfe
— a
nd
tha
t the
S
ovie
t "mo
le" in
the C
IA h
ad b
een
activated in 1959.
• W
hether or not a penetration of the C
IA b
y th
e S
ov
iets
ha
d o
cc
urre
d,
An
gleto
n b
ecame fu
lly con
vinced
th
at the S
oviets w
ere invo
lved in
a "d
isinfo
rmatio
n" g
ame w
hen
a nu
m-
ber o
f oth
er So
viet intellig
ence o
ffi-cers b
egan
volu
nteerin
g h
igh
ly sus-
pect in
form
ation
to th
e CIA
and
FB
I. These included Y
uri Nosenko, w
hose 'to
ry partly co
llapsed
wh
en S
oviet
ca
ble
traffic
wa
s in
terc
ep
ted
: "F
edo
ra," as be w
as cod
e-nam
ed b
y
,114,!
CortIFE,q6
reau
cra
tic Im
passe to
the re
cru
it-m
en
t of n
ew
ag
en
ts w
as re
so
lved
. U
nd
er C
olb
y's
new
po
licy, th
e C
IA
co
uld
take h
igh
er ris
ks in
accep
ting
vo
lun
teers
am
on
g C
om
mu
nis
t offi-
cia
ls a
nd
dis
tribu
te th
e in
form
atio
n
from
them
as w
ell a
s th
e d
ata
that
had
lon
g b
een b
ottled
up
on
the su
spi-
cio
n th
at it w
as fro
m "d
isin
form
a-
tion
" a
gen
ts. B
ut w
hile
this
led
ra
pid
ly to
the p
rod
uctio
n o
f new
in
form
ation
, it did
no
t solve th
e cou
n-
terin
tellig
en
ce p
rob
lem
. Ind
eed
, it led
to n
ew crises.
• E
arly
in 1
975 o
ne o
f An
gle
ton
's
cou
nterin
telligen
ce dep
uties w
ho
had
sta
yed
on
for s
evera
l mo
nth
s to
as-
sist with
the tran
sition
was in
form
ed
that th
e a
gen
cy h
ad
just m
ad
e
a
majo
r recru
itmen
t in M
osco
w.
Co
lby's p
olicy o
f acceptin
g all vo
lun
-teers h
ad o
bvio
usly b
een p
ut in
to ef-
fect. T
he ag
ent w
ho
m th
e CIA
recruited
w
as San
ya L. L
ipaysky, a 42-year-o
ld
neu
rosu
rgeo
n o
f- Jewish
descen
t wh
o
was e
mp
loyed
by th
e D
rivers
' Li-
cen
se B
ure
au
in M
osco
w a
s a
m
edical exam
iner. L
lpaysky claim
ed
that h
e h
ad
pre
vio
usly
been
a s
ur-
geo
n in
Mu
rman
sk a
nd
in th
at g
rou
p,
cap
acity
had
treate
d S
ovie
t pers
on
—:, S
om
e tw
o y
ears
late
r it turn
ed
ou
t n
el a
ttach
ed
to th
e n
ucle
ar s
ub
ma- th
at th
e m
an
the C
IA s
up
po
sed
it had
rin
e b
ases in
the a
rea. W
hen
this
recru
ited
was a
ctu
ally
in th
e s
erv
ice
info
rmatio
n w
as c
on
veyed
back fro
m o
f the K
GB
, Ap
pare
ntly
he a
p-
Mo
sc
ow
to C
IA h
ea
dq
ua
rters
atp
roa
ch
ed
the
CIA
on
ly a
fter th
e K
GB
, L
an
gle
y, th
e c
ase o
fficeE
hlo
sco
/ 4 .kik
l. fa
ther
• •
from
pris
on
in e
xc
ha
ng
e fo
r wh
ich
L
ipaysky ag
reed to
act as a pro
voca-
teu
r. In M
arc
h 1
977 L
lpaysky p
ub
-lis
hed
an
acco
un
t of h
is C
IA a
ctiv
i-tie
s in
the
go
ve
rnm
en
t ne
ws
pa
pe
r izvestia,
iden
tified
the "d
ead
dro
p"
the C
IA h
ad
assig
ned
him
an
d w
en
t o
n to
den
ou
nce S
hch
ara
nsky a
nd
o
ther J
ew
ish
activ
ists
as tra
itors
, cla
imin
g th
at th
ey h
ad
co
op
era
ted
w
ith h
im in
co
llectin
g in
form
atio
n
abo
ut h
ow
techn
ical equ
ipm
ent su
p-
plied
by firm
s in th
e West w
as bein
g
used
for c
ou
nte
resp
ion
ag
e a
gain
st
dissid
ents. T
he S
oviets th
en m
oved
to
arre
st S
hch
ara
nsky a
nd
oth
er d
issi
de
nts
on
the
ch
arg
e o
f co
op
era
ting
w
ith th
e CIA
.
It qu
ickly
becam
e a
pp
are
nt in
W
ash
ing
ton
that th
e K
GB
had
p
lanted
Lip
aysky on
the C
IA in
ord
er to
co
mp
rom
ise th
e h
um
an
-righ
ts
mo
vem
en
t in R
ussia
. Th
is w
as a
lso
em
barra
ssin
g to
Pre
sid
en
t Carte
r. w
ho
, even th
ou
gh
he h
ad b
een b
riefed
on
Lip
aysky's
CIA
co
nn
ectio
n, h
ad
p
ub
licly stated th
at Sh
charan
sky was
in n
o w
ay invo
lved w
ith th
e CIA
. Th
e d
eg
ree to
wh
ich
Lip
aysky (a
nd
the
KG
B) m
igh
t have fra
med
Sh
ch
a-
ran
sky a
nd
en
trap
ped
oth
er d
issi-
den
ts by m
anip
ulatin
g th
em in
to as-
sis
ting
him
was n
ot k
no
wn
; bu
t the
. S
ovie
ts c
learly
held
the tru
mp
— a
"C
IA" a
gen
t willin
g to
imp
licate
o
ther S
oviet d
issiden
ts — an
d P
resi-d
en
t Ca
rter to
pre
clu
de
furth
er
emb
arrassmen
t as well as tp
lessen
the d
am
ag
e to
the
vic
tims
of th
e
un
fortu
nate C
IA recru
itmen
t entered
in
to secret n
ego
tiation
s with
the S
ovi-
ets
to m
ak
e th
e b
es
t de
al h
e C
ou
ld
un
der th
e circum
stances.
ti W
hate
ver m
ay b
e th
e o
utc
om
e o
f th
e secret deal, th
e action
of th
e CIA
. in
recru
iting
Lip
aysky in
the firs
t 'p
lace s
eem
s in
exp
licab
le. L
lpaysky
had
no
access to secret in
form
atiop
; h
e had
no
persu
asive mo
tive to risk
his
life fo
r the C
IA; a
nd
he w
as in
-vo
lved in
a mo
vemen
t wh
ose in
teg-
rity a
nd
cre
dib
ility w
ere
extra
or-
din
arily
imp
orta
nt to
the U
nite
d
Sta
tes
. At b
es
t he
mig
ht h
av
e b
ee
n
able to
iden
tify oth
er po
ssible targ
ets for recru
itmen
t by th
e CIA
. T
he p
oin
t of th
e exercise may h
ave b
een o
nly b
ureau
cratic: to p
rove th
at w
itho
ut in
terfe
ren
ce fro
m A
ng
leto
n
and
his co
un
terintellig
ence staff, th
e! C
IA w
as capab
le of recru
iting
agen
ts even
insid
e R
ussia
. Yet n
o m
atte
r w
hat th
e ra
tion
ale
may h
ave b
een
, th
e L
ipaysky a
ffair d
em
on
stra
tes
that th
e d
ifficu
lties in
here
nt in
A
merican
cou
nterin
telligen
ce. efforts
have n
ot b
een
so
lved
. On
the c
on
-tra
ry, it
seems
cle
ar th
at C
olb
y's
n
ew b
ureau
cratic meth
od
s no
t on
ly h
ave so far p
roved
useless b
ut h
ave g
iven
rise to
pro
ble
ms o
f an
'even
m
ore
delic
ate
an
d p
ossib
ly d
an
ger-
ous kind.
(pre
su
mab
ly w
ork
ing
un
der d
iplo
-m
atic
co
ver) w
as a
uth
orize
d to
re-
cru
it Lip
ay
sk
y. T
he
CIA
the
n s
up
-p
lied
Lip
aysky w
ith th
e e
sp
ion
ag
e
app
aratus n
ecessary for h
im to
pass
alo
ng
info
rmatio
n h
e m
igh
t acq
uire
, an
d h
e was assig
ned
a "dead
dro
p"
— re
po
rted
ly a
ho
llow
ed
-ou
t cab
le
from
wh
ich h
is messag
es cou
ld later
be
retrie
ve
d b
y a
no
the
r co
urie
r for
the C
IA.
Co
lby's
new
man
In M
osco
w w
as
also h
eavily invo
lved w
ith a g
rou
p o
f Jew
ish d
issiden
ts wh
o w
ere leadin
g
the h
um
an-rig
hts m
ovem
ent in
Ru
s-sia
. In fa
ct, h
e s
hare
d a
roo
m w
ith
An
atoly S
hch
aransky, a yo
un
g en
gi-
neer w
ho
was th
e spo
kesman
for th
e m
ovem
en
t; an
d h
e h
ad
ing
ratia
ted
h
imself w
ith a
nu
mb
er o
f oth
er J
ew
-is
h a
ctiv
ists
, inclu
din
g V
lad
imir
Slep
ak (wh
o h
ad received
a telegram
o
f su
pp
ort fro
m J
imm
y C
arte
r du
r-in
g th
e 1976 presid
ential cam
paig
n),
Vita
ly R
ub
in a
nd
Ale
ksan
dr L
ern
er.
Du
ring
the p
erio
d o
f his
serv
ice to
th
e'CIA
, Llp
aysky con
tinu
ed to
main
- • taro
and
to in
tensify h
is con
tacts with
Jew
ish d
issiden
ts wh
o, o
f cou
rse, had
n
ot th
e s
ligh
test id
ea th
at L
ipaysky
was a
nyth
ing
bu
t a m
em
ber o
f their
the F
BI. w
ho su
pp
orted N
osenk
o on
elemen
ts of his story w
hich
Nosen
ko
adm
itted w
ere fabrication
s; and
Yu
ri L
og
ino
v, w
ho
, after co
nfirm
ing
N
osen
ko's sto
ry, red
efected fro
m
Sou
th A
frica to Ru
ssia. A
ngleton
and
his staff th
ereup
on
stiffened
their resistan
ce to inform
a-tion
from S
oviet intelligen
ce officers —
an
d to
the d
istribu
tion
of su
ch
info
rmatio
n a
mon
g o
ther W
estern
intelligen
ce services. Qu
ite abru
ptly,
the recru
itmen
t of agents grou
nd
to a h
alt. T
ensio
n a
lso d
evelo
ped
betw
een
the C
IA an
d th
e FB
I over this issu
e. T
he C
IA's cou
nterin
telligence staff,
wh
ich served
as liaison w
ith th
e FB
I, h
ad
con
clud
ed th
at a
mo
ng
So
viet
"d
isinform
ation"
agents w
ere three
officers work
ing u
nd
er UN
cover in
New
York
and
passin
g Inform
ation to
the F
BI. S
ince J. E
dgar H
oover had
b
uilt a
larg
e pa
rt of th
e FB
I's spy-
catch
ing p
rogra
m o
n w
hat th
ese S
oviet agents h
ad p
rovided
, he ch
ose n
ot to believe the cou
nterin
telligence
staff. By 1970 th
e resultin
g friction
betw
een th
e two agen
cies led H
oover virtu
ally
to b
reak
off F
BI co
nta
ct w
ith the CIA
. T
he in
telligen
ce com
mu
nity
wa
s th
us "
a hou
se divid
ed again
st itself,"
as Helm
s later pu
t it. At th
e root of th
e prob
lem w
as the q
uestion
of how
serio
usly
to a
ssess the S
oviet ca
-p
acity
for d
eceptio
n. A
ng
leton
be-
lieved th
at the S
oviets not on
ly had
su
ch a
cap
acity
bu
t used
it con
sist-en
tly to mislead
the C
IA. M
oreover, h
is co
un
terintellig
ence sta
ff at-
tribu
ted th
e CIA
's failure to recru
it w
orthw
hile S
oviet agents to th
e pres-
ence o
f a "
mole"
or to
som
e oth
er form
of pen
etration. T
hose op
posin
g th
is view argu
ed th
at An
gleton an
d
his sta
ff .ha
d o
verestim
ated
the
Soviet u
se of decep
tion, an
d th
e fail-u
re to recruit agen
ts stemm
ed from
h
is staff's u
nm
erited su
spicio
ns o
f every p
otential recru
it.
• C
olby h
ad lon
g sided
with
the tat-
ter poin
t of view. H
e resolved, even
b
efore h
e beca
me d
irector, th
at h
e "
wou
ld try to shift ou
r major effort to
con
tacts b
etween
ou
r officers a
nd
C
om
mu
nist o
fficials a
nd
tak
e the
chan
ce of mak
ing a few
mistak
es in
return
for recru
iting a
lot m
ore
1404 tItanilin
facton's) u
ltracareful
app
roach allow
ed."
In early 1973, he
note
s in h
is au
tob
iograp
hy, h
e
"recom
men
ded
to Sch
lesinger th
at A
ngleton
ough
t to be let go, reiterat-
ing m
y long-h
eld feelin
g that h
is ul-
traconsp
iratorial turn
of min
d h
ad, at
least in recen
t years, becom
e more of
a lia
bility
than
an
',asset to
the
agency."
'tot,
S
chlesin
ger refu
sed to
accep
t C
olby's ad
vice. Th
ree mon
ths later,
in th
e Watergate crisis, C
olby took
o
ver fro
m S
chlesin
ger a
s directo
r, a
nd
ag
ain
ma
neu
vered
to fo
rce A
ngleton
out b
y cuttin
g off his liaison
w
ith th
e F
pj.. B
ut, eC
olby riotes,
An
gleto
n '"
du
g in
hie •h
eels, f an
d
Colb
y then
y
ielded
, "b
ecau
se'
feared th
at An
gleton's p
rofessional
integ
rity a
nd
perso
nal in
tensity
m
igh
t have led
him
to ta
ke d
ire m
ea
sures if I fo
rced
the issu
e."
(P
resum
ab
ly, th
at 'is, A
ngleto
n
migh
t, if it came to a pow
er struggle', a
ttemp
t to g
o o
ver C
olb
y's h
ead
to
the p
residen
t.) Firin
g An
gleton w
as ob
viously goin
g to requ
ire mere th
an
a mere req
uest or even
a codk
On
ta-tion.
It was at th
is poin
t that C
oley real-ized
that S
eymou
r Hersh
willein
ter-ested
in d
oing an
expose of th
e CIA
. In
his autob
iograph
y, Colb
y gives the
followin
g chron
ology. .
• D
ecember 17, 1974: C
olby d
ecides
"to face u
p to m
y respon
sibility to re-
move Jim
An
gleton"
before th
e end
of th
e year; An
gleton again
"resists"
, C
olb
y's su
gg
estion
tha
t he retire
from cou
nterin
telligence.
• D
ecemb
er 18
: Co
lby
spea
ks tc
Ilereh o
n th
e teleph
on
e — a
call
Colb
y clams Ilersh
initiated
. •
Decem
ber 2
0: C
olb
y m
eets with
H
ersh, tells h
im a
bo
ut A
ng
leton
's role in
the m
ail-cover program m
od •, "
confirm
s" h
is expose.
• • teeeeeis. •
Decem
ber 21 (th
is particu
lar entry
does n
ot app
ear in th
e Colb
y book
):' C
olb
y tells A
ngelto
n a
bou
t the
comin
g liersh exp
ose tend
Insists o
a
his resign
ation.
•
Decem
ber 2
2: T
he liersh
exp
ose.
app
ears. •,
j
• D
ecember
23
: Co
lby
an
no
un
ces A
ngleton
'e resignation
.
ea Decem
ber 24: C
olby su
bm
its his
length
y report to the p
residen
t.
Colb
y succeed
ed in
his ob
jective of rem
ovin
g A
ngleto
n. lie a
lso fo
rced
the resign
ation of th
e three top
dep
u.
ties on th
e coun
terintelligen
ce staff a
nd
tran
sferred a
nu
mb
er of o
ther
officers o
n th
e staff,' w
hich
nev
er n
um
bered
mo
re tha
n 2
5, to
oth
er p
arts of the C
IA. T
he n
ew ap
poin
tees cam
e main
ly from th
e Far E
ast Divi-
sion
or V
ietna
m. F
or a
ll pra
ctical
pu
rposes, C
olby h
ad ob
literated th
e cou
nterin
telligence op
eration w
hich
A
ng
leton
ha
d d
evelo
ped
ov
er a 2
0-
yea
r perio
d. F
iles were sh
ifted to
o
ther d
epa
rtmen
ts an
d, in
som
e ca
ses, destro
yed
. In a
ma
tter of
week
s the in
stitution
al mem
ory was
erased.
With
the term
ination of Angleton
and
the key one oa his staff. 0(
I'
•
tti I eh
i
tr
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